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Iraq File
Iraq File....................................................................................................................................................................................................1
Iraq File...................................................................................................................................................................1
Strat Sheet................................................................................................................................................................................................3
Strat Sheet...............................................................................................................................................................3
***1AC Advantage***...........................................................................................................................................................................4
***1AC Advantage***..........................................................................................................................................4
Extension – Air Force K2 Mil..................................................................................................................................................................8
Extension – Air Force K2 Mil...............................................................................................................................8
Extension - Tech K2 Readiness.............................................................................................................................................................10
Extension - Tech K2 Readiness...........................................................................................................................10
Extension – Air Force K2 Winning the War..........................................................................................................................................13
Extension – Air Force K2 Winning the War......................................................................................................13
Extensions – Iraq Failure Bad................................................................................................................................................................14
Extensions – Iraq Failure Bad............................................................................................................................14
Extension - Air Force Key to War..........................................................................................................................................................16
Extension - Air Force Key to War......................................................................................................................16
Impact – Middle East Stability..............................................................................................................................................................17
Impact – Middle East Stability...........................................................................................................................17
Impact – Terrorism.................................................................................................................................................................................18
Impact – Terrorism..............................................................................................................................................18
***Iraqi Airforce Advantage***............................................................................................................................................................20
***Iraqi Airforce Advantage***........................................................................................................................20
A/T: Iraqi Airforce ready now...............................................................................................................................................................26
A/T: Iraqi Airforce ready now............................................................................................................................26
A practical first step in this reinstatement process is to establish sector-specific forward air controllers (FAC) for the top 12 to 15
"hot spots" in Iraq with round-the-clock coverage. The actual implementation of such a concept would have to come in stages, since
frankly, the Iraqi air force is not ready, and the US Air Force does not have the ready assets to fully put into practice the ideas that
follow. The critical core capability does exist, however, within the US Special Operations Command, specifically, the 6th Special
Operations Squadron (SOS) within Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). Though limited in number, these combat
aviation advisors (CAA) have the requisite language and trainer skills to lead the way; furthermore, they are acutely aware of the
cultures in which they operate and can avoid the natural pitfalls to which an untrained American would be susceptible. The first
products of such an implementation would be dramatic improvements in SA; significantly reduced reaction times; and ever-present,
on-scene "eyes for the commander." .....................................................................................................................................................26
A practical first step in this reinstatement process is to establish sector-specific forward air controllers
(FAC) for the top 12 to 15 "hot spots" in Iraq with round-the-clock coverage. The actual implementation
of such a concept would have to come in stages, since frankly, the Iraqi air force is not ready, and the US
Air Force does not have the ready assets to fully put into practice the ideas that follow. The critical core
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capability does exist, however, within the US Special Operations Command, specifically, the 6th Special
Operations Squadron (SOS) within Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). Though limited in
number, these combat aviation advisors (CAA) have the requisite language and trainer skills to lead the
way; furthermore, they are acutely aware of the cultures in which they operate and can avoid the natural
pitfalls to which an untrained American would be susceptible. The first products of such an
implementation would be dramatic improvements in SA; significantly reduced reaction times; and ever-
present, on-scene "eyes for the commander." ..................................................................................................26
Extension – Iraq Air Force K2 winning the war....................................................................................................................................27
Extension – Iraq Air Force K2 winning the war...............................................................................................27
***Iraq Disad***...................................................................................................................................................................................28
***Iraq Disad***.................................................................................................................................................28
Extension - Air Force k2 sustaining war................................................................................................................................................32
Extension - Air Force k2 sustaining war............................................................................................................32
Extension – Iraqis oppose Iraq...............................................................................................................................................................33
Extension – Iraqis oppose Iraq...........................................................................................................................33
Impact – Root of all Middle East problems...........................................................................................................................................34
Impact – Root of all Middle East problems.......................................................................................................34
Iraq Pullout Good - Stability..................................................................................................................................................................35
Iraq Pullout Good - Stability..............................................................................................................................35
Pullout Good - Terrorism.......................................................................................................................................................................36
Pullout Good - Terrorism....................................................................................................................................36
Iraq Pullout Bad – Ethnic Cleansing......................................................................................................................................................39
Iraq Pullout Bad – Ethnic Cleansing.................................................................................................................39
Iraq Pullout Bad – Heg decrease............................................................................................................................................................40
Iraq Pullout Bad – Heg decrease........................................................................................................................40
Iraq Pullout Bad – Civil War..................................................................................................................................................................41
Iraq Pullout Bad – Civil War..............................................................................................................................41
Pullout Bad – Genocide.........................................................................................................................................................................42
Pullout Bad – Genocide.......................................................................................................................................42
Pullout Bad - ME Chaos........................................................................................................................................................................43
Pullout Bad - ME Chaos......................................................................................................................................43
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Strat Sheet
There are two scenarios for an aff advantage in this file. The first is that solar
tech is key to the military which is key to winning the war and losing the war is
bad. The second scenario is the Iraqi Airforce scenario. This says that the U.S.
