Caleb James Rhetorical Theory Dr.

Jensen 5/03/12

Platos Gorgias and Phaedrus

Platos Gorgias is undoubtedly an attack on the practice of the Sophists. The Phaedrus, most would agree, is Platos attempt to divide rhetoric into three functions, arriving at two false types and one true. Bizzell and Herzberg (2001) summarize that The Gorgias develops Platos most extensive condemnation of false rhetoric, and the Phaedrus displays his most complete realization of true rhetoric (p. 82). With this essay I intend to show that in the Gorgias Plato attempts to limit the art of the Sophists, but he does not attempt to limit the function of rhetoric; moreover, the Phaedrus is an extension of his argument in which he divides rhetoric into three functions. Together, these two works can be seen as pieces of Platos argument in an ongoing debate on the definition of rhetoric; the Gorgias addresses Platos counter-arguments, whereas the Phaedrus makes his claim and supports his argument.

The Word Rhetoric

The term rhetoric emerged from ancient Greece sometime in the fourth or fifth century BCE. Then, as it has been since and is now, its definition was not completely agreed upon, nor was its range of use. Now, a general catch-all definitionthe art of persuasionis assigned to the term, and it proves problematic for studying its origins and then discussing it in its current context. In Edward Schiappas article, Did Plato Coin Rhtorik? he warns against assigning a generalized meaning to the broad term:

2 At the very least it can be said that any treatment of the Older Sophists, or even of the fourth-century rivals of Plato, that takes the notion of rhetoric as a given or as a conceptual constant is likely to be in need of revision. (1990, p. 470) Still, some scholars have analyzed classical Greek works under the generally accepted definition of today, which is not accurate out of context because it provides too large of a scope; others have taken the opposite approach, trying to give rhetoric an ancient meaning based on contextual passages, usually arriving at oratory for either litigation or politics. The problem with either of these approaches is that both are too simplified for a term with such an ambiguous meaning and a wide range of possibilities. There is evidence that in the Gorgias Plato either coined rhetoric or assigned a new meaning to an old word (Schiappa, 1990). Its novel use in Platos work and its seldom use by others until Aristotle support Schiappas claim. Although it is possible that Plato coined rhetoric, thus would be entitled to define it, it is inconsistent with the views of Platos contemporaries on what they practiced. Plato, and later Aristotle, harshly criticized rival teachers in order to pigeonhole them. Therefore, in fairness, we must consider how other rhetoricians, namely Isocrates, regarded his work as well as the work of his contemporaries. Isocrates Against the Sophists attempts to set his teaching apart from the Sophists, and his Antidosis defends his methods against the allegations that he was a teacher of chicanery. Stanley Wilcox (1945), in his article Isocrates Fellow-Rhetoricians, comes to Isocrates aid with the hope of showing that the only or chief goal of fourth-century rhetoric was not litigation (p. 172). He warns against taking Platos and Aristotles word when they speak of

3 Isocrates, for they have unfairly misrepresented him as a teacher of litigation (p. 171172). Wilcox maps out Isocrates distaste for litigants, which he shares with Plato, because of its petty nature, and Wilcox find[s] no passage in Isocrates which states that the rhetoricians of Isocrates own day gave any instruction at all for the courts p. 172). Moreover, Wilcox says: Isocrates often refers to the rhetoricians as writers on themes that are not dicanic And the sophists are spoken of as writers of moral advice In short he calls them speakers on many and various topics They do not appear to be teachers and writers for litigants; their writings are epideictic. (p. 177) Although Isocrates may have criticized the Sophists in his writings, he at least provides them a fairer representation than Plato had given. Additionally, it is apparent that their practice was not limited to forensic and deliberative discourse. Along the same lines, George Kennedy (1994) says: It thus seems possible to distinguish two traditions in the development of rhetoric in the fifth century: one is the tradition of the sophists, who taught mainly by example and imitation, not by providing precepts and rules, and whose epideictic speeches exemplified methods of inquiry but often dealt with issues of some philosophical significance; the other is the more pedestrian, less philosophical tradition of the handbook. (p. 19) Furthermore, Wilcox refers to a passage in Isocrates Panathenaicus in which he separates the men able to make deliberative speeches from the famous writers (i.e. rhetoricians) To judge from the context this seems to be a distinction between the rhetoricians, the astronomers and

4 other scientists, and the practitioners of forensic and deliberate oratory (p. 183). We can conclude, at least from Isocrates point of view, that Platos criticism of him and the Sophists was inaccurate.

