DOCTRINES OF CONSTI 1 CASES (based on Atty. Gabriels outline) CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES DE LEON v.

ESGUERRA The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been supers eded. GONZALES v. COMELEC R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 are null and void because: 1. The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments, as well as t he resolution calling a convention to propose amendments, are, at best, de facto Congressmen; 2. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives propose amendments or call a convention therefore but may not avail of both that is to say, propose amendme nt and call a convention at the same time; 3. The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall be s ubmitted for ratification, must be a special election, not a general election, i n which officers of the national and local governments such as the elections sch eduled to be held on November 14, 1967 will be chosen; and 4. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election, in which proposals for amendment shall be submitted to the people for ratification, must be held un der such conditions which, allegedly, do not exist as to give the people a reaso nable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the nature and implications of said am endments. IMBONG v. COMELEC Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Const itution, has full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for the purpose, by a three-fourths vote of each House in j oint session assembled but voting separately. Consequently, when Congress, actin g as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for such implementing details afte r calling a constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body, c an enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps. CONCEPT OF STATE Ruffy v Chief of Staff The rule that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are cons idered superseded or held in abeyance during the military occupation, is intende d for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory and not f or the enemies in arms. STATE IMMUNITY The Holy See v Rosario, Jr Pursuant to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic env oy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the rec eiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situate d in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission Sanders v Veridiano Mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capa city will not automatically remove him from the protection of the laws of public officers and doctrine of state immunity

Doctrine of state immunity applicable also to other states. Republic v Sandoval State cannot be held liable for the deaths that followed the incident; liability should fall on the public officers who committed acts beyond their authority 3 instances when suit is proper: 1. when sued by its name 2. when unincorporated government agency is sued 3. when the suit is against a government employee but liability belongs to the g overnment Festejo v Fernando Officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable and maybe sued as a ny other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury Civil Aeronautics Administration v. Court of Appeals Not all government entities whether corporate or not are immune from suits. Immu nity from suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the enti ty was organized. Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Judge Firme The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver a cting in behalf of the municipality is performing governmental or proprietary fu nctions. It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable bec ause their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of go vernmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that the y were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the state merely gives the claimants the right to show the defendant was not ac ting in its governmental capacity when the injury was inflicted or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimants canno t recover. Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez Municipal funds in possession of municipal and provincial treasurers are public funds exempt from execution. Municipal funds are held in trust for the people in tended and used for the accomplishments of the purposes for which municipal corp orations are created and that to subject said properties and public funds to exe cution would materially impede, even defeat and in some instance destroy said pu rposes. Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals When a municipality fails or refuses without justifiable reason to effect paymen t of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the r emedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds. USA vs Guinto A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. Veterans Manpower vs CA The state is deemed to have given tacitly its consent to be sued when it enters into a contract. However, it does not apply where the contract relates to the ex ercise of its sovereign functions.

The Merritt vs Gov of the Phil By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to the plaintiff, or create any cause of actio n in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability and submit itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defe nse. Amigable vs. Cuenca The government, when it takes away a property from a private land owner for publ ic use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sa le, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government with out thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit. This doct rine cannot be used in perpetrating injustice to a citizen. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan When the state files an action, it divests itself of the sovereign character and shed its immunity form suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. Fundamental Principles and State Policies Section 1 Villavicencio v. Lukban: Held: Mayors act unconstitutional. It was not authorized by any law or ordinance . Our government is a government of laws and not men. Section 2 Kuroda v. Jalandoni: think Japanese Lieutenat-General charged before the military commission. Held: T he Philippines can adopt the rules and regulations laid down on the Hague and Ge neva Conventions notwithstanding that it is not a signatory thereto. It embodied generally accepted principles of international law binding upon all states. Agustin v. Edu: think triangular reflectorized early warning devices. Held: Legislative enactment is not necessary in order to authorize the issuance of LOI prescribing the use of triangular reflectorized early warning devices. Th is is also an illustration of generally accepted principles of international law (Pacta sunt servanda). Ichong v. Hernandez: think Retail Trade Nationalization Law which is against the principle of Pacta s unt servanda.Held: the Retail Trade Nationalization Law is not unconstitutional because it was passed in the exercise of the police power which cannot be bargai ned away through the medium of a treaty. Gonzales v. Hechanova: think rice importation. Statute vs. Treaty. Held: Municipal law was upheld over international law on the basis of the doctri ne of separation of powers under the rule-making powers of the Supreme Court. In this case, the contracts adverted to are NOT treaties. Section 6 Aglipay vs. Ruiz -There is no violation of the principle of the separation of ch urch and state. The issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to b e linked with an event of a religious character, but the resulting propaganda, i

f any, received by the Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the gover nment. The idea behind the issuance of the postage stamps was to attract tourist s to our country and not primarily the religious event. Section 10 Almeda vs. CA -There exists a tenants right of redemption in sugar and coconut lands. Pursuant to Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963, it recognizes share tenancy in sugar lands which is in consonance with the States promotion of social justice wherein it may regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of pri vate property, and equitably diffuse propertyownership and profits. Ondoy .vs. Ign acio -The principle of social justice applied in this case is a matter of protec tion, not equality. The Court recognized the right of the petitioner to the clai m of compensation because her son was shown to have died while in the actual perf ormance of his work. To strengthen the constitutional scheme of social justice an d protection to labor, The Court made mention that as between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal ad vice, the law has reason to demand from the latter the stricter compliance. Salon ga vs. Farrales -The plea of social justice of the plaintiff cannot be considere d because it was shown that no contract, either to sell or of sale, was ever per fected between him and the defendant. It must be remembered that social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners who under our Cons titution and laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice consecrate d in 4 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 5 our Constitution was not intended to take away rights from a person and give the m to another who is not entitled thereto. Section 16 LLDA v. CA The immediate response to the demands of necessities of pr otecting vital public interests gives vitality to the statement on ecology embod ied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the 1987 Constitution . Article II, Section 16. As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person , it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but the consonance with the declared policy of the state to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. Section 19 GARCIA vs . BOI BOI committed grave abuse of discretion because it repudiates the independ ent policy of government to run its affairs the way it deems best for the nation al interest. Every provision of the Constitution on the national economy and pat rimony is infused with the spirit of national interest. The non-alienation of na tional resources, the State full control over the development and utilization of contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country and the regulation of foreign investment in accordance to national goals and priorities are too explicit not to be noticed and understood. Section 21 ASSOC. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHIL. vs. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM E minent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acqu ire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to t he owner. Private rights must yield to the irresistible demands of the public in terest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the policed power, t hat the welfare of the people is the supreme law. Section 25 BASCO VS PAGCOR Loc al Autonomy under 1987 Constitution simply means the decentralization and does n ot make the local governments sovereign within the State or an imperium imperio. LIMBONA VS MANGELIN Decentralization of administration is merely delegation of administrative powers to the LGUs in order to broaden the base of governmental p ower. Decentralization of power is the abdication by the national government pow ers. Section 30 Legspi vs CSC 5

