FLEC v. Angola ACHPR Case in Portuguese

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PERANTE A COMISSO AFRICANA DE DIREITOS HUMANOS E

DOS POVOS

FLEC (Frente de Libertao do Enclave de Cabinda)
Cabinda

vs.

Repblica de Angola

Comunicado 328/2006

APRESENTAO SOBRE O MRITO DA CAUSA

Para a Autora-FLEC:
Dr. Jonathan Levy, PhD
International Criminal Bar/ Barreau Pnal N
o
100465
Advogado da Autora-FLEC
37 Royal Pointe Dr.
Hilton Head Island, SC USA 29926
Tel/Fax 001 202-318-2406
Email jonlevy@hargray.com
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INTRODUO

A autodeterminao econmica foi caluniada como um primo pobre da
autodeterminao poltica. Porm, principalmente na frica, este no o
caso. A antiga luta contra o imperialismo e o colonialismo foi colocada de
lado pelo neocolonialismo e ps-colonialismo. A riqueza e recursos da
frica ainda enriquecem fortes interesses externos enquanto o povo
africano definha-se.

O protectorado de Cabinda nasceu da luta europeia por colnias, hoje o
petrleo de Cabinda estimula as economias da Europa e da Amrica do Norte,
enriquece os acionistas da Chevron e possibilita o governo de Angola a se
manter. A maioria dos cabindas pobre e est desempregada. Cabinda uma
metfora da frica e a autodeterminao econmica de Cabinda relevante a
todos que se opem a injustia.

1. Comunicado 328/2006 trata da autodeterminao econmica no territrio
de Cabinda e em particular a distribuio e a explorao de petrleo,
recursos minerais e naturais em terra.

2. Esta apresentao sobre o mrito da causa defende que a comisso deve
encontrar causa para conceder a solicitao da FLEC e nomear um Relator
Especial para a questo da autodeterminao econmica de Cabinda e a
distribuio de recursos em terra.

3. A FLEC argumenta que uma investigao neutra dos factos
necessria urgentemente devido situao dentro de Cabinda
permanecer instvel e voltil conforme estabelecido na actualizao dos
factos a seguir.

4. A Autora alega que o Estado Demandado violou os artigos 14, 19, 20,
21, 22 e 24 dispostos na Carta Africana com relao sua administrao
dos recursos naturais que so patrimnio de Cabinda:

5. Artigo 14

O direito a propriedade deve ser garantido. O direito somente pode ser
usurpado no interesse do pblico ou no interesse geral da comunidade e de
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acordo com os termos da legislao apropriada.

6. Artigo 19

Todas as pessoas devem ser iguais; elas devem gozar do mesmo respeito e
devem ter os mesmos direitos. Nada dever justificar o domnio de um povo
por outro.

7. Artigo 20

1. Todos os povos devem ter o direito existncia. Eles devem ter o direito
incontestvel e inalienvel de autodeterminao. Eles devem determinar a
sua viso poltica livremente e devem buscar o seu desenvolvimento social e
econmico de acordo com a poltica que escolherem livremente.

2. Os povos opressos ou colonizados devem ter o direito de se libertarem
dos laos de dominao utilizando quaisquer meios reconhecidos pela
comunidade internacional.

3. Todos os povos devem ter o direito assistncia dos partidos dos Estados
em relao a presente Carta em sua luta pela libertao contra a dominao
estrangeira, seja ela poltica, econmica ou cultural.

8. Artigo 21

1. Todos os povos devem destinar suas riquezas e recursos naturais
livremente. Esse direito deve ser exercido no interesse exclusivo do povo. Em
nenhuma circunstncia o povo deve ser privado do mesmo.

2. Em caso de espoliao, o povo espoliado tem o direito recuperao
legal de sua propriedade assim como uma compensao adequada.

3. A livre destinao de recursos naturais e riquezas deve ser exercida sem
prejuzo obrigao de promover cooperao internacional com base em
respeito mtuo, troca equitativa e em princpios da legislao internacional.

4. Os partidos dos Estados com relao a presente Carta devem exercer de
forma individual e coletiva o direito de destinar suas riquezas e recursos
naturais de forma livre a fim de fortalecer a unio e solidariedade africana.
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5. Os partidos dos Estados na presente Carta devem comprometer-se a
eliminar quaisquer formas de explorao econmica estrangeira
particularmente aquela praticada por monoplios internacionais com o intuito
de viabilizar que seus povos se beneficiem completamente das vantagens
provenientes de sua nacionalidade.

9. Artigo 22

1. Todos os povos devem ter o direito ao seu desenvolvimento econmico,
social e cultural com a devida considerao pela sua liberdade e identidade,
alm do desfrute igualitrio do legado comum da humanidade.

2. Os Estados devem ter o dever, de forma individual ou coletiva, de
garantir o exerccio do direito ao dever, de forma individual ou
coletiva, para garantir o exerccio do direito ao desenvolvimento.

10. Artigo 24

Todos os povos devem ter o direito a um ambiente satisfatrio geral
que favorvel ao seu desenvolvimento.

11. A FLEC no busca uma apurao da questo de autodeterminao
poltica e se contm s questes de autodeterminao econmica, direitos de
propriedade comum e desenvolvimento.

12. A FLEC solicita a nomeao de um Relator Especial para Cabinda com
o intuito de investigar e apurar as questes acima. Portanto, a Comisso
deve:

(a) nomear um Relator Especial para investigar a questo de
autodeterminao econmica em Cabinda e fazer recomendaes aps
consultar todas as partes envolvidas inclusive o povo de Cabinda, a FLEC, o
Governo de Angola, a sociedade civil, corporaes multinacionais, a igreja
catlica romana, ONGs e organizaes intergovernamentais.

(b) disponibilizar a interveno da Comisso para resolver essa causa de
uma maneira amigvel.

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APRESENTAO SOBRE O MRITO DA CAUSA.
A. Procedimento
13. No dia 29 de setembro de 2006, a Secretaria da Comisso Africana de
Direitos Humanos e de Povos (a Secretaria) recebeu uma queixa da Frente de
Libertao do Enclave de Cabinda - FLEC.

14. No dia 15 de agosto de 2007, a Autora aditou/suplementou os seus
factos e enviou um dossi de admissibilidade.

15. Informaes suplementares adicionais e correspondncia tambm
foram enviadas durante a pendncia deste processo.

16. Na 10 Sesso Extraordinria da Comisso, este comunicado foi
considerado admissvel.

B. Qualificaes e Informaes Suplementares

17. A Autora a FLEC, a Frente de Libertao do Estado de Cabinda com
membros e funcionrios em Cabinda, Ponta Negra, Repblica do Congo e
Frana. A FLEC membro da UNPO (Organizao das Naes e Povos No
Representados) e da OEAS (Organizao de Estados Africanos Emergentes).
1
Os oficiais chefes da FLEC so Afonso Massago (Presidente), Stephane
Barros (Secretria-Geral) e Dr. Joel Batila (Chanceler).
2

18. A FLEC se considera a representante aceita e histrica do povo de
Cabinda que so as verdadeiras partes de interesse. Em Cabinda a opinio
generalizada de que: Todo o Cabinda FLEC. A FLEC est banida da
participao na democracia angolana porque defende o direito de
autodeterminao.

19. Durante o preparo desta apresentao, a Autora consultou e/ou solicitou
informaes de cabindas comuns, cabindas afiliados a organizaes no
FLEC, organizaes no governamentais, organizaes governamentais
internacionais, da mdia, de representantes da igreja catlica, da comunidade
internacional e de representantes das indstrias de petrleo e minerao.
Todos os supramencionados expressaram apoio pela apurao neutra de
factos pela Comisso Africana de Direitos Humanos e dos Povos.

1
www.unpo; www.oeas.info.

2
Tambm conhecida recentemente como FLEK, Frente de Libertao do Estado de Kabinda.
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20. A Autora tambm forneceu informaes a respeito deste assunto
pendente para a Secretaria da Unio Africana, agncias das Naes Unidas,
para o Tribunal Criminal Internacional, ONGs e diversos estados soberanos.

21. O estado demandado de Angola no discutiu essa questo com a FLEC,
direta ou indiretamente. Da mesma forma, o estado demandado no
participou deste procedimento.

C. Informaes Suplementares com relao aos Recursos em Terra.

22. Esta queixa exclui a questo da alocao de recursos marinhos do seu
comunicado inicial embora a FLEC no faa quaisquer objees Comisso
ampliar o escopo de qualquer averiguao. O regime dos recursos marinhos
difere materialmente do regime em terra, pois a extrao dos produtos de
petrleo contnua e remonta ao menos ao ano de 1954 quando Cabinda era
um protectorado colonial de Portugal.

23. A extrao de recursos em terra est praticamente inativa ou em
situao exploratria devido em grade parte oposio das foras da FLEC
que impedem ou restringem as operaes.

24. A FLEC no reconhece a concesso de licenas de recursos ou
subvenes feitas por Angola e reserva-se o direito de efectuar os seus
prprios pactos com as empresas de recursos para conferir a
descolonizao de Cabinda.

25. A FLEC avisou em varias ocasies os empreiteiros estrangeiros que sua
segurana no pode ser garantida no conflito em terra.

26. Em consequncia do conflito por causa dos recursos, desde 2006, a FLEC
e as Foras Armadas Angolanas (FAA) entraram em confrontos diversas
vezes no ano passado no norte de Cabinda com incurses da FAA para dentro
da Repblica do Congo incluindo o assassinato e sequestro de oficiais da
FLEC.

C. O incidente de 08 de janeiro de 2010.

27. No dia 08 de janeiro de 2010 membros da equipe de futebol togolesa a
caminho da Copa da frica em Cabinda foram mortos e feridos junto
fronteira com Cabinda.

28. A FLEC e Angola tm divergncias sobre a responsabilidade pelo
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incidente. Um Relatrio da Comisso sobre o dia 08 de janeiro
autorizado pelo ento Secretrio Geral da FLEC Dr. Joel Batila
descobriu que as foras da FLEC no executaram o ataque e levantou
srias questes sobre o envolvimento de Angola. Angola responsabiliza
a FLEC. Apenso como PROVA UM.

29. Em dezembro de 2011, o governo francs libertou o arquiteto declarado
dos ataques aparentemente porque suas alegaes no eram crveis.
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A
FLEC tambm chegou a mesma concluso. Uma investigao francesa ainda
est em andamento.

30. A posio da FLEC de que o incidente de 08 de janeiro foi uma
provocao por um elemento do governo angolano para classificar a FLEC
como uma organizao terrorista. A FLEC solicitou uma investigao
internacional. Angola usou o incidente para justificar execues sumrias,
tortura e sequestro de supostos membros da FLEC e oposio civil no
filiada FLEC dentro de Cabinda e do Congo.

D. Corrupo e Assassinato de Oficiais da FLEC.

31. Aps o incidente de 08 de janeiro, Angola deu boas-vindas de forma
incongruente desero de vrios oficiais de alto ranking da FLEC, os
mesmo oficiais que logicamente teriam sido responsveis pelos ataques.
Estes incluam o Vice-presidente da administrao civil de Cabinda, o
comandante militar da FLEC e o Ministro de Segurana de Cabinda.
Nenhum destes foi preso ou acusado de terrorismo pelo governo de Angola.
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32. Aps a desero, pelo menos seis comandantes militares da FLEC
foram assassinados em 2010-2011 em ou nas proximidades de Ponta Negra,
Congo ou dentro de Cabinda inclusive o Chefe Operacional da FLEC, o
Comandante Sabata.
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33. Angola foi alm e prendeu ou emitiu mandados de priso para pelo
menos 23 cabindas no exterior que logicamente e de facto no poderiam ter
nada a ver com o incidente de 08 de janeiro, inclusive a liderana da FLEC e
ex-membros de Mpalabanda. Vrios indivduos desta lista foram mortos ou
desertaram.
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3
http://www.voanews.com/portuguese/news/01_25_12_Angola_Cabinda-138062653.html
4
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=89930
5
http://www.ibinda.com/noticias.php?noticia=1000091
6
http://www.ibinda.com/noticias.php?noticia=1000379
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E. Situao Actual

34. A empresa de petrleo nacional angolana anunciou que em 2013 a
extrao comercial de petrleo ir comear no sul de Cabinda, a Pluspetrol
da Argentina, Sonangol, Force Petroleum e a Cupet estatal Cubana
planejam iniciar a produo no bloco do poo de Castanha em Cabinda em
2012. Esta ser a primeira vez em que haver produo comercial de
petrleo em terra.
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Especula-se h tempos que as reservas de petrleo em
terra de Cabinda possam rivalizar as reservas marinhas. Caso seja verdade,
as reservas em terra podem ser uma das maiores fontes inexploradas de
petrleo na frica

35. A FLEC considera que a hostilidade e a corrupo da actualidade so
sintomticas de uma poltica oficial de Angola para fomentar confuso
dentro da FLEC a fim de evitar uma perturbao da extrao de petrleo em
terra. Ao criar caos de forma deliberada em Cabinda, Angola justifica a sua
ocupao militar e pode colocar de lado qualquer crtica dos cabindas sobre
suas polticas de recursos.

36. O governo angolano instituiu uma poltica de recompensar oportunistas
que desertam em troca de dinheiro. Isto, por sua vez, cria uma situao
onde a violncia na realidade incentivada e recompensas para os grupos de
presso armados so feitas ao invs da implementao de uma soluo
econmica abrangente a dita Sndrome Niger Delta.

37. Em razo do aumento da violncia, os cabindas vero um aumento da
represso e a situao de segurana ir deteriorar para cidados comuns em
2012.

F. A Posio Poltica da FLEC

38. A FLEC uma representante legtima dos cabindas e reconhecida de
tal forma desde pelo menos 1974. Consulte a PROVA DOIS. O MPLA
reconhece tal facto de forma implcita celebrando negociaes
fragmentadas e recompensando comandantes renegados da FLEC e
polticos que fazem negociaes utilizando o nome da FLEC para obter
lucro pessoal. O enganoso Acordo de Paz de Cabinda em 2006 tambm teve
como base a posio da FLEC embora a FLEC no tenha participado e
tenha repudiado o pacto.
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7
http://www.theafricareport.com/index.php/sectors/more-fuel-for-the-engine-51708618.html
8
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=61248

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39. A posio da FLEC de que o destino poltico de Cabinda somente
pode ser decidido pelo povo de Cabinda em um referendo supervisionado
internacionalmente. O nico acordo negocivel aceitvel o que resulta
em uma eleio democrtica para legitimar o status de sucesso do
protectorado portugus. A posio da FLEC de que isto representa o
partido de total independncia para Cabinda e no d apoio a uma
autonomia ou unio federal com Angola. A independncia o motivo da
existncia da Frente de Libertao do Estado de Cabinda.

G. Anlise Actual de Direitos Humanos

40. A situao deplorvel de direitos humanos est entrelaada com a
questo de recursos em Cabinda. Cabinda recomenda o relatrio da
Human Rights Watch para a Comisso como uma reflexo precisa da
actual situao. Apenso como PROVA TRS.

H. Violaes da Carta Africana Artigo 14

41. A FLEC considera que os recursos naturais de Cabinda devem ser
administrados amplamente para o benefcio do povo de Cabinda. Cabinda
um enclave sem qualquer valor militar ou estratgico para Angola, no
entanto, estima-se que ela fornece pelo menos metade da receita de petrleo
em Angola. H um incentivo econmico para Angola impedir que haja
qualquer desdobramento de Cabinda da Angola.