Platos Gorgias
Most scholars would agree that Platos Gorgias is an attack on what he viewed as the immoral practice of the Sophists, yet some scholars take literally the passage in which Gorgias limits the function of rhetoric to use for litigation and politics. There are two reasons why this should not be taken for granted. First, this is Platos attempt to essentialize the Sophists and limit the scope in which they work.1 Second, there is evidence to support the view that Plato had an idea for a more philosophical rhetoric. Both of these are to separate Platos teaching from Isocrates and the Sophists. The Gorgias criticizes the art practiced by the Sophists which Plato feltwas in danger of being ubiquitous and hence in need of definitional constraint (Schiappa, 1990, p. 467). In the Gorgias, we see Plato attacking the practice of Sophists, not rhetoric in its broad sense. Plato uses the character of Gorgias to limit rhetoric to that which you find in the law courts and in any public gatherings and it deals with what is just and unjust (Bizzell and Herzberg, 2001, p. 92). According to George Kennedy (1994) in A New History of Classical Rhetoric, this admission by Gorgias is not likely to have been the view of the historical Gorgias, who surely

It is possible and, to me, seems apparent that Platos Gorgias and Phaedrus are to promote his school and deter others from practicing litigation. The respective reasons are his competition with Isocrates and the Sophists for pupils, and his aristocratic views in the current Athenian democracy. H.M. Hubbell (1940) states, practically all the denunciation of sycophants at Athens comes from the wealthy and aristocratic opponents of democracy (p. 240). Hubbell also points out that there was some of this kind of sycophancy at Athens but it should not blind us to the equally obvious fact that a good deal of what modern historians accept as heinous crime was really such only in the eyes of the aristocratic victims of democratic law-enforcement (p. 241).

5 believed that his art applied to any topic (p. 36). Additionally, as Schiappa points out, Gorgias was not written as a philosophical treatise on rhetoric but as a broader attack on the life of the fourth-century politician (p. 466). As mentioned earlier, Plato likely coined rhetoric in the Gorgias to name this art of persuasive speech, but in order to distinguish himself from others who used and taught it, he had to first categorize his opposition. We must not forget that in Platos dialogues, he is the author of all of the characters voices, so readers should always question the historical accuracy of what the characters say, even Socrates. Therefore, when Gorgias delivers the line that limits rhetoric to forensic and political oratory, we cannot accept them as the words of Gorgias, but consider them as a foundation of Platos argument. Thus, consistent with the Socratic method of Platos dialogues, Plato stays within the parameters of Gorgias definition of rhetoric to discredit it because Plato had in mind a more noble purpose for rhetoric, as seen in the Phaedrus. Plato, however, reveals that he has at least considered in the Gorgias what the Phaedrus develops extensively: his idea of a true rhetoric. Nearing the end of the Gorgias, in Socrates discussion with Callicles on orators placing their own agendas over the welfare of the people, Plato foreshadows his dialectic as proposed in the Phaedrus: Callicles: This question of yours is not quite so simple; for there are some who have a regard for the citizens in the words that they utter, while there are also others of the sort that you mention. Socrates: That is enough for me. For if this thing also is twofold, one part of it, I presume, will be flattery and a base mob-oratory, while the other is noblethe endeavor, that is, to make the citizens souls as good as