by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 6 The constitutional right to information on matters of public concern is self-exe cuting without the need for any ancillary act of legislation. Valmonte vs de Villa The constitutional right to information is limited on matte rs of public concern and is further subject to such limitations as may be provid ed by law. However, although citizens are afforded the right to information, the Constitution does not accord them the right to compel the custodians of officia l records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information of public concern. Aquino-sarmiento vs morato When a commit tee or board is created as public in its very existence and character such MTRCB , there can be no valid claim to privacy. SEPARATION OF POWERS Sanidad v. COMELEC On whether the case is justiciable Polit ical questions are associated with the wisdom of the legality of a particular ac t. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. If the C onstitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority a ssumed was valid or not. On whether the President may propose Constitutional ame ndments If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative funct ions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but an adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. (Note that at the time Prez. Marcos had legislative powers and there was no legislative de partment at the time) Daza v. Singson Where the legality or validity of the act is in question and not the wisdom of the act, the Court may take jurisdiction an d decide on the acts validity. Even in political questions the Court may take jur isdiction under the expanded judicial power extended to it by Art 8 Sec. 1 of th e Constitution. (Judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or e xcess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of Government .) Delegation of Powers Garcia v. Exec. Secretary 6 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 7 The Congress is may authorize the President to fix tariff rates and duties subje ct to such limitations and restrictions that they may impose. This is expressly provided for in Art 6, Sec 28 par 2 of the Constitution. Araneta v. Dinglasan The delegation of emergency powers by Congress to the Presi dent. Such delegation of powers may be limited by Congress and subject to restri ctions it may provide. Congress may withdraw the delegated power at any time. In this case the emergency power was withdrawn at the time Congress became able to exercise its legislative duties again. In Re: Manzano The committee performs ad ministrative function* which under Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution prohibits members of the SC and other courts established by law to be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. To quote C J Fernando in Garcia vs. Macaraig, he said that while the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the pract ical demands of government precluding its doctrine application, it cannot justif

y a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a dut y non-judicial in character. Administrative functions are those which involves th e regulation and control the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own we lfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the poli cy of the legislative or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence. Angara vs. Electoral Commission The Electoral Commission is an independent, impa rtial, and non-partisan tribunal. The sole power to determine contests regarding the elections, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assem bly has been transferred in totality to the Electoral Commission. Its power is c lear, complete, and exclusive. Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all three branches of government speci fically in the case of the legislative. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced and not what the law shall be since the ascertainment of the latter subject is within the prerogative and determination of the legislature. Delegation of legislative power is permitted and valid prov ided that is passes the two accepted tests- completeness test and the sufficient standard test. The reason for such delegation is the increasing complexity of t he task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope d irectly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. Casibang vs. Aquino Wh ile under the 1973 Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judg e of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of memb ers of the National Assemble as well as elective provincial and city officials ( par 2, Sec. 2, Art. XII-C, 1973 Constitution), such power does not extend to ele ctoral contests concerning municipal elective positions. The issue 7 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 8 still remains a justiciable question and not a political question*. Hence, the c ourts have the jurisdiction to hear and decide on the case. Political questions, in its ordinary parlance, refers to the question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity to, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has be en vested to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concer ned with the issues dependent upon the wisdom, and not the legality of a particu lar measure. Rodriguez v. Gella Act No. 671 was expressly in pursuance of the co nstitutional limitation of the delegation of emergency powers. It is presumed th at the National Assembly intended it to be for a limited period. Executive Order s Nos. 545 and 546, which was anchored to the said Act are declared null and voi d and the respondents are ordered to desist from appropriating, releasing and al lotting expending funds set aside therein. People v. Vera Act No. 4221 is tantam ount to an undue delegation of legislative power. The powers of the government a re distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of the departments of the gove rnment derives its authority from the Constitution. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT Tobias v. Abalos The creation of a new congressional district is but a natural c onsequence of a municipalitys conversion into a city. The Constitution provides t hat a city should have a population of at least 250,000 and is entitled to at leas t 1 representative. Mariano Jr. v. Comelec As decided in Tobias v. Abalos, the C onstitution provides that the compositions of the House should not be more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The natural result in the creatio n of a new legislative from a special law whose purpose is to convert a municipa lity into a city is sanctioned by the Constitution. Montejo v. Comelec The Comel

ec has no power to reapportion districts but only to make minor adjustments. Rep ublic Act No. 7941 An act providing for the election of the party-list representa tives through the party-list system and appropriating funds therefrom. Section 1 3 Zandueta vs. De la Costa When a judge of first instance, presiding over a bran ch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial district by virtue of a legal and valid appointment, accepts another appointment to preside over the same branch o f the same Court of First Instance, in addition of another Court of First Instan ce 8 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 9 to the old one, enters into the discharge of the functions of his new office and receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his old office and cannot claim to be entitled to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the law by v irtue of which his new appointment has been issued; and, said new appointment ha ving been disapproved by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly , neither can he claim to continue occupying the office conferred upon him by sa id new appointment, having ipso jure ceased in the discharge of the functions th ereof. Section 14 Puyat vs. De Guzman No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear a s counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction, before any court in a ny civil case wherein the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumenta lity thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein any officer o r employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to h is office,or before any administrative body. Neither shall he, directly or indir ectly be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or spe cial privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrume ntality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, durin g his term of office. He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause o r matter where he may be called to act on account of his office. Section 16 Sant iago vs. Guingona, Jr. Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarde d or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority. Avelino vs. Cuenco The con stitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which s hould not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. When the constit ution declares that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, does not m ean all of its members. Majority of all the members constitute the House. Hence, 12 senators who unanimously voted constitute a majority of 23 senators (10 walk ed out, 1 out of the country). OSMEA VS. PENDATUN The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior as conferred upon by the Constitution. Also, Con gress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension. PAREDES, JR. VS SA NDIGANBAYAN Sandiganbayan has the authority to suspend a district representative in violation of the Anti-Graft Law as it is being imposed on the representative NOT as a member of the House. 9 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 10 U.S. VS PONS The Court may not go beyond the the recitals of the legislative jou rnals for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment when such journal a re clear and explicit. To inquire the veracity of journals, when they are clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the laws, to inv

