LocGov Digests by J.S.deinLA

THE LAW
PROF. GISELLA
ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS N. DIZON REYES | 2 SEMESTER, AY 2011-2012

ND
a political subdivision which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs Alvarez vs. Guingona (1996)
I. II.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND IN THE PHILIPPINES NATURE

AND
OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
STATUS
A.
Municipal corporation, local government defined; local government interchangeable with municipal corporations Public corporation created by the state as its own device and agency for the accomplishment of part of its own public functions classified into 1) municipal; 2) nonmunicipal; and 3) quasi-public corporations >> Municipal corporation a body corporate and politic organized for the government of a definite locality J. Dillon: established by law partly as an agency of the state to assist in the civil government of the country but chiefly to regulate and administer the local or internal affairs of a city, town, or district which is incorporated >> Non-municipal corporation created by the state solely as its own device and agency for the accomplishment of some parts of its own public work other than the local government carried on in designated areas by municipal corporations >> Quasi-public corporation combines some elements of both public and private corporations; organized for private profit, but their operations serve the needs of the general comfort, welfare, and convenience Private corporation formed for some private purpose, benefit, aim, or end, as distinguished from public corporations which have for their purpose the general good and welfare (i.e. public service corporations) Local Government
Facts: In this Petition for Prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction, petitioners assailed the validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago. Petitioners claimed that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its average annual income for the last two consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices falls below the required annual income of P20 M for its conversion into a city. The average annual income, arrived at after petitioners deducted the IRAs, would only be P13,109,560.47. Issue: WON the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the computation of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent component city Held: YES. IRAs form part of the income of LGUs. A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs. Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio, the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral local government units to develop not only at their own pace and discretion but also with their own resources and assets. The vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every local government unit is accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions. Availment of such resources is effectuated through the vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national
DEINLA, JOSALEE S. | 2002-26115
taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries. The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds accrue to the general fund of the local government and are used to finance its operations subject to specified modes of spending as provided for in the Local Government Code and its implementing rules and regulations. For instance, not less than twenty percent (20%) of the IRAs must be set aside for local development projects. As such, for purposes of budget preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of the income of the local government unit, among others, the IRAs and the share in the national wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income. This is as it should be, since income is defined in the Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the local government unit. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers. Basco vs. PAGCOR (1991) Facts: A TV ad came out, announcing "The new PAGCOR responding through responsible gaming." Thinking otherwise, the petitioners filed a petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR Charter (PD 1869), because it is
allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because it waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law. The petitioners were referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder, from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local." Issue: WON PD 1869 is unconstitutional for being offensive to the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy Held: NO. The City of Manila, being a mere municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Its "power to tax" must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax." The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. Municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress, which has the power to create and abolish municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power. The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. The states (local governments) have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the federal (national) government. (MC Culloch v. Marland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed.
579) This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over municipal corporations. Moreover, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization". It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio." In a unitary system of government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. B. Nature and Municipal Corporations C. Corporations Kinds of Status of
2.
Municipal corporation >> public corporation Public corporation Created by the state as its own device and agency for the accomplishment of part of its own public functions
Municipal corporation A body corporate and politic organized for the government of a definite locality
D.
Dual Nature
1. Dual nature and functions of municipal corporations SEC. 15. Political and Corporate Nature of Local Government Units. - Every local government unit created or recognized under this Code is a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. As such, it shall exercise powers as a political subdivision of the national government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory.
Municipal
Art. 44 (CC). The following are juridical persons: (1) The State and its political subdivisions; (2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law; Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member. (35a)
Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity and their functions and powers two-fold : 1) public/governmental/political and 2) corporate/private or proprietary.
(3)
A municipal corporation proper has a public character as regards the State at large insofar as it is its agent in government (instrumentality of the national government), and private insofar as it is to promote local necessities and convenience for its own community (local government). >> Governmental powers, which spring from sovereignty, are those exercised in administering the powers of the State and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public and political. >> Proprietary powers, arising from its existence as legal persons and not as public agencies, are those exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial, private and corporate.
Art. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article are governed by the laws creating or recognizing them. xxx
1.
Municipal corporation proper quasi-municipal corporation Municipal corporation proper A body corporate and politic organized for the government of a definite locality
>>
Quasi-municipal corporation Public entity created by law to deliver limited public services
Vilas vs. City of Manila (1911)
Facts: The plaintiffs are creditors of the City of Manila as it existed before the cession of the Philippine Islands (P.I.) to the United States by the Treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898. They brought action against respondent upon the theory that the city under its present charter was the same juristic person and liable for the obligations of the old city. The Supreme Court of the P.I. denied relief, holding that the present municipality is a totally different corporate entity, and in no way liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality. Prior to the controversy or on August 13, 1898, the city was occupied by American forces, and its affairs conducted by military authority. On July 31, 1901, Act 183 of the Philippine Commission was passed, reincorporating the city. Since that time, the city had been an autonomous municipality. Issue: WON the present municipality is liable for the obligations of the city incurred prior to the cession of the P.I. to the US and the citys reincorporation Held: YES. The Philippine Supreme Courts argument against the liability rested upon the theory that as the sovereignty of Spain was terminated by the treaty of cession, the municipality ipso facto disappeared for all purposes. This conclusion was reached upon the supposed analogy to the doctrine of principal and agent, the death of the principal ending the agency. This argument is untenable for it loses sight of the dual character of municipal corporations. They exercise powers which are governmental and powers which are of a private or business character. In the one character, a municipal corporation is a governmental subdivision, and for that purpose exercises by delegation a part of the sovereignty of the state. In the other character, it is a mere legal entity or juristic person. In the latter character, it stands for the community in the administration of local affairs wholly beyond the sphere of the public purposes for which its governmental powers are conferred. While military occupation or territorial cession may work a suspension of the governmental
functions of municipal corporations, such occupation or cession does not result in their dissolution. In fact, during military administration, the business of the city was carried on as usual. Taxes were assessed, collected and expended for local purposes, and many of the officials carrying on the government were those found in office when the city was occupied. The continuity of the corporate city was not inconsistent with military occupation or the constitution or institutions of the occupying power (as evidenced by the articles of capitulation, which were quoted in McKinleys instructions of April 7, 1900). And while there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of inhabitants of ceded territory and of laws in conflict with the political character of the substituted sovereign, the great body of municipal law regulating private and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler. Although the United States might have extinguished every municipality in the territory, it will not, in view of the practice of nations to the contrary, be presumed to have done so. The legal entity of the City of Manila survived both its military occupation by, and its cession to, the United States. Therefore, as the present city is entitled to the property rights of its predecessor, it is also subject to its liabilities. Lidasan vs. COMELEC (1967) Facts: Republic Act 4790 or "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur" was signed into law. By virtue of the statute, twelve barrios in two municipalities were dismembered from the province of Cotabato. COMELEC issued a resolution implementing the law for purposes of the upcoming elections. Petitioner Bara Lidasan, a resident of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato prayed that RA 4790 be declared unconstitutional, relying upon the constitutional requirement that "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." Issue: WON RA 4790 is unconstitutional Held: YES.
In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept in mind by the court. In the title, there is not the slightest intimation that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. Hence, the law is null and void. And even if the portion which took away the 12 barrios in the other province of Cotabato were nullified, RA 4790 may no longer be salvaged with reference to the remaining nine barrios in Lanao del Sur. Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly, they serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of government. Secondly, they act as an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State. Consequently, several factors are considered in determining whether a group of barrios is capable of maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst these are population, territory, and income. It was apparently these same factors which induced the creation by Congress of the town of Dianaton. The explanatory note to the HB spoke of the original 21 barrios which would comprise the new municipality as a progressive community with a large aggregate population and a collective income sufficient to maintain an independent municipality. These would no longer apply in a motley group of only nine barrios out of the 21. Furthermore, it is not fair to assume that the inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed into a municipality, what with the consequent duties and liabilities of an independent municipal corporation. RA 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality. Republic of the Philippines et al. vs. City of Davao (2002) Facts: Respondent City of Davao filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome, with the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), Region XI. The EMB Region XI denied the application after
finding that the proposed project was within an environmentally critical area and ruled that the City of Davao must undergo the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC), before it can proceed with the construction of its project. Respondent filed a petition for mandamus and injunction with the RTC Davao, which rendered judgment in its favor. The RTC ratiocinated that there is nothing in PD 1586 (re the EIA system), which requires LGUs to comply with the EIS law. Only agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including GOCCs, as well as private corporations, firms and entities are mandated to go through the EIA process for their proposed projects. A local government unit, not being an agency or instrumentality of the National Government, is deemed excluded under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Issue: WON the EIS applies to LGUs Held: YES. Section 15 of the Local Government Code defines a local government unit as a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. As such, it performs dual functions, governmental and proprietary. Governmental functions are those that concern the health, safety and the advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting the public generally. Proprietary functions are those that seek to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit and intended for private advantage and benefit. When exercising governmental powers and performing governmental duties, an LGU is an agency of the national government. When engaged in corporate activities, it acts as an agent of the community in the administration of local affairs. Found in Section 16 of the Local Government Code is the duty of the LGUs to promote the peoples right to a balanced ecology. Pursuant to this, an LGU, like the City of Davao, can not claim exemption from the coverage of PD 1586. As a body politic endowed with governmental functions, an LGU has the duty to ensure the quality of the environment, which is the very same objective of PD 1586.
Also, very clear in Section 1 of PD 1586 that said law intends to achieve a balance between socio-economic development and environmental protection by adopting a comprehensive and integrated environmental protection program where all the sectors of the community are involved, i.e., the government and the private sectors. The local government units, as part of the machinery of the government, cannot therefore be deemed as outside the scope of the EIS system. In the case at bar, however, respondent has sufficiently shown that the Artica Sports Dome will not have a significant negative environmental impact. Respondent had submitted all the required documents in support of its contention (certifications from City Planning and Development Office, CENRO and PHIVOLCS). 2. Purposes 3. General Powers and Attributes SEC. 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local government unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code. SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. - As a general rule, the creation of alocal government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit: (a) Income. - It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned; (b) Population. - It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the
territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and (c) Land Area. - It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace. Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). SEC. 8. Division and Merger. - Division and merger of existinglocal government units shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current income classification prior to such division. The income classification of local government units shall be updated within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Code to reflect the changes in their financial position resulting from the increased revenues as provided herein. SEC. 9. Abolition of Local Government Units. A local government unit may be abolished when its income, population, or land area has been irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum standards prescribed for its creation under Book III of this Code, as certified by the national agencies mentioned in Section 17 hereof to Congress or to the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be. The law or ordinance abolishing a local government unit shall specify the province, city, municipality, or barangay with which thelocal government unit sought to be abolished will be incorporated or merged. SEC. 10. Plebiscite Requirement. - No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date. SEC. 11. Selection and Transfer of Local Government Site, Offices and Facilities. - (a) The law or ordinance creating or merging local government units shall specify the seat of government from where governmental and corporate services shall be delivered. In selecting said site, factors relating to geographical centrality, accessibility, availability of transportation and communication facilities, drainage and sanitation, development and economic progress, and other relevant considerations shall be taken into account. (b)When conditions and developments in the local government unit concerned have significantly changed subsequent to the establishment of the seat of government, its sanggunian may, after public hearing and by a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of all its members, transfer the same to a site better suited to its needs. Provided, however, That no such transfer shall be made outside the territorial boundaries of the local government unit concerned. The old site, together with the improvements thereon, may be disposed of by sale or lease or converted to such other use as the sanggunian concerned may deem beneficial to the local government unit concerned and its inhabitants. (c) Local government offices and facilities shall not be transferred, relocated, or converted to other uses unless public hearings are first conducted for the purpose and the concurrence of the majority of all the members of the sanggunian concerned is obtained. SEC. 12. Government Centers. - Provinces, cities, and municipalities shall endeavor to establish a government center where offices, agencies, or branches of the national government, local government units, or government-owned or -controlled corporations may, as far as practicable, be located. In designating such a center, the
local government unit concerned shall take into account the existing facilities of national and local agencies and offices which may serve as the government center as contemplated under this Section. The national government , local government unit or government-owned or -controlled corporation concerned shall bear the expenses for the construction of its buildings and facilities in the government center. SEC. 13. Naming of Local Government Units and Public Places, Streets and Structures. (a) The sangguniang panlalawigan may, in consultation with the Philippine Historical Commission (PHC), change the name of the following within its territorial jurisdiction: (1) Component cities and municipalities, upon the recommendation of the sanggunian concerned; (2) Provincial roads, avenues, boulevards, thorough-fares, and bridges; (3) Public vocational or technical schools and other post-secondary and tertiary schools; (4) Provincial hospitals, health centers, and other health facilities; and (5) Any other public place or building owned by the provincial government. (b) The sanggunian of highly urbanized cities and of component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, hereinafter referred to in this Code as independent component cities, may, in consultation with the Philippine Historical Commission, change the name of the following within its territorial jurisdiction: (1) City barangays, recommendation of the barangay concerned; (2) City roads, avenues, thoroughfares,and bridges; upon the sangguniang boulevards,
