Academy of Economic Studies- Faculty of International Economic Relations

World Trade Organizations: Doha Round of Multilateral Negotiations. WTO criticism

Supervising professor : Students:Cuzdrioreanu Costin-Alexandru, Group 957 Neacsu Adriana-Laura, Group 957 Bitoiu Ioana, Group 953 Year : III Series:D

-Bucharest 2011-

Introduction The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the principal international organization governing world trade. It has 151 member countries, representing over 95% of world trade. It was established in 1995 as a successor institution to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The GATT was a post-World War II institution intended to promote nondiscrimination in trade among countries, with the view that open trade was crucial for economic stability and peace. Decisions within the WTO are made by member countries, not WTO staff1, and they are made by consensus, not formal vote2. High-level policy decisions are made by the Ministerial Conference, which is the body of political representatives (trade ministers) from each member country. The Ministerial Conference must meet at least every two years. Operational decisions are made by the General Council, which consists of a representative from each member country. The General Council meets monthly, and the chair rotates annually among national representatives. The United States was an original signatory to the GATT and a leading proponent of the GATT's trade-liberalizing principles. It continues to be among the countries urging further discussions on opening markets to trade. Although decisions in the WTO are made by consensus, the United States has a highly influential role shaping decisions in the institution befitting its status as the largest trading nation in the world. Periodically, member countries agree to hold negotiations to revise existing rules or establish new ones. These periodic negotiations are commonly called "rounds." The broader the negotiations, the greater the possible trade-offs3, and thus theoretically the greater the potential economic benefits to countries. The multilateral negotiations are especially important to developing countries, which might otherwise be left out of more selective agreements. It must be remembered, however, that trade liberalization also results in job losses and other economic dislocations as well. What Began at Doha? On November 9-14, 2001, trade ministers from member countries met in Doha, Qatar for the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference. At that meeting, they agreed to undertake a new round of multilateral trade negotiations. Before the Doha Ministerial, negotiations had already been underway on trade in agriculture and trade in services. These on-going negotiations had been required under the last round of multilateral trade negotiations (the Uruguay Round, 1986 1994). However, some countries, including the United States, wanted to expand the agriculture and services talks to allow tradeoffs and thus achieve greater trade liberalization. There were additional reasons for the negotiations. Just months before the Doha Ministerial, the United States had been attacked by terrorists on September 11, 2001. Some government officials called for greater political cohesion and saw the trade negotiations as a means toward that end. Some officials thought that a new round of multilateral trade negotiations could help a world economy weakened by recession and terrorism-related

The WTO staff is based in Geneva and numbers about 625 with a budget of approximately $152 million in 2007. 2 A formal vote is a correctly completed ballot paper that has been submitted. It is the formal votes that are counted to determine the result. 3 An exchange of one thing in return for another, especially relinquishment of one benefit or advantage for another regarded as more desirable

uncertainty. According to the WTO, the year 2001 showed the lowest growth in output in more than two decades, and world trade actually contracted that year. In addition, countries increasingly have been seeking bilateral or regional trade agreements.In present times, 380 regional trade agreements have been notified to the GATT/WTO, 202 of which are currently in force. There is disagreement on whether these more limited trade agreements help or hurt the multilateral system. Some experts say that regional agreements are easier to negotiate, allow a greater degree of liberalization, and thus are effective in opening markets. Others, however, argue that the regional agreements violate the general nondiscrimination principle4 of the WTO (which allows some exceptions), deny benefits to many poor countries that are often not party to the arrangements, and distract resources away from the WTO negotiations. With the backdrop of a sagging world economy, terrorist action, and a growing number of regional trade arrangements, trade ministers met in Doha. At that meeting, they adopted three documents that provided guidance for future actions. The Ministerial Declaration includes a preamble and a work program for the new round and for other future action. This Declaration folded the on-going negotiations in agriculture and services into a broader agenda. That agenda includes industrial tariffs, topics of interest to developing countries, changes to WTO rules, and other provisions. The Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health presents a political interpretation of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). A document on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns includes numerous decisions of interest to developing countries.5 Especially worth noting is how the role of developing countries changed at the Doha Ministerial. Since the beginning of the GATT, the major decision-makers were almost exclusively developed countries. At the preceding Ministerial Conference (Seattle, 1999), developing countries became more forceful in demanding that their interests be addressed. Some developing countries insisted that they would not support another round of multilateral negotiations unless they realized some concessions up-front and the agenda included their interests. Because of the greater influence of developing countries in setting the plan of action at Doha, the new round became known as the Doha Development Agenda. At the Doha meeting, trade ministers agreed that the 5th Ministerial, to be held in 2003, would "take stock of progress, provide any necessary political guidance, and take decisions as necessary," and that negotiations would be concluded not later than January 1, 2005. With the exception of actions on the Dispute Settlement Understanding, trade ministers agreed that the outcome of the negotiations would be a single undertaking, which means that nothing is finally agreed until everything is agreed. Thus, countries agreed they would reach a single, comprehensive agreement containing a balance of concessions at the end of the negotiations.

Progress of the Negotiations: The Search for Modalities Negotiations have proceeded at a slow pace and have been characterized by lack of progress on significant issues, and persistent disagreement on nearly every aspect of the agenda.
4

Non-discrimination principle -a country should not discriminate between its trading partners (giving them equally most-favoured-nation or MFN status); and it should not discriminate between its own and foreign products, services or nationals (giving them national treatment).
5

The Ministerial Declaration , the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health , and the Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns are available through the WTO home page at [http: //www.wto.org/].

A few issues have been resolved, notably in agriculture. However, the first order of business for the round, the negotiation of modalities, or the methods and formulas by which negotiations are conducted, still remain elusive four years after the beginning of the round. The Cancun Ministerial. An important milepost in the Doha Development Agenda round was the 5th Ministerial Conference, which was held in Cancn, Mexico on September 10-14, 2003. The Cancn Ministerial ended without agreement on a framework to guide future negotiations, and this failure to advance the round resulted in a serious loss of momentum and brought into question whether the January 1, 2005 deadline would be met. The Cancun Ministerial collapsed for several reasons. First, differences over the Singapore issues seemed irresolvable. The EU had retreated on some of its demands, but several developing countries refused any consideration of these issues at all. Second, it was questioned whether some countries had come to Cancun with a serious intention to negotiate. In the view of some observers, a few countries showed no flexibility in their positions and only repeated their demands rather than talk about trade-offs. Third, the wide difference between developing and developed countries across virtually all topics was a major obstacle. The U.S.-EU agricultural proposal and that of the Group of 216, for example, show strikingly different approaches to special and differential treatment. Fourth, there was some criticism of procedure. Some claimed the agenda was too complicated. Also, Cancun Ministerial chairman, Mexico's Foreign Minister Luis Ernesto Derbez, was faulted for ending the meeting when he did, instead of trying to move the talks into areas where some progress could have been made. At the end of their meeting in Cancun, trade ministers issued a declaration instructing their officials to continue working on outstanding issues. They asked the General Council chair, working with the Director-General, to convene a meeting of the General Council at senior official level no later than December 15, 2003, "...to take the action necessary at that stage to enable us to move towards a successful and timely conclusion of the negotiations." The Cancun Ministerial did result in the creation of the so-called Derbez text. Ministerial chairman Derbez invited trade ministers to act as facilitators in Cancun and help with negotiations in five groups: agriculture, non-agricultural market access, development issues, Singapore issues, and other issues. The WTO Director-General served as a facilitator for a sixth group on cotton. The facilitators consulted with trade ministers and produced draft texts from their group consultations. The Ministerial chairman compiled the texts into a draft Ministerial Declaration and circulated the revised draft among participants for comment. The Derbez text was widely criticized at Cancun and it was not adopted, but in the months following that meeting, members looked increasingly at this text as a possible negotiating framework. On agriculture, the Derbez text drew largely on both the U.S.-EU and Group of 21 proposals. It included a larger cut from domestic support programs than the U.S.EU proposal made, contained the blended tariff approach7 of the U.S.-EU proposal but offered better terms for developing countries, and provided for the elimination of export subsidies for products of particular interest to developing countries. On the Singapore issues, it included a decision to start new negotiations on government procurement and trade facilitation, but not investment or competition. The WTO Framework Agreement. The aftermath of Cancun was one of standstill and stocktaking. Negotiations were suspended for the remainder of 2003.
6

The G21 (Group of 20, also variously G20, G22 and G20+) is a bloc of developing nations established on 20 August 2003. Distinct and separate from the G-20 major economies. The G-20 accounts for 60% of the world's population, 70% of its farmers and 26% of worlds agricultural exports 7 Through this approach products are categorized by sensitivity .The approach blends three formulas. An Uruguay Round approach applies to one category, a Swiss formula to another, and a third is duty-free.