ade the coordinate and independent department of the government and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. CASCO PHIL CHEMICAL CO VS GIMENEZ Enrolled bill doctrine- the term urea formaldeh yde is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by t he Congress and approved by the President. Sec. 18: Daza vs Singson - The sense of the Constitution is that the membership in the COA must always reflect politi cal alignments and must adjust to changes. Nowhere, however, in the Constitution require that the party must be a registered party. Coseteng vs Mitra - Endorsem ent of other representatives (in COA) cannot be counted in favor of a representa tive if they do not belong to the latter s party. Guingona vs Gonzales - Full co mplement of 12 seats in COA is not mandatory. Rounding out 0.5 to 1 is unconstit utional as it would deprive other parties of seats in COA. Sec. 21: Bengzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee - Investigation was not in aid of legislation where it merely aims at determining whether a law is violated. To allow such investigation is to violate separation of powers. Arnault vs Nazaren o - Power of Investigation includes power to punish a contumacious witness for c ontempt. Experience has shown that mere requests for information are frequently unavailing. - In aid of legislation - not difficult to satisfy. Necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action is determined by the sum total of informatio n to be gathered as a result of investigation, and not by a fraction of such inf ormation elicited from single question. It is sufficient that the question is ge rmane to the subject matter of inquiry. There is no need for it to be directly r elated or connected to possible legislation. Neri vs Senate Committee on Account ability 10 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 11 - Exception to legislative inquiry: Executive Privilege (which is extended to al l close advisors of the President) - It is wrong for Senate to punish one for co ntempt where executive privilege is properly invoked. - Senate s mistakes in the case at bar: (1) invitations to Neri did not include possible statute; (2) cont empt order lacks required # of votes; (3) Senate did not first rule on the claim of executive privilege and instead dismissed Neri s explanation; (4) rules of p rocedure on inquiries in aid of legislation not duly published. Sec. 21 and 22: Senate vs Ermita - When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes, it is not imperative. - The o versight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to th e extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. - Appearance of departm ent heads in question hour is discretionary. - When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for the department heads to exempt themselves therefro m is by a valid claim of privilege. - EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE privilege based on doc trine of separation of powers, exempting executive from disclosure requirements where such exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. It covers categories of information not of persons. Sec. 24: To lentino vs Secretary of Finance - The phrase originate exclusively does not refer to the appropriations law but to the appropriations bill. It is sufficient that the House of Rep. initiated the passage of the bill. Alvarez vs Guingona - A bil l of local application, such as one asking for the conversion of a municipality into a city, is deemed to have originated from the House provided that the bill of the House was filed prior to the filing of the bill in the Senate even if, in the end, the Senate approved its own version. - The filing in the Senate of a s ubstitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill does not contravene th e constitutional requirement as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill. Sec. 25: Garcia vs Mata - RIDER a provision not rela

ted to the appropriation act (is prohibited) Demetria vs Alba - transfer of appr opriations prohibited PHICONSA vs Enriquez 11 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 12 - The list of those who may be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive. - Case at bar: Congressmen are allowed to determine the necessity of realignment, but House Speaker or Senate Pres. will have to approve the realignment before items are realigned. - Case at bar: Chief of Staff may not be give authority to realig n appropriations. Sec. 26: Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board - Imposition of tax is sufficiently related to the regulation of video industry where the title is comprehensive enough to include such subject (taxation) related to the general p urpose (creation of Videogram Board) Phil. Judges Assoc. vs Prado - Repeal/Withd rawal of franking privilege is germane to the object of the title, which is to c reate postal service system. Hence, the same is embraced in the title/ Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance [Sec. 26 (1)] - Withdrawing tax exemptions granted befo re is embraced in the subject of the title which is to widen the tax base Tan vs Del Rosario - 3 purposes of Sec. 3(1), Art. VI: (a) to prevent hodge-podge or l og-rolling legislation (b) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions which might be overlooked (c) to fairly apprise the people o f the subjects of legislation Uniformity of taxation means: (a) standards that a re used are substantial and not arbitrary (b) categorization is germane to achie ve legislative purpose (c) law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions (d) classification applies equally well to all those belon ging to the same class Tobias vs Abalos - Provision providing for a separate leg islative district is germane to the subject of the bill creating the City of Man daluyong Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance [Sec. 26 (2)] - IF it is only the pri nting that is being dispensed by presidential certification, the time saved woul d be so negligible as to be of any use in ensuring immediate enactment. (Printin g and Readings on separate days both dispensable by pres. certification) - Where no Senators controverted the reality of the factual basis of certification, gro wing budget deficit may be considered as basis for presidential certification. S enators, in responding to the call of the Pres. by voting on the bill, manifeste d their belief in the urgent need for certification of the bill. Sec. 27: Tolent ino vs Sec. of Finance 12 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 13 - It is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an e ntirely new provision not found in either House Bill or Senate Bill. (Amendment in the nature of substitution is warranted as long as amendment is germane to th e subject matter of the bill) - to disregard the enrolled bill is to disregard t he respect due the other 2 departments. Gonzales vs Macaraig - Pressident can ve to an item - Doctrine of inappropriate provisions a provision that is constituti onally inappropriate may be singled out for veto if it is not an appropriation o r revenue item. An inappropriate provision in an appropriations bill is an item in iself. Bengzon vs Drilon - President s power to veto an item does not grant authority t o veto part of an item (or provisions). - President cannot veto a law or repeal a law. PHILCONSA vs Enriquez - Provisions that are germane to the specific appro priations cannot be vetoed. - Requirement of Congressional approval for release of funds for modernization of AFP can be incorporated in separate bill and hence

