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Delivery problems and lack of utility make it unlikely that bio weapons will be used on the
battlefield.
The Washington Note. "Wolfowitz's Xmas Present to Troops: Anthrax vaccine?" 19 Dec. 2004
http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/000241.php
Environmental conditions (such as rain and wind) make it an imprecise weapon to deploy on a large scale. A shell
can be filled and fired, but because of the incubation period (48-72 hours, as stated above) it has limited tactical battlefield value. I
assume that the military has monitoring tools in place to identify whether or not a biological weapons attack is taking
place. If one were to happen, area troops could be evacuated for evaluation and treatment before symptoms manifested
themselves. I have difficulty thinking of a scenario where anthrax could be effectively deployed on such a scale
where a sizeable portion of target troops would require medical aid. With the resources of the US military I cannot
think of a likely opponent who would have adequate control of a portion of the battlespace to be able to deliver a
chemical or biological weapon. Anthrax's use as a weapon is best illustrated with the attack on the Senate. Concentrated exposure (via
a powder-filled envelope) will result in death within days, as the above poster pointed out. It seems to me that it is an effective weapon for
individual attacks where the target is unprepared and unprotected (essentially terrorist attacks). I don't see why we must inoculate the entire
military for such a limited threat. A more cost-effective approach to mitigating the risk would be in agent detection and accelerated treatment
for affected troops. Other chemical weapons such as mustard gas do have an immediate tactical impact. However, their utility is limited
because if they were to be deployed on a vast scale they are just as likely to affect the attacker as well as the
attacked.
Biological weapons cannot cause mass destruction and will not be used in war.
The Washington Note. "Wolfowitz's Xmas Present to Troops: Anthrax vaccine?" 19 Dec. 2004
http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/000241.php
Depending on the biological weapon used, delivery can become even more difficult. An infectious agent needs to be
introduced into the target population. This may be possible in a terrorist scenario, but it is highly unlikely that troops would
allow an enemy to walk up and sneeze on them, for example. A less facetious example would be a shell filled with an ebola-
like virus. But just because the shell is delivered does not necessitate infection amongst the target. This is not to minimize the
risk, but as with anthrax it is more effective to monitor for signs of infection and have treatment (including quarantine) ready. The threat
from chemical and biological weapons is at its most acute in the sphere of terrorism, not conventional warfare.
Biological and chemical weapons are NOT weapons of mass destruction of the same caliber as nuclear weapons. While
one vial of some horrible substance may be enough to wipe out thousands, there still remains the problem of a
reliable delivery system. The best way to mitigate that threat is to have freely available medical care. One warhead really can wipe out
millions and the delivery systems are well-tested. That is a weapon of mass destruction. I can only guess as to why the administration has spent
so much time and effort on the danger of anthrax. I suppose it has something to do with maintaining the fiction that Iraq really was a "gathering
threat".
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AT Bio War
Biological Weapons are unlikely to be used in War.
Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky.(Director emeritus of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, is a member of the Arms
Control Association Board of Directors). "Dismantling the Concept of Weapons of Mass Destruction." Arms Control
Today. April 1998 http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_04/wkhp98.asp
Biological weapons have not been used in warfare in modern times, but they have been and are still being stockpiled. The former Soviet Union had an extensive
program, the status of which remains under some cloud. The United States had an offensive BW program until the early 1970s. The future threat of biological weapons is real. Modern technology has produced and will continue to
produce a long list of potentially powerful agents and toxins, and several means of dispersal have been tested. Much has been written recently about the lethality of biological weapons. If virulent BW materials were to be widely
occur, the materials cannot be dispersed by a single-point explosion, but instead must be spread by an appropriate mechanism such as spray tanks or by
"fractionating" a missile's payload and dispersing separate mini-munitions over a wide area. Moreover, survival of BW material depends critically on local
meteorological and other conditions which define the delivery environment. The survival of agents is generally of
short duration and effects are delayed for days. Fortunately, there is no operational experience and test data are limited.
Chemical weapons were used extensively by the Central and Allied Powers during World War I, and to a very limited extent in World War II when Japan used them in its invasion of Manchuria. Iraq has used chemical weapons
against both its own Kurdish population and Iran, and Egypt reportedly used CW against Yemen in the mid-1960s. The United States and Russia still possess their Cold War inventories of 30,000 and 40,000 tons of agents,
respectively, which they are committed to destroy over the next decade at a cost of as much as $15 billion to $20 billion. There is little question that the lethality of chemical weapons-as measured by per unit weight of delivered
munitions-is lower by many orders of magnitude than it is for nuclear weapons or the undemonstrated and inherently uncertain potential of biological weapons. Thus, it is misleading to include chemical weapons in the category of
WMD; "weapons of indiscriminate destruction" or "weapons of terror" might be a more appropriate designation. Feasibility of Defenses Meaningful defense against nuclear weapons, either by passive or active means, is
extremely difficult if not impossible. This conclusion stems both from the extreme destructiveness of a single nuclear explosion and the multitude of delivery options available to an attacker. Each attempted intercept would have to
be extremely effective and the defense must be all-inclusive against feasible means of nuclear attack. Delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons in the form of land- or sea-based ballistic and cruise missiles of various ranges, artillery
shells and aircraft have been developed and deployed. Nuclear explosives have been "weaponized" into atomic demolition munitions, anti-submarine weapons, earth penetrators, and air and missile defense warheads. Nuclear
weapons can also be delivered on short-range missiles fired from nearby ships, detonated on board ships in a harbor, or simply smuggled across national borders. During World War II, British air defenses succeeded in shooting
down approximately one in 10 attacking aircraft carrying conventional bombs. As a result, German air force units were reduced by a factor of three after flying 10 attacking sorties. London stood, although it was badly battered. Yet
a single, successfully delivered large thermonuclear warhead would have wiped out most of the population and structures of that great city. Thus, the standard which a defense against nuclear weapons has to meet is vastly higher
than that required for conventional military exchanges. Such a standard simply cannot be met, particularly given the action-reaction dynamics between defense and offense. In response to deployed defenses, the offense can deploy
countermeasures (such as decoys) and multiple or maneuvering vehicles, or can even change its means of delivery and bypass the defense altogether. Undoubtedly, such offensive stratagems would, in almost all cases, be much
cheaper than the cost of the defense and still leave the threatened country just as vulnerable. Passive defenses are of limited value because a nuclear explosion results both in intense prompt effects (such as blast, radiation and heat)
and delayed effects (such as firestorms and radioactive fallout). Consequently, independent of the outcome of the highly politicized debate whether to develop and eventually deploy an expensive national missile defense (NMD)
system, protection against nuclear weapons by technical means will remain elusive. Protection, therefore, must be sought through dissuading potential opponents from acquiring or delivering nuclear weapons, or through their
global prohibition. Technical defenses have a much more significant role against BW and CW. Passive defenses (such as gas masks and
protective clothing) can be quite effective against both BW and CW, and such protection can be made generally available to troops and, to a more limited extent, to civilian
.