(3) Public elementary, secondary and vocational or technical schools, community colleges and non-chartered colleges; (4) City hospitals, health centers and other health facilities; and
(5) Any other public place or building owned by the city government. (c) The sanggunians of component cities and municipalities may, in consultation with the Philippine Historical Commission, change the name of the following within its territorial jurisdiction: (1) city and municipal barangays, upon recommendation of the sangguniang barangay concerned; (2) city, municipal and barangay roads, avenues, boulevards, thoroughfares, and bridges; (3) city and municipal public elementary, secondary and vocational or technical schools, post-secondary and other tertiary schools; (4) city and municipal hospitals, health centers and other health facilities; and (5)Any other public place or building owned by the municipal government. (d) None of the foregoing local government units, institutions, places, or buildings shall be named after a living person, nor may a change of name be made unless for a justifiable reason and, in any case, not oftener than once every ten (10) years. The name of a local government unit or a public place, street or structure with historical, cultural, or ethnic significance shall not be changed, unless by a unanimous vote of the sanggunian concerned and in consultation with the PHC. (e) A change of name of a public school shall be made only upon the recommendation of the local school board concerned. (f) A change of name of public hospitals, health centers, and other health facilities shall be made only upon the recommendation of the local health board concerned. (g) The change of name of anylocal government unit shall be effective only upon ratification in a plebiscite conducted for the purpose in the political unit directly affected. In any change of name, the Office of the President, the representative of the legislative district concerned, and the Bureau of Posts shall be notified.
SEC. 14. Beginning of Corporate Existence. When a new local government unit is created, its corporate existence shall commence upon the election and qualification of its chief executive and a majority of the members of its sanggunian, unless some other time is fixed therefor by the law or ordinance creating it. SEC. 15. Political and Corporate Nature of Local Government Units. - Every local government unit created or recognized under this Code is a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. As such, it shall exercise powers as a political subdivision of the national government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory. SEC. 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. SEC. 17. Basic Services and Facilities. - (a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) For a Barangay: (i) Agricultural support services which include planting materials distribution system and operation of farm produce collection and buying stations; (ii) Health and social welfare services which include maintenance of barangay health center and day-care center; (iii) Services and facilities related to general hygiene and sanitation, beautification, and solid waste collection; (iv) Maintenance of katarungang pambarangay; (v) Maintenance of barangay roads and bridges and water supply systems (vi) Infrastructure facilities such as multipurpose hall, multipurpose pavement, plaza, sports center, and other similar facilities; (vii) Information and reading center; and (viii) Satellite or public market, where viable; (2) For a municipality: (i) Extension and on-site research services and facilities related to agriculture and fishery activities which include dispersal of livestock and poultry, fingerlings, and other seeding materials for aquaculture; palay, corn, and vegetable seed farms; medicinal plant gardens; fruit tree, coconut, and other kinds of seedling nurseries; demonstration farms; quality control of copra and improvement and development of local distribution channels, preferably through cooperatives; interbarangay irrigation system; water and soil resource utilization and conservation projects; and enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves; (ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR, implementation of community-based forestry projects which include integrated social forestry programs and similar projects; management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50)
square kilometers; establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar forest development projects; (iii) Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of this Code, health services which include the implementation of programs and projects on primary health care, maternal and child care, and communicable and noncommunicable disease control services; access to secondary and tertiary health services; purchase of medicines, medical supplies, and equipment needed to carry out the services herein enumerated; (iv) Social welfare services which include programs and projects on child and youth welfare, family and community welfare, women's welfare, welfare of the elderly and disabled persons; community-based rehabilitation programs for vagrants, beggars, street children, scavengers, juvenile delinquents, and victims of drug abuse; livelihood and other pro-poor projects; nutrition services; and family planning services; (v) Information services which include investments and job placement information systems, tax and marketing information systems, and maintenance of a public library; (vi) Solid waste disposal system or environmental management system and services or facilities related to general hygiene and sanitation; (vii) Municipal buildings, cultural centers, public parks including freedom parks, playgrounds, and sports facilities and equipment, and other similar facilities; (viii) Infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of the residents of the municipality and which are funded out of municipal funds including, but not limited to, municipal roads and bridges; school buildings and other facilities for public elementary and secondary schools; clinics, health centers and other health facilities necessary to carry out health services; communal irrigation, small water impounding projects and other similar projects; fish ports; artesian wells, spring development, rainwater collectors and water supply systems; seawalls, dikes, drainage and
sewerage, and flood control; traffic signals and road signs; and similar facilities; (ix) Public markets, slaughterhouses and other municipal enterprises; (x) Public cemetery; (xi) Tourism facilities and other tourist attractions, including the acquisition of equipment, regulation and supervision of business concessions, and security services for such facilities; and (xii) Sites for police and fire stations and substations and the municipal jail; (3) For a Province: (i) Agricultural extension and on-site research services and facilities which include the prevention and control of plant and animal pests and diseases; dairy farms, livestock markets, animal breeding stations, and artificial insemination centers; and assistance in the organization of farmers' and fishermen's cooperatives and other collective organizations, as well as the transfer of appropriate technology; (ii) Industrial research and development services, as well as the transfer of appropriate technology; (iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR, enforcement of forestry laws limited to community-based forestry projects, pollution control law, small-scale mining law, and other laws on the protection of the environment; and mini-hydro electric projects for local purposes; (iv) Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of this Code, health services which include hospitals and other tertiary health services; (v) Social welfare services which include programs and projects on rebel returnees and evacuees; relief operations; and, population development services; (vi) Provincial buildings, provincial jails, freedom parks and other public assembly areas, and other similar facilities; (vii) Infrastructure facilities intended to
service the needs of the residents of the province and which are funded out of provincial funds including, but not limited to, provincial roads and bridges; inter-municipal waterworks, drainage and sewerage, flood control, and irrigation systems; reclamation projects; and similar facilities; (viii) Programs and projects for low-cost housing and other mass dwellings, except those funded by the Social Security System (SSS), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF): Provided, That national funds for these programs and projects shall be equitably allocated among the regions in proportion to the ratio of the homeless to the population; (ix) Investment support services, including access to credit financing; (x) Upgrading and modernization of tax information and collection services through the use of computer hardware and software and other means; (xi) Inter-municipal telecommunications services, subject to national policy guidelines; and (xii) Tourism development and promotion programs; (4) For a City: All the services and facilities of the municipality and province, and in addition thereto, the following: (i) Adequate transportation communication facilities; and
(ii) Support for education, police and fire services and facilities. (c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities funded by the national government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs, and services.
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(d) The designs, plans, specifications, testing of materials, and the procurement of equipment and materials from both foreign and local sources necessary for the provision of the foregoing services and facilities shall be undertaken by the local government unit concerned, based on national policies, standards and guidelines. (e) National agencies or offices concerned shall devolve to local government units the responsibility for the provision of basic services and facilities enumerated in this Section within six (6) months after the effectivity of this Code. As used in this Code, the term "devolution" refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. (f) The national government or the next higher level of local government unit may provide or augment the basic services and facilities assigned to a lower level of local government unit when such services or facilities are not made available or, if made available, are inadequate to meet the requirements of its inhabitants. (g) The basic services and facilities hereinabove enumerated shall be funded from the share of local government units in the proceeds of national taxes and other local revenues and funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned or -controlled corporations which are tasked by law to establish and maintain such services or facilities. Any fund or resource available for the use of local government units shall be first allocated for the provision of basic services or facilities enumerated in subsection (b) hereof before applying the same for other purposes, unless otherwise provided in this Code. (h) The Regional offices of national agencies or offices whose functions are devolved to local government units as provided herein shall be phased out within one (1) year from the approval of this Code. Said national agencies and offices may establish such field units as may be necessary for monitoring
purposes and providing technical assistance to local government units. The properties, equipment, and other assets of these regional offices shall be distributed to the local government units in the region in accordance with the rules and regulations issued by the oversight committee created under this Code. (i) The devolution contemplated in this Code shall include the transfer to local government units of the records, equipment, and other assets and personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions, and responsibilities. Personnel of said national agencies or offices shall be absorbed by the local government units to which they belong or in whose areas they are assigned to the extent that it is administratively viable as determined by the said oversight committee: Provided, That the rights accorded to such personnel pursuant to civil service law, rules and regulations shall not be impaired: Provided, Further, That regional directors who are career executive service officers and other officers of similar rank in the said regional offices who cannot be absorbed by the local government unit shall be retained by the national government, without any diminution of rank, salary or tenure. (j) To ensure the active participation of the private sector in local governance, local government units may, by ordinance, sell, lease, encumber, or otherwise dispose of public economic enterprises owned by them in their proprietary capacity. Costs may also be charged for the delivery of basic services or facilities enumerated in this Section. SEC. 18. Power to Generate and Apply Resources. - Local government units shall have the power and authority to establish an organization that shall be responsible for the efficient and effective implementation of their development plans, program objectives and priorities; to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which shall accrue exclusively for their use and disposition and which shall be retained by them; to have a just share in national taxes which shall be automatically and directly released to them without need of any further action; to have an equitable share in the proceeds from the utilization and development of the national wealth and
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resources within their respective territorial jurisdictions including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits; to acquire, develop, lease, encumber, alienate, or otherwise dispose of real or personal property held by them in their proprietary capacity and to apply their resources and assets for productive, developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise or furtherance of their governmental or proprietary powers and functions and thereby ensure their development into self-reliant communities and active participants in the attainment of national goals. SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. - A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property. SEC. 20. Reclassification of Lands. - (a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such
reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance: (1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen percent (15%); (2) For component cities and first to third class municipalities, ten percent (10%); and (3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided, further, That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act Numbered Sixty-six hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657), otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law", shall not be affected by the said reclassification and the conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act. (b) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority, authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in excess of the limits set in the next preceding paragraph. (c) The local government units shall, in conformity with existing laws, continue to prepare their respective comprehensive land use plans enacted through zoning ordinances which shall be the primary and dominant bases for the future use of land resources: Provided, That the requirements for food production, human settlements, and industrial expansion shall be taken into consideration in the preparation of such plans. (d) Where approval by a national agency is required for reclassification, such approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. Failure to act on a proper and complete application for reclassification within three (3) months from receipt of the same shall be deemed as approval thereof. (e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657. SEC. 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. - (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square
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falling within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is provided. (b) No such way or place or any part thereof shall be permanently closed without making provisions for the maintenance of public safety therein. A property thus permanently withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local government unit concerned may be lawfully used or conveyed: Provided, however, That no freedom park shall be closed permanently without provision for its transfer or relocation to a new site. (c) Any national or local road, alley, park, or square may be temporarily closed during an actual emergency, or fiesta celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs, or an undertaking of public works and highways, telecommunications, and waterworks projects, the duration of which shall be specified by the local chief executive concerned in a written order: Provided, however, That no national or local road, alley, park, or square shall set temporarily closed for athletic, cultural, or civic activities not officially sponsored, recognized, or approved by the local government unit concerned. (d) Any city, municipality, or barangay may, by a duly enacted ordinance, temporarily close and regulate the use of any local street, road, thoroughfare, or any other public place where shopping malls, Sunday, flea or night markets, or shopping areas may be established and where goods, merchandise, foodstuffs, commodities, or articles of commerce may be sold and dispensed to the general public. SEC. 22. Corporate Powers. - (a) Every local government unit, as a corporation, shall have the following powers: (1) To have continuous succession in its corporate name; (2) To sue and be sued; (3) To have and use a corporate seal;
(4) To acquire and convey real or personal property; (5) To enter into contracts; and (6) To exercise such other powers as are granted to corporations, subject to the limitations provided in this Code and other laws. (b) Local government units may continue using, modify, or change their existing corporate seals: Provided, That newly established local government units or those without corporate seals may create their own corporate seals which shall be registered with the Department of the Interior and Local Government: Provided, further, That any change of corporate seal shall also be registered as provided herein. (c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, contract may be entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of the local government unit without prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned. A legible copy of such contract shall be posted at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the city, municipal or barangay hall. (d) Local government units shall enjoy full autonomy in the exercise of their proprietary functions and in the management of their economic enterprises, subject to the limitations provided in this Code and other applicable laws. SEC. 23. Authority to Negotiate and Secure Grants. - Local chief executives may, upon authority of the sanggunian, negotiate and secure financial grants or donations in kind, in support of the basic services or facilities enumerated under Section 17 hereof, from local and foreign assistance agencies without necessity of securing clearance or approval therefor from any department, agency, or office of the national government or from any higher local government unit: Provided, That projects financed by such grants or assistance with national security implications shall be approved by the national agency concerned: Provided, further, That when such national agency fails to act on the request for approval within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed approved. The local chief executive shall, within thirty
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(30) days upon signing of such grant agreement or deed of donation, report the nature, amount, and terms of such assistance to both Houses of Congress and the President. SEC. 24. Liability for Damages. - Local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property.
III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