inappropriate. It was properly vetoed. - Executive Impoundment refusal of the P resident to spend funds already allocated by Congress for a specific purpose (th e duty to implement the law includes the duty to desist from implementing it whe n implementation would prejudice public interest). The Court, however, did not r ule on this issue, and rather declared the provision concerning benefits of CAFG Us as an inappropriate provision. Sec. 28: Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pili pinas vs Tan - a tax is considered uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject may be found. Abra Valley College vs Aquino - Where a lot is not used exclusively for educational purpose, it may be taxed if the use is not incidental to the attainment of main purpose. Sec. 29: Pascual vs Sec. of Public Works - Appropriation for a road owned by a private in dividual is invalid because it is not for a public purpose. Subsequent donation did not validate the law because validity of a statute depends upon the power of Congress at the time of its approval and not upon subsequent events. Aglipay vs Ruiz - Appropriation for special stamp issue is valid as it is not specifically made to benefit a religious denomination but for a public purpose. The benefit acquired by the Church is incidental only. 13 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 14 Guingona vs Carague - The Automatic Reappropriation Law for servicing foreign de bts is valid because the amount is fixed by the parameters of the law itself whi ch requires the simple act of looking into the books of Treasure (the amount is determinable). - Budgetary process: (a) budget preparation (b) legislative autho rization (c) budget execution (d) budget accountability Osmena vs Orbos - Increa se of petroleum prices to resolve the Terminal Fund Balance deficit is valid as it was a valid exercise of police power. PHILCONSA vs Enriquez - Pork barrel pro visions in the annual budget allowing members of Congress to perform executive f unction of spending money appropriated are not in violation of separation of pow ers because Congress itself had specified the uses of the fund and the power giv en was merely recommendatory to the President who could approve or disapprove th e recommendation. Sec. 30: First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs CA - B.P. Blg. 129 gr anting exclusive appellate jurisdiction to CA over the decisions of quasi-judici al bodies is not superseded by Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 providing that d ecisions of BOI are appealable to SC because advice and concurrence of SC was no t sought. Diaz vs CA - Sec. 10 of EO No. 170 stating a party adversely affected b y a decision of ERB may file a petition with SC was superseded by the Constitutio n stating that jurisdiction of SC cannot be made to increase without its advice and concurrence. Sec. 32: Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs COMELEC - Initiati ve is entirely the work of electorate; the process of law-making by the people t hemselves - Referendum consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body. - Case at bar: COMELEC erred in implementing a Resolution when respondents filed petition for Initiativ e and not Referendum. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Sec. 1: Marcos vs Manglapus - The Pre sident has residual powers. The President is more than the sum of specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. 14 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 15 - What is not part of the legislative and judicial departments is deemed part of the executive. - The 1987 Constitution provided for a limitation of specific po wers of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief cla use, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power. Soliven vs Ma kasiar - The privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presid

ential duties free from any hindrance or distraction considering that being the Chief Executive demands undivided attention. - The privilege pertains to the Pre sident by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the offi ce. There is nothing which prohibits the President to waive this privilege. Estr ada vs Desierto - A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit (imm unity is only during the tenure) - Even a sitting President is not immune from s uit for non-official acts or from wrongdoing. (Public office is a public trust. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same foo ting as any other trespasser. Sec. 13: Doromal vs Sandiganbayan - Sec Sec. 13, A rt. VII is applicable in a case where the accused has not signed any document of any bid of the family corporation of which he is a member, submitted to any gov ernment department. - Case at bar: Petitioner has at least an indirect interest with the transaction with DECS and NMYC. Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secr etary - EO No. 284 is unconstitutional insofar it allows a member of the Cabinet to hold not more than two positions in the government. (Respondent s contention that Sec. 7, Art. IX-B is an exception would defeat the obvious legislative int ent which is to prohibit cabinet members from holding multiple offices.) Aytona vs Castillo - As a rule, once an appointment is issued, it cannot be reconsidere d where the appointee has qualified. Exception: ad interim appointments issued i n the last hours of an outgoing Chief Executive (midnight appointments made for buying votes). In re Valenzuela and Vallarta - Sec. 15 (President shall not make appointments within 2 months prior to the next Presidential election) is applic able to the members of the Judiciary. - This sort of appointment is made for par tisan considerations. Sec. 16: Binamira vs Garrucho 15 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 16 - Appointment or designation involves exercise of discretion which cannot be del egated. Even if it be assumed that the power could be exercised by Minister of T ourism, it could be recalled by the President. - Designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure. Sa rmiento vs Mison - 4 groups of officers whom the President shall appoint: (a) he ads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consul s, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and o ther whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution (b) all other off icers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law (c) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint (d) officers l ower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President al one. - Case at bar: Confirmation of COA is not needed in appointment of Commissi oner of Bureau of Customs because a bureau head is not among those within the fi rst group of appointments where consent of COA is required. Bautista vs Salonga - Confirmation of COA is not needed in appointment of Chairman of Commission of Human Rights because such appointment is not vested in the President in the Cons titution. The rd President appoints Chairman of CHR pursuant to EO 163 (CHR Chai rman is thus within the 3 group of officers) Quintos-Deles vs Commission of Appo intments - The appointment of Sectoral Representatives requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The seats reserved for sectoral representatives may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Sec.7, Art icle XVIII of the Constitution (hence, sectoral st representatives are within th e 1 group of officers) st - Exceptions to those officers within the 1 group: (1) Ombudsman and his deputies, and (2) members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts. Calderon vs Carale - Confirmation by COA is required only for pres idential appointees that are within the 1 group of officers as mentioned in Sarm iento vs Mison. - Congress may not expand the list of appointments needing confi rmation. - Case at bar: RA 6715, which requires the COA confirmation in appointm ents of NLRC Chairman and Commissioners, transgresses Sec. 16, Art. VII. The app