populations (as Israel did, for example, during the Gulf War). While masks and protective clothing are available to the military, they are only reluctantly used because they interfere with the performance of troops in combat
Preventive vaccinations against biological agents can be effective, but only if the type and strain of enemy biological weapons are known. Unfortunately, due to
advances in biotechnology, the list of potentially lethal agents has lengthened and strains of agents resistant to particular vaccines continue to evolve. Thus, mass vaccinations against a single agent, such as those recently ordered
against anthrax for U.S. troops deployed in the Persian Gulf, can be negated if an attacker has an alternate agent available. In general, it is difficult for either side to estimate in advance the effectiveness of passive countermeasures
against BW and CW. Active defenses against BW and CW are equally difficult to evaluate due to the large number of delivery options available. It is interesting to note that the currently proposed U.S. NMD system, as designed,
would be ineffective against delivery of BW by ballistic missiles if their payloads were fractionated to assure dispersal of the agents, which is necessary to achieve a major impact. Potential Missions In view of their inherent
differences, the potential military roles of the three types of weapons are entirely different. Nuclear weapons remain in the inventories of the five declared nuclear-weapon states, and India, Israel and Pakistan either possess usable
nuclear weapons or can rapidly assemble them. Because there are currently no deployed NMD systems besides Russia's old and very limited deployment around Moscow, and because such systems are expected to be ineffective at
any rate, hostile nuclear explosions can only be prevented by successfully maintaining the tradition of non-use of such weapons, converting this tradition to policy and eventually removing such weapons from national inventories.
The tradition of non-use has been enforced in the past by treaty, by political dissuasion and through deterrence of nuclear weapons use by the existence of nuclear retaliatory forces. One can only hope that such measures will
continue to prevent the use of nuclear weapons in the future. Much has been written-without general consensus-on whether nuclear deterrence should be credited for the absence of nuclear weapons use during the Cold War, as
well as for the absence of direct armed conflict between the superpowers. However, it will always remain difficult to explain confidently why something did not happen. The nuclear weapons policies of the United States and
Russia continue to evolve, but at this time in opposite directions. Russia, confronted with the deterioration of its conventional forces, has withdrawn the former Soviet no-first-use declarations and adopted a policy akin to the
former NATO doctrine of compensating for its perceived conventional inferiority through reliance on nuclear weapons. For its part, the United States has made limited moves in the direction of constraining nuclear weapons to a
purely deterrent role. The latest step in this direction is the November 1997 presidential decision directive (PDD) on nuclear policy that reportedly eliminated the requirement that the United States be prepared to fight and win a
protracted nuclear war. Yet, U.S. policy still remains ambiguous given the "reduce and hedge" policy outlined in the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review. Reductions of strategic nuclear weapons are being pursued via the START
process, while the United States is still planning for an "enduring stockpile" of about 10,000 nuclear weapons in order to "hedge" against the emergence of a more hostile Russia. The "weapons of last resort" doctrine of NATO-
permitting first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear attacks-has not been revoked. Notwithstanding this complex situation, there is a growing recognition in the U.S. military that, in the words of a 1991 National Academy
of Sciences study, "the principal objective of U.S. nuclear policy should be to strengthen the emerging political consensus that nuclear weapons should serve no purpose beyond the deterrence of, and possible response to, nuclear
attack by others." As long as nuclear weapons remain in the legal inventories of the nuclear-weapon states and the de facto possession of India, Israel and Pakistan, that mission of nuclear weapons will continue. Today, that mission
should be the only valid use of nuclear weapons. This view, however, is not the avowed policy of any of the nuclear-weapon states except China. Terrorist use of nuclear weapons remains unlikely. Barring the clandestine
acquisition of an intact nuclear weapon, the successful construction and use of nuclear weapons requires access to substantial technical infrastructure as well as technical knowledge and skill. Such an operation would be extremely
difficult to carry out clandestinely without a state sponsor. One cannot, however, exclude nuclear terrorism sponsored by a state which has a nuclear weapons program. The only technical means to forestall nuclear terrorism or
accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon is by stringent safeguards and controls over nuclear weapons and the weapons-usable fissile materials essential to their construction. The military situation with respect to BW
and CW is generally the inverse of that pertaining to nuclear weapons. As a terrorist tool against civilians, chemical weapons, and particularly biological weapons, are a clear danger. The science and technology underlying these
weapons is widely known, and terrorist use of nerve gas was demonstrated in 1995 by the Aum Shinrikyo religious cult in Japan. While the technology to detect small quantities of released agents is improving rapidly, technical
tools to forestall terrorist use are limited and most ingredients have legitimate civilian as well as offensive military uses. Therefore, prevention must largely rest on intelligence gathering and sharing, infiltration, law enforcement
activities and other measures. Even inspections as intrusive as those conducted in Iraq by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) cannot definitively prevent clandestine efforts to maintain residual inventories. Moreover, such an
relatively ineffective tool in warfare. The effectiveness of biological weapons during military conflict is uncertain.