Art. X, Sec. 3, Constitution. Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executive and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination. Section 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component
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cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials. Section 1, LGC. SECTION 1. Title. - This Act shall be known and cited as the "Local Government Code of 1991". Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the local government units. (b) It is also the policy of the State to ensure the accountability of local government units through the institution of effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum. (c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. Section 3. Operative Principles of Decentralization. - The formulation and implementation of policies and measures on local autonomy shall be guided by the following operative principles: (a) There shall be an effective allocation among the different local government units of their respective powers, functions, responsibilities, and resources;
(b) There shall be established in every local government unit an accountable, efficient, and dynamic organizational structure and operating mechanism that will meet the priority needs and service requirements of its communities; (c) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, local officials and employees paid wholly or mainly from local funds shall be appointed or removed, according to merit and fitness, by the appropriate appointing authority; (d) The vesting of duty, responsibility, and accountability in local government units shall be accompanied with provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge their powers and effectively carry out their functions; hence, they shall have the power to create and broaden their own sources of revenue and the right to a just share in national taxes and an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas; (e) Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions; (f) Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them; (g) The capabilities of local government units,especially the municipalities and barangays, shall beenhanced by providing them with opportunities to participate actively in the implementation of national programs and projects; (h) There shall be a continuing mechanism to enhance local autonomy not only by legislative enabling acts but also by administrative and organizational reforms;
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(i) Local government units shall share with the national government the responsibility in the management and maintenance of ecological balance within their territorial jurisdiction, subject to the provisions of this Code and national policies; (j) Effective mechanisms for ensuring the accountability of local government units to their respective constituents shall be strengthened in order to upgradecontinually the quality of local leadership; (k) The realization of local autonomy shall be facilitated through improved coordination of national government policies and programs and extension of adequate technical and material assistance to less developed and deserving local government units; (l) The participation of the private sector in local governance, particularly in the delivery of basic services, shall be encouraged to ensure the viability of local autonomy as an alternative strategy for sustainabledevelopment; and (m) The national government shall ensure that decentralizatioontributes to the continuing improvement of the performance of local government units and the quality of community life. Section 4. Scope of Application. - This Code shall apply to all provinces, cities, municipalities, barangays, and other political subdivisions as may be created by law, and, to the extent herein provided, to officials, offices, or agencies of the national government. Section 5. Rules of Interpretation. - In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply: (a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned; (b) In case of doubt, any tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be construed strictly against the local government unit enacting it, and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. Any tax exemption, incentive or relief granted by any local government unit pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall be construed strictly against the person claiming it. (c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community; (d) Rights and obligations existing on the date of effectivity of this Code and arising out of contracts or any other source of prestation involving a local government unit shall be governed by the original terms and conditions of said contracts or the law in force at the time such rights were vested; and (e) In the resolution of controversies arising under this Code where no legal provision or jurisprudence applies, resort may be had to the customs and traditions in the place where the controversies take place.
A. Local Autonomy
Art. II, Section 25, Constitution. Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
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scope of their prescribed powers and functions. Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executive and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination. Section 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
The DBM ruled that it validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position. The CSC likewise ruled against San Juans protest, saying that the local chief executives recommending power is purely directory. Invoking Section 1 of E.O. No. 112 (Placing All Budget Officers of LGUs under the Administrative Control and Technical Supervision of the Ministry of Budget and Management), petitioner contended that he had the sole right and privilege to recommend the nominees to the position of PBO. Such recommendation must be made part and parcel of the appointment process. Thus, it must be given mandatory application in consonance with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution. Issue: WON the appointment of Almajose by the DBM was in derogation of the governors power to recommend nominees to the position of PBO Held: YES. When the CSC interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy. And the disregard by the DBM Secretary of the right of local governments to develop self-reliance in handling their own funds, the goal of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated. Section 6 of Local Budget Circular No. 31 which gives the DBM the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none of the nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements is ultra vires and void. The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees. Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the local level and after completion are forwarded to the national officials for review. They are prepared by
San Juan vs. Civil Service Commission (1991)

Facts: When the position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for Rizal was left vacant, petitioner Reynaldo San Juan, then governor, requested Director Reynaldo Abella of the DBM Region IV to endorse the appointment of Dalisay Santos. DBM Regional Director Galvez wrote San Juan that Santos and his other recommendees did not meet the minimum requirements under Local Budget Circular No. 31 and further required him to submit at least three other qualified nominees. Unknown to San Juan, however, the DBM, through Undersecretary Cabuquit, subsequently appointed private respondent Cecilia Almajose to the position. San Juan later protested against the said appointment on the grounds that Cabuquit was not legally authorized to appoint the PBO and that under Executive Order No. 112, it is the Provincial Governor, not the Regional Director or a Congressman, who has the power to recommend nominees for the position of PBO.
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the local officials who must work within the constraints of those budgets. This is why there should be a genuine interplay and a harmonization of proposals from both the local and national officials. It is also for this reason that the nomination and appointment process involves a sharing of power between the two levels of government.
constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of the government. However, under the Constitution, the President cannot formulate and economic policies unilaterally, that is, without consulting with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local government units. Under Section 284 of the LGC, there are several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: 1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; 2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the HOR and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes... The requirements under Section 284 had not been satisfied. But, as stated by the solicitor general, the A.O. is merely advisory in character, to prevail upon local executives to recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. It is understood, however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not follow such advice. Section 4 of A.O. No. 372 is invalid. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue, as mandated by no less than the Constitution. The LGC specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose.
Pimentel vs. Aguirre (2000)

