What Is The Nature of The Psychological Element of War and Can It Be Represented Through Game Mechanics?

What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics?
By Nicholas Edwards
M.Eng Computer Games Design

A project submitted in partial fulfilment of the award of the degree of Master of Engineering in Computer Games Design from Staffordshire University
Supervised by Capt. (Hon) Stephen Webley MAY 2012

45,529 Words 194 Pages Faculty of Computing, Engineering and Technology Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 1
Acknowledgements
To Steve Webley, his support on this project, through his extensive recommendations of literature, additional research areas, as well as general advice on the structure of this report and constant critique of its quality, has been crucial to the depth and scope that this project has been able to take.
To Nan, its hard to believe its been six months already since you left us. Me, Mum, Stephen, Granddad, and Ant still miss you more with each day that has passed. Thank you for everything that you did for me over the years and I shall never forget it, Im just sorry that you never got to see me graduate.
Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 2
Abstract
This study investigates what constitutes the nature of psychology in warfare, in what way it influences combat, and how it may be represented in wargames, understanding both the challenges this poses in creating game mechanics and the difference that such an element shall make to gameplay overall.
Firstly, the classical view of the psychological element of war is understood, linking Clausewitzs concept of chance and uncertainty in warfare to the moral factors. The concept of chance is then tied to wargames, specifically the role it plays in balancing gameplay alongside the factors of skill and reality. The section concludes that if recognising psychologys influence is essential to understanding the role of chance in warfare, and that chance is essential to well-rounded wargames, then the inclusion of the psychological factors in gameplay shall be critical. Furthermore, the way in which the psychological element of war is referred to through vague natural language, not by certain numerical means, is noted as an important underlying issue when it comes to the unpredictability of the element.
The factors that actually makeup the psychological element of war are then researched, with the aim of to seeing just why theorists like Clausewitz came to his opinion on the nature of psychology, by looking at the areas role at all three levels of conflict. It is concluded that there is clear evidence of the need to see psychology as both unpredictable in outcome and verbal in how it is analysed, in its occurrence and in its exploitation.
The research developed on the psychology of war, both in its nature and the factors that the element consists of, is then compared with the game mechanics utilised in various wargames. Each games mechanical systems and the influence that psychology has had upon gameplay are analysed, discovering what difference to gameplay that applying the nature of psychology has or could make, and how well the balance between chance and Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 3
skill is maintained. A need for game mechanics based on the nature of psychology to take the role of chance, whilst acting as a counterweight to material-based mechanics focused on skill, is identified to achieve a balance in gameplay. However, psychologys ability to represent chance in gameplay is often faltered by the use of mechanical systems that emphasise certain and numerical outcomes, forcing psychology to represent skill instead.
This study proposes that, as a resolution to the issues of predictability in psychological game mechanics, that the use of Fuzzy Logic may provide a better basis for developing systems to recreate the nature of the psychological element of warfare. Fuzzy Logic allows a user to manage variables through natural language where the truth between two statements is blended, allowing for potentially unpredictable systems that utilises the verbal, not numeric, style that psychology is communicated through in reality.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements................................................................................................................................. 2 Abstract ................................................................................................................................................... 3 1. Introduction to the Problem ............................................................................................................... 8 The Importance of Psychology in War ................................................................................................ 9 Nature of Psychology in War ............................................................................................................ 10 The Problem ...................................................................................................................................... 14 Understanding this Problem ............................................................................................................. 17 2. Analysing the Factors of Psychology: The Base Factors .................................................................... 19 The Base Factors ............................................................................................................................... 20 Courage and Fear .......................................................................................................................... 20 The Willingness to Kill ................................................................................................................... 24 3. Analysing the Factors of Psychology: Combat Motivation ............................................................... 31 Cohesion ........................................................................................................................................... 32 Overview ....................................................................................................................................... 32 How Cohesion is Formed .............................................................................................................. 32 Effects............................................................................................................................................ 34 Big-Men ....................................................................................................................................... 36 Ideology............................................................................................................................................. 38 Overview ....................................................................................................................................... 38 General Effects .............................................................................................................................. 39 Types ............................................................................................................................................. 40 Discipline ........................................................................................................................................... 48 Overview ....................................................................................................................................... 48 Internal .......................................................................................................................................... 49 Inducement ................................................................................................................................... 50 External ......................................................................................................................................... 52 Experience and Exhaustion ............................................................................................................... 54 4. Analysing the Factors of Psychology: The External Factors .............................................................. 57 Technology ........................................................................................................................................ 58 Effects of Technology on the User ................................................................................................ 58 Effects of Technology on the Receiver.......................................................................................... 63 Impact of the Commander ................................................................................................................ 67 Factors of Influence ...................................................................................................................... 67
5. Analysing the Factors of Psychology: The Higher Levels of War ...................................................... 75 Operational Level .............................................................................................................................. 76 Overview ....................................................................................................................................... 76 The Psychological Centre of Gravity ............................................................................................. 78 Manoeuvre .................................................................................................................................... 80 PSYOPs .......................................................................................................................................... 85 Airpower ....................................................................................................................................... 93 Strategic Level ................................................................................................................................... 99 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 99 Clausewitzs Trinity ..................................................................................................................... 100 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 108 Further Research......................................................................................................................... 109 6. Analysing the Factors of Psychology: Conclusion ........................................................................... 111 Conclusion of Analysis..................................................................................................................... 112 7. Methodology I: Quantifying Psychology in Games ......................................................................... 113 Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 114 Battle Academy ............................................................................................................................... 116 Mechanical Systems and Psychology .......................................................................................... 116 Psychology and its Impact on Gameplay .................................................................................... 118 Red Orchestra 2: Heroes of Stalingrad............................................................................................ 121 Mechanical Systems and Psychology .......................................................................................... 121 Psychology and its Impact on Gameplay .................................................................................... 122 Close Combat III: The Russian Front ............................................................................................... 125 Mechanical Systems and Psychology .......................................................................................... 125 Psychology and its Impact on Gameplay .................................................................................... 128 R.U.S.E. ............................................................................................................................................ 131 Mechanical Systems and Psychology .......................................................................................... 131 Psychology and its Impact on Gameplay .................................................................................... 134 Total War: SHOGUN 2 ..................................................................................................................... 138 Mechanical Systems and Psychology .......................................................................................... 138 Psychology and its Impact on Gameplay .................................................................................... 144 Russo-German War 41-44 ............................................................................................................. 148 Mechanical Systems and Psychology .......................................................................................... 148 Psychology and its Impact on Gameplay .................................................................................... 151
Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................... 154 What genre does the game come under and how has this affected what factors have been chosen and their level of detail? ................................................................................................. 154 What level, or levels, of war does this game take place at? Has this game implemented the psychology of war at each of these and if so how? .................................................................... 155 What mechanical system has been used to represent psychology? .......................................... 155 What difference does the inclusion of psychological issues have on gameplay overall? .......... 156 8. Methodology II: Developing a Theory............................................................................................. 159 Analysis ....................................................................................................................................... 160 Creation of a Mechanical Basis ................................................................................................... 161 Benefits to This New Mechanical Basis....................................................................................... 163 Use by a Developer ..................................................................................................................... 165 9. Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................... 169 Further Research............................................................................................................................. 176 10. Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 177 11. Image List ...................................................................................................................................... 191
1. Introduction to the Problem
The Importance of Psychology in War
The psychological element of warfare has been seen by many commanders and theorists to be a fundamental component to the nature of warfare itself and the field of war studies, the power of which may have a decisive effect upon the eventual outcome of conflict (Craig, 1997, p.61). Figures such as Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery have stated that, The more fighting I see, the more I am convinced that the big thing in war is morale and Napoleon before him feeling that, morale is to the physical as three is to one (Keegan, 1997, p.6-7).
The impact that psychology has upon the performance of soldiers in combat was noted by S.L.A. Marshall (1947/2000, p.38 & 104) in his study of American soldiers during the Second World War. Marshall felt that most breakdowns in combat effectiveness by a unit came down to the psychological factors, and as such was also of the opinion that having knowledge of the psychological side of warfare was as important to a commander as it is to understand the material factors of troop numbers and technology when assessing their own combat strength.
Because of the importance of the psychological element, a planner of military operations must not only focus on the destruction of the opponents material capabilities, but also target the minds of those soldiers they are fighting and their leaders as well. Not only does the targeting of the psychological element allow for another angle at which to defeat an opponent, but also has the potential to achieve greater results and a better economy of force than if only the material factors were of a concern (Lambert, 1995, p.26). Ultimately it is the psychological element that separates an army on paper from what it is in reality (Hastings, 2011, p.427) and what prevents war from being a comparison of each sides technological prowess (Jobbgy, 2010, p.19). Mao Zedong (1960, p.53) went as far to say that it is not the material factors, but the psychological factors that are the decisive factor to victory in war. Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 9
However, the exact way in which the psychological element affects warfare, what parts of it have the biggest impact on battle, how well it can be prepared for, the methods that exist for targeting this element, and how to quantify any psychological effects is under intense debate. Whilst it may be argued that the psychological aspect of combat is of the first importance, it is the intricacy of the element that makes creating an effect on this side of warfare difficult to achieve (Jobbgy, 2010, p.17). An answer, or at least progress toward one, must be found to the debate of its role in conflict if psychology is to be utilised effectively in war.
Nature of Psychology in War
For every physical action that occurs on the battlefield there is an inevitable psychological reaction based upon what the soldier in question perceives to be the current situation. It is also one that cannot be anticipated by either sides commander, whether its impact was targeted for or not (Lambert, 1995, p.iv). Along with being hard to anticipate, the factors that the psychological element consists of are innumerable. These factors will include anything from the smallest details to the biggest strategic developments (Craig, 1997, p.74), of which their interaction is often coincidental, suffering from the key issue of casually observed effects in that direct causation is impossible. Ultimately with any human factor in combat there are multiple causes, influences and consequences to any action, and make their identification, measurement and evaluation fraught with difficulty (Perry, 2008, p.1012).
The lack of quantifiable relationships between the factors that constitute military psychology is one of the key details that differentiate this element from the material side of warfare. Whilst troops, equipment, and supply numbers can conform to numerical systems, the psychological side of conflict currently has no known method of judging its effects, Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 10
outcomes, and influences rationally (Grossman, 1994, p.142). In concluding his thoughts on the psychological element of war, Marshall (1947/2000, p.179-180) felt that it must be seen as immeasurable and unpredictable in nature, in which the variations that take place could be better described as a rapidly oscillating wave.
Much of the issue behind the implementation of psychology within military theory lies with how war itself is interpreted, by this referring to the two bases of modern war studies, that being of Clausewitzian or Jominian principles. These two approaches to war studies broadly relate to whether war can be seen as more of a philosophical construct, where the reality is far too complicated by frictions to be fully quantifiable, as was stated by Clausewitz, or as a science, where rules and principles may be developed, as was promoted by Jomini (Biddle, 1989, p.6).
Carl von Clausewitz (1832/1993, p.172) was of the opinion that describing war as a science was a mistake, as the term science should only ever be applied to disciplines with a set order of logic, such as mathematics or astronomy. Clausewitzs (1832/1993, p.138) reason for feeling that war could not be seen as a science was down to the various frictions that complicate warfare. Frictions ultimately are the factors that make everything that should be simple to execute in war complex and the area that distinguishes warfare in reality to that on paper. An example of a friction may be the wrongful interpretation of an order, the breakdown of machinery, the hazards of the environment, or any other unforeseen circumstance that hinders the plans of the commander. When stacked upon each other, the various sources of friction slow down the military machine due to the influx of unpredictable events, partially caused by the fact that war is fought by individuals, each of whom have the inadvertent ability to cause the slowdown or the complete standstill of the system.
Many of Clausewitzs comments criticising the scientific approach to war studies were aimed indirectly at the writings of Antoine-Henri de Jomini (Bassford, 1993). Jomini (1838/1854) felt that the fundamentals of war could be boiled down to a set of principles or Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 11
rules, and that the key to victory is simply to be the one who can apply overwhelming force at the decisive point (Ebner, 2004). Clausewitz (1832/1993, p.216-217) however felt that Jomini, and others who believed in developing rules and principles for war, removed the impact of friction for the sake of forcing the study into a science. Summarising his opinion, Clausewitz said that it was paltry philosophy to force war into a science, going as far to say that rules are not only made for idiots, but are idiotic in themselves.
One of the factors Clausewitz (1832/1993, p.216) placed within the concept of friction was what he called the moral factors, a term which accommodates much of the psychological issues that influence soldiers on the battlefield and cannot be removed from the overall picture of war, as much as any other element that may be attributed. Despite their intrinsic integration with the nature of warfare, Clausewitz stated that the moral factors are not something that may be submitted to academic thinking, as they cannot be classified or moulded to any mechanical systems, and used this as another attack against those who tried to look at war as a science for often omitting this area.
In describing the nature of psychology in war as a friction, a comparison may be made with how this concept related with Clausewitzs views on chance and unpredictability (Beyerchen, 1992). One of the main keystones to Clausewitzs (1832/1993, p.101) theories was his paradoxical trinity of war, which contains what he considered the three dominant tendencies of conflict, each having a varying but deep-set relationship with each other, these factors being reason, passion and crucially to this study, chance. When looked upon as a whole, Clausewitz (1832/1993, p.96) stated that war could be best described as existing within the realm of chance and that,
No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with chance. And through the element of chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war
To Clausewitz (1832/1993, p.96-97) chance was ever present in war and that due to the possibilities and probabilities that permeate conflict, often because of the human element, the absolute can never be attained because a margin of uncertainty shall always exist when the moral factors are involved.
The way in which feedback on the psychological status of a unit, or the impact of the element in general, is just as imprecise or without standardisation as the factor itself, and this may be linked back to its unpredictable nature. Clausewitzs view on the moral factors and their inability to fit to mechanical systems can be seen first-hand in way that they are only ever spoken of verbally, not mathematically, with Group Captain Andrew Lambert (1995, p.3) summarising that,
Generals and Air Marshals feel far more confident with statements such as this plan will drop 13 of the bridges across the Euphrates with a 75 per cent assurance level, rather than this attack will reduce the Iraqi morale by 3dB. The latter statement is clearly nonsense since morale cannot, at present, be broken down and measured mathematically.
Instead, the factors of psychology, such as the state of morale, are talked of in vague terms such as good, bad, OK, but never reported of in terms like being at 64% and so forth, but much of the vagueness in the terminology used when describing the psychological element is not just down to the unpredictability of its nature. The other issue in defining the element is that the terms used to describe psychology often have a different meaning dependant on the situation or person speaking, frequently based upon the background and experiences of the one describing them (Marshall, 1947/2000, p.161).
Ultimately, due to both the unpredictability of the factor, the inability to correlate sources of any impact, and the ambiguity that exists when speaking of the mental effects of combat, no conclusive set of definitions of what constitutes the psychological element of war exists. Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 13
Instead, psychology is spoken of in the terms of broad concepts, used to allow them to de described to others, but without any definite boundaries or principles.
The Problem
Whilst the psychological factors of war are often seen as a symbol of Clausewitzian theory, and potentially in discord with Jominian principles, there is one area where this issue between the two approaches is beginning to surface again, that being the use of computer simulation as a military training tool.
Wargames have long had a close relationship with world militaries in preparing soldiers for war (Ulicsak & Wright, 2010, p.37), and this is quickly increasing in importance with the introduction of virtual environments for the aid of new training programs (Smith, 2009, p.37). Simulation offers a safer and more cost efficient training environment, where scenarios can be created that may not be practical to recreate in the real-world and repeated to perfect the performance of the soldiers being trained through these methods (Caspian Learning, 2008, p.6-7). Therefore, if the factors of psychology are as important to the picture of the battlefield as theorists such as Clausewitz suggest, then they should be a vital component of what must go into these simulations if soldiers are to be prepared for the full range of effects they will be exposed to in reality.
However, the issue with psychology in wargames comes from the fact that in order to implement these factors into a virtual environment, mechanics, or in other words rules, must be created, a Jominian way of approaching this area. The overriding problem then when creating a mechanical system representing psychology for wargames, is that a method is needed to develop a basis that meets halfway between Clausewitzian and Jominian approaches to War Studies, whilst also retaining psychologys unpredictable and verbal nature. Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 14
However, currently few set methodologies exist that allow for retention of the nature of psychology. Dr. Roger D. Smith (2009, p.184-185), Chief Technology Officer for U.S. Army Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation, feels that the military simulation industry is in dire need of new techniques to represent the psychological element in the mechanical systems used in wargames. If the psychological elements are within the realms of chance and friction, then any methods that work along to-the-book actions, such as the current methods of Finite State Machines, which utilise specific behaviours and reactions to certain scenarios, would be ignoring this crucial basis to the nature of what psychology is to war. What is required in a mechanical system for psychology in wargames is something that brings the element of chance that permeates the factor to the forefront.
Just how chance may be applied to wargames is however an issue within itself. Professor Phillip Sabin (2012, p.117-120) says that there is in fact a trinity, inspired by Clausewitzs, that represents what makes up the basis of a wargame, the three points being Reality, Skill and Chance.
Image 1.1
All representations of conflict fall within this trinity to a degree. Reality denotes the level of abstraction that has been used, Skill being the elements of the game which are completely Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 15
down to the ability of the player themselves, and Chance including any actions that occur outside of skill, being down to luck instead. At the extreme end of each of this trinity, pure Reality would be better described as a book on the conflict, which is not influenced because of any user input. Pure Skill may be a game such as chess, where the results of any actions are always known and the players fortunes rarely decided by luck. Finally, a game of pure Chance would be something like snakes and ladders, where player skill has very little influence on the outcome. An ideal wargame will however sit somewhere between these three concepts (Sabin, 2012, p.117).
Sabin (2012, p.119-120) stated that it is exactly because of Clausewitzs focus on the inherent uncertainty of war that, whilst it is technically possible to have a system without it, chance must always have a place within the design of wargames. Instead, the question on chances role in wargames should not one of whether it is be included in the first place, but rather how well balanced it is alongside skill. To achieve a balance between skill and chance, the player must be exposed to the uncertainties, or frictions, which always complicates war, skill then being a question of how well the player may improvise against chances influence. If the unquantifiable elements of war, of which psychology is a part of, are disregarded, then Sabin (2012, p.135) felt that with it the theoretical accuracy and objectivity of such simulations may be severely undermined.
Lieutenant General Raymond Furlong (1984, p.4-7) held a similar viewpoint to Sabin, feeling that both military chiefs and game designers must look back to Clausewitz when considering the elements that make up a wargame, specifically stating the need to apply Clausewitzs concepts of chance and uncertainty, or Unknown Unknowns as he also phrased it. Furlong conceded that those playing such a game might consider such use of chance in games unfair, but that ultimately a commander must learn not to be paralysed by the unknown, instead coming to terms with what they do and do not know and as a result learn to prepare for the unpredictable. Furlong concluded that if wargames do not allow for friction, instead
assuring a commander that any orders will be carried out without issue, then that game would be unrealistic and leave that commander unprepared for the realities of war.
Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Leser and Dr. James Sterrett (2010, p.151) of the U.S. Army War College, however, disagree and feel that through adding chance to simulation, the point behind the training program in the first place is lost and that students already know from personal experience that accidents will happen. To Leser and Sterrett, a users plans should only fail when they should be expected to fail, due to poor planning or execution, not because of any unpredictable elements, which will simply mask the reason behind a students success or failure.
However, to conclude that soldiers already know of the impact that friction brings to war and as such not need to be prepared for it may also be said to miss the point, if Marshalls (1947/2000, p.182) opinion is to be taken. In Marshalls eyes, commanders are often left shaken by the fact that battle is not as smooth as they had been prepared for, and felt instead that a commander should be exposed to as many of these issues in training beforehand. When it comes to exposing soldiers to the issues of friction, and indeed the human factors in general, Marshall summarised that,
To do this to make men knowledgeable of human nature as it is and as it reacts under the various and extreme stresses of the field cannot be regarded as destructive of confidence unless it is already conceded that confidence is a false virtue.
Understanding this Problem
If chance and uncertainty are to be taken as the basis behind the nature of psychology in war and that the inclusion of this element is critical to the development of accurate Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 17
wargames, then the way in which this may be represented through game mechanics shall be crucial. However, if it also may be stated that that mechanical methods often do not fit alongside psychologys nature, then new methods in representing this factor will also be just as crucial for wargames and simulation alike.
The verbal nature of the psychological element must also be considered in any system used, as an element like this that is outside the numerical basis of game mechanics may lead into a potential clash with the systems used in wargames. Ultimately, if the psychological element of warfare is to be implemented according to its nature, then the unpredictability of its impact and vague verbal basis upon which feedback on this elements influence is given must be present.
This study next needs to review what these psychological factors of war actually are, how they may interact with each other, and how they are seen to change the shape of the battlefield. This study of the relevant factors will be crucial to developing an understanding of just why theorists like Clausewitz and Marshall have formed their opinion on the link between chance and psychology. Also crucial to any analysis of the makeup of the psychological element of warfare shall be to see just how verbal the terminology of these factors truly is, as this link with chance may be important when it comes to understanding their role together in game mechanics. Finally, for the representation of psychology in games to be understood, a clear understanding must first be developed on the inspiration behind these game mechanics if they are to be compared and contrasted to reality.
2. Analysing the Factors of Psychology: The Base Factors
The Base Factors
As this study will show, there are three base factors that a commander would hope to inspire within their soldiers and are at the very bottom of the complex equation of how psychology affects the actions the events that transpire on the battlefield. If these three factors can be balanced then an army will often have the essentials for overcoming the issues of psychology or turn them in their favour. The various factors that make the element of psychology in war will in most cases eventually link back to the reaction they on the three base factors and the focus of this research will be to see just how this occurs. The three points are: To elicit courage To eliminate fear or create it within the enemy To enable willingness to kill
Courage and Fear
Courage and fear often stand as two diametrically opposed sides to how a soldier may feel in combat at a root level (Grossman, 2009, p.83-84) and can often be seen as the difference between attacking the source of their discomfort or fleeing from it (Holmes, 1994, p.29). The definition of the terms Courage and Fear goes back to the notion of Fight or Flight in that when in the face of danger, psychology ultimately dictates whether that the person will take the actions of either fighting their opponent, or fleeing from them(Grossman, 2009, p.5).
Courage
General George S. Patton Jr. (1947/1995, p.336) was of the opinion that it was Courage which, with his manhood, [which] makes for victory and Clausewitz (1832/1993, p.218) placed it as one of the principal elements that constructs the psychological element of war. Clausewitz also felt that as war is the realm of danger, courage will always be a soldiers first requirement and split it into two types, courage in the face of personal danger and courage to accept responsibility, alternatively this could also be said to be the avoidance of fear in both of these situations as well. Clausewitz (1832/1993, p.116) further expanded upon his definition by splitting courage in the face of danger into two further parts, that of a permanent condition and that which come from a sudden emotion.
Courage which is said to come from a permanent condition is down to the personally of the individual, whose courage may be because of habit or due to them holding little value to their own life and will be imbrued with this factor without much need for the input of other factors, it is therefore much more dependable. However, the other kind is courage that will be provoked by the input of other factors and this type of soldier will be those who have the most to take from the other psychological factors of this study. Whilst courage triggered by the situation is far less reliable than the permanent kind, it is capable of achieving far more. The highest way in which courage can be invoked, and fear avoided, is when a compound of the two is formed; a naturally courageous soldier whose courage is strengthened by the influence of the other factors (Clausewitz, 1832/1993, p.116).
Ultimately, the ability to master fear of battle may be described as courage, those actions made by the soldier that maintains their participation in the fight, rather than those that remove their presence or ability to continue (Holmes, 1994, p.213). Lord Moran felt that courageousness is something that exists in finite amounts to the soldier, a Well of Fortitude as referred to by Dave Grossman (2009, p.82-85), which that soldier will draw from repeatedly over the course of a conflict before eventually emptying when exhaustion Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 21
takes over. However, the rate at which courage may manifest or be lost to the soldier is inherently unpredictable, as is the nature of psychology in war, and as such a sudden shock may empty this well of fortitude in an instant (Holmes, 1994, p.216). Recalling the unpredictability of courage in his men, one British Brigadier from the Second World War stated that,
The riflemen who turned and ran on Monte Grillo, next day held fast and fought like lions; the same company of soldiers temporary lost all fighting spirit below Tavoleto, only to be transformed into the band of fanatical furies who stormed and captured the village against all odds(Holmes, 1994, p.220).
Fear