In either case, a military commander would not have confidence in their use against a designated target because he
could not judge the effectiveness of defenses. The effect of a broad-scale BW attack against opposing troops is
impossible to predict and would be delayed by days under any circumstance. But even more than in the case of
chemical weapons, biological weapons remain a formidable tool of terror as an adjunct to war.
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Schweller 2000 (Randall- Department of Political Science at Ohio State University, American Democracy
Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts, p.43)
The bad news is that extending the democratic zone will not lead to perpetual peace among nations. This is
because the fundamental causes of international conflict will remain, for they cannot be transcended. The spread of
democracy promises to dampen potential conflicts but it will not effect a major ‘qualitative change’ in international
politics, which will remain much as it has always been: a struggle for power and influence in a world of, at a
minimum, moderate scarcity. Though I am willing to concede the point— though other realists have challenged it
—that democracies have not fought each other in the past, I, like Kydd, ‘find it perfectly possible that democracies
could fight—indeed could fight long and bloody wars against each other—so long as the aims of the populations
are in fundamental conflict.’
Schwartz & Skinner 2002 (Thomas- Professor of Political Science at UCLA, Kiron K- Fellow at the Council
on Foreign Relations and the Hoover Institution, Orbis, Winter)
Here we show that neither the historical record nor the theoretical arguments advanced for the purpose provide any
support for democratic pacifism. It does not matter how high or low one sets the bar of democracy. Set it high
enough to avoid major exceptions and you find few, if any, democracies until the Cold War era. Then there were
no wars between them, of course. But that fact is better explained by NATO and bipolarity than by any shared
form of government. Worse, the peace among the high-bar democracies of that era was part of a larger pacifism:
peace among all nations of the First and Second Worlds. As for theoretical arguments, those we have seen rest on
implausible premises.
Schwartz & Skinner 2002 (Thomas- Professor of Political Science at UCLA, Kiron K- Fellow at the Council
on Foreign Relations and the Hoover Institution, Orbis, Winter)
During the past twelve years, states with elected governments have fought each other in the Balkans and Caucases
while democratic pacifists have barricaded themselves behind adjectives: it is not democracies that avoid war with
each other but "well-established" democracies (Weart), "nontransitional" democracies (Mansfield and Synder), or
"liberal" democracies (Zakaria). Outside of academia, plain "democracy" is still favored and, therefore, withheld
from elected but "bad" governments. Thus, Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic was called a "dictator" by U.S., British,
and NATO officials and journalists with far greater frequency than any nonelected national leader had ever been
called "dictator" before. It was continually pointed out that Milosevic had been (often "is") a communist and that
his government had radio and television stations that slanted the news in his favor. Fair enough, but anyone who
tried to explain that Milosevic faced an active parliamentary opposition, thereby intimating a degree of democracy,
would risk being branded an apologist or worse. Over and over the unconscious convention is to count only those
of whom we approve as democratic, or adjectivally democratic, and to tar enemies who run for office and compete
for votes with the brush of autocracy. The convention extends from foes to friends. Those friends who lead
patently authoritarian regimes might be called "king" or "president," sometimes "leader," but never "dictator" or its
ilk; though we cannot use the word "democrat," we studiously avoid its antonyms.
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F. Gregory Gause III 2005 Gause is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont and Director of its Middle East
Studies Program. [“Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?” F. Gregory Gause III From Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005
http://fullaccess.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84506/f-gregory-gause-iii/can-democracy-stop-terrorism.html]
But this begs a fundamental question: Is it true that the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to produce
terrorists and terrorist groups? In other words, is the security rationale for promoting democracy in the Arab world based on a sound
premise? Unfortunately, the answer appears to be no. Although what is known about terrorism is admittedly incomplete, the data
available do not show a strong relationship between democracy and an absence of or a reduction in terrorism. Terrorism appears to stem
from factors much more specific than regime type. Nor is it likely that democratization would end the current
campaign against the United States. Al Qaeda and like-minded groups are not fighting for democracy in the Muslim
world; they are fighting to impose their vision of an Islamic state. Nor is there any evidence that democracy in the
Arab world would "drain the swamp," eliminating soft support for terrorist organizations among the Arab public and
reducing the number of potential recruits for them.
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Democracies Are More Prone To Go To War – Democratic Regime Change Will Spur
Worldwide Conflict
Henderson 2002 (Errol A- Associate Professor of Political Science at Wayne State University, Democracy and
War: The End of an Illusion?, p. 68-70)
My findings refute the monadic level DPP, which suggests that democracies are more peaceful than nondemocracies, and
they reveal that democracies are more likely than nondemocracies to be involved in—and to initiate—interstate wars
and MIDs. Wedding these findings to those in Chapter 2, it appears that the spread of democracy may precipitate an increase in
the likelihood of wars as individual states become democratic and, subsequently, more war-prone. Further, casting
these findings in the light of recent studies of the DPP highlights some daunting prospects for global peace. For example, recent empirical
findings indicate that regime changes are much more likely to occur during or following wars and that losing states are much more likely to
experience regime change. Since democracies are more likely to win wars as compared to nondemocracies, it follows that nondemocracies are
more likely to experience regime change, which in some cases may result in their full democratization. The result is that war
involvement may actually increase the proportion of democratic states in the system and, subsequently, increase
the likelihood of warfare for those newly democratic states. From this perspective, the spread of democracy will create
more of the most war-prone states, thereby increasing the likelihood of war involvement and initiation for those
states. These relationships hardly encourage a sanguine view of the prospects for peace with a democratic
enlargement strategy.