42. Embora um estado possa certamente conceder direitos de recursos em
nome do seu povo, menos estabelecido se tais concesses forem legtimas
no caso de um povo dominando outro ou se uma concesso for feita ou
administrada de uma maneira irresponsvel. Por exemplo, a Unio
Africana e as Naes Unidas tm apoiado as reivindicaes do povo
saariano pelos recursos do Saara Ocidental embora a potncia de ocupao,
o Marrocos, tenha conseguido explorar estes recursos com parceiros
estrangeiros. desejvel que quando um conflito deste tipo venha tona
com relao ao rumo dos recursos econmicos que haja um entendimento
antes que os recursos sejam esgotados.

43. Os cabindas afirmam que so um povo separado com um legado
histrico vinculado ao Congo e a Portugal invs do estado moderno de
Angola. A pedra fundamental desta declarao o Tratado de Simulambuco
assinado em 1885 que criou um protectorado colonial portugus em
Cabinda, o dito Congo portugus. Os cabindas sempre mantiveram uma
identidade separada reforada pela geografia de Cabinda que no contgua
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a Angola. Linguisticamente, os cabindas falam o seu prprio idioma e
muitos falam francs devido a estarem circundados por pases francfonos.
Os cabindas nunca foram consultados com relao resciso unilateral do
protectorado colonial portugus e nunca ratificaram a ocupao angolana.
Desde 1974, a FLEC tem mantido um governo civil dentro de pores de
Cabinda de forma contnua, principalmente em reas no urbanas. A zona de
controle da FLEC mudou de configurao desde 1974 em diversas ocasies.
Muitas das reas de extrao de recursos esto em ou nas proximidades da
zona FLEC.

44. A sada precipitada e mal preparada dos portugueses de Cabinda
contribuiu para milhares de mortes. A OUA, o Zaire e o Gabo todas em
alguma ocasio reconheceram as aspiraes do povo cabinda; estas
esperanas foram frustradas pela conferncia de Alvor em 1974 que
concedeu o protectorado de Cabinda a Angola. Independente da
convenincia poltica, na qualidade de povo separado, os cabindas no se
consideram angolanos e consideram o governo angolano uma ocupao
temporria at que a situao de Cabinda seja decidida por referendo. Os
cabindas que se subordinam ao regime angolano so conhecidos pelo termo
sarcstico cabingolas.

I. Violaes da Carta Africana Artigo 19

45. A FLEC considera que a receita proveniente da extrao de recursos em
terra ir fluir para Luanda da mesma forma que a receita marinha est a fluir
no momento. O enganoso Acordo de Paz de Cabinda de 2006 com Bento
Bembe supostamente prometeu um retorno de 50% da receita do petrleo
para Cabinda, esta promessa no foi cumprida ou auditada. Somente uma
pequena porcentagem, talvez 10% ou menos, ir retornar a Cabinda. A
FLEC embasa esta estimativa nas alocaes actuais da receita marinha. No
est claro se estes 10% tambm incluem o oramento da FAA, o que no
beneficia o povo cabinda. Quaisquer tentativas de questionar esta alocao
tem acarretado em apreenses sumrias como no caso da investigadora
Sarah Wykes da Global Witness que foi presa pela polcia angolana e
acusada de espionagem aps encontrar-se com representantes locais da
sociedade civil em Cabinda.
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46. Embora haja petrleo marinho em abundncia, o desemprego em
Cabinda bastante elevado. Pobreza, mortalidade infantil e doenas
tambm so mais elevadas do que na maioria das reas de Angola.

9
http://www.globalwitness.org/library/angola-anti-corruption-campaigner-still-unable-leave-cabinda-
angola
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47. A receita proveniente do petrleo marinho de confiana de Cabinda tem
subsidiado o governo de Angola e representa 50% da sua receita de petrleo;
portanto a receita em terra deve ser reservada ao povo de Cabinda.

48. Um retorno desigual do fluxo de receita para Cabinda proveniente tanto da
receita de petrleo em terra quanto da receita marinha neocolonialismo predatrio.
A administrao angolana de Cabinda pode ser considerada predatria na medida
em que tem pouco apreo pelo fornecimento de bens pblicos e incentivos para
facilitar o investimento de melhorias e aperfeioar o bem-estar da populao em
geral. O governo de Angola abusa da sua autoridade poltica para maximizar a
receita com recursos naturais com o intuito de aumentar a sua prpria riqueza e a
riqueza dos adeptos do MPLA, o que resulta em corrupo e queda econmica em
Cabinda.

J. Violaes da Carta Africana Artigo 20

49. Os cabindas so um povo distinto dos angolanos de modo geogrfico, poltico,
lingustico e cultural. O nico elo entre Cabinda e Angola foram actos pela ex-
potncia colonizadora, Portugal, que uniu as administraes de angola e do
protectorado colonial de Cabinda iniciando-se em 1954 e sem autoridade legtima
cedeu Cabinda para a Repblica de Angola na Conferncia de Alvor. Angola tem
desde ento tentado assimilar Cabinda sem sucesso.

50. Os cabindas tm direito ao desenvolvimento econmico e social. No
momento, eles no conseguem exercer este direito porque organizaes que
defendem um ponto de vista exclusivamente cabinda como a FLEC e a
Mpalabanda (Sociedade Civil de Cabinda) foram banidas pelo governo angolano.

51. Os cabindas que fazem campanha pela autodeterminao econmica so
presos com frequncia na qualidade de simpatizantes da FLEC. Estrangeiros que
identificaram corrupo econmica em Cabinda foram presos.

K. Violaes da Carta Africana Artigo 21

52. Ofertas de petrleo e direitos minerais em terra foram feitas pelo governo
angolano sem consultar os cabindas. Todas as decises e concesses de contratos
e licenas so feitas por Luanda. Taxas de licenciamento e royalties so pagas
para Luanda.

53. Toda a gesto dos recursos em terra cabinda so geridos de Luanda ou por
corporaes estrangeiras.
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54. O povo cabinda e os seus representantes, como a FLEC, no foram consultados
de forma adequada sobre a gesto dos seus recursos em terra.

55. Actividades de explorao de minerais e petrleo so feitas com medidas de
segurana junta FAA. Os cabindas so retirados de forma sistemtica das
proximidades dos projectos de perfurao.

56. A FLEC contesta legalmente o direito de Angola de destinar e explorar
recursos em terra e considera tais actividades como espoliao reparvel por
meios jurdicos tanto contra Angola quanto contra seus licenciados em tribunais
de jurisdio competente fora de Angola.

L. Violaes da Carta Africana Artigo 22

57. O povo de Cabinda um povo distinto com direito a desenvolvimento
social e econmico.

58. A poltica actual do governo de Angola um de angolizao de Cabinda.
Indivduos e grupos que afirmam uma identidade cabinda so discriminados e/ou
presos de forma sistemtica.

M. Violaes da Carta Africana Artigo 24

59. O ambiente actual no til ao intento do desenvolvimento de Cabinda. A
FLEC no busca um ambiente ideal, somente um que permita uma medida de
equidade para o povo de Cabinda. O regime actual permite que corporaes como
a Chevron degenerem o ambiente sem medo de monitoramento civil ou
reparao pelo povo de Cabinda conforme explicado a seguir.

N. O Exemplo da Chevron.

60. A subsidiria da Chevron, a Cabinda Gulf Oil (CABGOC), est em
actividade em Cabinda desde os tempos do protectorado colonial portugus em
1954. Embora tais operaes no sejam o tpico desta queixa, elas so relevantes
porque proporcionam um indcio das prticas econmicas passadas e actuais em
Cabinda que violam a sesso da Carta Africana clamada acima.

61. A Chevron oferece no seu relatrio de responsabilidades corporativas oficiais
alguns exemplos de sua generosidade com o povo cabinda. Estes projectos, no
entanto, so minsculos em comparao com o petrleo e gs extrados dos poos
15
marinhos e faz pouco para atenuar as injustias feitas com o povo cabinda desde a
traio dos portugueses junto ao protectorado em 1974.

62. O governo de Angola tem estaes com aproximadamente 40.000 soldados e
sentinelas adicionais em Cabinda para proteger o territrio rico em recursos e a
sua receita. A Chevron pagou bilhes de dlares ao governo de Angola que, por
sua vez, perpetua esta ocupao e a concomitante violao de direitos humanos. A
FLEC no recebe nenhuma receita proveniente do petrleo e no tem quaisquer
patrocinadores externos de meno.

63. A explorao de petrleo e as actividades de produo da Chevron, inclusive
testes ssmicos, perfurao, despejo marinho de detritos de perfurao e gua
produzida, actividades de alagamento e fractura, vazamentos de oleodutos,
vazamentos acidentais de petrleo e o uso de qumicos como dispersantes
devastam a sade humana e ambiental. Uma degradao ambiental parecida ou
pior pode ser esperada das actividades em terra sob o controle de Angola, no
necessariamente porque as empresas de petrleo no iro cumprir normas
ambientais e sim porque Angola tem pouco ou nenhum interesse em sacrificar a
receita com a produo em detrimento do meio ambiente em Cabinda. A ausncia
da sociedade civil, da FLEC e da Mpalabanda em Cabinda impede o
monitoramento eficaz das actividades das empresas de petrleo. O estado de
represso em Cabinda tambm dificulta, torna ftil ou impossvel que cabindas
comuns postulem recompensa contra a Chevron ou outras empresas de petrleo.

64. A Chevron deslocou diversos trabalhos no operacionais para Luanda
inviabilizando o desenvolvimento da economia local. O complexo da Chevron em
Malongo tem segurana privada e todos os confortos da sociedade ocidental para
os sortudos expatriados e cabindas que moram l, porm junto ao Malongo, os
cabindas no possuem servios bsicos como gua potvel, encanamento e
electricidade. Consulte Chevron em Angola extrado do the True Costs of
Chevron 2009 & 2010 Alternative Annual Reports, PROVA QUATRO tambm
no site www.truecostofchevron.com .

O. O Protectorado

65. Em 1885, Portugal e os governantes locais de Cabinda assinaram o Tratado de
Simulambuco que estabelece um protectorado colonial sobre a regio. As
circunstncias da administrao portuguesa so muito bem documentadas. Cabinda
era administrada separadamente de Angola e nunca foi considerada parte de
Angola. Portugal violou o protectorado de forma unilateral transferindo Cabinda
16
para Angola na Conferncia de Alvor. At que um referendo supervisionado e
reconhecido internacionalmente seja feito em Cabinda,

66. Angola deve ser considerada sob a legislao internacional como uma
administradora construtiva do protectorado de Cabinda para o povo de Cabinda. Os
portugueses transferiram Cabinda para Angola sem consultar os cabindas. Angola
ocupa a posio de Portugal embora a sua propriedade de Cabinda seja ilegtima.
Contudo, a funo de administrador deve ser imputada a Angola. Portanto, Angola
no pode abusar do seu dever de preservar e proteger os recursos de Cabinda para o
beneficio do povo cabinda.

P. Mpalabanda

67. A Anistia Internacional divulgou uma declarao condenando vigorosamente
a proibio de Mpalabanda, declarando que, A anistia internacional considera
os membros de [Mpalabanda] como defensores dos direitos humanos... O seu
fechamento ir tornar Cabinda uma rea repleta de violaes flagrantes dos
direitos humanos, sem uma organizao de direitos humanos para monitorar e
registrar violaes dos direitos humanos. Ver PROVA CINCO.

Q. Retaliao de Angola

68. A FLEC considerada uma organizao terrorista pelo governo de Angola.
Os cabindas arriscam sua vida e liberdade ao serem publicamente associados
com a FLEC. A FLEC tem conhecimento de que muitos cabindas desejam dar a
sua opinio com relao s questes discutidas na presente, mas no podem
fazer o mesmo por medo de represlias. Alm disso, a FLEC no ir colocar os
cabindas em perigo disponibilizando os seus testemunhos na presente mesmo
quando tenha sido oferecido livremente.

Q. Concluso

69. Sob o protectorado colonial portugus de Cabinda, a autodeterminao de
Cabinda no foi realizada embora o colonialismo dos portugueses fosse beneficente
em comparao s violaes de direitos humanos e corrupo de Angola. Cabinda
uma entidade pequena tanto em populao quanto em rea geogrfica embora de
vasta importncia econmica devido ao petrleo. As disparidades econmicas
descritas acima so atribudas pela FLEC ao neocolonialismo de Angola. Cabinda,
diferentemente de outras provncias de Angola, tem uma existncia poltica singular
na qualidade de protectorado colonial. Tais protectorados coloniais frequentemente
progrediram e alcanaram soberania como no caso da Suazilndia, Gmbia e
17
Botsuana. Angola, sem consentimento dado livremente pelo povo de Cabinda, no
pode revogar o status de protectorado que foi abandonado de forma unilateral por
Portugal e de facto assumida por Angola. At que os cabindas ratifiquem a
anexao de Angola, o governo angolano o administrador construtivo de
Cabinda, mas no o seu governante legtimo.

70. A providncia solicitada pela FLEC no exige uma apurao especfica de
culpa pela Comisso contra Angola. Ao invs disso, a FLEC deseja que a
Comisso tome uma posio proactiva de apurao neutra de factos por um
Relator Especial. O raciocnio da FLEC o seguinte:

1. Uma concluso parajudicial ter pouco efeito em Angola, a qual ir ignorar
qualquer crtica percebida. Isto, por sua vez, desgasta o valor da deciso e o
prestgio do processo da Carta Africana e por fim da Comisso. O valor
vinculante da mesma forma limitado.

2. A nomeao de um Relator Especial uma soluo mais inclusiva. Este
processo permite opinies de outros seguimentos da sociedade de Cabinda alm da
FLEC que so incapazes ou no esto dispostos a arriscar sofrer represlias da
MPLA e do governo de Angola por estarem associadas FLEC.

3. Os direitos descritos na presente e as violaes da presente se enquadram no tipo
adotado no the Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for
Economic and Social Rights / Nigeria (155/96) e so portanto adequadas para a
ao da comisso.

R. Solicitao para a Convocao de Testemunhas

71. Se a Comisso acreditar que poderia ser til, a liderana da FLEC se
disponibilizaria para interrogatrio e solicitaria da Comisso a garantia de sua
passagem segura, viagem com proteo e acomodaes.

S. Solicitao de Reparao

1. Nomeao de um Relator Especial para averiguar factos e fazer
recomendaes sobre as questes discutidas na presente.

2. A disponibilidade da interveno da Comisso caso considerados teis para
auxiliar nas questes discutidas na presente.

3. Custas e honorrios advocatcios no valor de US$50.000 a serem pagos
pelo governo de Angola ao representante legal da FLEC.
4. Outras conclus6es ou reparagdes conforme exigidas pela Comissflo.
Enviadas respeitosamente neste dia 15 de fevereiro de20l2:
{asslnatura} {carimbo -
JONAT}IAN LIVY ADVOGADO BARREAU PENAL}
Legal daAutora
FLEC
18

PROVA UM

Pgina 1 de 9

Repblica de Kabinda
Relatrio da Comisso sobre o incidente togols de 08
de janeiro de 2010

Sumrio Executivo

Por ordem do Premi Joel Batila da Repblica de Kabinda, a Comisso de 08 de janeiro foi formada para
investigar o ataque fatal do dia 08 de janeiro de 2010 feito contra a equipe de futebol togolesa em sua viajem
de nibus do Congo para Cabinda.
Os membros da Comisso so:
Membro da Comisso Gabriel Homem: Repblica de Kabinda, Ministro de Segurana Interna
Membro da Comisso Advogado Clement Chigbo Promotor Especial da Repblica de Kabinda
Presidente da Comisso Dr. Jonathan levy, Advogado da Repblica de Kabinda e da FLEC.
Escopo da Investigao: os eventos que culminaram, durante e depois, nos eventos de 08 de janeiro de 2010.
Perguntas a serem respondidas:
1. Como ocorreram os eventos do dia 08 de janeiro de 2010?

