Indonesia along with its neigboring countries had become premier examples of the developmental state model in the

1990s. It emphasized on the centrality of the role of government in achieving economic growth and development. There existed an insulated, economically-oriented bureaucracy operating in a compliant society.1 However, in todays globalized world where states relevance have continuously been questioned and challenged, does developmental state remain a valid model for Indonesia? Even more, can it function under the young democratic regime? By focusing on the period of 1999 until present, this essay argues that developmental state continue to exist in the country, but has deviated from the original model proposed by Leftwich. It will be organized into three sections: first, evolution of the developmental state in Indonesia under democracy; second, rationales behind such system of governance; and third, evaluating its effectivity in formulating and implementing policies. In his discussion, Leftwich pointed out six major components that define the developmental state model, implying that it could only operate under an authoritarian regime led by technocrats2. The model greatly contrasted elements of democracy that fosters strong civil societies, discourages repression, emphasizes transparent and accountable governance, and most importantly allows the questioning of authorities.3 In Leftwichs own words, ...democracy is essentially a conservative system of power, geared to stability, not change (development). Following this logic, Indonesias democratic transformation in 1999 should indicate an end to the countrys development. However, looking at the present condition, developmental efforts seem to have taken on a new height as evident through the decreasing rate of poverty in addition to continuous positive economic growth.4 This achievement is due to various factors among which are: the prevalence of developmental elite, economic performance legitimacy, and the strengthening of civil society. The first two are major components of the developmental state as argued by Leftwich, therefore implying that Indonesia continues to follow the model but has adapted it to meet democratic demands. The current existence of a developmental elite in Indonesia may not be as explicit as it was back during the New Order regime when one-third of the governing cabinet consisted of active or retired military officers. 5 Nowadays elite fragmentation commonly occurs in the legislative body, which may appear as inefficient and ineffective. A closer analysis on economic policy making in Indonesia indicate that such absence of compromise does not hinder the government in achieving developmental goals. According to the National Development Planning System (Sistem Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional), long term development plans were formulated under the Agency based on technocratic considerations taken from

Leftwich, Adrian. Bringing Politics Back In: Towards a Model of the Developmental State. Journal of Development Studies Vol. 31 Issue 3, 1995. Accessed on: 25 February 2012. Available from: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00220389508422370 2 Six major components of developmental state model: (i) developmental elite, (ii) autonomy, (iii) powerful, competent, and insulated economic bureaucracy, (iv) weak and suborinated civil society, (v) effective management of non-state economic interests, and (vi) repression, legitimacy and performance. (See Leftwich) 3 Leftwich, Adrian. Democracy and Development: Is there Institutional Incompatibility?. Democratization Vol. 12, No. 5, December 2005. Accessed on 17 February 2012. 4 Indonesias Poverty Line: To make a million people unpoor. The Economists, 3 August 2011. Accessed on: 27 February 2012. Available from: http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/08/indonesias-poverty-line 5 Leftwich. Bringing Politics Back In: Towards a Model of the Developmental State.Op.Cit

ministerial reports.6 The recent product of this process is what referred to as MP3EI (Masterplan for the Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesias Economic Development) that was launched last year. It must be noted that from Megawatis regime in 2002 until Yudhoyonos present regime, key economic ministerial positions were filled by technocrats with professional background in developmental fields, such as Sri Mulyani, Kwik Kian Gie, Mari Elka Pangestu, Gita Wirjawan, and the current finance minister Agus Martowardojo. These figures are the present developmental elite who remain absent from political interests and forms the primary ring around the President. Moreover, the Indonesian constitution allowed the President to have discretionary powers in setting down economic policies without legislative approval.7 This allows the executive body to effectively achieve economic development goals similar to what had happened during the Suharto regime. The democratic system is not at all threatened by the process because check and balance system continues to operate through the legislative. Similar to the New Order regime, present Indonesian government maintain economic performance as their source of legitimacy. This is reflected through annual surveys on government satisfaction for which economic performance remain an essential independent variable.8 Governments popularity is high in correspond with a positive economic growth and reduction in poverty level. Therefore, it has continued to set economic goals as their highest priority, which is evident in President Yudhoyonos state address in front of the Peoples Consultative Assembly (MPR).9 One of the main reason for President Yudhoyonos reelection in 2009 was his success in developing Indonesias economic resilience against the global financial crisis. The third characteristic of present developmental state in Indonesia is the existence of a strong civil society, as represented through NGOs, interest groups, and labor unions. According to Tuong Vu, there are two components to the developmental state: developmental structure and developmental role.

Datta, Ajoy; Jones, Harry; Febriany, Vita & Harris, Dan. The Political Economy of Policy-making in Indonesia: Opportunities for Improving the Demand and Use of Knowledge. Overseas Development Institute July 2011. 7 Ibid 8 Menurunnya Kinerja Pemerintah dan Disilusi tehadap Partai Politik. Lembaga Survei Indonesia. January 2011. Accessed on 28 February 2012. Available from:http://www.lsi.or.id/riset/400/Rilis%20LSI%206%20Januari%202011 9 Ladies and Gentlemen, along with the accleration and expansion program of the Indonesian economy in the next 15 years, we hope for greater domestic job opportunities so that our brothers and sisters should no longer work in the informal or household sector abroad. This is very crucial as it relates to the dignity and pride of our nation. (unofficial translation of President Yudhoyonos State Address on 16 August 2011). Accessed on 28 February 2012. Available from: http://presidensby.info/index.php/pidato/2011/08/16/1692.html