236 CM Hegemony 1NC 2AC Supplement

Hegemony 1NC/2AC
DDI ’08 Clark/Martin

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Hegemony 1NC/2AC Supplement

Hegemony 1NC/2AC Supplement........................................................................................................................1
Hegemony is not sustainable.................................................................................................................................2
Current Hegemony doesn’t solve - Space............................................................................................................3
Counter-Balancing won’t Happen........................................................................................................................4
Counter-Balancing won’t Happen........................................................................................................................5
Counter-Balancing Won’t Happen.......................................................................................................................6
Counter-Balancing Won’t Happen.......................................................................................................................7
Hegemony Solves EU CB and NATO...................................................................................................................8
Must Increase Hegemony Now.............................................................................................................................9
Addressing Climate Solves Hegemony...............................................................................................................10
Hegemony Good Impacts – Indonesia Add-On.................................................................................................11
Hegemony Good Impacts – Climate Solvency...................................................................................................12
Hegemony Good Impacts – Proliferation..........................................................................................................13
Hegemony Good Impacts – NATO.....................................................................................................................14
Hegemony Good Impacts – UN, genocide, security, proliferation..................................................................15
Hegemony Good Impacts – Middle East...........................................................................................................16
Hegemony Good Impacts – China......................................................................................................................17
Hegemony Good Impacts – China Brink...........................................................................................................18
Hegemony Good Impacts – ASEAN 1/2.............................................................................................................19
Hegemony Good Impacts – ASEAN 2/2.............................................................................................................20
Multipolarity now................................................................................................................................................21
Multipolarity Inevitable......................................................................................................................................22
EU will counter-balance......................................................................................................................................25
Hegemony Inevitable...........................................................................................................................................26
Hegemony Turns Itself.........................................................................................................................................27
If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 1

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Hegemony is not sustainable

Hegemony isn’t sustainable - China
Elisabeth Economy, fellow Council on Foreign Relations, 2007, “China and Antiterrorism”
The picture that emerges in the security realm is thus a mixed one. While China has not asserted itself as an alternative to U.S.
leadership, the potential exists. Despite strengthened military ties between the U.S. and some regional actors, a strong reservoir of
distrust and enmity exists toward the United States in many of the region’s publics. It is plausible that over time, China’s
message of non-interference, cooperative security, and the diminution of the role of the U.S. that is implied by China’s
approach will gain in popularity, although the United States may yet again broaden its approach to security and regain territory it
has lost.
Hegemony is not sustainable – action is the only alternative.
Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson professor of International Politics at Columbia University, 2007, “The
Remaking of the Unipolar World” as published in The Washington Quarterly.
The irony is that Washington seeks to change the rules of today’s unipolar world order. Preemption but is actually prevention,
including preventive war. In extreme cases such as Iraq, the United States has justified the use of force by arguing that even
though Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, he would have developed them when
conditions were propitious. It was better for the United States to act rather than wait for this to occur. This may be a political
and psychological rationalization, but the argument does have a strong logic to it, especially if deterrence cannot cope with
dedicated adversaries, most notably terrorists. When defense is also inadequate, the United States must use preventive measures.
Preventive actions, however, even if effective in the short run, will only be a stopgap if international politics were to proceed on
its normal trajectory. To bring lasting peace, stability, and prosperity, the system must not simply be preserved, as the Defense
Guidance advocated; it must be transformed. Although the second element in this trilogy can perhaps be squared with a conservative
view of the role of the hegemon, the other two cannot. Together, the three argue that even if the status quo is in some sense
satisfactory, it is an illusion to believe that it can be maintained. One way or another, world politics will change drastically. The
questions are who will change it and whether it will be for better or worse. In a way that should shock Henry Kissinger and other
students of the order established by the Congress of Vienna, U.S. foreign policy should be more closely modeled after Napoleon
than after Talleyrand and Metternich. The United States simply cannot maintain its hegemonic position through the policies
advocated by realists and followed before September 11, 2001, so current doctrine argues that the United States must instead be a
revolutionary power.

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Current Hegemony doesn’t solve - Space

Current US space technology and hegemony unable to solve terrorism and security
Linda Bilmes (professor at Harvard University) and Joseph E. Stiglitz (professor at Columbia University),
April 2008, “The Economic Costs of the Iraq War: An Appraisal Three Years After the Beginning of the
Conflict”
Why has a retrenchment in U.S. space dominance occurred? First, space weapons have little application to the overriding
security threat of Islamist terrorism. Second, for the time being, a rapid rise of technological adversaries does not appear
imminent. But the most compelling case against space weapons is that the U.S. space industry and associated military space
leadership are incapable of delivering any space capability, let alone a space weapon. Space weapons advocates (and there are
some in the military) have little chance when every space penny goes to funding overruns on such programs as the Space-Based
Infrared System (intended to detect and track ballistic missiles) and Future Imagery Architecture (a planned constellation of
reconnaissance satellites)— programs that are both five times more expensive than initially estimated. Those who are genuinely
concerned with space security should take no comfort in these developments. We are confronted with an increasingly
interconnected world served by global utilities, many of which are based in or rely upon space systems. The war on terrorism is
actually a multi-decade war of ideas. Space is a vital component of the information distribution and collection systems that will make
it possible to win that war. Yet, U.S. leadership in space security and industry seems incompetent to address these issues,
particularly from a technically sophisticated standpoint. As such, not only U.S. security, but also global security is at risk.

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Counter-Balancing won’t Happen

Counterbalancing will not occur, but hegemony is not sustainable without further actions.
Josef Joffe, fellow for Centre for Independent Studies, 8/5/2005, “Gulliver Unbound: Can America Rule the
World?”
This is surprising. Many observers expected sharp breaks with the past after the cold war, such as the end of American
hegemony, the return to great-power balancing, the rise of competing regional blocs, and the decay of liberal multilateral
regimes. Yet even without the Soviet threat and bipolarity, the United States, Western Europe, and Japan have reaffirmed
their alliances, contained political conflict, expanded their trade and investment ties, developed new mechanisms for inter-
governmental cooperation, and avoided the return to strategic rivalry and traditional balance-of-power politics. Continuity, not
transformation, has been the hallmark of the post–cold war era. Change today is not revolutionary but incremental, a variation on an
old theme: it mainly entails the expansion and integration of the 1940s order rather than something new. World politics is much like
contemporary suburban sprawl, in which expansion is relentless but the basic model or organizational logic dates to the 1950s. Like
suburban sprawl, contemporary world politics involves the unwieldy and unplanned growth of “more of the same.” The old roads and
bridges, not built for today’s traffic, threaten breakdown and gridlock. But an entirely new system, absent an earthquake, is
unthinkable. What we need are city planners who can insinuate some design into the sprawl, and engineers who can repair and
expand basic infrastructure. The American postwar order has been hugely successful, built on a rich tradition of thinking and practice
centered on how markets, society, democracy, and institutions can give shape to political order. The ability of the industrial
democracies to dampen or overcome the underlying manifestations of anarchy (order built on balance of power) and
domination (order built on coercive hegemony) explains the character and persistence of this order. Yet most observers have
failed to recognize its institutional foundation—a logic in which the connecting and constraining effects of institutions and democratic
polities reduce the incentives of great powers to engage in strategic rivalry or balance against American hegemony. Because of its
distinctively open domestic political system, and because of the array of power-dampening institutions it has created to
manage international political conflict, the United States has been able to remain at the center of an expanding,
institutionalized, and legitimate political order