air force is k2 developing the Iraqi air force, and the Iraqi airforce is critical to
withdrawal, which increases military readiness, which is low now, and high
military readiness is k2 heg, and heg collapse bad. There is also an Iraq disad
which says that the air force is key to sustaining the mission, or preventing
withdrawal, and pullout is good. All extensions follow the shells. Good luck
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***1AC Advantage***
Lack of energy efficient tech makes the army vulnerable in Iraq
Defense Industry Daily, 3-17-06, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/energy-conservation-moving-up-
pentagons-agenda-02036, Junaid
DID has covered contracts that begin to illustrate the US military’s massive requirement for fuel, and also noted measures like
wind power installations, the US Navy’s alternative energy projects, R&D efforts like camouflage solar structure surfaces from
Konarka, Solar Integrated, et. al., the installation of fuel cells, and more. And how about this solar parking lot? Meanwhile,
advanced green technologies like hybrid drive vehicles offer both fuel economy and stealth benefits in combat, a significant
plus in the urban warfare scenarios that appear to be such a big part of future wars. The truth is that the military can’t live
without fuel, but every gallon of it is both a logistics burden and a financial burden.
While some military items cannot realistically be converted, every conservation success or renewable energy conversion within
the military’s jurisdiction makes it more deployable to the field, and more self-sufficient once there. Now add the fact that
diversified “green infrastructure” lowers vulnerability to the kind of “system disruption” attacks one sees in Iraq, and
the military/ security benefits become compelling. That means the military will be willing to invest in these technologies
even when the dollars and cents case alone may be in question. It’s a trend that has already started… and it’s about to
pick up speed.
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Failure in Iraq will cause regional terrorism and nuclear war- zero question of withdrawal
Reuel Marc Gerecht, Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1-
8-07, http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.25407/pub_detail.asp, Junaid
If we leave Iraq any time soon, the battle for Baghdad will probably lead to a conflagration that consumes all of Arab
Iraq, and quite possibly Kurdistan, too. Once the Shia become both badly bloodied and victorious, raw nationalist and
religious passions will grow. A horrific fight with the Sunni Arabs will inevitably draw in support from the ferociously
anti-Shiite Sunni religious establishments in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and on the Shiite side from Iran. It will probably
destroy most of central Iraq and whet the appetite of Shiite Arab warlords, who will by then dominate their community,
for a conflict with the Kurds. If the Americans stabilize Arab Iraq, which means occupying the Sunni triangle, this won't
happen. A strong, aggressive American military presence in Iraq can probably halt the radicalization of the Shiite
community. Imagine an Iraq modeled on the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps. The worst elements
in the Iranian regime are heavily concentrated in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Ministry of Intelligence, the
two organizations most active inside Iraq. The Lebanese Hezbollah is also present giving tutorials. These forces need
increasing strife to prosper. Imagine Iraqi Shiites, battle-hardened in a vicious war with Iraq's Arab Sunnis, spiritually
and operationally linking up with a revitalized and aggressive clerical dictatorship in Iran. Imagine the Iraqi Sunni
Islamic militants, driven from Iraq, joining up with groups like al Qaeda, living to die killing Americans. Imagine the
Hashemite monarchy of Jordan overwhelmed with hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Sunni Arab refugees. The
Hashemites have been lucky and clever since World War II. They've escaped extinction several times. Does anyone want to
take bets that the monarchy can survive the implantation of an army of militant, angry Iraqi Sunni Arabs? For those who
believe that the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is the epicenter of the Middle East, the mass migration of Iraq's Sunni
Arabs into Jordan will bury what small chances remain that the Israelis and Palestinians will find an accommodation.
With Jordan in trouble, overflowing with viciously anti-American and anti-Israeli Iraqis, peaceful Palestinian evolution
on the West Bank of the Jordan river is about as likely as the discovery of the Holy Grail. The repercussions throughout
the Middle East of the Sunni-Shiite clash in Iraq are potentially so large it's difficult to digest. Sunni Arabs in Egypt,
Jordan, and Saudi Arabia will certainly view a hard-won and bloody Shiite triumph in Iraq as an enormous Iranian victory. The
Egyptians or the Saudis or both will go for their own nukes. What little chance remains for the Americans and the Europeans to
corral peacefully the clerical regime's nuclear-weapons aspirations will end with a Shiite-Sunni death struggle in Mesopotamia,
which the Shia will inevitably win. The Israelis, who are increasingly likely to strike preemptively the major Iranian
nuclear sites before the end of George Bush's presidency, will feel even more threatened, especially when the Iranian
regime underscores its struggle against the Zionist enemy as a means of compensating for its support to the bloody
Shiite conquest in Iraq. With America in full retreat from Iraq, the clerical regime, which has often viewed terrorism as a tool
of statecraft, could well revert to the mentality and tactics that produced the bombing of Khobar Towers in 1996. If the
Americans are retreating, hit them. That would not be just a radical Shiite view; it was the learned estimation of Osama bin
Laden and his kind before 9/11. It's questionable to argue that the war in Iraq has advanced the radical Sunni holy war against
the United States. There should be no question, however, that an American defeat in Mesopotamia would be the greatest
psychological triumph ever for anti-American jihadists. Al Qaeda and its militant Iraqi allies could dominate western
Iraq for years--it could take awhile for the Shiites to drive them out. How in the world could the United States destroy
these devils when it no longer had forces on the ground in Anbar? Air power? Would we helicopter Special Forces from aircraft
carriers in the Persian Gulf into a distant war zone when our intelligence information on this desert region was--as it would
surely be--somewhere between poor and nonexistent? Images of Desert One in 1980 come to mind. Neither Jordan nor Kuwait
may be eager to lend its airfields for American operations that intend to kill Sunnis who are killing Shiites.