2. Quem foi o responsvel pelo resultado fatal?

3. Por que os elementos da FLEC inicialmente assumiram responsabilidade e em seguida mudaram suas
posies?

4. Aes de Angola e da FLEC aps o dia 08 de janeiro.

Pgina 2 de 9

5. Concluses e recomendaes.

Quem a FLEC
A FLEC a Frente de Libertao do Estado de Cabinda. H apenas uma FLEC.
Muitos indivduos e grupos, inclusive os agentes angolanos, usam o nome da FLEC como parte da sua
campanha de desinformao.
Uma campanha contnua de desinformao atribuda ao governo angolano alega que a FLEC est fraca e
dividida. Este no o caso. A FLEC est forte e unida e tem clulas e brigadas jovens em todas as cidades,
municpios e vilarejos de Cabinda.
A imprensa tem sido enganada por frentes virtuais falsas da FLEC e impostores visveis na internet, mas
desconhecidos dentro de Cabinda. Dentre estes impostores angolanos, o Comandante Lopes, Rodrigues
Mingas e Rui Gabirro tambm conhecido como Mangovo Ngoya se destacam como os piores infratores.
O comandante Lopes no comanda nada a no ser um site longo e estagnado Cabinda.org. Suspeita-se que
Lopes esteja envolvido com fraude imigratria e de asilo poltico na Frana com a emisso dos ditos cartes de
identidade de Cabinda idealizados e fabricados por ele mesmo. O seu site serve para enganar o pblico e
ocupa os direitos legtimos da FLEC a tal domnio de internet.
O RT Hon Mangovo Ngoyo Mwana Kabinda, dito Secretrio para os Assuntos Estrangeiros da Repblica de
Cabinda e Membro da Regncia de Cabinda, Rui Gabirro, um cidado portugus, filho de colonialistas
portugueses. Gabirro tambm se intitula ilusoriamente como Duque de Cabinda e estabeleceu uma
operao fantasia chamada de Federao de Estados Livres da frica, um dito banco fraudulento e uma
universidade falsa.
O seu governo da Repblica Federal de Cabinda inclui Rodrigues Mingas. Gabirro tambm vende
passaportes, moedas e selos que so de propriedade legal da FLEC. Gabirro tambm infiltrou grupos de jovens
angolanos anti-MPLA no comeo deste ano e interveio na qualidade de porta-voz seguindo o exemplo de
Mingas. Vrios anti-Santos foram ento presos em Luanda.
Infelizmente, Lopes e Gabirro fizeram uma ocupao ciberntica em dois domnios de alto nvel, Cabinda.org e
Cabinda.net difamando a causa da FLEC ao olhos da imprensa e do pblico.
A FLEC uma organizao estvel com bases de operao na Frana e nas imediaes de Ponta Negra, Congo.
A FLEC universalmente distinguida dentro de Cabinda como a nica fora crvel de autodeterminao. A FLEC
tem foras, clulas e brigadas jovens para se defender espalhadas por Cabinda.

Pgina 3 de 9

A FLEC e a luta pela autodeterminao em Cabinda tm sido o movimento de autodeterminao africano mais
persistente e longo que existe desde 1963 e, mesmo contra tudo, tem isolado mercenrios das empresas de
petrleo, cubanos, portugueses, sul-africanos e as foras da MPLA, FNLN e UNITA. No momento, a FLEC d
nfase resoluo de conflitos sem violncia e tem um caso pendente com a comisso da unio africana com
relao ao petrleo e aos recursos minerais em terra. A liderana da Repblica de Cabinda e a FLEC no
desejam ver Cabinda virar um campo de batalha sangrento como quando ocorrido durante a guerra civil
angolana entre a UNITA e a MPLA.
Embora a FLEC tenha a capacidade de convocar greves gerais e rebelies, ela tem de forma deliberada
refreado tais aes com o intuito de poupar a populao civil que mal consegue sobreviver sob o regime
neocolonial angolano. A nfase actual da FLEC a de resoluo de conflitos atravs de organizaes
internacionais, legislao internacional, ajuda a refugiados e educao. A FLEC no uma organizao
terrorista e condena o terrorismo, inclusive os eventos de 08 de janeiro.
Eventos Culminantes do dia 08 de janeiro
Foi dada pouca ateno aos eventos que antecederam a copa africana pela FLEC. O testemunho do coronel
congols Cosmas Nzaou indica que detectives desconhecidos no cruzamento da fronteira do Congo com
Cabinda distriburam panfletos antes do dia 08 de janeiro de 2010 avisando sobre os ataques. A FLEC, no
entanto, no tinha conhecimento disto e o coronel indica que a fonte dos panfletos pode ter sido a polcia
secreta angolana ao invs da FLEC.
Oficiais da Copa da frica tambm avisaram todos os grupos a respeito do uso dos cruzamentos na fronteira,
mesmo assim o nibus da equipe togolesa foi colocado no trajeto do cruzamento da fronteira pelas
autoridades angolanas diretamente de encontro a uma emboscada.
Embora a FLEC tenha operaes ao longo do norte da fronteira congolesa, os comandos da FLEC geralmente
permanecem longe dos cruzamentos que so altamente fortificados na fronteira. Conflitos entre a FLEC e a
FAA (exrcito angolano) tm acontecido em regies remotas de Cabinda durante os ltimos cinco anos e no
em municpios com alta guarnio em parte para evitar vtimas civis. Quase todas as operaes da FLEC desde
2006 tm como alvo as actividades neocoloniais que envolvem a extrao de recursos pela MPLA e os seus
empreiteiros estrangeiros. Tais incidentes tm sido curtos e inconstantes.
Reunies para colectar informaes com a liderana da FLEC indicam que no houve nenhuma campanha para
ter como alvo a Copa da frica e que qualquer campanha de entrega de panfletos no se originou da FLEC. As
operaes da FLEC tipicamente tm como alvo as foras do MPLA da FAA fora de reas civis. Alm de ter
como alvo a FAA, a FLEC tambm interrompeu a explorao de minerais e petrleo aps avisar que tais
operaes eram ilegais e no seriam toleradas.

Pagina 4 de 9

Os Eventos do dia 08 de janeiro 2010
Os organizadores da Copa da frica alegam que os participantes foram avisados a no entrar em
Cabinda por cruzamentos terrestres, no entanto, a existncia de uma escolta da FAA angolana
indica que o nibus estava coordenado e era conhecido da FAA.
O vilarejo de Tchikamba uma rea aberta no meio das guarnies da FAA. Existe uma posio de
morteiro nas proximidades. um local extremamente improvvel para as operaes da FLEC.
De acordo com depoimentos de testemunhas oculares, quando o nibus entrou foi emboscado
por homens armados. Um tiroteio se iniciou com a escolta da FAA e os passageiros do nibus
sofreram baixas antes que os agressores se retirassem.
Depois do ataque no houve aparentemente nenhuma perseguio eficaz da FAA apesar dos
supostos avisos distribudos previamente e aparente alto estado de alerta existente na rea.
incontestvel que algum grupo armado bem preparado atacou o comboio que era composto de
vrios veculos militares, um nibus da equipe e batedores. Ao menos trs pessoas foram mortas e
oito ficaram feridas.
Consequncias do dia 08 de janeiro
Dentro de horas aps o ataque, um indivduo relativamente desconhecido, Rodrigues Mingas, se
responsabilizou pelo ataque. Mingas, em diversas ligaes bem coordenadas com a imprensa
internacional de um telefone celular registrado na Frana, alegou chefiar algo chamado FLEC
Posio Militar ou FLEC-PM. Mingas concedeu entrevistas por telefone e por algum tempo colocou
material na internet incluindo a sua prpria foto em uniforme militar. A imprensa em geral aceitou
Mingas como um representante legtimo da FLEC.
No h evidncia, em depoimento ou de outra forma, que a organizao de Mingas existia antes
dos eventos do dia 08 de janeiro embora Mingas tenha alegado que a FLEC PM tinha sido fundada
em 2003. Mingas tinha de facto sido barrado por muitos anos da FLEC devido associao da
famlia dele com a MPLA em Angola. inconcebvel que Mingas, operando da Frana ou at mais
implausvel de Angola e sozinho, poderia ter recrutado e treinado um grupo militar em um dos
setores mais militarizados de Cabinda.
Mingas alegou que o ataque foi incidental visto que suas foras no tinham nenhuma ideia de
que o nibus estava transportando a equipe togolesa e tinha pensado que este era um comboio da
FAA.

Pgina 5 de 9

Mingas deu a impresso que seu grupo estava patrulhando a regio da fronteira, viu um comboio
com seus binculos e decidiu atac-lo no local. Mingas em seguida ameaou fazer mais ataques
durante os jogos da Copa da frica.
Mingas disse que o seu grupo tinha escrito dois meses antes do ataque para Issa Haayatou, o chefe
da Confederao Africana de Futebol, para avisar do problema iminente. No h nenhuma
confirmao que tal carta tenha jamais existido.
A FLEC PM tambm era desconhecida do ex-general Boma das foras armadas da FLEC assim como
do Comandante da Frente Norte, Sabata, posteriormente trado e assassinado nas mos da FAA
angolana. Mingas e a FLEC PM eram desconhecidos da liderana da FLEC no exterior. Mingas, no
entanto, alegou ser o Secretrio Geral da FLEC em seus comunicados. Nada mais foi jamais ouvido
falar da FLEC PM.
Em janeiro de 2011, Mingas foi preso pelas autoridades francesas sob suspeita de terrorismo, no
entanto ele foi liberado no dia 18 de janeiro de 2012 aps ter sido aparentemente julgado
inocente apesar das suas admisses em pblico. O governo francs chegou a concluso que era de
facto impossvel Mingas cometer os actos que confessou ter feito. Mingas foi agora decretado um
impostor.
Alegaes Confusas e Estranhas da FLEC
No dia 10 de janeiro de 2011, o ex-general Boma da FLEC anunciou uma atitude de no violncia
durante o restante da Copa Africana. Ele, no entanto, no esclareceu a responsabilidade pelos
eventos do dia 08 de janeiro nem condenou Mingas.
Seguindo os passos da provocao de Mingas com a imprensa, o neto do Presidente fez
declaraes sem autorizao plena imprensa em nome da FLEC. Ele afirmou que a FLEC e no
Mingas foi responsvel pelo ataque. Acerca do dia 12 de janeiro de 2011, em uma declarao junto
imprensa internacional, Jean Claude Nzita acusou mingas de ser um oportunista e assumiu
responsabilidade pelo ataque em nome da FLEC.
Jean Claude Nzita no era um oficial da FLEC e no tinha autorizao para fazer declaraes em
nome da FLEC. Sua nica conexo com a FLEC era a sua relao familiar com o Presidente de longa
data da FLEC. Jean Claude Nzita um residente da Sua e tem tido pouca, se alguma, negociao
com a FLEC em anos recentes. No se sabe o que possa ter provocado a sua declarao e
personificao de um porta-voz oficial da FLEC. Contudo, a imprensa internacional divulgou as
declaraes como crveis.
Coincidentemente com a declarao de seu neto, o Presidente da FLEC assumiu responsabilidade
pelos ataques. O Secretrio Geral da FLEC Joel Batila, no entanto, negou qualquer responsabilidade
da FLEC. O Presidente, no entanto, ignorou Batila e alegou que Batila no estava plenamente
informado. Batila, no entanto, no mudou sua posio.

Pgina 6 de 9

Como se tivesse recebido um sinal, Rui Gabirro anunciou a formao de um governo da Repblica
de Cabinda com ele e Mingas como ministros. Para acrescentar confuso, um indivduo
desconhecido alegando ser o Ministro da Defesa da Repblica de Cabinda, Tiburcio Tati Tchingobo,
negou responsabilidade, mas acusou outros grupos da FLEC em Cabinda. Tudo isso foi transmitido
pela imprensa internacional. A imprensa relatou que Tchingobo fazia parte da Repblica Federal de
Cabinda.
Uma discusso interna da FLEC se iniciou e o Presidente retratou qualquer envolvimento da FLEC
no dia 14 de janeiro de 2011. O comunicado indicava que Mingas era um agente angolano
conhecido e que a FLEC PM era pura inveno. O comunicado, no entanto, no explicava as bvias
contradies de tal declarao.
A FLEC ento indicou em uma carta autorizada por Batila que prestaria toda a cooperao possvel
FIFA em uma investigao do incidente. A FIFA encaminhou a oferta Federao Africana de
Futebol a qual, porm no deu uma resposta.
A Reao de Angola
A reao angolana foi significativa e constante apreenses e detenes de cabindas dentro de
Cabinda e do Congo. As apreenses comearam quase logo aps o incidente e tem continuado de
forma incansvel. O incidente de 08 de janeiro era um mero pretexto para as apreenses j que
muitos dos indivduos apreendidos nem mesmo tinham ligao com a FLEC e no estavam nas
imediaes do ataque nem plausivelmente poderiam ter qualquer conexo com o mesmo. O seu
nico crime era a suposta oposio ao domnio angolano em Cabinda.
Angola tambm emitiu uma dita lista com lderes da FLEC os quais considerou responsveis pelo
dia 08 de janeiro e quer tais apreendidos como terroristas.
Tentativa de Golpe de Estado
Em julho de 2010, o chefe militar da FLEC, Stanislas Boma, o vice-presidente Alexandre Tati, chefe
de segurana Carlos Luembe e o ministro de assuntos estrangeiros Luis Veras, sem qualquer
autoridade aparente, viajaram para Luanda e posteriormente declararam o fim da luta armada. O
Presidente repudiou o evento aps o facto, no entanto, nenhuma explicao foi fornecida de como
os quatro oficiais superiores de linha de frente da FLEC foram corrompidos ou autorizados a ir a
Luanda. A liderana renegada da FLEC curiosamente no foi acusada de quaisquer crimes em
conexo com o dia 08 de janeiro levantando ainda mais dvidas. Contudo, estes quatro indivduos
teriam logicamente sido responsveis pelos eventos do dia 08 de janeiro se estivessem
comprometidos pela FLEC conforme Angola tem alegado. A desero obviamente comprometeu
todas as operaes da FLEC em Cabinda e seus arredores.

Pgina 7 de 9

Assassinato dos Comandantes da FLEC
O Chefe Militar da FLEC Pirilampo foi sequestrado do Congo, torturado e assassinado pelos
angolanos em maro de 2011. Muito provavelmente ele foi trado pelos indivduos de dentro da
FLEC.
Este golpe foi seguido de sequestro, tortura e assassinato do Comandante Sabato da Frente Norte
duas semanas depois sob circunstncias parecidas.
A faco de Bomo e Tati em Luanda aparentemente teve conhecimento do evento.
Desde julho de 2011, ao menos meia dzia de oficiais da FLEC foram sequestrados, assassinados
ou emboscados pelas foras angolanas inclusive Vinagre, Buna Roi, Damas Makunda, Larry,
Dominique Makoumbou e Razao. H suspeita de traio em todos estes casos tambm.
Estes assassinatos entre fronteiras foram justificados por Angola com base no incidente de 08 de
janeiro e como uma resposta alegao de terrorismo pela FLEC.
Concluses
1. Os eventos de 08 de janeiro implicam a polcia angolana e possivelmente o Congo DTC. As
identidades exatas dos atiradores so desconhecidas, porm eles no estavam agindo
mediante as ordens da FLEC.