Facts: In 1997, President Fidel Ramos issued A.O. No. 372 (Adoption of Economy Measures in Government for FY 1998). Petitioner brought an original petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking 1) to annul Section 1 of A.O. No. 372 insofar as it requires LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services and 2) to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds 10% of their IRAs. Issue: WON 1) Section 1 of A.O. No. 372, insofar as it directs LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% and (2) Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10% of their IRAs, are valid exercises of the President's power of general supervision over local governments Held: YES and NO. Section 1 of the issuance is valid. Local government units, in addition to having administrative autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the constraints thereof. Hence, the necessity of a balancing of viewpoints and the harmonization of proposals from both local and national officials. Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by
Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals (1991)

Facts: Three consolidated cases arose from ten administrative complaints filed against
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Iloilo City Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon by various city officials on various charges such as abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention. Finding probable grounds, respondent Secretary of Local Government issued a preventive suspension order for a period of sixty (60) days. Thereafter, Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition in the respondent Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in 20 months. Petitioner Mary Ann Artieda on the other hand was similarly charged by the respondent Secretary. Issue: WON the Secretary of Local Government as the Presidents alter ego has the power to suspend and/or remove local officials Held: YES. It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to them, the deletion of the phrase "as may be provided by law" with regard to the supervision clause in the 1935 Constitution is significant since: (1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer. The charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. The omission of "as may be provided by law" signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units. It is noteworthy that local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other things, the
passage of a local government code, a local tax law, and other legislative measures. Also, the Charter allows Congress to include in the LGC provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing LGC has done, delegate its exercise to the President. Autonomy, therefore, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited. Petitioners were moreover under the mistaken impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation and disciplinary authority. "Supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms since "investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing." However, the suspensions so far imposed by the Secretary indicate an abuse of power. They are unreasonable, contrary to the LGC, and tantamount to a punishment despite the fact that Ganzons guilt had not yet been proven. Doctrine: The Court laid down the following rules in Ganzon:
Local
autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide;
The
change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations
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provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy;
Since local governments remain

accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials; and
act and the creation of an autonomous region. Because the procedure for the creation of the autonomus region as outlined in the Constitution is complex and takes time, the President saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime. E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. The bodies it created merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and NGOs in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras. 2. NO. The CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations. The CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered areas. Considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the CAR and the indispensable participation of the line departments of the National Government, the CAR may be considered as a regional coordinating agency of the National Government. 3. NO. Local autonomy in the Constitution refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or the decentralization of government authority. On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy in these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions (Art. X, sec. 18).
"Supervision" and "investigation"
are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not signify "control" (which the President does not have).
Cordillera Broad Coalition Commission on Audit (1990)
vs.
Facts: E.O. No. 220, issued by President Corazon Aquino in the exercise of her legislative powers, created the CAR to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Several consolidated petitions assailed the constitutionality of the E.O. on the ground that it: 1) preempted the enactment of an organic act by the Congress; 2) contravened the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political subdivision; 3) breached the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces and city which compose the CAR. Issues: 1. WON E.O. No. 220 is unconstitutional 2. WON the CAR is a territorial and political subdivision 3. WON E.O. No. 220 infringed upon the local autonomy of the provinces and city composing the CAR Held: 1. NO. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic
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B. Decentralization
Art. X, Section 3, Constitution. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. Section 14. The President shall provide for regional development councils or other similar bodies composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives from nongovernmental organizations within the regions for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units in the region.
Pending further proceedings, the Supreme Court received a resolution filed by the Sangguniang Pampook expelling petitioner from the Sangguniang Pampook. Petitioner allegedly paid without authority from the Assembly the salaries of Odin Abdula who was considered resigned after filing his COC for Congressman for the First District of Maguindanao. Issues: 1. WON the expulsion is valid 2. WON the autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts Held:
1. NO. There is no
showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and that the petitioner had been heard in his defense. In administrative law, due process does not absolutely require notice and that a party need only be given the opportunity to be heard. In this case, it does not appear that the petitioner had was made aware that he had been charged of graft and corruption. Also, the resolution appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen against the petitioner. 2. YES. Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions. At the
Limbona vs. Mangelin (1989)

Facts: Petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, was invited to be resource persons in a conference organized by the House Committee on Muslim Affairs. Petitioner instructed the Assembly not to hold session during the conference, saying that their presence therein took precedence over any pending business in the Sanggunian. However, the Assembly held a session in defiance of petitioner's advice. On a motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair declared the said seat of the Speaker vacant. Petitioner filed a petition to nullify the abovestated acts of the Assembly.
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same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny with minimum intervention from central authorities. But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy to Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution is a decentralization of power rather than mere administration is a question foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local government unit constituted prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. An examination of P.D. No. 1816 creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades that they were never meant to exercise self-immolation. P.D. No. 1816, in the first place, mandates that the President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions. In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services.
IV. CREATION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS A. Nature and powers to create municipal corporations
Pelaez vs. Auditor General (1965)

Facts: The president, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued E.O. Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129, creating 33 municipalities. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
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Pelaez alleged that such are null and void, since Sec. 68 has been impliedly repealed by RA 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Sec. 3 of RA 2370 provides that barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Issues: 1. WON the power of the President to create municipalities under Sec. 681 of the Revised Administrative Code amounts to an undue delegation of legislative power 2. WON Sec. 68 is deemed repealed Held: 1.YES. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in
1
nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" or solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power." Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself -- it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard -- the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. "Public welfare" and "public interest," are sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in Calalang v Williams must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved such as the grants to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their administrative functions. Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in Section 68. The question of whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. It is purely a legislative question or a political question. Non-delegation doctrine: If the validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive. Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, (township) municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the (GovernorGeneral) President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed.
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governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion BUT this power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. The President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. 2. YES. Even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said Sec 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the 1935 Constitution which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment. Disposition: The Executive Orders in question were declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. Separate Opinion (J. Bengzon): The issue is whether the legislature can validly delegate to the Executive such power. The power to create a municipality is legislative in character. American authorities have therefore favored the view that it cannot be delegated; that what is delegable is not the power to create municipalities but only the power to determine the existence of facts under which creation of a municipality will result. The test is said to lie in whether the statute allows any discretion on the delegate as to whether the municipal corporation should be created. If so, there is an attempted delegation of legislative power and the statute is invalid. Now Section 68 no doubt gives the President such discretion, since it
says that the President "may by executive order" exercise the powers therein granted.
Municipality of Kapalong vs. Moya (1988)

Facts: From portions of the Municipality of Kapalong, President Carlos P. Garcia created respondent Municipality of Santo Tomas, and the latter now asserts jurisdiction over eight barrios of petitioner. This conflict of boundaries between the two municipalities was brought, at the instance of respondent, to the Provincial Board of Davao. However, as no action was taken thereon, respondent then filed a complaint with then CFI of Davao, presided over by public respondent Judge Felix L. Moya, against the Municipality of Kapalong for settlement of the municipal boundary dispute and recovery of collected taxes and damages. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the lower court and lack of legal personality of the Municipality of Santo Tomas. Respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss as well as petitioners motion for reconsideration (MR) and second MR. Hence, the instant petition. Issue: WON the Municipality of Sto. Tomas legally exists Held: NO. Petitioner was correct in contending that based on the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General, it is clear that the President has no power to create municipalities. Thus, there is no Municipality of Santo Tomas to speak of. It has no right to assert, no cause of action, no corporate existence at all, and it must remain part and parcel of Kapalong. On the ground of jurisdiction, as petitioner has correctly argued, the settlement of boundary disputes is administrative in nature and should originate in the political or administrative agencies of the government, and not in the courts whose power is limited to judicial review on appropriate occasions.
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Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that only "entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action." Now then, as ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the President has no power to create a municipality. Since private respondent has no legal personality, it can not be a party to any civil action, and as such, respondent Judge should have dismissed the case, since further proceedings would be pointless. Disposition: Petition granted. The orders of respondent judge were set aside.
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws. The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. Section 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
B. Creation of municipal corporations 1. Constitutional provisions
Art. X, Section 1, Constition. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executive and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination. Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and
Alvarez vs. Guingona (1996), supra

A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs. Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio, the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the
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peripheral local government units to develop not only at their own pace and discretion but also with their own resources and assets. The vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every local government unit is accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions. Availment of such resources is effectuated through the vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.
territorial jurisdiction of the government unit concerned; and
local
(c) Land Area. - It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace. Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources(DENR). Section 385. Manner of Creation. - A barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, by law or by an ordinance of the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod, subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be conducted by the Comelec in the local government unit or units directly affected within such period of time as may be determined by the law or ordinance creating said barangay. In the case of the creation of barangays by the sangguniang panlalawigan, the recommendation of the sangguniang bayan concerned shall be necessary. SEC. 441. Manner of Creation. - A municipality may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered only by an Act of Congress and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be conducted by the Comelec in the local government unit or units directly affected. Except as may otherwise be provided in the said Act, the plebiscite shall be held within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of its effectivity. Section 442. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A municipality may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the provincial treasurer, of at least Two million five hundred thousand pesos
2.
Statutory provisions
Section 6, LGC. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local government unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code. Section 7. Creation and Conversion. - As a general rule, the creation of alocal government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit: (a) Income. - It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned; (b) Population. - It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the
26
(P=2,500,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on the 1991 constant prices; a population of at least twenty-five thousand (25,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office; and a contiguous territory of at least fifty (50) square kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population or income of the original municipality or municipalities at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. Section 449. Manner of Creation. - A city may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, only by an Act of Congress, and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be conducted by the Comelec in the local government unit or units directly affected. Except as may otherwise be provided in such Act, the plebiscite shall be held within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of its effectivity. Section 450. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or, (ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newlycreated city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement
on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. Section 460. Manner of Creation. - A province may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, only by an Act of Congress and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be conducted by the Comelec in the local government unit or units directly affected. The plebiscite shall be held within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of said Act, unless otherwise provided therein. Section 461. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P=20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or, (ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
27
trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
Held: NO. The phrase A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city in Section 450 of the LGC is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the merger of local government units to create a province, city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code. Thus, Section 8 of the LGC distinctly provides: Section 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current income classification prior to such division. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Cawaling vs. COMELEC (2001)