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Counter-Balancing won’t Happen

Counter-balancing is ineffective to US hegemony
William Thomas Allison, professor at the Australian Defence Force Academy, 9/24/2007, “Primacy and the
Unipolar Moment: The Debate over American Power in an Asymmetrical World” as published in the Australian
Army Journal
How then do major powers bring about a multipolar system or at least begin to balance US hegemonic power? After all, it is
an ‘ironclad rule of international history that hegemons always provoke, and are defeated by, the counter-hegemonic
balancing of other great powers’. Hard-power, or military force, counter-balancing seems out of the question, considering the
disparity between US military power and that of its distant military rivals. Moreover, the risk-reward calculus of such a strategy
of counter-balancing would favor none of the potential challengers. Some argue that soft-balancing strategies that are non-
military in nature, like diplomacy, international law, multilateral international institutions, or transnational organisations, can
limit hegemonic, or in this case US, behavior. Such a peaceful approach does not overtly threaten or unnecessarily provoke the
superpower. While this might be good on paper, such approaches have not had much success in recent years in counter-
balancing US hegemony, mainly because of the impotency of international institutions.
Counter-balancing will not occur effectively.
G. John Ikenberry, IR professor at Georgetown University, 4/28/2003, “Strategic Reactions to American

Preeminence: Great Power Politics in the Age of Unipolarity”
American unipolar power is unlikely to trigger a full-scale, traditional balance of power response. The major powers – Russia,
China, Germany, France, Britain and Japan – will attempt to resist, work around, and counter American power -- even as they
also engage and work with American power. But they are not likely to join in an anti-American countervailing coalition that
will break the world up into hostile, competing camps. The balance of power is the most time-honored way of thinking about
politics among the great powers. 2[2] In this classical view, when confronted with a rising and dominant state, weaker states flock
together and build an alternative power bloc. The circumstances for this type of dramatic, order-transforming move do not exist
-- and they are not likely to exist even if American power continues to rise relative to other major states and even if American
policy antagonizes other states in the way that is has recently over the Iraq war. There are a variety of reasons why this is so. One is
simply that a bloc of major states with sufficient power capabilities to challenge the United States is not possible to assemble.
Another is that American power itself is not sufficiently threatening to provoke a counter- balancing response. To be sure,
American power – and the policies and roles that this power enables – does worry other major states. Responding to it is their
major geopolitical challenge. But counter-balancing responses – manifest in separate and competing security alliances and
systematic policies of opposition – are both not feasible and not responsive to the distinctive challenges posed by unipolarity.
What troubles the other major countries about American power cannot be remedied by the classic geopolitical tool of the
balance of power.

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Counter-Balancing Won’t Happen

There is nothing to counter-balance US Hegemony.

Third, there is no other rival global ideology to the American liberal vision. Other countries may not like specific features of
America’s ideological commitment to democracy, open markets, and the globalization of the world system, but alternative
worldviews are not yet in sight. No other state offers a vision of world order that would facilitate the creation of a counter-
American global coalition. Fourth, the recent exercise of American military power – in Afghanistan and Iraq – has shown the
world how extraordinary and effective that power is. In effect, the exercise of power has created even more power – or at least
revealed that power to the world. The United States can take down entire regimes without sustaining high costs of manpower
or national treasure. The cost of war has gone down, particular in the areas where war is most likely. This expands the realms in
which American military power can be projected. The inability of other great powers to do the same further intensifies the
power disparities. Finally, although the Cold War is over, the American system of client states and security ties is still in place
across Europe and East Asia. Many of these security protection agreements grew out of the bipolar struggle with the Soviet Union,
but they were not disassembled with the collapse of the Soviet Union. This means that there is an entire global system of formal
and informal security ties that continue to make states dependent on the United States for protection. These states – who exist
in all regions of the world – have reasons to remain tied to the United States. There are no good substitutes for military junior
partnership. Japan is a good example. It may not like to be so tied to the United States for security protection but it is in a
security box. All the other alternatives are more risky and costly. This legacy of the Cold War reinforces the structure of hierarchy
inherent in a unipolar order.

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Counter-Balancing Won’t Happen

Counter-balancing will never happen and is counterproductive for other
countries

The first facet of American power is its traditional power assets – material capabilities that allow it to pursue its objective and get
other states to go along with it. One aspect of material capabilities is the sheer size of the American military establishment. As
mentioned earlier, American military expenditures are greater than the next fourteen countries combined – and if current
trends continue, the United States military expenditures will be equal to the rest of the world combined by 2007. The advanced
technological character of much of this military power makes this power disparity even greater. This mass of military power
makes it difficult if not impossible for a group of states to develop capabilities that could balance or counter the United States.
But other considerations further increase the difficulties of organizing a counter-balancing coalition. First, there are collective
action problems. States might like to see the formation of a counter-unipolar coalition but they would prefer other states do the
work of organizing it and covering its costs. This is the problem of “buck passing” – the collective action problem that makes it
less likely that a coalition will form. There is also the problem of regional blocking problems. If particular great powers do
decide to amass greater military power to challenge the United States, other major states in their region are likely to be threatened
by this move and challenge it. For example, if Japan were to undertake military mobilization to counter the United States, it would
find a hostile East Asian neighborhood awaited it. These considerations make counter-balancing unlikely. 5[5] Other material
power assets also work to America’s advantage – namely, security protection, markets, and nuclear weapons. Alliance security
protection that the United States has the capacity to extend to states in all four corners of the world provides a positive incentive to
cooperate with the United States. This incentive is of two sorts. One is simply that American security protection reduces the
resources that these countries would otherwise need to generate to cover their own protection. It is a cost-effective way to deal
with the elemental problem of national security. If it means working with the United States and not offering opposition to it,
the forgoing of this option of opposition is a cost that is more than compensated by the value of the security protection itself.
The second benefit of security protection, at least for some states, it that it means that these states won’t need to face the
regional challenges that might come if they provided for their own security. Germany and Japan are the best examples of this.
By positioning themselves under the American security umbrella, Germany and Japan were able to reassure their worried neighbors
that they would not become future security threats to their respective regions. The United States is able to provide security to so many
countries because it has the economic and military capabilities to do so on a worldwide basis. Indeed, it might well be that economies
of scale exist for a versatile and high-tech military power such as the United States.