2. Mingas, Jean Claude Nzita e Gabirro cumpriram as ordens da MPLA aps o dia 08 de
janeiro propagando desinformao e se colocando como representantes legtimos da FLEC
em um conluio para implica a FLEC como uma organizao terrorista e justificar a violncia
angolana que resultou em assassinatos e apreenses ilegais. Estes indivduos prejudicaram
bastante a FLEC e so indiretamente responsveis pelas execues sumrias realizadas
pela MPLA aps o dia 08 de janeiro de 2010.

3. A faco Tati e Boma traiu a FLEC ao desertar para a MPLA. As mortes dos comandantes
militares da FLEC recaem sobre eles.

4. A posio do Presidente indica no mnimo uma interrupo fatal na comunicao em um
momento crucial e uma incapacidade de conter uma grande crise.

Recomendaes
1. Para que a FLEC sobreviva ela deve instituir medidas de segurana internas slidas,
inaceitvel que seus comandantes de linha de frente sejam assassinados, no que parece,
de forma arbitrria pelos angolanos sobre o pretexto de 08 de janeiro.

Pgina 8 de 9

2. Os FLECs falsos devem ser extirpados e legalmente destrudos Gabirro, Mingas, Lopes e
Nzita Mbemba Antonio devem ser impedidos de usar o nome da FLEC de maneira falsa
para fornecer desinformao, para obter lucro e para colaborar com a MPLA.

3. As ditas negociaes em andamento com Luanda devem cessar enquanto os comandantes
de linha de frente da FLEC forem mortos arbitrariamente em violao da lei internacional.

4. A FLEC deve agir para repudiar a cadeia de eventos lamentveis iniciadas em 08 de janeiro
e chamar a ateno em voz alta quanto ao envolvimento angolano nas mortes de
desportistas inocentes para promover a campanha da FAA contra a FLEC.

5. Os indivduos que esto implicados neste relatrio devem ser convocados para explicar
suas aes. Se os membros da FLEC ou os ex-membros da FLEC colaboraram com os
angolanos em 08 de janeiro, eles devem ser expostos e levados justia tambm.

6. Os eventos de 08 de janeiro devem ser investigados por uma organizao internacional. A
FLEC apresenta acusaes de terrorismo apoiado por estado contra o governo de Angola.
As vtimas so togoleses, cabindas e membros da FLEC.

7. A FLEC envia este relatrio Comisso de Paz e Segurana da Unio Africana,
Confederao Africana de Futebol e ao rgo da Comunidade de Desenvolvimento da
frica do Sul sobre Defesa e Segurana para maiores investigaes e aes.

Enviado ao Premi Batila:

Levy
Homem
Chigbo
20 de janeiro de 2012

Recebido por: janeiro 22/01/2012

{assinatura}
Dr. Joel Batila, Premi da Repblica de Kabinda {carimbo Repblica de Kabinda}

Page 9 of 9

Copies for action to:

Mr. MARTIN A. EWI
ANTI-TERRORISM ANALYST
PEACE AND SECURITY DEPARTMENT
COMMISSION OF THE AFRICAN UNION
P.O. BOX 3243
ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

Confederation of African Football
Executive Committee
3 Abdel Khalek Sarwat Street
El Hay El Motamayez,
P.O. Box 23,
6th October City Egypt

South African Development Community
Organ on Defense and Security
PO Box 0095
Gaborone, Botswana
EXHIBIT TWO
H U M A N
R I G H T S
W A T C H
Angola
They Put Me in the Hole
Military Detention, Torture and Lack of Due Process in Cabinda
EXHIBIT THREE


Military Detention, Torture, and Lack of
Due Process in Cabinda

Copyright 2009 Human Rights Watch
All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America
ISBN: 1-56432-503-2
Cover design by Rafael Jimenez

Human Rights Watch
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June 2009 1-56432-503-2

Military Detention, Torture, and Lack of Due Process in Cabinda
I. Glossary of Acronyms ...................................................................................................... 1
II. Summary ........................................................................................................................ 2
III. Recommendations ......................................................................................................... 4
To the President and Government of Angola ................................................................... 4
IV. Methodology ................................................................................................................. 5
V. Background .................................................................................................................... 6
VI. Individuals Arrested for Security Crimes since September 2007 ..................................... 8
1. Fernando Lelo and co-accused FAA members .............................................................. 9
2. Persons Arrested in Rural Areas ................................................................................. 10
3. Former FLEC Members Arrested in the DRC and Cabinda ............................................ 10
VII. Abuses by the Angolan Armed Forces ......................................................................... 12
Arbitrary Arrests ............................................................................................................. 12
Incommunicado Detention ............................................................................................ 13
Torture in Military Custody ............................................................................................. 14
VIII. Treatment in Civilian Prisons ..................................................................................... 20
IX. Violations of Due Process Rights ................................................................................. 21
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... 25
Annex: Persons Held for Security Charges at Yabi Prison .................................................. 26
Current Detainees ......................................................................................................... 26
Previous Known Detainees ............................................................................................ 27

1 Human Rights Watch | June 2009

I. Glossary of Acronyms

ANR Congolese National Intelligence Service (Agence Nationale de
Renseignement)
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
FAA Angolan Armed Forces (Foras Armadas Angolanas)
FCD Cabindan Forum for Dialogue (Frum Cabinds do Dilogo)
FLEC Liberation Front of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente de Libertao do
Enclave de Cabinda)
FLEC-FAC Liberation Front of the Enclave of Cabinda Cabindan Armed Forces
(Frente de Libertao do Enclave de Cabinda Foras Armadas
Cabindesas)
GOI Operative Intelligence Group (Grupo Operativo de Inteligncia)
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
MPLA Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (Movimento Popular de
Libertao de Angola)
OAA Angolan Bar Association (Ordem dos Advogados de Angola)
UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Unio Nacional
para a Independncia Total de Angola)
VOA Voice of America

They Put Me in the Hole 2

II. Summary

At least 38 people who have been arrested by Angolan military and intelligence officials in
Cabinda, Angolas oil-rich enclave, from September 2007 to March 2009 have been
subjected to torture and cruel or inhumane treatment in military custody and been denied
basic due process rights as well as the right to a fair trial. The detainees are accused by the
authorities of involvement in armed opposition in Cabinda in the context of a separatist
insurgency.

The intensity of the armed conflict in Cabinda has declined as a result of large-scale
counterinsurgency operations in 2002-2003, and the government publicly claims that the
Cabinda conflict came to a close in 2006, when a peace agreement was signed with a faction
of the rebel Liberation Front for the Independence of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC). But the
campaign for independence remains unresolved, and sporadic guerrilla attacks have been
ongoing.

Despite its insistence that the insurgency is no longer active, the militarys systematic
arbitrary detention and torture of people in Cabinda suggests that the government has
resorted to unlawful means to retaliate against people with perceived sympathy for the
FLECs armed independence campaign. Angolan military and intelligence services have a
widespread presence in the small territory, and they have intimidated and harassed people
with perceived dissident views.

Human Rights Watch has previously reported on government intimidation in Cabinda. In a
February 2009 report on the parliamentary elections of September 2008, Human Rights
Watch showed how the government has continued to use security concerns in Cabinda to
justify restrictions on freedom of expression, association, and movement, as well as
arbitrary arrests and unfair trials. In December 2008, Human Rights Watch called attention to
the Angolan governments use of torture and unfair trials in state security cases, in
connection with 14 civilians who were arbitrarily detained and tortured in military custody in
Cabinda.

This report extends that work with new first-hand, field-based information and shows a
disturbing pattern of human rights violations during pre-trial detention of persons accused
of state security crimes in Cabinda. In most of the 38 cases that Human Rights Watch
investigated, those accused of security crimes endured arbitrary arrests, lengthy
incommunicado detention, and interrogations under torture in military custody. All 38
detainees were eventually brought to the judicial authorities and a civilian detention facility.
But trial records in several cases show that due process rights were violated.

In addition to providing further detail on the high-profile case of Fernando Lelo, a former
Voice of America correspondent who was convicted of national security crimes in September
2008, this report also draws attention to those cases that have attracted much less public
attention and risk being overlooked.

The Angolan government should immediately adopt all necessary measures to ensure that
the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) act in accordance with Angolas obligations under
international human rights and humanitarian law. In particular, the government should
ensure, in accordance with Angolan law, that the armed forces promptly transfer individuals
detained for security crimes to the competent civilian authorities, hold them according to
international standards for pre-trial detention, and provide a prompt and fair trial.

The Angolan courts should also promptly review the proceedings against detainees currently
or previously held for state security offenses, and then release unconditionally or fairly retry
individuals convicted in trials that violated basic fair trial standards. The Angolan
government should investigate allegations of serious human rights violations by members of
the military and intelligence services, and prosecute alleged perpetrators.

In order to prevent further abuses, the Angolan government should set up an independent
and impartial inquiry into human rights violations allegedly committed by the Angolan
Armed Forces and branches of intelligence in Cabinda and establish mechanisms to
compensate victims of torture and arbitrary detention.

III. Recommendations

To the President and Government of Angola
Take all necessary measures to ensure that the Angolan Armed Forces act in
accordance with Angolas obligations under international human rights and
humanitarian law.
Ensure that persons taken into custody are promptly brought before an independent
officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power, and held only in official places of
detention; that all detainees are provided with immediate and regular access to
family members and legal counsel, and that criminal proceedings are in accordance
with international fair trial standards.
Ensure that coerced confessions, particularly those made under torture, are not
admitted as evidence against persons at trial and that prosecutors and judges have
the independence to investigate torture and illegal detention by any branch of the
military and domestic intelligence services, free from obstruction or interference.
Release prisoners that have been convicted in unfair trials or appropriately retry
them in accordance with international fair trial standards.
Provide adequate remedies, including compensation, for persons arbitrarily arrested
or tortured or otherwise mistreated in detention.
Ensure that military and intelligence officers committing torture or other human
rights violations against persons in their custody are appropriately disciplined or
prosecuted.
Allow independent scrutiny of detention facilities where detainees allege having
been held illegally and tortured by security forces, including the detention center at
the headquarters of the second regional command of the Angolan Armed Forces and
all military garrisons.
Set up an independent and impartial inquiry into human rights violations committed
by the Angolan Armed Forces and branches of intelligence services, including the
arbitrary detention of persons in military custody.
Ratify the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment and its Optional Protocol and allow visits by the Protocols
Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture.

IV. Methodology

Between March 2008 and March 2009, a Human Rights Watch researcher visited the
Angolan enclave province of Cabinda (capital and municipality of Cacongo) three times and
conducted interviews there, in Luanda, and elsewhere. The researcher interviewed 60
persons, in person, by phone, or email, including lawyers, members of religious groups and
civil society organizations, activists, journalists, diplomats and officials of the government,
military, police, and the judiciary. In March 2009, the researcher also conducted in-person
group and individual interviews with 20 persons detained at Yabi prison in Cabinda who had
been charged with crimes against the security of the State and related crimes. Interviews
with detainees were conducted freely, without interference or the presence of government
officials. Yet, provincial government, military, and police officials were less open for Human
Rights Watch interviews in March 2009 than previously. In response to official meeting
requests, most claimed being unavailable. The researcher also consulted legal documents
referring to the cases. The initials of detainees whose accounts were quoted have been
changed to protect their security.

V. Background

The Angolan enclave province of Cabinda, with an estimated population of 300,000, is
separated from the countrys other 17 provinces by a strip of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC). It produces half of Angolas oil.

The armed separatist FLEC movement, founded in 1963, first fought for independence from
Portugal, Angolas colonial rulers, and then from Angola itself when Angola became
independent in 1975. Following the end of a civil war in Angola in 2002 between the
government, dominated by the Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA), and the
main opposition movement, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA),
the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) re-deployed some 30,000 government soldiers to Cabinda
to wipe out the remaining separatist insurgency. These military efforts led to the destruction
of FLECs main bases in the interior and considerably weakened the guerrillas military
capacity.

In 2004, Human Rights Watch documented human rights violations against civilians in
Cabinda in the course of these counter-insurgency operations, including extrajudicial killings,
arbitrary detention, torture, and excessive restrictions on freedom of movement. According
to that research, most of the human rights violations were committed by the Angolan Armed
Forces with impunity.
1
In 2004, the government claimed that the war in Cabinda was over,
but dialogue would continue. However, successive attempts to reach a formal peace
agreement with several wings of the FLEC remained unsuccessful, and sporadic insurgent
attacks continued.

In 2006, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by the Angolan government and
Antnio Bento Bembe, the former leader of the FLEC Renovada wing and president of the
Cabindan Forum for Dialogue (FCD), sought to formally end the armed conflict. The FCD had
been established in 2004 as a joint commission including representatives of the two main
FLEC factionsFLEC Renovada and FLEC-FACas well as members of civil society and the
churches, to facilitate peace negotiations with the government. The MOU included an

1
Human Rights Watch, Angola: Between War and Peace in Cabinda, briefing paper, December 2004,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/12/22/angola-oil-rich-cabinda-army-abuses-civilians. Local civil society, including the
civic association of Cabinda, Mpalabanda, and the Catholic Churchs Justice and Peace Commission also issued several
human rights reports detailing abuses in Cabinda, most of them by the FAA.
amnesty, a demobilization and reintegration plan for former FLEC combatants, and the
allocation of a number of government posts to a range of former FLEC officials.
2

The peace agreement, however, has enjoyed little credibility in Cabinda, because the most
active FLEC wing, FLEC-FAC, as well as other members of the FCD, had been excluded from
the talks, and no political concessions were made to the separatists. The armed insurgency
has continued, but since 2006 the government has claimed the war ended in Cabinda and
has attributed continuing sporadic attacks to bandits. FLEC-FAC has claimed responsibility
for a number of armed attacks targeting government forces and expatriate workers of private
companies. The intensity of the armed conflict and the level of serious human rights
violations have decreased since 2004, but the FAA presence is proportionately higher in
Cabinda than elsewhere in Angola today, suggesting the governments continuing concern
about the separatist movement.

Despite the peace agreement in 2006, freedom of expression and association remains
restricted in Cabinda. The government has used state security concerns to crack down on
peaceful opposition and scrutiny. In late 2006 and early 2007, two high-profile civil society
activists were arrested for alleged state security crimes in Cabinda and were later released,
following local and international public pressure, without having been formally charged.
3
In
July 2006, the provincial court banned the civic association of Cabinda, Mpalabanda,
founded in 2003, and alleged that the organization had incited violence and acted as a
political party campaigning for Cabindas independence. The new bishop who took office in
June 2006 temporarily dissolved the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, which had
been essential to documenting human rights violations since 2002. As a result, local and
international organizations have struggled to obtain independent information from the
interior to corroborate allegations of human rights abuses committed by both the FAA and
FLEC since 2006.

2
The Memorandum of Understanding for Peace and Reconciliation in the Province of Cabinda was signed on August 1, 2006
and approved by the Angolan parliament on August 16, 2006. See Resolution 27-B/06 of August 16, 2006, published in the
state gazette (Dirio da Repblica) on August 16, 2006.
3
Raul Danda, then spokesperson of the civic association Mpalabanda, was arrested under state security charges on
September 29, 2006 in Cabinda, allegedly for carrying newspaper articles that expressed criticism of the governments policy
in Cabinda. He was released on November 3, 2006 and later formally pardoned under the amnesty law, despite never having
been charged. Sarah Wykes, a campaigner for the international organization Global Witness, was arrested in Cabinda on
February 18, 2007 under alleged charges of espionage, and was later released and allowed to leave the country in March 2007.