However, in early 2004, then-U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Zoellick offered proposals on how to move the round forward. The USTR called for a focus on market access, including an elimination of agricultural export subsidies. He also said that the Singapore issues could progress by negotiating on trade facilitation, considering further action on government procurement, and possibly dropping investment and competition. This intervention was credited at the time with reviving interest in the negotiations, and negotiations resumed in March 2004. On July 31, 2004, WTO members approved a Framework Agreement that includes major developments in the most contentious and crucial issue - agriculture. Because of the importance of agriculture to the Round, the Framework, which provides guidelines but not specific concessions, was regarded as a major achievement. With a broad agreement on agriculture and on other issues, negotiators were given a clearer direction for future discussions. However, the talks settled back into a driftless stalemate. The Hong Kong Ministerial. The stalemate in 2005 increased the perceived importance of the 6th Ministerial in Hong Kong as potentially the last opportunity to settle key negotiating issues that could produce an agreement by 2007, the actual deadline resulting from the expiration of U.S. trade promotion authority. Although a sudden burst of negotiations took place in the fall of 2005, WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy announced in November 2005 that a comprehensive agreement on modalities would not be forthcoming in Hong Kong, and that the talks would be included in the negotiations and would try to reach agreements in negotiating sectors where convergence was reported. The final Ministerial Declaration of December 18, 2005, reflected areas of agreement in agriculture, industrial tariffs, and duty-free and tarifffree access for least developed countries. Generally, these convergences reflect a step beyond the July Framework Agreement, but fall short of full negotiating modalities8. Deadlines were established at Hong Kong for concluding negotiations by the end of 2006. These deadlines included an April 30, 2005 date to establish modalities for the agriculture and NAMA negotiations. Further deadlines set for July 31, 2006, include the submission of tariff schedules for agriculture and NAMA9, the submission of revised services offers, the submission of a consolidated texts on rules and trade facilitation, and for recommendations to implement the "aid for trade"language in the Hong Kong declaration. On April 21, 2006, WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy announced there was no consensus for agreement on modalities by the April 30 deadline. Trade negotiators likewise failed to reach agreement at a high-level meeting in Geneva on June 30-July 1, 2006. It was agreed at those meetings, however, that Director-General Pascal Lamy would undertake a more proactive role as a catalyst to conduct intensive and wideranging consultations to achieve agricultural and industrial modalities. Prior to the summit, Lamy for the first time in his tenure suggested the outline of a possible compromise. Known as the "20-20-20 proposal," the offer (1) called on the United States to accept a ceiling on domestic farm subsidies under $20 billion, (2) proposed the negotiations use the G20 proposal of 54% as the minimum average cut to developed country agricultural tariffs, and (3) set a tariff ceiling of 20 for developing country industrial tariffs. This suggestion was roundly criticized by all sides and was not adopted at the Geneva meetings. At the G-8 summit of leading industrialized nations in St. Petersburg, the leaders pledged a "concerted effort" to reach an agreement on negotiating modalities for agriculture and industrial market access with a month of the July 16 summit.
8

The modalities are targets (including numerical targets) for achieving the objectives of the negotiations, as well as issues related to rules. 9 NAMA(Non-Agricultural Market Access) refers to all products not covered by the Agreement on Agriculture. In other words, in practice, it includes manufacturing products, fuels and mining products, fish and fish products, and forestry products. They are sometimes referred to as industrial products or manufactured goods.

Suspension. Despite the ecouraging language of the G-8 Ministerial Declaration, the talks were indefinitely suspended less than a week later by Director General Lamy on July 24, 2006. The impasse was reached after a negotiating session of the G-6 group of countries (United States, EU, Japan, Australia, Brazil, and India) on July 23 failed to break a deadlock on agricultural tariffs and subsidies. The EU blamed the United States for not improving on its offer of domestic support, while the United States responded that no new offers on market access were put forward by the EU or the G-20 to make an improved offer possible. Members of Congress praised the hard-line position taken by U.S. negotiators that additional domestic subsidy concessions must be met with increased offers of market access. Following the July 2006 suspension, several WTO country groups such as the G-20 and the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters10 met to lay the groundwork to restart the negotiations. While these meeting did not yield any breakthrough, Lamy announced the talks were back in "full negotiating mode" on January 31, 2007. Key players in the talks such as the G-4 (United States, European Union, Brazil, India) conducted bilateral or group meetings to break the impasse in the first months of the year. In April 2007, G-6 negotiators (G-4 plus Australia and Japan) agreed to work towards concluding the round by the end of 2007. Subsequently, a G-4 summit in Potsdam, Germany collapsed in sharp animosity on June 21, 2007 over competing demands for higher cuts in developed country agricultural subsidies made by developing countries and developed country demands for greater cuts in industrial tariffs in developing countries. Despite this setback, the chairs of the agriculture and industrial market access (NAMA) negotiating groups put forth draft modalities texts on July 17. These texts, represent what the chair of each committee, as facilitators of the talks, believe is the basis for a balanced level of concessions based on the Doha Declaration and subsequent agreements. Despite the criticism these texts received from nearly all quarters, they have served to continue the engagement of the various parties in Geneva at a time when many have predicted the demise of the round. If negotiators are not able to achieve a breakthrough, there may be several consequences for multilateral trade liberalization. First, the negotiation of bilateral and regional free trade agreements may accelerate. In the wake of the 2006 suspension, the United States, the EU, Brazil, and India all announced plans to concentrate on additional bilateral liberalization. A second consequence may be the increased use of the WTO's dispute settlement function. If a political solution to disagreements among members cannot be agreed through negotiations, some practices like agricultural subsidies may be challenged in dispute settlement. An increased reliance on dispute settlement may, in turn, put stress on the WTO as an institution if the decisions rendered are not implemented or are not perceived as being fairly decided. A further consequence may be the loss of agreements already made at the negotiations. A third consequence of a prolonged impasse may be the withdrawal of offers already on the table. Such development-oriented proposals such as aid-for-trade, duty-free and quota-free access for least developed countries, or trade facilitation may lose strength due to the stalemate in the negotiations. Other negotiating proposals currently on the table may not be reflected in future government policy, such as in U.S. farm legislation, or the mid-course review of the EU's common agriculture policy in 2008. The 2006 negotiating impasse put negotiators beyond the reach of agreement under U.S. trade promotion authority (TPA)11, which expired on July 1, 2007. Thus, the parties are seeking to make progress in the negotiations in the hope that the 110th Congress may extend TPA.
10

The Cairns Group is a unique coalition of 19 agricultural exporting countries with a commitment to reforming agricultural trade. A diverse coalition bringing together developed and developing countries from Latin America, Africa and the Asia-Pacific region.

Possible Congressional consideration of TPA extension legislation may provide a venue for a debate on the status of the Round and the prospects for reaching an agreement consistent with principles set forth by Congress in granting TPA. Significance of the Negotiations Trade economists argue that the reduction of trade barriers allows a more efficient exchange of products among countries and encourages economic growth. Multilateral negotiations offer the greatest potential benefits by obliging countries throughout the world to reduce barriers to trade. The gains to the United States and to the world from multilateral trade agreements have been calculated in the billions of dollars. For example, a recent study by the International Trade Commission found that if the tariff cuts from the Uruguay Round were removed, the welfare loss to the United States would be about $20 billion. A study by the University of Michigan found that if all trade barriers in agriculture, services, and manufactures were reduced by 33% as a result of the Doha Development Agenda, there would be an increase in global welfare of $574.0 billion. Other studies present a more modest outcome predicting world net welfare gains ranging from $84 billion to $287 billion by the year 2015. Multilateral negotiations are especially important to developing countries that might otherwise be left out of a regional or bilateral trade agreement. Developing country blocs can improve trade and economic growth among its members, but the larger share of benefits are from the trade agreements that open the markets of the world. Multilateral trade negotiations are also an exercise in international cooperation and encourage economic interdependence, which offers political benefits as well. When a country opens its markets, however, increased imports might cause economic dislocations at the local or regional level. Communities might lose factories. Workers might lose their jobs. For those who experience such losses, multilateral trade agreements do not improve their economic well-being. Also, if a country takes an action that is not in compliance with an agreement to which it is a party, it might face some form of sanction. Further, some oppose WTO rules that restrict how a country is permitted to respond to imports of an overseas product that employs an undesirable production method, for example a process that might use limited resources or impose unfair working conditions. Thus, while multilateral trade agreements have been found to offer broad economic benefits, they are opposed for a variety of reasons as well.

The Doha Agenda

Doha Round talks are overseen by the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC), whose chair is Director-General Lamy. The negotiations are being held in five working groups and in other

11

Fast track negotiating authority (also called Trade Promotion Authority, TPA) for trade agreements is the authority of the President of the United States to negotiate agreements that the Congress can approve or disapprove but cannot amend or filibuster.

existing bodies in the WTO.12 Virtually every item of the negotiation is part of a whole and indivisible package and cannot be agreed separately. This is known as the single undertaking: Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. The nature of WTO decision-making has divided analysts for a number of years, with many attributing deadlocks within the Doha Round to the complexity associated with requiring all 153 members to unanimously agree a simultaneous solution to all of their differences. However, the single-undertaking facilitates issue-linkages that are at the heart of trade negotiations in which countries offer concessions on their defensive interests, namely sectors that would suffer from import competition, in exchange of reciprocal concessions of benefits to their offensive interests, that is, sectors seeking access to foreign markets.13The Doha Development Agenda is the most recent round of trade-negotiations within the World Trade Organization (WTO). It attempts to redefine the earlier agreements on global trade to make them fit the current political reality more closely, and to bring greater agreement among the constituents of the WTO.The Doha Development Agenda placed the needs and interests of developing countries at the heart of the current round of trade talks. It aimed to redress existing imbalances in the multilateral trading system. The Round must ensure that liberalization commitments put trade at the service of development. In practice, this means giving priority to agreements in areas which have the potential to contribute most to poverty reduction.14 The Doha agenda was ambitious, aiming not only to cut barriers in highly protected economic sectors, such as agriculture and services, but to write new rules for globalisation in areas such as investment and competition policy. Most of all, Doha was purportedly focused on helping the poor. Rich countries promised to open their markets in areas, especially farm goods and textiles, which matter most to poor countries. They promised to help poor countries with cash, technical assistance and special and differential treatment in implementing any agreement. To underline the pro-poor message, the words development and developing were included 63 times in the 10page document that launched the Doha round.15 There are 21 subjects listed in the Doha Declaration, most of them involving negotiations. Other work includes actions under implementation, analysis and monitoring. Selected topics under negotiation are discussed below in five groups: market access, development issues, WTO rules, trade facilitation, and other issues. 1)Market Access Agriculture The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) broke new ground by applying disciplines to practices that had never been subject to effective international restraints. Its importance, however, lies more in precedent and principle than in performance. It called for continued negotiations toward ...the long-term objective of substantial progressive reductions in support and protection....16 By early 2001, WTO members had achieved some preliminary work in those sectoral negotiations, and later that year, agriculture was wrapped into the broader Doha agenda.