Facts: In 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor. The COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification. The creation of the City of Sorsogon was later proclaimed as having been ratified by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite. In his capacity as resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsorgon, Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. filed the present petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the ground of non-compliance with periods prescribed for the conduct of the plebiscite. He later instituted another petition seeking to enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for being unconstitutional. According to petitioner, the creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code (cf. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution2) which requires that only a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city. Futher, he argued that there was no compelling reason for merging the merging the two municipalities, considering that the Municipality of Sorsogon alone already qualifies to be upgraded to a component city. Issue: WON unconstitutional
2
Petitioners second argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which the Court is not competent to rule. League of Cities vs. COMELEC (2011)
Facts: The 11th Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. Thereafter, the 12th Congress passed into law R.A. No. 9009, which amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20M to P100M. Sixteen municipalities later filed their ndividual cityhood bills, all containing a common provision exempting all the municipalities from the P100M income requirement under R.A. No. 9009. Congress approved such cityhood bills, which
R.A.
No.
8806
is
Section 10, Artice X. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
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subsequently became effective as law without the Presidents signature. By virtue of the said Cityhood Laws, the COMELEC held plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each municipality approved of the conversion. Petitioners LCP et al. sought to declare the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the equal protection clause. 1. On November 18, 2008, the SC En banc, by a majority vote, declared the 16 Cityhood Laws to be in violation of the Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides that no city shall be created except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code. The SC held that since respondent municipalities did not meet the P100million income, the requirement under Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009, the Cityhood Laws converting said municipalities into cities were unconstitutional. 2. On March 31, 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, also by a majority vote, denied the respondentmunicipalities first motion for reconsideration. 3. On April 28, 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the respondent municipalities second motion for reconsideration. The November 18, 2008 decision became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on May 21, 2009. 4. However, on December 21, 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc reversed the November 18, 2008 decision and upheld the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws. The Court reasoned that: When Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution speaks of the local government code, the reference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of laws, let alone the LGC of 1991. It would be noted that at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, B.P. Blg. 337, the then LGC, was still in
effect. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, they would have referred to B.P. 337. Also, they would not have provided for the enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as they did in Section 3, Article X of the Constitution. Accordingly, the criteria for creation of cities need not be embodied in the LGC. Congress can impose such criteria in a consolidated set of laws or a singlesubject enactment or through amendatory laws. The passage of amendatory laws, such as RA 9009, was no different from the enactment of the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting laws, effectively decreased the already codified indicators. Deliberations on RA 9009, particularly the floor exchange between Senators Aquilino Pimentel and Franklin Drilon, indicated the following complementary legislative intentions: (a) the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the proposed P100 M minimum income requirement; and (b) RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the pending cityhood bills were concerned. That said deliberations were undertaken in the 11th and/or 12th Congress (or before the cityhood laws were passed during the 13th Congress) and Congress was not a continuing legislative body, was immaterial. Debates, deliberations, and proceedings of Congress and the steps taken in the enactment of the law, in this case the cityhood laws in relation to RA 9009 or vice versa, were part of its legislative history and may be consulted, if appropriate, as aids in the interpretation of the law.
Petitioners could not plausibly invoke the equal protection clause because no deprivation of property resulted by the enactment of the Cityhood Laws. It was presumptuous on the part of petitioner LCP member-cities
29
to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their property, as the IRA was yet to be allocated. Furthermore, the equal protection clause does not preclude reasonable classification which (a) rests on substantial distinctions; (b) is germane to the purpose of the law; (c) is not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) applies equally to all members of the same class. All of these requisites had been met by the subject Cityhood Laws: (a) Respondent municipalities were substantially different from other municipalities desirous to be cities. They had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009, and years before the enactment of the amendatory RA 9009, respondent municipalities had already met the income criterion exacted for cityhood under the LGC of 1991. However, due to extraneous circumstances (the impeachment of then President Estrada, the related jueteng scandal investigations conducted before, and the EDSA events that followed the aborted impeachment), the bills for their conversion remained unacted upon by Congress. To impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they had gone through would appear to be unfair; (b) the exemption of respondent municipalities from the P100 M income requirement was meant to reduce the inequality, occasioned by the passage of the amendatory RA 9009, between respondent municipalities and the 33 other municipalities whose cityhood bills were enacted during the 11th Congress; and (c) the uniform exemption clause would apply to municipalities that had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009 and were compliant with then Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, which prescribed an income requirement of P20 M.
the affected municipalities is now an operative fact. New cities appear to have been organized and are functioning accordingly, with new sets of officials and employees. Pursuant to the operative fact doctrine, the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in question should be upheld. Petitioners moved for reconsideration (ad cautelam) and for the annulment of 21 December 2009 decision. Some petitionersin-intervention also moved for reconsideration (ad cautelam). Issue: WON the 16 Cityhood Laws violated Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause Held: YES. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is clear the creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the LGC and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the LGC all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units follows the same uniform, nondiscriminatory criteria found solely in the LGC. From the moment R.A. 9009 took effect (on 30 June 2001), the LGC required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 M income requirement. Section 450 of the LGC, as amended, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement, even for municipalities with pending cityhood bills in Congress when R.A. 9009 was passed. The uniform exemption clause in the Cityhood Laws, therefore, violated Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the
The existence of the cities consequent to the approval of the Cityhood Laws in the plebiscites held in
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effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. Respondent municipalities theory that the implementation of the Cityhood Laws operated to contitutionalize the unconstitutional Cityhood Laws was a misapplication of the operative fact doctrine and would set a gravely dangerous precedent. This view would open the floodgates to the wanton enactment of unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their immediate implementation before the Court could declare them unconstitutional. Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. Accordingly, the 16 Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional. However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by the new cities or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective, as a matter of equity and fair play, to innocent people who may have relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Courts declaration of their unconstitutionality. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities. Moreover, the pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress, as a criterion, limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that
the classification must apply to all similarly situated; municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Disposition: The 18 November 2008 Decision, declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional, was reinstated.
3.
Section 68, Revised Administrative Code (1987) Special acts or charters, presidential decrees
Pelaez vs. Auditor General (1965), supra

The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" or solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power." Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself -- it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard -- the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
Municipality of Condijay, Bohol vs. Court of Appeals (1995) 4. 5. 6. Municipal prescription corporation by
De facto municipal corporations Attack against incorporations validity of
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7. Beginning of corporate existence of municipal corporations

Section 14, LGC. Beginning of Corporate Existence. When a new local government unit is created, its corporate existence shall commence upon the election and qualification of its chief executive and a majority of the members of its sanggunian, unless some other time is fixed therefor by the law or ordinance creating it.
NationalStatistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau(LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources(DENR). SEC. 8. Division and Merger. - Division and merger of existinglocal government units shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current income classification prior to such division. The income classification of local government units shall be updated within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Code to reflect the changes in their financial position resulting from the increased revenues as provided herein. SEC. 9. Abolition of Local Government Units. - A local government unit may be abolished when its income, population, or land area has been irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum standards prescribed for its creation under Book III of this Code, as certified by the national agencies mentioned in Section 17 hereof to Congress or to the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be. The law or ordinance abolishing a local government unit shall specify the province, city, municipality, or barangay with which thelocal government unitsought to be abolished will be incorporated or merged. SEC. 10. Plebiscite Requirement. - No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of
V.
ALTERATION AND DISSOLUTION CORPORATIONS
OF
MUNICIPAL
A. Nature of Power 1. Necessity for defining territorial boundaries B. Manner or Mode

SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. - As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit: (a) Income. - It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned; (b) Population. - It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and (c) Land Area. - It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace. Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the
32
effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date. Art. X, Sec. 10, Constitution. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
sovereign. By the cession, public property passes from one government to the other, but private property remains as before, and with it those municipal laws which are designed to secure its peaceful use and enjoyment. n Shapleigh v. San Angelo, the Court said: "The state's plenary power over its municipal corporations to change their organization, to modify their method of internal government, or to abolish them altogether, is not restricted by contracts entered into by the municipality with its creditors or with private parties. An absolute repeal of a municipal charter is therefor effectual so far as it abolishes the old corporate organization; but when the same or substantially the same inhabitants are erected into a new corporation, whether with extended or restricted territorial limits, such new corporation is treated as in law the successor of the old one, entitled to its property rights, and subject to its liabilities."
C. Effects 1. Effect of annexation or consolidation of municipal corporations 2. Effects of division of municipal corporations D. When there is no dissolution 1. Non-user or surrender of charter 2. Failure to elect municipal officers 3. Change of sovereignty Vilas vs. City of Manila, supra
The Citys principal-agent argument is incorrect for it loses sight of the dual character of municipal corporations. They exercise powers which are governmental and powers which are of a private or business character. Further, in Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. McGlinn, it was said: "It is a general rule of public lawthat whenever political jurisdiction and legislative power over any territory are transferred from one nation or sovereign to another, the municipal laws which are intended for the protection of private rights continue in force until abrogated or changed by the new government or
VI. PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENTS

Art. X, Sec. 10, Constitution. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Sec. 10, LGC. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.
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Padilla vs. COMELEC (1992)

Facts: R.A. No. 7155 was approved on September 6, 1991, creating the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines Norte. In the plebiscite held throughout the Municipality of Labo, only 2,890 votes favored its creation while 3,439 voters voted against the creation of the Municipality of TulayNa-Lupa. Consequently, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and disapproval of the independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa by a majority of votes. In this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte, sought to set aside the plebiscite and to have a new one conducted. Petitioner contended that the Courts ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC (in which it was held that all the residents of the mother province or municipality from which the new LGU is to be created must participate in the plebiscite) has been superseded with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, thus reinstating its earlier ruling in Paredes vs. COMELEC. Issue: WON the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo is valid Held: YES. Petitioner opined that since Tan vs. COMELEC was based on Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, the Courts ruling in said case is no longer applicable under Section 10 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, especially since the latter provision deleted the words "unit or." This is incorrect. The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution from its precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution did not affect the ruling in Tan vs. Comelec. As explained by then CONCOM Commissioner Associate Justice Hilario Davide during the debates in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the words units or were
deleted because the plebiscite involve all the units affected.
must
It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected" is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. Disposition: Petition dismissed.
Tan vs. COMELEC (1986)