ointments of NLRC Chairman and rd Commissioners do not need COA confirmation bec ause they fall under the 3 group of officers. Tarrosa vs Singson - affirmed the ruling in Calderon vs Carale - Case at bar: Appointment of Central Bank Governor does not need COA confirmation. Flores vs Drilon - A law which limits the Presi dent to only one appointee is an encroachment to the prerogative of the Presiden t because appointment involves discretion to choose who to appoint. st 16 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 17 Luego vs Civil Service Commission - CSC is without authority to revoke an appoin tment because of its belief that another person was better qualified, which is a n encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority. - Th e permanent appointment made by the appointing authority may not be reversed by CSC and call it temporary. Pobre vs Mendieta - The vacancy in the position of Ch airman of the Professional Regulation Commission cannot be filled by the Senior Associate Commissioner by operation of law (or by succession) because it will de prive the President of the power to appoint the Chairman. Sec. 17 Drilon vs Lim - Distinction between power and control: An officer in con trol lays down the rules in the doing of an act. if they are not followed, he ma y, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he m ay even decide to do it by himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. T he supervisor merely sees to it that rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only t o conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner except to see to it that the rules are followed. (Note) Power of control pertains to powe r of an officer to alter, modify, nullify, or set aside what a subordinate has d one in the performance of his duties and to substitute his judgment to that of t he former [Mondano vs Silvosa] Villena vs Secretary of the Interior - Doctrine o f Qualified Political Agency (alter ego principle) -acts of the Secretaries of E xecutive Departments, when performed and promulgated in the regular course of bu siness or unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumpti vely the acts of the Chief Executive - Case at bar: Secretary of the Interior is invested with the authority to order the investigation of the charges against t he petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for that purpose. Lacson-Mag allanes Co., Inc. vs Pano - Department heads are President s men of confidence. Hi s is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pl easure. Normally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his autho rity to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department s ecretaries. - Case at bar: The President, through his Executive Secretary, may u ndo an act of the Director of Lands City of Iligan vs Director of Lands 17 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 18 - The President has the power to grant portions of public domain to any governme nt entity like the City of Iligan because he has control over the Director of La nds, who has direct executive control in the lease, sale or any form of concessi on or disposition of the land of public domain. Gascon vs Arroyo - Case at bar: Executive Secretary has the power and authority to enter into the Agreement to A rbitrate with the ABS CBN as he acted for and in behalf of the President when he signed it. Kilusan Bayan vs Dominguez - An administrative officer has only such

powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exe rcise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what ma y be necessary for their just and reasonable execution. Angangco vs Castillo - The power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint, but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them the inherent power cannot be exercised NAMARCO vs Arca Executive power of control extends to government-owned corporations. Sec. 18: Gu azon vs De Villa - The President has the power to ordain saturation drives. Ther e is nothing in the Constitution which denies the authority of the Chief Exec. t o order police actions to stop unabated criminality, rising lawlessness, and ala rming communist activities. Ruffy vs Chief of Staff - Courts martial are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the Congress for the Presi dent as Commander in chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy a nd enforcing discipline therein and utilize under his order those of his authori zed military representatives. Olaguer vs Military Commission No. 34 - Due proces s of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions the accused be entitled to a trial. The trial contemplated by the due process clause is trial by judicial pro cess. Military Commissions are not courts within the Philippine judicial system. Judicial power is vested only in the courts. Military commissions pertain to th e executive department and are instrumentalities of the President as commander-i n-chief to aid him in enforcing discipline in the armed forces. Sec. 19: Torres vs Gonzales 18 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 19 - A judicial pronouncement is not necessary in determining whether the condition s in the pardon are violated. The determination of whether there is a violations of the conditions rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the President. Mon santo vs Factoran - Pardon implies guilt. While it relieves the party pardoned f rom all punitive consequences of his criminal act, it relieves him from nothing more. It does not, therefore, restore a convicted felon to public office forfeit ed by reason of conviction. People vs Salle, Jr. - Pardon may be granted only by final judgment. Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal, execu tive clemency may not yet be granted. Before an appellant may be granted pardon, he must first ask for the withdrawal of his appeal. Garcia vs COA - President s grant of executive clemency to a person dismissed from his office pursuant to a n administrative case (but where the latter has been acquitted in a criminal cas e based on the same facts alleged in the criminal case) entitles the latter to a utomatic reinstatement and backwages. Sabello vs DECS - Pardon (in a criminal case) frees the individual from all the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. Although su ch pardon may restore a person s eligibility to public office, it does not entit le him to automatic reinstatement. He should apply for reappointment to said off ice. - [Compare with Garcia vs COA] Llamas vs Orbos - In granting the power of e xecutive clemency, the Constitution does not distinguish between criminal and ad ministrative cases. Sec. 18: Constantino, Jr. vs Cuisia - The debt-relief contra cts, prividing for buy-back and bond-conversion schemes, entered into pursuant t o Financing Program are not beyond the powers granted to the President under Sec . 20, Art. VII. The only restriction that the Constitution provides, aside from the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, is that loans must be subject to li mitations provided by law. Accordingly, the contention that buy-back and bond-co nversion schemes are neither loans nor guarantees, and hence beyond the Presidents po wer to execute, are without merit. Sec. 21: Commissioner of Customs vs Eastern S ea Trading (1961) - The concurrence of the House of Congress is required by our fundamental law in the making of treaties which are however distinct and differe

nt from executive agreements which may be validly entered without such concurren ce. 19 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 20 Pimentel, Jr. vs Exec. Sec. - The power to ratify is vested in the President, su bject to concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate is limited only to gi ving or withholding its consent or concurrence to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senat e or having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. This discretion to ratify lies within the President s competence alone. - 4 steps in treaty-making process: (a) negotiation (b) signing of the treaty (simply a means of authenticating the instrument and a symbol of good faith) (c) ratification ( formal act by which a statute confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty) ( d) exchange of instruments of ratification - In the case at bar, the treaty was merely signed. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Sec. 1: Santiago vs Bautista - The courts may not exercise j udicial power when there is no applicable law. - Case at bar: An award of honors to a student by a board of teachers may not be reversed by a court where the aw ards are governed by no applicable law. Daza v Singson - Even if the issue prese nted was political in nature, the Court is still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon it that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. - That where serious constitutional questio ns are involved, "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases dem ands that they be settled promptly and definitely brushing aside, if we must, te chnicalities of procedure." Mantruste Systems v Court of Appeals - There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an administrative agency, except when it violates a citizen s constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of discretion, or acts in excess of, or without jurisdiction. - Cour ts may not substitute their judgment for that of the Asset Privatization Trust ( administrative body), nor block, by an injunction, the discharge of its function s and the implementation of its decisions in connection with the acquisition, sa le or disposition of assets transferred to it. Malaga v Penachos, Jr. - It was p reviously declared the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or r estraining orders by courts against administrative acts in controversies involvi ng facts or the exercise of 20 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 21 discretion in technical cases. The Court observed that to allow the courts to ju dge these matters would disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative mac hinery. On issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving questions o f law, courts could not be prevented by any law (in this case, P.D. No. 605) fro m exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts. PACU v Sec retary of Education - Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. (Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might unde r the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justic iable controversy.) - Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein however intellectually solid the problem may be. This is especially true where the issues "reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court s duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion. Mariano, Jr. v COMELEC -