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Barring a major U.S. intervention to ensure that Sunni interests are addressed, according to the report, "Unmaking Iraq: A
Constitutional Process Gone Awry", "Iraq is likely to slide toward full-scale civil war and the break-up of the country."
Similarly, no one outside the administration doubts the under-reported judgment made here just last week by visiting Saudi
Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal. "Iraq is a very dangerous situation and a very threatening situation," he said. "The
impression is (that it is) gradually going toward disintegration. There seems to be no dynamic now that is pulling the country
together." "All the dynamics there are pushing the (Iraqi) people away from each other," he said, adding that, if current trends
persist, "It will draw the countries of the region into the conflict..." This view was shared by members of a high-powered
panel of Iraq and Iran specialists at the quasi-governmental U.S. Institute for Peace earlier this month. Amid these gloomy, not
to say apocalyptic, warnings, a public debate over U.S. withdrawal -- and specifically whether the U.S. military presence is
making all-out war more or less likely -- has intensified outside the administration. The mainstream position still sees the U.S.
forces as a bulwark that is preventing, or at least braking, the trend toward war. According to Ferguson, who was a war-
booster, the current situation, as bad as it is, is just "a little local difficulty" compared to the alternative of all-out civil
war and its regionalisation.
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Failing in Iraq would end all progress made towards democracy and Iraq would
fall into civil war
RON CLAIBORNE, staff writer, March 26, 2008 ABC News“McCain Asserts Iraq Withdrawal Could Mean Civil War”
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Vote2008/story?id=4528489&page=1
GOP presidential hopeful John McCain on Wednesday cast America's commitment to Iraq as a "moral responsibility" to
avert a genocidal civil war that could ensue if U.S. troops are withdrawn too soon. In a major address in California on
foreign policy, the presumptive Republican nominee said, "It would be an unconscionable act of betrayal, a stain on our
character as a great nation, if we were to walk away from the Iraqi people and consign them to the horrendous violence,
ethnic cleansing and possibly genocide that would follow a reckless, irresponsible and premature withdrawal." McCain
Sees Progress in Iraq. Speaking to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, McCain, who has supported the war from the
beginning, pointed to what he said were signs of progress: a decrease in violence and civilian and military deaths, Iraqis
returning to work, markets open, and oil revenues increasing. He also said there have signs of political reconciliation at the
local level, but he acknowledges, "political progress at the national level has been far too slow. … but there is progress."
McCain spent two days in Iraq on a congressional visit one-and-a-half weeks ago. He has previously said that to be elected
president, he will need to convince American voters that whatever they think of the wisdom of having gone to war, the U.S.
has a vital interest in keeping troops there long enough to quash the threat posed by Al Qaeda. The Challenge in
November In his speech, he said he believes it is still possible for Iraq to become a stable democracy and it is in the geo-
political interests of the United States to see that Iraq and Afghanistan attain that goal. "Those who claim we should
withdraw from Iraq in order to fight Al Qaeda more effectively elsewhere are making a dangerous mistake," he warned.
"Whether they were there before is immaterial. Al Qaeda is in Iraq now. If we withdraw prematurely, al Qaeda will survive
[and] proclaim victory … Civil war in Iraq could easily descend into genocide, and destabilize the entire region as
neighboring powers come to the aid of their favored factions. I believe a reckless and premature withdrawal would be a
terrible defeat for our security interests and our values."
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Broader Mideast instability. No one should underestimate America’s deterrent effect in that unstable region, a benefit
that would vanish if we left Iraq precipitously. Iran would feel free to begin unfettered meddling in southern Iraq with
the aim of helping young radicals like Moqtada al-Sadr overwhelm moderate clerics like the Grand Ayatollah Sistani.
Syria would feel free to return to its predations in Lebanon and to unleash Hezbollah on Israel. Even allies like Turkey
might feel compelled to take unilateral, albeit counterproductive steps, such as intervening in northern Iraq to protect
their interests. Every country in the Middle East would make its own new calculation of how much it could afford to
support U.S. interests. Some would make their own private deals with al Qaeda, or at a minimum stop aiding us in our
pursuit of Islamists.