Facts: Petitioners, residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, filed with the Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite pursuant to the enactment of B.P. Blg. 885 (An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte). The plebiscite proceeded as planned, and was confined only to the inhabitants of the three cities and 11 municipalities in Negros Occidental which would comprise the new province. Because of the exclusion of the voters from the rest of the province, petitioners submitted a supplemental petition for a writ of mandamus, directing COMELEC to hold another plebiscite at which all the qualified voters of the entire province will participate. To the respondents, the remaining cities and municipalities of Negros Occidental not included in the area of the new province do not fall within the meaning and scope of the term "unit or units affected" as referred to in Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution3. They invoked the ruling in
3
SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units
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Governor Zosimo Paredes vs. Executive Secretary (1984): To allow other voters to participate will not yield a true expression of their will. They may even frustrate it, That certainly will be so if they vote against it for selfish reasons, and they constitute the majority. That is not to abide by the fundamental principle of the Constitution to promote local autonomy, the preference being for smaller units. To rule as this Tribunal does is to follow an accepted principle of constitutional construction, that in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people may be gleaned from provisions in pari materia Respondents also insisted the the requisite territory of the new province contemplates not only land area but also the waters over which it has jurisdiction, within the threemile marginal sea limit. Thus, Negros del Norte, with more or less 4,019.95 sq. km. complied with the requisite geographical area (3,500 sq. km). Issues: 1. WON the excluded inhabitants of Negros Occidental should participate in the plebiscite 2. WON the territory requirement in the LGC embraces both the land area and the waters over which the political unit exercises control Held: 1. YES. The unit or units referred to in Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution embraces both the parent province as well as its constituent provinces or municipalities which will form the new LGU. The reasons in Paredes and Lopez vs. COMELEC cases invoked by respondents were formerly considered acceptable. However, few and lesser problems were involved in the earlier case, which was about the division of a barangay only, whereas the instant case concerns the
affected.
creation of a new province, the largest political unit contemplated in the Constitution. To form the new province of Negros del Norte will result in Negros Occidental losing not only least seven of the 15 sugar mills, but also approximately 2,768.4 sq. km. from the land area of the province. Thus, the division of the parent province necessarily will affect all the people living in the separate areas of Negros Occidental and the proposed province of Negros del Norte, as well as their economy. There is no legal basis for the unexplained change made when Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was enacted into B.P. Blg. 885 so that it is now provided in said enabling law that the plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected." By no mere legislative fiat can the unit or units affected referred in the fundamental law be diminished by the Batasang Pambansa to cities and municipalities comprising the new province. As petitioners correctly argued, the terms 'created', 'divided', 'merged', and 'abolished' as used in the constitutional provision do not contemplate distinct situations mutually exclusive to each other. Such cases necessarily will involve existing unit or units abolished and definitely the boundary being substantially altered. It would thus be inaccurate to state that where an existing political unit is divided or its boundary substantially altered, only some and not all the voters which suffers dismemberment or substantial alteration of its boundary are affected. Rather, the contrary is true. 2. NO. The LGC provision states that the "territory need not be contiguous." "Contiguous", when employed as an adjective is only used when it describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. Therefore, what need not be "contiguous" is the "territory" the physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory"
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embrace not only land area but also territorial waters. Disposition: The plebiscite was declared null and void. However, the Court did not order the conduct of another plebiscite because of the constitutional infirmity attaching to B.P. Blg, 885, and the failure of Negros del Norte to comply with the criteria established in the LGC. The ruling in Paredes and Lopez was also abandoned.
Held: YES. A close analysis of the said constitutional provision shows that the creation, division, etc. of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator material change in the political and economic rights of the LGUs directly affected. It is for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the political units directly affected." The consent of the people of the local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of the legislative power. The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial. For one, the independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished. The city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will now have to be shared with the province. When R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality to an independent component city, it required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There is neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite should not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City when R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the status of their city. Indeed, there is more reason to consult the people when a law substantially diminishes their right. Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the LGC is in accord with the Constitution when it provides that: (f) Plebiscite (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUS shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes
Miranda vs. Aguirre (1999)

Facts: On May 5, 1994, R.A. No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city was signed into law. The people of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite. On February 14, 1998, R.A. No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among others, it changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city. Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528 on the ground of lack of a provision submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite. In his Comment, the Solicitor General contended that R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent component city to a component city. It allegedly did not involve any "creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units," hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. A similar Comment was submitted by intervenor Giorgidi B. Aggabao, arguing that both the Constitution and the LGC do not require a plebiscite "to approve a law that merely allowed qualified voters of a city to vote in provincial elections. Issue: WON R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for failing to provide that the conversion from an independent component city to a component city should be submitted to the people in a proper plebiscite
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cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected xxx xxx xxx The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so long as they result in a material change in the local government unit directly affected, especially a change in the political and economic rights of its people. On J. Buenas dissenting opinion: Congress power of amendment is limited by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Quite clearly, when an amendment of a law involves the creation, merger, division, etc. of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory. He also contends that the amendment merely caused a transition in the status of Santiago as a city. The spirit of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution calls for the people of the local government unit directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and responsibilities. They may call the downgrading of Santiago to a component city as a mere transition but they cannot blink away from the fact that the transition will radically change its physical and political configuration as well as the rights and responsibilities of its people. On J. Mendozas dissenting opinion: J. Mendoza posits the theory that "only if the classification involves changes in income, population, and land area of the local government unit is there a need for such changes to be approved by the people . . . ." Such an interpretation runs against the letter and spirit of Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. It is clear that the Constitution imposes two conditions first, the creation, division, merger, etc. must meet the criteria fixed by the LGC on income, population and land area and second, the law must be approved by the people "by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
The requirements in Sections 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the LGC were imposed to help assure the economic viability of the local government unit concerned. They were not imposed to determine the necessity for a plebiscite of the people. Indeed, the Local Government Code does not state that there will be no more plebiscite after its requirements on income, population and land area have been satisfied. On the contrary, section 10, Chapter 2 of the Code provides: "No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes casts in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, opines that the plebiscite is absolute and mandatory. The criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income, population and land area are designed to achieve an economic purpose. In contrast, the people's plebiscite is required to achieve a political purpose to use the people's voice as a check against the pernicious political practice of gerrymandering. Disposition: Petition granted.
Tobias vs. Abalos (1994)

Facts: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. At the plebiscite, the turnout was a low 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no."
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Petitioners contended that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 494 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution, namely: 1. the one subject-one bill rule the law embraced two principal subjects: 1) the conversion of and 2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. 2. the composition of the HOR, which shall be no more than 250 representatives the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts has increased this; and 3. pre-emption of the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts. Petitioners also asserted that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite as the same involved a change in their legislative district. Issues: 1. WON R.A. No. 7675 is constitutional 2. WON the residents of San Juan should have participated in the plebiscite Held: 1. YES. The statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than 250,000 indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution: . . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative. (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution). Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. The title of R.A. No. 7675 necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49. Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec, the Court ruled that It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject." As to the composition of the HOR, the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the HOR shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 pre-empts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since it is a glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself. 2. NO. The inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong. The principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto.
ART. VIII, SEC. 49. As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election.
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Disposition: Petition dismissed.
VII. GENERAL POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS A. Police Power

SEC. 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and selfreliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
In United States v. Salaveria, the ponente Justice Malcolm stated that the general welfare clause has two branches: 1) The first attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority, relating to such ordinances as may be necessary to carry into effect the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law; 2) The second branch is much more independent of the specific functions of the council which are enumerated by law. It authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals The ordinance in this case falls under the second branch. It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify as reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. The ordinance on its face is thus characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. In the guise of a police regulation, there was in this instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed. Notwithstanding the above conclusion, the Court stated that the same must not be interpreted as a retreat from its resolute stand sustaining police power legislation to promote public morals. Disposition: The writ of certiorari was granted. Ordinance No. 84 was declared void and unconstitutional.
Dela Cruz vs. Paras (1983)

Facts: The Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan passed Ordinance No. 84 prohibiting the operation of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls and the issuance of employment licenses or permits to professional hostesses, hospitality girls and professional dancer for employment in any of the aforementioned establishments. According to the ordinance, the said establishments were the principal cause in the decadence of morality in the community. Petitioners filed two cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the CFI of Bulacan, alleging that the municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling, and that the ordinance was violative of petitioners' right to due process and the equal protection of the law. The CFI dismised the petitions. Issue: WON a municipal corporation can prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade (i.e. operation of night clubs) and the pursuit of a lawful occupation
Technology Developers, Inc. vs. CA (1991)

Facts: Petitioner, a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture of charcoal briquette, received a letter dated
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from private respondent Acting Mayor Pablo N. Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation of the petitioner's plant until further notice. The letter likewise requested its plant manager to bring with him to the office of the mayor the following: a) Building permit; b) Mayor's permit; c) Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources AntiPollution Permit. Later, respondent ordered the Municipality's station commander to padlock the premises of petitioner's plant. Petitioner instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction against private respondent with the lower court. Respondent judge initially issued writ of preliminary injunction but set the same aside later after reviewing documents which contained the residents complaints about the fumes being emitted by the petitioners plant. The CA also denied the petition upon appeal. Issue: WON CA gravely abused its discretion in rendering the decision in question Held: NO. The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or otherwise, in grave abuse of its discretion. By the same token the court that issued such a preliminary relief may recall or dissolve the writ as the circumstances may warrant. The following circumstances militate against the maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction sought by petitioner: No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control is essentially addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR, it
must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virture of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emissions in the operation of the business. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation which yielded the observatino that the fumes emitted by the plant goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device has been installed.
Petitioner failed to produce building permit from the municipality Sta. Maria, but instead presented building permit issued by an official Makati.
a of a of
While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May 25, 1988. Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community.
Disposition: Petition denied.
Chua Huat vs. CA (1991)

Facts: Re: G.R. No. 63863 (one of the consolidated cases) Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. requested the City Engineer and Building Officials of Manila Romulo del Rosario, to condemn the dilapidated structures located at Pedro Gil St. and Paz St., Paco, Manila, all occupied by petitioners. Notices of condemnation were issued to petitioners, stating that the subject buildings were found to be in dangerous condition and therefore must be condemned, subject to the confirmation of the mayor of the City of Manila. The
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buildings, according to inspection reports, were suffering from structural deterioration by more than 50% and as much as 80%. Civil Engineer Romulo C. Molas, a private practitioner, inspected the abovementioned structures upon the request of petitioners. In his evaluation report, he stated that although the buildings are old, they were still structurally sound with a remaining economic life of at least eight years. A demolition order was issued. Petitioners then filed the instant Petition for Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order, against Mayor Ramon Bagatsing, City Engineer Romulo del Rosario and Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. The RTC issued a T.R.O. against public respondents. Meanwhile, the respondent mayor confirmed the rest of the condemnation orders issued by the respondent city engineer. Petitioners then instituted a petition for certiorari with the SC. Issue: WON petitioners were entitled to the writ of certiorari Held: NO. Petitioners have no valid grievance for the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to be available to them. It is explicitly clear from Rule 65.1 of the Rules of Court that for certiorari to be available: a) a tribunal, board or office exercising judicial function acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and b) that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioners failed to show the presence of both elements. The power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the city Engineer, who is at the same time the building officials, (Sec. 206, P.D. 1096). Also, according to Section 215 of P.D. 1096 or the National Building Code, building officials have the authority to order the condemnation and demolition of buildings
which are found to be in a dangerous or ruinous condition. It is also clear from the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila that the mayor has the power to confirm or deny the action taken by the building officials, with respect to the dangerous or ruinous buildings. There was also no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent City Engineer because the orders were made only after thorough ocular inspections were conducted by the City's Building Inspectors. The respondent Mayor's act of approving the condemnation orders was likewise done in accordance with law.
Binay vs. Domingo (1991)