When fear does inevitably set-in amongst combat troops, the effects it may have upon the combat effectiveness of that unit may be devastating (Huss, 1999, p.24). In battle fear is something that will affect very soldier that enters the field, with variety coming from the actions that it causes, its intensity, the external threat that triggers it in the first place, and how it is managed once it does begin to affect the combat performance of a solider (Holmes, 1994, p.204). The idea that some soldiers go into battle fearless is for the most part a myth, the difference comes from how well they can personally manage its impact and stop the actions it can cause from manifesting (Hastings, 2011, p.371). As long as the threat of physical danger hangs over those within an army, the spectre of fear shall continue to play a part in the actions that a soldier takes both in battle and outside it (Marshall, 1947/2000, p.149).
The reasons for the increase of fear on the battlefield come down to the way in which stress is applied toward those affected and how well their coping mechanisms can deal with this. If stress is applied too quickly and with a high rate of change, then the ability for a soldier to cope may be significantly reduced (Lambert, 1995, p.75). Expanding on the basis of applied Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 22
stress, Lieutenant A. Argent felt that there was two phases to the occurrence of panic, the first being the gradual build-up of stress from combat, followed by an event, real or perceived, that shocks the soldier into a sudden panic (Lambert, 1995, p.45).
The inevitability of panic means that commanders must expect its occurrence and in particular, realise how its impact shall affect the combat effectiveness of not just the individual soldier, but also the unit that they form a part of. Panic is not an emotion that influences soldiers individually, it is in fact highly contagious and the sudden appearance of panic in one part of a firing line can easily spread to the others within it (Hastings, 2011, p.642). Panic is a feeling that can easily snowball throughout a unit, often with no large cause behind the initial action, the simple fact that one member of the unit has run is usually enough to convince the others to do the same. S.L.A. Marshall (1947/2000, p.144147) spoke of an incident during the Second World War that demonstrates the snowballing that underlines panic in battle,
For example, a sergeant in the First Battalion, 502d Infantry, was hit through an artery during the Carentan Causeway fight on June 12, 1944. It happened in a flash. One second he was hit and the next he was running for a first-aid station without telling his own squad why he was getting out. They took out after him and then the line broke. Others who hadnt seen the sergeant make his dash saw someone else in flight. They too ran. Someone said: The order is to withdraw. Others picked up the word and cried it along the line: Withdraw! Withdraw! It happened just as simply as that.
The effects of panic amongst soldiers can therefore have an effect that causes the training afforded to the soldier to be forgotten and allows instinct to take over instead (Marshall, 1947/2000, p.142). Even without the panic of withdrawal, the challenge to the commander from impact of fear can be momentous, especially when attempting to maintain movement during an operation (Marshall, 1947/2000, p.193). The concept of suppression comes from the impact upon movement that fear brings and the ability for fire to keep down an Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 23
opposing unit can mentally pin these troops down, especially if the direction of fire is hard to fathom (Marshall, 1947/2000, p.142-143).
Panic can also influence the combat effectiveness of a commanders troops through the efficiency of their fire. Nervous troops are far more likely to fire without thinking and often a side effect of fear amongst defending soldiers is higher rate of friendly fire casualties caused by panicked return fire (Hastings, 2011, p.257). One incident during the Second World War where Japanese troops launched a surprise attack on an American airfield, a large amount of the American casualties and destruction of facilities or aircraft was caused not just by the Japanese, but also through the panicked fire returned by American troops, shocked by the Japanese attack (Felton, 2009, p.160). Another action that may be caused by panic though is simple inertia as many soldiers, when gripped by the effects of fear, will often find themselves just waiting the situation out through inaction, too dragged down by fear to either attack or run (Hastings, 2011, p.212).
Ultimately, the onset of fear in an army, or the influx of courage, is unpredictable and managed by inputs of several different competing factors, which determine the usual points at which fight or flight occurs. This study shall be looking into these factors in the following chapters, with a view to understanding just what these factors are and just how they may influence the reactions that fear and courage entail.
The Willingness to Kill Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 24
It has often been presumed that soldiers will fire at those they are fighting without any issue to doing so, the battles in the past were won and those in charge were none the wiser, nor had reason to see situation any other way (Grossman, 2009, p.3). However, in reality soldiers often find it difficult kill other people (Grossman, 2009, p.31), and in his study following the Second World War, S.L.A. Marshall (1947/2000, p.50) found that in the majority of cases only a quarter of those surveyed within the United States Army used their weapon during a confrontation with another enemy unit.
This factor underlines how easily a soldier may find it to fire at another person and what impact this may have on their combat effectiveness as a result. This factor will often be of paramount importance, as the basic principle to success behind most tactical situations is tied to the rate of fire that can be achieved by a unit. The army that can inspire the willingness to kill in their men, in greater amounts than their opponent, will often have the advantage in close combat (Marshall, 1947/2000, p.51).
Posturing
Whilst courage and fear symbolise the two psychological reactions of flight or flight, the view of a soldier towards killing gives rise to an often ignored third case, that of posturing (Grossman, 2009, p.8). Posturing is a mid-point between wanting to act with aggression and wishing to fleeing, coming from a reluctance towards aggression, but not to a level where they would wish to escape (Shalit, 1988, p.51). A reaction of posturing is shown on the battlefield by those who fire to scare off an enemy without aiming to kill them, often simply firing into the air to keep up the appearance of a soldier who is firing as they are expected (Grossman, 2009, p.6 & 9-10).
Conditioning Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 25
Since the identification of the fact that high firing rates do not come naturally to soldiers, various methods have been conceived with the aim of bringing the willingness to kill up to a level where universal firing may be expected. A staple of much life-fire training conducted now by modern armies is conditioning to remove the inhibitions that drag firing rates down in combat (Grossman, 2009, p.13).
During the Second World War firing-range exercises were a simple case of firing at a circular target, the instructors main aim being to improve the accuracy of those firing. However, since the Second World War there has been a change in many world militaries to training based on how realistic the act of killing can be portrayed. The aim of realistic training is seen to be to condition the firer to shoot at an enemy on the battlefield without issue, developing a quick-shot ability in their soldiers (Grossman, 2009, p.255). The result of the improved realism of training has been a harsh rise in the numbers ready to fire, going from the quarter during the Second World War, rising to fifty-five percent in the Korean War and reaching ninety percent for the Vietnam War (Grossman, 2009, p.36). The removal of inhibitions to fire is necessary for the majority of frontline soldiers who enter service, but it must also be remembered the existence of a two percent of personnel who do not. This two percent of soldiers have no psychological barriers to firing at and killing their opponent, with it often being these soldiers that are responsible for a large amount of killing that takes place on the battlefield (Grossman, 2009, p.180).
An example of the disparity of firing rates was observed in the Falklands War of 1982, where very high rates of fire were noted in British forces, who were seen to very few issues in their willingness to fire at their opponents. The Argentinian forces, however, were recorded as having a very low firing rate, the only effective fire coming from machine-gun and snipers and cost them many tactical engagements. The interesting comparison to make here is the fact that the British Army at the time of the Falklands practiced the use of realistic training methods, whilst the Argentinians were still using the Second World War-era training schemes. The different in how the British and Argentine soldiers were trained to fire in Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 26
combat had a direct influence on their ability to lay down fire, leaving the British superior in tactical combat (Grossman, 2009, p.178).
Physical Distance
A powerful variable that must be attached to the willingness to kill is the distance between the perpetrator and the victim. It will often become far harder to for a soldier to kill the nearer their victim is when they confront them (Grossman, 2009, p.97), similarly the further away an opponent is to that soldier, the less humanised they become and helps to remove many of the barriers to killing (Gray, 1959/1998, p.178). This base factor of distance only concerns distance in which the two soldiers can see each other without any mechanical interference, or situations that they are too far to see their enemy. The application of technology in this factor shall be analysed later.
Mid-Range
Mid-Range represents the length at which a soldier may be able to see their opponent and engage them effectively, but also is too far from them to see the extent of any wounding caused to the opponent, the facial expressions showing their reaction to being hit and the sounds of the screams they let out. Furthermore, there is an ability to mentally deny responsibility from the mid-range range if within a group, making it easier for someone to shoot as they remind themselves that it could not possibly be them who hit (Grossman, 2009, p.111). The mid-point of range also includes those kills made by grenades, which whilst required due to the nature of the weapon, is also a far easier method due to its simplicity of use and link with natural behaviour (Grossman, 2009, p.113).
Close-Range
The difference between Close-Range and Mid-Range comes from when the distance becomes such that the firer is unable to deny their responsibility for the act. As well as the certainty of responsibility, they will also be in a position where previously unseen wounding becomes obvious, the facial expressions clear, and the screams audible (Grossman, 2009, p.116). Close-range is also the point where the personal side of combat comes into play and has the ability to stop the act of killing through the humanisation of their opponent this distance attributes, often even if sufficient motivation exists beforehand. (Grossman, 2009, p.114 & 199).
Edged Weapons-Range
Edged-Weapons Range, or alternatively Bayonet-Range, is the point where the trauma of killing may finally become unbearable to the majority of troops, again, due to the further increased influence of the factors that humanise the enemy. However, there is a large impact on the fear factor delivered upon an opponent if attacked at a range close enough for edged-weapons, due to the mentally horrific nature of being killed through this method (Grossman, 2009, p.122).
In fact most soldiers will flee before the charge of a bayonet even reaches them, and is often the most potent effect of this form of attack (Grossman, 2009, p.125-126). However, the reaction of fleeing at bayonet-range is a double-edged sword, as by turning their back, many of the factors that may humanise them to an opponent shall disappear and instead killing is actually increased. The result of turning a back on an enemy in combat may be decisive on killing rates during battle (Grossman, 2009, p.127-128).
Hand-to-Hand-Range
Finally, Hand-to-Hand Range embodies any killing done by using the attackers bare hands. Due to the extreme lack of distance in hand-to-hand combat, and its very personal nature, this range serves as the strongest point of resistance to killing on the battlefield, where many of factors that condition a soldier to kill and that acted as a psychological buffer to the act disappear completely (Grossman, 2009, p.131-132).
3. Analysing the Factors of Psychology: Combat Motivation
Cohesion
Overview
Cohesion is the methods employed to bond together members of a unit as a way of supporting the willingness and commitment of that unit toward each other, and the mission in hand, as well as the factors resulting from this (Johns et al, 1984, p.9). Ardent du Picq felt that the impact of peer pressure led to what he tokened as Mutual Surveillance and was of the opinion that cohesion is the principal psychological factor to be found on the battlefield (Grossman, 2009, p.150). Wing Marshal Darryl Henderson (1985, p.4) concurred, calling cohesion the main Human Factor and the decisive point on which two opposing forces may be compared.
Thus, cohesion has become one of the major areas in which the motivation of a unit in combat may be assessed and is considered one of the primary pieces to building a successful structure within the armed forces. Without cohesion severe issues in cooperation may occur, especially within the enlisted ranks (Walendowski, 1988, p.34 & 37-38). Dave Grossman (2009, p.188) felt that there are five methods in which a cohesive group will influence an individual soldier with these being, the soldiers identification with the group, the groups proximity to them, the intensity of the groups support for orders, the number within the group and the legitimacy of the group to the soldier.
How Cohesion is Formed
Many factors go into the different ways in which cohesive relationships are created between soldiers, with affinity, loyalty and trust between the troops being a few of the key points that must be developed for this to take hold successfully (Walendowski, 1988, p.3 & 86). Another common method used to develop cohesion is to create a sense of pride within Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 32
the unit for being in the unit, and it is for this reason that the regimental system is seen as one of the main strengths of the British Army, as well as those based on it. Through encouraging a feeling of pride for the regiment itself, a common bond between the personnel within it may be formed from the moment they sign-up (Ben-Shalom et al, 2005, p.72).
There is still another side to this factor though and that is the fact that cohesion itself can develop very quickly under the stresses of combat, as those involved find themselves needing mutual support from their comrades to survive mentally (Walendowski, 1988, p.38). Even if the level of cohesion may look bad during peacetime, this caveat must be remembered when assessing an army before war breaks out as the chance is there for cohesion to develop anyway (Walendowski, 1988, p.51).
Cohesion still needs an amount of time to form, whether this is during combat or in peacetime, as the feeling of comradeship is not something that will occur instantaneously (Dinter, 1985, p.71). Nevertheless, if cohesion is formed within a unit not only time is needed, but also for units to be organised in a way that does put apart these units, as any cohesion built shall be lost and along with it any benefits (Baillergeon et al, 2012).
Cohesion will continue to be a motivating factor as long as soldiers who form the unit in question maintain visual contact with each other, this being sufficient to remind each member of the group of the mutual support they are receiving. When visual contact is lost between the members of a unit, usually through the impact of enemy fire forcing them to scatter or hit the ground, then sense of unity between these soldiers shall be lessened until contact is regained (Marshall, 1947/2000, p.129).
Effects
Effective cohesion can be one of the most potent factors that influences morale as a whole (Strachan, 1997, p.371), with S.L.A. Marshall (1947/2000, p.150) felt that tactical unity on the battlefield was down to the knowledge and understanding present between those soldiers within the unit, their greatest challenge being to avoid any isolation. There is also a strong link from cohesion with fear, as due to the accountability that exists between the soldiers, every action they take is done so under the close eye of their comrades (Grossman, 2009, p.149). Any feeling of fear can be overcome through the greater anxiety of being seen as coward by those a soldier is closest to on the battlefield and can cause greater dread than many of the worst possibilities that may come from continuing to fight (Ellis, 1993, p.107).
In many cases some soldiers find that they would rather die than having to deal with the fact that they have let their comrades down and, if this is a present factor, then it can have a humongous impact on the willingness of a unit to stay in combat (Grossman, 2009, p.150). The effect of the peer-group on a soldier can be immense, not only in terms of keeping them in combat, but in influencing their actions in general, but this may not always be positive. On the Eastern Front, the pressure of the groups actions was often a catalyst in many Wehrmacht soldiers joining the atrocities that took place, which had originally been started by the ideological few (Schulte, 1997, p.281).
The presence of a high degree of cohesion is one of the main influences that affects a soldiers willingness to kill and can be one of major ways in which this inclination is produced. The influence of accountability, as well as the anonymity that group can create for an individual, can make the desired need for killing the enemy much easier, as not only will the soldier be able to defer the responsibility, but will also be under pressure not to be the only one in the group to be seen not to. The group therefore becomes more likely to kill due to cohesion and in fact can become the motivation to do so for an individual, especially if they have seen some of their comrades die beside them (Grossman, 2009, p.152-155). Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 34
Morris Janowitz and Edward Shils (1948, p.281) felt that one of the main reasons the Wehrmacht stayed a credible force so close to the end of the Second World War was due to the cohesion created within its ranks, which allowed them to overcome the realities of the strategic situation. Cohesion has also been applied to the North Vietnamese Army and the Vietcong during the Vietnam War as a key reason for their ability to stand against American firepower, which dwarfed its own, and ultimately gain victory (Henderson, 1985, p.1-2).
Nevertheless, when looked at alongside the other main factors of combat motivation, it is often found that it can be an area that overrides the impact of ideology upon a unit and Hew Strachan (1997, p.371) felt that, ultimately, soldiers will fight for their friends, not for countries or ideologies. Nevertheless, cohesion can also be an equaliser if the feeling for their groups ideology is negative, as their loyalty to their comrades means that their combat motivation will often not be dulled as much if they disagree with the meaning and nature of the conflict itself (Stouffer et al, 1949, p.135). A caveat to this point though must be that ideology can still have a powerful impact, especially if it is an agreed one throughout the cohesive group. Whilst cohesion may be a positive factor in ideology if it helps spread the one the authority wishes for, it can just as easily be a rival, or otherwise countering idea, and could cause a large breakdown in discipline (Grossman, 2009, p.153).
In cases where ideology and discipline are not present though, cohesion will often be the factor that keeps combat motivation going by itself, more so than ideology or discipline would singularly, but this would be finite and would ultimately need their reestablishment to prevent complete collapse (Walendowski, 1988, p.107).
However, cohesion is not a fully positive force and its downsides must be stated as side effect to be prepared for. A prominent issue is the breakdown, and defeat, of a unit after sustaining around a fifty-percent casualty rate. Whilst breakdown from casualties may be found at any level of cohesion, its impact and timing will be more severe for a unit with Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 35
close bonds between each other (Grossman, 2009, p.149). The loss of close comrades can quickly stun a unit into paralysis, and result in them being overrun quickly as their motivation fades. Nonetheless, this is not true in all situations and in many cases, the loss of comrades can be the main catalyst in increasing the willingness of a soldier to kill, as they attempt to gain revenge for their fallen colleague (Hastings, 2011, p.230).
A final opinion on the effect of cohesion was from Omer Bartov (1994, p.95-96), who felt that within the conditions of the Eastern Front during the Second World War, the horror and casualty-rate was of such a level that cohesion could never have taken hold effectively. In a harsh environment, Bartov said that the factors of harsh discipline and fear of the enemy would be of a much greater use than any attempts to create something like cohesion, which would be destroyed so easily. Cohesion cannot be expected to take hold under all circumstances, and if this is to be the case in the current scenario then this must be identified in order to be prepared for.
Big-Men
Another side to the factor of cohesion is John Keegans (1997, p.8-10) theory that all units have a Big-Man who inspires and motivates the rest of those within it. These Big Men are the figures on the battlefield who have a natural influence over those alongside them, the ones who may enjoy being there and create a level of courage for the rest to aim for. The effect of role models within a unit and impact this has on combat motivation must be noted, as the groups courage may often rely on such individuals (Marshall, 1947/2000, p.61).
Ultimately, no commander can lead a company themselves and the issues that can permeate command at this level in terms of organisation, mean that one person cannot lead that company forward alone (Marshall, 1947/2000, p.62). Natural leaders will commonly supplant the nominated leadership at the lower levels, allowing the company as a whole to continue (Lambert, 1995, p.73) and through the example that they set to the rest of the Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 36
squad (de Lee, 1997, p.366). One soldier boldly and vocally moving forward will often be sufficient to force the rest to follow, improving momentum across the line (Marshall, 1947/2000, p.130).
Ideology
Overview
Ideology is the commitment to and acceptance of the ideals and goals of the nation, authority or group that the soldier is fighting for, or the ideals of that individual and their society (Walendowski, 1988, p.52). Terry Eagleton (2007, p.1-2) describes an ideology as being a mental phenomenon able to legitimise the ideas of a dominant political power, false or not. Such a far-reaching factor as ideology may have a great impact of the conduct of soldiers on the battlefield, and may be seen in various extremes in the actions of many armies in history.
The influence that ideology has upon a solider must in most cases be imbrued in them before they reach the battlefield, often being a major force bringing them there in the first place (Walendowski, 1988, p.108). Ideology has far less influence when the actual fighting begins, instead acting as a motivational force when the soldier is low on the other psychological factors (Dollard, 1944, p.56).
The link with the ideology of the force the soldier is fighting for is not always a positive one with negative opinions potentially existing instead, especially for conscripts. Often a mixed ideological picture may emerge in which a soldier may wish to fight for their country, but disagree with the political goals of those in charge (Walendowski, 1988, p.110). It must be understood though that ideology is a factor that affects personnel differently between various groups, as often many influences are specific to national character or history of the military and those they fight for (Walendowski, 1988, p.56).
General Effects
Whilst the effects of the ideological factors are specific to the beliefs themselves, some basic reactions may be noted if it is positively influencing those in battle. Often forces that are willing to risk all for their cause will be able to overcome inferior match-ups of equipment, resist the moral effect of a temporary defeat, and stave off the impact of fear upon them (Dollard, 1944, p.56).
Ideology can also be seen as an important part of the influences that underscore combat motivation, as if troops believe in the causes for which they are risking life and limb for then their motivation to do so will often be furthered (Marshall, 1947/2000, p.162 & 165). Similarly, if the ideas for which the troops are fighting run counter to their own, then their willingness to make these same sacrifices may be diminished. However, measures may be taken, such as isolating troops with a negative view from the rest of the army by keeping them mostly in reserve and as a result stopping alternative views from spreading (Walendowski, 1988, p.108 & 116).
Cohesion will also be affected by the view of ideology within the ranks, as a positive view may bring about a creation of these bonds must quicker, as those within the unit fight together with a common outlook (Heywood, 2003, p.4). Equally though if the unit is ideologically lacking then a strong level of cohesion can overcome many of the negative effects that may have resulted from their own views (Walendowski, 1988, p.108).
However, if an ideological spirit does not exist in the troops fighting within an army, then whilst they may be competent soldiers under regular circumstances, their combat motivation may come to a grinding halt when circumstances turn difficult. General Sir William Platt of the British Army during the Second World War reported the difficulties in using colonial troops, who were recruited through inducement rather than loyalty, and experienced sharp levels of desertion, surrender and ignoring of orders when the war in Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 39
Burma turned against the British. Platts soldiers simply did not have the will to risk their lives for a cause that they did not believe in (Hastings, 2011, p.410-411).
Types
State
State-based ideology is the acceptance or commitment to the official institutions of the nation or group a soldier is fighting for, as well as their beliefs and political systems. The ideology of the state may be a single organisations or a national system of government, such as democracy, and can often include the leaders of these organisations or the aims of the war itself (Walendowski, 1988, p.52-53). Often the variation between different nations and groups on the issue of ideology can be a defining factor in the way those soldiers will conduct themselves in battle (Holmes, 1994, p.220-221).
This influence of state ideology has been a major part of war in the twentieth and twentyfirst centuries. Many conflicts, as well as the motivations of those who took part, can be traced back to the influence coming from the ideology preached by those in a position of authority over the military that fight for them (Strachan, 1997, p.377), whether government or militia. This use of state ideology can be seen both in the use of nationalism as justifications for expansionist policies by the Axis powers during the Second World War or the call to defend American values and way of life by the United States government during both the Cold War as well as the War on Terror (Heywood, 2003, p.100 & 157).
Those who will be most affected by state ideology though will often be those with a strong predisposed loyalty to the authority in question and the political culture that this authority rules under (Walendowski, 1988, p.56). Nevertheless, if a soldier or unit is negatively disposed to the regime they serve, there may be great potential for combat motivation to Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 40
be destabilised by these thoughts (Walendowski, 1988, p.53) and also works the other way around, in terms of the authorities, or civilians, support for the conflict being fought. If a solider feels they are not supported by those who they are fighting for then their motivation may be severely affected (Walendowski, 1988, p.65). Ultimately, many soldiers are positively motivated by knowing that the nation, or group, they are fighting for, validate the sacrifice that they are making and this may will them to continue fighting for those they perceive themselves to be doing so for (Strachan, 1997, p.376).
A common method of creating a positive view of state ideology has been through the Political Officer, whose role is to imbrue the values of the official ideology upon those within the ranks, preaching the thoughts that the authority wishes them to follow. However, the idea of indoctrination is frequently a process that only works on those who are already partially inspired by these values. Many Polish soldiers during the Communist era have since spoke of their dislike for the regime and how the efforts to convince them otherwise by these political officers would fall on deaf ears, the only ones reacting positively being the officers, whose motivation was simply that it was required for stable career advancement (Walendowski, 1988, p.61-64).
However, a caveat may be made is that whilst a negative view of the national ideology may impact upon combat motivation, other issues, such as foreign invasion, can override these feelings quickly, such as when the Soviet Union was attacked by Germany in the Second World War. Whilst the Soviet Union was divided by views of the regime before the conflict, the impact of being invaded quickly spurned the population and the military around Stalin in the face of a common enemy (Walendowski, 1988, p.109).
The nature of the national ideology of an army can have great effects on what soldiers in the field can be ordered to achieve and the chances of them those troops actually doing so. An interesting comparison to make is the difference in how easily soldiers from authoritarian and democratic backgrounds will lay down their lives (Hastings, 2011. p.61). An example of Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 41
the ideological differences in self-sacrifice can be seen in Churchills orders to General Wavell in the last days of the Fall of Singapore in 1942, demanding that,
There must at this stage be no thought of saving the troops or sparing the population. The battle must be fought to the bitter end at all costs () Commanders and senior officers should die with their troops. The honour of the British Empire and of the British Army is at stake. I rely on you to show no weakness or mercy in any form.
Churchills reasons for ordering such self-sacrificial actions in Singapore were based on the similar will to do so from the Russian, German and Japanese troops, all under ideologically authoritarian regimes. However such martyrdom was beyond the limits of what a soldier from a liberal democratic background would be willing to act on and the orders were ignored (Hastings, 2011, p.212).
Emotional Distance
The other side to the issues of Physical Distance, that being Emotional Distance, consists of the factors that come from the soldiers view of their opponent and is another method in which a foe will be distanced from the soldier, as well as being the fuel that allows ideology to influence them, whether personal or official (Grossman, 2009, p.158).
Social Distance
Social Distance is invoked when matters of class are seen as being what divides the soldier from their opponent or is the basis of the cause being fought for (Grossman, 2009, p.160). Before the Napoleonic-era, social distance was a large influence, as serfs fought other serfs and found it harder to kill their opposite, with instead the majority of the killing being Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 42
conducted by the landed noblemen, who had no issues striking down those they saw simply as lowly peasants (Grossman, 2009, p.169).
However, a more recent example of social distance may be found in the ideology of classwarfare that was seen by some to be a driving force behind the ideology of those who agreed with the regime of the Soviet Union during the Second World War within the Red Army (Nollendorfs et al, 2005, p.7). In his memoirs, Hans von Luck (1989, p.5) stated how he saw social distance first hand during his hearing to be released from Soviet imprisonment after the Second World War ended. Von Luck quoted the Colonel heading the parole hearing talking of how, Everyone with von is a big capitalist and a Nazi and how he would hate to let one of these vons get away, von being in German naming conventions a marker of the aristocracy.
Moral Distance
The distance caused by morality is one where a cause is legitimised by the demonisation an opponent, as justification for that soldiers own actions (Seliger, 1976, p.14). The enemys leader is made out to a be a criminal and everyone who follows them is either just as guilty or a misguided fool (Grossman, 2009, p.164-165). It has been said that the first aim for any nation or group at war should be to earn moral superiority, as a way of establishing a context where their soldiers will not be afraid to kill their opponent.
The impact of moral distances thus has a strong link with the willingness to kill, as if this distance has not been developed then the act of eliminating an enemy may seem like murder instead (Grossman, 2009, p.195). Demonising a sides cause is also critical to the fighting of a civil war, where soldiers on each side will find themselves fighting those they have little emotional distance between and as such the moral distance is often required to sustain motivation (Grossman, 2009, p.166).
A common circumstance for the creation of moral distance in the eyes of a soldier, is when they are fighting to protect their homeland from an invader (Walendowski, 1988, p.52). Hew Strachan (1997, p.376) felt that defending again an invader would always be a far more powerful method for ideology to affect troops than any state-based calls to a fight for a cause. However, state ideology is still an important factor in this area and can be seen in part that the language used by the Germans during the Second World War when referring to the Soviets. The Nazi government often demonised the Soviet regime as Bolshevik criminals and linked this with their other terms of cultural distance, as a way of indoctrinating those fighting on the Eastern Front and easing them of the methods being used (Frster, 1997, p.270-272). German troops often needed this reassurance to the legitimacy of their actions and when these troops were ordered to fight against Soviet partisans in the occupied territories, it was known as a Criminal Order to be carried out in the Lawless Territories, as a way of adding moral legitimacy to what they carrying out (Schulte, 1997, p.278).
Another important side to moral distance between soldiers ideologically is that of religion. The ability for religious differences to create a sentiment of good versus evil has been seen throughout history, as each side sees themselves as the enlightened and the others as those who are subverting Gods message. The ability for such a fundamentalist conflict as a religious war to become bloody is prominent, with even suicidal motivation to the cause being fought for being seen in many conflicts like this (Heywood, 2003, p.302-303).
Ultimately, though the creation of moral distance can often be a personal experience, rather than anything created by a higher ideology, as one Second World War Soviet soldier demonstrates in a letter to his wife,
I received the letter telling me that your brother Aleksandr was killed on 4 May (). My heart has become like stone, my thoughts and feelings reject pity; hatred towards the enemy burns in my heart. When I look through my sights, firing point-blank at these beasts on two legs, and see their split skulls and mutilated bodies, I feel a great joy and laugh like a child in the knowledge they will not come back to life (Hastings, 2011, p.385).
Another experience that can lead to personal moral distance is that of seeing atrocities by enemy forces, creating a similar feeling of good and evil between the soldier and their opponent, whomever they may be (Pennington, 1997, p.259-260). It is the fact that these personal experiences can often lead to the creation of moral distance, however, which results in a sense of unpredictability in the ideology of the soldiers on the ground.
Cultural Distance
The final method in which emotional distance may be developed is through cultural issues, and can include any of the racial, ethnic and nationalistic differences that have often been invoked to dehumanise or otherwise degrade a foe. Quite often it can be easy to inspire someone to kill an opponent if they are different from themselves, especially if this because of the way they look (Grossman, 2009, p.160-161). One of the biggest impacts of nationalism, as a them and us mentally that may be easily created, regardless of the moral justifications of each sides actions (Heywood, 2003, p.172-173).
One of the most infamous uses of cultural distance in ideology was the racial and nationalistic tone used by the Nazis during the Second World War, which helped to justify the actions being taken to the soldiers of the Wehrmacht (Glantz et al, 1995, p.105). As well as using the term, Bolshevik to demonise the Soviet regime, it was often joined with racial issues, being commonly referred to as Jewish-Bolshevism. Such joining of two facets of Nazi ideology helped to create a joint assurance to the troops of the need for conflict
against the Soviet Union, and that any attacks they took were justified (Frster, 1997, p.270272).