Two full-blown crises, in Lebanon and Iraq, are merging into a single emergency. A chain reaction could spread quickly almost
anywhere between Cairo and Bombay. Turkey is talking openly of invading northern Iraq to deal with Kurdish terrorists based there.
Syria could easily get pulled into the war in southern Lebanon. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are under pressure from jihadists to support
Hezbollah, even though the governments in Cairo and Riyadh hate that organization. Afghanistan accuses Pakistan of giving shelter to
Al Qaeda and the Taliban; there is constant fighting on both sides of that border. NATO's own war in Afghanistan is not going well.
India talks of taking punitive action against Pakistan for allegedly being behind the Bombay bombings. Uzbekistan is a repressive
dictatorship with a growing Islamic resistance. The only beneficiaries of this chaos are Iran, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, and the Iraqi Shiite
leader, Moqtada al-Sadr, who last week held the largest anti-American, anti-Israel demonstration in the world in the very heart of
Baghdad, even as 6,000 additional American troops were rushing into the city to "prevent" a civil war that has already begun. This
combination of combustible elements poses the greatest threat to global stability since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, history's only
nuclear superpower confrontation. The Cuba crisis, although immensely dangerous, was comparatively simple: It came down to two
leaders and no war. In 13 days of brilliant diplomacy, John F. Kennedy induced Nikita Khrushchev to remove Soviet missiles from
Cuba. Kennedy was deeply influenced by Barbara Tuchman's classic,"The Guns of August," which recounted how a seemingly
isolated event 92 summers ago — an assassination in Sarajevo by a Serb terrorist — set off a chain reaction that led in just a few
weeks to World War I. There are vast differences between that August and this one. But Tuchman ended her book with a sentence that
resonates in this summer of crisis: "The nations were caught in a trap, a trap made during the first thirty days out of battles that failed
to be decisive, a trap from which there was, and has been, no exit." Preventing just such a trap must be the highest priority of
American policy. Unfortunately, there is little public sign that the president and his top advisers recognize how close we are to a chain
reaction, or that they have any larger strategy beyond tactical actions.
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Impact – Terrorism
Iraq Failure means increased terrorist attacks
Wall Street Journal, 3/22/06, What if we lose?, http://www.theabsurdreport.com/2006/what-if-we-lose/
The third anniversary of U.S. military action to liberate Iraq has brought with it a relentless stream of media and political pessimism
that is unwarranted by the facts and threatens to become a self-fulfilling prophesy if it goes unchallenged. Yes, sectarian tensions are
running high and the politicians of Iraq’s newly elected parliament are taking a long time forming a government. But the attack on the
Golden Mosque in Samarra several weeks back has not provoked the spiral into “civil war” that so many keep predicting. U.S.
casualties are down over the past month, in part because Iraqi security forces are performing better all the time. More fundamentally,
the coalition remains solidly allied with the majority of Iraqis who want neither Saddam’s Hussein’s return nor the country’s descent
into a Taliban-like hellhole. There is no widespread agitation for U.S. troops to depart, and if anything the Iraqi fear is that we’ll leave
too soon. Yet there’s no denying the polls showing that most Americans are increasingly weary of the daily news of car bombs and
Iraqi squabbling and are wishing it would all just go away. Their pessimism is fed by elites who should know better but can’t restrain
their domestic political calculations long enough to consider the damage that would accompany U.S. failure. A conventional military
defeat is inconceivable in Iraq, but a premature U.S. withdrawal is becoming all too possible. With that in mind, it’s worth thinking
through what would happen if the U.S. does fail in Iraq. By fail, we mean cut and run before giving Iraqis the time and support to
establish a stable, democratic government that can stand on its own. Beyond almost certain chaos in Iraq, here are some other likely
consequences: • The U.S. would lose all credibility on weapons proliferation. One doesn’t have to be a dreamy-eyed optimist
about democracy to recognize that toppling Saddam Hussein was a milestone in slowing the spread of WMD. Watching the
Saddam example, Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi decided he didn’t want to be next. Gadhafi’s “voluntary” disarmament in turn helped
uncover the nuclear network run by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan and Iran’s two decades of deception. Now Iran is dangerously
close to acquiring nuclear weapons, a prospect that might yet be headed off by the use or threat of force. But if the U.S.