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Hegemony Solves EU CB and NATO

US hegemony prevents EU counter-balancing and saves NATO.
Christopher Layne, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, 6/1/2008, “It's
Over, Over There: The Coming Crack-up in Transatlantic Relations”
The United States is determined to maintain its regional hegemony in Europe, and thus to keep NATO intact, in order to
prevent the EU from emerging as a rival pole of power in the international system. However, US strategy has changed subtly.
During the Cold War, the US needed large numbers of troops in Western Europe to keep the Europeans from being at each other's
throats; contain Germany; deter the Soviet Union; and prevent Western Europe from developing the capabilities to act autonomously
in the realms of foreign and security policy. One might term the US strategic role in Europe during this period as one of 'positive
hegemony.' Today, however, although the American goal of preventing the emergence of an independent pole of power on the
Continent has remained constant, the means of attaining it have changed. The US no longer deems it necessary to maintain a
huge military presence on the Continent to control Europe. Instead of positive hegemony, the United States has now embraced
a policy of negative hegemony.

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Must Increase Hegemony Now

US must end proliferation now, we are on the brink of nuclear attacks
Shultz et al., George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, Mr. Shultz, a
distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry
was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger, chairman of Kissinger Associates, was secretary of
state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 1/4/2007, “A
World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, Published in the Wall Street Journal.
North Korea’s recent nuclear test and Iran’s refusal to stop its program to enrich uranium—potentially to weapons grade—
highlight the fact that the world is now on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era. Most alarmingly, the likelihood
that non-state terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weaponry is increasing. In today’s war waged on world order by terrorists,
nuclear weapons are the ultimate means of mass devastation. And non-state terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are conceptually
outside the bounds of a deterrent strategy and present difficult new security challenges. Apart from the terrorist threat, unless urgent
new actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically
disorienting, and economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence. It is far from certain that we can successfully
replicate the old Soviet-American “mutually assured destruction” with an increasing number of potential nuclear enemies worldwide
without dramatically increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be used. New nuclear states do not have the benefit of years of
step-by-step safeguards put in effect during the Cold War to prevent nuclear accidents, misjudgments, or unauthorized
launches. The United States and the Soviet Union learned from mistakes that were less than fatal. Both countries were diligent to
ensure that no nuclear weapon was used during the Cold War, by design or by accident. Will new nuclear nations and the world be as
fortunate in the next 50 years as we were during the Cold War?

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Addressing Climate Solves Hegemony

Addressing climate change restores US hegemony.
Washington Quarterly, publication concerning United States actions past, present, and future, 4/1/2008 “Real
Leaders Do Soft Power: Learning the Lessons of Iraq”
Second, Washington can restore the legitimacy of U.S. leadership by showing a greater willingness to take into account the
views of its necessary partners. The administration’s about-face on North Korea and Iran and support for global initiatives on
HIV/AIDS and malaria are valuable steps in the right direction. Yet, more could be done, starting with a leadership role in
addressing climate change, supporting the International Criminal Court, and reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in U.S.
strategy to bolster the flagging nonproliferation regime. The United States has a unique capacity to foster peace and stability in the
world, but its unique role and capabilities do not justify an unconstrained version of U.S. exceptionalism. If the United States wants
others to live by the rules and be “responsible global stakeholders,” it must accept the need to do the same.

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Hegemony Good Impacts – Indonesia Add-On

Hegemony solves Indonesian economy and prevents instability.
John T. Dori, former Research Associate in The Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, 2006,
“Indonesia's Economic and Political Crisis: A Challenge for U.S. Leadership in Asia”
Indonesia's present economic and political crisis presents a key challenge to U.S. leadership in Asia. Indonesia has been
devastated by an economic crisis comparable to the U.S. Great Depression. At the same time, Indonesia is beginning a political
reform process that many Indonesians hope will reverse the effects of years of strict political authoritarianism and economic autocracy.
By offering targeted assistance, the United States can help Indonesians to emerge from their crisis and perhaps to build the
world's third-largest democracy. By helping in Indonesia's economic recovery, the United States can lessen the impact of Asia's
economic crisis on the U.S. economy. Although offering humanitarian food assistance and necessary economic advice to
prevent a second Indonesian political crisis, the United States also should encourage Indonesians to consolidate free-market
economic reforms that promote transparency in the financial sector and reduce the government's role in the economy. The
United States also can offer advice to help new political parties to learn democratic skills. Just as important, it should rebuild ties to
Indonesia's military as it promotes reform in that institution.
Indonesia key to US security
Indonesia is important as well to the security of the United States. Indonesia sits astride strategic sea lanes connecting the
Indian and Pacific Oceans through which passes 40 percent of the world's shipping, including 80 percent of Japan's oil supply and
70 percent of South Korea's. Indonesia has been suspicious of China's intentions in the region and has worked within ASEAN to
convince China to modify its claims to most of the South China Sea. In recent years, the United States and Indonesia have affirmed
their interest in regional security by engaging in military exercises, some in Australia. And, as the world's largest Muslim state,
Indonesia has been a welcome moderating force in the Islamic world. The United States should champion reforms that revive
Indonesia's economy and encourage its transition to a democratic political system.
Indonesia on the brink now.
But the current calm could prove illusory. Predictions of dire food shortages as early as this fall raise the prospect of renewed
violence and rioting that could lead to a second Indonesian political crisis. The United States should do what it can to help
Indonesia to avoid further economic dislocation and violence, and to safeguard and advance the tentative steps toward economic
and political reform that have been made since President Suharto's ouster.