Facts: Petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which confirmed the ongoing burial assistance program. The funds for the said program were to be taken out of unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement fired at P400,000.00 for the implementation program. However, when the resolution was referred to respondent COA, the same was disapproved and disallowed in audit. Two letters for reconsideration were filed by petitioners Mayor Jejomar Binay and the Municipality of Makati, both of which were denied by respondent. According to COA, there was no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained under Resolution No. 60 and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati. Bent on pursuing the program, the Municipality of Makati, through its Council, passed Resolution No. 243, re-affirming Resolution No. 60. However program was stayed by COA Decision No. 1159, prompting petitioner to file a special civil action of certiorari.
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Issue: WON the burial assistance program is a valid exercise of police power by a municipality Held: YES. Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature. As a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise inferred police powers which grow out of the fact that they can only fully accomplish the objects of their creation by exercising such powers. Municipal governments exercise such powers under the general welfare clause. In the case of Sangalang vs. IAC, it was ruled that police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, overexpanding to meet the exigencies of the times, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In handing down its decision, COA was not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to promote the general welfare The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified as in laws that have accorded benefits to the disabled, emancipated the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, provided housing to the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social
justice. It vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay those who have less in life, should have more in law." The Court, however, warned that this decision, must not be taken as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise. Disposition: Petition granted.
Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac (1992)

Facts: On the basis of complaints received from the residents of barrio Sta. Elena against the disturbance caused by the operation of a machine inside the warehouse of petitioner Tatel which emitted smoke, obnoxious odor and dust, a committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter. The committee noted the crowded nature of the neighborhood with narrow roads and the surrounding residential houses such that an accidental fire within the warehouse and the storing of inflammable materials created a danger to the lives and properties of the people within the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac declaring the warehouse a public nuisance. His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Municipal Council of Virac, petitioner instituted a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the CFI of Catanduanes, which sustained the validity of the resolution. Respondent municipal officials contended that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters. On the other hand, petitioner argued that said ordinance was contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution. Issue: WON Ordinance No. 13 is a valid exercise of police power
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Held: YES. Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the (then) Administrative Code. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well-established principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and 6) must not be unreasonable. Ordinance No. 13, meets these criteria. In spite of its fractured syntax, the purpose of the ordinance in question is to avoid the loss of life and property in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligations of the government.
mayor discovered that the defendants filed a "Cadastral Answer" over said lot; that the defendants refused to vacate the place; and that the national government under Proclamation. No. 365 had alloted a budget for the construction of a gymnasium within the public plaza but the said construction which was already started could not continue because of the presence of the buildings constructed by the defendants. Petitioner Judge issued two (2) orders, one of which granted the petitioner municipality's motion for a writ of possession with the ancillary writ of demolition. These were later implemented by petitioner municipality, dispossessing the respondents of the land and the structures they have built thereon. They then filed their answer, alleging that they were never lessees of the municipality, Medina having bought the parcel from a Subanan native. Before the petitioner Judge could further act on the case, the private respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which set aside petitioner Judges orders. Petitioners contended that the allegations in the complaint constituted a cause of action for abatement of public nuisance. On the basis of this proposition, they asserted that petitioner municipality is entitled to the writ of possession and writ of demolition. Issue: WON the municipality is entitled to writs of possession and demolition even before the trial of the case starts Held: NO.
Judge Tamin vs. CA (1992)

Facts: Petitoner Municipality of Dumingang, Zamboanga del Sur filed with the RTC presided by the petitioner Judge a complaint for ejectment against respondents Vicente Medina and Fortunata Rosellon. The complaint alleged that the petitioner is the owner of a parcel of residential land which was reserved for a public plaza; that in 1958, the municipality leased an area to the respondents subject to the condition that they should vacate in case it is needed for public purposes; that the defendants paid the rentals until 1967 but refused to pay thereafter; that the
Public plazas are outside the commerce of man and properties of public dominion to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general. Constructions thereon can be abated summarily by the municipality. If, therefore, the allegations in the complaint are true and that the parcel of land being occupied by the private respondents is indeed a public plaza, then the writ of possession and writ of demolition would have been justified.
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However, not only did the municipality avoid the use of abatement without judicial proceedings, but the status of the subject parcel of land has yet to be decided. It must also be noted that Proclamation No. 365 recognizes private rights which may have been vested on other persons. And even before the Proclamation, the parcel of land was the subject of cadastral proceedings before another branch of the RTC. The outcome of said proceedings becomes a prejudicial question which must be addressed in the resolution of the instant case. But technically, a prejudicial question shall not rise in the instant case since the two actions involved are both civil in nature. However, of significance is the fact that the cadastral proceedings will ultimately settle the real owners of the disputed parcel of land. In case respondent Medina is adjudged the real owner, then the writ of possession and writ of demolition would necessarily be null and void. Thus, the more prudent course for the trial court to have taken is to hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a determination of the administrative case. In the event that respondent Vicente Medina is declared owner of the subject parcel of land, necessarily, the private respondents would be entitled to just compensation for the precipitate demolition of their buildings. On the other hand, if private respondent Medina is declared to have no rights over the subject parcel of land then, the private respondents would not be entitle to any compensation for the demolition of their buildings. Faced with these alternative possibilities, and in the interest of justice, petitioner municipality must put up a bond to be determined by the trial court to answer for just compensation. The appellate court moreover correctly ruled this Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court on eminent domain can not be made a subterfuge to justify the petitioner Judge's issuance of a writ of possession in favor of petitioner municipality.
Patalinghug vs. CA (1994)

Facts: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 363 otherwise known as the "Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City." A A building permit was later issued by the Zoning Administrator in favor of petitioner for the construction of a funeral parlor. Acting on the complaint of several residents of Barangay Agdao, Davao City that the construction of petitioner's funeral parlor violated Section 8 of Ordinance No. 363, since it was allegedly situated within a 50-meter radius from the Iglesia ni Kristo Chapel and several residential structures, the Sangguniang Panlungsod conducted an investigation and found that "the nearest residential structure (owned by Wilfred Tepoot) is only 8 inches to the south." Notwithstanding the findings of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, petitioner continued to construct his funeral parlor. Consequently, private respondents filed a case for the declaration of nullity of a building permit with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and/or restraining order with the TC. After conducting its own ocular inspection, the TC dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the lower court. It disagreed with the lower court's determination that Tepoot's building was commercial and ruled that although it was used by Tepoot's lessee for laundry business, it was a residential lot as reflected in the tax declaration. Issue: WON petitioner violated Ordinance No. 363 Held: NO. The municipalitys classification of the area as a commercial zone overrides Tepoots tax declaration. While the commercial aspect of Tepoots property has been established by the presence of machineries and laundry
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paraphernalia, its use as a residence, other than being declared for taxation purposes as such, was not fully substantiated. A tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes. A property may have been declared by its owner as residential for real estate taxation purposes but it may well be within a commercial zone. It does not bind a provincial/city assessor, for under Sec. 22 of the Real Estate Tax Code, appraisal and assessment are based on the actual use. The trial court's determination that Mr. Tepoot's building is commercial and, therefore, Sec. 8 is inapplicable, is strengthened by the fact that the Sangguniang Panlungsod has declared the questioned area as commercial or C-2. Consequently, even if Tepoot's building was declared for taxation purposes as residential, once a local government has reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must prevail. The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone thru a municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power. Corollary thereto, persons may be subjected to certain restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the state and to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated. The ordinance which regulates the location of funeral homes has been adopted as part of comprehensive zoning plans for the orderly development of the area covered thereunder. Disposition: Decision of the CA reversed.
In 1987, upon conducing a relocation survey in the area, petitioner discovered that certain portions of the property had been "unlawfully usurped and invaded" by the Municipality of Balanga, which had allowed the construction of shanties and market stalls. Petitioner later applied with the Office of the Mayor of Balanga for a business permit to engage in business in the said area. The mayors permit was granted. However, the Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga passed Resolution No. 12, s-88 annulling the Mayor's permit issued to petitioner. Pursuant to said Resolution, Mayor Banzon, issued E.O. No. 1, s-88 revoking the permit insofar as it authorized the operation of a public market. Petitioner filed the instant petition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory aimed at the reinstatement of the Mayor's permit. The Court did not issue the preliminary reliefs prayed for. Respondent asserted that Resolution No. 12, s-88 of the Sangguniang Bayan, was a legitimate exercise of local legislative authority and. On the contrary, petitioner asserted that the executive order and the resolution in question were quasi-judicial acts and not mere exercises of police power. Issue: WON Resolution No. 12, s-88 and E.O. No. 1, s-88 are a valid exercise of police power Held: NO. Lot 261-B was originally owned and registered in the name of Aurora T. Banzon Camacho, who subdivided the land into nine lots. She denoted some of the lots to the Municipality of Balanga which now comprise the Balanga Public Market, and sold others to third persons. Five buyers of certain portions of Lot 261-B filed Civil Case No. 3803 against Camacho for partition and delivery of titles. The TC rendered a decision ordering the defendant to segregate the definite portions sold to the
Greater Balanga Development Corp. vs. Municipality of Balanga (1994)

