This section discusses the main functions of financial intermediaries and financial markets, and their comparative roles. Financial systems, i.e.financial intermediaries and financial markets, channel funds from those who have savings to those who have more productive uses for them. They perform two main types of financial service that reduce the costs of moving funds between borrowers and lenders, leading to a more efficient allocation of resources and faster economic growth. These are the provision of liquidity and the transformation of the risk characteristics of assets.[2]
technologies. They provide different forms of finance to borrowers. Financial markets provide arms length debt or equity finance (to those firms able to access markets), often at a lower cost than finance from financial intermediaries.
for financial intermediaries is as follows. Once financial intermediaries obtain information they must be able to obtain a market return on that information before any signalling of that information advantage results in it being bid away. If they can not prevent information from being revealed prior to obtaining that return, they will not commit the resources necessary to obtain it. One reason financial intermediaries can obtain information at a lower cost than individual lenders is that financial intermediation avoids duplication of the production of information faced by multiple individual lenders. Moreover, financial intermediaries develop special skills in evaluating prospective borrowers and investment projects. They can also exploit cross- customer information and re-use information over time. Financial intermediaries thus improve the screening of potential borrowers and investment projects before finance is committed and enforce monitoring and corporate control after investment projects have been funded. Financialintermediation thus leads to a more efficient allocation of capital. The information acquisition cost may be lowered further as financial intermediaries and borrowers develop long-run relationships (Petersen and Rajan 1994 and Faulkender and Petersen 2003).[4] Financial markets create their own incentives to acquire and process information for listed firms. The larger and more liquid financial markets become the more incentive market participants have to collect information about these firms. However, because information is quickly revealed in financialmarkets through posted prices, there may be less of an incentive to use private resources to acquire information. In financial markets information is aggregated and disseminated through published prices, which means that agents who do not undertake the costly process of ex ante screening and ex post monitoring, can freely observe the information obtained by other investors as reflected in financial prices. Rules and regulation, such as continuous disclosure requirements, can help encourage the production of information. Financial intermediaries and financial markets resolve ex post information asymmetries and the resulting moral hazard problem by improving the ability of investors to directly evaluate the returns to projects by monitoring, by increasing the ability of investors to influence management decisions and by facilitating the takeover of poorly managed firms. When these issues are not well managed, investors will not be willing to delegate control oftheir savings to borrowers. Diamond (1984), for example, develops a model in which the returns from firms investment projects are not known ex post to external investors, unless information is gathered to assess the outcome, i.e. there is costly state verification (Townsend 1979). This leads to a moral hazard problem. Moral hazard arises when a borrower engages in activities that reduce the likelihood of a loan being repaid. For example, when firms owners siphon off funds (legally or illegally) to
themselves or their associates through loss-making contracts signed with associated firms.
Notes [2] The financial system also plays a role in ensuring that payments can be exchanged and settled.
This role is largely ignored in this paper. [3] When markets do not operate costlessly, firms arise if they can reduce market transaction costs by organising resources more cheaply within the firm (Coase 1937). [4] However, the cost of developing long-run relationships may be to discourage competition from switching intermediaries.