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Hegemony Good Impacts – Climate Solvency

Hegemony is key to global climate change solvency.
Lynn M. Wagner, editor for the International Institute for Sustainable Development's Reporting Services (IISD
RS) Division, 2008, “Identifying US Preferences and a Way Forward in the Ozone, Climate and Forests
Regimes”
The three books demonstrate the importance of norm entrepreneurs and leaders for effective international environmental policy.
Hoffmann's computer simulation indicates that a norm entrepreneur who only reaches 30 percent of agents can still produce an
outcome in which 70 percent of agents accept the norm. Hoffmann also suggests that a hegemon may act as a norm entrepreneur,
although he finds that US entrepreneurial activity on climate change has caused instability in the global governance of climate
change. Davenport presents suggestions for how the willingness of the United States to take on a leadership role could be increased.
Could the same actions increase US willingness to change its entrepreneurial activity? Humphreys' proposal to negotiate a
convention on transnational corporations would benefit from consideration of what would be involved for a norm entrepreneur or
leading state to take it up. He suggests that the very "revitalization of the charter as an active instrument for accountability will
stimulate citizen [End Page 141] engagement and participatory democracy" (p. 231), although Hoffmann's simulation on norm
creation suggests that the first step should come from a norm entrepreneur. Similarly, Davenport suggests that, under current
circumstances, US leadership is required for effective agreements to emerge. What would need to precede the development of a
charter to ensure that it would have US support? The case studies presented in these three books illustrate the difficulties in assessing
costs, benefits and underlying norms for the negotiator and analyst alike, but they also indicate that that they do change. The
negotiators' changing positions in international talks about ozone depletion, climate change and forests are admirably charted and
analyzed in these three books, and point to potential actions and some hope for those who would like see the development of effective
environmental policies.

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Hegemony Good Impacts – Proliferation

Hegemony key to stop proliferation
Shultz et al., George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, Mr. Shultz, a
distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry
was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger, chairman of Kissinger Associates, was secretary of
state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 1/4/2007, “A
World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, Published in the Wall Street Journal.
Nuclear weapons today present tremendous dangers, but also an historic opportunity. U.S. leadership will be required to take
the world to the next stage—to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to
preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world. Nuclear
weapons were essential to maintaining international security during the Cold War because they were a means of deterrence. The end of
the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete. Deterrence continues to be a relevant consideration
for many states with regard to threats from other states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly
hazardous and decreasingly effective.

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Hegemony Good Impacts – NATO

US leadership is key to NATO and EU security.
Richard Holbrooke and Ronald D. Asmus, Richard Holbrooke, a former U.S. ambassador to the United
Nations. Ronald D. Asmus is executive director of the German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Center in
Brussels. 3/14/2006, “Next Step for NATO”, published in the Washington Post.
In the new global security environment, NATO has to address the gravest threats to its members' collective security. But now
those threats come thousands of miles from the European heartland, not just a few yards away on the East Berlin side of
Checkpoint Charlie. If NATO does not take on more of these problems, we will all be less safe, and the alliance will again risk
becoming irrelevant. This does not mean that NATO should, or could, become a globo-cop; not every security problem in the world
is of direct concern to NATO, and not every issue can be solved by it. Nor is this a call for a new age of Western imperialism; we are
talking here of dealing with issues of national security vital to all NATO members -- issues that happen to lie outside NATO's
traditional area of concern but on which NATO can make a difference. In fact, NATO has put its toe in some global waters by
(belatedly) taking over a major mission in Afghanistan authorized by the United Nations, starting a modest training mission for Iraq,
flying relief missions to the earthquake zone in Pakistan, and beginning (again, belatedly) to discuss a significant, U.N.-authorized
role in Darfur. These are all commendable actions, but NATO has not yet crossed the Rubicon and explicitly embraced a more
global mission. Each individual NATO action thus becomes the arena for an internal battle royal. It is time for a formal policy
decision, which should be made soon and then announced at the NATO summit eight months from now in Riga, Latvia. For NATO to
make this mission leap, there must be real European support and effective U.S. leadership. In principle, a more global NATO
would pursue precisely the kind of goals embraced in Europe's own security strategy. Defending Europe by dealing with these
new threats is a core European -- and U.S.-Canadian -- foreign policy objective. A case in point is Iran, where policy is now weakened
because it is divided among several institutions, no single one of which contains all the Western nations whose security is endangered
by Tehran's nuclear program. It should be stressed in this regard that involving NATO does not necessarily mean military action; it
means, however, a seriousness of diplomatic and political purpose backed by the threat of collective action.
US hegemony key to NATO.
This article is structured as follows. First, I discuss the historical roots of the current tensions in transatlantic relations. Second, I argue
that the real source of transatlantic conflict is America's role as a global — and European — hegemon, and the concomitant gap in
hard-power capabilities between the United States and Europe. Third, I show that, although US primacy is the major cause of
transatlantic friction, the very fact of American hegemony is what explains why NATO still is in business more than a decade
after the Cold War's end. I conclude that, although NATO essentially is obsolete as a military alliance, US power will not be
retracted from Europe any time soon. As long as there is a consensus among the American foreign policy elite that the US
should be a global hegemon NATO will continue to be perceived as an indispensable instrument both of US geopolitical
preeminence, and America's containment of European power.

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Hegemony Good Impacts – UN, genocide, security, proliferation

US leadership key to the UN and solving genocide, proliferation, and US security.
Linda S. Jamison, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/5/2007, “Leadership vs.
Stewardship: Advice for the New UN Ambassador”
The United Nations is the most successful international institution ever established, and that stature has allowed the
international body to set norms and standards of international behavior that one country could never impose on its own. The
62-year history of the United Nations has proven that shaming human rights abusers, curbing weapons proliferation, stopping
genocide, conducting peacekeeping, and mitigating conflict are best done when the world stands together, even when the
outcome is insufficient or the problem goes unsolved. The United Nations was never intended to solve the world’s problems. It was
envisioned as a mechanism to manage and mitigate conflict by providing a forum for dialogue to save the world from catastrophe. But
regardless of any successes that the United Nations has had over the years, it needs the might and will of the world’s
superpower behind it — at every level. The United Nations needs U.S. leadership in order to be a more effective body, and the
United States needs the United Nations to help counter violence and threats to peace. No degree of raw power can ever
substitute for the agility of leadership and the ability to bring the world together for the greater good of humanity.