retreats from Iraq, Iran’s mullahs will know that we have no stomach to confront them and coercive diplomacy will have no
credibility. An Iranian bomb, in turn, would inspire nuclear efforts in other Mideast countries and around the world. • Broader
Mideast instability. No one should underestimate America’s deterrent effect in that unstable region, a benefit that would vanish if we
left Iraq precipitously. Iran would feel free to begin unfettered meddling in southern Iraq with the aim of helping young radicals like
Moqtada al-Sadr overwhelm moderate clerics like the Grand Ayatollah Sistani. Syria would feel free to return to its predations in
Lebanon and to unleash Hezbollah on Israel. Even allies like Turkey might feel compelled to take unilateral, albeit counterproductive
steps, such as intervening in northern Iraq to protect their interests. Every country in the Middle East would make its own new
calculation of how much it could afford to support U.S. interests. Some would make their own private deals with al Qaeda, or at a
minimum stop aiding us in our pursuit of Islamists. • We would lose all credibility with Muslim reformers. The Mideast is now
undergoing a political evolution in which the clear majority, even if skeptical of U.S. motives, agrees with the goal of more democracy
and accountable government. They have watched as millions of Iraqis have literally risked their lives to vote and otherwise support the
project. Having seen those Iraqis later betrayed, other would-be reformers would not gamble their futures on American support.
Nothing could be worse in the battle for Muslim “hearts and minds” than to betray our most natural allies. We would invite more
terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. Osama bin Laden said many times that he saw the weak U.S. response to Somalia and the
Khobar Towers and USS Cole bombings as evidence that we lacked the will for a long fight. The forceful response after 9/11
taught al Qaeda otherwise, but a retreat in Iraq would revive that reputation for American weakness. While Western liberals
may deny any connection between Iraq and al Qaeda, bin Laden and the rest of the Arab world see it clearly and would
advertise a U.S. withdrawal as his victory. Far from leaving us alone, bin Laden would be more emboldened to strike the U.S.
homeland with a goal of driving the U.S. entirely out of the Mideast. We could go on, but our point is that far more is at stake in
Iraq than President Bush’s approval rating or the influence of this or that foreign-policy faction. U.S. credibility and safety are at risk
in the most direct way imaginable, far more than they were in Vietnam. In that fight, we could establish a new anti-Communist
perimeter elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The poison of radical Islam will spread far and wide across borders if it can make even a
plausible claim to being on the ascendancy, and nothing would show that more than the retreat of America from Iraq.
We still believe victory in Iraq is possible, indeed likely, notwithstanding its costs and difficulties. But the desire among so many
of our political elites to repudiate Mr. Bush and his foreign policy is creating a dangerous public pessimism that could yet lead to
defeat — a defeat whose price would be paid by all Americans, and for years to come.
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Terrorism is nothing new. Fanatical groups have been wreaking havoc from time immemorial. Today two things have changed that together transform
terrorism from a ``nuisance'' to ``one of the gravest dangers facing mankind.'' First terrorists be they Islamic extremists in the Middle
East, ultranationalists in the US, or any number of other possible permutations seem to have changed from organized groups with clear
ideological motives to small clusters of the paranoid and hateful bent on vengeance and destruction for their own sake. There are no longer
any moral limitations on what terrorists are willing to do, who and how many they are willing to kill. Second, these unhinged collectivities now have ready
access to weapons of mass destruction. The technological skills are not that complex and the resources needed not too rare for terrorists to employ nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons where and when they wish. The consequences of such weapons in the hands of ruthless, rootless fanatics are not
difficult to imagine. In addition to the destruction of countless lives, panic can grip any targeted society, unleashing retaliatory action which in turn can
lead to conflagrations perhaps on a world scale. To combat such terrorist activities, states may come to rely more and more on dictatorial and authoritarian
measures. In short, terrorism in the future may threaten the very foundations of modern civilizations. On all of this, Laqueur is quite
convincing. Useful, too, is his elaboration on the nature of the various terrorist threats we face. Yet he too often falls back on questionable, if not offensive, opinion. He
asserts, for instance, that in non-Western countries ``human lives count for less,'' and so the danger of terrorism in these countries is greater. This is simply unacceptable
doggerel. Useful in pointing out the terrorist danger, but be wary of the author's more outlandish pronouncements.
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In practical terms, that means carrying out the disengagement in coordination with the Iraqi government and, as necessary,
armed groups outside of it and that U.S. forces in the queue for redeployment are put to good use. A further step would be to
convene a group of UN Security Council members, Japan and Canada, and states bordering Iraq, including Syria and Iran, to
participate in a regional stabilization project. Its purpose would be to encourage Iraq’s neighbors to pursue their common
interest in a unified, stable Iraq in mutually reinforcing ways. The intention to withdraw should be declared as the results of
the surge become clear. A coordinated declaration of this kind would not entail setting a certain date on which the last American
soldier would depart Iraq. Since there exists a remote possibility that the situation on the ground might change radically during the
drawdown period, the United States could qualify its declared intention to leave on a specific timetable with appropriate caveats. If,
for example, there were a dramatic increase in intercommunal violence leading to a flood of refugees, U.S. forces might be needed to
set up camps, administer aid, and provide security for the refugees. Alternatively, if the current surge strategy works, political
compromises are made, ethnic cleansing operations cease, militias are brought under the government’s control, a multiconfessional
army including a meaningful number of Sunni officers is created, and the United States is asked to remain to battle a lingering
insurgency, it might behoove Washington to suspend the drawdown. A twelve-to-eighteen-month time frame for disengagement, to
commence once the results of the surge have become apparent, would leave the United States with the flexibility to respond to
such changes. The surge results should be clear well within six months. Nevertheless, the departure timetable would not hinge on
specific benchmarks, since the Iraqi government is probably incapable of curbing militias and accommodating Sunni concerns; nor is
it likely to generate an effective, multiconfessional army in the foreseeable future. The U.S. drawdown should not be hostage to Iraqi
performance.