Considering that those contingencies mentioned by the petitioners may or may no t happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue (city of M akati is involved). Worse, they raise this futuristic issue in a petition for de claratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction. Macasiano v National Housing Authority -It is a rule firmly entrenched in our ju risprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented i n appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case. J. Joya v P CGG - The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or va lidity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: tha t the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible o pportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. But the most important are the first two (2) requisites. - Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualif y to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer s suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbur sement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by a n officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Legaspi v Civil Service Commission - It becomes apparent that wh en a Mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requireme nt of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a c itizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right. "Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it embraces every person. 21 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 22 Dumlao v COMELEC - For one, there is a misjoinder of parties and actions. One pe titioner does not join other petitioners in the burden of their complaint, nor d o the latter join the former in his. They, respectively, contest completely diff erent statutory provisions. - For another, there are standards that have to be f ollowed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the exis tence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the pa rty raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exerc ised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. Bugnay Const. and Devt. Corp . v Laron - The doctrine holds that only when the act complained of directly inv olves an illegal disbursement of public funds raised by taxation will the taxpay er s suit be allowed. The essence of a taxpayer s right to institute such an act ion hinges on the existence of that requisite pecuniary or monetary interest. It is not enough that the taxpayer-plaintiff sufficiently show that he would be benefited or injured by the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party in interest. Kilosbayan v Guingona, Jr. - A party s standing before this Court is a procedura l technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in vie w of the importance of the issues raised. - In line with the liberal policy of t his Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even ass ociation of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiat e and prosecute actions before this Court to question the constitutionality or v

alidity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agenc ies or instrumentalities. PHILCONSA v Enriquez - The Senators have legal standin g to question the validity of the veto. When a veto was made in excess of the au thority of the President, it impermissibily intrudes into the domain of the Legi slature. A member of Congress can question an act of the Executive which injures Congress as an institution. Tatad v Garcia, Jr. -The prevailing doctrines in ta xpayer s suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national government or government-owned or controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of the law and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved (just like in Bugnay case since no public money was involved). Opos a v Factoran, Jr. - CLASS SUIT: The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippine s. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. 22 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 23 - Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be b ased on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. - Needless to say, every generati on has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, th e minors` assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the sa me time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that ri ght for the generations to come. Lozada v COMELEC - As taxpayers, petitioners ma y not file the instant petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged that tax mone y is being illegally spent. It is only when an act complained of, which may incl ude a legislative enactment or statute, involves the illegal expenditure of publ ic money that the so-called taxpayer suit may be allowed. - The unchallenged rul e is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain , direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part t o cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution. When the asser ted harm is a "generalized grievance" shared in substantially equal measure by a ll or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exerc ise of jurisdiction. Kilosbayan v Morato - The voting on petitioners standing in the previous case w as a narrow one, seven (7) members sustaining petitioners standing and six (6) denying petitioners right to bring the suit. The majority was thus a tenuous on e that is not likely to be maintained in any subsequent litigation. In addition, there have been charges in the membership of the Court, with the retirement of Justice Cruz and Bidin and the appointment of the writer of this opinion and Jus tice Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist on the maintenanc e of the ruling as to petitioners standing. SECTION 3 Bengzon v Lim - What is f iscal autonomy? It contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. I t recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensat ion and play plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. - The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence an d flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposi tion of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutiona l offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is an

athema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the C onstitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based SECTION 4 23 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 24 Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v Court of Appeals, et.al. - Reorganization is pure ly an internal matter of the Court to which petitioner certainly has no business at all. - The Court with its new membership is not obliged to follow blindly a decision upholding a party s case when, after its re-examination, the same calls for a rectification. SECTION 5 Drilon v Lim - The Constitution vests in the Sup reme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower court s in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, interna tional or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, in struction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. - In the exercise of this ju risdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bear ing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the st ability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the qu estioned act is usually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive depart ments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming mo desty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegi ate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in i ts discussion. Larranaga v Court of Appeals (Transfer the venue of the prelimina ry investigation from Cebu City to Manila because of the extensive coverage of t he proceedings by the Cebu media which allegedly influenced the people s percept ion of petitioner s character and guilt.) - The Court recognizes that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. It was previously held that to warrant a fi nding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judge s have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage in publicity. - In the case at bar, nothing in the records shows that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v Court of Appeals - It is intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over cases paced under its appellate jurisdiction. For the indiscrimina te enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction. For the indisc riminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction can unnec essarily burden the Court and thereby undermine its essential function of expoun ding the law in its most profound national aspects. Aruelo v Court of Appeals Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule prohibiting the fili ng of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules con cerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court. Javellana v DILG 24 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 25 (Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 does not violate Article VIII. Section 5 of the Constitution. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court s power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law.) - The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public offic

ials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it. SECTION 6 Maceda v Vasquez - In the absence of any administrative act ion taken against a person by the Court with regard to his certificates of servi ce, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in vio lation of the doctrine of separation of powers. - Where a criminal complaint aga inst a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, th e Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scop e of their administrative duties. Raquiza v Judge Castaneda, Jr. - The rules eve n in an administrative case demands that if the respondent Judge should be disci plined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence presented agains t him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary, to w hich respondent belongs, no less demands that before its member could be faulted , it should be only after due investigation and based on competent proofs, no le ss. This is all the more so when as in this case the charges are penal in nature . ( Misconduct also implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgm ent. It results that even if respondent were not correct in his legal conclusion s, his judicial actuations cannot be regarded as grave misconduct, unless the co ntrary sufficiently appears.) SECTION 10 Nitafan v Commissioner of Internal Reve nue - The clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the propos ed express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judic iary, so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches of Governmen t. SECTION 11 De La Llana v Alba -Judiciary Act does not violate judicial securit y of tenure. This Court is empowered "to discipline judges of inferior courts an d, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal." Thus, it possess es the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the Presiden t who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished fro m termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure t o a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In ca se of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his po sition. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of 25 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 26 any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumb ents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its ef fect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Rea listically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judici ary. People v Gacott, Jr. - To require the entire Court to deliberate upon and p articipate in all administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, i mposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the a djudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since e ven cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court e n banc. - Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically required to be decided by the Court en b anc, in cognizance of the need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of seriou s charges against members of the judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or bot h, that the administrative matter may be decided in division. SECTION 12 In Re: Manzano - As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government . Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderl y society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC jud ges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the landable pur