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Hegemony Good Impacts – Middle East

US leadership causes Middle Eastern peace.
Daniel C. Kurtzer, S. Daniel Abraham Visiting Professor of Middle East Policy Studies at Princeton
University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Aªairs, served as U.S. Ambassador to Egypt
from 1997 to 2001 and U.S. Ambassador to Israel from 2001 to 2005, August 2008, Shortsighted Statecraft
Washington's Muddled Middle East Policy
Strong U.S. leadership in the Arab-Israeli peace process can make a difference. A coherent strategy in Iraq can be formulated so
as to disengage and withdraw U.S. forces, instead of pursuing the illusion of a "victory" that remains undefined after more than five
years of war. And although engagement with Iran will not instantly end Tehran's nuclear ambitions and ongoing support of
terrorism, it is surely preferable to waiting until military action becomes the only option available. Smart, sustained diplomatic
engagement may make the challenge of choosing enemies -- and bolstering ties with friends -- much easier for the next president.

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Hegemony Good Impacts – China

Collapse of US leadership causes US-Sino military conflict.
Flynt Leverett and Jeffrey Bader, Flynt Leverett is a senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy
at The Brookings Institution. Jeffrey Bader is director of the Brookings China Initiative, 2006 “Managing
China-U.S. Energy Competition in the Middle East”
The bid by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to acquire Unocal earlier this year triggered not only a hostile
reaction in the U.S. Congress but also growing interest and debate within the foreign policy community about the rapid growth in
China’s energy demand and the prospect for competition between the United States and China for access to global oil and gas
resources.1 Henry Kissinger has gone so far as to argue that competition over hydrocarbon resources will be the most likely
cause for international conflict in coming years. China’s hunt for oil is clearly influencing its foreign policy toward its neighbors,
such as Russia, Japan, and the Central Asian states, and toward regions as far afield as sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.3 As
China seeks access to global energy resources, its status as a rising power is already enabling it to exercise influence in ways
that make it more difficult for the United States and the West to achieve their goals on a number of issues. The potentially
explosive combination of a China less willing to passively accept U.S. leadership and the prospect of competition between
China and other states for control over vital energy resources poses particularly critical challenges to U.S. interests in the
Middle East. Chinese engagement in the Middle East has expanded economically, politically, and strategically over the last
several years. Since the late 1990s, Beijing’s policies toward the region have been closely linked to the objectives of the three major,
state-owned Chinese energy companies—the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China National Petrochemical
Corporation (Sinopec), and CNOOC—to seek access to Middle Eastern oil and gas, frequently on an exclusive basis. Since 2002, the
Middle East has become the leading arena for Beijing’s efforts to secure effective ownership of critical hydrocarbon resources,
rather than relying solely on international markets to meet China’s energy import needs. There is every reason to anticipate
that China will continue and even intensify its emphasis on the Middle East as part of its energy security strategy. China will
likely keep working to expand its ties to the region’s energy exporters over the next several years to ensure that it is not
disadvantaged relative to other foreign customers and to maximize its access to hydrocarbon resources under any foreseeable
circumstances, including possible military conflict with the United States. It seems doubtful that Chinese energy companies’
fledgling efforts to lock up petroleum resources will succeed in keeping a critical mass of oil reserves off an increasingly integrated
and fluid global oil market. Nevertheless, China’s search for oil is making it a new competitor to the United States for influence
in the Middle East. If not managed prudently, this competition will generate multiple points of bilateral friction and damage
U.S. strategic interests in the region.
US leadership on climate key to US-Sino relations
Elizabeth C. Economy, C. V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign
Relations, 10/2007, “The Great Leap Backward?”.
Given this reality, the United States -- and the rest of the world -- will have to get much smarter about how to cooperate with
China in order to assist its environmental protection efforts. Above all, the United States must devise a limited and coherent set of
priorities. China's needs are vast, but its capacity is poor; therefore, launching one or two significant initiatives over the next five to
ten years would do more good than a vast array of uncoordinated projects. These endeavors could focus on discrete issues, such as
climate change or the illegal timber trade; institutional changes, such as strengthening the legal system in regard to China's
environmental protection efforts; or broad reforms, such as promoting energy efficiency throughout the Chinese economy. Another
key to an effective U.S.-Chinese partnership is U.S. leadership. Although U.S. NGOs and U.S.-based MNCs are often at the
forefront of environmental policy and technological innovation, the U.S. government itself is not a world leader on key
environmental concerns. Unless the United States improves its own policies and practices on, for example, climate change, the
illegal timber trade, and energy efficiency, it will have little credibility or leverage to push China

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Hegemony Good Impacts – China Brink

US-Sino relations are strained now.
Maryann Kelton, professor at the School of Political and International Studies, University of Flinders, 2008,
“US Economic Statecraft in East Asia”
There are those in Congress, however, who do not share the same sanguine view. Testimony provided during the 2005
Congressional Armed Services Committee revealed the depth of fear derived from Chinese expansion (US House Armed
Services Committee, 2005). This was reinforced later in the year by the Pentagon's annual report assessing Chinese military
expansion. Reputedly, this report was delayed by some four months as the State and Defense Departments debated the assessment.
Though State argued for a more benign interpretation, the Pentagon promoted a more threatening analysis. Clearly, the hawks in
the administration had bought into an analysis that played on the development of China's nuclear arsenal and the
accumulation of missiles that could target the majority of the US mainland. More broadly, Kurt Campbell interpreted the
change ominously: I think we will look back on 2001–04 as the high point in US-Sino relations. We are entering a new period
where trade tensions, macro-economic disputes and strategic worries are animating the larger picture

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Hegemony Good Impacts – ASEAN 1/2