VI. Individuals Arrested for Security Crimes since September 2007

Officially, since the MOU in 2006, the Angolan government has denied the continued
existence of an armed FLEC guerrilla movement. Senior FAA and police officials explained to
Human Rights Watch in March 2008 that those people who were arrested for national
security crimes were bandits who oppose development,
4
or people who still identify with
FLEC, seeking to call attention to compromise the governments cooperation with countries
and companies.
5
Bento Bembeformer FLEC Renovada and FCD leader and current minister
without portfolioexplained to Human Rights Watch in March 2009 that those people
cannot be from the FLEC, because I represent the guerrillas.
6
However, the cases
documented in this report clearly contradict this claim, as many of the charges in the cases
refer to alleged involvement in concrete acts of armed insurgency. Court records also often
explicitly refer to alleged cooperation with FLEC-FAC.

Between September 2007 and March 2009, at least 38 persons, including six members of
the Angolan Armed Forces, (see list in Annex) were arrested by military and intelligence
agents for alleged crimes against the security of the State, including armed rebellion and
sabotage, and other crimes relating to the armed FLEC insurgency in Cabinda, such as
homicide, illegal possession of arms, and desertion. The Angolan law on crimes against the
security of the state from 1978, which allows for up to 215 days pre-trial detention,
7
includes
an overly broad and ambiguous range of offenses: Every and any act, not provided for by
law, that endangers or may endanger the security of the State...
8

All 38 detainees were initially held in military custody for long periodsfrom 26 days to six
monthsbefore being transferred to the civilian prison at Yabi in Cabinda and brought either
before a prosecutor or to be formally charged or before a judge.
9
So far, two trials have taken
place, as a result of which seven persons were convicted and four were acquitted.

4
Human Rights Watch interview with Miguel Jos Lus Muhonga, provincial first superintendent and second commander of the
National Police, Cabinda, March 26, 2008.
5
Human Rights Watch interview with Colonel Antonino Pessala, spokesperson of the second regional command of the FAA,
Cabinda, March 27, 2008.
6
Human Rights Watch interview with General Bento Bembe, Luanda, March 26, 2009.
7
Law on Pre-trial detention (18-A/92) (Lei da priso preventiva em instruo preparatria), arts. 25-26, allows 90 days pre-
trial detention in cases of crimes against the security of the state, which can be extended three times for 45, 45 and 35 days.
8
Law on crimes against the security of the State (Law 17/78 of May 26, 1978), art. 26.
9
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in article 9 requires that Anyone who is arrested shall be
informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him and
The 38 individuals targeted, arrested and charged can roughly be grouped into three
categories:

1. Fernando Lelo and co-accused FAA members
The Angolan Armed Forces in September 2007 arrested six FAA personnel: Antnio Santos
Nguimbi (soldier), Loureno Ila Dembe (soldier), Alberto Suami (1
st
sergeant), Alberto Joo
Chimbinda (soldier), Baslio Muanda (1
st
corporal), and Custdio Nguimbi Sumbo (1
st

sergeant). Their arrests led to the November 15, 2007 arrest of former Voice of America (VOA)
journalist Jos Fernando Lelo by the Angolan military at his workplace in the oil compound of
Malongo.

All of these men were eventually charged with having organized or carried out three armed
attacks between December 2006 and July 2007; the FAA members were additionally charged
with having committed military crimes such as desertion.
10
Lelo and the six were put on trial
before the Cabinda military court from May 5 to June 11, 2008 and convicted on September
16, 2008. Lelo was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment. Five of the co-accused were
sentenced to 13 years of imprisonment. Custdio Nguimbi Sumbo was acquitted. Lelo and
the five convicted military personnel are currently prisoners at Yabi prison in Cabinda, which
Human Rights Watch visited, while an appeal against their conviction to the Supreme
Military Court is pending.

Human Rights Watch and other organizations believe that Lelo was primarily targeted for
arrest and conviction as a result of opinions he expressed as a VOA journalist until
December 2006, which were perceived to be critical of the Angolan government and the
2006 Memorandum of Understanding.
11

that Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by
law to exercise judicial power.
10
The Cabinda military prosecutors accusation quoted the following attacks: On December 29, 2006 against a military
vehicle in Buco Zau, killing three and injuring two soldiers; on July 27, 2007 against military guarding a cell phone antenna in
Buco Zau, killing one soldier and injuring another; and on September 13, 2007 against a military vehicle, killing two soldiers
and seriously injuring five. Cpia do Despacho da Pronncia, Procuradoria Militar da Segunda Regio, Cabinda, March 5, 2008.
11
Human Rights Watch, AngolaEnd Torture and Unfair Trials in Cabinda, Human Rights Watch news release, December 10,
2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/05/angola-end-torture-and-unfair-trials-cabinda ; see also Amnesty
International, Angola: Unfair Trial of Fernando Lelo, AFR 12/008/2008, September 22, 2008,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR12/008/2008/en (accessed June 5, 2009).
2. Persons Arrested in Rural Areas
Most of those who were arrested and charged with security crimes between January 2008
and March 2009 were residents of villages in the interior of Cabinda. The majority were
arrested in groups during military raids, which followed armed attacks attributed to the FLEC
separatist guerrilla movement in the municipalities of Buco Zau and Cacongo.
12

So far, only five of those arrestedJoo Mateus Luemba, Elias Menos, Garcia David Antnio,
Antnio Zau, and Natalcio Mbatchiwere tried by the provincial civil court from March 24 to
April 22, 2009. On May 7, the judge acquitted four of the accused for lack of evidence, while
sentencing Mbatchi to 18 months in prison for illegal possession of arms. All five had been
arrested in January 2008, over a year previously, and charged with crimes against the
security of the State and related crimes. At that time, all were released from custody,
including Mbatchi, who had already spent 17 months in pre-trial detention.

Local human rights activists told Human Rights Watch that more people have been arrested
during such military raids and were later released from military custody without having been
charged and presented to the public prosecutor.
13

3. Former FLEC Members Arrested in the DRC and Cabinda
Seven detainees at Yabi prison interviewed by Human Rights Watch confirmed that they
previously were FLEC members. Five had been living in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) since 2005 and 2006. They said that they had not been FLEC members since. They
were arrested in different places in the DRC in October 2008 by the Congolese Agence
Nationale de Renseignement (ANR) and later transferred to Angola. Two former FLEC
members were also arrested in Cabinda in Dinge (Cacongo) and in Cabinda city in the same
month. They alleged not having yet been formally charged with any crime.

12
Five men were arrested in January 2008 in the village of Sevo da Vula, Buco Zau, following an attack on December 29, 2007
against border police, killing one. Five men were arrested in January 2008 in the village of Tando Malele, Buco Zau, after an
attack against the oil company Grant on December 29, 2007, which killed a Brazilian worker. Five men were arrested in April
2008 in Micuma I, Buco Zau, following an attack against staff of the private company Emcica on December 31, 2008, which
killed two workers. One man was arrested in January 2009 in Cossuenda, Buco Zau, after the assassination of a traditional
leader on December 30, 2008. Three men were arrested in the village of Sassa Zau Velho, Buco Zau, on the day of an attack
against a military vehicle on January 7, 2009. Five men were arrested in the village of Liamba-Lione, Cacongo, on the day of an
attack against a vehicle, which killed one Chinese worker and seriously injured two on March 26, 2009.
13
Local human rights activists documented 11 such cases between June 2007 and January 2008. This includes the case of Jos
Gabriel Puati, who was allegedly killed by FAA soldiers upon his arrest on December 29, 2007. Human Rights Watch interviews
with three human rights activists (names withheld) in Cabinda, March 2008 and March 2009.
Human Rights Watch also interviewed two registered refugees from Cabinda, including one
former FLEC member now in Lisbon, Portugal, and the current Voice of America
correspondent in Kinshasa, both of whom allege having been threatened with arrest and
transfer to Angola in early 2008 and early 2009, respectively.
14
These firsthand accounts and
secondary reports received by Human Rights Watch suggest a wider pattern of arrests of
Cabindans in the DRC at the request of the Angolan authorities.

14
Human Rights Watch phone interviews with VOA correspondent in Kinshasa, February 11, 2009, and with Jos Luis Luemba
Veras, in Lisbon, April 6, 2009. Human Rights Watch also had access to a letter of complaint written by Mr. Veras to the
regional UNHRC delegation in Kinshasa from March 24, 2008, describing the threats he was subjected to, which led him to
seek refuge in Portugal in July 2008.

VII. Abuses by the Angolan Armed Forces

This chapter details key human rights violations committed by the Angolan Armed Forces
against persons detained under the charge of crimes against the security of the state and
related crimes since September 2007.

Arbitrary Arrests
The 20 detainees interviewed at Yabi prison and lawyers of those and other detainees told
Human Rights Watch that all were arrested without warrants, most of them by the military.
Arrests without a warrant are permitted under Angolan law when the persons are caught in
the act of which they are accused, but the arrests need to be validated by the public
prosecutor on the same day, or within five days maximum, when a public prosecutor cannot
be reached immediately.
15
This time limit is often exceeded in Angola, as even the Cabinda
public prosecutor conceded to Human Rights Watch.
16

According to the detainees, lawyers, and legal counsel, none of those arrested was
apprehended in combat situations or with arms alleged to have been used in guerrilla
attacks, nor were the detainees presented to any authorized magistrate immediately
following their arrest, as required by law. Lelo was presented with an arrest warrant, with no
issuing authority, at his work place in Cabinda and was taken in handcuffs to the military
section of So Paulo prison in Luanda, where he was held for more than three months before
being transferred back to Cabinda on March 30, 2008. Most of the detainees arrested in
villages said they were arrested following a guerrilla attack that had taken place close to
their village or several villages away. In addition, several detainees told Human Rights Watch
that they were arrested when they presented themselves to the authorities, either because
they had heard a military commander was looking for them at their homes, were seeking
information about an arrested relative, or, as in the case of three former FLEC members in
the DRC, because they formally announced to the Congolese authorities their intention to
return to Cabinda.

15
Law on Pre-trial detention (18-A/92) (Lei da priso preventiva em instruo preparatria), art. 9 and 14.
16
Human Rights Watch interview with Antnio Nito, public prosecutor, Cabinda, March 18, 2009. See also: United Nations
General Assembly, Human Rights Council: Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, AddendumMission to Angola,
A/HRC/7/4/Add. 4, February 29, 2008; Human Rights Watch interview with Fernando Macedo, member of the Angolan human
rights organization Association Justice Peace and Democracy (Associao Justia Paz e Democracia or AJPD) in Luanda, March
20, 2009.
Incommunicado Detention
All detainees told Human Rights Watch that they were held incommunicado in military
custody for long periods of timein several cases, for more than 35 days and in some cases
for up to 50 daysbefore being presented to an authorized magistrate (the public
prosecutor) and the criminal investigation police and eventually brought to the civilian
prison of Yabi. During military custody, they were unable to contact legal counsel or family
members. Only Fernando Lelo had access to a lawyer five days after his arrest.

FAA members co-accused with Lelo (but arrested before him) were held incommunicado in
military custody for up to six months in Cabinda and Luanda, without access to a legal
counsel, until they were transferred to Cabinda on March 30, 2008, brought to the prison at
Yabi, and presented to the Cabinda public prosecutor.
17

Those detainees who were arrested in rural areas told Human Rights Watch that they first
were held in different military garrisons and in the FAA headquarters in Cabinda, before
eventually being brought to the prison at Yabi and presented to the public prosecutor.
18

Detainees arrested in the DRC by Congolese intelligence agents said they were first sent to
and held in unknown places in the capital, Luanda, before being directly transferred to the
FAA headquarters in Cabinda, where they were held for more than three weeks before being
presented to the public prosecutor and finally brought to the prison at Yabi.
19

According to Angolan law, incommunicado detention is allowed until the public prosecutor
interrogates the detainee. This must occur on the same day, or within five days maximum.
Incommunicado detention can be extended after the first interrogationfor national security
crimes for up to 10 daysbut only if authorized by the public prosecutor.
20

Extended incommunicado detention violates the fundamental human rights to humane
treatment and access to counsel, as provided under the International Covenant on Civil and

17
Their legal counsel, Aro Tempo, spoke with his clients for the first time on April 7, 2008. Human Rights Watch phone
interview with Aro Tempo, May 30, 2009.
18
Human Rights Watch interviews with detainees at Yabi prison, Cabinda, March 16, 2009.
19
Human Rights Watch interviews with detainees arrested in the DRC at Yabi prison, Cabinda, March 16, 2009.
20
Law on Pre-trial detention (18-A/92) (Lei da priso preventiva em instruo preparatria), art. 3. Angolan human rights
activists of the Association Justice Peace and Democracy (AJPD) challenge this provision. See Pedro Romo and Fernando
Macedo, Anotaes Lei da Priso Preventiva e Legislao Complementar, Coimbra, May 2008, p. 18.
Political Rights (ICCPR), which Angola ratified in 1992.
21
The UN Commission on Human
Rights has repeatedly said that incommunicado detention should be prohibited.
22
In
addition, Angolas practice is contrary to the minimum international standards of detention
as set out in the UN Standard Minimal Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.
23

Torture in Military Custody
Many detainees told Human Rights Watch that military officers and soldiers under their
command tortured them to force them to incriminate themselves and others. Others said
they were threatened that they would be killed unless they say the truth. Some were
forced to sign written confessions at gunpoint in local military garrisons, before they were
transferred to the FAA headquarters in Cabinda city.

All detainees interviewed by Human Rights Watch were specific about where and how they
were tortured. Several practices of torture and degrading treatment described to Human
Rights Watch in March 2009 are consistent with practices documented by Human Rights
Watch in 2003a period when the armed conflict in Cabinda was more intense.
24
A Human
Rights Watch researcher saw that most of the detainees had visible scars on their arms near
their elbows, consistent with their accounts of having been tied up with cords across their
back.

One of the legal counsel of the FAA members convicted along with Lelo in 2008 told Human
Rights Watch that his clients were subjected to torture and inhumane treatmentincluding
mock executions, severe injuries with firearms, beatings with various objects, and public
humiliation of relativesin several FAA garrisons. One soldier lost a leg as a result of injuries
suffered in military custody.
25
Lelo was the only detainee interviewed by Human Rights
Watch who said he had not been physically mistreated.