poses for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably inci dental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties. SECTION 14 Nicos Industrial Corp v Court of Appeals - The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate decisions and/or minute reso lutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case. - As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the merits, it is imperative that it be a reasoned decision clear ly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the law on which it is based. Me ndoza v CFI - What is expected of the judiciary "is that the decision rendered m akes clear why either party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as e stablished. Nor is there any regid formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy the requirement of clarity and distinctness. The discretion of the parti cular judge in this respect, while not unlimited, is necessarily broad. There is no sacramental form of words which he must use upon pain of being considered as having failed to abide by what the Constitution directs." - The provision has b een held to refer only to decisions of the merits and not to orders of the trial court resolving incidental matters such as the one at bar. (content of the reso lution: incident in the prosecution of petitioner) 26 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 27 Borromeo v Court of Appeals - The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and l itigants that it disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and dec rees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, whe re the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case an d the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is f iled merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition alw ays gives the legal basis. - When the Court, after deliberating on a petition an d any subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the respondent court s decision is shown or for some othe r legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. - Minute resolutions need not be signed by the membe rs of the Court who took part in the deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the Chief Justice. Komatsu Industries (Phils.) Inc v Court of Appeals - It has long been settled th at this Court has discretion to decide whether a "minute resolution" should be u sed in lieu of a full-blown decision in any particular case and that a minute Re solution of dismissal of a Petition for Review on Certiorari constitutes an adju dication on the merits of the controversy or subject matter of the Petition. It has been stressed by the Court that the grant of due course to a Petition for Re view is "not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there i s no need to fully explain the Court s denial. For one thing, the facts and law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals opinion." Prudential Bank v Castr o - The Constitutional mandate that "no . . . motion for reconsideration of a de cision of the court shall be . . . denied without stating the legal basis theref or" is inapplicable in administrative cases. And even if it were, said Resolutio n stated the legal basis for the denial and, therefore, adhered faithfully to th e Constitutional requirement. "Lack of merit," which was one of the grounds for denial, is a legal basis. -(certification issue) The requirement of a certificat ion refers to decisions to judicial cases and not to administrative cases. Besid es, since the decision was a per curiam decision, a formal certification is not required. Oil and Natural Gas Commission v Court of Appeals - The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing ther

ein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not p reclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the find ings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribu nals. SECTION 14 (not 16) Valdez v Court of Appeals 27 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 28 - The (lower) court statement in the decision that a party has proven his case w hile the other has not, is not the findings of facts contemplated by the Constit ution and the rules to be clearly and distinctly stated. - This Court has said a gain and again that it is not a trier of facts and that it relies, on the factua l findings of the lower court and the appellate court which are conclusive. CONS TITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS A. COMMON PROVISIONS Aruelo v. CA The rule of the Commiss ion should prevail if the proceeding is before a Commission. But if the proceedi ng is before a court, the Rules of Court prevails. (Sec. 6) Cua v. Comelec The 2 -1 decision rendered by the First Division was a valid decision under Article IX -A, Section 7 of the Constitution. (Sec.7) Vital-Gozon v. CA Execution of the Ci vil Service Commission s decision should have been ordered and effected by the C ommission itself, when de la Fuente filed a motion therefor. It declined to do s o, however, on the alleged ground, as de la Fuente claims he was told, that it " had no coercive powers unlike a court to enforce its final decisions/resolutions ." That proposition, communicated to de la Fuente, of the Commission s supposed lack of coercive power to enforce its final judgments, is incorrect. It is incon sistent with previous acts of the Commission of actually directing execution of its decisions and resolutions, which this Court has sanctioned in several cases; and it is not in truth a correct assessment of its powers under the Constitutio n and the relevant laws Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v. Ferrer While it may be true that the l ower court has the jurisdiction over controversies dealing with the COMELEC s aw ard of contracts, the same being purely administrative and civil in nature, neve rtheless, herein petitioner has no cause of action on the basis of the allegatio ns of its complaint. "The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elect ions and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by la w. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative q uestions affecting elections, including the determination of the number of locat ion of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other e lection officials . . . The decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission shal l be subject to review by the Supreme Court." Mateo v. CA The hiring and firing of employees of government-owned and controlled corporations are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations. SC Revised Admin istrative Circular No. 1-95. Final resolutions of the Civil Service Commission s hall be appealable to the Court of Appeals. In any event, whether under the old rule or the 28 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 29 present rule, Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain cases invo lving dismissal of officers and employees covered y the Civil Service Law. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION Section 2 TUPAS v. NHC Civil service now covers only governm ent-owned or controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those incorpo rated under and pursuant to a general legislation. NHC is not covered by civil s