12

For detailed information, see the organization chart from the official website of WTO [http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org2_e.htm] 13 Trade Hot Topics, issue 71, Doha Decision Making: Implications of the Consensus and Single-Undertaking Principles for Developing Countries, by Euan MacMillan, March 2010 14 Trade Liberalisation and Poverty reduction, Tim Conway, February 2004 15 The Economist, special report: The Cancun Challenge, Sep 4th 2003 16 The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, Randy Green, Washington D.C, January 2000

Agriculture is yet again causing contention in international trade negotiations. It caused long delays to the Uruguay Round in the late 1980s and 1990s and it is again proving to be a major stumbling block in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). For example, it contributed substantially to the failure of the September 2003 Trade Ministerial Meeting in Cancun to reach agreement on how to proceed with the DDA.17It is ironic that agricultural policy is so contentious, given its small and declining importance in the global economy. The sectors share of global gross domestic product (GDP) has fallen from around one-tenth in the 1960s to little more than one-thirtieth today.18 In developed countries, the sector accounts for only 1,8 percent of GDP and only a little more of full-time equivalent employment. For developing countries, agricultures importance in exports has fallen from 42 to 11 percent. So why all the fuss over agriculture? It is because policies affecting this declining sector are so politically sensitive, there are always selfinterested groups suggesting it be sidelined in trade negotiations. To do so, however, would be a major disservice to many of the worlds poorest people, namely those in farm households in developing countries. Some developing countries have been granted greater access to developed-countries markets for a selection of products under various preferential agreements. Examples are European Union provisions for former colonies in the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) program and more recently, for least developed countries under the Everything but Arms (EBA) agreement. Likewise, the United States has its Africa Growth and Opportunity Pact (AGOA) and Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).19 These schemes reduce demands from preference-receiving countries, but they exacerbate the concerns of countries excluded from such programs and thereby made worse off through worsened terms of trade. Such schemes may even be harmful, reducing, rather than improving aggregate global welfare. Just as disagreement over agricultural issues was the principal cause of the July 2006 suspension of negotiations, agriculture has been at the center of efforts to restart the negotiations. After resuming on November 16, 2006, negotiations have focused on various formulas for reducing trade-distorting subsidies and tariffs. There have also been discussions at the political level involving presidents and prime ministers as well as trade ministers. The political discussions have involved expressions of support for successfully concluding the round as well as expressions of willingness to reach satisfactory compromises on the issues dividing WTO members. 20 United States goals in the new round were elimination of agricultural export subsidies, easing of tariffs and quotas, and reductions in trade-distorting domestic support. The Doha Ministerial Declaration included language on all of these three pillars of agricultural support. It stated that the members committed to comprehensive negotiations aimed at substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade distorting support.21 The Doha Ministerial declaration
17 18

The Economist, Tequila Sunset in Cancun, Sep 17th 2003 Databases of World Bank and World Resources Institute [http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS] and [http://earthtrends.wri.org/searchable_db] 19 Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda, editors Kym Anderson and Will Martin, copublication of Palgrave Macmillan and the World Bank, 2006 20 Different facets of power in decision-making in the WTO, Manfred Elsig, September 2006, Swiss National Center of Competence in Research

also provided that special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing countries would be an integral part of all elements of the negotiations. The course of the negotiations in the lead up to Cancun was influenced by the reform of the EUs Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). A major issue for the EU was whether or not to approve separation (decoupling) of payments to farmers based on production. Those types of payments are among the most trade-distorting (amber box). On June 26, 2003, EU agriculture ministers approved a reform package that included partial decoupling for certain products.22 EUs Agriculture Commissioner explained the achievement of the decisions reached indicating: our new policy is trade-friendly. We are saying goodbye to the old subsidy system, which significantly distorts international trade and harms developing countries.23 The action was seen by many as a positive step for advancing the trade negotiations. WTO Director General, Supachai Panitchpakdi, called the EU decision a substantial achievement further suggesting: The EU has done a great deal to move the process forward. The movement means we can go further in agriculture, which should spur countries to move in other areas such as services and non-agricultural goods.24 The EU reform largely addressed one of the three pillars of agricultural reform domestic support but did little in a second pillar market access. In the WTO negotiations on market access, the United States and the Cairns Group support the harmonizing of tariff peaks, or high rates. In comparison, the EU and Japan want flexibility to cut some items less than others to arrive at an average total rate cut. Developing countries view reform in agricultural trade as one of their most important goals. They argue that their own producers cannot compete against the surplus agricultural goods that the developed countries, principally the EU and the United States, are selling on the world market at low, subsidized prices. Some African countries also are calling for an end to cotton subsidies, claiming that such subsidies are destroying markets for the smaller African producers. Indeed, an analysis by the World Bank suggests that an ambitious, though achievable, reduction of trade barriers in the Doha round could boost global income by between $290 billion and $520 billion a year. Well over half of these gains would go to poor countries. The World Bank thinks that by 2015, a successful Doha round could lift 300 million people out of poverty. 25 Agriculture is the issue which puts the most pressure on rich countries. The World Bank estimates that over two-thirds of the overall benefits from Doha's barrier-lowering would come from freer farm trade. It is easy to see why. Farm protectionism is a scandal. Over three-quarters of the world's poor live in rural areas, mostly dependent on agriculture. Yet the rich world spends over $300 billion a year supporting its farmers, more than six times the amount it spends on foreign aid. Average agricultural tariffs in rich countries are many times higher than those on manufactured goods. On individual products, barriers are often much higher. In Japan, for instance, there are ludicrous tariffs on rice, at up to 1,000%.
21

Doha Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 14 November 2001 [http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm#agriculture] 22 European Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) Reform in the WTO Context, Geneva, 10 July 2003 23 Fischers surprise for Europes farmer: now the argument over agriculture moves to the WTO, Financial Times, 27 June 2003 24 Fischers surprise for Europes farmer: now the argument over agriculture moves to the WTO 25 The World Bank, Launching Development Round could help poor countries facing global downturn

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This lavish support distorts prices and blocks market access for poor countries that are natural exporters of farm products. Cotton is a classic example.26 The world's biggest exporter of cotton is America, even though its production costs are far higher than those of African producers. America's 25,000 cotton farmers receive $4 billion of government subsidies in return for producing $3 billion-worth of cotton. These subsidies push down the world market price, hurting, among others, 11 million cotton producers in West Africa. Similar stories abound in other products. From beef to cereals, world markets are distorted by rich country's cosseting of their farmers. In the early hours of the 1st of August 2004, World Trade Organization member states agreed to a document dubbed the July Package. The package was a bid to revitalize the talks on the Doha Agenda, signed in November 2001, but since left languishing in stalemate as countries failed to meet any of the deadlines for agreement. The Framework consists in an overview of general commitments for the Doha Agenda, followed by a series of annexes on specific agreements. Annex A deals with agriculture and it is organized by pillars: domestic support, export competition and market access. The market access pillar is arguably the most complex and intricate pillar of the agriculture negotiations. The key feature of the market access provisions in the July Framework is that a banded formula, still to be specified, will be used to ensure that the highest tariffs will face the largest cuts. The cuts will come from bound rather than applied tariff levels, which will reduce the immediate impact of reform, as many agricultural tariffs, in both developed and developing countries, are bound at higher levels than countries actually apply. The text sets up three exceptions to the application of the reduction formula: sensitive products, special products and the special safeguard mechanism. All countries can designate an appropriate number of sensitive products (the number to be negotiated). Tariffs on these products will not have to be cut along the lines set by the formula, but some cut will still have to be made, and further market access will also have to be created through the use of tariff rate quotas. The heart of the Framework proposal on domestic support is to cut overall levels of support, and to cut the highest levels of support by a greater percentage than smaller levels. The framework includes some very modest proposals, including that spending should be reduced on at least some products, while all product-specific support will be capped, presumably at current levels (meaning it cannot subsequently be increased).27 Members agreed to cut domestic support programs with a three band methodology. As the largest user of domestic agricultural subsidies, the EU was placed in the highest band. The United States and Japan were placed in the second band and lesser subsidizing countries were placed in the third band. However, the actual percentage cuts that these bands represent remain subject to negotiation. Members also renewed a commitment to achieve a tariff cutting formula by April 30, 2006. This deadline was not met. The aggregate measure of support (AMS), which measures spending on agriculture that has to be reduced (programs that are classified in the Amber Box) was to be cut by a minimum of 20 percent in the first year of the implementation of the new Agreement on Agriculture.
26 27