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Democracies Are Not Inherently Peaceful – They Are More Likely To Fight – Prefer Our
Studies
Henderson 2002 (Errol A- Associate Professor of Political Science at Wayne State University, Democracy and
War: The End of an Illusion?, p. 146)
The results indicate that democracies are more war-prone than non-democracies (whether democracy is coded
dichotomously or continuously) and that democracies are more likely to initiate interstate wars. The findings are obtained
from analyses that control for a host of political, economic, and cultural factors that have been implicated in the
onset of interstate war, and focus explicitly on state level factors instead of simply inferring state level processes from dyadic level
observations as was done in earlier studies. The results imply that democratic enlargement is more likely to increase the
probability of war for states since democracies are more likely to become involved in—and to initiate—interstate
wars.
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War has never happened between mature democracies, yet democratizing states are disproportionately war-prone
toward regimes of all types, when they lack the coherent political institutions that could manage the intensified
domestic political competition that characterizes the transition to democracy.
When political institutions are weak, the rising demand for mass participation in polities forces elites to recruit
popu/ar allies, yet elites are insufficiently accountable to the average voter.' Some groups that are threatened by
democratization exploit this chance to evade accountability. They invoke the populist creed of rule for the people
while simultaneously resisting rule the people. Even those groups that might prefer
stable democracy find that nascent democratic institutions are too ineffec-tual to defend their interests. I71 this
setting, both rising new elites and falling old elites have the motive and the opportunity to resort to the rhetoric of
nationalism, which mobilizes mass support through the language of popular sovereignty while evading the
accountability that would be provided by free and fair elections and the rule of The nationalist politics that this
unleashes. often embroils the country in military conflicts with other states, for reasons we explain in this chapter.
The politics of democratizing states that initiate war are likely to exhibit at least some of the
following causal mechanisms; exclusionary nationalism that generates enemy images or perceptions of
conflicts of interest with other slates; pressure-group politics b y military r ethnic, or economic groups
that seek a parochial benefit from policies that raise international tensions: logrolling among elite
factions that include such groups; persuasion and outreach by such groups to gamer mass a[lies; in-
effectual brokerage of political bargains by the ruling elite; contradictory and unconvincing signaling
in foreign affairs; the use of aggressive foreign policies by groups gambling for domestic political
resurrection; the use of partial or complete media domination to promote nationalist ideology; and
nationalist bidding wars between old elites and rising mass groups. We do not expect that all of
these mechanisms will be present in every democratizing state that fights a war, but we do expect at
Least a few or them. Which mechanisms are expected to be present in a particular case depends on
two factors: the adaptability of elite interests and the strength of the country's political institutions
during earl y democratization.' Together, these two factors determine the intensity cat the
democratizing country's nationalism and the form that nationalist exclusions are likely to take-
Representing the resulting possibilities ass .a schematic simplification, this yields four types of
nationalism, which are portrayed in Table 7.1; counterrevolutionary, revolutionary, ethnic, and
civic nationalism- Each type of nationalism is to reflect a somewhat different mix of causal
mechanisms that affect the chance of war
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The International Victims of Terrorism Conference was held in Belfast, and a very clear message was sent out by the
delegates and by the international speakers.
That message was the total inappropriateness and wrongness of having terrorists in the government of any
democracy. We learned how democracy is undermined and eventually destroyed by terrorism, instead of democracy
destroying terrorism – a message that is as urgent as it is necessary.
The futility and offensiveness of having terrorists defining what terrorism is, and indeed, defining what a victim is,
this is what is happening at Stormont.
One of the lies that terrorists have succeeded in getting people to believe, is that they had a very good reason why
they resorted to terrorist violence to get where they are today, a lie that was refuted powerfully. The issue
surrounding "one man's terrorist being another man's freedom fighter" was also aired and demolished with great
precision, and those who hold to such a viewpoint were shown to be very foolish. The conference heard that the
particular circumstances of Northern Ireland can be encapsulated in one word: terrorism. It is this (terrorism) that
must be destroyed rather than accommodated by our institutions. If democracy does not destroy terrorism, terrorism
will destroy democracy. Rather than human rights being there to protect democracy, it is being used to undermine it,
and to protect terrorists and their activities. The use of politically correct language is an attempt to sanitise the
language we use to describe what has been visited upon us during the past four decades. Practically everyone speaks
about the conflict and the Troubles. A few describe it as it really was – an evil terrorist campaign of genocide and
ethnic cleansing against the decent people in Northern Ireland. Unless and until there is accuracy in language and
definition, there will be no possibility to deal with the continuing terrorist threat and activity. If you do not know
precisely what you are talking about, you cannot deal with it. The message is very clear: democracy and terrorism
are incompatible and mutually exclusive. This message was reinforced by the acceptance of the Belfast Declaration
at the end of the conference, and the setting up of a European-wide network of victims of terrorism groups.
Victims are not stupid, they can discern who the genuine people are, and those who are playing games with them.
Indeed, victims are very deeply hurt and feel insulted when such politicians pretend that they are committed to
addressing victims' issues, when in fact they have betrayed them. We have not been fooled by their honeyed words
and their fine talk. Nor are we impressed by their secret deals done in the name of helping victims.
Victims will not be used as political pawns, or as instruments to give legitimacy to institutions at Stormont where
terrorists are accepted as bona fide democrats, the very thing they are not! We have said consistently that if victims'
issues are not dealt with in a way which gives victims proper recognition and which supports them in opposition to
those who made them victims, Northern Ireland's future will be bleak. The fact is, that this is still not being done,
despite fine-sounding words.
The spread and use of small arms and light weapons in South Asia has increased violence, resulted in the loss of
precious human life, impacted negatively upon sustainable development, human rights and human security, and
fractured peace in the societies and amongst nations of the region. Small arms undermine democracy, election
process, threaten democratically elected regimes and impede peaceful resolution of conflicts. More than 500,000
people are killed annually due to small arms, more than the conventional wars. Many more wounded or injured.
Millions of people made homeless refugees. Humanitarian relief work inhibited and economic development
deferred. In Nepal two generations of the Royal family were wiped out by small arms. These were the concerns
expressed by South Asian civil society representatives present at the two-day regional strategy meeting on small
arms and light weapons held in Sri Lanka. They felt that the elimination of these weapons of civilian destruction
should be a priority of the civil society and governments of South Asia.