The effects of demonising an opponent culturally can result in a greatly increased level of violence from the soldiers, as this acts as a motivation for them to kill those of the opposing side (Shalit, 1988, p.68). Cultural distances can have an especially large impact on the willingness to kill if the differences are racial, as the one side may start to view the others as animals, as occurred between the Western Allies, the Japanese and the Chinese during the Second World War (Hastings, 2011, p.264). However, cultural distance may not always be a permanent factor, especially in close combat where if near each other for a period of time, this cultural gap may close between the two sides as they begin to recognise each others humanity (Grossman, 2009, p.158).
Often the result of an increased willingness to kill an enemy and an overall widening of cultural differences is a scenario where quarter cannot be expected from an opponent in the case of surrender. The feeling, justified or not, that surrender would be worse than dying and can persuade some soldiers to fight to death if they have this expectation of an enemy. German and Soviet soldiers became unwilling to surrender often because of the conditions each side held their prisoners of war in (Glantz et al, 1995, p.105).
However, if quarter can be expected from an opponent then the results can quite the opposite. S.L.A. Marshall (1947/2000, p.161) felt that the expectation of quarter usually gave a soldier a reason to accept surrender rather than fight, often meaning that some soldiers would surrender at the first occurrence of difficulty. British commanders during the North African conflict because worried about the ease at which their soldiers would surrender in what was known as War Without Hate, due to the civilised view they had of hostilities in comparison to the expectations of their German foe (Hastings, 2011, p.131).
Issues of cultural distance will not only apply to opposing sides, alliances often have to break through his friction as well if historical differences exist between them (Walendowski, 1988, p.68). Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein (1955, p.535) described the problems the Axis had with their Rumanian and Hungarian allies, who had significant historical grievances with each other, and were in fact were keeping back reserves in case they had to fight each other. The end result of their mistrust between each other was that both Rumanian and Hungarian armies were swiftly crushed when the war turned on the Axis, as the cooperation was not there to join forces against a common foe (Walendowski, 1988, p.68).
Discipline
Overview
The factor of discipline refers to any methods of coercion employed to make sure soldiers will follow their orders when placed within a combat situation and this may be achieved through appealing to three broad types of discipline. The first type, Internal discipline, consists of any aspects concerning the soldiers personal will to fight and obey orders, through any allegiance or empathy they have with those giving them their orders. The second type of discipline, Inducement, uses a carrot and stick model through which the offering of a physical or psychological reward is utilised as a motivation for following orders. The third type, External discipline, is that which comes from obedience being driven into soldiers through the threats of punishment from their superiors or some form of deprivation (Walendowski, 1988, p.72-75).
Discipline is a factor that will apply just as aptly to personnel of the enlisted ranks, NCOs and junior or senior officers, making it is a vital part of an armys combat motivation. A unit with good levels of discipline may have a greater ability to overcome the factor of fear, due to the order and obedience well-developed disciplinary systems can infuse upon them, preparing these soldiers for the realities of war (Walendowski, 1988, p.72 & 88). American general George S. Patton Jr. (1947/1995, p.336) felt discipline was vital as All human beings have an innate resistance to obedience. Discipline removes this resistance and, by constant repetition, makes obedience habitual and subconscious.
A unit without a high level of discipline within the ranks will find that their combat motivation will be much more dulled than would a unit with good levels (Hastings, 2011, p.318). Often found in cases of low discipline are troops that act lethargically, repeatedly query orders, or flat-out ignore them, and others that simply desert. In extreme cases, a low
level of discipline can lead to violence or mutiny against superior officers (Walendowski, 1988, p.77).
A good example of how a bad disciplinary structure can affect a military organisation may be seen during Operation Barbarossa, Hitlers invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. At the start of Barbarossa, the forces of the Red Army, buffeted after being caught by surprise and through purges of their officer corps, were considered to be without any strong sense of discipline. The lack of discipline within the ranks of the Soviet Army was seen to be a key reason for the initial poor performance against the Wehrmacht, resulting in many reforms to heighten discipline for the rest of the war (Werth, 1964, p.619).
In relation to other factors of combat motivation, discipline can quite often be called upon to shore up a units willingness to fight when the factors of cohesion and ideology are bereft. Through the use of coercion a combat unit may be forced into an obedient position, though harder this may now be, and made easier if cohesion is present due to the fear of being outcast from the main group (Walendowski, 1988, p.73 & 108). However on the other hand if cohesion and ideology are highly charged in the unit, but discipline is found to be slack, then whilst this unit may certainly have the willpower to fight, disobedience will eventually take hold and can be critically felt against a foe, who obtains this same determination as well as professional discipline (Walendowski, 1988, p.109).
Internal
The Internal method of discipline relies upon the innate self-discipline of the soldiers themselves, born from the respect or loyalty they have to the superiors who issue their orders to them. It is seen as the most ideal of the three styles of discipline, as troops imbued for internal reasons may be trusted to perform their duties voluntarily, without the need for any of the methods that come from the second form of discipline, inducement Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 49
(Walendowski, 1988, p.72 & 75). British Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery felt that internal discipline was especially important, as he held that self-discipline is the basis of any collective discipline within a unit (Kellett, 1982, p.92).
There is a strong link with cohesion, as a unit formed upon internal discipline will often have a higher degree of mutual trust for their colleagues and superiors. As such internal methods of discipline can be said to be necessary for good cohesion to form, being a result of the self-discipline that forms when a soldiers main motivation comes from not wanting to let their comrades down in battle (Walendowski, 1988, p.72 & 86). Ideology also overlaps heavily into internal discipline as well, owing to the simple fact that troops who recognise the legitimacy of their superiors and the institution whose power they represent will be more likely to follow the wills that this authority places upon them, whether this be the strategic objectives of the campaign or the establishment itself (Hauser, 1973, p.111).
Inducement
The second method of discipline, Inducement, is the method of using physical or psychological incentives as a reward or enticement in order to ensure personnel follow their commands, also known as the carrot and stick approach. Inducement is the most commonly adopted technique utilised by military authorities to achieve their own needed disciplinary level, and can be a successful substitute when the unit in question does not have the required level of self-discipline to be able to rely on Internal methods (Walendowski, 1988, p.75).
John Keegan (1997, p.6) felt that self-interest closely follows behind self-preservation as being the strongest of human impulses and as such may be exploited by military authorities as a way of creating order in the ranks. The use of incentive by the military for disciplinary purposes can be seen in the ways in which medals are distributed for good performance, either in battle or training for the enlisted ranks, and the uniforms, awards and decorations Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 50
given to officers (Grossman, 2009, p.63 & 177). The use of inducement may be noted often in states where the officers may not agree with the government ideology, but will still follow the regimes orders for the benefits to their career this gives. The benefits to their career advancement were a common factor in the motivation of officers in many Warsaw Pact states during the Cold War (Walendowski, 1988, p.72). The use of inducement as a methodology also works both ways, as disobedience will result in the removal of these privileges, such as pay, and works alongside the positive reward (Walendowski, 1988, p.7576).
Also encapsulated within incentive-based discipline are the trappings of honour and renown that may be lavished upon soldiers who make great accomplishments in battle, which this factor uses as a motivation. Clausewitz (1832/1993, p.121) felt that Of all the passions that inspire man in battle, none, we have to admit, is so powerful and so constant as the longing for honour and renown. John Keegan (1997, p.10-11) disagrees however with the motivation of honour, stating that he feels the need for honour goes against the basis of what combat motivation is. Whilst an individual may be enticed to act because of the will for honour, the group will not be motivated their comrades personal aims. Keegan instead felt that the use honour as an incentive is therefore simply an influence on the proceedings of combat, but not a motivation.
Finally there are the factors used as an enticement to make sure soldiers follow orders, a prominent one of these is Narcosis, which involves the use of drugs or drink to remove the feelings of fear and trepidation that dog many soldiers in combat. Drink has been a common way of eliminating anxiety for centuries, from barrels of rum being delivered to the troops at Waterloo, to crew members of RAF Bomber Command using drink to anaesthetise themselves against the reality of the situation. However, the use of narcosis is not without fault and the effects that such products have on combat performance must be remembered, along with issues caused to discipline if addition occurs (Keegan, 1997, p.5).
External
External discipline is the use of punishment, or the threat of punishment, either physical or mental, as a means to keeping a culture of obedience within the ranks. The use of fear to force compliance is more often seen in an army operating for an authoritarian government, as it can hard to implement other kinds of discipline if the regime is unpopular (Walendowski, 1988, p.76 & 88). The external method often works prominently with the factor of fear, but instead turns the direction that this is coming from towards the superiors of the troops, turning them into figures of terror (Hastings, 2011, p.179).
Such terror-based disciplinary methods were common in the Imperial Japanese Army before and during the Second World War, and were seen as the only way of controlling an army that under the nations expansionist policies had grown five times as large between 1900 and 1937. Japanese soldiers were beaten regularly by their officers for even minor offences and one regular at time said that I felt that Id missed out on something if by night-time I hadnt been beaten up at least once (Rees, 2001, p.26-27). The fear that the Japanese High command was aiming to create from this was also one that created a feeling of disgrace. A Japanese soldier was first made to feel they had disgraced their family, adding to the physical punishment with a mental one by using moral coercion (Keegan, 1997, p.8), and secondly tying in with ideology, as this disgrace was also against the Emperor himself (Rees,2001, p.29-30).
Also before and during the Second World War, the German Wehrmacht moved towards a focus on external discipline, Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein (1955, p.222), for example feeling that harsh punishment would preserve order whilst under heavy fire. Omer Bartov (1994, p.95-96) agreed with von Manstein, feeling that aspects such as cohesion could not survive on the Eastern Front, instead only the fear of repressive discipline and the enemy could do so. One method used being to coerce soldiers into following any order was to tell them that the Gestapo held accurate records on any deserters and their families Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 52
(Walendowski, 1988, p.76). However, one of the strictest methods known from the Second World War was that used by the Soviet Union, where Border Troops were used to man machine guns behind their own front-line. If any Soviet soldier was seen to be retreating they were shot instantly, creating a scenario where even times when survival was slim in attack, it was still better than retreat (Glantz et al, 1995, p.121).
However, in previous centuries the External method of discipline was far more common, especially in the mercenary armies that dominated Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries until the French Revolution (Strachan, 1997, p.375). Without the factors of ideology and cohesion available to them, commanders of the time suffered constantly from desertion and it thought only the strictest rule would alleviate this (Palmer, 1986. P.93-98). Clausewitz (1832/1993, p.222) however felt that whilst harsh discipline would certainly preserve the spirit of the soldiers, it could never improve it and should not be overrated as a result.
Nevertheless, there are issues with such a harsh disciplinary system, chiefly that it stifles any initiative by the lower ranks, and as such the US military feels that by using such a system a military will become inflexible, creating a culture of complying to any order, even those which are wrong (Walendowski, 1988, p.74 & 85). There is also a strong link with cohesion, as the effect of external discipline is that it very quickly creates a feeling of negativity within the ranks when regarding their own unit, and as a result this strict regime may in fact be eroding any cohesion present. When soldiers are held under a feeling of fear, trust and affinity become near impossible to create and is one of the downsides to utilising a stricter form of discipline (Walendowski, 1988, p.47 & 86).
Experience and Exhaustion
Green and veteran status establishes the difference between how long troops have been deployed at the sharp end of combat, each of these states comes with their own benefits, and limitations, beyond the increase in ability that comes through experience (Marshall, 1947/2000, p.124).
Green units are those soldiers that enter combat with little to no combat experience and come in two different varieties, those mostly dominated by anxiety and those by naivety (Ellis, 1993, p.99-100). Those soldiers dominated by anxiety will be subject to many of the outputs caused by the factor of fear, and their level of experience can often have a fundamental effect on how severe this is.
A survey by Israeli military psychologist Ben Shalit (1988, p.11) on Swedish peacekeepers with no combat experience found that their biggest fear in battle was the anxiety caused from potentially being killed or injured. One American soldier during the Second World War described anxious green troops as having to be prised loose from a pole to which he had grabbed on. He is too scared to even whimper (Ellis, 1993, p.101) and this effect is only amplified if this type of soldier is placed into an environment in which he is also unacquainted to. British troops in Burma during the Second World War found that the unfamiliar surroundings of the jungle added to overall fear caused by Japanese themselves (Ellis, 1993, p.96).
Soldiers that enter combat with a nave view of combat however, will be those enticed by the myth of what their experience of combat and the battlefield will be, focusing on the curiosity of what is waiting for them and the excitement they have for it (Lambert, 1995, p.75). Many soldiers enter battle feeling that the spectre of injury and death as something unable to conceive of (Ellis, 1993, p.99-100). Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 54
A popular example of a feeling of nativity on a mass scale was in conscripted men during the First World War, where the fascination caused by the views of war of the day shaped this view in the men who went off to fight, especially in the first years of the conflict. However, those who enter combat with a nave view will often also find themselves quickly turning to one of anxiety, once they actually enter combat, experience first-hand the reality of the situation and learn that they can just as easily be killed as anyone else among them (Ellis, 1993, p.99-100).
However, one factor that green soldiers have or their advantage, once they overcome their initial thoughts, is their overall freshness. Troops new to the fight are often said to be greater affected by the factors of combat motivation and are seen to have a superior lan for being placed on the sharp end (Buckley, 2006, p.204). Because of their freshness, soldiers on the front-line are said to be at maximum efficiency after ten to thirty from entering, due to having fallen into a pattern of combat, and find themselves less distressed by the truths of combat, but without the issues that affect veteran troops (Frisbee, 2010).
The other side to this are the veterans of combat who have a greater degree of combat experience and know what to expect from the situations ahead, which despite their experience, combat will never fully become routine (Ellis, 1993, p.100-101). The view of a battle-hardened veteran, who has become accustomed to combat and unfazed their surroundings, is a rare figure on the battlefield (Strachan, 1997, p.372). In reality, the more time a soldier spends on the front-line the more the stresses of combat will start to get to them, and this is where exhaustion will start to play a role.
The longer a soldier is in combat, more they will tap into their previously mentioned Well of Fortitude that governs the onset of fear (Grossman, 2009, p.82) and will eventually be found in entire squads, who end up becoming an aggregate of this well. Eventually a unit that has been in combat too long will become just a squad of exhausted soldiers, whose Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 55
earlier will has been drained to nothing (Grossman, 2009, p.84). The fact that this exhaustion happens to those meant to be the most used to the realities of war has led to the term of over-experience (Buckley, 2006, p.204), leading to a system of balancing between these units of greater experience and knowledge, and those with less of these but with far more energy and will for the fight.
A prominent example of this effect of exhaustion in combat was during Operation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy by Allied forces between 6th June and 25th August 1944. During Overlord, British Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery was in favour of the deployment of tried and tested veteran divisions, who had fought with him in North Africa at the sharp-end of operations, rather than the green troops without this experience (Grossman, 2009, p.85). However, the experienced troops performed poorly in comparison to the newer divisions in Normandy, and this is commonly put down to their over-experience. XXX Corps commander Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks felt that the under-performance of the experienced British divisions came about as the soldiers within them began to feel it is time that they had a rest and someone else did some fighting (Buckley, 2006, p.204).
4. Analysing the Factors of Psychology: The External Factors
Technology
Effects of Technology on the User
Mechanical Distance
Mechanical Distance is the other half to the factor of Physical Distance, and constitutes the introduction of any form of buffer placed between the soldier and realty, distorting or removing the psychological issues that come from the traditional standard of distance (Grossman, 2009, p.160 & p.169). Technology has allowed two further points to be added to Grossmans list of distances, Maximum-Range and Long-Range.
Maximum-Range
Maximum-Range is a situation where the soldier would be unable to see their opponent without the use of technological devices, such as radars, periscopes, binoculars or through a TV monitor, and will also include those who cannot see at all (Grossman, 2009, p.107). The main personal who may enter battle through maximum-range, are those of Airborne Bomber Crews, Modern Artillerymen, Modern Fighter Pilots and Modern Naval personnel, who today only kill in most scenarios through the distance that their weaponry affords them (Grossman, 2009, p.58). Soldiers at the maximum level of distance can effectively deny that they are killing anybody and as any of the inhibitors of physical distance are removed, allowing for a much higher willingness to kill (Grossman, 2009, p.78 & 97).
Those in the service of Bomber Crews are the ones who are most often associated with maximum-range. Bomber crews may be able to kill thousands of civilians through their actions. Whilst bomber-crews intellectually understanding what they are doing, emotionally
they will usually feel nothing, at least at first, and easily push the button or pull the trigger that unleashes the munitions (Grossman, 2009, p.101-102).
A good example of the ease in killing from bomber-crews, was the bombing campaigns conducted during the Second World War. One of the heaviest uses of bomber-crews seen was during Operation Gomorrah, the bombing and destruction of the German city of Hamburg by the RAF and USAAF of the Eighth Army. During the bombing of Hamburg seventy-thousand civilians were killed by the munitions released by the crews of these bombers, however this was only due to the mechanical block of distance between them and those on the ground, the fact that they could not see those individuals they were killing allowed them to do it (Grossman, 2009, p.78).
Image 4.1: Aftermath of the Bombing of Hamburg
Had those who bombed Hamburg been at a closer, physical, distance then it could never have happened, the block would have been there in the form of now being able to see those individuals they are killing, their reactions and all the human effects of this (Grossman, 2009, p.100-102). An interesting caveat in how these bomber crews may view the situation differently can also be seen in public opinion.
As the Allied bombing raids happened most could not imagine themselves doing any differently, however, had the same happened at close range, the result would have been dismay and demonization of those who perpetrated it (Grossman, 2009, p.104-105). Maximum-range also applies to artilleryman, who also cannot see their victim when they pull the trigger, and is part of the reason that the majority of battlefield casualties come from the effects of artillery and mortar-fire (Marshall, 1947/2000, p.73).
Before the twentieth century, naval combat was a similar affair to those on land of the time, in terms of the level of close-range combat, and had the same issues found by those whose ability to kill is hampered by distance. However, the changes in naval warfare during the First and Second World Wars changed distance to an issue where instead of shooting at or stabbing individual sailors of the other ship, they were firing at the ships themselves or the airplanes supporting them, adding the needed mechanical distance between the two sides (Grossman, 2009, p.57-58). The lack of direct contact in modern naval warfare again removes the emotional feeling of killing actual people, allowing those on board to simply focus on killing the ship itself. The only feel of regret or humanisation for a modern sailor will be if they see the men from the sunken ship adrift in the water, long after any decision to fire has been made (Bowes, 2011).
Fighter pilots have also taken a very similar path to sailors in how distance has lengthened over time. Prior to the introduction of the jet aircraft, the speed of most planes made air combat a much more personnel affair as pilots could easily see their opponent, resulting in statistics such as in the Second World War, where only one percent of pilots were responsible for thirty to forty percent of all enemy aircraft shot down (Grossman, 2009, p.31). Again, the inhibitors for pilots caused by physical distance were overcome by mechanical distance when the jet-plane removed any humanisation from the equation, as enemy pilots were reduced from human faces to blips on the radar (Grossman, 2009, p.58).
Long-Range
Long-Range is the mechanical distance where a soldier may be now able to see their opponent, but cannot execute the kill without the use of technological apparatus such as a snipers scope, anti-armour missiles, or the fire delivered by tank crews. The snipers scope also allows for a significant addition to distance, as the scope itself removes a small part of the barrier to the act of pulling the trigger on a gun that physical distance creates. This type of distance is the most common way in which technology can help the willingness to kill in close combat, allowing for commanders who utilise these weapons to increase their firing rate easily (Grossman, 2009, p.108-109).
The Placebo Effect
One important effect on morale can be that of a placebo, a piece of equipment or protection that, whilst not making any real physical difference, creates an extra feeling of security. Whilst a placebo may not make any difference materially, they have the potential to make a real difference to the feelings of fear and courage in a soldier. The placebo effect can be seen in soldiers serving in any service or combat arm and will have an effect in situations where they are present or are not. The thoughts of Private Bagnall during an artillery attack are good example of the effect of such a small placebo as a backpack, thinking that,
I wish to God we had packs on, I thought, I wish to God we had packs on not because theyre any use but it feels better (Ellis, 1993, p.69).
Armoured units have often relied heavily on the use of placebos, or applique armour to fortify the morale of their crews on the battlefield. During Operation Overlord British tank crews frequently felt that they were unprotected in comparison to their German Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 61
counterparts, a feeling not helped from the combustibility of the Sherman, and as a way of relieving these concerns, appliqu armour was fitted to the side of the hull. The actual physical effect of this extra armour was negligible, but the effect on morale and the fearlevel of crews was tremendous, and resulting in a greater inclination to enter combat (Buckley, 2006, p.187-189).
Sometime a tanks armour may be nothing more than a placebo effect to its crew overall. Legendary German tank commander from the Second World War, Oberleutnant Otto Carius (2003, p.3 & 8), described the pride he felt on receiving his Czech Panzer 38t and how he was enthusiastic about the armour protection it gave him and his crew. However, Carius view of his 38t was quickly turned into hatred after it was easily taken out by a Russian ATGun, an incident in which he felt the tanks armour did more damage to crew than the round and convinced him that the armour was simply there to serve as moral protection which would only stop small-arms fire.
Image 4.2: Applique Armour welded onto an M4 Sherman
Effects of Technology on the Receiver
Noise
Of all the factors that technology can influence on the psychological side of war, noise has been shown to be one of the most potent. The sound emitted by a weapon will often infuse a greater sense of fear in an opponent than its actual effectiveness may suggest. Dave Grossman (2009, p.9) suggests that the level of noise was largely the reasoning behind the procurement of gunpowder weapons. Whilst the longbow still had a greater killing efficiency over early muskets, the comparative noise-levels meant that the musket would always elect the factor of fear in the opponent far more frequently, directing a greater psychological effect.
Today however the prime noise-producers on the battlefield have moved to shell-throwing and bombing weapons, bringing with this the title of being main creators of technological fear in combat personnel. Surveys taken by Allied forces during the Second World War proved that the lethality of weapons is not connected to the actual fear infused in the soldiers who faced them.
Whilst Machine-Guns were the most efficient killer on the battlefield, with a 50% fatality rate from hits, soldiers asked in one survey only said they were the weapon they feared most 4.1% of the time. In comparison, whilst artillery only had a 20% rate of efficiency, a staggering 92% of troops feared this weapon more than any other. The result is that noise is often more potent in developing fear than the weapons effectiveness was further backed up by other studies. In another survey, shell-throwing or dive-bombing weapons were listed as the most disliked weapon 83% of the time, matched by 17% for small-arms. Finally, a further study returned a figure of 98% feeling anxiety for the noisier weapons, broken down to 42% for dive-bombers, 35% for artillery and 11% for high-level bombing (Ellis, 1993, p.89-90).
Whilst the figures may slightly vary per survey, a dominant pattern can still be seen in which the loudest weapons created a larger factor of fear than others did. Many soldiers talk of the psychological effect of some of these noiser weapons, such as the Nebelwerfer a multiple-barrelled mortar, whose firing created a distinctive wailing sound that had an effect on soldiers past the actual point of impact (Ellis, 1993, p.88). Another famous example of a noise-producer were the German Stuka dive-bombers during the Second World War, whose distinct wailing sound had the effect of inciting fear, even if the soldier in question was not physically effected (Lambert, 1995, p.21-22).
Image 4.3: The Nebelwerfer
Reputation
The equipment used by an army, if it stands out enough, can have an immense psychological effect on its enemy when they enter combat on the battlefield, whether these are a certain type of unit or specific models. A good example of the mental effect a single design can have on combat is the Panzerkampfwagen VI Tiger, commonly known simply as the Tiger Tank. During the Second World War, the Tiger individually was one of the best weapons available to the Wehrmacht, with its all-round thick armour which stopped the tactic of hitting its weaker flank or rear armour for an easier kill (Hughes, 2007). Furthermore, the 88mm gun the Tiger carried was not only more powerful than the 75mm Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 64
guns of the American and British M4 Sherman tanks (wwiivehicles) or 76mm of the Soviet T34 tank (wwiivehicles), but with an effective range of 1,200m the Tiger would score a kill before either of these were in range of it (Fprado, 2006).
Image 4.4: Panzerkampfwagen VI Tiger
All its individual stats amounted to fantastic individual performances from Tiger crews and, with huge amount of Allied tanks being destroyed by the Tigers, a reputation of invincibility started to cloud these units, resulting in what some have come to call Tiger-phobia (Buckley, 2006, p.179). Allied tanks started to turn back on reports that Tigers had been spotted in the sector, because of this reputation and instructions that to kill a Tiger five M4 Shermans were needed to surround it, with only one expected to survive. The psychological effect of Tigers resulted in British Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery banning any positive reports of the Tigers performance against his troops in any post-battle report (Buckley, 2006, p.190).
Whilst the Tiger had incredible advantages over what the Allies could place against them, in no way were they without disadvantages. The sheer weight of the tank gave the Tiger a very low driving speed of 28mph, which was only magnified during the fighting retreats the Wehrmacht were conducting for the most part of 1943-45, adding to this was a fuel consumption that made mobility a huge issue as the war turned against Germany. The main Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 65
disadvantage of the Tiger though was just simply the fact that the complexity of its design meant that only 1,346 were produced, in comparison to the Allied M4 Sherman of which had 49,234 built. In fact Allied tank crews were far more likely to be fighting Panzer-IVs or StuGs, in which they were mostly superior to during the Normandy campaign, than the Tigers that caused the anxiety (Buckley, 2006, p.188-190).
The fact that the Tiger had a five to one kills to losses ratio meant nothing in the face of the overwhelming manufacturing numbers of Allied armour, and in reality allowed the Tiger only ever hold a tactical superiority, rather than any operational or strategic benefits (Fprado, 2006). However, the Tigers effect on Allied morale far outstripped their production numbers. The Tiger Tank is therefore a good example of how the psychological impact of equipment can be far larger than the material results.
Impact of the Commander
Leadership can have a vital influence on the mental factors that affect frontline combat troops, whether this is at NCO, officer or general-rank levels, and can have either a positive or negative impact dependant on the skill of those in the chain of command. The relationship that is built between both officer and subordinate may often be a critical factor on the morale of an army (Craig, 1997, p.65).
Factors of Influence
Dave Grossman (2009, p.144-145) felt that there are four main factors that affect a commanders influence on their soldiers, upon which the ability for their authority to make an impact is based.
Proximity
Proximity relates to the effects drawn from the commanders actual presence amongst the troops that they are commanding and can have a drastic effect on whether the leaders will is sufficiently fulfilled. The impact of the commanders presence can be seen in how S. L. A. Marshall (1947/2000, p.58) noted that a low rate of fire by soldiers would rise in the presence of an officer, but drop again the moment they left. Ardant du Picq also found a link between the presence of a commander and raised firing rates when studying military officers. Du Picq mentioning an incident where two groups of soldiers met each other unexpectedly, but as they were without a definite leader, simply threw a few rocks at each other and withdrew, not fight as may have been expected (Grossman, 2009, p.143-144).
The presence of a senior commander at the front can also have good results on influencing the troops and one historical example renowned for his ability to lead from the front was Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 67
Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel (Battistelli, 2010, p.56). Rommel felt that through leading by example, particularly in emergencies, courage could be inspired in his men (Showalter, 2005, p.315). Rommel also felt that some when given orders would simply find reason to ignore them, concluding, People of this kind must be made to feel the authority of the commander and be shaken out of their apathy (Rommel & Liddell-Hart, 1953, p.226).
General George S. Patton Jr. was also a commander known for making good use of his presence and this method of restoring morale. In the wake of the worst of the German assaults during the Battle of the Bulge, Patton visited as much of the frontline as possible, making sure his men saw him and spread the word afterwards (Showalter, 2005, p.395-396). Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery was also an advocate of what he called personal command, and in the weeks leading up to The D-Day Landings made sure to visit every unit he could, talking to his men in an informal and friendly manner as a way of bolstering their motivation. Montgomery felt that it was necessary to use his presence to lift morale, due to the heavy fighting soon on the way in the Normandy campaign (Brighton, 2008, p.201-202).
Respect
Just as the cohesion between the enlisted soldiers of the unit must be generated and maintained, also known as the horizontal cohesion (Walendowski, 1988, p.35), so must the vertical cohesion of the bond between the group and their leader be established. Respect is one of the primary factors to the successful creation of vertical cohesion and an officer or NCO who has a relationship based upon this with their troops will find their command more readily received than one who does not, or has yet to earn it (Grossman, 2009, p.144) (Buckley, 2006, p.181).
Image 4.5: Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery
A superior-subordinate relationship must be developed for vertical cohesion to take hold and the need to face similar hardships to their soldiers is one part of this, the other side being to act as the champion of the group (Walendowski, 1988, p.35). Montgomerys previously mentioned visits to his troops before D-Day were described by General Sidney Kirkham of elevating the soldiers view of Montgomery to the level where He was a film star. Its like, in the Peninsular War, a glimpse of Wellington. And there they were looking at a film star (Brighton, 2008, p.201). The view of Patton from his men was similar, one officer writing Here was a man for whom you would go to hell and back (Brighton, 2008, p.252). Overall, the existence of this form of respect for their commander can have a fantastic effect on the general picture of morale (Buckley, 2006, p.181) and can be even more crucial if the impact of ideology is lacking in the unit (Walendowski, 1988, p.108).
However, the impact of respect can have negative implications on morale if those in charge lack any reverence from those they command (Craig, 1997, p.67). After the Axis forces where thrown out of North Africa during the Second World War, Rommel was quick to throw blame at the standard of his Italian allies, particularly those of their officer ranks (Showalter, 2005, p.237).
Rommel felt that the Italian officers failed to gain any respect from their men through their refusal to face the same conditions they did, stating, Whilst the men had to make shift Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 69
without field-kitchens, the officers, or many of them, refused adamantly to forgo their several course meals (Rommel & Liddell-Hart, 1953, p.262). One Polish soldier from the Cold War era stated that the respect for officers was at such a low level that in fact he was convinced that, if combat did break out, many NCOs and officers Would be shot of revenge by their subordinates, showing how dangerous this situation can become (Walendowski, 1988, p.44).