6 possible, and the persistent effort to say what is best, whether it prove more or less pleasant to ones hearers. But this is a rhetoric you never yet saw; or if you have any orator of this kind that you can mention, without more ado let me know who he is! Callicles: No, upon my word, I cannot tell you of anyone, at least among the orators of today. (p. 123) With this passage Plato distances his methods from the methods of the orators whose goal is to win over an audience without regard for the truth. Moreover, he refers to his methods as a rhetoric you never yet saw. The term rhetoric here is crucial, for it implies that he believes his dialectic is rhetoric, or a form of rhetoric, or a division of rhetoric. While Plato has set his rhetoric apart from his notion of the rhetoric of others, it would seem to support Schiappas claim that Plato coined rhetoric. However, Schiappa himself points out that a line in the Gorgias may offer evidence that Plato is merely assigning a new meaning to an uncommon word (1990, p. 468). Before the line in which Gorgias limits the function of rhetoric, Socrates says, I see plainly, from what he has said, that Polus has had more practice in what is called rhetoric than in discussion (p. 88). By saying what is called, as if saying socalled, implies that rhetoric was a word, but with a controversial meaning that needed to be adjusted (Schiappa, p. 468). Plato adjusted it; if not, he coined and defined it. Either way, his intent was to persuade others that it could function as a philosophical tool, thereby expanding its purposes, not limiting them to forensic and deliberative discourse.

Platos Phaedrus
The Phaedrus, whose theme is an extension of the Gorgias, is comprised of three speeches, dividing love into three different types, each representing Platos view of the different functions of rhetoric. This notion is largely unanimous within fields of rhetoric.2 For brevitys sake, I will not analyze the Phaedrus, but I will provide summaries of George Kennedys (1994) and Richard Weavers (1953) analyses of the three speeches. The first speech in the Phaedrus is written by Lysias,3 and Phaedrus reads it to Socrates under a shade tree on the waters edge. Kennedy (1994) describes this speech as representing love as An intimate relationship without emotional involvement is preferable in that neither partner makes excessive demands on the other and neither is hurt when the relationship ends (p. 40). Weavers analysis is similar, yet he also provides commentary on the argument laid out by Plato. He says, It is Platos dramatistic presentation of a major thesis he is asking whether we ought to prefer a neuter form of speech to the kind which is ever getting us aroused over things and provoking an expense of spirit (1953, p. 1362). Kennedy notes that Socrates at first claims to be quite overcome by the beautiful language of the speech (p. 40). Phaedrus continues to praise its eloquence, showing the mesmerizing effects of a sophistic style. This sets up the second speech, before which Socrates points out the flawed invention and arrangement in the first (Kennedy, p. 40). The second speech is delivered by Socrates in order to show that he can perform better than Lysias. Kennedy (1994) points out that this speech is a technical improvement over that of Lysias in terms of the rhetorical theory that was being developed in fifth-century Greece.
2 3

See McAdons Platos Denunciation of Rhetoric in the Phaedrus. McAdon (2004) contests this view. Kennedy (1994) notes This speech, however, is almost certainly by Plato, who clearly enjoyed showing his rhetorical virtuosity by imitating the style of other writers or speakers (p. 40).

8 There is a prooemiuma narrationa proofand an epilogue. (p. 40). Socrates begins his speech with a definition of love. Weaver (1953) says, The lover wishes to make the object of his passion as pleasing to himself as possible; but to those possessed by this frenzy, only that which is subject to their will is pleasant (p. 1364). The theme of the second speech is selfish, jealous love. For rhetoric, this would be exploitation of the audience to fulfill the will of the speaker. Weaver calls this base rhetoric and says of the base rhetorician that Nothing is more feared by him than a true dialectic, for this not only endangers his favored alternative, but also gives the beloved... some training in intellectual independence (p. 136465). After showing the flaws in love (rhetoric) in this and the previous type, Socrates realizes his error in representing love as evil in the first two speeches and wishes to correct it with a third speech showing loves divinity. The third speech shows love as the transcendence of pleasure in order to reach a nobler goal. Plato provides a myth to analogize the type of love of which he is speaking: the flight of the immortal soul upward, imagined as a charioteer seeking to govern two winged horses, one inclined to pull it downward to earthly lust, one upward to heavenly contemplation (Kennedy, 1994, p. 41). Weaver (1953) says, What Plato has prepared us to see is that the virtuous rhetorician, who is a lover of truth, has a soul of each movement that its dialectical perceptions are consonant with those of a divine mind (p. 1367). With this last speech, Plato has set himself and his teaching methods apart from the others at the time, representing himself as noble and representing the others as ineffective or evil.