The Economist, special report: The Cancun Challenge, Sep 4th 2003 Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, The WTO July 2004 Framework Agremment. An overview of Agriculture, November 2004

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In policy discussions, the United States is being asked by the European Union (EU) and the developing countries, led by Brazil and India, to make a more generous offer for reducing tradedistorting domestic support. The United States is insisting that the EU and the developing countries agree to make more substantial reductions in tariffs and to limit the number of import-sensitive and special products that would be exempt from cuts. Import-sensitive products are of most concern to developed countries like the European Union, while developing countries are concerned with special products those exempt from both tariff cuts and subsidy reductions because of development, food security, or livelihood considerations. Brazil has emphasized reductions in tradedistorting domestic subsidies, especially by the United States, while India has insisted on a large number of special products that would not be exposed to wider market opening. The July Framework did not set a date for the elimination of export subsidies, but it does include the unambiguous statement, The following will be eliminated by the end date to be agreed: export subsidies as scheduled. The framework expands the area of subsidies to be eliminated with the inclusion of export measures with equivalent effect. These are defined as export credits or export credit guarantees or insurance programs with repayment periods of more than 180 days (which is the baseline set by commercial credit terms), or programs with repayment periods of less than 180 days that include other subsidy elements (including low interest rates or easy repayment terms). The list of these elements is still to be negotiated. In addition, trade-distorting practices with respect to exporting STEs [state trading enterprises] are included for elimination, and the future use of monopoly powers is subject to further negotiation.28 Food aid that is not in conformity with operationally effective disciplines to be agreed will also be eliminated. This reflects a fight between the U.S. and some of its food aid recipients on the one hand, and most other countries on the other hand. The U.S. distributes a great deal of food as program food aid. This food is given to NGOs and governments to sell in the market to generate counterpart funds for spending on development projects. In other words, it is not food that meets an emergency shortfall. The food competes directly with local producers. U.S. export firms like the system (they are paid on a commercial basis for shipping the food) and U.S. NGOs like the money (which they are highly unlikely to get as cash from the U.S. Agency for International Development). Recipient governments are often glad for the food, which they would otherwise have to find the money to buy on commercial terms to meet the need. However, the practice has been shown to be detrimental for local producers, because it introduces subsidized competition into the market, and it angers other commercial exporters, who would perhaps be more competitive in those markets if U.S. surpluses were not being dumped. The European Commission, after a series of damning investigations into its use of food aid, now complies with multilateral guidelines to ensure its food aid meets developmental needs in the recipient country. The U.S. has refused to accept such multilateral disciplines to date.29 The July 17 draft modality paper submitted by the WTO Agriculture committee chairman Crawford Falconer sought to address the divergent negotiating positions of the parties. Some of the
28

World Trade Organization, WTO Analytical Index. Guide to WTO Law and Practice, Second edition, volume 1, Cambridge University 29 ABC World News, U.S Food Aid Contributing to Africas Hunger?, by Dana Hughes, Kenya, Oct2009 and Who does U.S Food Aid Benefit? [http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/3342/]

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headline figures include a reduction of U.S. trade distorting domestic support of 66% or 73% for a total of $13.0-$16.4 billion and a reduction in European domestic support of 75%-85% to $22.7 billion - $38.1 billion. Subsequent to this draft, Chairman Falconer issued working papers to clarify various aspects of the export competition (November 2007), domestic support (December 2007) and market access (January 2008) pillars. These papers are designed to resolve certain technical issues.30

Services31

Along with agriculture, services were a part of the built-in agenda of the Uruguay Round. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which was concluded in that Round, directs Members to ...enter into successive rounds of negotiations, beginning not later than five years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement [January 1, 1995]...[to achieve] a progressively higher level of liberalization.32 The Doha Ministerial Declaration recognized the work already undertaken and reaffirmed the March 2001 guidelines as the basis for continuing the negotiations. The U.S. services sector is among the worlds most advanced, efficient and open, especially in such areas as financial services and telecommunication services. Services are a significant part of the U.S. economy and the source of most U.S. employment. Such is the case also with many other economically advanced countries. For many years, many in Congress and successive administrations have been pressing to make trade liberalization in services a priority in multilateral trade negotiations and a priority in the current round. By contrast, developing countries, whose service sectors are less advanced than those of the industrialized countries, were reluctant to have services covered by international trade rules. An important element to the structure of the GATS and the negotiations to expand the coverage of the GATS has been the recognition that most services transactions are conducted inside borders and that barriers to trade in services occur inside customs barriers. Effective trade rules would have to take into account the various modes of delivery in order to discern the barriers that foreign providers of services encounter when trying to sell in a trade-partners market. The GATS divides the modes of delivery of services into four categories. The concessions that a member country makes in opening up its services market are largely mode-dependent.33 The four modes of delivery are: cross border supply (mode1), consumption abroad (mode 2), commercial presence (mode 3) and presence of natural persons (mode 4).

30 31

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agchairtxt_1aug07_e.htm CRS Report RL33085, Trade in Services: The Doha Development Agenda Negotiations and U.S Goals, William H. Cooper, April 7 2010 32 General Agreement on Trade in Services [http://www.worldtradelaw.net/uragreements/gats.pdf]
33

Max Planck Commentaries on world trade law, WTO-Trade in Services, edited by Rudiger Wolfrum, PeterTobias Stoll and Clemens Feinaugle, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008

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In mode 1, the service is supplied from one country to another. The supplier and consumer remain in their respective countries, while the service crosses the border. For example, a U.S. architectural firm based in Chicago is hired by a client in Mexico to design a building. The U.S. firm does the design in Chicago and sends the blueprints to its client in Mexico. In mode 2, the consumer physically travels to another country to obtain the service. A Mexican client travels to the United States to obtain the services of a U.S. architectural firm. In mode 3, the supplier of a service establishes a branch, agency, or wholly owned subsidiary in another country and supplies services to the local market. A U.S. architectural firm establishes a subsidiary in Mexico to sell services to local clients. In mode 4, individual supplier travels temporarily to the country of the consumer. A U.S. architect travels to Mexico to provide design services to her Mexican client. One area of controversy is so-called Mode4 services. Developing countries want easier movement of their nationals under Mode 4. They claim that the services negotiations have centered on the establishment of businesses in other countries, which has been a focus of developed countries, while there has been no negotiation on Mode IV, which would help them. Developed countries, especially the United States, have opposed discussions on Mode IV services trade. Congress might oppose easier entry for business persons, based on Senate approval of a resolution (S.Res. 211) in the 108th Congress expressing the sense of the Senate that future U.S. trade agreements and implementing legislation should not contain immigration-related provisions. Mode IV services will be a difficult issue to resolve. Fifteen countries have joined a plurilateral request for Mode 4 services liberalization to the United States and other developed countries.

Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA)34

NAMA refers to the cutting of tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTB) on industrial and primary products, basically all trade in goods which are not foodstuffs. While the agriculture negotiations
34

CRS Report RL33634, The World Trade Organization: the non-agricultural market accesss (NAMA) negotiations, Ian F. Ferguson, January 11, 2011

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have often overshadowed the NAMA talks, trade of industrial and primary products continues to make up the bulk of world trade. Average tariffs in developed countries have declined from 40% at the end of World War II to 6% today through successive rounds of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO trade negotiations. Developed countries seek the reduction of continuing high tariffs in the developing world, particularly from such countries as Brazil, India and China. Developing countries seek special and differential treatment and tie their cuts in industrial tariffs to reductions in agricultural tariffs and subsidies. While overall rich-country tariffs on manufactured goods are low, they are high in areas such as textiles and footwear, which are most important to poor countries. On average, tariffs applied by rich countries on the types of goods that poor countries produce are four or five times higher than the tariffs on goods usually imported from other rich countries. As a new study for Oxfam35, an aid agency, points out, the tax rate which America applies to imports from Bangladesh is 14% compared with a rate of 1% on imports from France. Contrary to popular belief, the biggest potential gains for poor countries are actually from tariff cuts in other poor countries. For the past decade, trade flows between poor countries have risen twice as fast as overall global trade, precisely because many poor countries have been cutting tariffs. Trade between developing countries now makes up 11% of all global trade. Nonetheless, barriers between poor countries are still far higher than those between rich and poor countries. And the maximum barriers allowed under WTO rulesthat is, the level at which countries have bound their tariffsis often higher still. In America, for instance, the average tariff on industrial goods is 4%. In Brazil, by contrast, the average tariff level permitted under trade rules is 30% while in India it is almost 40%. The average tariff levels actually applied in Brazil and India are 14% and over 30% respectively. In response to the global economic crisis, the Group of 20 (G-20) leading economies has repeatedly called for conclusion of the Doha Round as a way to bolster economic confidence and recovery. WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy has referred to 2011 as a window of opportunity to conclude the round and announced an intensive work program to achieve this goal. The subject of the current NAMA negotiation is a draft textrevised several times since its initial release in 2007 that has been subject to much disagreement. The negotiation of the tariff reduction formula was initially the main stumbling block in the negotiations. Members agreed to a Swiss-formula with a non-linear tariff reduction approach at the December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial, a formula in which higher tariffs are decreased more than lower tariffs. However, disagreements persist about the size or amounts of the tariff cuts. The talks also seek to reduce the incidence of non-tariff barriers, which include import licensing, quotas and other quantitative import restrictions, conformity assessment procedures and technical barriers to trade. The use of sectoral tariff elimination and special and differential treatment for developing countries has also proven controversial.