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A practical first step in this reinstatement process is to establish sector-specific forward air controllers (FAC) for the top 12 to
15 "hot spots" in Iraq with round-the-clock coverage. The actual implementation of such a concept would have to come in
stages, since frankly, the Iraqi air force is not ready, and the US Air Force does not have the ready assets to fully put into
practice the ideas that follow. The critical core capability does exist, however, within the US Special Operations Command,
specifically, the 6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) within Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). Though
limited in number, these combat aviation advisors (CAA) have the requisite language and trainer skills to lead the way;
furthermore, they are acutely aware of the cultures in which they operate and can avoid the natural pitfalls to which an
untrained American would be susceptible. The first products of such an implementation would be dramatic improvements in
SA; significantly reduced reaction times; and ever-present, on-scene "eyes for the commander."
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***Iraq Disad***
1. Solar power allows the army to sustain its mission in Iraq
Adam Fenderson and Bart Anderson; 3-12-06; “US army: peak oil and the army’s future” Energy Bulletin
http://www.energybulletin.net/node/13737
“The days of inexpensive, convenient, abundant energy sources are quickly drawing to a close,” according to a recently
released US Army strategic report. The report posits that a peak in global oil production looks likely to be imminent, with wide
reaching implications for the US Army and society in general.
The report was sent to Energy Bulletin by a reader, and does not appear to be available elsewhere on the internet. However it is
marked as unclassified and approved for public release.
The report, Energy Trends and Their Implications for U.S. Army Installations (PDF &ndash 1.2mb), was conducted by the U.S.
Army Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and is dated September 2005.
Author Eileen Westervelt, PE, CEM, is a mechanical engineer at the Engineer Research and Development Center (US Army
Corps of Engineers) in Champaign, Ill. Author Donald Fournier is a senior research specialist at the University of Illinois’
Building Research Council and has worked with the Corps in the past.
Westervelt and Fournier give special credence to the work of independent energy experts, such as the Association for the Study
of Peak Oil and Gas (ASPO) and the Oil Depletion Analysis Center (ODAC). They seem to place very little credibility on the
more optimistic oil production forecasts of the international energy agencies. They reproduce ASPO graphs and quote ASPO
member Jean Laherrere on why the US Geological Survey (USGS) future oil availability estimates are clearly overly
optimistic:
The USGS estimate implies a five-fold increase in discovery rate and reserve addition, for which no evidence is presented.
Such an improvement in performance is in fact utterly implausible, given the great technological achievements of the industry
over the past twenty years, the worldwide search, and the deliberate effort to find the largest remaining prospects.
The authors warn that in order to sustain its mission, “the Army must insulate itself from the economic and logistical
energy-related problems coming in the near to mid future. This requires a transition to modern, secure, and efficient
energy systems, and to building technologies that are safe and environmental friendly.” The best energy options they
conclude are “energy efficiency and renewable sources.” However, "currently, there is no viable substitute for petroleum."
They do not expect that any transition will be easy: “energy consumption is indispensable to our standard of living and a
necessity for the Army to carry out its mission. However, current trends are not sustainable. The impact of excessive,
unsustainable energy consumption may undermine the very culture and activities it supports. There is no perfect
energy source; all are used at a cost.” The report includes what looks like a solid overview of the pros and cons of all major
renewable and non-renewable energy options. They consider problems associated with hydrogen, shale oil, biofuels and tar
sands. On nuclear energy they note that "our current throw-away nuclear cycle uses up the world reserve of low-cost uranium
in about 20 years." They hold more hope for certain solar technologies and wind turbines, however, "renewables tend to be a
more local or regional commodity and except for a few instances, not necessarily a global resource that is traded between
nations." Overall this is surprisingly green sounding advice, and one might think out of left field for one of the most
environmentally destructive and energy consuming institutions on the planet. And yet the report does not seem to be at odds
with the Army's new Energy Strategy which sets out five major initiatives: Eliminate energy waste in existing facilities
Increase energy efficiency in new construction and renovations Reduce dependence on fossil fuels Conserve water resources
Improve energy security (See: hqda-energypolicy.pnl.gov/programs/plan.asp) Westervelt and Fournier assert that changes must
be made with urgency. However they express concerns that "we have a large and robust energy system with tremendous inertia,
both from a policy perspective and a great resistance to change." In light of this, “the Army needs to present its perspective to
higher authorities and be prepared to proceed regardless of the national measures that are taken.” Westervelt and Fournier
suggest "it is time to think strategically about energy and how the Army
should respond to the global and national energy picture. A path of enlightened self-interest is encouraged." As we approach
Peak Oil, what is ecologically sound and what is perceived to be to in an institution's practical benefit might tend to converge,
at least in some respects - even those of an institution such as the US Army.