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Culture differences prevent the democratization of areas like the Middle East.
Inglehart and Norris 2003 (Ronald, Research Professor for U of M, Center for Political Studies Ph.D., and
Pippa, Paul F. McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics at John F. Kennedy school of government Harvard. “The
True Clash of Civilizations” Foreign Policy, No. 135 (Mar. - Apr., 2003), pp. 62-70)
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The ‘interdependence leads to peace’ argument, however, is inherently suspect. After all, Europe never was more
interdependent (economically, and intellectually and culturally, as well) than it was on the eve of the First World
War. Obviously, the prospect of forgoing the economic gains of trade did not stop Europe’s great powers from
fighting a prolonged and devastating war. Implicit in the ‘interdependence leads to peace’ argument is the notion that
statesmen think like accountants; but they do not. Calculations of possible economic gain or loss are seldom the
determining factor when policymakers decide on war or peace. And even if they were, there is little reason to believe that
economic interdependence would be a deterrent to war. This is because even for the losers, the negative economic consequences of modern
greatpower wars have been of short duration.
Economic interdependence does not foster peace – just creates strategic entanglements
Layne 1996 “less is more” the national interest
Political order is not sufficient to explain economic prosperity, but it is necessary. Analysts who ignore the importance of this political order are
like people who forget the importance of the oxygen they breathe. Security is like oxygen -- you tend not to notice it until you
begin to lose it, but once that occurs there is nothing else that you will think about.(12) Either way, the idea that
economic links forged by interdependence foster peace is a myth. Far more often, interdependence of the sort that
requires military forces to preserve it generates costly and dangerous strategic commitments. Such commitments do
not shrink but expand the frontiers of American insecurity.
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The EU and US are embroiled in several high-profile and long-standing trade wars, including over beef
and poultry imports from the US, genetically modified seeds and foods and, above all, subsidies for the
rival plane-makers Airbus and Boeing.
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18:23 CET (GENEVA) - Aviation industry association IATA on Tuesday slammed the European Parliament's move to
force airlines to cap their greenhouse gas emisisons from 2012 and to pay for some of their pollution. In a vote earlier
Tuesday, 640 lawmakers at the European Parliament voted in favour of the plan to require all airlines operating in the 27-nation European Union
-- including foreign carriers -- to join the emissions trading scheme. Only 30 parliamentarians voted against and 20 abstained. Giovanni
Bisignani, IATA's Director General and CEO said: "It's absolutely the wrong answer to the very serious issue of environment. We support
emissions trading but not this decision." Europe has "taken the wrong approach, with the wrong conditions at the wrong time," he said. At a time
when the industry was weighed down by soaring fuel costs, the scheme could add 3.5 billion euros (5.46 billion dollars) to industry costs in the
first year of operations, IATA said. But there was "no guarantee" that the money would go toward environmental purposes, it added. It's time for
Europe's politicians to be honest. This is a punitive tax put in place by politicians who want to paint themselves 'green.' Worse, it's not even part
of a coordinated European policy," said Bisignani. He reiterated that the move could even spark trade wars, as IATA officials
have earlier warned. IATA officials previously described the EU's plan as "unilateral" and said it violated an
international aviation convention. "Fuelling legal battles and trade wars is no way to help the environment. Already
over 130 states have vowed to oppose it," said Bisignani. IATA instead said that only a global scheme brokered through the United Nations
agency, the International Civil Aviation Organisation, could work. In addition, IATA said if Europe was serious about cutting emissions, it should
hasten the conclusion of a Single European Sky proposal that aimed at reducing traffic jams in the skies and preventing planes from having to fly
further to get to their destinations.
THE European Union could be heading for a trade war with the US over its carbon-trading scheme.
European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso wants to bring non-European manufacturers into the system
but the signs are that a furious Washington would retaliate.The situation will worry those who view the EU's move
as protectionism sneaked in through the back door. On a purely practical level, it could also damage shipping interests by acting as a
restraint on world trade.Commentators believe that Mr Barroso might have been influenced by France, which has long sought what have been
dubbed "climate change sanctions", particularly against the US.Yet Mr Barroso has been keen to stress the free market logic of the policy. He
said: "The reality, of course, is not so much that we are bringing climate change to the marketplace, but that climate change is happening to the
market place."He said that it is necessary to "incentivise the saving of the planet". The cap and trade system has shown companies that if they
invest in emissions reduction, they can profit from the opportunity of selling their carbon allowances.While not mentioning shipping directly, he
made clear that the existing scheme will be extended to "all major industrial emitters", a category that clearly includes the shipping industry.All of
this is not likely to go down well on the other side of the Atlantic. A precursor to the US's likely reaction, can be found in a quote
from the notes to a speech recently delivered by US Trade Representative Susan Schwab: "The unilateral imposition
of restrictions can lead to retaliation, and dramatically impact economic growth and markets worldwide; while
accomplishing nothing or worse when it comes to advancing environmental objectives."British Energy Minister
Malcolm Wicks has also reacted unfavourably to Mr Barroso's speech. He told the BBC: "We believe in global
trade, we want more of it in the future, not less, and that is good for the European economy. So we are against any
measures which might look like trade barriers.
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In other disputes, technological progress can be a force for change. The audiovisual dispute is a case in point where EU efforts to increase
protection of this sector have faced growing technological obstacles, as well as consumer resistance. Rapid technological innovation in the form
of cable and satellite television, innovations strongly supported by consumers, offer new products that are difficult to block or regulate.