35

Oxfam Briefing Paper, Stitched Up. How rich countries protectionism in textiles and clothing trade prevents poverty alleviation, April 2004

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Developing countries are leery of opening up their markets to competition, often making the argument that protectionist policies were employed in the development of many successful economies, from the European and North American economies in the 19th century to the rise of the East Asian tigers in the 20th century. However, as negotiating positions have made clear, developed countries are demanding more access for their industrial products as a price for opening up their agricultural sectors, where many developing countries have a comparative advantage. Conversely, developing countries have held industrial tariff negotiations hostage to movement on agriculture. This dynamic has been one of the factors contributing to the current deadlock in the negotiations. This linkage has come be known as the exchange rate between the two negotiations.

2) Development Issues

Three development issues are most noteworthy. One pertains to compulsory licensing of medicines and patent protection, a second deals with a review of provisions giving special and differential treatment to developing countries, while the third addresses problems that developing countries were having in implementing current trade obligations.

Access to patented medicines36

A major topic at the Doha Ministerial regarded the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The issue involves the balance of interests between the pharmaceutical companies in developed countries that held patents on medicines and the public health needs in developing countries. Before the Doha meeting, the United States claimed that the current language in TRIPS was flexible enough to address health emergencies, but other countries insisted on new language. One concern of the pharmaceutical industry was that the medicines sent to the developing country might be diverted instead to another country. To address this problem, it was suggested that the medicines be marked so that they can be tracked. Another concern was that more advanced developing countries might use the generic medicines to develop their own industries. For this problem, it was proposed that countries voluntarily opt-out, or promise not to use compulsory licensing. On August 30, 2003, WTO members reached agreement on the TRIPS and medicines issue. Voting in the General Council, member governments approved a decision that offered an interim waiver under the TRIPS Agreement allowing a member country to export pharmaceutical products made under compulsory licenses to least-developed and certain other members. An accompanying statement represented several key shared understandings of Members regarding the Decision,
36

CRS Report RL33750, The WTO, Intellectual Property Rights and the Access to Medicine Controversy, by Ian F. Fergusson, updated December 12, 2006

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including the recognition that the decision should be used to protect public health and not be an instrument to pursue industrial or commercial policy objectives and the recognition that products should not be diverted from the intended markets. The statement listed a number of countries that either agreed to opt out of using the system as importers or agreed that they would only use the system in national emergencies or extreme urgency.

Special and Differential (S&D) Treatment37

At the multilateral level, the relevance of S&D and development issues in their various shapes, formats and names will increase, becoming one of the pivotal requirements for the functioning of the multilateral trading system. The fact that the meaning of S&D and the scope of the development agenda varies among developing countries is not an obstacle to the growing relevance of the topic in the shaping of trade rules. Empirical evidence lies at the roots of the S&D concept today as it did thirty years ago, when it was formulated: there is plenty of data showing the enormous gaps between developing and developed countries in terms of share of world trade5, access to financing and technology, diversification of the production, infrastructure, institutional and human resources. The S&D treatment aims at introducing more equity in the unbalanced North/South economic relations by allowing certain policy measures and international rules that partially compensate the gaps. Therefore, the raison dtre of the S&D, today as it was in the 70's, lays both on the actual differences in the levels of development as well as the responsibility of the international community to help bridging these differences. Under existing S&D provisions, WTO Members provide developing country Members with technical assistance and transitional arrangements toward implementation of the WTO Agreement. The Framework permits developing countries longer periods to implement tariff reductions. LDCs would not be required to apply formula cuts, nor participate in the sectoral cuts, but would undertake to substantially increase the level of bound tariffs. Developed-country participants and others are encouraged to grant LDCs duty-free and quota-free access to their markets by a date not specified. Newly- acceded countries would also be given flexibilities based on the market access commitments of their accessions. The Framework also acknowledges the challenge of designing tariff reductions for countries that are already beneficiaries to various preference programs such as the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act or the European Unions Everything But Arms Initiative. In devising the formula, credit is to be given for autonomous liberalization in developing countries.
37

Staff Working Paper ERSD-2004-03, WTO, Economic Research and Statistics Division, Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO: Why, When and How?

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The current WTO negotiations are now blocked on issues related to a narrowing vision of S&D, such as: what are the "mandatory" S&D obligations and how to ensure that they are effectively implemented; how to monitor the utilisation of the S&D provisions; what sort of graduation should be applied among the WTO members beneficiaries of S&D.

Implementation Issues38

Developing countries claim that they have had problems with the implementation of the agreements reached in the earlier Uruguay Round because of limited capacity or lack of technical assistance. They also claim that they have not realized certain benefits that they expected from the Round, such as increased access for their textiles and apparel in developed-country markets. They seek a clarification of language relating to their interests in existing agreements. The Doha Declaration provides that where there is a specific negotiating mandate, implementation issues will be included in the negotiations. Other implementation issues will be addressed as a matter of priority by the relevant WTO bodies. The additional Doha Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns provides some insight into what the Ministers conceive as the content of implementation. Outstanding implementation issues are found in the area of market access, investment measures, safeguards, rules of origin, and subsidies and countervailing measures.39

3) Trade Facilitation

Trade facilitation aims to improve the efficiency of international trade by harmonizing and streamlining customs procedures such as duplicative documentation requirements, customs processing delays, and nontransparent or unequally enforced importation rules and requirements. The scope of negotiations has revolved around proposals dealing with freedom of transit, fees and formalities, and administrative transparency. Discussions have also occurred concerning the technical assistance and trade capacity building needed by developing countries to implement any subsequent agreement. Developed countries, including the United States and the European Union, favor the negotiation of a concrete rules-based system with appropriate accountability, while some developing countries prefer optional guidelines with policy flexibility.

38

from http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/implem_explained_e.htm

39

Asian Development Bank, The Doha Agenda and Development: a view from the Uruguay Round, J. Michael Finger, September 2002, ERD Working Series no.21

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4) WTO Rules

WTO Members agreed at the Doha Ministerial Conference to launch negotiations in the area of WTO Rules. These negotiations relate to the following subject matter: the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 (better known as the Anti-dumping Agreement), the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and, in this context, WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies and WTO provisions applying to regional trade agreements. Many countries have attacked the use of antidumping actions by the United States and other developed nations as disguised protectionism. However, many developing countries are now using antidumping actions themselves, which may goad some countries to reexamine the necessity for discipline. Most of the proposals on trade remedies focus on providing more specificity or restrictions to the Antidumping Agreement and to the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement in terms of definitions and procedures. The leading proponents of such changes have been a group of 15 developed and developing countries known as the Friends of Antidumping (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey; though not all countries sign onto every proposal). In essence, their proposals would reduce the incidence and amount of duties. Many of their proposals would require a change in U.S. laws. Although the EU is a major user of trade remedies and not a member of the Friends group, it has agreed with some of the groups proposals. The Rules negotiations Chair, Guillermo Valles Galms, released a draft modalities paper on November 30, 2007. A key feature of this draft was language allowing the use of zeroing in certain antidumping (AD) calculations. The draft is widely seen as a concession to the United States, the only country that now employs the zeroing methodology, which has faced several adverse Appellate Body decisions over the practice.

5) Other Issues

Among other issues, the Ministerial Declaration included several provisions on trade and environment. On November 30, 2007, the United States and the European Union unveiled a twotiered tariff elimination proposal. The first tier would be the elimination on tariffs on 43 goods and services directly related to climate change mitigation such as wind-turbine parts, solar collectors, and hydrogen fuel cells. All countries would be obliged to take on this mandate, although certain phase-in periods are contemplated for developing and least-developed countries. The second phase would be the creation of a plurilateral Environmental Goods and Services Agreement (EGSA) that would liberalise 153 additional environmental-related goods and services among developed and advanced developing countries. However, this proposal has been criticized by several developing
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countries. Brazil has decried the omission of biofuels from the list, as well as biofuel production equipment. Another difficulty is geographical indications, or the protection of product names that reflect the original location of the product. An example is the use of Bordeaux wine for wines from the Bordeaux region only. Europeans, joined by India and some other countries, want a mandatory registry of geographical indications that would prevent other countries from using the names. The United States and other countries refuse to negotiate a mandatory list, but will accept a voluntary list with no enforcement power. While the EU has said that it will not accept an agriculture agreement without a geographical registry, more recently it reportedly has lowered expectations to achieving a registry for wines and spirits.

Criticism of the WTO Evidence is persuasive that trade openness delivers efficiencies and generates wealth. If trade opening takes place under the right conditions, all countries can benefit from international exchange. This was the assessment of the Director General of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Pascal Lamy, speaking at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) and the Stanford Center for International Development (SCID) on 27 October 2008. Yet, not all would agree with this statement. Despite the increasing number of countries to join the WTO, criticism remains high, especially from the part of social and environmental NGOs. This Criticism of the WTO generally falls into two broad categories:
1.