Intensity of Demands
Whilst the presence of an authority figure is one of the factors that aid the influence leadership on soldiers, this may not always be sufficient to elect the intended response and their expectancies may need to be communicated in a more forceful manner (Grossman, 2009, p.144-145). Many commanders may link intensity with the force of their presence, and an example can be seen by Rommel in a more extreme way in an incident when he threatening to shoot a platoon commander during Fall Gelb, the German invasion of France in 1940, who was reluctant to follow his orders. By utilising such an extreme threat Rommel was able to force this reluctant commander to swiftly capture a necessary position (Battistelli, 2010, p.17-18).
However, intensity of orders must be carefully balanced, and for the majority of situations negotiation takes a far higher precedence as most units will not simply obey an order if they believe the chances of survival if followed are low. Officers will often have to link the intensity of the order with respect, especially if their presence is not available, and make sure these instructions are such that subordinates will happily pass these down the ranks to follow them out (Buckley, 2006, p.181). Troops instructed to hold their positions at all costs will in most cases simply ignore this the moment that they face too heavy a resistance, and indeed the ability to negotiate orders is a critical point of improving the impact the commander can have on the morale as a whole (Strachan, 1997, p.374).
Legitimacy
If a soldier sees those giving them their orders as a legitimate source of authority from which these should be coming from, then they will far more likely to follow those orders and respect their purpose. There is a strong link between legitimacy of authority and ideology, as much of the legitimacy of a leadership figure comes from the state-sanctioned trappings of power that come within professional military organisations.
However, for those of guerrilla or other non-official combat groups, the legitimacy of their authority figures is a significant issue and the link with ideology or other factors of leadership must be strong to overcome this failing (Grossman, 2009, p.145). Another point at which legitimacy may become an issue is if the strategic situation has fallen to a point that all looks lost and with it the authority that props up the commanders word. The collapse of the Wehrmacht during the last days of the Third Reach was partially down to soldiers understanding the strategic situation, associating this crumbling of power with their commanders own (Hastings, 2011, p.09).
Other Factors
Willpower
One of prime causes of defeat of an army is down to the willpower of the commander, as well as how sufficiently they may impose this will on their troops. When this leader can no longer bring themselves to sacrifice their soldiers to the fight, rout and retreat is commonly followed soon after (Grossman, 2009, p.147). Clausewitz (1832/1993, p.120) felt that the commanders willpower was one of the main ways in which an opponent can directly exert pressure on an army, as the heavier this becomes, the more the burden shall befall their leadership. When combined with the factor of courage on the enlisted ranks, willpower can inflict a considerable mental force that will react upon an enemy and their own commander. Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 71
Eliciting Courage
The commander has a humongous responsibility for eliciting courage within their soldiers, and for them to apply effective leadership this must be at the forefront of their concerns (Walendowski, 1988, p.39). Frederick the Great felt that a brave colonel made a brave battalion (Palmer, 1986. P.97), and this joins heavily with the concept of the Well of Fortitude that governs the two factors of courage and fear. The military leaders own Well, of which they will draw from, shall also affect the fortitude of the soldiers around him, allowing them to top up their own. Lord Moran described those leaders able to elicit courage in others as being rafts to which all humanity clung for support and hope (Grossman, 2009, p.84).
An example, which came about due to the influence of presence and respect, comes from the account of one veteran of the Second World War, who recalled that he told the soldiers that fifty feet of standing wheat stopped a bullet, they believed me. Id made it up (Keegan, 1997, p.4). This shows how a commander can improve the courage of their soldiers through small measures as long as other factors are in place and that they aim to elicit this courage, however false it may be.
Effect on the Opponent
Many of the factors that apply to enlisting the effects of leadership upon their own troops also apply to how the enemy may perceive this same commander, whether by soldiers on the frontline or by the opposing commanders. The Duke of Wellington was said to feel that Napoleons presence on the battlefield was worthy of forty-thousand men, and he was not the only one to note the effect of Napoleons presence on the battlefield. French troops, miles from where he may have actually been, were ordered to shout Vive lEmpereur! to Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 72
convince their opponent that Napoleon was there facing them directly, aiming to create a sense of panic within their ranks (Paret, 1986, p.134).
A more recent example of the effect of commander on an enemy may be seen with the presence that surrounded Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel. During the North African campaign Rommels name slowly became an influence on British troops, with intelligence reporting that his name and legend are in process of becoming a psychological danger to the British Army, whatever his actual contributions to their conditions may have been (Brighton, 2008, p.109). The impact Rommel himself had on morale can be summed up by a message sent by British General Sir Claude Auchinleck, which stated,
There is a real danger that our friend Rommel will turn into a bogeyman for our troops just because they talk so much about him. He is not superhuman energetic and capable though he is. And even if he were a superhuman, it would be most undesirable for our soldiers to attribute supernatural powers to him (Irving, 1977, p.8).
Image 4.6: Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel
The British were talking up the reputation of Rommel through messages like this, and eventually the name Rommel itself was becoming a psychological issue for the Eighth Army (Reuth, 2004, p.142). This mystification of Rommel was not only created by British; General Omer Bradley noted of General George S. Patton that, He was possessed of the idea that he, George Patton, was here to do battle with Rommel (Brighton, 2008, p.192).
5. Analysing the Factors of Psychology: The Higher Levels of War
Operational Level
Overview
For the knowledge of the psychological factors of war to be of any practical use, it must also be understood what influence they have in planning at the higher levels of war. Commanders have the ability to exploit the effects of psychology, based upon their expected interaction and their knowledge of the opponent, through the understanding of how it applies to planning for effect at these higher levels.
Image 5.1: The different levels of war (United States Depart. of the Army, 2001, p. 2-3).
The main level that this will apply to, on the purely military side of planning, is the Operational-Level of War, the point at which the strategic objectives of the conflict are organised into the aims of the campaign or operation, ready to be carried out in combat the tactical-level. The concept behind the Operational-Level is the ability to have a bridge Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 76
between the strategic goals of the political government and the actions that take place on the ground, organising these tactical engagements in a way that achieves the strategic goals.
Without the link with the Strategic-Level, a campaign would simply deviate into a series of unconnected engagements with no greater purpose behind their actions, other than their own individual success. What the operational-level gives to a military planner is the longterm thinking needed if a campaign is to achieve success at all levels of conflict (United States Depart. of the Army, 2001, p.2-2 2-3).
The role of psychology at the higher levels of war is in what way the operationalcommander may utilise the mental factors as a part of their plans in preparing the psychological condition of the theatre, ready to be exploited at the Tactical-Level. The extent to which psychology may be exploited in Operational-Level planning was seen during the 1991 Gulf War, where the targeting of the psychological state of the Iraqi forces allowed Coalition planners to sweep many from the battlefield without having to resort to a direct confrontation. Through the demoralisation caused, a situation where the majority of Iraqi troops surrendered or fled was achieved, in contrast like many other campaigns where the majority should have been killed (Lambert, 1995, p.87). If a result can be achieved where an opponent may defeated without risking friendly troops through knowledge of the psychology of war, then its role at this level will be especially important.
The Psychological Centre of Gravity Overview
The Centre of Gravity constitutes the point on the battlefield that determines where the opponent may be defeated. By locating the enemys centre, a commander can focus and concentrate their forces upon this point knowing that in doing so they can bring down the opposing force through the elimination of this weak-point. Similarly, a commander must also recognise their own Centre of Gravity, lest their opponent concentrate their own power upon this first.
The Centre of Gravity is often a particular section of an army, upon which it draws its main strength, but may also be a geographic position (Johnson et al, 2010, p.19) or, importantly for this study, their psychological state. An armies psychological capability may be mustered from their Centre of Gravity (Echevarria II, 2002, p.2), and thus the potential exists to bring about the collapse of the enemy in ways that they may not be expecting or can be as easily control.
Direct
A Direct attack on the psychological Centre of Gravity will involve locating in planning the source of the opponents moral stability and focusing an attack at this point. An example of a direct psychological attack would be targeting the mental balance of a central opposing commander in order to disrupt their equilibrium and their ability to direct their soldiers (Burkett, 2003, p.6).
Indirect
An Indirect psychological attack on the opponents Centre of Gravity may come about from the concentrated targeting of another section of their military forces upon which their mental state may be affected most through its defeat. A good example of an indirect psychological attack was the focused destruction of planes and ground facilities of the Luftwaffe in the lead-up to D-Day, thus grounding the German forces ability to control the air and allowing Allied air forces to gain air superiority over Normandy.
The knock-on effect of losing air superiority to the Allies was a severe demoralisation of German troops on the ground (Burkett, 2003, p.12), who found the sky littered with Allied planes able to strike them at will. German soldiers of the time complained about the lack of presence by the Luftwaffe and that they would soon be told to fight fighter-bombers with pocket knives (Lambert, 1995, p.85). Commander of German forces in Normandy at the start of Operation Overlord, Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel was also affected by Allied airpower, feeling that their superiority made movement of his forces near impossible (Hallion, 1989, p.205), eventually falling prey to this air superiority himself (Irving, 1977, p.594). Generalfeldmarschall Gnther von Kluge also felt that the psychological effect of losing air superiority was a crucial issue. Von Kluge stated that, The psychological effect of such a mass of bombs coming down with all the power of elemental nature upon the fighting troops, especially the infantry, is a factor which has to be given particularly serious consideration (Keegan, 1983, p.219).
Through the physical destruction of a crucial point in the German forces in Normandy, the confidence of both the troops on the ground and their commanders were affected because of the psychological impact this had on the battlefield afterwards, forcing the widespread demoralisation of the Wehrmacht and reducing their ability to fight the allies considerably. By targeting of a physical component of the opposing forces, the Allies were able to create a
psychological reaction that undermined the ability for the German Army to resist for the rest of the operation (Lambert, 1995, p.24-25).
Manoeuvre Basis and Psychological Effect
The idea of manoeuvre warfare is based around the concept of avoiding an opponents strongpoints in order to move around them and instead hit them where they are vulnerable (Grossman, 1994, p.186). Manoeuvre acts in contrast to attrition warfare, which instead hits the enemy head-on and attempts to grind them down through force, eliminating as many of the opponent as possible (Johnson et al, 2010, p.201). Instead of destroying the opponent physically, with manoeuvre it is done so mentally, destroying their will to fight rather than their ability to (Grossman, 1994, p.142). It must however be noted that a successful operation will utilise both manoeuvre and attrition (Grossman, 1994, p.186), often with a Fixing Force holding the opponent down through attrition whilst another element sweeps around them through manoeuvre (United States Depart. of the Army, 2001, p.2-3). However, it will often be the manoeuvre element of an operation in which the main psychological impact shall be observed (Grossman, 1994, p.143).
The main reason that manoeuvre has such a large psychological effect is its ability to cut-off large sections of the opponents army from the rest. It is human nature to feel vulnerable when surrounded on all sides and separate from any external support (Grossman, 1994, p.327). When looked at through the lens of the psychological factors, it may be noted that a key effect of isolation may be the splitting of troops from their leadership and nulling the effects of their impact on troops, such as authority and presence (Grossman, 1994, p.177).
The impact of appearing at unexpected locations though can simply be one of confusing the opponent to the nature or size of the attack, allowing them to be caught off-balance and unprepared, leading to panic, fleeing, and potentially surrender (Grossman, 1994, p.162). Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 80
An example of manoeuvres ability to surprise was seen during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, where Egyptian troops found themselves becoming increasingly demoralised by an Israeli army which could bypass and attack them from unexpected directions at will (House, 2001, p.232). The end result is that manoeuvre can allow a commander to destroy much of their opponents combat motivation simply through the ability to launch surprise attacks, which can leave a daunting and confusing effect (Grossman, 1994, p.162).
However, whilst manoeuvre can inflict a large psychological effect on an opponent, the ability for an army to utilise this method for war-fighting in the first place will often be brought-down by the friction that exists in the chain of command. The most prominent issue to executing a successful manoeuvre operation will seen in the personality of the commander themselves. A major source of friction in manoeuvre warfare is the factor of ideology, the commanders own in particular, when this ideology is one that looks down on such methods that avoid direct combat. The desire to face an opponent head-on will often be due to images of the honour and glory of war, such as those who have been brought-up in an environment that would see this avoidance of a toe-to-toe fight as weak or cowardly.
Dave Grossman (1994, p.181) talked of an example where cultural ideology hampered an officers view of manoeuvre, where a friend was sponsoring a student from the Central African Republic, who, whilst an intelligent an skilled officer, almost failed the section on tactical thinking of a course. The reason that this student struggled in tactical exercises came straight down to ideology, the officer refused to use flank or rear attacks as a solution to a situation in any plan as he felt it a dishonourable way to fight. Whilst this may have been an isolated incident, it must be remembered that ideological opposition to manoeuvre does exist in some soldiers and as such, the existence of this form of ideology with a chain of command can easily cause the benefits of manoeuvre to be lost.
However, another link to the psychological factors comes from the temperament of the commander themselves, in particular those with an authoritarian style who dislike the idea Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 81
of centralised command, the reason for this being down to the other side of the requires for manoeuvre warfare, Auftragstaktik (Tamsitt, 1996, p.22-24).
Auftragstaktik
Aufragstaktik is the concept of using mission-style tactics to achieve an objective, by this meaning that a commander is issued a goal to accomplish, a timeframe, and the resources to do so, but is trusted to use their own judgement in deciding how they should go about achieving that goal (Widder, 2002, p.5). Put simply it is the concept of telling a commander what to do, not how to do it.
There are six basic tenets to Aufragstaktiks use and that justify its use within a command structure (Shamir, 2011, p.15): The battlefield is chaotic and runs under Clausewitzs three principles of, chance, friction and uncertainty. Optimising a complex systems output requires that knowledge of intent is also recognised. Short decision-making cycles are critical due to the importance of timing on the battlefield. Due to the limited capacity for processing information, this process should include selected subordinates Whilst technology can improve communication, it lacks the human factor that allows fast and creative judgements. Combat motivation is shored-up by responsibility.
The human element of Aufragstaktik is prominent, in both its benefits and its execution and may be linked back to Clausewitzs notion of friction. If the psychological element of war is a friction, then any method that may help to overcome this may have a powerful impact on how the mental element is handled on the battlefield.
By being aware of their senior commanders intentions, a junior officer can relay their own orders and execute them far faster, with less scope for human error. If a junior commander has to pass every command up and down the chain of command each time they wish to use their initiative or respond to a changing situation, valuable time will be wasted for their opponent to exploit (House, 2001, p.77-78). Instead with Aufragstaktik, a leader can immediately react to any issues of friction, that inevitability crop up, without simply creating more friction as these requests are passed upwards, and deal with unexpected issues as they occur (Marshall, 1947, p.116-117).
Ultimately, the concept of Aufragstaktik is built upon the initiative and self-discipline of the junior commander, whose judgement will always be closer to the ground, than blind discipline towards a senior command many miles away (Tamsitt, 1996, p.25). However, a crucial word in the chain of command is trust and the lack of this, willingly or not, is a key factor to why the benefits of centralised command may be lost because of authoritarianism.
An authoritarian commander will often feel uncomfortable with the decentralised command upon which Aufragstaktik operations rely on, often due to personality traits such as narcissism or egoism. Keeping the command structure of their unit centralised is often a more content situation for a leader of this type as their control over its actions shall revolve around them. Rather than allow a subordinate the space to conduct Aufragstaktik operations in the first place, an authoritarian command will instead keep them a tight leash, often out a fear that the achievements of the operational will not reflect back to them personally (Grossman, 1994, p.181). Authoritarianism not always the reason for preparing centralised, trust is another common issue, but the implications are the same in that the Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 83
flexibility that Aufragstaktik gives in dealing with friction and making the best use of time, are lost.
Authoritarian command may also impact command at the higher levels of war, up to and including those who hold the political power that the army serves. A good example of the restraint that authoritarianism can cause was during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, during which Saddam Hussein had many generals executed simply for deviating from his orders, or being classed as a threat due to their own personal success on the battlefield.
As a result of Saddams authoritarian style, Iraqi commanders along the chain of command became unwilling to make the simplest tactical decision without express authority to do so from their superiors. Under such restrained circumstances, the Iraqi command structure became rigid and inflexible, unable to adjust to the most basic of frictions or change in circumstances, out of fear of the consequences. Saddams own controlling nature paralysed the initiative of his army and paid for in the stalemate that resulted (Davies, 1996, p.45-48).
For something that may control much of the friction that psychology can cause, Aufragstaktik can be caught up in much of its own, resulting from psychology in the first place. A command structure that contains individuals with authoritarian personalities at any level can stop the spread of Aufragstaktik from that point onwards as subordinates are forced to keep a leash on their own troops due to the restraint put on them by their own commander. Aufragstaktik can be a great tool in creating a flexible army that uses its initiative to steal a march on its enemy, but it must also be remembered that its implementation is not as simple to spread across that army as it is said.
PSYOPs
Basis
Psychological Operations, or PSYOPs, is the use of information to influence the reasoning of an opponent in order to secure a favourable reaction from them that will boost an armies ability to defeat an enemy mentally, rather than just physically (Smith, 2000, p.50). Whilst PSYOPs will be targeted at the opponents mind, the methods used to inflict this may be physical, such as a side effect of material destruction, or purely psychological, when spreading information in the first place (Roosevelt, 1976, p.99).
Ultimately the aim of PSYOPs to defeat an opponent mentally before having to physically, doing so through an appeal to reason in the face of the unreasonable violence. The ability to fight an enemy in their head, alongside the traditional material methods, adds another dimension to the picture of modern warfare (Valley & Aquino, 2003, p.2-3).
Types
An important caveat to any Psychological Operation is that it is not simply the releasing of messages telling the enemy to surrender but instead an approach that must take its basis from similar principles to those used in marketing. There must be an understanding of both the audience being targeted and the delivery systems for the message itself, as both of these factors will have an impact on the effectiveness of the operation (Jamieson, 1997, p.43).
This study will first look at the different delivery systems upon which PSYOPs may be based. Whilst this is not an exhaustive list, it shall underline the primary backgrounds that are used and the stark differences that may underline their effect. Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 85
Leafleting
Leafleting is the act of passing the information of a PSYOP campaign physically, often through actions such as dropping these leaflets on the positions of enemy forces from aircraft, whose impact lies largely in their physical nature in comparison to other oral or digital methods.
Like other forms of PSYOPs, leaflets can create a sense of doubt in an opponent, which can then be exploited at the tactical-level (Davies, 1996, p.49). What differs from other PSYOPs, is that the effect of a leaflet can often have a far longer lasting effect than oral or digital methods. Unlike non-physical methods, leaflets may be held onto by an enemy soldier for an indefinite amount of time, rather than fading to memory as soon as the message has been given (Jones, 1994, p.27).
A good example of the effect of a leafleting campaign was those conducted during the 1991 Gulf War. One particular leaflet was dropped on Iraqi forces, soon after a large bombing raid on their position, with the main message being that that they should expect a return visit by the B-52 bombers unless they give-up and surrender now. What truly enhanced the effect of this leaflet though was what was printed on the reverse side, a message promising safe passage for any Iraqi who surrendered to Coalition forces, on the condition that they had this leaflet on their person when they arrived (Davies, 1996, p.49-51).
Whilst safe passage was given to all Iraqi PoWs in reality, the benefits that ownership of this leaflet seemed to give made it psychologically in the interests of Iraqi troops to hold onto this leaflet. Even if that soldier was not currently swayed toward surrender, unlike a one-off broadcast, the need for them to keep hold of this leaflet forced its own message to be stuck alongside that soldier physically and reminding them of their situation constantly as a result (Davies, 1996, p.49-51). Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 86
Of the 87,000 Iraqi troops who surrendered to Coalition forces, it was reported that the vast majority arrived still holding the leaflets they had been exposed to over the course of the war, one man in particular was said to have had over 345 of them with him when he arrived at the PoW camp (Jones, 1994, p.27). Concluding the effects that leafleting had on his forces, Brigadier-General Ibrahim Adwan Abdul Hussein of the Iraqi army was quoted as saying that, PSYOP leaflets produced the highest threat to morale, second only to allied bombing (Lambert, 1995, p.88). The fear over the effectiveness of leafleting within the Iraqi command was shown in way that troops were regularly threatened with the firing squad if they were found to have any Coalition leaflets on them (Jones, 1994, p.27).
Image 5.2: A leaflet dropped over Iraqi forces, offering safe passage to those in possession of it
However, this is not to say that leafleting is a completely positive endeavour. The process to developing a leafleting operation is dogged by high costs, both in production, where large amounts of staff as well as facilities are needed to produce and print, and in delivery where aircraft must be diverted from bombing missions. Furthermore, leaflets have a very limited
spread in comparison to broadcasting methods, which have the potential to deliver their message over an entire theatre (Collins, 1999, p.58).
Despite this, it must be remembered what leaflets do offer, and that is a powerful and longlasting effect with which a commander can use as part of a concentrated psychological attack on a vulnerable sector, creating results that could swing the direction of the operation. Leaflets may not be able to affect every soldier the enemy has, but sometimes the concentration of resources can be a more fruitful effort, just as the same applies to the material impact on the battlefield.
Broadcasting
The use of broadcasting as a method for a PSYOP campaign is the application of nonphysical media, such as radio or television, as the means of distributing the message to enemy troops (Lambert, 1995, p.58). The main benefit to this form of PSYOP is that, unlike physical methods such as leafleting, an operation based upon broadcasted messages has the power to reach enemy troops across the entire theatre of operations (Collins, 1999, p.58).
The key to the utilisation of a broadcasted message is similar to that of leafleting, this being to undermine the authority of the enemy leadership, at all levels, and create the same sense of doubt in the objectives the opponents soldiers are fighting for (Lambert, 1995, p.73). However, in a stark comparison to print methods, broadcasts can be deployed quickly and exploited just as fast. During the Gulf War bombing missions would often be preluded by radio messages announcing the exact time and place of these missions, shortly before they were due to go, as a way of increasing the feeling of dread in those targeted (Lambert, 1995, p.63). Such rapid delivery would be impossible with print media, which must be prepared long before the needed date and such accuracy would have been far harder to achieve.
However, just like print media, broadcasting relies on the facilities to produce and distribute the message in the first place, in this case television stations and radio transmitters. As a result, in recent conflicts broadcast stations have been an important military objective to control or restrict access to for each side. During the Yugoslavian Wars of 1991-1999, Serbian forces made the capture of radio and television transmitters a high priority objective during the early points of the war, seizing control of as much local electronic media centres as possible (Collins, 1999, p.59). On the reverse side though, once the NATO bombing campaign began in 1995, broadcasting facilities were among some of the first targets that were eliminated, to prevent any further use by the Serbians (Smith, 2000, p.51).
Tactical
In the aftermath of an Operational PSYOP campaign, the commander must exploit its effects at the Tactical-Level if the full impact of the operation is to be realised and utilised practically. A popular method for exploiting PSYOPs at the Tactical-Level is by using loudspeakers, utilising similar methods of those for Broadcasting but on a local basis. Loudspeakers aim to finally convince the enemy to surrender after being worn down by the Operational PSYOP campaign (Jamieson, 1997, p.44) and often are simply telling soldiers where to surrender, after Operational PSYOPs has convinced and told them how to (Lambert, 1995, p.59).
During the Gulf War, loudspeaker operations were accredited with convincing thousands of Iraqi troops to surrender overall, and were the tactic that negated the need for much of the risk that would have befallen ground forces if these positions had to be taken through combat alone (Jones, 1994, p.27). However, for Tactical-Level PSYOPs to have had an effect, the Iraqi forces needed to have passed the point of futility first, which without no amount of loudspeaker operations would have made an impact (Lambert, 1995, p.84).
Just as any other military concept, the links between its application at the tactical and operational levels is a strong, with the methods in which the effects created at one level can be exploited at another being important for strategic success. However, if these two levels are not collaborated successfully, the tensions between commanders may grow, as Operational-level commanders feel their efforts are being wasted and Tactical-Level commanders see themselves being constrained by an abstract policy (Collins, 1999, p.63). Furthermore, the limitations of Tactical PSYOPs must always be remembered. For example, these loudspeaker operations have only a range of a kilometre, well outside the same range for most modern weapon systems and as such this technique may have to evolve in the future to meet these new challenges (Collins, 1999, p.58).
Process
Underlying this process is the fact that Operational PSYOP is not as simple as just applying these techniques once the opponent is met on the battlefield, as if the operation is to be successful then their will must be prepared beforehand (Asisian, 2007, p.8). Failure to do so may result in a strengthening of the opponents will before they each battle or a lack of knowledge on the issues that may potentially be targeted (Valley & Aquino, 2003, p.6).
Basis of Intelligence
For a successful PSYOP campaign, planners must be sure to understand fully the background of those that their operations aim to target, from their history to any common values and with information on the targeted group, the message may filtered through any major influences. With a targeted approach, the message being distributed can be directed to hit specific points that apply to the enemy, as well as avoid any potential offensive issues that if attacked, may have the side effect of inflaming their will (Szeredy, 2005, p.14). A good example of how knowledge of a target group can be utilised was again in the Gulf War, where a U.S. PSYOPs team needed to instruct Iraqis who wished to surrender how exactly Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 90
to do so. The solution used to guide the Iraqi soldiers was simply to instruct them to defect and to go to Mecca, as every Iraqi soldier would know this direction, even if they did not know where exactly they were themselves (Lambert, 1995, p.64).
Once the battle has begun however, a new opportunity becomes available to planners dependant on the success of the initial wave of PSYOPs and how many enemy troops it convinced to surrender. Any prisoners of war created by the initial PSYOP campaign may become a large source of potential information for the next wave of psychological attacks, allowing planners to understand the concerns and issues that are currently affecting the opponents frontline. Through interrogation, information on current concerns may be learned and integrated into future messages being distributed, whilst also can allowing a PSYOP campaign to maintain its relevancy throughout the operation through constantly relevant information (Jones, 1994, p.25).
However, a major caveat on the use of information gained through interrogation is that it will often be unverifiable, and in fact may be some way from the truth. Captured troops will often distort the information they give their captors as way of legitimising their own surrender, and because of this, any issues that can be taken from these interrogations may be magnifications of the truth, often worse than in reality (Lambert, 1995, p.6).
Effects of PSYOPs
The desired effect of a psychological operation can be complex and will often hit many areas of the opponents psyche, usually dependant on the nature of the message itself. In general however a key aim is to lower the opponents morale, ruin their combat efficiency and force them to question their loyalties, both in the army and in the government (Burkett, 2003, p.11-12). The benefit that PSYOPs may hold can often be seen in casualty numbers, a psychological campaign during the Vietnam War caused the surrender of nearly 30,000 Viet Minh and NVA troops in 1967 and 1968, an amount that would have cost US force an Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 91
estimated 6,000 casualties to have eliminated through regular combat (Valley & Aquino, 2003, p.4).
The effect PSYOPs can have on enemy forces can, if done well and in the right psychological environment, force an overwhelming amount of troops to be removed from combat. The Gulf War was a perfect example of how powerful a PSYOP campaign may be, with around 44% of the Iraqi army deserting for reasons attributed to PSYOP messages (Jones, 1994, p.22). Ultimately, a successful psychological operation will make an opponent feel deserted by their leaders, isolated from their allies and vulnerable in their position to the wrath of their enemy, with no other option than to escape this scenario as quickly as possible (Lambert, 1995, p.64).
It must also be remembered that the intended effects of a PSYOP campaign are not the only ones that will manifest because, and this again comes back to the fact that psychology is unpredictable, causing the end result to often look different than what was planned for. The indirect effects of PSYOPs can be physical or psychology and will possibly create side effects that were not expected from the original direct message.
Indirect effects in PSYOPs are not always bad, and can allow for the expansion of the target audience to new groups, but the fact that this impact could be negative must always be remembered and are a constant friction for a commander running a PSYOP campaign (Burkett, 2003, p.9). However, the strength of association between cause and effect is not irrelevant with PSYOPs, it must simply be remembered that this effect not always be singular or the one expected (Perry, 2008, p.10).
Limitations & Criticisms
Commanders often relegate PSYOPs to a supporting force-multiplier role, not a precondition to the planning of an operation where if they can be used they will, but specific preparations will not be made for this (Valley & Aquino, 2003, p.6). Ultimately, many commanders do not yet see the importance of psychological methods (Jones, 1994, p.27), this often down to the fact that the effects of psychological operations are regularly misunderstood, underutilised, and discredited due to the unquantifiable nature of psychology that prevents any concrete connections being made.
The success of a PSYOP campaign cannot be explained in tangible terms and because of this the efforts expended on these methods can instead look wasted and a distraction from the real war (Huss, 1999, p.31). The lack of proof of its effects is often the greatest limitation that plagues PSYOPs as it is incredibly difficult to show that it was a psychological operation that was the cause of the outcome, not some other unrelated variable (Perry, 2008, p.9-12).
Another potential limit for PSYOPs is at what level its effects are developed. If psychological operations are to truly have the wide-ranging effects that its supporters contend it can achieve, then it must ultimately start at the Strategic-Level, not just the Operational (Valley & Aquino, 2003, p.4-5). This subject of PSYOPs must therefore be revisited when this study looks into psychology at the Strategic-Level of war.
Airpower
The use of airpower has become an increasingly important factor in the way in which wars are fought, ranging from bomber command during the Second World War to wars in recent years that have attempted to achieve victory mostly from the air, such as the NATO campaign over Libya in 2011. For all of airpowers material application however, an Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 93