Against McAdon
Brad McAdon (2004), in the article Platos Denunciation of Rhetoric in the Phaedrus, disagrees that Platos Phaedrus promotes a positive view of rhetoric. He insists that the Phaedrus is an unmistakable response to Isocrates Against the Sophists and that in the Phaedrus Plato is distinguishing his philosophical method, as he conceives it, from Isocrates pseudo-philosophical method (as conceived by Plato) (p. 21). While I can see, though doubt, that the Phaedrus is a response to Against the Sophists, there is much evidence to support that Plato didnt denounce rhetoric in its broad sense. I will not spend time arguing that the Phaedrus is not a response to Against the Sophists; I believe in part it is a response to Against the Sophists, in which Isocrates laid out his teaching methods, but more likely, it is a response to all of the teachers of the time, especially teachers of rhetoric. In that sense, the parallels McAdon draws between the Phaedrus and Against the Sophists are accurate; however, when the Phaedrus was written, twenty years had passed since Isocrates had written Against the Sophists, and sixteen years had passed since Plato had written the Gorgias in 386 BCE.4 Therefore, I cannot accept that the Phaedrus is merely a response to Against the Sophists. It is Platos attempt to promote his practice of rhetoric and discredit the practice of others. McAdon says, Platos view of rhetoric in the Phaedrus is consistent with the view expressed in the Gorgiashe denounces it completely (p. 22). From the second page of his article he is erring even in the interpretation of the Gorgias, which was discussed above. Then he says:
4

Some scholars date the Gorgias later than 386, but all agree it was written before the Phaedrus. If it was written later than 386, closer to the Phaedrus, it strengthens my claim that Plato introduced in the Gorgias his ideas that he elaborated on in the Phaedrus. That is, he would be less likely to change his mind in a shorter period of time.

10 Platos dialectic that is outlined in the dialogue is to be understood as his philosophical method and not as a philosophical or dialectical rhetoric *C+ontemporary commentators who understand a positive Platonic rhetoric do so by appropriating to Plato and Platos texts a contemporary understanding of rhetoric rather than understanding the terms rhetoric and rhetor within their immediate and ancient contexts. (p. 22) First, as George Kennedy (1994) says: there was, however, no sharp division between philosophy and rhetoric in the fifth century and all sophists explored the themes of truth and opinion, nature and convention, and language and reality (p. 20). However, I suppose McAdon would say Kennedy is applying a contemporary understanding of rhetoric, yet what McAdon is trying to do and what Plato was trying to do is the very same thing: both are essentializing rhetoric as the practice of the Sophists and that of logographers. As we see from Schiappa (1990), it is quite possible that Plato coined rhetoric in the Gorgias to criticize others and promote himself, so we cannot fairly call only legal and political discourse rhetoric if Sophists and teachers of rhetoric disagree with Platos definition,5 which I have pointed out in the introduction. However, we may take what McAdon is saying as Plato is only denouncing the practice of legal and political rhetoric,6 yet that would not be consistent with Platos polemical attacks on the Sophists in the Gorgias or Lysias in the Phaedrus, because, as established earlier, the Sophists were not limited to political and forensic discourse. There is striking evidence even
5

Isocrates Antidosis is largely a defense of the accusationsas Stanley Wilcox (1945) puts itthat [sophists] cheated in court, wrote speeches for litigants, and taught sycophancy (p. 176). 6 Wilcox (1945) also recognizes that Some training in forensic oratory was an essential part of this upper-class education, not for the sake of petty litigation but as a means of self-protection and as an instrument for gaining political powerLaw suits often were used to attack political opponents (p. 175).