US hegemony trades off with China in ASEAN countries, leadership key to security and economic
interests.
The recurring pattern of US interest in establishing preferential trade agreements in the Asia Pacific region is, where possible, to
overlay trade agreements upon the established system of security arrangements. The overarching purpose of the economic and
security linkage is to shore up US engagement in a region where China is regarded, particularly by the Pentagon, as an
increasing threat to US hegemony. It is a method by which the US can reinforce its dominance as the hub of both security and
economic arrangements. As FTA negotiations are subject to political and bureaucratic influences, where the domestic elite
value US relations over any Congressional attempt to exacerbate the US gains in an agreement, the FTA will most likely be
signed. Thus, for the US linkage strategy to be set in place, the regional domestic elite payoffs must be perceived as significant
enough to override any losses sustained through a separate neo-mercantilist agenda.
US leadership and action key to maintaining ASEAN relations and solve security issues – economic ties.
The US is aware that China has already signed an agreement with ASEAN that aims to create free trade by 2010. ASEAN
countries are keen to ensure that their specialized high-end manufactures have assured and established markets in China prior to the
internationalization of local Chinese products. With increasing skill development with also a commensurate rise in labor costs ASEAN
countries need to ensure preferential access to Chinese markets as early as possible. Although some of the ASEAN states experienced
their highest growth in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 2004, both China (with US$72 billion) and Hong Kong remained as the
largest and second largest recipients of FDI. ASEAN thus has a particular interest in fostering its associations with the US as it
competes with China (and increasingly India) in this marketplace. Specifically, it has interests in liberalizing its domestic
economy and taxation regulations in raising its magnetism for US FDI. For ASEAN, the necessity for a rapid recovery to the Asian
Financial Crisis also heightened the FDI imperative and sharpened ASEAN's interest in trade agreements with the US.
Responding to questions regarding the competition for influence in Southeast Asia and an appropriate US response to Chinese
clout in the region, the USTR argued that the US ‘should be active in our own right. Our response to others’ activism should be
activism, not negativism'. US relations with Malaysia demonstrate the extent to which the US has prioritized its anti-terrorism
agenda and its preparedness to use its economic statecraft to serve those ends. US–Malaysian relations have endured a roller
coaster ride over the past decade. Tensions relaxed after early support for the US post-September 11; however, they were revived
after the US invasion of Iraq. Malaysia perceived the US operations as damaging to normative behavior in international system and as
an assault against Muslims. However, Malaysia has actively cooperated with the US in the apprehension of alleged Islamic
extremists and suspects in nuclear proliferation networks. Consequently, the US remains prepared to weather criticisms over
its defense policy in order to retain Malaysian cooperation in anti-terrorist activities. Integral in maintaining this level of
Malaysian support has been continued US attention to trade matters. The US signed off on TIFA arrangements in 2004 and launched
FTA negotiations in March 2006. The US remains Malaysia's largest single country export market with export increases of 5.3%
recorded in 2006. The US is the fourth largest investor in Malaysia and its trade deficit since 1992 endures.

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Hegemony Good Impacts – ASEAN 2/2

US leadership tied to ASEAN states combating terrorism, WMD, proliferation, and economic collapse.
Coupled with these twin processes, the rise of fundamentalist terrorist networks with destructive intent beyond local concerns is
of increasing disquiet in the US. These non-conventional and transnational groups operating within the region present an increasing
threat to the US. US military presence in the Middle East, regarded as both a slur against sovereignty and religion for some Islamic
radical and political groups, is being utilized as a recruiting force in Southeast Asia. Where in the past local groups, such as those
insurgent clusters with secessionist interests in The Philippines and Southern Thailand, may have operated in isolation there are
escalating fears that these groups are being infiltrated by those with grander intent (Wright-Neville, 2006). Terrorist bombings on
western targets in the Balinese resorts of Jimbaran Bay in October 2005 following on from previous attacks in Bali, the Jakarta
Mariott, and Kuningan bombings stand as testimony to the capacity of local networks to inflict violence within the region.
Moreover, there exist mounting fears in Washington that the next major attack on the US may originate in Southeast Asia
(Dibb, 2006). Thus, the region assumes greater prominence for the US. Accordingly, Philip Crane, Chair of the US House of
Representatives Subcommittee on Trade, stated that: the importance of the ASEAN region to American political, economic and
security is increasing. US policy must continue to recognize our growing interests in the region, and do more to expand our
engagement of ASEAN and its member nations (Crane, 2003). Shortly after her appointment with USTR, Schwab confirmed that
Southeast Asia remained a ‘top priority’ for both economic and strategic reasons (Office of the USTR, 2006c).
Acknowledgement of this importance had previously been reflected in the US Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI) and the ASEAN
Cooperation Plan (ACP) in 2002, which aimed to facilitate greater cooperation between the US and the ASEAN states. Two-way trade
amounted to US$120 billion and ASEAN collectively was the US' fifth largest trading partner. In particular, these agreements aimed to
improve trade and investment flows between the two groups. Initially, the EAI plan embodied proposals to allow individual ASEAN
states to develop TIFA arrangements and then eventually FTAs. The US also assisted Cambodia with accession to the WTO (a
prerequisite for an FTA with the US) and signaled its willingness to aid Laos and Vietnam in this process. Opportunity was provided
for the ASEAN states to act individually in the negotiation of agreements. Already in place were TIFA agreements signed with The
Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia, and by May 2003, the ‘model’ FTA with Singapore was signed (US Department of State, 2002b).
By August 2006, the US and ASEAN had agreed to a ‘Joint Vision Statement on the Enhanced Partnership’ not only to strengthen
the EAI but to cooperate more closely on transnational security threats which included terrorism, WMD (weapons of mass
destruction) proliferation, drug trafficking, and illegal migration (Office of the USTR, 2007). Moreover, that a number of
ASEAN states oversee the security of crucial sea-lanes including the Straits of Malacca intensifies the magnitude of the
security agenda. The US administration has thus argued that a strong US–ASEAN relationship ‘is a force for stability and
development in the Southeast Asian region’ (US Department of State, 2002a).

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Multipolarity now
Multipolarity NOW.
Parag Khanna, senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation.,
1/27/2008, “Hegemony is a Thing of the Past: Waving Goodbye to Hegemony”, published in the New York
Times
At best, America’s unipolar moment lasted through the 1990s, but that was also a decade adrift. The post-cold-war “peace
dividend” was never converted into a global liberal order under American leadership. So now, rather than bestriding the
globe, we are competing — and losing — in a geopolitical marketplace alongside the world’s other superpowers: the European
Union and China. This is geopolitics in the 21st century: the new Big Three. Not Russia, an increasingly depopulated expanse run by
Gazprom.gov; not an incoherent Islam embroiled in internal wars; and not India, lagging decades behind China in both development
and strategic appetite. The Big Three make the rules — their own rules — without any one of them dominating. And the others
are left to choose their suitors in this post-American world. The more we appreciate the differences among the American,
European and Chinese worldviews, the more we will see the planetary stakes of the new global game. Previous eras of balance of
power have been among European powers sharing a common culture. The cold war, too, was not truly an “East-West” struggle; it
remained essentially a contest over Europe. What we have today, for the first time in history, is a global, multi-civilizational,
multi-polar battle.