understanding of the psychological effects it can inherently cause may bring some of the biggest benefits to an Operational-Level campaign (Huss, 1999, p.24). Airpower may complement its material side through exploiting the psychological situation shaped by previous actions, such as PSYOP (Szeredy, 2005, p.11), or demoralising an opponent to ready the ground for an attack (Lambert, 1995, p.23).
The effect that the use of airpower on an enemy may have on their morale and overall mental state can be massive, often able to capitalise on the impact that it can have on a soldiers stressors. Ultimately, a well-conducted air attack has the potential to not only pin an enemy position down, but to create a feeling of isolation and expendability that they have little ability to retaliate against (Lambert, 1995, p.49-50). The result of an air attack can be very similar to what a commander may wish to achieve through PSYOPs, that being to create an opponent who feels so helpless and inferior to their enemy that their only choice is to surrender, desert, or simply flee (Lambert, 1995, p.24).
PSYOP and airpower are not however mutually exclusive, in fact it is quite often the opposite, a good PSYOP campaign can take advantage of the underlying moral effects of an air attack. A good example of airpower and PSYOPs combining was in the psychological operations being utilised during the Gulf War, where many Iraqi troops surrendered on hearing that a B-52 attack was on the way so soon after the last. By alerting the Iraqi troops to the incoming attack their anxiety was increased and with it the likelihood they would simply surrender instead (Lambert, 1995, p.65).
Nevertheless, any use of airpower on an opponent must be of a sufficient level and the intensity of such a bombing campaign can be critical. At the base of all of an air attack is the opponents expectancy, as whilst some will help worry an opponent into feeling destabilised, too much can leave an enemy more relieved instead. Rather than a slow campaign that builds up into a final all-out shock and awe attack, an attack should be more intense than the adversary is expecting, creating greater effects of panic than if they felt Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 94
theyd got off lightly from the full-scale bombardment they were expecting (Lambert, 1995, p.78-79).
Major Jon Huss (1999, p.31) of the United States Air Force feels that there are four main truths that enemy troops should be convinced of through a prolonged air campaign:
1. Their defences are useless. 2. If they move, operate, or remain with their equipment and/or weapons, they will be targeted and killed. 3. They will receive no rest from the bombing. 4. The worst is yet to come.
Much of the reason for the psychological affect that airpower brings to the battlefield is down to the sheer freedom of manoeuvre that aircraft have in comparison to their colleagues on the ground, similar to the mental impact of regular manoeuvre warfare (Huss, 1999, p.26). Through their ease of manoeuvre, enemy aircraft can very easily start to feel omnipotent to a soldier on the ground, especially if their position lacks the equipment to combat the threat, forcing them into a quick descend to feelings of hopelessness and impotency (Lambert, 1995, p.49). Adding airpowers psychological edge is that, unlike artillery, aircraft are more likely to be seen by those on the receiving end, and can add an air of personally to the attack, leading to a much more daunting presence (House, 2001, p.44 & 69).
The use of airpower within the theatre of operations does not only have an effect on enemy forces, but indeed may act as a buoy to the morale of a commanders own forces, especially when the skies seem to be under their control. The potential exists for airpower to create a feeling in troops on the ground that they are not isolated and that their commanders in fact Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 95
support them (Lambert, 1995, p.56). However, if the commanders side has not yet attained air supremacy, then it must be remembered that the demoralising impression of enemy airpower will outweigh any boost to morale that their own aircraft shall apply. The greater mental impact of enemy aircraft can be seen in the early days of the North African campaign, where both Axis and Allied servicemen on the ground were convinced that it was the opponents air force who held control over the skies (Lambert, 1995, p.23).
Psychological Versus Material
What can be seen in many air operations is that this psychological effect is not just a secondary impact; it is in fact the primary outcome of an air attack and in the vast majority of cases the influence these attacks have on a soldiers mental state far outweighs any material destruction that such operations can cause (House, 2001, p.116-117). For the most part explosives dropped from the air are either widespread and inaccurate or precisionbased with a singular target in mind. Neither types of air attack actually kill many enemy soldiers when compared to ground assaults, and as such, the main outcome that may be achieved through airpower is that an attack will break the nerves of an opponent, rather than cause them casualties (Holmes, 1994, p.210).
The fact that airpower is more effective in creating psychology than material effects is not lost on planners of air operations either. During the Gulf War American pilots were ordered to fit 500lb munitions to B-52s for bombing raids which, when attacking the dug-in positions the Iraqis held, would be inappropriate if the wish had been to clear positions through casualties. If casualties had been the effect desired then cluster bombs would have been of greater effect, however, what 500lb bombs do give is explosive power and the impact of this would have been instrumental on breaking the morale of those in these positions (Lambert, 1995, p.62-63).
When targeting enemy positions for airpower there must be a focus on the psychological effects that this can bring, not just the destructive, as this can be the greatest influence that such technology can have on an enemy position. Ultimately, a commander at the Operational-Level must always remember the intangible effects of airpower, not just the tangible (Huss, 1999, p.31-32).
To exploit the psychological effect fully an air campaign must also have methods of following up an air attack through operations on the ground, making sure that both are sustained and integrated together for the most potent end result. Whilst air power can create significant psychological impacts upon an opposing force, it is far less capable of exploiting these effects once they have been developed and creating the desired outcome upon enemy behaviour (Huss, 1999, p.28-29).
Even during the Gulf War, where the Coalition forces had subjected Iraqi troops to endless air bombing over a one-month period, there still had to be a large ground invasion to actually displace these forces and convince them to surrender or flee. The need for a ground attack is linked to the interpersonal nature of fighting at close-range, where the presence of the opponents army or the potential for it, adds to the stress of the situation (Grossman, 1994, p.8). The main reason for a ground assault after an air attack is that not only does this sudden presence of opposing troops give someone for them to surrender to in the first place, but it also forces a quick decision on the part of these soldiers. During an air attack each assault, whilst fierce, shall also be momentary and allows for a soldier to have time to contemplate their actions or for their morale to stabilise (Huss, 1999, p.29).
Ultimately, in any air campaign both the physical and psychological sides to an attack must work in tandem if the full effects of airpower are to be realised in operations. The tangible material attacks often associated with airpower are of high importance and have the ability to inflict high amount of damage to an opposing army. However, it must be remembered that airpower is an inaccurate and momentary force, compared to most ground systems, Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 97
where the greatest impact will in fact be through the psychological impact created. To make best use of the material and mental sides to an air attack a commander must be aware of how these two effects may work together to create their desired outcome, without ignoring the interaction that exists between them (Lambert, 1995, p.85).
Strategic Level
Introduction
Above the Operational Level of War comes the Strategic Level, the point where the policy that dictates the nature of the war being fought is decided and the objectives that must be achieved to meet this political goal picked. Success at the strategic level comes from not just the ability to manage military capabilities, but also its synchronisation with other relevant national bodies (United States Depart. of the Army, 2001, p.2-2).
Image 5.3
A commander at the strategic-level must therefore understand the social-economic and political nature of both their opponents and themselves. By looking at the psychological factors at the Strategic-Level, a commander can factor the wider considerations into their Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 99
planning and exploit them at the Operational-Level (Jobbgy, 2010, p.20). Knowledge gained at the Strategic-Level will not only allow a commander to build a picture of the psychological nature of their opponent, based upon the impact they have had on their psychological factors, but may also allow them to understand just how their opponent may see them (Burkett, 2003, p.22).
The closer a conflict is looked at to the Strategic-Level, the more psychological in nature it becomes (Jobbgy, 2010, p.15) and as such knowing the make-up of such a level of war can allow for the psychological aspects of the conflict to be exploited efficiently and targeted correctly.
Clausewitzs Trinity
A critical method of viewing the nature of strategy is through Clausewitzs (1832/1993, p.101) Paradoxical Trinity, this being the three points of Reason, Passion, and Chance, each of which primarily concern the Government, the People, and the Army respectively. A constant balance much be kept between the three points of this trinity for a nation or group to succeed in war, and for this reason Clausewitz felt that any theory of war that excluded one or more of these points would conflict with the reality of war and as such be useless.
Analysing psychology at the Strategic-Level can viewed through Clausewitzs trinity as well, as any attempts to exploit the effects of the moral factors at this level should attempt to do so through this off-balancing by directing a psychological attack toward those groups on the three points. By defeating an enemy psychologically at one point on the trinity, the effects can cause the collapse of the others, leading to victory at the highest level of war (Thomas, 2003, p.7). Due to the balance that must be maintained between the groups of the Government, the People and the Army, along with the impact they have on stabilising an entity at the Strategic-Level, techniques to defeat an enemy strategically must at their core be attempting to dislodge this equilibrium. Any events that could a loss of stability between Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 100
the three points of the trinity can be the first step that leads to defeat at the Strategic-Level (Burkett, 2003, p.7).
This study has already looked at the Army corner of the Clausewitzian trinity and will now need to look at how the other two points of Clausewitzs trinity stand alongside the military side to conflict.
Government
By understanding the nature and attitude of an enemy government, a vital step may be made in targeting that opponent in such a way that the political will to continue the conflict may be undermined completely, breaking the ability for either the army or the people to continue (Thomas, 2003, p.6).
Colonel John Warden (1995, p.46) outlined the importance of political leadership as a factor in strategy through his Five Rings Theory, which suggested that there are five major areas that an opponent may be defeated through, the closer to the centre that ring is the more vital it will be. At the centre of Wardens ring is leadership, with the population and the military both holding outer rings, the suggestion being that the removal of central leadership will cause the collapse of the other two due to its role as the opponents brain.
Warden suggested that by attacking this vital centre-point of government, rather than simply striking the Muscle of the army, victory might be achieved far quicker and without the need for full-scale confrontation between the two sides armed forces. This approach of attacking the leadership can apply to psychological concepts as well, and by doing so an attacker may focus any psychological operation on hitting the opposing governments will to continue (Chun, 2008, p.297).
When attacking the political centre of an opposing entity, a common issue is the application of stress upon the regime and rate at which this level of stress varies. A quickly oscillating change in the intensity of stress can force the enemy leadership into feeling that their options are becoming limited, coercing them into a hasty or overactive response. Whilst a rushed response may be desired from a foe if the planner wishes to goad them into this, the same cannot be said if that response could cause significant consequences, such as a nuclear attack (Lambert, 1995, p.77).
Image 5.4: Wardens Five-Ring Theory
To achieve an objective aimed at the political centre of an opponent, strategic bombing has often been seen as a method in attempting to coerce that leadership into surrender through an attack aimed at their command and control centres, bypassing their forces in the field. With a bombing campaign targeted at the leadership stress, and the rate at which it is applied, again becomes the main concern of a military planner. A slow and gradual application of stress will only help a leadership become habituated against the bombing campaign, giving them time to motivate the people and prepare their defences. Part of the reason that Operation Rolling Thunder, a United States strategic bombing campaign against the North Vietnamese government from 1965-68, ending in failure was down to the gradual increase in the intensity of the operation, allowing the Communist leadership to dig-in, prepare their defences and ready the population (Lambert, 1995, p.71). Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 102
The difficulties that come with tempo underline much of the issues of a strategic bombing campaign aimed at the leadership, as often the deeper that the political centre is dragging into the conflict, the less willing they become to make concessions, effectively causing the opposite psychological reaction than was hoped for (Pape, 1992, p.427). A strategic bombing campaign against a leadership therefore has many issues, both in method and outcome, and as such is usually only effective against a government already weakened by other factors. Ultimately, for strategic bombing to have a positive effect, the tempo of proceedings must be fluctuated correctly and the intensity of the operation must outweigh the expectations of that leadership (Lambert, 1995, p.71-72).
Aiming the effects of psychology against a political centre need not only be targeted at an opponent, but also at neutral or potentially allied groups around the world. In the build-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the United States launched a two-stage strategic PSYOP campaign against the Iraqi government, the first part an attempt to turn international opinion on Iraq through claims of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the second part being to negatively portray the personalities that made up the Iraqi leadership. The main aim of the US strategic PSYOP campaign against Iraq was not only to justify the war to the citizens of the invading countries, but also to convince the international community of the same (Asisian, 2007, p.10).
People
Another point on both Clausewitzs trinity and Wardens Five Rings, is that of the people, who have often been seen as indirect targets for conducting a war, one way being through strategic bombing campaigns aimed toward them. The reasoning behind targeting civilians is that an attack here will influence a key Centre of Gravity at the Strategic-Level, the opponents national will (Huss, 1999, p.31).
There is also a strong link with the stability of the political centre when civilians become the target of strategic bombing campaigns. An example of a bombing campaign with political overtures was Saddam Husseins SCUD attacks on Israel during the 1991 Gulf War. Whilst the targets and those affected by the Iraqi SCUDs where the general population, the goal was to use this as a way of forcing the Israeli government into the war as TV reports spread panic amongst the population (Thomas, 2003, p.9).
Saddams goal of forcing Israel into the conflict was done in the knowledge such a move would have shattered the international coalition as Arab states may have refused to continue alongside an alliance containing Israel (Lambert, 1995, p.61). An attack on the population can be used to create large ripples politically and any disruption here can easily cause the off-balancing of the other two corners of Clausewitzs trinity.
Public opinion can also be a major catalyst for the beginning or continuation of a strategic bombing campaign. Allied bombing raids during the Second World War were often incredibly inaccurate, especially in the early years, but continued nevertheless due to the political need to be seen as striking back at Germany to the public. Raids such as the Dambusters raid during Operation Chastise had a far larger effect on British public opinion than any major strategic impact on Germanys ability to continue fighting (Lambert, 1995, p.15 & 30).
Part of the reason behind the power of attacking the enemy population through airpower goes back to the factor of expectancy. The daily lives of a civilian population are dominated by the illusion of safety in the environment they live, and so the moment this is shattered unexpectedly, the effects of terror bombing hit home (Solomon 1993, p.128-129). Ultimately, the sight of casualties and destruction to those unfamiliar to them will have a crushing effect on morale and public support to continue fighting, especially to those with doubts over the campaign beforehand (Lambert, 1995, p.38).
The role of expectancy in the strategic bombing of civilians can be seen clearly in the impact produced by German bombing raids over Britain during the Second World War. The initial bombing of British cities by the Luftwaffe during the Blitz in 1940 was preceded by a feeling of fear and anxiety throughout the population, anticipating a wave of destruction to befall them. However, the Blitz failed to live up to expectations due to the inaccuracy and small payloads of the munitions dropped, and as a result, instead of British morale being crushed, it was bolstered as the situation turned out better than had been imaged. Conversely, the VWeapons had a great effect on British morale as the expectancy of being targeted had dropped with the progress of war, in particular the feeling that victory was near after D-Day. The V-Weapons dealt considerably less damage than the Blitz, but the difference in expectancy, due to the strategic situation, changed the impact this had on the psychological state of the British public (Lambert, 1995, p.46), forcing campaigns such as Operation Crossbow that constrained resources and distracted air support from Normandy (Kipphut, 1996, p.10). The V-Weapons demonstrated that the psychological impact at the strategic level is often greater than the actual the material value.
The people are also prime targets for PSYOP campaigns carried out at the Strategic-Level, which may be used to undermine the national will of the opposing entity. The difference between using PSYOPs over airpower is that it does so in a way that avoids civilian casualties and may instead improve their view of the side who executed the PSYOPs originally (Valley & Aquino, 2003, p.7).
Psychological Operations targeted at the people may be carried out both before military operations begin, to convince the local population that they would be better off without their political leaders, and after the secession of hostilities to legitimise this previous claim, hoping to preserve the security situation if a period of occupation follows (Asisian, 2007, p.7-8). By utilising the techniques of PSYOPs towards an adversarys population, they may be won over to their opponents side and influenced to support their political goals over their own leaderships (Szeredy, 2005, p.11-12). However, for a PSYOP message to have any effectiveness it must have a credible, believable message to the population targeted that Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 105
they can be expected to accept. No matter how well presented and distributed a psychological message may be, unless the contents are seen to be reliable, then it will not be excepted and as a result strategic PSYOP aimed at a population may take months or even years (Collins, 1999, p.62).
A divided nation will always be far easier to split using PSYOP messages, as was France during the German invasion in 1940, where the nation found itself fractured by dissension and class war, leaving it vulnerable to the German radio broadcasts aimed at the French public (Lambert, 1995, p.20-21). Another example of how division has been exploited by PSYOPs was during the opening stages of the Bosnian War of 1992-5, where regional leaders made use of broadcast media to manipulate and ignite the latent ethnic tension in the region (Collins, 1999, p.59).
Strategic leaders must remember to make sure their own citizenship is convinced of the need for conflict as much as those being targeted in the opposing nation (Burkett, 2003, p.89). Whilst a major part of PSYOPs aimed at the public is gaining their backing for the political objectives, their support for the armed forces achieving them is just as critical. Propaganda to increase the public profile of the army can be seen in both peacetime through recruitment and militainment, and during wartime, such as films like Desert Victory (1943), creating during the Second World War by the British government. The use of PSYOP techniques will not only increase support for the army but, indirectly, the political goals being fought for (Craig, 1997, p.69).
Image 5.5
The nature of PSYOPs and the way it influences the population is however changing. News, both through broadcasts and the Internet, can now bring the events of the battlefield straight to the TVs and monitors of the public both at home or abroad near instantly and as such control of the media will strongly dictate the sentiment of the public in this coming era. Political groups must take the initiative if they are to control information with the advent of instantaneous news, both ready to counter what may be said and to inoculate their own citizens against what may be distributed (Thomas, 2003, p.6-7).
Ultimately, the public support afforded to each side can be an effective Centre of Gravity to be exploited by either at the Strategic-Level, with the potential to bypass the power of the army and indirectly derail the support for the political goals of the campaign.
A classic example of failing to maintain public support was the Vietnam War, where the United States found itself both tactically and technologically superior to the North Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 107
Vietnamese, but inferior strategically due to the sharp discrepancies between popular support on each side, especially towards the end of the United States involvement in the conflict (Burkett, 2003, p.5). A commonly noted turning point in public support in the United States for the Vietnam War came after the Tet Offensive, where in 1968 the Viet Cong launched a surprise attack on South Vietnamese cities.
Whilst the Tet Offensive was militarily a disaster for the Viet Cong, losing thousands of fighters and only occupying he majority of their objectives for a short period, the effect on the American public was much larger, who saw the images of US forces fighting in areas meant to be safe. The end result of the Tet Offensive was calamitous to the US, as the American people came to the opinion that the war could not be won and saw a sharp decline in both public, and due to this, political support (Record, 2005, p.18 & 23).
Conclusion
Ultimately, PSYOPs must originate at the Strategic-Level if a unified message is to be distributed by the army in question and be seen by those throughout the enemy systems. Unless PSYOPs has a level of coordination that runs through each level of war then the chances of the messages being spread doing more harm than good increases, as commanders at the tactical levels begin to contradict the overall tone of what the enemy should be manipulating into feeling. The contradiction of messages will not only effect militarily, but politically and publically as well (Jamieson, 1997, p.45-46). Finally, the threat of enemy PSYOPs must continue to be recognised, with the destruction of the methods of distribution available to the opponent remaining a high priority target upon the commencing of hostilities (Thomas, 2003, p.8).
Further Research
To fully understand the psychological side of strategy, an analysis of the nature and factors involved in psychology is needed, not only from the point of view of the military, but from the other two corners of Clausewitzs trinity. To build a full picture of the role of psychology in strategy then further research of all three corners of Clausewitzs trinity is critical if a full picture is to be painted of the element.
6. Analysing the Factors of Psychology: Conclusion
Conclusion of Analysis
By having analysed some of the factors that are commonly considered to make up the psychological element of war, it may be noted that a common theme runs throughout, as each factor illustrates how the influence that the psychological factors have on the battlefield is consistently unpredictable in nature. The impact that each factor has is only observable as the most likely, a common caveat being the contradictions or other irregularities in the way in which the reactions of each individual soldier manifest in battle.
The psychological factors identified by this study have not only been shown to be inherently uncertain, but verbal as well. None of the factors analysed utilises any numerical system for stating the level of effect or the strength of the impact been made, instead these psychological issues are evaluated through natural language, with vague and often altering definitions existing for each.
The mix of uncertainty and verbal presentation has also been noted in the planning at the higher levels of war, where the application of concepts such as PSYOPs attempts to manipulate the impact of psychology on the battlefield. There has been shown to be no predictability in the utilisation of the psychological factors at the Operational and StrategicLevels of war, as they like the factors themselves, come down to chance and uncertainty.
This study has previously defined the nature of the psychological element of war to be unpredictable and verbal, based upon the thoughts and experiences of various military theorists. By evaluating of the factors that make up psychology, it has been revealed that the focus on the elements unpredictability and link with language is correct, as these two points can be found to have a continual influence. A focus on uncertainty and language must therefore continue if the nature of the element of psychology is to be analysed correctly when investigating its representation in wargames. Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 112
7. Methodology I: Quantifying Psychology in Games
Overview
If the nature of psychology in war is both verbal and unpredictable, then the way in which this basis is applied mechanically and the impact such a system has upon gameplay, shall be crucial to understanding just how this element is represented in wargames. As Sabin (2012, p.117) stated, the balanced application of chance is crucial to the development of accurate wargames and so the role that the psychological element may offer, in terms of sources to base this chance upon, shall be necessary if any new method is to be found.
A variety of wargames shall be investigated, with an aim of looking into how the introduction of psychology has affected the make-up of that game, asking five questions of that games and its design. This study will conducted using a similar basis of that used in war studies, by looking at games through both a scientific lens and a philosophical one. Scientifically a game may be analysed through its mechanical background or any definitions it falls under, whilst philosophically through unquantifiable variables such as the impact on the quality of gameplay. Looking at wargames, both through their quantifiable mechanics and their unquantifiable gameplay experiences, will be vital if both game and war studies are to be understood alongside each other.
These two sets of questions shall then be answered using the results found in the analysis of each wargames, contributing towards a conclusion on the impact of psychology in wargames and the ways in which it may be represented mechanically.
Scientifically the followed questions shall be asked of each game: What genre does the game come under and how has this affected what factors have been chosen and their level of detail? What level, or levels, of war does this game take place at? Has this game implemented the psychology of war at each of these and if so how? What mechanical system has been used to represent psychology?
This will then be joined by the philosophical questions of: What difference to gameplay has the introduction of different psychological factors given? What difference does the inclusion of psychological issues have on gameplay overall, or more specifically the role it plays in balancing Sabins concepts of skill and chance.
Image 6.1 (Sabin, 2012, p.117)
Battle Academy
Image 6.2
Mechanical Systems and Psychology
BBC Battle Academy (formerly known as BBC Battlefield Academy) (Slitherine Software, 2010) is a Turn-Based Strategy title, in which the player takes command in battles ranging over several different theatres of the Second World War; including North Africa, Normandy, the Battle of the Bulge, Market Garden, the Fall of France and a hypothetical German invasion of Britain. Battles take place at a tactical-level with players being able to customise their force makeup before battle, and on the Market Garden missions, carry their units over to the next battle. Maps are split into checkerboard grids, upon which unit movement is constrained, with gameplay then taking place in turns. A key feature to the turn-based system is that an enemy will still attack any unit currently moving if they enter their line of fire, despite it not being their turn.
A key mechanic of Battle Academy is the introduction of a Morale value to every unit currently on the battlefield, indicating their present combat willingness. This has been used to create a Supressing Fire mechanic where if a unit is attacked then their morale will fall, based on the power of the attack and their current level of cover. A units value for morale shall start at 100 for the majority of troops, 75 for conscript troops and 125 for troops of elites forces such as the Waffen-SS, however if it is brought below 50 then this unit will then be classified as Supressed.
Image 6.3: Morale and attack values may be seen for an American and German unit.
Once Supressed, units will no longer be able to automatically attack enemy units that move into their line of fire, also moving into cover if available. If a units morale eventually moves down to 0 whilst the attacker is in a neighbouring square, then that unit will surrender and be removed from the map. If morale falls all the way to -100, then that unit Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 117
will rout and be removed from the game wherever the attacker is. A units morale shall be regained slowly after every turn outside of combat, though it may also be recovered mechanically on some missions in which the Rally combat order is allowed, allowing the player to restore the morale of a unit by 50.
Another feature that must be noted is how the game handles each units health values, or more accurately, how it does not as no unit in the game has a visible health value, only an Attack value. The game uses a units Attack value as the basis for a chance based system, wherein a unit with a higher value shall have a greater chance of destroying their opponent, further balanced by angle of attack when targeting armoured vehicles. Importantly though is that even though chance has been used to determine success in eliminating an opponent, these attacks will still do Morale damage whatever the outcome.
Psychology and its Impact on Gameplay
The combination of morale and chanced-based combat in Battle Academy, has allowed for not only a unique gameplay system, but also one that has brought the two concepts of chance and skill together in way that complements the other. In line with Sabins (2012, p.117) trinity, it may be stated that if the combat system been developed with only the chance-based attack mechanic, then the influence of player skill in gameplay would have been greatly diminished.
By allowing the parallel processes of health and morale to work together, any potential frustration caused to a player by chance costing them success in a fire-fight has been diluted by the morale impact this attack still created. Even if an attack fails to destroy an opposing unit, it will suffer from the morale effects of this attack and pushing them closer to being supressed or surrendering. Instead of chance in the combat system creating frustration, the opposite becomes true, as players feel lucky when they destroy a unit earlier then having to force its surrender. Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 118
Because of the influence that morale has on gameplay in Battle Academy, the role of the material factors has changed, with the supremacy of superior equipment dulled by the minds of those operating it. An example of the balance between the psychological and material factors in Battle Academy may be seen in a scenario where a player has to defend against heavy armour with inadequate anti-tank guns. The game may only give a low to zero chance of destroying the opposing tank, something that in most combat system would spell automatic defeat. However, due to the certainty of a psychological reaction, whilst superior opposition cannot be totally defeated, they may be delayed and held off until adequate support arrives. As such, player tactics have been given another dimension, as the player with the superior weapons will only have an advantage in the chance-based material side to gameplay, being liable to the opponent who can best exploit the certainty of morale.
However, in representing the psychology of war in game mechanics Battle Academy has utilised a numerical approach, out of line with what Clausewitz felt on applying mechanical systems to the moral factors and the verbal nature in which it is communicated in reality. Furthermore, through the creation of a mechanic that emphasises the certainty of psychological reactions, the game has also failed to represent the other side to the nature of the human element of conflict. What Battle Academy does is reverse the natures of the material and psychological factors mechanically from what this study has found to be their traditional bases. Instead of the material factors being the most imbrued with certainty it is the psychological.
Despite the reversal of the natures of the psychological and material factors of war in Battle Academy, gameplay has still managed to maintain the required balance between skill and chance in its mechanics, stopping any adverse effects because of this change. However, by aligning psychology with certainty and materials with uncertainty, Battle Academy has shown that the sources that inspire the balance between skill and chance must be carefully considered in design if accuracy in representing the nature of war is desired. Without noting
the fundamentals nature of the differing elements of war, the accuracy of such mechanics may be at fault form their very base.
Despite this issue of certainty in representing psychologys nature, it must not be ignored what can be taken from this title. Morale has been shown to be a useful method of creating a secondary effect, which if the player is made aware of, can complement the primary outcome of any action that takes place in gameplay. By allowing the physical and mental elements of conflict to interrelate in game mechanics, their impact may complement the other and act further depth to player options during combat.
Red Orchestra 2: Heroes of Stalingrad
Image 6.4
Red Orchestra 2: Heroes of Stalingrad (Tripwire Interactive, 2011), is a historical First-Person Shooter set during the Battle of Stalingrad, in which the player may participate in online battles as part of either the German or Soviet armies. This game gives an interesting angle in looking at the role of psychology in games, as it does so from a perspective of a player character, rather than AI-guided units as in a Strategy title.
Gameplay takes place at the tactical-level of war, as the players can only control characters that are on the ground, and has resulted in the psychological systems of the game being grounded in the individual application of the psychological factors. The importance of the personal basis for the role of psychology is that many of the game mechanics created to represent this must do so around the issues of player control. Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 121
Each player has a Suppression meter located on the main HUD, which visibly indicates how much fear the player character feels due to the current situation. Whenever the player experiences a near-miss from either enemy fire or explosive attacks, the this meter will begin to drop, the lower it goes the worse the players own aim will be and slowly the screen will fade to a blurry, monochrome view. The only methods to restore morale is to either stay out of combat for a period of time, or be near another player who earned the rank of Hero through the games levelling system, the meter slowly being restoring during this.
Image 6.5: HUD of Red Orchestra 2 with the Suppression Meter marked