Regulations in this environment often are too complex to enforce or, if enforced, prove adverse to the interests of European producers.45 Trade
Conflict in Perspective Mark Twain reportedly once said of Wagner’s music that “it is not as bad as it sounds.” Similarly,
U.S.-EU trade conflicts may not be as ominous and threatening as they appear. Despite the rise in trade tensions and
episodes of tit-for-tat retaliation over the past few years, the notion that the relationship between the world’s two
most powerful economic powers is constantly teetering on the brink of a transatlantic trade war seems a stretch. Nor
does it appear that the trade conflicts represent or symbolize any kind of fundamental rift that is possibly developing
between the United States and Europe. At the same time, the disputes do not appear to be ephemeral distractions or mere consequences
of a mass media that tends to sensationalize and define the relationship unfairly. Nor are they products of trade negotiators, who like generals, are
often accused of fighting the last war. Nor are they trivial or silly squabbles because they represent a mere 1-2% of transatlantic trade. Trade
conflicts rather appear to have real, albeit limited, economic and political consequences for the bilateral relationship. Perhaps more significantly,
trade disputes may also pose very real obstacles for the two partners in their efforts to play a leadership role in promoting a more open and
prosperous world economy. This is particularly evident in the way bilateral trade disputes may be testing the functioning of the World Trade
Organization.
In contrast,
I do not see trade wars or serious commercial conflicts dominating
the transatlantic dialogue and driving apart the partnership. There are too many
common interests among the business communities on both sides of the Atlantic to let
this happen. Moreover many of the current trade issues and conflicts are not principally
among the industrial countries, but are more pressing and conflictual between the industrial and the developing countries as the Doha
Round, and especially the failure to reach agreement in Cancun have shown. And while conflicts may well arise in other
areas of commercial transatlantic relations, there are no reasons to expect that they will
be more disruptive than similar disputes have been in the past. Of course, there is
always the risk that careless leadership could lead to unexpectedly serious and intractable conflicts. More importantly, there is the risk that a
serious recession on either side of the Atlantic, most likely brought about by poor macroeconomic management,
would lead to political backlash and protectionism. Particularly in the U.S., where welfare system reforms in recent years have significantly
reduced the social safety net and increased American’s dependence on holding jobs, any serious and protracted spike in the unemployment rate
might well cause the kind of political firestorm that would make it attractive for political leaders to seek redress in protectionist responses.39
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Bombardier has set its sights on selling the new jets in Europe and the Middle East, as troubled North American airlines are not in
a position to add to their fleets. Much of the work is to be done in plants around Montreal, where the project will create as many as 3,500 high-
paying jobs. Governments of Northern Ireland and Britain are contributing about $311-million (U.S.) in loans to support the fabrication of C-
Series wings in Northern Ireland. Ottawa will provide $350-million, and the government of Quebec will contribute $118-million.
Bombardier is flying into some turbulent airspace as it seeks to take on Boeing and Airbus, the
battling powerhouses of the aerospace
market. The U.S. government and European Union have been engaged in a nasty trade war involving accusations
and counteraccusations over subsidies for years. The World Trade Organization is expected to rule on both trade actions later this
year. Even Foreign Minister David Emerson acknowledged in 2005 - when he was a Liberal industry minister - that the subsidy program would
"no doubt" entail "trade risks."
EU and US already fought over GMOs and their was no impact. Empirically denied
Schifferes 2003 US launches GM trade war By Steve Schifferes Tuesday, 13 May 2003
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3025217.stm BBC News Online,
Washington Washington has brought a complaint against the European Union for refusing to allow the sale
of genetically modified (GM) food or crops, escalating trade tensions between the world's two biggest economic
blocs. The United States - and twelve other agricultural exporting nations - want the EU to repeal its five-year moratorium on GM foods, or
face trade sanctions under World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick said that the US had run out of
patience after years of EU procrastination on the issue. "The EU's persistent resistance to abiding by its WTO obligations has
perpetuated a trade barrier unwarranted by the EC's own scientific analysis, which impedes the global use of a
technology that could be of great benefit to farmers and consumers around the world," he said. The EU is unlikely to
lift the block on GM food imports, which is widely supported by European consumers, and is also developing tough new labelling
regulations which worry US farmers. EU trade commissioner Pascal Lamy questioned the motives behind the US case, and denied there was a
"moratorium" on GM foods. "The EU regulatory system for GM authorisation is in line with WTO rules: it is clear, transparent and non-
discriminatory. There is therefore no issue that the WTO needs to examine," he said. And EU consumer and green lobby groups vowed to oppose
the US decision. "If this attempt succeeds, the US will force GM foods onto European markets regardless of the wishes of consumers," said
Friends of the Earth Policy Director Liana Stupples.
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Trade disputes between Europe and the U.S. are insignificant and won’t escalate.
Kull ’01 [Steven, director of WorldPublicOpinion.org and the Program on International Policy Attitudes, “Culture Wars? How
Americans and Europeans View Globalization”, The Brookings Institute, Fall 2001, Accessed July 17, 2008,
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2001/fall_globaleconomics_kull.aspx]
Given the consistent message of the polls to the contrary, what is the source of the view that Americans are
promoting and Europeans are resisting globalization? In the first place, several high-profile U.S.-European disputes
on agricultural subsidies, bananas, American films, steel, pasta, hormone beef, and more have received substantial
attention in the press. Some of these disputes lend themselves to the impression that the United States is trying to
force something on the Europeans—to make small family farms unviable, to stop favoring former colonies, to watch
American films, to eat beef grown with hormones. But this exaggerated image does not resonate deeply with the
public. The media hype has made the disagreements seem fundamental and enduring when in fact they are little
more than intrafamily conflicts over which side is going to make more adjustments within a fairly consensual broad
framework and set of values. Attempts to understand the attitudes of the publics on both sides of the Atlantic are complicated by the
strident voices of vocal groups who are suffering the negative consequences of globalization or who are sympathetic to those who are. Sometimes
these groups are taken as representative of the general public.
But in fact the American and European publics seem to agree that globalization is more positive than negative. At
the same time, both are uneasy about the impact of globalization, especially on workers. Both desire to keep some
trade barriers for now, at least long enough to help workers adapt to the changes that globalization entails. To
reassure both publics, it will probably also be necessary to address globalization's effect on workers in developing
countries and on the environment as well. The United States and Europe will probably continue to engage in
periodic disputes over exactly how to address these concerns, but the disputes should not obscure the shared
underlying support on both sides of the Atlantic for the broader process of globalization.