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Over the past four years, the Department of the Air Force has been feeling the heat over its comparatively limited role in
Iraq.
While the Army and the Marines are now awash in extra funds, the Air Force faces severe cutbacks.
The Air Force is the second-largest service branch, accounting for about one-quarter of all active-duty military. But airmen
make up only about 5 percent of the total troop presence in Iraq. And the numbers have prompted Pentagon bean counters to
shift Air Force money away to the other service branches.
Because airmen, on average, serve four-month tours of duty (compared with the average Army tour of 15 months), the high rate
of turnover can often lead to administrative blunders. One Army officer privately complained that when the new airmen come
in every few weeks, it is "hellish, especially when you're trying to coordinate with your Air Force counterparts."
The Air Force has received the message. Top officials are now quietly considering whether to extend Air Force tours of duty
from four to six months.
"One of the things we're going to have to look at is how long we're going to be able to sustain this effort," said Air Force
General Burt Field. "And what's the right tour length in order to sustain this effort over time."
The Army will soon run out of manpower to sustain the large-scale occupation of Iraq. And so the Air Force, with its
340,000-strong active duty component, may begin to fill some of that shortfall.
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Edward Luttwak, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January/February 2005, Council on Foreign
Relations “Iraq: The Logic of Disengagement” http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/0512luttwak.pdf
Given allthat has happened in Iraq to date, the best strategy for the United States is disengagement. This would call for the
careful planning and scheduling of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from much of the country—while making due
provisions for sharp punitive strikes against any attempt to harass the withdrawing forces. But it would primarily require an
intense diplomatic effort, to prepare and conduct parallel negotiations with several parties inside Iraq and out. All have
much to lose or gain depending on exactly how the U.S. withdrawal is carried out, and this would give Washington a great deal
of leverage that could be used to advance U.S. interests. The United States cannot threaten to unleash anarchy in Iraq in order
to obtain concessions from others, nor can it make transparently conflicting promises about the country’s future to different
parties. But once it has declared its firm commitment to withdraw—or perhaps, given the widespread conviction that the
United States entered Iraq to exploit its resources, once visible physical preparations for an evacuation have begun—the
calculus of other parties will change. In a reversal of the usual sequence, the U.S. hand will be strengthened by
withdrawal, and Washington may well be able to lay the groundwork for a reasonably stable Iraq. Nevertheless, if key
Iraqi factions or Iraq’s neighbors are too shortsighted or blinded by resentment to cooperate in their own best interests, the
withdrawal should still proceed, with the United States making such favorable or unfavorable arrangements for each party as
will most enhance the future credibility of U.S. diplomacy. The United States has now abridged its vastly ambitious project of
creating a veritable Iraqi democracy to pursue the much more realistic aim of conducting some sort of general election. In the
meantime, however, it has persisted in futile combat against factions that should be confronting one another instead. A strategy
of disengagement would require bold, risk-taking statecraft of a high order, and much diplomatic competence in its
execution. But it would be soundly based on the most fundamental of realities: geography that alone ensures all other parties
are far more expose. States making such favorable or unfavorable arrangements for each party as will most enhance the
future credibility of U.S. diplomacy. The United States has now abridged its vastly ambitious project of creating a veritable
Iraqi democracy to pursue the much more realistic aim of conducting some sort of general election. In the meantime, however,
it has persisted in futile combat against factions that should be confronting one another instead. A strategy of disengagement
would require bold, risk-taking statecraft of a high order, and much diplomatic competence in its execution. But it would be
soundly based on the most fundamental of realities: geography that alone ensures all other parties are far more exposed to the
dangers of an anarchical Iraq than is the United States itself Iraq: The Logic of Disengagement
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Niall Ferguson, Professor of History Harvard College, May 24, 2005 NEW YORK TIMES,
http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/node/3138
No one should wish for an overhasty American withdrawal from Iraq. It would be the prelude to a bloodbath of ethnic
cleansing and sectarian violence, with inevitable spillovers into and interventions from neighboring countries. Rather, it
is time to acknowledge just how thinly stretched American forces in Iraq are and to address the problem: whether by finding
new allies (send Condoleezza Rice to New Delhi?); radically expanding the accelerated citizenship program for immigrants
who join the army; or lowering the (historically high) educational requirements demanded by military recruiters.