21
See ICCPR, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976, arts. 10 (1), and 14 (3).
22
See, e.g. UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 2003/32, para 11.
23
United Nations Minimal Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted 1955, U.N. Doc A/CONF/611, annex I, E.S.C. res. 663C,
24 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (n 1) at 11, U.N. Doc E/3048 (1957), amended E.S.C. res. 2076, 62. U.N. ESCOR Supp. (n 1) at 35, U.N.
Doc. E/5988 (1977).
24
These practices include, for example, tying detainees elbows together at the back or holding detainees in pits dug into the
ground. See Human Rights Watch, Between War and Peace in Cabinda, p. 16f.
25
See AngolaEnd Torture and Unfair Trials in Cabinda, Human Rights Watch news release, December 10, 2008,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/05/angola-end-torture-and-unfair-trials-cabinda.
Three other detainees described to Human Rights Watch their treatment by the military as
follows:

I slept at the police post, and the morning after, the FAA came to fetch me,
and a military security commander took me to the military garrison at Loma.
There soldiers tied me up with cords across my back and beat me, shouting
because you are FLEC, because you attacked a car of a company and killed
a worker, You are the head of the group. I bled a lot. They took metied
upto the military garrison at Caio and put me in a hole full of water. I stayed
there for 19 days, after which they took me back to Loma where I was
presented to a group of senior military. I insisted I was innocent. Then they
put me again in the hole in Caio where I stayed for another nine days.
26

They beat me, squeezed my testicles and my tongue with a pincer, telling me
to say the truth. I cried in pain. They called a nurse to give me an injection.
Commander Lacrau then asked, Tell us how many arms the coordinator gave
you to attack this car.
27

In the village, the military tied our arms up with bootlaces, stripped our shirts,
and beat us. I vomited blood. They searched the village for arms and
ammunition but didnt find any. We were taken to the next military garrison in
Necuto where they stripped us naked and tied my testicles to a mortar. Then
they took us to the military unit at Loma, Buco Zau. There, the military
commander, Lacrau, accused me of having taken arms to the village from the
city. He gave a guard a weapon and a bucket and told him to dig a grave and
execute me. Then he fired a shot in the air and told the guard to lock me in
the latrine and tell the others arrested with me that I was dead and the same
would happen to them if they didnt tell the truth throughout the night
military counter-intelligence operatives came to beat us. They threatened us
with pistols and knives to tell the truth. At some stage we said anything. The
beatings were too much. Later we were taken by state security agents and
two military in a civilian Land Cruiser to the military garrison at Dinge. There

26
According to the detainee A.B.C. (fictitious abbreviation), these abuses took place in April 2008. Human Rights Watch
interview at Yabi prison, Cabinda, March 16, 2009.
27
According to the detainee D.E.F. (fictitious abbreviation), these abuses took place in April 2008. Human Rights Watch
interview at Yabi prison, Cabinda, March 16, 2009.
they shouted at us, You are FLEC. They beat us with whips and rifle butts
and burned our testicles with cigarettes.
28

Detainees told Human Rights Watch that they were eventually held for varying periods of
time under inhumane conditions at the FAA headquarters in Cabinda in a dark, dirty cellar
without windows and sanitation facilities, which floods when it rains. This detention facility
is commonly known and feared as the hole. The FAA spokesperson in Cabinda in March
2008 denied to Human Rights Watch the existence of such a prison.
29
Some detainees said
they met military personnel who were being held there for internal disciplinary offenses.
Most who had been detained there complained that they were prevented from washing for
up to 17 days and defecating for up to five days. A lawyer acting as defense counsel for the
six FAA members co-accused with Lelo told Human Rights Watch that the detained FAA
members were handcuffed for three months in the hole, where they were beaten and often
denied food.
30
Another defense lawyer told Human Rights Watch his client was beaten at the
FAA headquarters with whips until he fell unconscious.
31

Former FLEC members arrested in October 2008 in the DRC and transferred to Angola told
Human Rights Watch that they were held in the hole for long periods of timebetween 25
and 30 dayswhere they were threatened with execution, beaten, and kicked by officials
identified only by aliasesColonel Walter, Major Cafundinhoand several unidentified
military, including military police officers from the FAA headquarters. As a former FLEC
member arrested in Cabinda described:

Members of the military police who arrested me threatened to shoot me, tied
me up with bootlaces, and took me to the headquarters of the second
regional command of the FAA. There, Major Kafumbira beat me with metal
sticks and rifle butts and shouted Take off your clothes! We will kill you!
They took my money and ordered me to tell them the names of all the people

28
Human Rights Watch interview with G.H. (fictitious abbreviation), at Yabi prison, Cabinda, March 16, 2009.
29
Human Rights Watch interview with Colonel Antonino Pessala, FAA spokesperson and head of the department for patriotic
education, Cabinda, March 27, 2008. See AngolaEnd Torture and Unfair Trials in Cabinda, Human Rights Watch news
release, December 10, 2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/05/angola-end-torture-and-unfair-trials-cabinda. In
March 2009, the office of the second regional FAA command in Cabinda declined a meeting with the Human Rights Watch
researcher by referring to an outstanding authorization from the head of the general chief of staff of the FAA in Luanda.
30
Human Rights Watch email interview with Aro Tempo, November 25, 2008. See also AngolaEnd Torture and Unfair Trials
in Cabinda, Human Rights Watch news release, December 10, 2008.
31
Human Rights Watch interview with Francisco Luemba in Cabinda, March 25, 2008; Objection to the Judges Counselors of
the Chamber for Crimes against the Security of the State of the Supreme Court, presented by Francisco Luemba regarding the
process 490-C/08of the public prosecutor against Lus Geraldo Barros and others, Cabinda, January 31, 2009.
I work with, whether I knew guerrilla members in the forest, and why I came
to the city. Blood poured out of my ears.
32

The local representative of the Angolan Bar Association (OAA) told Human Rights Watch that
10 people arrested on March 26, 2009 in the village Liambo-Lione (Cacongo municipality)
alleged that they were severely beaten by military personnel inside the FAA headquarters.
Only five of the menafter 26 days of incommunicado detentionwere eventually presented
to the public prosecutor. The other five, including the wife of one detainee, were released
directly from military custody after five days.
33

According to Angolan law, only the public prosecutor has the power to interrogate
detainees.
34
However, detainees and lawyers interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that,
in all cases, military intelligence officers carried out interrogations. In addition, military
officials in command of interrogation sessions that involved torture, in which some
participated actively, never formally identified themselves, either by name or affiliation. Thus,
soldiers and commanding officers involved in the torture of detainees are only known by
aliases, or noms de guerre, the most quoted being Colonel Fuchi, Colonel Walter,
35
and
Major Cafundinho. Some detainees, lawyers, and others told Human Rights Watch that the
officers belong to a unit called the Operative Intelligence Group (Grupo Operativo de
Inteligncia or GOI), created some years ago to coordinate the counter-insurgency activities
of Angolas domestic and military intelligence services in Cabinda.
36
Human Rights Watch
could only identify the full name of one well-known senior military officer, Col. Antnio Jos
da Conceio Kambanda, alias Lacrau, commander of the Third Infantry Regiment of the
FAA, who oversaw the torture of detainees in Buco Zau. Several detainees told Human Rights
Watch that some local administrators and military commanders as well as senior military
officials tried to intervene on behalf of detainees they perceived to be innocent, but were
overruled by Colonel Lacrau.

The provincial public prosecutor and former military prosecutor, Antnio Nito, denied having
any knowledge of unofficial military detention places, as well as interrogations under
torture in military custody, and questioned the credibility and accuracy of detainees

32
Human Rights Watch interview with I.J. (fictitious abbreviation), detainee at Yabi prison, Cabinda, March 16, 2009.
33
Human Rights Watch phone interview with Aro Tempo, Cabinda, May 4, 2009.
34
Law on Pre-trial detention (18-A/92) (Lei da priso preventiva em instruo preparatria), art. 4.
35
Former detainees interviewed by Human Rights Watch in Cabinda in 2004 had referred to an officer called Walter as head
of the intelligence. See Human Rights Watch, Between War and Peace in Cabinda, p. 18.
36
Human Rights Watch interviews with a local lawyer and journalist (names withheld) in Cabinda, March 2009 and follow-up
email and phone interviews in May 2009.
accounts. He told Human Rights Watch: They would say anything, but this is not sufficient.
They have to present evidence and file a legal complaint.
37
Nevertheless, the accounts
collected by Human Rights Watch are remarkably consistent and suggest a systematic
pattern of abuse by the Angolan military and intelligence services.

The prohibition on torture is a fundamental principle of international human rights law;
torture is prohibited at all times and under all circumstances. Angola has yet to ratify the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
which obliges states to prevent and sanction acts of torture and other mistreatment. The
Angolan government has on several occasions promised to ratify the convention and its
optional protocol, which allows international monitoring of detention facilities. It reiterated
this promise in its voluntary pledges submitted to the UN General Assembly in May 2007
38

before being elected as a member of the Human Rights Council for 2007-2010.

As a member of the United Nations, Angola has agreed to abide by the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, which bans all use of torture and other mistreatment.
39
Angola is party to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human
and Peoples Rights, both of which prohibit arbitrary detention and outlaw the use of torture
and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
40
In addition, Angola is bound by international
humanitarian law, the laws of war. Common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which
applies during internal armed conflicts, protects captured combatants and detained civilians
against torture and cruel, humiliating, and degrading treatment.

In addition, Angolas constitution, which is currently under review in parliament, states that
Constitutional and legal norms related to fundamental rights shall be interpreted and
integrated harmoniously with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the African
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights and other international instruments to which Angola
is party, and that In the assessment of disputes by Angolan courts, those international
instruments shall apply even when not invoked by parties.
41
These international

37
Human Rights Watch interview with Antnio Nito, public prosecutor, Cabinda, March 18, 2009.
38
Angolas voluntary pledges to promote human rights, Annex to the letter dated 3 May 2007 from the Permanent
Representative of Angola to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly,
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/331/59/PDF/N0733159.pdf?OpenElement (accessed May 12, 2009).
39
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948), art. 5.
40
ICCPR, art. 7; The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, adopted on June 27, 1981, entered into force on October 21,
1986, ratified by Angola in 1990, art. 5.
41
Lei Constiticional (1992), art. 21. See also comments by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention: United Nations
General Assembly, Human Rights Council: Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Addendum - Mission to Angola,
A/HRC/7/4/Add. 4, February 29, 2008, p. 11, para 32.
instruments place a legal obligation on Angola to end its arbitrary detention, torture, and
mistreatment of detainees in Cabinda.

VIII. Treatment in Civilian Prisons

Detainees at Yabi prison told Human Rights Watch that detention conditions at the newly
built prison facility, where all were eventually brought, were generally good. That was less
true for the former VOA journalist Fernando Lelo, who told Human Rights Watch that he was
only allowed to leave his cell for the prison yard after several months. My detention
conditions are not determined by the prison director, but by orders from his superiors, he
said. Its as if I was in a private prison here.
42

However, several detainees at Yabi prison told Human Rights Watch that after finally being
presented to the public prosecutor and criminal investigation police, they were first shuttled
back and forth to different cells of the Cadeia Civil, a transit detention center for military
and civilian detainees, including illegal migrants.
43
Some detainees told Human Rights
Watch they were forced under the seats of the cars by officials shuttling them to and from
the Cadeia Civil.
44

Others described to Human Rights Watch the inhumane conditions at that jail:

We stayed 17 days in the dark cell of the Cadeia Civil. We had to do
everything thereurinate, defecate, eatbut they didnt beat us. After being
presented to the public prosecutor, we were taken back to the military
headquarters, where we stayed for seven days. Then they took us back to the
Cadeia Civil, to the civilian part, for another four days.
45

One detainee described his stay in the Cadeia Civil as cramped into a cell of four
square meters maximum together with 17 other people.
46

42
Human Rights Watch interview with Fernando Lelo at Yabi prison in Cabinda, March 16, 2009.
43
An official request by Human Rights Watch to visit the Cadeia Civil in March 2009 was not responded to.
44
Human Rights Watch interview with K.L., M.N., O.P. (fictitious abbreviations), detainees at Yabi prison, Cabinda, March 16,
2009.
45
Human Rights Watch interview with K.L. (fictitious abbreviation), detainee at Yabi prison, Cabinda, March 16, 2009.
46
Human Rights Watch interview with Q.R. (fictitious abbreviation),detainee at Yabi prison, Cabinda, March 16, 2009.

IX. Violations of Due Process Rights

Human Rights Watchs research into the criminal proceedings and trial of Fernando Lelo and
the co-accused FAA members found that their treatment fell far short of international due
process standards.

The six FAA members were arrested in September 2007 without a warrant and were held
incommunicado in military custody for up to six months, during which time they were forced
to confess and incriminate Lelo and themselves under torture and degrading and inhumane
treatment.

Lelo and the six co-accused FAA members were formally charged by the military prosecutor
of Cabinda in March 2008 with crimes against the security of the state and military crimes.
They were tried by a military court in hearings lasting from May 5 to June 11, 2008. This was
in violation of Angolan law, because crimes against the security of the State and cases
against civilians, like Lelo, should be tried in civilian courts.
47

No credible evidence, either during the criminal investigation or at the trial, was presented
against any of the detainees, while evidence in defense of the accused was not taken into
account. The military prosecutor and military judge dismissed all objections regarding
arbitrary arrest, evidence obtained under torture, and the jurisdiction of military courts.
48

Lelo was accused of having undertaken a vast recruitment of former FLEC soldiers
integrated into the FAA, with the aim of carrying out armed attacks against the FAA in order
to influence national and international opinion that the separatist insurgency in Cabinda
continues to be active.
49
However, the co-accused FAA members had not identified Lelo
during two lineups. They allege that they were tortured to incriminate themselves and Lelo.

47
Law on Military Crimes (4/94 of January 28). See also United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council: Report of
the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, AddendumMission to Angola, A/HRC/7/4/Add. 4, February 29, 2008, p. 11, para
28.
48
See: Objection to the President Judge of the Military Court of the 2
nd
Region presented by defense counselors Francisco
Luemba and Aro Tempo regarding the process 19/2008 of the military prosecutor against Alberto Joo Chimbinda and others,
Cabinda, May 5, 2008. According to the Angolan Criminal Procedure Codecurrently under reviewdefense lawyers may only
challenge an accusation alleging procedural irregularities after the criminal investigation is completed. The UN Working Group
on Arbitrary Detention expressed concern with the fact that a detention cannot be effectively challenged during the
investigation phase and judges are not involved before trial in Angola. See: United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights
Council: Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, AddendumMission to Angola, A/HRC/7/4/Add. 4, February 29,
2008, para 40-45 and 75-77.
49
Cpia do Despacho da Pronncia, Procuradoria Militar da Segunda Regio, Cabinda, March 5, 2008.
No other evidence was presented to suggest that Lelo had met the FAA soldiers whom he
was accused of paying and instructing to carry out armed attacks.
50

The trial was further tainted by government statements that infringed upon judicial
independence and Lelos right to a fair trial. Long before the start of the trial, Attorney
General Joo Maria de Sousa, stated repeatedly in the state media that there were strong
indications of Lelos guilt.
51
Such statements were widely viewed as intended to exert
pressure on the judge to hand down a conviction.

In addition, according to Angolan law and international human rights standards, trials are to
be public.
52
However, several trial observers told Human Rights Watch that public access to
the hearings, including for family members and the privately owned press, was restricted,
while a large number of domestic and military intelligence and police agents occupied the
courtroom.
53
Lelo himself described the atmosphere during the trial to Human Rights Watch:

Almost every day they suspended the trial. We spent two hours maximum
there a day. Every time I was shuttled from the prison to court, escorted by a
motorcade of several cars with armed agents of the Public Order Police, the
Rapid Intervention Police, and the FAA. The car I was in didnt have windows.
This spectacle served to present me to the public as a highly dangerous
criminal and to intimidate the population watching the scene. At court, the
military prosecutor dominated the trial, despite not being familiar with the
legal process.
54

On September 16almost three months after the trialfive FAA members were sentenced to
13 years of imprisonment for military crimes (violence against a superior and subordinate
and desertion) and crimes against the security of the state, including armed rebellion. One
FAA member was acquitted. Fernando Lelo was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment for
inciting the co-accused to commit the crimes.