Criticism of WTO aims

The WTO is very strongly committed to trade liberalization which means a movement towards free trade both in the reduction and elimination of tariffs and a removal of non-tariff barriers such as quotas. This position (pro free trade) is firmly grounded in main stream trade economics - particularly comparative advantage theory - which implies that free trade is an optimal system (in technical terms it is pareto optimal). Importantly it is even good for poor undeveloped countries, hence the WTO's fifth principle about development.

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This, however, is controversial. There are some, particularly in development studies and development economics, who are doubtful that free trade and deregulation are in fact good for developing countries or the best development paradigm. In fact it is often felt that free trade is actually bad in a variety of ways for poorer countries and beneficial mainly to richer ones. The other main criticism of the WTO's philosophy comes from environmental circles. It is felt that the free trade/deregulatory paradigm is detrimental to the environmental protection and preservation. In fact some environmentalists would argue that the idea of the ultimate economic good being material improvement (GDP growth) which is implicit in the WTO's philosophy is fundamentally misguided in that it neglects and fails to take into account the (negative) environmental affects of pursuit of this economic goal (e.g. global warming).
2.

Criticism of WTO practices/structure

Criticism of WTO practices and/or structure focus on the democratic or undemocratic nature of the organization. The points tend to seperate into two related arguments. First that the structure and personnel of the WTO is undemocratic in various ways that lead to developed richer countries winning out over less developed poorer countries. Second that while not actively biased or undemocratic the WTO facilitates and permits powerful groups to dominate the others (these groups being either the richer developed countries or e.g. TNCs - transnational corporations). Apart from this, the other main criticism of WTO practices would be that it does not implement its philosophy evenhandedly, in particular free trade arguments are used to open up the markets of third world countries while the developed world retains all kind of protectionist measures.. The operating procedures of the organisation, however, tend to create imbalances between its members. Its decision-making process, which is taken in the basis of consensus, often creates disadvantages or developing countries. Firstly because any objection to a particular decision should be presented by its opponents and this translates in a very difficult condition for developing countries. About 22 member countries have no delegation in Geneva, headquarter of the WTO, and therefore they are not able to voice their objection to the decision under discussion. Secondly, due to the existence of exclusionary clubs-like meetings, as the majority of the developing countries have found themselves often excluded from such meetings. This informal, ad-hoc, diplomatic procedures are in some way in opposition to the broad principle of transparency that is one of the pillars of the WTO. In regard to environmental issues, the contention of critics is that the Organization is inadequate for the purposed of protecting the environment. There are two general arguments for including environment in WTO discussions. The first is that the GATT is out of date; when it was negotiated, environmentalism was not a public issue. The second is that the environment is of such importance that WTO rules should allow trade restrictions to support protection to the environment. A more particular argument is concerned to agricultural policy; when the rules of free trade apply to agriculture, exemptions should be made. A related argument made by environmentalists is that the degradation of the environment in the global commons (the atmosphere, the migratory species, the high seas, etc.) requires extraterritorial reach. However, this implies with national sovereignty of the member-states, and the WTO principles are based upon
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national sovereignty of its members. In fact, there are no cases where it can be said that WTO procedures provides effective protection to the environment. But maybe its capacity to meet the core objective raising prosperity trough trade, would be undermine if the WTO would give to his members great latitude to restrict trade to protect the environment. The Seattle Issue WTO criticism reached a peak in 1999, surrounding the Ministerial Conference, which was to be the launch of a new millenial round of trade negotiations, held between 30 November- 3 December in Seattle, US. The negotiations were quickly overshadowed by massive and controversial street protests outside the hotels and the Washington State Convention and Trade Center, in what became the second phase of the anti-globalization movement in the United States. The scale of the demonstrationseven the lowest estimates put the crowd at over 40,000dwarfed any previous demonstration in the United States against a world meeting of any of the organizations generally associated with economic globalization (such as the WTO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or the World Bank)40 . The events are sometimes referred to as the Battle of Seattle or the Battle in Seattle. The estimated 40,000 protesters expressed views and goals as varied as the interests they represented. Some were against free trade, contending it wreaks havoc on the environment, fosters unacceptable working conditions and human rights deprivation in less developed countries, and destroys jobs at home. Some targeted the multinational corporation as producing the same effects. Some were not against free trade but wanted to abolish the WTO, viewing it as a supranational authority invading national sovereignty. Some said they merely wanted the WTO to be more open. Some acknowledged they had little understanding of international trade and were just against globalization (whatever that is). The only characteristic evident among all protesters seemed to be a seizing of the WTO and its Seattle meetings as a stage on which to vent their frustrations. As Senator Patty Murray, a supporter of free trade and the WTO, remarked in a 1 December speech to the Seattle Rotary Club, the WTO has become the focal point for every complaint having to do with global affairs. Within the WTO meetings differences were also manifest, both among leading industrial countries and between industrial and less developed countries. Differences over reducing protection of agriculture and introducing rules on labor standards proved so irreconcilable that the hoped-for launching of a new round of trade negotiations was not achieved. President Clinton was accused of scuttling the last hope for a new round by threatening trade sanctions against poor countries not adopting satisfactory labor standards, in order to win Democrat support from labor at home. As it is commonly used, the term free trade does not mean total laissez-faire, unfettered trade, as some opponents of free trade seem to think. Advocates of free trade recognize the usefulness of regulating, through the vehicle of government and in prescribed ways, certain
40

Seattle Police Department: The Seattle Police Department After Action Report: World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference Seattle, Washington November 29 December 3, 1999. p. 41. "Police estimated the size of this march [the labor march] in excess of 40,000."

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economic activities for purposes such as public safety and health, environmental protection, and preserving competition. What free trade does mean is that government will not intervene in allowing people to select producers who can fulfill their needs at the lowest cost. It allows a person to select a super market providing desired groceries at low prices, a doctor providing medical care for a fee considered reasonable, a computer store offering a wanted PC at the lowest price. Freedom to fulfill needs at the lowest cost accomplishes two things that benefit both the individual and society. It increases real income since, after buying one product, more income is left over to fulfill other needs. Secondly, and importantly, free trade results in efficient use of resources, since it is producers who use productive resources most efficiently that provide products at the lowest cost. These benefits are realized regardless of where the trading participants are located. Washingtonians obtain oranges from Californians at much lower cost and less consumption of resources than if they produced the oranges themselves. And the benefits are as real in international as domestic trade. Brazilians obtain machine tools at lower cost than they can produce themselves by trading coffee to Germans who could produce coffee only at high cost with very inefficient use of resources. Rising incomes and efficient use of resources bear directly on improved labor standards, environmental protection, and the advancement of human rights, all professed goals of the opponents of free trade and the WTO. Rising incomes enable people in less developed countries to afford improved working conditions and have children going to school instead of contributing to economic output, just as more industrially advanced countries experienced that same progress in their own histories. The advancement of human rights is similarly dependent on rising incomes. People living at subsistence levels are more concerned about their next meal than asserting rights often still unknown to them. And if we are to protect the environment, people need to be free to buy a product from producers most efficiently using the combination of resources needed to produce the product. Otherwise, more resources must be consumed, increasing resource depletion and the pollution that accompanies increased resource consumption. Rather than causing poor working conditions, environmental degradation and denigration of human rights, free trade is essential to their alleviation. Imposing sanctions or other barriers to imports from poor countries only perpetuates their poverty, often forcing labor out of factories back to scratching the soil for survival. However, obstacles to free trade continue. In response to pressure from organized special interest groups corporations, industries, trade associations, labor unions with more focused political clout than dispersed, unorganized consumers, governments still impose tariffs and quotas on imports, depriving society as a whole from the benefits of free trade. These measures are costly. Not only does logic conclude that society will lose if it chooses to fill a need from its own resources rather than from someone else who can fulfill the need more cheaply, experience demonstrates it. A 1994 study of 21 protected industries revealed that U.S. consumers paid about $70 billion in higher prices in 1990 because of import barriers.
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On average, the cost for saving one job in those industries was $170,000 per year, six times the average wages and benefits for manufacturing workers. In certain industries it was much higher; in steel for example countervailing duties and anti-dumping penalties saved 1,239 jobs at a cost of $835,351 each. The study indicated that $3,000 to $5,000 of the price of a Japanese car was attributable to voluntary import quotas, allowing both U.S. and Japanese car manufacturers to substantially raise prices. As the Economist observes, For five decades the worlds multilateral trade-liberalizing machinery known first as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and more recently as the World Trade Organization has, in all likelihood, done more to attack global poverty and advance living standards right across the planet than has any other manmade device. Critics contend the WTO encroaches on sovereignty. It should be recognized that agreements between nations usually entail each party agreeing to do things it might not do on its own. This is true of peace and mutual security treaties, arms reduction treaties, agreements to protect the environment. Nations enter into such agreements because they consider it in their interests to do so. The United States was a leader in the formation of both GATT and the WTO because administrations and Congresses, both Democrat and Republican, saw the substantial benefits freeing up trade would bring to Americans. In entering into such agreements a nation does not give up its sovereignty. Each WTO member may ignore its commitment to the WTO or any ruling of a WTO member-appointed panel against it. In so doing the member country may incur costs and forego realization of WTO benefits, but it is free to do that. Critics also contend that free trade and the WTO benefit only big corporations. Nothing could be further from the truth. No one benefits more from free trade than consumers, because free trade provides them with products at the least cost. Consumers are all of us. It must also be remembered that a corporation is not some separate entity that sucks well-being out of society; rather it is an aggregate of people, most of whom are in that segment of society called labor. It is argued that companies moving production abroad destroys jobs. Yes, some jobs are often lost when capital moves from one locale to another. But just as the free flow of goods and services enhances overall well-being, so does the free flow of capital. For if capital is to be employed most productively and its contribution to a societys income maximized, it must be free to flow to where it brings the highest return. Restricting its flow will only reduce the income of society as a whole. This is as true for international flows of capital as it is for capital flows within a country. Often overlooked is the fact that when production moves to a new locale the unemployed resources labor, land, remaining capital are a valuable, newly available productive resource to fulfill other of societys endless wants. When capital moved from the New England textile industry to the Southeast, not only did the nation benefit from lower cost clothing and a higher return on capital, but resources in New England were freed up to supply other products. Supplying new products is what New England has been doing ever since, and incomes there are among the nations highest. Pittsburgh, once the worlds premier steel producer, no longer produces one ton
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of steel, yet Pittsburghers are supplying themselves and others with a variety of high-value products and enjoying a prosperity not previously known. Progress often results in loss for some. Technological advance, changing wants, shifting comparative advantage all can put people out of work. But progress must not be held back just to keep people working in old jobs. The challenge is for them to be reemployed and the solution is in preserving the free environment of opportunity that enables that. Importantly, capital flowing from rich to poor enables the poor to be more productive, thus raising their own and others standards of living. If economic development is to take place and the gap in global income distribution narrowed, capital must be free to flow from the rich to poor countries. Reducing disparity in income distribution both domestically and internationally is in the interests of all. Many of the protesters in Seattle advocated the WTO be more open. This view is now widely supported, so that people may better understand the WTOs objectives and means and be able to submit their views on WTO deliberations. Official counterarguments After the Battle for Seattle, the WTO issued some official counterarguments towards the misperceptions (as they call them) that are associated to the organization. The most common misperceptions that resulted in criticisms are: 1. The WTO only serves the interests of multinational corporations