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The miracle in Iraq is that the Iraqi government, feeble and sectarian as it is, hasn't given up trying to play by the rules and
hasn't forsaken completely its imperfect constitution. The presence and power of Americans is undoubtedly the primary
reason the worst hasn't happened. But only the blind, deaf, dumb, or politically malicious cannot see that the Iraqis
themselves, especially the Shia, are still trying desperately to avoid the abyss. Having seen, then, that there is still sufficient
political hope on the Iraqi horizon, let us return to the matter of what will likely happen in Mesopotamia and the Middle East
if the United States departs. Certainly the most damning consequence of failure in Iraq is the likelihood that an American
withdrawal would provoke a take-no-prisoners civil war between the Sunni and Shiite Arabs, which could easily reach
genocidal intensity. The historical parallel to have in mind is the battle between subcontinent Hindus and Muslims that came
with the independence of India. Although of differing faiths, the pre-1947 Hindus and Muslims were often indistinguishable
culturally, linguistically, and physically. Yet they "ethnically cleansed" their respective new nations, India and Pakistan, with
exuberance. Somewhere between 500,000 and one million Muslims and Hindus perished, tens of thousands of women were
raped, and more than ten million people were forced to flee their homes. This level of barbarism, scaled down to Iraq's
population, could quickly happen in Mesopotamia, long before American forces could withdraw from the country. (And it's
worth recalling that few British officials anticipated the communal ferocity that came with the end of the Raj.)
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Presumptive Republican nominee Sen. John McCain used his time at the podium at the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee on Monday to launch a withering attack on Democratic rival Barack Obama's Iran policy. A presidential summit
with Iranian leaders, which McCain implied that Obama supports, would produce an "earful of anti-Semitic rants"
from the Holocaust-denying Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as well as harm to Iranian dissidents and the
strengthening of hardliners. McCain, who called for tough sanctions against Iran, earned his most enthusiastic ovation for
another statement referencing the Holocaust: "When we join in saying 'never again,' this is not a wish, a request, or a plea
to the enemies of Israel. It is a promise that the United States and Israel will honor, against any enemy who cares to test
us." He also received rousing applause for his lambasting of the idea of that the US isn't dealing effectively with Iran because
it isn't meeting with its leaders. "The idea that they now seek nuclear weapons because we refuse to engage in presidential-
level talks is a serious misreading of history," McCain said to rousing applause. "We hear talk of a meeting with the Iranian
leadership offered up as if it were some sudden inspiration, a bold new idea that somehow nobody has ever though of before,"
he said, recalling several overtures recent US leaders had made to Iran with little to show for it. Obama will address the
AIPAC Policy Conference on Wednesday morning, when he hopes that Tuesday's final Democratic primaries, in South Dakota
and Montana, will have given him a definitive edge in securing the party nomination over Hillary Clinton, who is also
scheduled to speak to AIPAC then. In the past, Obama has expressed a willingness to meet with Iran's leaders without
preconditions in an effort to use diplomacy to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, a position McCain has used to try to
portray his competitor as naive and inexperienced. But the Obama campaign quickly pushed back against the attack, arguing
that McCain has inflexibly pursued policies that endanger America and Israel. "John McCain stubbornly insists on continuing
a dangerous and failed foreign policy that has clearly made the United States and Israel less secure," Obama spokesman Hari
Sevugan said. "He promises sanctions that the Bush administration has been unable to persuade the (United Nations) Security
Council to deliver." In his AIPAC speech, McCain called for tough sanctions, outside the UN if necessary, particularly against
the Central Bank of Iran, and restrict Iran's import of refined petroleum products. McCain also criticized Obama by name
for his support of troop withdrawals from Iraq, arguing that would jeopardize Israel's security and lead to civil war
and genocide. To applause, McCain declared, "We must not let this happen." Sevugan countered that McCain "promises to
continue a war in Iraq that has emboldened Iran and strengthened its hand." MK Ephraim Sneh warned the AIPAC
audience that a year from now, Iran would be on the verge of completing a nuclear weapon - and that Israel was
preparing to face that challenge alone. "There will be a government in Israel which will not allow it to happen," he
declared, and added, "Our assumption is that we may face the problem alone." Sneh continued, "if we are alone, we
will have to act alone." He did not specify what action Israel was contemplating, though there has been speculation as to
whether Israel is planning a military attack. Iraq was the focus on some controversy at last year's AIPAC conference, when
some members of the audience booed Nancy Pelosi, the speaker of the US House of Representatives, when she spoke about the
problems created by the war in Iraq. This year, before McCain took the podium to open the three-day conference, Bernice
Manocherian, the immediate past president of AIPAC, urged members of the audience to be on their best behavior. Addressing
the more than 7,000 conference participants, including 1,200 students from 363 colleges, she told them, "We will treat all of the
speakers with respect and dignity, remembering that they are all our friends." Prime Minister Ehud Olmert will be speaking
at the conference, and could come under criticism for his efforts to engage the Palestinians and Syrians. Opposition
leader Binyamin Netanyahu (Likud), who was in town to attend the conference, spoke to both Democratic contenders. When
Obama informed Netanyahu that he was considering visiting Israel this summer, Netanyahu told him he should visit Sderot.
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