11 in the Phaedrus that Plato himself did not believe that rhetoric only pertained to those two categories: Lysias, a logographer, has delivered an epideictic speech on love. Therefore, if Plato truly believed that rhetoric was only for law and politics, as McAdon suggests, why would he contradict himself by attributing a speech on neither of those topics to someone he accuses of practicing only those functions of rhetoric? Perhaps, though, I should humor McAdons claim further by briefly addressing evidence that shows Plato himself, even if rhetoric was only for legal and political purposes, was a rhetorician. Is not Platos Apology a legal defense of Socrates? Is that not forensic discourse? Is not Platos Republic a suggestion for a political structure? Is that not deliberative discourse? Did not Plato allow Aristotle to teach rhetoric at his Academy? Consequently, if Plato does completely denounce rhetoric as political and legal oratory, he does so only in words. However, I do not believe that his intent was to define rhetoric as such, but to show that it could be used for nobler purposes.

Conclusion
The idea defended here is that out of self-interest, Plato, in the Gorgias, attempted to categorize his competition as immoral with the goal of promoting his rhetorical teaching methods. Likewise, in the Gorgias he hints that there is a noble kind of rhetoric that can improve mens souls, foreshadowing the ideas he presents in the Phaedrus. In the Phaedrus, he dismisses the types of rhetoric practiced by his rivals and advances the idea of his dialectical rhetoric. As a result, if we apply the parts of a discourse laid out in the Phaedrusintroduction, narrative, testimony, proofs, probabilities, confirmation, refutation, and conclusionwe can consider the Gorgias and the Phaedrus together, as parts of Platos extended argument on the

12 function of rhetoric. The Gorgias represents Platos refutation, which can be in accusation and in defense (Bizzell and Herzberg, 2001, p. 161); similarly, the Phaedrus represents his testimony, proofs, and confirmation, though it begins with a narration too. As an illustration of these two works as parts of Platos argument, we can consider the words of Aristotle in Rhetoric Book III: Refutation of the Opponent is part of the arguments: so is Comparison of the opponents case with your own, for that process is a magnifying of your own case and therefore a part of the arguments, since one who does this proves something (2001, p. 240). To me, this is a remarkably accurate description of the function of Platos Gorgias and Phaedrus, in which Plato compares his rhetoric with other teachers and practitioners of the time.

13 References Aristotle. (2001). Rhetoric: Book III. In P. Bizzell & B. Herzberg (Eds.), The rhetorical tradition: Readings from classical times to the present (2nd ed.) (pp. 236240). Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martins Bizzell, P. & Herzberg, B. (Eds.). (2001). The rhetorical tradition: Readings from classical times to the present (2nd ed.). Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martins Hubbell, H.M. (1940). Untitled [Review of the book The administration of justice from Homer to Aristotle by R.J. Bonner& G. Smith]. The American Journal of Philology, 61(2), pp. 238 243. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/290745 Kennedy, G. A. (1994). A new history of classical rhetoric. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University McAdon, B. (2004). Platos denunciation of rhetoric in the Phaedrus. Rhetoric Review, 23(1), pp. 2139. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20176594 Plato. (2001). Gorgias. In P. Bizzell & B. Herzberg (Eds.), The rhetorical tradition: Readings from classical times to the present (2nd ed.) (pp. 87138). Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martins Plato. (2001). Phaedrus. In P. Bizzell & B. Herzberg (Eds.), The rhetorical tradition: Readings from classical times to the present (2nd ed.) (pp. 138168). Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martins Schiappa, E. (1990). Did Plato coin rhtorik? The American Journal of Philology, 111(4), 457 470. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/295241 Weaver, R. (2001). The Phaedrus and the nature of rhetoric. In P. Bizzell & B. Herzberg (Eds.), The Rhetorical tradition: Readings from classical times to the present (2nd ed.) (pp. 1361 1371). Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martins

14 Wilcox, S. (1945). Isocrates fellow-rhetoricians. The American Journal of Philology, 66(2), pp. 171186. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/290788