ervice so its employees undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employees organizations. The right to unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sec tors. De los Santos v. Mallare The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical. These positions mentione d are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and e mployees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. Thus, the city engine er cannot be removed without just cause. Salazar v. Mathay The tenure of officia ls holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures. Corpus v . Cuaderno Highly technical employees cannot be removed by reason of lack or los s of confidence by the one making the appointment. Luego v. Civil Service Commis sion The CSC has no authority to disapprove or revoke a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee. The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing th e appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. Approva l is more appropriately called an attestation, that is, of the fact that the app ointee is qualified for the position to which he has been named. Province of Cam arines Sur v. CA Lack of civil service eligibility makes an appointment temporar y; thus, the appointment is revocable at any time (without a fixed and definite term) or dependent upon the pleasure of the appointing power. Obtaining the civi l service legibility later on does not ipso facto convert a temporary appointmen t into a permanent one. SSS Employees Association v. CA The right of government employees to organize does not include the right to strike. Section 7 29 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 30 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary While all other appointive official s in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the gov ernment during their tenure when such is allowed by tlaw and the primary functio n of their office, Cabinet members, their deputies, and assistants may only do s o when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. Flores v. Drilon The pro viso which states, Provided, however, that for the first year of its operations f rom the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appo inted as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority, violate s the constitutional prohibition against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts. Section 8 Quimson v. Ozaeta The employment of a person as an agent collector is not itself unlawful because there is no inc ompatibility between aid appointment and his employment as Deputy Provincial Tre asurer and Municipal Treasurer. There is no legal objection to government offici al occupying two government offices and performing functions to both as long as there is no incompatibility. The Constitutional prohibition refers to double app ointments and performance of functions of more than one office. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Section 1 Cayetano v. Monsod Practice of law means any a ctivity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal proced ure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to pr actice law is to give notice or render any kind of service which device or servi ce requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. Brillantes v. Yor ac The President has no authority to make designation of a Comelec Chairman in a n Acting Capacity. The choice of temporary Chairman in the absence of the regula r chairman comes under the discretion of the Comelec. It cannot be exercised by the President. A designation As Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and therefore revocable at will. No cause need be established to just ify its revocation. Lindo v. Comelec Comelecs statement that fake and spurious ba

llots may have been introduced to increase the votes of protestant cannot be mad e a basis for denying the execution pending appeal. Section 3 Sarmiento vs. Comelec 30 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 31 Pursuant to Section 16 of R.A. 7166, it provides: "All pre-proclamation cases pe nding before the Commission shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the t erm of the office involved and the rulings of the boards of canvassers concerned shall be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a regular election protest by the aggrieved party. However, proceedings may continue when on the b asis of the evidence thus far presented, the Commission determines that the peti tion appears meritorious and accordingly issues an order for the proceeding to c ontinue or when an appropriate order has been issued by the Supreme Court in a p etition for certiorari." Reyes vs. RTC of Oriental Mindoro All election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, must be decided by the COMELEC in division. Should a party be di ssatisfied with the decision, he may file a motion for reconsideration before th e COMELEC en banc. It is, therefore, the decision, order or ruling of the COMELE C en banc that, in accordance with Art. IX, A, Section 7, "may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari." Section 4 National Press Club vs. Comelec The Com elec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by m edia practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite per iods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebisci te periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines vs GMA It is argue d that the power to supervise or regulate given to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution does not include the power to prohibit. In the fir st place, what the COMELEC is authorized to supervise or regulate by Art. IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution, among other things, is the use by media of inform ation of their franchises or permits, while what Congress (not the COMELEC) proh ibits is the sale or donation of print space or air time for political ads. In o ther words, the object of supervision or regulation is different from the object of the prohibition. It is another fallacy for petitioners to contend that the p ower to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. This may have force if the object of the power were the same. Adiong vs. COMELEC The posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles nee ds the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate. Whether the candidate is rich and, therefore, can afford to d oleout more decals and stickers or poor and without the means to spread out the number of decals and stickers is not as important as the right of the owner to f reely express his choice and exercise his right of free speech. The owner can ev en prepare his own decals or stickers for posting on his personal property. To s trike down this right and enjoin it is impermissible encroachment of his liberti es. Sanidad vs. COMELEC 31 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 32 Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but the

y do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned bec ause they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific r adio or television times. COMMISSION ON AUDIT SECTION 2 GUEVARA VS GIMENEZ The Auditor-General has no mada te to disapprove expenditures which in his opinion are excessive and extravagant . His authority is limited to the auditing in expenditures of funds and properti es. such function is limited to a determination of whether there is a law approp riating funds for a given purpose; whether a contract entered made by the proper officer has been entered in conformity with the said appropriation law; whether the goods and services covered by the said contract have been delivered or rend ered in pursuance thereof, as attested by the proper officer; and whether paymen t therefore has been authorized by the officials of the corresponding department or bureau. If these requirements have been fulfilled, it is the ministerial dut y of the Auditor General to approve and pass in audit the voucher and treasury w arrant for said payment. No discretion to disapprove said payment on the ground that contract was unwise or unreasonable. OROCIO VS COA To determine whether an expenditure of a government agency or instrumentality is irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant and unconscionable, the COA should not be bound by the o pinion of the legal counsel of a particular agency. Legal counsel can only offer legal advice. OSMENA VS COA A compromise agreement between a municipal corporat ion (Cebu City) and the parents of victim (Spouses dela Cerna) was constitutiona l. The participation of the city in an amicable settlement and eventual executio n of a compromise is indubitable within the power and authority of a municipal c orporation. Notably, the compromise agreement was submitted to its legislative c ouncil, which approved it conformably with its established rules and procedure. SAMBELI VS PROVINCE OF ISABELA COA has the regulatory power to ensure that gover nment funds and properties are fully protected and conserved and that irregular unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant expenditures or uses of funds owned by, o r pertaining to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies of instrumen talities are prevented. BUSTAMANTE VS COA Discretion exercised by COA in the den ial of the appeal (on the decision of a Regional Auditor) is within its power. A lso, conclusions of a Board of Directors of a government-owned and controlled co rporation in safeguarding the proper use of the governments and peoples property c annot prevail over the constitutional mandate on COA. SALIGUMBA VS COA 32 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola 33 Supreme Courts power to review COA decisions refers to money matters and not to administrative cases (rape case vs. auditing examiner-respondent) involving the discipline of its personnel. SECTION 3 PHIL AIRLINES VS COA (more on section 2) COA has the exclusive authority, subject to limitations, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefo re. COA can adopt as its own, simply by reiteration or by reference, without the necessity of repromulgation, already existing rules and regulations. It may als o expand the coverage thereof to agencies or instrumentalities under its audit j urisdiction. COA can advised PAL to desist from bidding the its fuel upon expira tion of contracts BAGATSING VS COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION COA, the agency that a dopted the rules on bidding procedure to be followed by government offices and c orporations, upheld the legality of bidding although there is only one offeror ( 2 were disqualified- bid below floor price and technical reasons) since the COA Circular does not speak of accepted bids but of offerors, without distinction as to whether they were disqualified. The interpretation of an agency of its own r ules should be given more weight than the interpretation by the agency of the la w it is merely tasked to administer.

33 by 1E (2008-2009) SBC Law-Mendiola