The accusation The WTO is not a democratic institution, and yet its policies impact all aspects of society and the planet. The WTO rules are written by and for corporations with inside access to the negotiations. For example, the US Trade Representative relies on its 17 Industry Sector Advisory Committees to provide input into trade negotiations. Citizen input by consumer, environmental, human rights and labor organizations is consistently ignored. Even requests for information are denied , and the proceedings are held in secret. The reality: The WTO is as democratic as its member governments; and between the members it is ultra-democratic because decisions are taken by consensus all members have to be persuaded. The rules are written by member governments, no one else has access to the negotiations. However, governments, which are elected democratically by their citizens, do take into account the views of various groups in their societies. How they do that is up to them and their citizens. Governments regularly cite pressure from consumer, environmental, human rights and labour organizations, as well as business. The structure of negotiations also helps governments strike a more equitable balance between various interest groups over a broad range of issues. Before they take effect, WTO rules and agreements are approved by all national parliaments.
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 An immense amount of information is available to the public. The WTO website currently contains over 60,000 official documents available for the public in the three official languages (English, French and Spanish). The vast majority of official documents are published immediately. Few remain restricted, and even then for a maximum of about six months. 2. The WTO is a stacked court The accusation The WTO's dispute panels, which rule on whether domestic laws are barriers to trade and should therefore be abolished, consist of three trade bureaucrats who are not screened for conflict of interests . For example, in the tuna/dolphin case that Mexico filed against the US, which forced the US to repeal its law that barred tuna from being caught by milelong nets that kill hundreds of thousands of dolphins each year, one of the judges was from a corporate front group that lobbied on behalf of the Mexican government for NAFTA. The reality The WTO's dispute settlement procedures were agreed by all member governments. They were not imposed on anyone. Dispute panels rule on whether countries break agreements they have made with each other in the WTO not on whether domestic laws are barriers to trade. Without these independent panels, countries could be tempted to settle trade conflict by force. All three panelists are normally agreed by both sides in a dispute. In the minority of cases (15 out of almost 200 cases) when the two sides cannot agree, the WTO director-general selects the panelists. The US was not required to repeal its law. Instead, Washington negotiated treaties with relevant trading partners. 3. The WTO tramples over labour and human rights The accusation The WTO has refused to address the impacts of free trade on labor rights , despite that fact that countries that actively enforce labor rights are disadvantaged by countries that consistently violate international labor conventions.Many developing countries, such as Mexico, contend that labor standards constitute a "barrier to free trade" for countries whose competitive advantage in the global economy is cheap labor. Potential solutions to labor and human rights abuses are blocked by the WTO, which has ruled that it is: 1) illegal for a government to ban a product based on the way it is produced (i.e. with child labor); and 2) governments cannot take into account the behavior of companies that do business with vicious dictatorships such as Burma . The reality The WTO has not refused to address this issue. At their first ministerial meeting (Singapore, 1996), WTO members reaffirmed their commitment to core labour standards. The WTOs developing-country members resist including labour standards in WTO rules because: (a) they see it as a guise for protectionism in developed-country markets, a smokescreen for undermining the comparative advantage of lower-wage developing countries; and
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(b) they argue that better working conditions and improved labour rights arise through economic growth sanctions imposed against countries with lower labour standards would merely perpetuate poverty and delay improvements in workplace standards. In addition, to suggest that developed countries are handicapped because they enforce labour standards ignores the fact that developed countries are highly successful in exporting they have by far the largest share of export markets. No one has argued in the WTO that labour standards constitute a barrier to free trade . The WTO has never ruled on child labour because the issue has never come up for a ruling. Countries efforts to deal with child labour problems have never been challenged in the WTO. 4. The WTO is destroying the environment The accusation The WTO is being used by corporations to dismantle hard-won environmental protections, who call them barriers to trade. In 1993 the very first WTO panel ruled that a regulation of the US Clean Air Act, which required both domestic and foreign producers alike to produce cleaner gasoline, was illegal. Recently, the WTO declared illegal a provision of the Endangered Species Act that requires shrimp sold in the US to be caught with an inexpensive device that allows endangered sea turtles to escape. The WTO is currently negotiating an agreement that would eliminate tariffs on wood products, which would increase the demand for timber and escalate deforestation. The reality The WTO panel ruled in 1996. It did not rule that the US Clean Air Act was illegal. It ruled that the act should be applied equally to domestic and foreign producers alike, and should not be more lenient towards domestic producers. The shrimp-turtle panel and the appeals body stated clearly that the US can pursue the protection of endangered turtles. They did not rule that the provision of the Endangered Species Act is illegal. They ruled, among other things, that the US government was discriminating against Asian suppliers and in favour of Caribbean suppliers. In addition to the proposal to lower tariffs on wood products, there are proposals which include environmental conservation issues. The outcome depends entirely on what governments are willing to do. 5. The WTO is killing people

The accusation The WTO's fierce defense of intellectual property rights patents, copyrights and trademarks comes at the expense of health and human lives. The organization's support for pharmaceutical companies against governments seeking to protect their people's health has had serious implications for places like sub-Saharan Africa, where 80 percent of the world's new AIDS cases are found. The US government, on behalf of US drug companies, is trying to block developing countries' access to less expensive, generic, life-saving drugs. For example, the South African government has been threatened with a WTO challenge over proposed national health laws that would encourage the use of generic drugs, ban the practice of manufacturers
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offering economic incentives to doctors who prescribe their products and institute parallel importing, which allows companies to import drugs from other countries where the drugs are cheaper. The reality The need to protect health and human life is built into the WTO agreement on intellectual property rights. The organization cannot support pharmaceutical companies against governments because the WTO is run only by governments, and decisions in favour of or against a member government are reached only by consensus among those governments. There is nothing in the WTO intellectual property agreement which prevents or discourages the use of generic drugs. (Similarly, requiring a government to offer patent protection for new inventions does not mean the government has to allow the invention to be used.) Totally false, such a ban would not violate WTO agreements. Parallel importing (and compulsory licensing) are clearly allowed under the WTO's intellectual property agreement, particularly in national emergencies. South Africa has cited these rules. While opinions differ about some of the details e.g. on compulsory licensing and what developing countries should be allowed to do for their healthcare needs there is no question that patent protection for pharmaceuticals has helped with the discovery of new drugs and has therefore helped to save lives.

6.