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“The relationship between the United States and Europe constitutes the world’s strongest, most comprehensive and
strategically most important partnership.” European Commission President Barroso (pictured, extreme right), Brussels, 9 February
2005. “Today, security and justice and prosperity for our world depend on America and Europe working in common
purpose. That makes our transatlantic ties as vital as they have ever been.” US President Bush, 19 February 2005. As the
two greatest powers on the world scene, the relationship between the EU and the US is central and irreplaceable. It
has a long, mutually beneficial history based on shared and strong fundamental beliefs in democratic government,
human rights and market economies. Since its very inception, the process of European Integration has been strongly
supported by the US. Without US vision and assistance, the European founding fathers would have had enormous
difficulties. That support still exists. During his visit to Europe in February 2005, President Bush stated:“My government and the United
States want the European project to succeed. It's in our interests that Europe be strong (…). It's in our interests because the values that caused the
European Union to exist in the first place -- the values of human rights and human dignity and freedom -- are the same values we share. And we
have an opportunity to work together to spread those values.”
Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic believe that the relationship is valuable at all levels -- for European and American business, civil societies
and citizens -- and that it is the task of governments to promote the building of bridges across the Atlantic. Its importance is reflected in trade
relations, the fight against terrorism and the handling of crisis and conflicts. This joint commitment of the EU and the US has found clear
expression in the New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995 and the Transatlantic Economic Partnership of 1998. This partnership was further reinforced
at the EU-US Summit of 2002 through the launching of a “Positive Economic Agenda.”
Bilateral trade between the EU and US amounts to over $1 billion a day; investment links are even more substantial,
totaling over $1.8 trillion a year. Each partner creates jobs for about 6 million workers on each side of the Atlantic, and EU-US trade
accounts for almost 40% of world trade. But the EU-US economic partnership goes way beyond pure trade matters: it is
supported by a number of institutionalized dialogues and regulatory cooperation between the partners.Through
continued dialogue and cooperation the EU and US also work together to promote global peace, stability and
democracy. On a global level, the EU and US are major powers and as such have a global responsibility. Exercising that power and
responsibility effectively inevitably means working together. In that respect the EU and US are jointly promoting democracy, freedom, stability
and prosperity throughout the world. Whether it is in the Middle East, Afghanistan or the Balkans, Europe and the US can only succeed in
advancing these values if they act together. Together the EU and US are committed to the challenge of alleviating poverty and disease and
provide almost 80% of global development assistance.
To respond to global threats and protect their citizens, intensive EU-US discussions have taken place since 9/11 which have yielded strengthened
cooperation and coordination in the fields of counter-terrorism and domestic security. As a result, an Enhanced Security Dialogue on transport
and border security was established in 1994, yet another example of the willingness to tackle challenges together.
“For myself, I am totally committed to working closely with the new US Administration to achieve our common
objectives, an indeed firmly believe that the realization of these objectives will only be possible through such a close
cooperation.” Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Brussels, 3 December 2004.
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No US Europe War
No risk.
Charles A. Kupchan Fall 1999 World Policy Journal "Life after pax Americana"
It is fortunate that the near-term challenge to U.S. primacy will come from Europe. After decades of close
cooperation, Europe and North America enjoy unprecedented levels of trust and reciprocity. European states have
gone along with U.S. leadership not just because they have not had the power and influence to do otherwise;
despite cavils,they also welcome the particular brand of international order sustained by the United States. A more
equal distribution of power across the Atlantic will no doubt engender increased competition between a collective
Europe and the United States. But such conflict is likely to be restricted to economic matters and muted by the
mutual benefits reaped from high levels of trade and investment. Furthermore, the underlying coincidence of
values between North America and Europe means that even when interests diverge, geopolitical rivalry is not
likely to follow. Efforts to preserve an Atlantic consensus may well lead to a lowest common denominator and
produce inaction (as has occurred repeatedly in the Balkans). But it is hard to imagine the United States and
Europe engaging in militarized conflict.
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India's Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, has mounted a strong defence of his nuclear energy deal with the United
States, saying it was crucial for the country's prosperity.
The deal, seen as the cornerstone of a new friendship between Delhi and Washington, has drawn criticism from
across the political spectrum and raised fears it could destabilise Mr Singh's coalition.
Critics say the deal is unfair, compromises India's nuclear sovereignty, and forces it to accept US influence over
foreign and strategic policies. But Mr Singh, said in a speech in parliament that he had redeemed a pledge to secure
the best agreement. The pact finalised last month was "good for India, and good for the world", he declared.
The deal aims to give India access to US nuclear fuel and equipment for the first time in 30 years to help meet its
soaring energy needs, even though it has stayed out of non-proliferation pacts and tested nuclear
weapons.REUTERS
India Deal will increase India/U.S. relations and be an asset to U.S. businesses
CBS 06 CBS, The Nuclear Deal With India, Wolfson: Good For Relations, Good For Business, But Is It 'Good' Good Enough?” ,March 3,
2006)
“Don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good” is a catch-phrase often used by negotiators trying to conclude a deal
and it applies to this week’s agreement signed in New Delhi by President Bush and Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh. Now, the question is: is "good" good enough?
The pact will open India's civilian nuclear program to international inspection and safeguards and "remove a basic
irritant" in U.S.-Indian relations over the past 30 years, according to the chief American negotiator, Under Secretary
of State R. Nicholas Burns. American businesses stand to reap huge profits from the expected sale of equipment,
nuclear technology and nuclear fuel as India expands its civilian nuclear program to help fill its demand for more
power to meet the needs of its expanding population and economy.