The developers of Red Orchestra 2, Tripwire Interactive have stated that their focus on the game was one of recreating the realism of combat, aiming to deliver unrivalled accuracy and attention to detail through details such as accurate ballistic systems. However, whilst accuracy of weapons has brought realism to the material side of Red Orchestra 2, the Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 122
developers aimed for the Morale System to do for the same for psychology, bringing the mental experience a soldier goes through to the forefront (Tripwire Interactive, 2011).
Through use of the morale system in Red Orchestra 2, the concept of suppression that permeates tactical-level combat in reality has been recreated in a First-Person Shooter environment.
By combining the both input of enemy fire and the output in mechanical inhibitors on the players performance, that player may be forced into the actions that this concept create in from soldiers in real-world warfare, allowing the effects this has to shape the nature of combat in-game. The moment a players morale starts to get low and the players ability fight back effectively is reduced, then the best action for that player to take is to fall back into cover and wait for their character to calm down before continuing. Furthermore, the opponent who forces a player into cover has an incentive to continue firing, as doing so will stop the player from regaining their Morale and often forcing them to flee the area to recover.
Through the addition of a mechanic that recreates the impact of psychology on a soldiers actions, the way combat in Red Orchestra 2 works has been completely changed. By modifying a players ability to complete, both technically and through visual feedback, the potential now exists for the player to coerce an enemys reaction. The ability to modify an enemy players reactions allows for further depth to tactical decisions in combat, such as disorientating and pinning an opponent.
The fact that any fire directed at an opponent will have an impact also has a large effect on the value players will attribute to each weapon type in the game, moving them closer to their perceived worth in reality. Machine-guns now can keep a fire-team pinned down for other players, or stop their advance, rather than just being subject to whether they can kill them before being killed. Grenades are similar, rather than the quality of their use being Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 123
down to how many enemy troops hey killed, instead it can be just as useful to force them into cover.
The use of psychology as a mechanic has also addressed the crucial issue of the balance between skill and chance in Red Orchestra 2. A player cannot simply dominate their rivals just because of their greater aiming ability, the influence of chance in the appearance and severity of a drop in morale force them to improvise once its effects have limited their skill.
However, the previously mentioned issue of player control that is indicative of the First Person Shooter genre and how the fear experienced by a unit is now much more in a players hands. The integrated player control of the genre though limits the effectiveness to allow these factors to integrate naturally with gameplay and instead some abstraction has to be applied. Such abstraction can be seen with the visual effects, seen in Red orchestra 2 in the visual effects and the impact on the players aim, combining together to create the same sense of fear that causes suppression to occur in reality. The players actions are not forcefully taken out of their control, but instead the desired behaviour by that player is made the more tactically shrewd.
Nevertheless, what Red Orchestra 2 does highlight is that the application of the psychological factors of war in games must form a separate approach when dealing with the First-Person Shooter genre, or any with such a focus on player control, in comparison to Strategy titles. The psychological factors of war have been shown to have an important effect on the actions of those in combat, often causing undesired or unexpected reactions on those affected. Whilst recreating such influences on a units actions is possible within Strategy titles, once balanced with a players own skill, but such removal of control in a FirstPerson Shooter to add the influence of a factor such as ideology may only cause frustration.
Close Combat III: The Russian Front
Image 6.6
The third iteration in the series, Close Combat III: The Russian Front (Atomic Games, 1998) is a Real-Time Tactics game set on the Eastern Front of the Second World War with a separate strategic side, as players must manage a platoon to company sized unit of soldiers from either the Russian or German side and make it through the conflict. The factors of psychology play an important part in the combat system of the game and are constant element behind any tactical moves made during a battle, or the influences on the strategic management of a players units during the campaign.
The way in which Close Combat has dealt with psychology may be taken with high regard due to the games adaption by the U.S. Marines (Atomic Games, 2004) and the RAF regiment (Atomic Games, 2006) as a basis for training programs.
The players soldiers in Close Combat III are all influenced by a psychological system that sets what response they will give to any given situation. As a unit is fired upon by the enemy, enter close quarters combat, see their comrades die or are simply in a precarious position for too long a time, the effects of fear will begin to pull away at their courage. Feedback to a units mental state is then delivered by using verbal statements that describe the current level that their morale is currently at, though this statement also reflects their actions in general, giving player feedback to the units actions such as Ambushing or Crawling.
Image 6.7 Units whose status is in red are shown to be effected by morale, the LMG Infantry Cowering for example.
As the situation begins to turn on a unit they will stop following the orders a player has given them this verbal statement will begin to change to one of the psychological statements available. Units will begin Panicking as their fear starts to rise, before eventually Cowering by hiding in a covered area and ignoring orders. Finally, a unit may be Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 126
Fleeing or Surrendering, effectively running from the battlefield when their mental state moves too low.
A unit shall move between the morale statements dynamically as the combat situation around them changes, moving closer to fleeing battle as the battle goes against them. Alternatively, if a unit has not yet fled the battle then the opportunity exists for them to be Re-Buoyed and returned to regular combat effectiveness suddenly, if the situation that caused their drop in morale has passed.
At the Strategic-Level side of the game, one of Close Combat IIIs main mechanic is to allow players to lead their units from the first battles of Operation Barbarossa all the way to the Battle of Berlin. To complete the main campaign the player must manage the same company throughout the entire operation as they progress, adding units to this group or losing them through combat. The main consideration for players during the campaign, other than the balance of unit types making up their company, is the influence of the conflicting factors of experience and exhaustion along with their morale.
Units with higher levels of experience, earned from extended performance in battle shall perform better in battle, whilst those with a higher morale will be less affected by the psychological factors on the battlefield, earned through sustained high morale levels at the end of battles and victory within them. However, exhaustion also plays a part in balanced experience and morale as a unit that been in combat too often shall eventually need to be rested from combat. If a unit becomes exhausted but is still thrown into combat then the chances of them fleeing or surrendering become far greater.
Image 6.8: The pink and blue bars next to units representing Morale and Experience on the company management screen.
However, unlike when in battle, morale is represented through visual means, using a bar that represents how high this value is out of four. Exhaustion is still shown through verbal means, but unlike the steps these statements use in-battle, outside the player will simply be warned that a unit needs resting for the next battle.
The main impact upon gameplay that utilisation of the psychological factors has given Close Combat III is to force the player to plan their assaults in far more depth. In comparison to if these units simply responded to orders like robots, in Close Combat III ordering units into constant frontal assaults will ultimately lead to a complete breakdown of morale. Players Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 128
must remember that their units will often turn and run if the tactical situation becomes too overwhelming, forcing another dimension to gameplay.
The application of psychology in Close Combat III demonstrates the confusion and frustration that it may cause a commander when they place their units at the sharp end and showcases is exactly what Clausewitz meant when he spoke of the influence of friction. Without the psychological factors in the game, players would simply be able to manoeuvre their units into to the best position tactically allowing everything would to a very simple affair. However, because of these factors of fear and courage, these frictions, it is just as Clausewitz (1832/1993, p.140) described them as, the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult and this is exactly the effect they have on gameplay here.
The utilisation of psychology as a friction that makes the players plans so much harder to execute has allowed this facet of the nature of the element to occur, disconnecting actions from what would be expected. Through psychologys inclusion, the Tactical-Level side to Close Combat III has managed to balance the points of skill and chance within its combat system. The player must not only be a skilled tactician, but must also have the ability to improvise when psychology acts as a friction to their actions.
By using verbal statements to feedback to the player the current psychological status of their units, Close Combat III has also managed to utilise the other side to the nature of the psychological element in Tactical-Level gameplay. Players are able to understand the mental picture of the battle through natural language that simply and clearly describes the current situation.
However, one criticism that must be made of the way in which change occurs in battle and the warning the player is given, as due to the low numbers of statements and the fact that each soldier in a unit has their own individual mental state, keeping an overall picture is difficult. The player will often learn of a negative psychological reaction after its occurrence Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 129
without being able to prepare as the situation worsens. By grouping the psychological state of a unit to the entire squad this status may have been far more manageable to players and allow them reaction time. Whilst applying the psychological factors has applied chance to gameplay, the system must still be manageable if skill is to be kept constant as well.
Looking at how Experience and Exhaustion, or here Morale, has been handled at Close Combat IIIs Strategic-Level, it may be seen how the balance between these two factors has be brought into gameplay. The utilisation of exhaustion in gameplay ah shown not only how this balance can easily bring another strategic edge to gameplay, but also that ultimately that any theory of equating these psychological factors will have to take long-term factors into consideration. Ultimately the player has to more to think about than just how good a unit is, a system like this could be used to force the rotation of units, or make sure players make use of any unit under their command, rather than simply always rely on a set few.
However, unlike the Tactical side to Close Combat IIIs gameplay, the verbal nature of psychology has not been preserved completely at the Strategic-Level. Whilst morale is broken down into statements in battle, it is converted to a numerical system outside by using a visual four-block graph. The main issue that may be observed at the Strategic-Level though is the lack of skill applied in the exhaustion system, in that the unpredictability of its occurrence and the warning given to the player edge it too far toward chance. The player will only learn about the need to rest a unit before the battle that they are warned to do so for, leaving the player unable to prepare for such an eventuality through knowing the likelihood of this occurring. If the same staged statement system used in battle had been applied for exhaustion the balance of skill and chance may have been better applied, as players are able to plan around its chance of appearing.
R.U.S.E.
Image 6.9
R.U.S.E. (Eugen Systems, 2010) is a Real-Time Strategy game published by Ubisoft for PC, PlayStation 3 and Xbox 360, in which the player must take up the role of a Second World War commander, leading Allied forces from the North African desert and eventually into Germany itself. The game takes place at both the Tactical and Operational-Levels of war, moving further upwards as the campaign progresses.
However rather than being a straight split between the levels of war, the divide in R.U.S.E. is far fuzzier as the core gameplay itself stays the same. As the player progresses they are simply trusted to command more units over a larger area, rather than AI-guided battles surrounding them as do in many earlier levels. By the end of the game, the players command has grown from a few troops in a small sector of the map, to an entire regiment. Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 131
As such, R.U.S.E. is a good example of how the implementation of psychological concepts at the different levels may be done so concurrently, and work in tandem during gameplay.
Looking at the Tactical-Level, the game focuses simply on the factors of Fear and Courage, units will either hold their ground and advance, or they will run from the fight when the pressure starts to get too high. Each individual unit has a morale variable assigned to them and if that unit takes a certain amount of damage then they will run from that position in the opposite direction to that the fire is coming from, ignoring any commands that the player may give them. However, if that unit is currently within cover, such as wooded areas, then their morale limit will be far higher than usual.
Image 6.10: Exclamation marks show a unit whose morale has forced them to flee.
The psychology of the Tactical-Level is joined at the operational-level by the Ruse system. One of the main technical features of R.U.S.E. is the ability for the player to zoom-in from a level where they can see the entire battlefield, to one where they are able to see combat from head-height. When the player has zoomed out to a higher level, then the battlefield will appear to be split into a number of Sectors that divide the map, and these sectors may be used by the player as locations to play a Ruse upon. By achieved a Ruse the player may Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 132
apply a specific effect to that entire area, under a limit to how many they may use, having to wait for a Ruse Card to generate every couple of minutes.
Image 6.11: Sectors that have had Ruses applied to them.
Two Ruses that are of attention to this study are that of Propaganda and Fanaticism, which when applied to a sector, have a direct effect the morale of units at the Tactical-Level. The first, Propaganda, will modify the upper-limit for morale on enemy troops in that sector to be far lower than usual, forcing them to run much sooner. Alternatively, Fanaticism will affect the players own troops and make it so that all within that sector will never run as long as it is active, removing the morale mechanic entirely. Interestingly, the use of the latter will cancel out the effects of the former.
The other side to these Ruses, aside than those that offer standard power-up style bonuses, such as Blitzkrieg which makes all units move twice as fast, are those which utilise deception. Rather than concentrate on any mechanical effect, deception Ruses instead focus on the psychology of the players themselves. Deception Ruses include, Decoy Offensive, which simulates a fake attack by infantry, armour or aircraft, which whilst not being able to do damage, aims to draw attention away from the real assault. Decoy Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 133
Building, which acts as the defensive version of the Decoy Offensive, by making it seem that the player has key objectives in areas which they do not, to draw in an attack from other areas. Finally there is Reverse Intel; in R.U.S.E. all units out of range of sight are displayed as poker chips, large for armour, small for infantry, this Ruse simply flips this around in the specified sector. The difference with these deception Ruses is that instead of a mathematical alteration with the mechanics of the game, they simply adjusts the players perception of the battle from what it really is
One point that may be noted at first is the abstraction used of the base factors of Fear and Courage as the basis for the psychological system of the game. The only action that the morale may create is to run when it gets too low, with no other factors to consider. Whilst a system with one action may seem basic for Tactical-Level battles, the key to its need becomes clear as the player advances through the campaign and is trusted with more and more units over an ever-widening area.
By leaving R.U.S.E.s psychology to such as a simple calculation, the system has become applicable to higher levels of gameplay, where the Operational and Tactical-Levels start to merge and the player has less of an ability to concentrate on individual units. What Ruses morale systems shows is that the higher up the levels of war a game wishes to base itself, more abstraction must be used if a psychological system is not to become unwieldy. By only having to worry whether a unit is retreating or not, R.U.S.E. has allowed a player at a higher level of command to be able to worry about tactical psychology without being overwhelmed by detail.
Nevertheless, the inclusion of a psychological system in the first place has had a twofold influence upon the nature of gameplay. Firstly, the link between psychology terrain has the effect of focusing the players attention on the benefits that come from placing units within Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 134
cover, alongside the visible feedback of troops holding their ground from going so, and running easily if not. By attaching morale to the terrain mechanic, the player will have a noticeable reason for placing units within cover, past simply losing that unit quicker in combat.
However, the main effect of the link between psychology and terrain goes back to how players can handle troops when at the higher levels of the game. As mentioned players cannot keep an eye on all their troops at the higher levels of command, but must still make sure that troops that are currently not of their focus are well protected, lest they be attacked and pushed back whilst their focus is elsewhere. The purpose of terrain as a result is to allow units to be left unsupervised by a player over a wide map, for extended periods of time and is where morale hits gameplay doubly. Aside from the initial focus on terrain the morale system gives players at earlier points in the game, it also acts as a key method in which players can manage these isolated points.
Morale acts as an early warning system for these points, as when the player is informed of a unit that has been forced to run, they may quickly refocus on that point and shore it up as needed. The use of psychological reactions can be a great method of feeding back to the player the balance of power in an engagement before the situation moves outside of their control, allowing them to rectify it first. The simplification of the morale system at the Tactical-Level only furthers the ease in which the player may feedback this information quickly and allows for the chance of psychology to be managed by the players skill.
Moving back to the Operational-Level Ruse mechanic, similar points on abstraction may be noted in their application. Each of the Ruses are based upon real-world concepts, whose typical effect has been converted to mechanics and able to be applied with a simple click of a button and whose effect is known. The idea here has been not to replicate the minor details of that operation, but to bring across its nature, Radio Silence, for example, allows
units simply to not appear on the map to opponents in the sector; it does not deal with the ins and outs of the frictions that not using radio may cause and so forth.
For such a mechanic to work some sort of abstraction is needed lest the player be bogged down in detail and the system misses the nature that is supposed to be represented (Juul, 2007). What this mechanic does show is how the player may manage psychology on an Operational-Level. By using an array of pre-set concepts, each with their own impact and effect, players can now manipulate these factors in a simple manner over a known area of the map. There is however a valid point though that this has an issue of predictability, such as the point that Propaganda is overridden by Fanaticism, and as such much of these concepts become more like power-ups than representations of operational planning.
On the other side of this however are the Deception Ruses, which do get around the issue of predictability. By bringing the players own psychology into the game, the unpredictability of these concepts is furthered far more than the other ruses available to the player. There is no mechanical output to the Deception Ruses, just the wit behind their use by the player.
However, by relying on non-mechanical outputs for the unpredictable elements of the game, Deception Ruses are often used far less than others due to the lack of feedback they give on their success. Players only receive feedback on Deception Ruses in the form of the opponents actions and often instead would rather spend their allowance on Ruses with set feedback on their application. The Power-Up Ruses provide this feedback through the mechanical enhancements they bring, and are always going to seem more valuable to a player than those whose value only comes clear with experience.
What has happened with the Ruse system in R.U.S.E. is that both side to the mechanic, the Power-Up and the Deception Ruses, each sit on diametrically opposed sides on Sabins trinity. For the Power-Up Ruses, their sheer predictability means that they shall always fall into the factor of skill, relying on certain outcomes and effects. The certainty of the PowerNicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 136
Up Ruses forces this application this to psychological elements like PSYOPs and Ideology, against their basic nature.
The Deception ruses on the other hand fall straight into chance, there being no skill mechanically to their use. Instead for the ruses that target the players own psychology, everything comes down to the chance that comes naturally from this element. Ultimately, there is no better way to recreate the psychological nature of war than by actually linking with the players own mental state. However, without the proper feedback on its effectiveness a mechanic such as the Deception Ruses shall always fall too far into chance to be seen as valuable to the player.
Total War: SHOGUN 2
Image 6.12
Total War: SHOGUN 2 (The Creative Assembly, 2011) is the latest title in the long-running Turn-Based/Real-Time Strategy series Total War published by SEGA, in which the player must take control of a regional warlord during Japans Sengoku Jidai, or Warring States Period. The game offers an interesting mix of psychological impacts at both the Tactical and Strategic-Levels of gameplay and how these affect each other will be of great use to this study.
Strategic-Level
The strategic-level of SHOGUN 2 allows players to manage the affairs of their selected clan and manoeuvre their forces around the different regions which make up Japan, in order to achieve the main goal of the campaign, becoming Shogun by capturing the capital Kyoto by 1775 or 1600, dependent on game-mode. Gameplay progresses in a turn-based fashion, each of these turns representing a season, with the players actions being those taken during this time-period before they move onto the next season.
Image 6.13: Armies on the Campaign Map.
Looking at the Strategic-level of SHOGUN 2 through Clausewitzs trinity, it must first be noted that military and political power sharply overlaps, due to the fact that players are controlling warlords, or Daimyos with this control over their clan. These same policy makers will be the ones who then go and enforce their politics on the battlefield at the Tactical-Level.
On the political side of strategy, players have to manage the affairs of their clan, both internally through their interaction with the Generals who lead their armies and control their political departments, and externally with the other clans that are also vying for control over Japan. Three main variables influence political affairs between personalities or clans. These are Loyalty, Honour and Character Traits or Skills.
Loyalty is the level of faithfulness a General has towards their clan and a character low in this will be more likely to accept bribes from rival clans, defect or start a rebellion against the players rule. Loyalty is influenced by the honour of the players clan, victories they have achieved in battle, their overall position in the clan, their personality traits and the choices they may have made during dilemmas. If a Generals level of Loyalty sinks too low then the option will become available to order them to commit seppuku.
The People in SHOGUN 2 are those who inhabit the provinces under the control of each specific clan and whose obedience to this rule is crucial to the player clans long-term survival. Each province has a Public Order level, which is calculated by comparing the factors that are causing Happiness or Unhappiness to the population, these being the current tax level, food quantities, clan honour and religious ideology of the clan. If the unhappiness of the people starts to outweigh their happiness, then chances are that a riot will occur which, in the short-term will cause damage to the provinces infrastructure, but in the long-term may see the clan lose ownership of the province to Rebels.
Image 6.14: Public order information for a province.
However, the military also play a very important part in maintaining public order, as an extra factor on top of this level of public order, is that of their repression. The size of the military garrison within a province will act as a Repression bonus to the factors causing happiness for the locals and help outweigh any negative issues as a result. Feedback on the state of repression in a province is done so through the number of factors causing Happiness or Unhappiness, the player having to keep one number higher than the other to keep order under control.
Tactical-Level
The tactical side to SHOGUN 2 comes from when two armies meet on the strategic map, either in the field or from an assault on a castle town and gameplay moves down to a realtime level as players must resolve this confrontation on the battlefield. As with the strategic-level, psychological issues have a powerful impact upon gameplay at the TacticalLevel.
Image 6.15: A cavalry units morale noted by the information box, here Eager.
Every unit has a Morale level, which again represents the colliding factors of Fear and Courage, as the effect this value will have on gameplay boils down to whether that unit will hold firm and fight, or run from the battlefield in panic. However, what may be is that an
abstraction has been made so that instead of this morale calculation running per solider within a unit, the entire squad that it is made up of shares this value together.
The squads joint morale value is then split into a number of statements which feedback the current level of Morale to the player, these different statements are then used by the game to decide what actions the unit takes in that situation. Furthermore, by the use of statements to split up morale the game has allowed for system where a unit may become obviously more scared or courageous as battle progresses.
Eight statements have been used to split up morale levels,
Impetuous: The highest level of morale, where a units courage may cause it to charge an opponent without being ordered to, and as such may be a double-edged sword. Elite units will start at this level.
Eager: The default level of morale for most units, meaning that units have a long way to drop until the effects of fear start to hit, allowing lower levels to act as a buffer.
Confident, Steady, Shaken: The next three levels down act as this buffer zone, allowing a units morale situation to be improved by the player before the fears of fear to start to take hold.
Wavering: This is the last level where units will continue to fight the enemy. Due to this, the game will now warn the player this unit is on the verge of routing on the unit panel on the HUD.
Broken: This units morale has been torn apart and will now run from the battle towards the maps edges. They will not attempt to get into combat, but if attacked will have a much reduced attacking stat. However, there is still a chance of them returning to combat.
Shattered: The units morale has been completely destroyed and as such will flee the battlefield, just this time there is no chance of them returning.
However, a massive variable on the morale system is that of the leader, the General who has lead this army into battle and features as one of the combat units to be utilised. This General unit has a radius that is highlighted around their position showing their influence on those fighting for them. Any units that enter the Generals radius shall have their morale steadied and as a result will be less influenced by the effects of morale. Nevertheless placing their General in danger to bolster their soldiers morale may lead to them being killed, triggering a wholesale morale drop to units across the battlefield, and potentially forcing them to flee.
Strategic-Level
SHOGUN 2 has utilised the psychology elements of strategy in a way that fits in very well with Clausewitzs trinity. Each of the elements of Government, People and the Army, are crucial to any sort of victory in the strategic side of the game, with the psychological side of each at full prominence in any issues.
Because of the interdependence of the three points of Clausewitzs trinity in the gameplay at the strategic-level, a situation occurs where, without maintaining the obedience of the people, infrastructure will collapse and with it the ability to weld political or military power. Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 144
Without maintaining the political side, either then the clan will divide itself through infighting, splitting the people and the military, or a war will occur that the clan is not ready for, due to the inability to cooperate with the other clans. Finally, without maintaining the military the people will revolt against the players regime and make the ultimate political goal of taking Kyoto impossible. All these scenarios come from the psychological issues that permeate the two main forces, the viewpoint of the people and the honour and loyalty of the political forces, which must utilise these for the military success needed for victory in the campaign.
The psychology of the people shall be a huge friction in particular. If the population of the players provinces run out of control, through a lack of supervision or some form of disaster, then the players ability to win militarily shall be curtailed massively. Such issues force the player to consider the local population whilst conquering, lest if they fail to secure that provinces public order in the aftermath, then this conquest will be short-lived. The player must even give thought to chance, the basis to much friction, as evens such as natural disasters or bad harvests, which are out of the players hands, may be the issue that drags a province into rebellion.
Tactical-Level
Psychology has had a massive impact on the progress of tactical battles and the planning that must go into them. The ability for a player to attack their opponent mentally means that actions such as a charge may be used to force a group of units to flee. Because of this psychological effect in gameplay, the concepts of manoeuvre, such as a flank attack, have an effect far past their physical direction of attack. To the player not only does the ability to attack psychologically give them more options, but also it gives a benefit to planning in a way that allows them to win without having to resort to costly direct combat. Not only will an opponent be defeated far earlier, but will be done so with far less casualties than if the player had fought them face-to-face. Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 145
However, the ability for the enemy to run may be a doubled-edged sword, as any fleeing units can regroup on the strategic map, and as a result physical destruction of the enemy is still necessary to avoid letting an opponents army flee and recover.
SHOGUN 2s combat system has also allowed for the commander to become an objective for each side. Due to the effect that each sides leadership figure that has upon an army, such as steadying their sides morale, their loss can leave the an army without a source of stability and be handicapped as a result, their death ultimately shattering the morale of their forces. By attaching the psychological prominence a leader has in combat, SHOGUN 2 has added objectives to gameplay that replicate the importance of this figure, but also act as points that players can focus any plans in battle toward.
Mechanically, by abstracting morale down to a squad-level, rather than individual, basis, SHOGUN 2 has made morale far easier to evaluate by players in a much quicker time. For a game that commonly involves battles of 1500-3500 troops, with the potential for up to 56,000, an abstraction was needed in calculating morale for the numbers being worked with. Nevertheless, even without extreme numbers, by simplifying the way that feedback to the player is displayed, the psychological element of gameplay down to a relevant level the game has made it easier for players to understand the state of morale. The alternative of working out morale per soldier may have been overwhelming and not have allowed such quick understanding of the situation.
Furthermore, by utilising verbal statements as feedback for morale-levels, SHOGUN 2 has expanded on the accessibility of the morale systems. Rather than forcing the player to try to understand an abstract numerical value, the player can clearly understand the situation through verbal statements that describe the situation instead. Combined with the grouping of morale per squad, this system means players can understand the psychological picture of the battlefield quickly and react just as fast. By providing such an easily understandable Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 146
system, that utilises the verbal nature of psychology, SHOGUN 2 has allowed morale to become not only an important factor in battle, but one that a player may use to their advantage as well.
Russo-German War 41-44
Image 6.16
Russo-German War 41-44 (Schwerpunkt, 2001) is a Turn-Based Strategy game set on the Eastern Front of the Second World War, where players must take command of either the Soviet or German armies for the first three years of the conflict. The developer of RussoGerman War 41-44, Schwerpunkt (2010), state that their design philosophy is to create historically accurate, Operational-Level wargames, based on traditional analogue boardgames. Evaluating how well a mechanical system originally developed for analogue games can represent the influence psychology has upon combat shall be vital to see whether these systems may offer insight into how to approach this issue.
Each unit in Russo-German War represents a military formation ranging from regiment-size up to Army Group/Front level, which each player must manoeuvre upon a hex-based map of the Eastern Front, aiming to capture their opponents cities and destroy their armies. Gameplay is based on a turn-based system where each player must take turns to move their units into place, before awaiting their opponents reply. A unit may attack an enemy unit Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 148
that occupies a hex bordering the one it currently sits within and it is here that any combat is simulated.
Each unit has a number of Combat Modifiers that represent different aspects of their strength and organisation, abstracting many complex areas such as attack and defence strength as well as the terrain that unit occupies, to a single value or statement. One of the modifiers Russo-German War utilises in its combat system is a joint value of Training, Experience, and Morale.
Image 6.17: Gameplay in Russo-German War
Image 6.18: The different indicators on a unit, including that for morale.
A units morale rating is represented by a numerical value of between 0and 3, which is utilised alongside the other Combat Modifiers in the calculation to determine the results of any battles that occur. When combat commences between two units, or groups of units, all the Combat Modifiers for one side are totalled into a single value that represents their combat strength. The ratio between the attackers and the defenders total is then determined before finally a dice-roll is made, using a 1-6 number to determine losses and the chance of one side retreating. The result of these calculations is then made using the Combat Results Table, as follows, Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 150
DICE-ROLL 1 1-3 R A T I O 1-2 1-1 2-1 3-1 4-1 5-1 A1 D1 A1 D1 R A0 D2 R A0 D3 R A0 D3 R A0 D4 R A0 D5 2 A2 D0 A1 D1 A1 D1 R A1 D2 R A0 D2 R A0 D3 R A0 D4 3 A2 D0 A2 D0 A1 D1 R A1 D1 R A1 D2 R A0 D2 R A0 D3 4 A3 D0 A2 D0 A1 D0 A1 D1 R A0 D1 R A1 D2 R A0 D2 5 A3 D0 A3 D0 A2 D0 A1 D0 R A1 D1 R A1 D1 R A1 D2 6 A4 D0 A3 D0 A2 D0 A2 D0 A2 D1 R A1 D1 R A1 D1
R = Retreat
A# = Attacker Losses
Image 6.19
D# = Defender Losses
After combat these losses are applied to each unit, as per the results of the results table, with a Retreat symbolising that the defending unit must also move backwards one hex, whilst the attacker takes their place.
The system used to resolve combat in Russo-German War is based upon the Combat Results Table developed by James Dunnigan (2000, p.19), that utilises the same method of totalling each sides combat strength and comparing this value to a luck-based dice-roll.