50
According to the defense lawyer Martinho Nombo, a former municipal police commander whose testimony was quoted by
the accusation, denied at court having ever seen Lelo at the village in Buco Zau where he allegedly met the co-accused
soldiers on July 12, 2007 , while Lelos employer confirmed he had been working within the Malongo compound on the same
day. Human Rights Watch interviews with Martinho Nombo, Cabinda, March 2009.
51
For example: Detention of journalist Lelo is not arbitrary, says Attorney-General (Deteno do jornalista Fernando Lelo no
arbitrria, diz PGR), Rdio Nacional de Angola/ Angop, January 7, 2008.
52
ICCPR, art 14 (1).
53
Human Rights Watch interviews with local journalists (names withheld), March 2009.
54
Human Rights Watch interview with Fernando Lelo at Yabi prison, Cabinda, March 16, 2009.
Human Rights Watch has argued that the courts verdict was delayed until after Angolas
parliamentary elections on September 5-6, 2008, in order to avoid potential damage to the
ruling party MPLAs electoral campaign in Cabinda.
55

While Lelo and the FAA soldiers convicted along with him were tried before a military court,
current detainees charged with state security crimes in Cabinda have had their cases signed
by the civilian prosecutor and so will be brought before a civilian court. This is a step forward.
Nevertheless, Human Rights Watch research found that other current detainees have been
denied basic due process rights, even when transferred after varying periods in military
custody, to the civilian prison of Yabi and presented to the criminal investigation police and
the public prosecutor.

Human Rights Watch has documented a number of procedural irregularities in the judicial
proceedings against two groups of detainees, both arrested in January 2008.

According to
international human rights standards, evidence obtained under duress, such as
interrogations under torture, must be considered inadmissible in judicial proceedings.
56

However, in both cases, records of the criminal proceedings show that lawyers were denied
access to military and intelligence interrogation files quoted by the prosecution as evidence.
In one case, interrogation files were classified as secret, according to the Law on the
Secret of the State.
57
By withholding essential information to the defense and failing to
dismiss evidence alleged to have been obtained by coercion and torture, the prosecutor
violated international principles guaranteeing a fair hearing.
58
In addition, military
intelligence officers who were called for questioning during the investigation by the defense
failed to show up during the criminal investigation and at court.
59
In one case, the defense
objected to the public prosecutors conclusion that there were strong indications of a

55
Human Right Watch, AngolaEnd Torture and Unfair Trials in Cabinda, Human Rights Watch news release, December 10,
2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/05/angola-end-torture-and-unfair-trials-cabinda.
56
Human Rights Committee General Comment 20, para 12.
57
Law on the Secret of the State (10/02) from August 16. See Objection to the Judges Counselors of the Chamber for Crimes
against the Security of the State of the Supreme Court, regarding the process 490-C/08 of the public prosecutor against Lus
Geraldo Barros and others, presented by lawyer Francisco Luemba, Cabinda, January 31, 2009.
58
Human Rights Committee General Comment 13, para 15.
59
Objection to the Judges Counselors of the Chamber for Crimes against the Security of the State of the Supreme Court,
regarding the process 490-C/08 of the public prosecutor against Lus Geraldo Barros and others, presented by lawyer
Francisco Luemba, Cabinda, January 31, 2009; Objection to the Honorable Judge of the Common Crimes Chamber of the
provincial court in Cabinda regarding the process 0470-C/08 of the public prosecutor against Natalcio Mbatchi and others,
Cabinda, presented by lawyer Aro Tempo, Cabinda, March 27, 2009.
linkage between the accused and the FLEC FAC guerrillas, simply because several known
guerrilla members have relatives in that particular village.
60

The Cabinda public prosecutor and two of the three judges in the civil judiciary previously
served as military magistrates in other provinces before being appointed in Cabinda in 2006.
It is not uncommon in Angola for military magistrates to occupy posts in the civilian
judiciarythe Attorney-General himself is a former military magistrate. But rights advocates
credibly fear that, in national security cases, these judges will not show sufficient
independence from the government to provide fair trials. Indeed, a senior military official
told Human Rights Watch that previous civilian magistrates in Cabinda had been replaced in
2006 because they never managed to convict anybody for crimes against the security of
the state.
61

There are some cautious grounds for hope for fairer trials in national security cases. A judge
in Cabinda on May 7, 2009 cited lack of evidence and the principle of in dubio pro reo to
acquit four men on national security charges, while sentencing one man for a minor
offense.
62
The public prosecutor challenged the judges sentence at the Supreme Court,
which has not yet issued a ruling. Lawyers have expressed hope that the verdict, if upheld by
the Supreme Court, may reflect a willingness by judges to act independently and impartially
in national security cases.
63
However, with more upcoming trials of the remaining
detaineesall with a far lower public profile than Fernando Leloand as-yet unconfirmed
reports that more arrests for national security crimes have occurred in April 2009, concerns
about the due process rights of detainees in national security cases in Cabinda remain.

60
Objection to the Judges Counselors of the Chamber for Crimes against the Security of the State of the Supreme Court,
regarding the process 490-C/08 of the public prosecutor against Lus Geraldo Barros and others, presented by lawyer
Francisco Luemba, Cabinda, January 31, 2009.
61
Human Rights Watch interview with senior military official (name withheld) in Cabinda, March 17, 2009.
62
See Verdict of the Provincial Court of Cabinda, Cabinda, May 7, 2009.
63
Human Rights Watch phone interview with Aro Tempo, May 7, 2009, and email correspondence with Francisco Luemba,
May 8, 2009.

Acknowledgements

The report was researched and written by a Human Rights Watch researcher. It was edited by
Jon Elliott, advocacy director of the Africa Division; Rona Peligal, deputy director of the Africa
Division; Iain Levine, program director; and James Ross, legal and policy director. Jeffrey
Severson, associate of the Africa Division, provided production assistance.

Human Rights Watch acknowledges with gratitude the contribution provided by lawyers,
journalists, human rights activists, members of churches, national and international
organizations, officials of the government, military, police and judiciary, and detainees who
agreed to be interviewed for this report. We own special gratitude to those individuals who
gave us invaluable and unfailing support during our research on the ground and follow-up.
We also thank NOVIB for the funding that made this research possible.

Annex: Persons Held for Security Charges at Yabi Prison

Current Detainees
Antnio Santos Nguimbisoldier in the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), arrested on September
9, 2007 in Buco Zau. Sentenced by the provincial military court on September 16, 2008 to 13
years prison.
Loureno Ila DembeFAA soldier, arrested in Buco Zau on September 17, 2007. Sentenced by
the provincial military court on September 16, 2008 to 13 years in prison.
Alberto Suami1
st
sergeant in the FAA, arrested on September 18, 2007 in Cabassango (Buco
Zau municipality). Sentenced by the provincial military court on September 16, 2008 to 13
years in prison.
Alberto Joo ChimbindaFAA soldier, arrested in Cabassango (Buco Zau) in September 2007.
Sentenced by the provincial military court on September 16, 2008 to 13 years in prison.
Baslio Muanda1
st
corporal in the FAA, arrested in Buco Zau on September 22, 2007.
Sentenced by the provincial military court on September 16, 2008 to 13 years in prison.
Jos Fernando Leloemployee of Algoa and former VOA journalist, arrested at the Cabinda
Gulf Oil Company compound Malongo on November 11, 2007. Sentenced by the provincial
military court on September 16, 2008 to 12 years in prison.
Sebastio Sambocatechist, arrested in Tando Malele (Inhuca commune, Buco Zau) on
January 24, 2008.
Carlos Jos Samboarrested in Tando Malele on January 24, 2008.
Joo Domingos Mabetetraditional leader and deputy village coordinator, arrested in Tando
Malele on January 24, 2008.
Paulo Simoarrested in Tando Malele on January 24, 2008.
Lus Geraldo Barrostraditional leader, arrested in the village of Conde (Inhuca commune,
Buco Zau) on January 29, 2008 .
Joo Paulo Momboteacher and coordinator of Micuma I (Buco Zau), arrested in the village
of Micuma I on April 2, 2008.
Joao Baptista Maeiaemployee of Encica, arrested in Micuma I on April 2, 2008.
Zacarias Joo Zauarrested in Micuma I on April 2, 2008.
Marcos Lbuca Malila Tovoarrested in Micuma I on April 2, 2008.
Joaquim Valentim Culebiarrested in Micuma I on April 2, 2008.
Armando Muabiarrested by the Agence Nationale de Renseignement (ANR) in Buendi
Kassanfu, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), on October 7, 2008.
Prspero Biangaarrested by the ANR in Buendi Kassanfu, DRC, on October 7, 2008.
Joo Alfredo Dumbiarrested by the ANR in Buendi Kassanfu, DRC, on October 7, 2008.
Joo de Deus Deu Muandaarrested by the ANR in Tshela, DRC, on October 14, 2008.
Csar Dneri Dungearrested by the ANR in Kimbadi Kuimba, DRC, on October 19, 2008.
Jos Fernandes Jorgearrested in Dinge (Cacongo) on October 20, 2008.
Cornlio Mabialaarrested in his home in Cabinda city on October 28, 2008.
Clemente Joo Mavungocoordinator of Cossuenda, arrested in Necuto (Buco Zau) on
January 2, 2009.
Paulo Mavungoteacher, arrested in Sassa Zau Velho (Buco Zau) on January 7, 2009.
Rafael Futiarrested in Sassa Zau Velho on January 7, 2009.
Alexandre Fundoarrested in Sassa Zau Velho on January 7, 2009.
Massota Vundaarrested in Liambo-Lione (Cacongo) on March 26, 2009.
Alexandre Antnio Fortunatoarrested in Liambo-Lione on March 26, 2009.
Francisco Linda Luemba Panzoarrested in Liambo-Lione on March 26, 2009.
Lus Massiti Gomesarrested in Liambo-Lione on March 26, 2009.
Joo Baptista Puativillage coordinator, teacher and pastor, arrested in Liambo-Lione on
March 26, 2009.

Previous Known Detainees
Custdio Nguimbi Sumbo1
st
sergeant in the Angolan Armed Forces, arrested in Buco Zau in
September 2007. Acquitted by the provincial military court on September 16, 2008.
Natalicio Mbatchiarrested in Sevo da Vula (Necuto, Buco Zau) on January 16, 2008.
Sentenced on May 7, 2009 by the provincial court to one year and six months in prison, and
released.
Joo Mateus Luembanurse, arrested in Sevo da Vula on January 16, 2008. Acquitted by the
provincial court on May 7, 2009.
Elias Menosarrested in Sevo da Vula on January 16, 2008. Acquitted by the provincial court
on May 7, 2009.
Garcia David Antnioarrested in Sevo da Vula on January 16, 2008. Acquitted by the
provincial court on May 7, 2009.
Antnio Zauarrested in Sevo da Vula on January 16, 2008. Acquitted by the provincial court
on May 7, 2009.

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H U M A N
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W A T C H
Sentencing of Fernando Lelo and six
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2008 Cristvo Luemba
Military Detention, Torture and Lack of Due Process in Cabinda
While the intensity of armed conflict in Angolas oil-rich Cabinda enclave has declined since 2004, sporadic
separatist guerrilla attacks have continued, despite a peace agreement signed by the government and a faction
of the armed opposition in 2006. This report gives new first hand, field-based information on a disturbing pattern
of official abusearbitrary arrest, lengthy incommunicado detention, and torture in military custodyof people
suspected of involvement in rebel attacks.
Between September 2007 and March 2009, at least 38 persons were arrested by Angolan military and intelligence
officials in Cabinda and eventually charged with state security crimes. While all were eventually brought to a
civilian prison, most were initially subjected to torture and other ill-treatment in military custody and denied basic
due-process rights. The report provides further detail on the high profile case of Fernando Lelo, a former Voice of
America correspondent convicted of national security crimes in September 2008, but also draws attention to
several other cases that have attracted much less public attention.
In this report Human Rights Watch urges the Angolan government to adopt all necessary measures to ensure that
the armed forces act in accordance with Angolas obligations under international human rights and humanitarian
law. The government should review proceedings against detainees currently or previously held for state security
crimes, investigate allegations of human rights violations, and prosecute alleged perpetrators. The government
should also set up an independent and impartial inquiry into human rights violations committed by the Angolan
armed forces and intelligence services in Cabinda.
Chevron Alternative 2008 Annual Report 21
Agostinho Chicaia is the president of Mpalabanda. Amnesty
International released a statement forcefully condemning the
ban, stating, Amnesty International considers [Mpalabandas]
members to be human rights defenders... Its closure will leave
Cabinda, an area rife with egregious violations of human
rights, without a human rights organisation to monitor
and record violations of human rights.
116
An international
outcry followed, universally
acknowledging the peaceful and
vital work of Mpalabanda.
CHEVRON IN CABINDA
(ANGOLA)
Statement by Agostinho
Chicaia, Extinta Mpalabanda
Associao Cvica de Cabinda
(MACC), Cabinda, Angola
Labor Policies
Discrimination is rampant
in the treatment given to
Cabindan vs Luandanor the
remainder of Angolan employees.
We believe that in the last two
years, Chevron has required the
compulsory transfer of many
Cabinda-based administrative
personnel to Luanda. Angolas
General Labour Law requires that
employees be compensated for expenses related to transfers,
including expenses related to the employee himself or the
family members for whom the employee is responsible. We
believe that Chevron has adhered to this law only in the case
of non-Cabinda employees. This transfer process to Luanda
is extremely precarious. It has been dividing and destroying
families, as the Cabindan transferred employees earnings are
not enough to cover the costs incurred for their families.
Human Rights
There have been murmurs and claims all over: we hear
shouts of indignation and revolt from employees or members
of the communities against Chevrons way of doing things.
CHEVRON HAS BEEN IN ANGOLA since the 1930s,
when Texaco began marketing there. In 1958 Cabinda Gulf
Oil Co., Chevrons Angolan subsidiary, drilled its rst well.
The company has dominated oil production in Angola ever
since. Today, Chevron has four Angolan concessions, the
most important of which are the massive offshore Benguela
BelizeLobito Tomboco and the $3.8 billion Tombua-Landana
projects. Also in 2008, construction
began on a 5.2 million-metric-ton-
per-year liqueed natural gas plant.
Angola is the second-largest oil
producer in sub-Saharan Africa and
the worlds seventh-largest supplier
to the United States. Yet its health
indicators are some of the worst
in sub-Saharan Africa, sixty eight
percent of the population lives
below the poverty line, and 28%
live in extreme poverty.
114