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China Thursday indicated for the first time that it may not raise any objections when the 35-member IAEA board
considers the India-specific safeguards pact in Vienna Aug 1. "I believe countries could under the presentation of
fulfilling international obligations carry out peaceful cooperation in peaceful (use of) nuclear energy and I hope the
relevant issues can be resolved through negotiations between relevant parties," Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu
Jianchao told reporters in Beijing. "We have taken note that the US and India are making further contact on this (nuclear) issue," Liu said
when asked if China was planning to raise any objections when India's case comes up before the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The spokesperson's remarks has raised hopes in New Delhi that Beijing, which has maintained an ambivalent stance on the India-US nuclear
deal, will not stand in India's way in the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
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India deal would increase the chances of proliferation, double standard and close relations
with Iran are possible causes
LEONOR TOMERO. Director of Nonproliferation, Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation. The Washington
Post. July 12, 2008. The Rush to a Flawed Nuclear Deal. 7/17/2008
In his July 7 op-ed piece, "New Life for the India Nuclear Pact," Bill Emmott said that Congress must not allow
India's close ties with Iran to hold up the U.S.-India nuclear deal and that the deal is worth pursuing.
In reality, the India-Iran relationship should be cause for concern. The two countries have undertaken two joint naval
exercises, and Indian companies have been subject to sanctions by the United States for exporting expertise and
technology related to weapons of mass destruction to Iran.
Ultimately, however, India's close relationship with Iran isn't the most serious problem with the pact. Rather than
integrating India into the nonproliferation mainstream, the proposed deal would set a risky double standard that
would shatter the delicate bargain upon which the global nonproliferation regime is based.
In addition, by increasing India's capability to produce nuclear weapons, the deal will exacerbate an already perilous
nuclear arms race in South Asia, because Pakistan is likely to respond by expanding its own nuclear capability.
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Matthew Rosenberg. Associated Press. Jun 18, 2008. US-India nuclear deal appears to be in trouble. 7/17/2008
Google News
NEW DELHI (AP) — The future of a landmark nuclear energy accord between India and the United States looked
deeply uncertain Wednesday after India's government put off talks with powerful communist opponents of the pact.
The meeting is now scheduled to take place next week. But even if it goes ahead, it's unclear what difference it will
make with the communist parties steadfast in their opposition, reinforcing doubts over whether the deal can be
clinched before President Bush leaves office. "We have several times made our position clear — we are opposed to
it," Nilotpal Basu, a top official of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), told The Associated Press. The deal
would "undermine the independent foreign policy of India," he said, citing U.S. pressure on New Delhi to aid
Washington's efforts to halt Iran's nuclear program. "We do not think this deal gives us any advantages." U.S.
policymakers see India as a counterweight to an ever-more powerful China, and the deal reverses three decades of
American policy by allowing the shipment of nuclear fuel and technology to India, which has never signed
international nonproliferation accords and yet has tested atomic weapons.
The India Nuclear Deal is dead due to India’s communist parties, and it’s too late
Matthew Rosenberg. Associated Press. Jun 18, 2008. US-India nuclear deal appears to be in trouble. 7/17/2008
Google News
And even though the deal only covers civilian nuclear power, it tacitly acknowledges India as a nuclear-weapons
state, giving its weapons program a degree of international legitimacy — and adding to India's growing clout. But a
wave of opposition from India's communist parties, which provide the governing coalition with its parliamentary
majority, appears to have scuttled the pact for now. U.S. officials said earlier this year that with American elections
coming up — and no guarantee the next U.S. administration will keep the deal on the table — India needed to
complete its end of the pact by May to give the U.S. Congress enough time to pass it. Congress breaks for the
summer in early July, and many lawmakers will be busy campaigning in the fall. It's now mid-June, and New Delhi
has made no progress in reaching a separate deal with the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency that's needed
before Congress can approve the pact. Wednesday's meeting was intended to persuade the communists to allow the
government to secure a deal with the IAEA. It was canceled because of scheduling conflicts, Basu said. Following
the postponement, an Indian Foreign Ministry official said the deal was in "meltdown," although he held out hope
for a last minute communist reversal. The official insisted on anonymity because of the sensitivity of the situation. A
day earlier in Washington, U.S. State Department spokesman Tom Casey stressed that the Bush administration
would "make every effort to move it through Congress" before leaving office in January. But he, too, suggested that
is unlikely to happen. "We would certainly hope that the next administration, whoever comes to office in January,
would also see this agreement as something fundamentally in America's interest," he told reporters on Tuesday. Both
Barack Obama and John McCain have endorsed the deal. But it is not clear if either would make it a priority. The
nuclear deal faces opposition in the U.S., too. Critics there, including some in Congress, say providing U.S. fuel to
India would free up India's limited domestic supplies of nuclear material for use in atomic weapons, which they
argue could spark a nuclear arms race in Asia.
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Gene Gleeson Wednesday, July 16, 2008 Report: State economy close to recession
http://abclocal.go.com/kabc/story?section=news/business&id=6267821
LOS ANGELES (KABC) -- New numbers out Wednesday morning confirm what many have felt in their gut and their
wallet for some time. The state's economy is close to recession, and parts of Southern California are already there.
Experts said the state's economy looks bleak for the next couple of years. The Los Angeles County Economic
Development Corporation released two reports that give reasons why the state economy is a mess. Chief among
them were the housing market crash, soaring gas and diesel prices and the writer's strike. ""If you go to the
Riverside-San Bernardino area, they had a huge boom in new home building. They actually have what you call a
housing supply bubble there, and then the other key industry for them is international trade imports started falling in
early 2007," said Jack Kyser from the L.A. County Economic Development Corporation. "The decline has picked up
so far this year, and so they're getting hit a couple ways too." Already in L.A. County, the unemployment rate has
jumped from 5 percent in 2007 to 6.2 percent in 2008. Kyser said the worst is yet to come for places like Orange
County and the Inland Empire: 18,600 jobs are expected to be lost from Orange County, and 20,500 jobs are
expected to be lost in the Riverside/San Bernardino area in 2008.
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