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Multipolarity Inevitable
Multipolarity is inevitable – US acceptance of it allows for primacy in the
multipolar system
Unipolar Moment The Debate over American Power in an Asymmetrical World” as published in the Australian
Army Journal
Christopher Layne offers an intriguing alternative to hard-power and soft-power counter-balancing. In what he terms ‘leash-slipping’,
Layne suggests that US hard- power is a ‘non-existential’ threat to the autonomy and interest of other powers. Other powers
see US hegemony as a real threat to their security interests. Moreover, Layne holds that traditional balance-of-power politics is
still alive and well, and because of this other powers will act to counter-balance the hegemon regardless of the nature of the
hegemonic threat. In order to obtain the ability to act independent of the United States to pursue security objectives, other
powers must build up military capabilities to act regionally without the need or behest of the United States. As more states
attain such capability, they can more easily ‘slip free of the hegemon’s leash-like grip and compel the United States to respect their
foreign policy interests’. For Layne, ‘leash-slipping’ is not a hard-power counter to US power because it is does not counter an
‘existential’ threat. Layne argues that successful ‘leash-slipping’ would restore a multipolar system and bring the brief
American unipolar moment to an end. However, the United States can stave off this counter-balancing by adopting ‘an
offshore strategy of self restraint’. In order to lessen the fear of American power, the United States will have to restrain its use
of military force, accommodate the ‘rise of new great powers, and abandon the myth that American national security is
dependent upon a globalised image of itself for the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy’. Thus, accepting a
multipolar system, unilaterally practicing ideological restraint, and depending less upon unilateral use of force—offshore
balancing—will perhaps ensure US primacy in a more accommodating multipolar system

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Multi-polarity is inevitable – India, China, Japan and regional powers will
counter-balance.
Unipolar Moment: The Debate over American Power in an Asymmetrical World” as published in the Australian
Army Journal
So, if the United States does not speak for the international community even though it says it does, is not then the United States a
rogue state? Or, as Huntington suggests, a rogue superpower? While many would not consider the United States a military threat
to their national existence, they do see the United States, in Huntington’s words, as ‘a menace to their integrity, autonomy,
prosperity, and freedom of action’. The major powers view the United States as ‘intrusive, inter- ventionist, exploitive,
unilateralist, hegemonic, hypocritical, and applying double standards’, and using financial, cultural, and intellectual
imperialism to pursue its own goals while stifling those of the major powers. The world’s business is US business. Thus, for a
major power like India, the United States has the capability to veto or at least bring together enough international pressure to prevent
India from pursuing any number of regional and international strategies. For India, the United States is a political and diplomatic
threat, as it is for China, Russia, Japan, and the regional powers of the Middle East. 9 Around the same time as Huntington
proposed the uni-multipolar system as a more accurate view of the new world order, Coral Bell took Krauthammer’s unipolar
concept even further, suggesting that the ‘unipolar moment’of American power will last at least another four decades—much
longer than a ‘moment’. For Bell, the gap that US peer competitors had to overcome to transform the unipolar system into a
multipolar system is currently insurmountable. For a major power such as China, Russia, or Europe to challenge American
supremacy, many diverse obstacles would have to be overcome. In fact, for Bell, multipolarism may not be the best option in
the long run. A return to a bipolar system with either China or Russia as the balancing superpower is much more likely. Like
Krauthammer, Bell points to the United States preference for apparent multilateralism in the way the United States approaches its
unipolar vision: ‘The unipolar world should be run as if it were a concert of powers’. The post-Second World War, US-made
organisations now must be used to at least give the appearance of multilateralism and legitimacy to US action. Witness using the
United Nations Security Council to impose sanctions or condemn the action of another major power. It helps ease the burden of the
unilateralist impulse to use multilateral organisations to put the stamp of international legitimacy on US-desired action. Thus,
the United States uses the pretence of concert as part of its unipolar strategy. Lately, the United States seems to be doing this
quite poorly.

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Multi-polarity and the collapse of hegemony inevitable.
Parag Khanna, senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation.,
1/27/2008, “Hegemony is a Thing of the Past: Waving Goodbye to Hegemony”, published in the New York
Times
It is 2016, and the Hillary Clinton or John McCain or Barack Obama administration is nearing the end of its second term.
America has pulled out of Iraq but has about 20,000 troops in the independent state of Kurdistan, as well as warships
anchored at Bahrain and an Air Force presence in Qatar. Afghanistan is stable; Iran is nuclear. China has absorbed Taiwan
and is steadily increasing its naval presence around the Pacific Rim and, from the Pakistani port of Gwadar, on the Arabian Sea.
The European Union has expanded to well over 30 members and has secure oil and gas flows from North Africa, Russia and the
Caspian Sea, as well as substantial nuclear energy. America’s standing in the world remains in steady decline. Why? Weren’t we
supposed to reconnect with the United Nations and reaffirm to the world that America can, and should, lead it to collective
security and prosperity? Indeed, improvements to America’s image may or may not occur, but either way, they mean little.
Condoleezza Rice has said America has no “permanent enemies,” but it has no permanent friends either. Many saw the
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as the symbols of a global American imperialism; in fact, they were signs of imperial
overstretch. Every expenditure has weakened America’s armed forces, and each assertion of power has awakened resistance in the
form of terrorist networks, insurgent groups and “asymmetric” weapons like suicide bombers. America’s unipolar moment has
inspired diplomatic and financial counter movements to block American bullying and construct an alternate world order. That
new global order has arrived, and there is precious little Clinton or McCain or Obama could do to resist its growth.

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EU will counter-balance
EU will counter-balance US hegemony.
Three considerations predict that the EU will counter-balance the US in coming years. First, EU military capabilities
constitute a hedge against future American policies. Although 'the US may be a benign hegemon today, there is no reason to
assume it will always be so' (Posen, 2004, 9). Second, Europe is concerned about how its overall political and economic position
in the international system is affected by American power (Art, 2004, 180). Indeed, there is 'a growing sense among many
Europeans that the current and deeply uneven distribution of power leaves them far too dependent on an America whose views on
world politics it does not necessarily share' (Cox, 2005, 226). Third, by investing itself with the capability to act autonomously of
the United States in the realm of security, the European Union can also gain bargaining power to force the US to respect
European interests abroad rather than running roughshod over them. As Barry Posen (2004, 9) has said, the EU's drive to build-
up its own military capabilities is consistent with the expectation that in a unipolar world, those actors that can do so 'will at a
minimum act to buffer themselves against the caprices of the US and will try to carve out the ability to act autonomously should it
become necessary.' If the EU's drive to gain military independence from Washington through the European Security and
Defence Policy (EDSP) is successful, the result would be the creation of a new pole of power in the international system which
would (along China's rise) restore multipolarity — and bring American hegemony to an end.