Chevron operated in Angola
when it was a Portuguese colony,
through a bloody 14-year armed
struggle to independence in 1975,
and through a 27-year brutal civil
war ending in 2002, which left
as many as one million Angolans
dead, 4.5 million internally
displaced, and another 450,000 as
refugees. Since the end of the Civil
War the government has remained
rife with corruption, such that
Transparency International ranks
it as one of the most corrupt governments in the world, and
Amnesty International describes its human rights record as
poor and plagued by serious problems.
Cabinda is the heart of Angolas oil production. The
twenty-four-hour oil operations there are, as lawyer and
journalist Daphne Eviatar writes, what nanced the
governments army during a civil war ... And theyre the most
obvious sign of the Wests relentless tentacles reaching into
Angola today.
115
In 2006, the Angolan government banned Mpalabanda
(Associao Cvica de Cabinda), the only human rights
organization operating in Cabinda. The group focused not only
on abuses by the government, but also by the oil companies.
Luanda, Angola 2006
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III. Around the World
CHEVRON IN ANGOLA
EXHIBIT FOUR
22 Chevron Alternative 2008 Annual Report
center there, but these projects are very far from the real
problems, concerns, and needs of the communities. Chevron
prospers and enriches itself, while the local communities
get poorer and poorer, more and more miserable, more and
more vulnerable. The very little that Chevron does that is
not done unilaterally, without considering the opinions and
the priorities of the communities. They dont walk the talk,
considering what they preach themselves. There is neither
dialogue nor are there objective partnerships or common
goals between themselves and the communities. Cabinda does
not in any way reect the oil-producing giant that generates
scandalous amounts of money for the Angolan government as
well as Chevron itself.
Chevron says that it recently created a Social Responsibility
team to mitigate daily criticisms and to create an internal forum
to discuss issues related to social responsibility, environmental
problems, health, and safety. But, thus far, these efforts are
unproductive, and civil society monitoring capabilities are not
yet up to the task.
What the Communities Want
We nd that extractive industry practices in Cabinda only
stress and deepen poverty levels, for Chevron pollutes and
destroys the environment, accentuates social injustice, stops
development, and sows frustration. As such, local communities
and the Cabindan people demand more social, environmental,
and economic responsibility on Chevrons part and for
themselves. Environmental organizations such as Gremio ABC
specically demand that Chevron nally replace its old leaking
oil pipelines.
Mpalabanda-Cabinda Civic Association, illegally abolished
by the Cabinda Court of Justice as ordered by the Cabinda
Provincial Government (and mandated by the Presidency of
the Republic Military House), has always held that there was
excessive pressure over the oil exploration in Cabinda, which
prepared the ground for successive oil spills. It was absurd to
deplete all the Cabinda reserves today only to inherit serious
environmental problems tomorrow. Mpalabanda demanded the
development of an independent environmental impact study to
determine the marine resources contamination levels. It asked
the Angolan Government to regulate the basic environmental
laws and the capacity building of the local structures for a joint
monitoring of the oil exploration activities in Cabinda with
civil society.
Employees rights are simply violated, ignored, and denied;
there is discrimination in the workplace, particularly over
wages. The employees Trade Unions encounter a number
of difculties in exercising their role, as Chevron does not
allow it. Collective bargaining is not welcomed. Many times
employees are unfairly terminated, in total violation of their
rights. Furthermore, there is no distinction between human
rights and politics, so talking about human rights is considered
a provocation to the government. Standing up for your rights is
considered being ungrateful or lacking respect. Dialogue does
not exist, and when they talk about dialogue, it is to simply
communicate decisions already made or to seek pretexts to take
actions, because anything you say may be used against you.
Environment
The local communities do not derive any real benets
from activities undertaken in their geographical areas. The
communities quality of life and living standards continue to
deteriorate. The environment has been increasingly degraded.
The impact of the pollution has been trivialized by Chevron,
particularly with the successive oil spills in Cabinda. No
independent environmental impact study has been produced
to evaluate the present state of our beaches, the deteriorated
mangroves areas, the affected ecosystems in the sea, on the
earth, and the transfer to rivers.
In a rare government action in 2002, Chevron was
ned $2 million by Angolas Ministry of Fisheries and the
Environment for oil spills from its platform that polluted
beaches and damaged the local shing industry. A government
investigation found that leaks from poorly maintained pipes
used to transport crude oil from the platform were the cause of
the spills. With most oil spills, however, we nd that Chevron
will deny responsibility and accuse operators in neighbouring
countries. On the few occasions when Chevron has accepted
responsibility, we have found the number of barrels of oil
spilled was generally below 50 in order to avoid being penalized
under Angolan law. To indemnify the shermen, the main
victims, Chevron dictates the indemnication value without
proper serious and transparent negotiation.
What Chevron Says
Lately, Chevron has carried out some projects to benet
the communities. Chevron builds one school here, a medical
The solution? As a last resort, discontinue Chevrons oil exploration in Cabinda,
as it is the mother of our disgrace, bringing poverty, environmental problems, and
armed conict.
Agostinho Chicaia, Angola
Chevron AlLernaLive 2009 Annual ReporL 23
Chevrcn in AncIa
Kristin Peed, author, Crude Existence: Environment and The Politics oI Cil in Northern Angola and
Elias Mateus Isaac, Cpen 5ociety Initiative Ior 5outhern AIrica, Angola
!
!!!. Arcund the WcrId
Chevron is the biggest polluter of the
environment (seas, lakes, ora) in Cabinda ...
Chevron has given very limited attention and
provided minimal investment to protect and heal
the environment in Cabinda.
~Chevrcn cfhciaI in Cabinda, ApriI 2010.
CHLVRON lS 1HL LARCLS1 FORLlCN producer of
Angolan oil. In 2010, it will extract 580,000 barrels of oil per
day from offshore Blocks 0 and 14.
208
Producing 1.78 million
barrels per day, Angola briey eclipsed Nigeria as Sub-Saharan
Africas largest oil producer in August 2009.
209
Angola supplies
31% of its crude to the U.S. and Chevron plays a major role
in Angolan oil exports with a 39.2% interest in the Malongo
Terminal Oil Export project.
210
A Crude History
Chevrons wholly-owned subsidiary, Cabinda Gulf Oil Com-
pany, pioneered exploration activitie s before Angola achieved
independence from the Portuguese. Chevron boasts of con-
ducting Angolas rst seismic operations in 1954, drilling its
rst onshore well in 1958, and discovering its rst offshore oil
and gas elds in 1966 and 1971, respectively.
211
Yet all of these
activities occurred in Cabinda, a Portuguese protectorate dis-
tinct from the Angolan colony. Many Cabindans claim Angola
illegally annexed the oil-rich territory and they blame Chevron
for nancing the Angolan governments repressive hold on
Cabinda ever since.
Oil revenues largely nanced Angolas bloody internation-
alized civil war until 2002. Despite the ongoing war, Chevron
steadily increased offshore production. In 1997, Chevron
began developing Kuito, Angolas rst deepwater well. By 2009,
Chevron introduced one of the largest man-made structures
on earth designed for maximum daily production rates of
100,000 barrels per day in 2011.
212

Abusing Human Pights
Since Angolas annexation of Cabinda in 1975, Cabindans have
sought autonomy, some supporting militant movements for
independence. Today, some 30-40,000 Angolan troops are sta-
tioned in Cabinda, committing egregious human rights abuses
against the civilian population of 400,000, including forced
labor, rape, beatings, torture, summary executions and politi-
!
Elias Isaac and Albertina Delgado oI Cpen 5ociety traveled to Cabinda in
April 20!0 to conduct interviews oI Cabindan shers and Chevron oIcials.
All nonsourced quotes are derived Irom these interviews.
cal intimidation.
213
Journalist Lara Pawson reported that in
2008,Cabinda appears more militarized than parts of Angola I
visited during the height of the civil war.
214

Security forces arbitrarily detain Cabindans suspected of
involvement in armed opposition. Between September 2007
and March 2009, 38 such persons were subjected to torture
and cruel or inhumane treatment, deprived of due process
rights, and denied a fair trial.
215
Many detainees are human
rights and environmental campaigners. A recent wave of
suspects taken into custody in 2010 included human rights
lawyer Francisco Luemba, Catholic priest Ral Tati, and other
members of the banned Mpalabanda Civic Association, which
elucidated Chevrons role in undermining human rights in
Cabinda.
The Angolan government uses military force in Cabinda
to quash protest and secure resource-rich territory. Chevron
is indirectly linked to Cabindas militarization by supplying
billions of dollars in oil payments to a repressive and opaque
government. Improved transparency could help channel oil
monies to social services and poverty reduction, rather than
corrupt elites or repression.
Dangers to Environmental and Human Health
Chevrons oil exploration and production activitiesincluding
seismic tests, drilling, offshore disposal of drill cuttings and
produced water, fracturing and water ooding activities,
pipeline leaks, accidental oil spills, and use of chemicals such as
dispersantsdevastate human and environmental health.
216

Oil Spills
Oil spills are the most visible negative impact of Chev-
rons operations offshore. Chevron reports 182 accidental
spills between 1990 and 1998, releasing 5,984 barrels of oil
into Cabindas artisanal shing grounds.
217
According to one
sher, The uncontrolled oil spill also poses a big threat for the
survival of shing communities who constantly see their liveli-
hoods threatened with no work to do or means to adequately
and decently sustain their families.
Kwanza, Anqolan Currency
Chevron AlLernaLive 2009 Annual ReporL 24
Chevron delivers compensation in an uneven and
opaque manner, favoring wealthier registered shers over
informal day laborers and entirely disregarding the wider
affected population, including women sh traders.
218
A
sher recalled, In 2000, when Chevron destroyed a sh-
ing habitat and a lake near Landana, only 14 shermen
were compensated in a total population of about 2,500
people who directly and indirectly depended on shing.
Overlooked community members sought indemnication
in the courts. Yet, one claimant lamented, The amounts
are so little and insignicant compared to the losses that
the communities have suffered. There are still court cases
of some shermen against Chevron which have never
been resolved because a lot of people who have or are
being affected by the spills and pollution have been delib-
erately not considered.
When oil spills occur, Chevron often fails to alert
communities.
219
Worse yet, some say Chevron relies on
security forces to quell community demandsor uses
chemical dispersants to mask spills before shers can
make claims to compensation. As one sher recalled,
This year, after another big spill occurred, the local com-
munity tried to organize a demonstration against Chevrons
practices, but the security forces quickly prevented it. Chevron
has been a bit more careful of informing the local communi-
ties whenever an oil spill takes place and the cleaning of the
seas is promptly assumed. Unfortunately, the use of chemical
dispersants in cleaning operations may be more dangerous to
human and environmental health than oil alone.
220
The state of repression and underdevelopment in Cabinda
may benet Chevron by limiting liability and compensation
claims. An anonymous Chevron ofcial admitted, Chevron
is the biggest polluter of the environment (seas, lakes, ora)
in Cabinda and because there are no independent bodies or
civil society organizations capable and efcient to monitor [the
company], most of the spills go unreported and unheard of
with the exception of those detected by local shermen. Chev-
ron has given very limited attention and provided minimal
investment to protect and heal the environment in Cabinda.
One resident of a community near Chevrons operations
agreed, Though there is widespread discontentment in the
community, there have never been any public complaints
against Chevron [because] the majority of the population are
illiterate or have low education and do not know their rights.
Cabindas artisanal shers depend on the waters in Block 0 for
their sustenance and livelihoods, but few recognize the dangers
of oil production beyond oil spillslike eating sh that have
bioaccumulated high levels of methylmercury from exposure to
drilling wastes.
Flare Abatement: Finally
Chevrons commitment to reducing aring in Angola is most
welcome. Chevron holds a 36.4% ownership interest in
Angola Liqueed Natural Gas, a multi-billion joint venture
to produce 5.4 million metric tons of exportable LNG.
221
In-
creasing prices and rising demand for cleaner fuels in the U.S.
encouraged Chevron to seek a prot on associated gases rather
than burn them at the wellhead. Nevertheless, Chevron and
other oil companies operating in Angola continue to are most
of the gas. Of the 355 billion cubic feet of gas produced from
Angolan elds in 2008, 69% was ared or vented, 23% was
reinjected, and 8% went to domestic consumption.
222
Flaring
abatement and gas reinjection are long overdue for environ-
mental and human health.
Chevron 5ays
In 2004, the Angolan government allowed Chevron to publicly
disclose a $300 million payment for extension of the Block 0
concession. The transparent moment was short-lived; Angola
still refuses to sign the Extractive Industries Transparency Ini-
tiative (EITI). The challenge of EITI not only reects Angolas
intransigence but also reveals Chevrons lack of political will
to promote transparency and become more accountable to the
Angolan populace.
The challenges are great: communities neighboring Chev-
rons oil base at Malongo lack electricity and running water.
Some residents acknowledged, Chevron has some good social
assistance programs for the population and rattled off a few
projects. Others criticized Chevron for prioritizing social initia-
tives used as political propaganda by the government or ruling
party and refusing funding to civil society organizations.
Demands Ior Chevron
Chevrons contributions to development and minor attempts at
transparency do little to offset the direct harm the corporation
has inicted on human and environmental health in Cabinda
or the indirect damage to human rights and democracy in An-
gola. We implore Chevron to take the following actions:
Repair faulty, outdated infrastructure contributing to
environmental degradation; Cease all aring of associated gases
at the wellhead; Educate communities on environmental and
human health concerns associated with activities; Report all
risks to environmental and human health (e.g., spills) to com-
munities immediately; Distribute compensation to all affected
parties in a transparent and equitable manner; Support basic
human rights and the development of non-partisan civil society
in Angola; Publish all payments to the Angolan government;
Lobby for the U.S. Energy Security through Transparency Act
of 2009 (S. 1700); and Implement fair practices to promote
hiring of local personnel.
Pescadores da Laqoa de Massai, Cabinda
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AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

Public Statement

AI Index: AFR 12/006/2006 (Public)
News Service No: 203
4 August 2006

Angola: Human rights organization banned

Amnesty International is gravely concerned about the ban of Mpalabanda (Associao Cvica de Cabinda),
a human rights organization operating in Cabinda, Angola.

In a case instituted by the Angolan government against Mpalabanda, the Provincial Court of Cabinda
ruled on Thursday 20 July that Mpalabanda should be banned. Mpalabanda is appealing against the
decision, which was apparently based on the Law of Associations of May 1991 (Lei das Assosiaes de
Maio de 1991).

Mpalabanda is the only human rights organization operating in the province of Cabinda. Amnesty
International considers its members to be human rights defenders. The organization has been involved in
the documentation of human rights violations committed by both the government and members of the
Front for the Liberation of the Cabindan Enclave (FLEC). Its closure will leave Cabinda, an area rife with
egregious violations of human rights, without a human rights organisation to monitor and record violations
of human rights.

Amnesty International is particularly concerned about the effect of the court ruling on Mpalabanda's and
human rights defenders' freedoms of association and expression, and consequently, their ability to carry
out human rights monitoring and evaluation. These freedoms are contained in the Constitution of Angola,
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, to which Angola is a party. Under international human rights law, no restrictions may be placed on
the exercise of the right to freedom of association, other than those prescribed by law and strictly
necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, public order, public health and morals or the
protection of the rights and freedom of others.

While Amnesty International recognises the government's right to restrict the operations of organizations
in the circumstances mentioned above, the organization urges it to ensure that this is done only when
strictly necessary and in accordance with the Angolan national and international law.

Amnesty International calls upon the government to respect and protect the enjoyment of the right to
freedom of association and expression.

In addition the organization urges the government to fulfil the principles contained in the Declaration on
the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and
Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. This Declaration recognizes the right of all, individually and in association with others, to
promote and strive for the protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the
national and international level.
EXHIBIT FIVE

Background
Mpalabanda was created in July 2003 in terms of the Law of Associations of May 1991 (Lei das
Assosiaes de Maio de 1991) and was officially registered in December 2003. In March 2004 the
organization was allowed to hold its first meeting after two consecutive refusals by the provincial
government to allow a meeting to take place. Since then it has been refused permission on several
occasions to hold meetings and marches to commemorate Cabinda Day.

In 2004 FLEC, the Catholic Church, and Mpalabanda set up the Cabinda Forum for Dialogue (Forum
Cabindese para o Dialogo, FDC) to enter into dialogue with the government for peace in Cabinda.

According to reports, on Monday 19 June 2006, Agostinho Chicaia the president of Mpalabanda was
summoned to court (tribunal da comarca de Cabinda) where he was issued with a copy of a government
application to ban Mpalabanda. The application alleged that Mpalabanda incited violence and hatred. It
also accused Mpalabanda of carrying out political activities rather than being a civil society organization.
The organization was given ten days to submit a responding affidavit, which it submitted within the given
time.

On Thursday 20 July the Court decided to ban the organization. Mpalabanda was informed of this
decision on Monday 24 July.

There is no mention in the judgement that Mpalabanda promoted violence and hatred. Nor were any of
the cited witnesses called to give evidence to this effect.

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