Image 6.20: Dunnigans Combat Results Table
By utilising a system that balances the certainty of the standard factors of combat with chance, the friction of combat may be abstracted down to a simple modifier that applies an element of luck to the outcome of a battle. Dunnigan (2000, p.19 & 38) stated that the idea behind the Combat Results Table was to create a gameplay situation where the most powerful player would only have a better chance of victory. The impact of chance in warfare is too great in Dunnigans view to be ignored, and that by using a probability table like his, a player can never rely on certain victory, only able to increase their relative luck.
Through its use of Dunnigans combat results system as a basis for its own, Russo-German War has created a gameplay environment where the two concepts of skill and chance have been balanced against each other. By forcing any certainty that exists to pass through a filter of chance first, the system is able to bring chance into every action that occurs, whilst also keeping skill present through the players accumulation of Combat Modifiers to weigh their luck. Furthermore, by utilising a pre-existing system like Dunnigans the developers were able to balance this application of skill and chance within gameplay to their own requirements.
However, whilst the use of this mechanic has allowed combat to become unpredictable as a whole, psychology as a single factor cannot be said to be the same. Whilst the actual way in which psychology is processed through the mechanical system is unpredictable, due to the use of dice-rolls for combat results, it is not psychology itself that is bringing this element of chance to gameplay. Instead, as morale is one of the Combat Modifiers, it will act as part of the side to the mechanic that applies certainty by steading the impact that chance has upon the results of combat. Morale in the game is a known quantity and its existence shall only act to decrease the impact that chance may have upon a players actions.
The use of psychology as a factor in Russo-German War has therefore been applied in the same way as any of the material factors that represent the element of skill in the game, something only emphasised by the numerical way in which it has been presented. In contrast, whilst chance does have an impact on combat, the utilisation of the nature of psychology within this may have created a greater link between the potency of this effect and the players actions on the ground.
Conclusions
What genre does the game come under and how has this affected what factors have been chosen and their level of detail?
A large correlation has been shown to exist between the control that a genre shall typically give the player over their actions during gameplay and how the psychological factors have been applied to gameplay.
During a Real-Time or Turn-Based Strategy title, where the players task is to order the movements of AI-controlled units, not make these moves themselves, the implementation of a system that alters how an action is carried out does not add much frustration. As long as the reason is communicated clearly enough, one of the players units being forced to run can be made to seem a normal reaction, rather than control being ripped form the players hands.
However, in a First-Person Shooter title, a player has far more control over the actions of their avatar, usually amounting to the ability to move freely as and when they like. The addition of a mechanic that manipulates their actions in the same way units do in a Strategy title may cause large amounts of frustration as the players control, which comes from expectations of the genre, is removed. As such, a First-Person Shooter may instead opt for modifiers and visual effects aimed at the player, often artificially inhibiting their sense of control, but never removing it completely, as was seen in Red Orchestra 2 (Tripwire Interactive, 2011).
What level, or levels, of war does this game take place at? Has this game implemented the psychology of war at each of these and if so how?
The level of war at which a game takes place at shall have a powerful impact on both the level of detail of the mechanics used for psychology and the factors utilised as inspiration for this system in the first place. The higher up the levels of a command a game falls, the more abstracted the application of psychological mechanics has been seen to be, ultimately moving up to just the base factors of Fear and Courage as the most simplified version.
However, the higher up the levels of war a game find itself, the more prominent that the strategic factors of psychology will appear, starting more abstracted using the basis of Clausewitzs trinity, before expanding on these as the game moves up to the realms of general strategy. It is important, therefore, to understand clearly what level of war a game is attempting to take place at whilst designing it. With this knowledge available, the level of abstraction required for the desired factors of psychology can be accounted for, not only for their level of detail on the battlefield, but for those of strategic psychology on the other two points of the trinity, the government and the people.
What mechanical system has been used to represent psychology?
What has been noted in the analysis is that often, by using verbal statements as basis, psychological states may be simplified to a level that can be easily read and understood by the player. Morale is a concept that is spoken of through language, not numbers, and as a result, by using verbal statements to indicate feedback, the fundamental basis of this elements role in planning and the way that its impact is analysed in reality may be introduced and abstracted for gameplay. Numbers can often show elements, such as the material factors, in a far clearer light, but for an element like psychology, mechanics cannot hope to break morale down to mathematics when such an approach is unreadable in comparison to language for commanders in the real world. Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 155
However, an issue commonly seen is that of certainty in mechanics designed to represent psychology in wargames, where often the impact of one factor upon gameplay is certain in terms of value or level of effect. What the psychological element requires is a system that preserves the fundamentals of a fair input-output system, but also introduces an element of friction, which underpins much of psychologys influence on the battlefield. Ultimately, abstraction comes down to preserving the nature of what it represents (Juul, 2007), and if psychology is to be the same, then this will be necessary, requiring a system that represents both the elements unpredictable and verbal sides.
What difference does the inclusion of psychological issues have on gameplay overall?
Overall psychology has been shown to have a massive influence on gameplay, which when included, have often acted as a counterweight to material-based mechanics, each with the ability to undermine or boost the other and adding an extra dimension to combat. Many of the titles analysed have utilised psychology in a way that allows it to take the role of chance within gameplay, balancing the material factors that emphasise skill.
Examples of how the application of psychology influences gameplay can be seen in examples where players now had the option to scare a tank away, rather than having to outright destroy it, as was seen in Battle Academy (Slitherine Software, 2010). By giving the player extra options, through combining psychological and material effects into gameplay, variety and depth may be introduced to combat situations, above what material-only mechanics can achieve.
However, examples have also been shown of wargames that utilise psychology, but do so in a way that instead of placing psychology within chance, makes it a part of skill instead, through the inclusion of mechanics focused on certainty. While as previously mentioned, Battle Academy (Slitherine Software, 2010) allowed for the creation of a combat system that Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 156
combined psychology and the material factors, it did so in a way that produced certain results in terms of any impact on morale .
Much of the issues with certainty or uncertainty come back to Sabins (2012, p.117) trinity of the three influences that affect a wargame.
Image 6.21
When devising a game mechanic attempting to represent psychology, designers must be unafraid to move away from Skill, out of fear of creating an unfair game, but similarly not falling too close to Chance, lest psychology becomes a completely unpredictable force. Finally, whilst this is happening, the approach must not then just move straight to Reality. Abstraction is essential if the psychological element is to be successfully applied to game mechanics, but at the same time must have a level of accessibility that allows players to handle and apply it to gameplay.
A wargame that can balance itself within Sabins (2012, p.117) trinity shall be in a position to combine the influence that chance and skill may have upon mechanics and enrich gameplay as a result. By utilising the nature of psychology to create chance, while still allowing the material factors to stay certain and represent skill, a designer shall be able to a create a system that achieves this ideal.
8. Methodology II: Developing a Theory
Analysis
Through this studys analysis of the representation of the psychological element of conflict in wargames, one common issue noted has been the predictability of many of the mechanical systems utilised in these games. Often the systems utilised have relied on definite outcomes where morale has been measured numerically and the outputs triggered are certain, in contrast to the unpredictability that this study has shown to make up part of the nature of psychology.
Under a mechanical structure that emphasises certainty, the argument that it is impossible for the psychological factors of war to be represented through rules and mechanics, whilst preserving its very nature, is astute. Such an unpredictable element will never be able to be portrayed using a system that only produces certain results if unpredictability is critical to the nature of psychology.
The other side to the nature of psychology in war that this study has found is the fact that it is a factor only ever referred to through verbal means. By utilising language, as do some of the games studied, the player may be made clear of the mental state of their troops in a way that reflects how such issues are analysed in reality. However, verbal methods stand in contrast to the mechanical nature of games due to their vague nature, meaning that simply giving numerical groups names will not bring in the ambiguity that exists in natural language.
A mechanical system for psychological game mechanics must therefore combine both the unpredictability of the elements impact on battle as well as the verbal way in which it is spoken of. Furthermore, any system must made sure to not stray too far towards skill and chance individually, instead keeping the balance that Sabins (2012, p.117) trinity suggests. By keeping to mechanical systems that emphasise certainty, a game will lean too far Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 160
towards skill to make use of the unpredictability of chance. Similarly, if a game only brings the uncertainty of psychology into consideration, then that wargame will move too far toward chance and lose the link with skill needed to create the needed balance. What is required is a mechanical system that allows psychology to be the main producer of chance in a wargame, but at the same time does not drag gameplay too far away from skill to be enjoyable.
Creation of a Mechanical Basis
If the need for a balance between skill and chance is needed for the representation of psychology in wargames, then a method that may be proposed is that of Fuzzy Logic, a mathematic theory based upon the principle that nothing in life is black and white, true or false. Fuzzy Logic instead works upon the basis that everything may be calculated through shades of grey or degrees of truth (Kosko, 1994, p.18-19). A major part of Fuzzy Logic has been creating the ability for computers to process data based upon verbal statements through natural language. One example of fuzziness in language is the use of phrases such as tall or young, both of which have a vague meaning with no absolute definition, unlike saying six-foot tall or twenty-one years old, in a way that can be applied to a mathematical model; or rather rules. Fuzzy Logic however aims to allow such vague terms to be applied through mechanical means (Nguyen & Walker, 2000, p.1-3).
The use of Fuzzy Logic is underpinned by the grouping of numerical data into what are known as Fuzzy Sets, placing these values into uncertain, overlapping sets of data (Kosko, 1993, p.162). The example below (Image 7.1) shows a basic game mechanic based upon Fuzzy Logic that aims to create reactions based upon a units level of Fear, that instead being calculated on a 0-100 value, has divided this range into three overlapping Fuzzy Sets of Low, Medium, and High. The unit in questions current level of Fear shall be defined as being one of these three verbal statements and shall act as the inputs for this mechanic (Kosko, 1993, p.162). Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 161
Image 7.1
A second group of Fuzzy Sets are then created using the same process as the value for Fear, except now representing the three actions desired from that unit, being either to Withdraw Slowly, Run Away, or Flee (Kosko, 1993, p.162). These three sets shall act as the outputs for the mechanic.
Next Fuzzy Rules must be developed, linking the optimum outcome to each input, so that verbal rules may be created between the input and output Fuzzy Sets (Kosko, 1993, p.163). Looking back at the example, one interaction that may now be applicable to mechanics would be to say:
If Unit Fear is Medium then Run Away
However to achieve the link with these outputs in an uncertain manner, Defuzzification must take place, finding an output from a Fuzzy Set to be used to match the corresponding action. To find this number the average from between the two axis of the Fuzzy Set may be Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 162
found (Kosko, 1993, p.172) or alternatively may be a random number between the two end point of the Fuzzy Set if a more unpredictable result is required.
The value created for the input set data may then be compared with the outputs, using that number to correspond to a relevant action in the second graph (Kosko, 1993, p.175). In the case of the Fear mechanic example, the further from True or 1 this end point is, either the effect is merged alongside its neighbour, or the respective ratios adding as percentagebased chances of each occurring. The Fuzzy rule may therefore instead become,
If Unit Fear is Medium then .7 Run Away and .3 Routed or If Unit Fear is Medium then probably Run Away
Benefits to This New Mechanical Basis
What the use of Fuzzy Logic could bring to the development of mechanical systems designed to represent the psychology of war is way in which the conflicting factors of skill, chance, and verbal feedback are balanced.
Firstly, due to the verbal nature in which Fuzzy Logic bases its input and output system along, by grouping factors into statements managed by language, the system already delivers a pre-existing method to bring a verbal method of feedback into gameplay. As each Fuzzy Set takes its data from traditional numerical values, such a system may easily be converted into utilising this form of verbal-based mechanics. Furthermore, because of the inaccurate and overlapping way in which Fuzzy Sets are developed, the inaccurate and vague nature of this language is conveyed far better than if these had simply been definite beginning and ends (de Byl, 2012, p.305). Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 163
The other need that Fuzzy Logic tackles when it comes to acting as the basis to mechanics based upon the psychological element of war may be traced back again to Sabins trinity (Image 7.2). If psychology is to take its place as the main cause of chance within a wargame then the ability for it to be balanced alongside skill must exist. Through its inaccurate method of first creating each input and output data set, the allowance for chance to impact upon gameplay becomes very high, especially if utilising a random method of Defuzzification and percentage-based action occurrence. However, due to the steadying force of the Fuzzy Sets and ability for the designer to weigh the chances of each action that occurs from the output graphs, skill is retained in the psychological system.
Image 7.2
Because the designer may stipulate the positions of each of the Fuzzy Sets and determine the amount of chance present in the Fuzzy Rules, the ability for the balance between skill and chance to match the game created becomes far easier. A game design whose creators feel psychology is currently bringing too much chance to gameplay and off-balancing skill may easily adjust the values used. The Fuzzy Sets used to determine data sets may easily have their overlaps reduced and outputs percentages made a more certain amount if chance must be reduced and skill increased. Similarly, the axis of each Fuzzy Set may be overlapped further or percentages made less certain if more chance is needed in favour of skill.
By utilising Fuzzy Logic, developers may not only allow themselves to recreate the dual nature of psychology in war, as an uncertain and verbally represented element, more accurately than standard input-output methods. What Fuzzy logic allows for is a method that may be easily tweaked and adjusted, dependent on the need for the balance of chance and skill. If Fuzzy Logic is utilised for mechanical representations of psychology, a basis will exist that may be perfected through testing, allowing the control over both chance and skills balance. If a developer can ultimately control the balance between skill and chance through quick modifications of their mechanical system to, their ability to match what Sabins (2012, p.117) thoughts on the need for their balance may be achieved.
Use by a Developer
Battle Academy
Battle Academy (Slitherine Software, 2010), as discussed, is a game that prominently uses a numeric method that creates definite outcomes to judge the impact of morale on the actions of units. Using Fuzzy Logic and Fuzzy Sets for verbal statements, the range upon which actions are triggered along morales numeric range could be subject to more chance and luck, in a similar vein to the way Battle Academy handles the destruction of units. Currently the game relies on pure-skill for the handling of the psychological issues of conflict, whilst combat as a whole has a balances it with skill, which makes the ability exploit chance in battle possible. Through Fuzzy Logic, the balance between chance and skill in Battle Academy may be addressed, creating a mix that will add to the depth of gameplay.
Red Orchestra 2
Whilst, as stated, Red Orchestra 2 (Tripwire Interactive, 2011) will come at the issue of psychology from a far different angle than some other titles, due to its First-person Shooter status, the use of Fuzzy Logic may still be applicable. As of now the game does not feedback to a players allies their current level of morale, something that would be hard to make readable through the visual system used to feedback to the player themselves. Through Fuzzy Logic, such information as morale-level could be easily shared, by converting the numerical value for morale into a verbal statement, which could then be shared with allied players through looking at an ally for an amount of time. Through feeding back morale to other players, Red Orchestra 2 could allow for a higher level of understanding to a teams tactical situation for those within it, allowing to them to make decisions based upon this knowledge.
Close Combat III
Whilst the implementation of exhaustion in Close Combat III (Atomic Games, 1998) introduced the issue that exists of balancing it alongside experience, the system worked on a very definite basis, with a unit simply either being in need of a rest or not. By utilising Fuzzy Logic, the same verbal statements used in tactical-level combat could be applied to the strategic-level, allowing the same level of balance between skill and chance. With Fuzzy Sets laying the basis for statements, feedback could highlight the current level of exhaustion in each unit, but without the need for numbers and with the ability for a level of unpredictability that would remove any chance of a dry repetitive rotation system, which may occur if set turn amounts were utilised.
R.U.S.E.
Whilst a predictable system was a necessity for the deception mechanic utilised within R.U.S.E. (Eugen Systems, 2010), in order to acquaint players with an unfamiliar mechanic such as the Ruse system, Fuzzy Logic may be easily applied to future versions of this mechanic, in this series or others. By utilising Fuzzy Logic, chance could be brought into the use of operational techniques, by allowing Fuzzy Sets to act as verbal statements to represent odds and allow the ability have different effects based on the statement that ultimately is output. Through adding fuzzy systems to its Ruse mechanic, games like R.U.S.E. could add an element of uncertainty to situations such as the Propaganda and Fanaticism, which instead of a direct override could instead allow for a conflicting balance, through the varying levels of truth between the two.
Total War: SHOGUN 2
Total War: SHOGUN 2 (The Creative Assembly, 2011) already uses a statement-based method of feeding-back tactical morale levels to the player and as such the implementation of Fuzzy Logic would be incredibly easy. What Fuzzy Logic could bring to the game would be an increased level of chance in the actual levels of morale a unit drops to during gameplay, adding a level of uncertainty to engagements as well as chance-based actions such as rebuoyed troops, allowing combat to turn on an instant.
Russo-German War 41-44
The use of Fuzzy Logic in Russo-German War may be one method to apply psychology in a different way to that of the material factors, not only by developing a verbal method of presenting the element, but by also allowing morale to be influenced more by chance than by skill.
Fuzzy Logic can output unpredictable results and so the use of various verbal psychological statements could be utilised as the main influence as well as the way in which chance is applied. Rather than disconnected dice-rolls, which gives chance the same influence whatever the in-game situation, the use of the psychological status of those units on the ground may allow the application of uncertainty to originate from the state of gameplay itself. If the situation on the ground is more uncertain then this may be allowed to influence the level of effect at which chance is applied.
A results table like Dunnigans (2000, p.19) has its advantages when it comes to keeping analogue gameplay simplified, so that players may concentrate on gameplay instead of working out results, as the developer Schwerpunkt (2010) state to be their aim with using such a system. However, it must not be forgotten that computerised wargames take away the need to calculate results, and as such, the potential for extra depth to exist when calculating results is far higher, without the worry about interference on gameplay that would occur in an analogue title. As such applying a system like Fuzzy Logic may be a valid option alongside a traditional system like this.
9. Conclusions
This report has found the following conclusions on the role of the psychological element of conflict, both in war studies and as a factor to be represented in wargames.
1. The nature of the psychological element of war is both unpredictable in outcome and referred to through vague verbal statements.
In analysing the psychological element of war, a strong link has been shown to exist between the mental factors and Clausewitzs concepts of chance and friction. The factors evaluated that make up part of the psychological influence in combat are often uncertain in outcome, with unexpected or contradictory actions being commonly carried out by soldiers in battle. Overall, there have been no certain reactions or results found in any of the factors that make up psychology, simply outcomes that are either the most likely or more desirable by one side.
This unpredictability in psychologys application within conflict is only furthered by the lack of mechanical systems for evaluating the level of effect or strength of the elements influence, instead verbal terms such as good and bad are used. Without any certainty in how the psychological side of war influences combat, they have become impossible to quantify through numerical systems, instead leaving natural language as the only method of communicating any impact that occurs. Furthermore, due to the vagueness of natural language, the meanings of any verbal statements used to describe psychology are often specific to the background or experiences of the one using them, as well as the situation at hand. The nature of the psychological element of war may therefore be described as unpredictable in application and verbal in evaluation.
2. The psychological element is present in and may be exploited at all three levels of war.
The influence of psychology upon warfare does not only surround the immediate reactions of those soldiers in combat at the Tactical-Level, but also has an observable impact at the Operational and Strategic-Levels of war as well.
Operationally, psychology is beginning to become a major part of planning for this level of conflict, with the mental impact of airpower now having been recognised alongside the material, and the targeting of various forms of PSYOPs toward an opponent a major part of a campaign. Attacking an opponent mentally has been shown to have a great effect on softening an enemy before an attack, and so how the psychological factors of combat may be exploited is now of critical importance to an Operational-Level commander.
At the Strategic-Level, the influence of Clausewitzs trinity of the Army, the People, and the Government must then be brought into consideration. The same ideals of exploiting the psychological state of an opponent may be targeted toward the three groups that constitute Clausewitzs trinity, manipulating their mental state through similar applications of PSYOPs or airpower. The effect of disabling an opponents will to fight, away from just those on the battlefield, can be as vital to causing their overall collapse as is the destruction of their armies.
3. If the influence of psychology upon warfare to be fully understood, then research of the same level of this report must be undertaken on the psychological factors of politics and people.
This study has predominantly focused on the influence that a soldiers mental state shall have on combat, as a method of understanding the nature of the psychological element of war. However, if the way in which psychology affects war is to be understood as a whole, then a similar level of research to that completed for this study must be undertaken on the psychological factors that exist within the two groups of the government and the people as well. Only when all three points of Clausewitzs trinity have been analysed in full shall an answer be found to what is the real influence that psychology has on war, not just the impact it has upon the Army as this study has focused on for the most part.
4. For the nature of the psychological element of war to be represented in wargames, game mechanics that create certain results and numerical feedback must be avoided.
If the nature of psychology in war is as unpredictable as this study has found, then any game mechanics that focus on certain results, by utilising standard input-output systems, shall be undesirable. If a designer wishes to use the influence that the psychological factors have on combat within their game mechanics, then a system must be utilised that emphasises the inherent uncertainty that provides the basis of the element.
Furthermore, the application of the nature of psychology in game mechanics shall not only affect the calculation of any in-game results, but also the way in which these results are relayed to the player through feedback. If the psychological elements verbal nature is as important as this study suggests, then the utilisation of numerical methods for providing feedback shall not only be ignoring reality, but also the reasoning behind their avoidance. Psychology cannot be quantified into numerical systems, due to the lack of certainty in their Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 172
occurrence, and as such, any use of numerical data shall have no clear meaning behind what each value represents. By utilising verbal feedback, the vagueness of psychology may be retained in a way that allows players to grasp an understanding of the situation far quicker than abstract numbers may do so instead.
5. Wargames must make sure that they balance the two concepts of skill and chance in their mechanics. The application of chance-based psychological mechanics may be used in conjunction with skill-based material mechanics to achieve this.
Phillip Sabins (2012, p.117) trinity has shown a need for wargames to balance the application of the two factors of skill and chance within game mechanics, avoiding a situation where gameplay falls too far toward each corner and ignoring the nature of warfare through doing so. Instead, game mechanics should aim to create systems that allow the two factors to work alongside each other and bring depth to gameplay as a result. A game that balances skill and chance will not only test the players ability to win through their own abilities, but also challenge them to improvise on their plans when factors outside their control influence gameplay.
Image 9.1
If this balance between skill and chance is as important to gameplay in a wargame as Sabin suggests, then knowing what elements of warfare may be utilised to increase either of these Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 173
factors shall be crucial. Psychology may be one of these elements to be utilised, as whilst the material factors quantifiable nature shall allow it to take up the role of skill, psychologys link with unpredictability makes the element a natural way of creating chance. By utilising psychology as a source of chance alongside the material factors as a source of skill, a designer may be able to create the balance the Sabin suggested.
It is for this reason that an accurate representation of the nature of psychology shall be desirable to the design of a wargame, past just an aim for realism. As Russo-German War (Schwerpunkt, 2001) displayed, psychology may be simply be applied as theming for a standard skill-based mechanic. Whilst having no connection to the reality of the area, a mechanic like this may be included to link the mechanic back to the theme of a wargame, easily interchangeable with any other element. It is by the accurate representation of psychologys nature however, that a designer shall be able to exploit its uncertainty as a potent tool for introducing chance to their game mechanics. By aiming for accuracy in its application, the task of balancing chance and skill shall become easier if the nature of psychology is included.
6. That Fuzzy Logic may be used as a mechanical basis to applying psychology in wargames, due to its ability to balance both skill and chance as well as apply feedback through vague verbal terms.
The concept of Fuzzy Logic is based upon idea of creating vague or uncertain answers within a mechanical system and as such may be a potent method of developing game mechanics for representing the psychological element of warfare.
The fact that Fuzzy Logic allows the designer to set the level of uncertainty in the Fuzzy Sets developed, means that the concept of balancing skill and chance may be brought down to a mechanical level. If a wargame requires more skill, then the Fuzzy Sets may be made more certain, with less overlap between each collection of data. Similarly, if more chance is Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 174
needed in the game, then the Fuzzy Sets used may be set to be more uncertain, through a greater level of overlap between each group.
Furthermore, the fact that Fuzzy Logic is built upon converting numerical values into verbal statements makes it perfect for representing the role that language plays when the psychological factors are discussed. By utilising Fuzzy logic, verbal feedback may be given to players, whilst also retaining its vague basis and the way that it relates to psychologys unpredictability as a whole. Instead of good and bad meaning one set definite concept, just how certain either of these statements are becomes far more vague to the player and allows for the uncertainty of both psychology and verbal statements to be represented in tandem.
Ultimately, Fuzzy Logic allows a designer to introduce a balanced application of psychology with skill and chance in gameplay, that may be modified to suit any level of skill or chance the designer wishes to achieve. Furthermore, Fuzzy Logic does so in a way that utilises the verbal nature of Fuzzy Sets to act as feedback on the status of uncertain areas in a more easily understood and natural manner.
Further Research
As identified this study now needs to be joined by research of a similar level that focuses on the role of psychology on the other two corners of Clausewitzs trinity, the Government and the People. Just how the mental state of these two groups influences the StrategicLevel of warfare shall be critical to developing a full understanding of psychology in war, with questions such as the role of ideology in both groups, or the impact of crowd mentally in the people needing an answer.
Wargames shall also need to be compared to the other two points on the trinity, if the full range of influences at the Strategic-Level of war is to be understood and utilised in gameplay. As such games like SimCity 3000 (Maxis, 1999) that focus only on politics and people, or Geo-Political Simulator (Eversim, 2008) which aims to present strategy from a political point of view, may be useful sources for understanding how wargames may incorporate the full range of Clausewitzs trinity when it comes to psychology.
Whether the nature of psychology can be analysed and represented in the same uncertain or vague terms that is seen from a military angle shall be crucial to understanding whether the analysis of mechanical systems in this study applies to these other areas. Ultimately, the interconnection between the three groups of Clausewitzs trinity must be evaluated if the role of psychology as an element of war, both in reality and wargames, is to be understand as a whole.
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11. Image List
Image 1.1: (Sabin, 2012, p.117, Figure 8.1) Image 4.1: Aftermath of the Bombing of Hamburg: http://www.boerner.net/jboerner/wpcontent/uploads/2010/04/Hamburg_after_the_1943_bombing.jpg Image 4.2: Applique Armour welded onto an M4 Sherman: http://www.boerner.net/jboerner/wpcontent/uploads/2010/04/Hamburg_after_the_1943_bombing.jpg Image 4.3: The Nebelwerfer: http://static.howstuffworks.com/gif/russian-army-repelshitlers-forces-23.jpg Image 4.4: Panzerkampfwagen VI Tiger: http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWtiger.jpg Image 4.5: Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery: http://www.trueknowledge.com/images/thumbs/180/250/Bernard_Law_Montgomery.jpg Image 4.6: Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel: http://ep.yimg.com/ca/I/mcmahanphoto_2205_230578282 Image 5.1: The different levels of war: (United States Depart. of the Army, 2001, p. 2-3, Figure 2.1) Image 5.2: A leaflet dropped over Iraqi forces, offering safe passage to those in possession of it: (Davies, 1996, p.51, Figure 4). Image 5.3: (United States Depart. of the Army, 2001, p. 2-3, Figure 2.1) Image 5.4: Marshalls Five-Ring Theory: (Chun, 2008, p.299, Figure 1) Image 5.5: http://www.moviepostershop.com/desert-victory-movie-poster-1943 Image 6.1: (Sabin, 2012, p.117, Figure 8.1) Image 6.2: http://www.slitherine.co.uk/box/BA-frontshot-800px.jpg Image 6.3: Morale and attack values may be seen for an American and German unit: http://www.slitherine.co.uk/screenshots/original/game_1277805287.jpg Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 192
Image 6.4: http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51Ll8lZRTWL.jpg Image 6.5: HUD of Red Orchestra 2 with the Suppression Meter marked: http://rawrecruits.com/resources/images/hudinfantry.png Image 6.6: http://media.giantbomb.com/uploads/2/29439/892244-cc3.jpg Image 6.7: Units whose status is in red are shown to be effected by morale, the LMG Infantry Cowering for example: http://www.frenchville.net/CloseCombat3/battle6_big.jpg Image 6.8: The pink and blue bars next to units representing Morale and Experience on the company management screen: http://www.frenchville.net/CloseCombat3/requisition_big.jpg Image 6.9: http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/A146StjjLXL._AA1500_.jpg Image 6.10: Exclamation marks show a unit whose morale has forced them to flee: http://img13.imageshack.us/img13/4664/ruse2009120719061029.jpg Image 6.11: Sectors that have had Ruses applied to them: http://img12.imageshack.us/img12/1909/ruse2009120718344331.jpg Image 6.12: http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/91XZVG%2BFgQL._AA1500_.jpg Image 6.13: Armies on the Campaign Map: http://elmundotech.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/22519shogun2_spring_campaignlarge.jpg Image 6.14: Public order information for a province: http://shogun2.heavengames.com/galleries/20/0000/0682/nanban11_1__618x778.jpg Image 6.15: A cavalry units morale noted by the information box, here Eager: http://img717.imageshack.us/img717/1214/2011032200011.jpg Image 6.16: http://sugarfreegamer.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/05/rgw_setup_splash.jpg Nicholas Edwards 08003479 What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics? 193
Image 6.17: Gameplay in Russo-German War: http://schwerpunkt.wargamer.com/files/rgwss1.jpg Image 6.18: The different indicators on a unit, including that for morale: (Schwerpunkt, 2001, Reference Card) Image 6.19: Replicated from: (Schwerpunkt, 2001, Users Guide, p.33) Image 6.20: Dunnigans Combat Results Table: (Dunnigan, 2000, p.19) Image 6.21: (Sabin, 2012, p.117, Figure 8.1) Image 7.1: Created by author, based upon: (Kosko, 1993, p.164, Figure 10.4) Image 7.2: (Sabin, 2012, p.117, Figure 8.1) Image 9.1: (Sabin, 2012, p.117, Figure 8.1)