The US adoption of the WTO was undemocratic

The accusation The WTO was established out of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations. On December 1, 1994, Congress approved GATT under Fast Track during a lame duck session of Congress. Fast Track limits public debate by not allowing amendments. The approval of the WTO required entire sections of US laws to be rewritte to conform with the WTO rules, similar to the way that treaties often redefine how the US will interact with other states. Had the agreement been voted on as a treaty, requiring a two-thirds majority in the Senate, it would have been defeated. The reality How countries ratify the WTO agreements is an internal issue. The WTO cannot comment on the process in each country, and it cannot speculate on the result of a vote in different circumstances. In addition, certain principles apply to all countries: There was a lot of democratic public debate around the world during the almost seven years (1986-94) of the negotiations, including in the United States. The pressure of public opinion determined countries' positions in the negotiations. The final ratification period, from the signing in April 1994 to December 1994, was no more than that: a final period of a long negotiation that included more than 100 countries, not only the US.
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 All countries had the option to accept or reject the agreement. However, by 1994 any attempt to amend the agreement would have meant reopening the negotiation which had already taken seven and a half years. It would probably have killed the agreement. WTO member governments and parliaments decided that would have been the worst option. Agreement was reached because all participating countries believed they had reached the point where on balance the benefits outweighed the discomfort, both politically and economically. Such a bargain could not have been struck if countries were allowed individually to pick and choose only the bits they preferred. All countries had to face changes that were domestically unpopular. But they considered this to be outweighed by the benefits of the package. In many cases, other countries had to accept changes demanded by the United States. 7. The WTO undermines local development and penalizes poor countries The accusation The WTOs most favored nation provisions require all WTO member countries to treat each other equally and to treat all corporations from these countries equally regardless of their track record . Local policies aimed at rewarding companies who hire local residents, use domestic materials, or adopt environmentally sound practices are essentially illegal under the WTO. Under the WTO rules, developing countries are prohibited from following the same polices that developed countries pursued, such as protecting nascent, domestic industries until they can be internationally competitive. The reality Most-favoured-nation treatment means non-discrimination between countries. Equal treatment is an overwhelmingly important and useful principle for both fairness and efficiency. Most-favoured-nation does not mean treating all corporations equally. A government can reward or penalize corporations, but the same criteria for doing this must normally apply to all foreign companies. (There are some constraints on what those rules might say.) Policies for hiring local staff, using domestic materials or encouraging sound environmental practices are definitely not outlawed. However, countries have negotiated terms for allowing their professionals and other workers to work abroad. If they allow foreign workers in, it is because they want to learn from foreign expertise or they want their workers to be able to work abroad in exchange. This is not a principle of WTO law, but something countries (developed and developing alike) want to negotiate with each other. The value of infant-industry protection is debated. However, developing countries are given longer timetables for implementing many important provisions and commitments precisely in order to allow them to protect nascent industries if they want to. 8. The WTO is increasing inequality The accusation Free trade is not working for the majority of the world. During a the most recent period of rapid growth in global trade and investment 1960 to 1998 inequality worsened both internationally and within countries. The UN Development Program reports that the richest 20 percent of the world's population consume 86 percent of the world's resources while the poorest 80 percent consume just 14 percent. WTO rules have hastened these trends by opening up
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countries to foreign investment and thereby making it easier for production to go where the labor is cheapest and most easily exploited and environmental costs are low. This pulls down wages and environmental standards in developed countries who are having to compete globally. The reality This is an analytical question, unlike the previous points which are factual errors, except that no one pretends the present WTO system is free trade. All the evidence points to trade making a major contribution to increasing standards of living and to lifting people out of poverty. The majority would almost certainly be poorer if there had been no trade liberalization and no international trade rules. Has trade worsened inequality? This is debatable, and the economic evidence is complex - inequality can rise and fall as countries go through different levels of development. However, even if the world were more equal without trade, it would almost certainly be poorer, and most of the poor would almost certainly be poorer. Trade liberalization and investment liberalization are not the same thing. However, arguing against investment creating jobs in poor countries amounts to arguing that the poorest people in the world should be kept poor. There is also plenty of evidence to support the argument that trade, by raising incomes, helps poor countries find the resources to protect their environment. (There is also a contradiction in the logic of the critics' argument here. If trade does encourage companies to migrate to low-wage countries and to pull down wages in developed countries, then it must be reducing inequality. As always, the reality is much more complex because it depends on a lot of factors such as productivity, technology, etc, so investment and trade can mean gains both for those in developed and developing countries.) 9. The WTO undermines national sovereignty The accusation By creating a supranational court system that has the power to economically sanction countries to force them to comply with its rulings, the WTO has essentially replaced national governments with an unelected, unaccountable corporate-backed government. For the past nine years, the European Union has banned beef raised with artificial growth hormones. The WTO recently ruled that this public health law is a barrier to trade and should be abolished. The EU has to rollback its ban or pay stiff penalties . Under the WTO, governments can no longer act in the public interest. The reality The WTO dispute settlement systems rulings are based on agreements that all parties in a dispute have agreed to. The sanctions are not imposed by the WTO, but by the country winning the case. The sanctions imposed on the EU were imposed voluntarily by the elected national government of the United States, within WTO rules and procedures. The case was not initiated by the WTO (the WTO does not have the power to do that) but by the US and Canadian governments.
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(In fact, the US first imposed $100 million in annual sanctions against the EU for the beefhormone ban in 1989, six years before the WTO came into being.) The WTO did not say the law should be abolished. The ruling said the ban (not the law) violated WTO agreements which the EU itself negotiated and signed. The EU had the option of providing sufficient evidence of health risk to support the ban, or removing the ban. It chose to supply the evidence, but within the agreed time-limit it was unable to do so and US sanctions were imposed. The EU still says it will supply the evidence. Meanwhile, the ban has not been lifted. No one has been forced to do anything. The agreements include countless provisions allowing governments to take public interest into account. The agreements are also the result of negotiations in which all governments pursued what they saw as the interests of their public. If their view of public interest changes, they are completely free to seek to amend the agreements. That has already happened in eight successive trade rounds under GATT, with the ninth approaching after the Seattle Ministerial Conference. 10. The tide is turning aganst free trade and the WTO! The accusation There is a growing international backlash against the WTO and the process of corporate globalization over which it presides. Movement-building by coalitions such as Peoples Global Action against the WTO in Europe and the Citizens Trade Campaign in the US are growing fast, as public support for corporate-managed free trade dwindles. Recent polls show that 58 percent of Americans agree that foreign trade has been bad for the US economy, and 81 percent of Americans say that Congress should not accept trade agreements that give other countries the power to overturn US laws. (Too late!). This is why tens of thousands of people from all walks of life will converge in Seattle Nov. 29-Dec. 4 to confront the World Trade Organization head on at its ministerial meeting. Join us! The reality People are free to have their own opinions. The WTO is at the centre of intense debate among governments in the negotiating rooms (which is what the WTO is for), and among citizens out in the streets. That is healthy. But in any proper debate, it is essential to get the facts right first. Organizations supplying information about the WTO have the responsibility to make sure theyve got their facts right, too. Those making the accusations listed here have quite simply got their facts wrong. Some protesters might believe there is a growing international backlash against the WTO. But the countries queuing up to join the WTO, from the most populous (China) and the largest physically (Russia) to tiny Andorra, are proof that a significant part of the world believe that their economic future lies in the WTO system. And opinion polls suggest that the public in the US and elsewhere are in favour of freer trade even if they have reservations about some aspects.

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Bibliography: 1. Trade Hot Topics, issue 71, Doha Decision Making: Implications of the Consensus and Single-Undertaking Principles for Developing Countries, by Euan MacMillan, March 2010 2. Trade Liberalisation and Poverty reduction, Tim Conway, February 2004 3. The Economist, special report: The Cancun Challenge, Sep 4th 2003 4. The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, Randy Green, Washington D.C, January 2000 5. The Economist, Tequila Sunset in Cancun, Sep 17th 2003 6. Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda, editors Kym Anderson and Will Martin, copublication of Palgrave Macmillan and the World Bank, 2006 7. Different facets of power in decision-making in the WTO, Manfred Elsig, September 2006, Swiss National Center of Competence in Research 8. European Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) Reform in the WTO Context, Geneva, 10 July 2003 9. Fischers surprise for Europes farmer: now the argument over agriculture moves to the WTO, Financial Times, 27 June 2003 10. The World Bank, Launching Development Round could help poor countries facing global downturn 11. Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, The WTO July 2004 Framework Agremment. An overview of Agriculture, November 2004
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12. World Trade Organization, WTO Analytical Index. Guide to WTO Law and Practice, Second edition, volume 1, Cambridge University 13. ABC World News, U.S Food Aid Contributing to Africas Hunger?, by Dana Hughes, Kenya, Oct2009 and Who does U.S Food Aid Benefit? [http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/3342/] 14. CRS Report RL33085, Trade in Services: The Doha Development Agenda Negotiations and U.S Goals, William H. Cooper, April 7 2010 15. Max Planck Commentaries on world trade law, WTO-Trade in Services, edited by Rudiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll and Clemens Feinaugle, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008 16. CRS Report RL33634, The World Trade Organization: the non-agricultural market accesss (NAMA) negotiations, Ian F. Ferguson, January 11, 2011 17. Oxfam Briefing Paper, Stitched Up. How rich countries protectionism in textiles and clothing trade prevents poverty alleviation, April 2004 18. CRS Report RL33750, The WTO, Intellectual Property Rights and the Access to Medicine Controversy, by Ian F. Fergusson, updated December 12, 2006 19. Staff Working Paper ERSD-2004-03, WTO, Economic Research and Statistics Division, Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO: Why, When and How? 20. Asian Development Bank, The Doha Agenda and Development: a view from the Uruguay Round, J. Michael Finger, September 2002, ERD Working Series no.21 21. General Agreement on Trade in Services [http://www.worldtradelaw.net/uragreements/gats.pdf] 22. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agchairtxt_1aug07_e.htm 23. Doha Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 14 November 2001 [http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm#agriculture] 24. Databases of World Bank and World Resources Institute [http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS] and [http://earthtrends.wri.org/searchable_db] 25. Official website of WTO, organizational chart [http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org2_e.htm] 26.Tavora, Felipe: The WTO and its critics, 2007 27. Klaus-Gnter Deutsch,Bernhard Speyer: The World Trade Organization millennium round: freer trade in the twenty-first century 28.Jeffrey J. Schott : The WTO after Seattle

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