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Hegemony Inevitable
Hegemony is inevitable – soft power uncontestable
Josef Joffe, fellow for Centre for Independent Studies, 8/5/2005, “Gulliver Unbound: Can America Rule the
World?”
Nonetheless, history and theory suggest that this cannot last. In the international system, power will always beget counter-
power, usually by way of coalitions and alliances among the lesser players, and ultimately war, as in the cases of Napoleon,
Wilhelm II. and Adolf I. Has this game already begun? The answer is 'no, but…'. It is 'no' for two reasons. First, America irks
and domineers, but it does not conquer. It tries to call the shots and bend the rules, but it does not go to war for land and glory. Maybe,
America was simply lucky. Its 'empire' was at home, between the Appalachians and the Pacific, and its enemies-Indians and
Mexicans-easily bested. The last time the US actually did conquer was in the Philippines and Cuba a hundred years ago. This is a
critical departure from traditional great power behaviour. For the balance-of-power machinery to crank up, it makes a difference
whether the others face a usually placid elephant or an aggressive T. rex. Rapacious powers are more likely to trigger hostile coalitions
than nations that contain themselves, so to speak. And when the U.S. attacked Afghanistan and Iraq, it was not exactly invading an
innocent like Belgium. Nonetheless, Mr. Big is no pussycat, and he does throw his weight around. Why is it so hard to balance
against him? My answer: Counter-aggregations do not deal very well with the postmodern nature of power. Let's make no
mistake about it. 'Hard' power-men and missiles, guns and ships-still counts. It remains the ultimate, because existential,
currency of power. But on the day-to-day transaction level, 'soft power' is the more interesting coinage. It is 'less coercive and
less tangible'. It grows out of 'the attraction of one's ideas. It has to do with 'agenda setting', with 'ideology' and 'institutions',
and with holding out big prizes for cooperation, such as the vastness and sophistication of one's market. 'Soft power' is
cultural-economic power, and very different from its military kin. The US has the most sophisticated army in the world. But it
is in a class of its own in the soft-power game. On that table, none of the others can match America's pile of chips; it is
American books and movies, universities and research labs, American tastes high and low that predominate in the global market.
This type of power-a culture that radiates outward and a market that draws inward-rests on pull, not on push; on acceptance, not on
imposition. Nor do the many outweigh the one. In this arena, Europe, Japan, China and Russia cannot meaningfully 'gang up' on the
US like in an alliance of yore. All of their movie studios together could not break Hollywood's hold because if size mattered, India,
with the largest movie output in the world, would rule the roost. Nor could all their universities together dethrone Harvard and
Stanford. For sheer numbers do not lure the best and the brightest from abroad who keep adding to the competitive advantage of
America's top universities. Against soft power, aggregation does not work. How does one contain power that flows not from
coercion but seduction? Might it work in the economic sphere? There is always the option of trading blocs-cum-protectionism. But
would Europe (or China or Japan) forego the American market for the Russian one? Or would Europe seek solace in its vast internal
market alone? If so, it would forgo the competitive pressures and the diffusion of technology that global markets provide. The future is
mapped out by DaimlerChrysler, not by a latter-day 'European Co- Prosperity Sphere'. This is where the game has changed most
profoundly. Its rivals would rather deal with America's 'soft power' by competition and imitation because the costs of
economic warfare are too high-provided, of course, that strategic threats do not re-emerge. To best Gulliver, Europe et. al. must
do their work-out at home.

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Hegemony Turns Itself

Hegemony creates the threats it tries to solve.
Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson professor of International Politics at Columbia University, 2007, “The
Remaking of the Unipolar World” as published in The Washington Quarterly.
The U.S. position in the world is without precedent, but the basic impulses animating it are not. Having established order
within its large sphere, a hegemon will find itself threatened by whatever is beyond its reach. The very extent of the hegemon’s
influence means that all sorts of geographic and ideological disturbances can threaten it. Frontiers can be expanded, but doing
so just recreates them. Despite the fact that or perhaps because it lacked what would now be referred to as peer competitors,
the Roman empire was never able to establish stable frontiers, and although the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century
was able to develop tolerable working relationships with European states, its empire expanded beyond the original intention in
part because of the inability to control and limit its holdings in Africa and Asia. Having established trading outposts, it was driven
to further expansion not only by competition with other European states, but by the difficulties of establishing local order.7 For the
United States, the frontier is ideological rather than geographic, but the basic point is the same: preservation of a desirable and
ordered zone requires taming or subduing areas and ideologies of potential disturbance. Hegemony thus also ironically
magnifies the sense of threat. The very fact that the United States has interests throughout the world leads to the fear that
undesired changes in one area could undermine its interests elsewhere. Most changes will harm the United States if they do not
improve its situation. Furthermore, U.S. hegemony means that even those who share its values and interests have incentives to free
ride on its efforts, knowing that Washington cannot shirk its role. Thus, although the United States has few intrinsic interests in the
borderlands around China and Japan is strong enough to carry much of the weight in this region, U.S. fears about the rise of
China follow a certain logic.

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Hegemony 1NC/2AC

DDI ’08 Clark/Martin

Hegemony 1NC/2AC Supplement

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 1

Hegemony is not sustainable

Hegemony is not sustainable – action is the only alternative.

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 2

Current Hegemony doesn’t solve - Space

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 3

Counter-Balancing won’t Happen

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 4

Counter-Balancing won’t Happen

Counter-balancing will not occur effectively.

G. John Ikenberry, IR professor at Georgetown University, 4/28/2003, “Strategic Reactions to American

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 5

Counter-Balancing Won’t Happen

G. John Ikenberry, IR professor at Georgetown University, 4/28/2003, “Strategic Reactions to American

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 6

Counter-Balancing Won’t Happen

G. John Ikenberry, IR professor at Georgetown University, 4/28/2003, “Strategic Reactions to American

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 7

Hegemony Solves EU CB and NATO

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 8

Must Increase Hegemony Now

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 9

Addressing Climate Solves Hegemony

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 10

Hegemony Good Impacts – Indonesia Add-On

Indonesia key to US security

Indonesia on the brink now.

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 11

Hegemony Good Impacts – Climate Solvency

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 12

Hegemony Good Impacts – Proliferation

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 13

Hegemony Good Impacts – NATO

US hegemony key to NATO.

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 14

Hegemony Good Impacts – UN, genocide, security, proliferation

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 15

Hegemony Good Impacts – Middle East

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 16

Hegemony Good Impacts – China

US leadership on climate key to US-Sino relations

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 17

Hegemony Good Impacts – China Brink

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 18

Hegemony Good Impacts – ASEAN 1/2

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 19

Hegemony Good Impacts – ASEAN 2/2

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 20

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 21

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 22

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 23

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 24

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 25

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 26

Hegemony Turns Itself

If you hate hegemony, then the terrorists will have won. 27

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