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What is the Nature of the Psychological Element of War and can it be Represented Through Game Mechanics?

M.Eng Computer Games Design

Supervised by Capt. (Hon) Stephen Webley MAY 2012

1. Introduction to the Problem

The Importance of Psychology in War

Nature of Psychology in War

Understanding this Problem

2. Analysing the Factors of Psychology: The Base Factors

The Base Factors

Courage and Fear

3. Analysing the Factors of Psychology: Combat Motivation

How Cohesion is Formed

Experience and Exhaustion

4. Analysing the Factors of Psychology: The External Factors

Effects of Technology on the User

Image 4.1: Aftermath of the Bombing of Hamburg

The Placebo Effect

Image 4.2: Applique Armour welded onto an M4 Sherman

Effects of Technology on the Receiver

Image 4.3: The Nebelwerfer

Image 4.4: Panzerkampfwagen VI Tiger

Impact of the Commander

Image 4.5: Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery

Effect on the Opponent

Image 4.6: Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel

5. Analysing the Factors of Psychology: The Higher Levels of War

The Psychological Centre of Gravity Overview

Manoeuvre Basis and Psychological Effect

Limitations & Criticisms

Psychological Versus Material

Image 5.4: Wardens Five-Ring Theory

6. Analysing the Factors of Psychology: Conclusion

7. Methodology I: Quantifying Psychology in Games

Image 6.1 (Sabin, 2012, p.117)

Mechanical Systems and Psychology

Psychology and its Impact on Gameplay

Red Orchestra 2: Heroes of Stalingrad

Mechanical Systems and Psychology

Psychology and its Impact on Gameplay

Close Combat III: The Russian Front

Mechanical Systems and Psychology

Psychology and its Impact on Gameplay

Mechanical Systems and Psychology

Image 6.11: Sectors that have had Ruses applied to them.

Psychology and its Impact on Gameplay

Total War: SHOGUN 2

Mechanical Systems and Psychology

Image 6.13: Armies on the Campaign Map.

Image 6.14: Public order information for a province.

Eight statements have been used to split up morale levels,

Psychology and its Impact on Gameplay

Russo-German War 41-44

Mechanical Systems and Psychology

Image 6.17: Gameplay in Russo-German War

Psychology and its Impact on Gameplay

Image 6.20: Dunnigans Combat Results Table

What mechanical system has been used to represent psychology?

8. Methodology II: Developing a Theory

Creation of a Mechanical Basis

If Unit Fear is Medium then Run Away

Benefits to This New Mechanical Basis

Close Combat III

Total War: SHOGUN 2