Facts: This case involves a parcel of land in Barrio San Jose located behind the Balanga Public Market. It was registered in the name of petitioner Greater Balanga Development Corporation. Petitioner had earlier donated to the Municipality of Balanga the present site of the Balanga Public Market.
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plaintiffs and deliver to them the corresponding titles thereto. This decision was affirmed by the CA. The defendant elevated the matter to the SC but the petition was denied for lack of merit. The question of ownership over Lot 261-B had already been settled with finality by the SC in 1983. When the Mayor's permit was revoked, five years had already elapsed since the case was decided. Petitioner obtained in its name TCT No. 120152 "without any memorandum of encumbrance pertaining to any decision rendered in any civil case". Clearly, for all intents and purposes, petitioner appeared to be the true owner of Lot 261-B-6-A-3 when respondents revoked its permit to engaged in business on its own land. Assuming arguendo that Lot 261-B-6-A-3 was actually one of those awarded to the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3803 and the TCT of petitioner is spurious, this still does not justify the revocation of the Mayor's permit. According to the records, the Sangguniang Bayan did not establish or maintain any public market on the subject lot. The resolution merely mentioned the plan to acquire the lot for expansion of the public market adjacent thereto. Until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court, the landowner cannot be deprived of its right over the land. The Sangguniang Bayan has the duty in the exercise of its police powers to regulate any business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe the conditions under which a municipal license already issued may be revoked. But the anxiety, uncertainty, restiveness among the stallholders and traders allegedly caused by petitioner cannot be a valid ground for revoking the permit. After all, the stallholders and traders were doing business on property not belonging to the Municipal government. Moreover, we find that the manner by which the Mayor revoked the permit transgressed petitioner's right to due process. The alleged violation of the Balanga Revenue Code was not stated in
the order of revocation, and neither was petitioner informed of this specific violation until the Rejoinder was filed in the instant case. The knowledge of the pendency of Civil Case No. 3803 could not ipso facto nullify any claim petitioner had on the lot. This necessitated first and foremost a determination of the exact parameters of the lot and a finding that petitioner is not the true owner thereof. Disposition: E.O. No. 1, s-88 and Resolution No. 12, s-88 issuedby respondents were nullified.
Tano vs. Socrates (1997)

Facts: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of: 1) Ordinance No. 1592, which banned the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from 1993 to 1998; 2) Office Order No. 23, which authorized inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from Puerto Princesa; and 3) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, which prohibited the catching, possession, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms. The petitioners contended that the said Ordinances deprived them of due process of law and livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade. Public respondents Governor Socrates and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of the ordinances as a valid exercise of the provincial government's power under the general welfare clause. Issue: WON the assailed ordinances are a valid exercise of police power Held: YES. The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merely seek to give flesh and blood to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In fact, the General Welfare Clause, expressly mentions this right. Moreover, Section 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of the LGC shall
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be liberally interpreted to give more powers to the local government units in accelerating economic development... The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and to impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing laws. Further, the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod and the sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the protection of the environment. Pursuant to the system of decentralization as expressly mandated by the Constitution, one of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. Both ordinances have two principal objectives: (1) to establish a closed season for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years, and (2) to protect the corals of the marine waters of Puerto Princesa and Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities. The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters, such as P.D. No. 1015, which allows the establishment of closed seasons. The devolution of such power has been expressly confirmed in the MOA between DAR and DILG (1994). The realization of the second objective falls within both the general welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment. Disposition: Petition dismissed.
White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila (2009)

Facts: Mayor Alfredo Lim signed into law Ordinance No. 7774, which prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. Petitioner White Light Corp., an operator of mini-hotels and motels, sought to have the Ordinance nullified on the ground that the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner, holding that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance. Respondent City contended the ordinance is valid exercise of police power. It invoked the LGC, under which a city is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. Issue: WON Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power Held: NO. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less
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intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and vice is a common problem confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. Disposition: Petition granted.
years old from being accepted in such hotels, unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian, and the lease of any room more than twice every 24 hours. Petitioners filed an action for prohibition against the Ordinance on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive and offensive of their right to due process. The lower court issued an injunction, ruling against the validity of the Ordinance. Issue: WON Ordinance No. 4760 is a valid exercise of police power Held: YES. The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers. The challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels. The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard: reasonableness and fariness. Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees. Licenses for non-useful occupations such as the operation of motels are also incidental to police power and the right to exact a fee
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, et al. vs. City of Manila (1967)
Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760. Section 1 of the Ordinance imposes a P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels, aand requires the owner, manager, etc. of motels to refrain from entertaining any guest or customer without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times, wherein he should disclose his personal information and relationship with his companions, if any. Section 2 prohibits a person less than 18
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may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion. In the leading case of Lutz v. Araneta, this Court affirmed the doctrine that taxation may be made to implement the state's police power. (The other day before this decision came out, the SC had affirmed the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities, which is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects.) The prohibition against leasing rooms more than once in a day cannot be viewed as a transgression of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. It was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be. There exists a correspondence between the existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Disposition: Lower court decision reversed.
government unit concerned may be lawfully used or conveyed: Provided, however, That no freedom park shall be closed permanently without provision for its transfer or relocation to a new site. (c) Any national or local road, alley, park, or square may be temporarily closed during an actual emergency, or fiesta celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs, or an undertaking of public works and highways, telecommunications, and waterworks projects, the duration of which shall be specified by the local chief executive concerned in a written order: Provided, however, That no national or local road, alley, park, or square shall set temporarily closed for athletic, cultural, or civic activities not officially sponsored, recognized, or approved by the local government unit concerned. (d) Any city, municipality, or barangay may, by a duly enacted ordinance, temporarily close and regulate the use of any local street, road, thoroughfare, or any other public place where shopping malls, Sunday, flea or night markets, or shopping areas may be established and where goods, merchandise, foodstuffs, commodities, or articles of commerce may be sold and dispensed to the general public.
CLOSURE AND OPENING OF ROADS

SEC. 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is provided. (b) No such way or place or any part thereof shall be permanently closed without making provisions for the maintenance of public safety therein. A property thus permanently withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local
Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (1989)
Facts: Five consolidated petitions were filed by respondent BAVA and three residents of Bel-Air Village against other residents of the Village and the Ayala Corporation, formerly the Makati Development Corporation, as the developer of the subdivision. The petitioners sought to enforce certain restrictive easements in the deeds of sale over their respective lots in the subdivision. These were the prohibition on the setting up of commercial and advertising signs on the lots, and the condition that the lots be used only for residential purposes. Petitioners alleged that respondents, who were residents along Jupiter Street of the subdivision, converted their residences into commercial establishments in violation of the deed
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restrictions, and that respondent Ayala Corporation ushered in the full commercialization of Jupiter Street by tearing down the perimeter wall that separated the commercial from the residential section of the village. The petitions were dismissed based on Ordinance No. 81 of the Municipal Council of Makati and Ordinance No. 81-01 of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC). Municipal Ordinance No. 81 classified Bel-Air Village as a Class A Residential Zone, with its boundary in the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street. The Municipal Ordinance was adopted by the MMC under the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the National Capital Region and promulgated as MMC Ordinance No. 81-01. Bel-Air Village was indicated therein as bounded by Jupiter Street and the block adjacent thereto was classified as a High Intensity Commercial Zone. Issue: WON Ordinance No. 81 of the Municipal Council of Makati and Ordinance No. 81-01 of the MMC were valid Held: YES. Since both Ordinances recognized Jupiter Street as the boundary between Bel-Air Village and the commercial district, Jupiter Street was not for the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air residents. The perimeter wall on said street was constructed not to separate the residential from the commercial blocks but simply for security reasons, hence, in tearing down said wall, Ayala Corporation did not violate the deed restrictions in the deeds of sale. The ordinances, specifically MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, are a legitimate exercise of police power. The power of the MMC and the Makati Municipal Council to enact zoning ordinances for the general welfare prevailed over the deed restrictions. In the second Sangalang/Yabut decision (on motion for reconsideration), it was held that the opening of Jupiter Street was warranted by the demands of the common good in terms of traffic decongestion and
public convenience. Jupiter was opened by the Municipal Mayor to alleviate traffic congestion along the public streets adjacent to the Village. The same reason was given for the opening to public vehicular traffic of Orbit Street, a road inside the same village. The destruction of the gate in Orbit Street was also made under the police power of the municipal government. The gate, like the perimeter wall along Jupiter, was a public nuisance because it hindered and impaired the use of property, hence, its summary abatement by the mayor was proper and legal. Disposition: Petition dismissed.
Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals (1991)

Facts: On September 19, 1969, the Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted Resolution No. 158. Said Resolution closed the old road leading to the new Capitol Building to traffic and provided the owners of the properties traversed by the new road equal area from the old road adjacent to the respective remaining portion of their properties. Deeds of Exchange were then executed, conveying to five persons portions of the closed road in exchange for their own respective properties. Petitioner Bruno Cabrera filed a complaint with the CFI of Catanduanes for "Restoration of Public Road and/or Abatement of Nuisance, Annulment of Resolutions and Documents with Damages." He alleged that the land fronting his house was a public road owned by the Province and therefore beyond the commerce of man. The lower court while holding that the land in question was not a declared public road but a mere short-cut," nevertheless sustained the authority of the provincial board to enact Resolution No. 158. However, the CA ruled that the he was prejudiced by his lost of access to the road, for which he must be compensated with P5,000 as nominal and/or temperate damages, and the sum of P2,000 as attorney's fees.
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Petitioner argued that Sec. 2246 is inapplicable because Resolution No. 158 is not an order for the closure of the road in question but an authority to barter or exchange it with private properties. He further insisted that control over public roads is with Congress and not with the provincial board. Issue: WON the provincial boards order to close the road was valid Held: YES. The closure is as plain as day except that the petitioner, with the blindness of those who will not see, refuses to acknowledge it. The authority of the provincial board to close that road and use or convey it for other purposes is derived from R.A. No. 51855 in relation to Section 22466 of the Revised Administrative Code. These provisions are also in consonance with Article 422 of the Civil Code, which provides: "Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." The provincial board has the duty of maintaining roads for the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants of the province. Moreover, this authority is inferable from the grant by the national legislature of the funds to the Province of
Catanduanes for provincial roads.
the
construction
of
As to the issue of compensation, the general rule is that one whose property does not abut on the closed section of a street has no right to it for the closing of the road, if he still has reasonable access to the general system of streets. The circumstances in some cases may be such as to give a right to damages to a property owner, even though his property does not abut on the closed section. But to warrant recovery in any such case the property owner must show that the situation is such that he has sustained special damages differing in kind, and not merely in degree, from those sustained by the public generally. Petitioner is not entitled to damages because the injury he has incurred is the price he and others like him must pay for the welfare of the entire community. This is not a case where his property has been expropriated and he is entitled to just compensation. The construction of the new road was undertaken under the general welfare clause. Disposition: The award for damages was deleted.
Dacanay vs. Asistio (1992)

Facts: On January 5, 1979, MMC Ordinance No. 79-02 was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Commission, designating certain city and municipal streets as sites for flea markets. The Caloocan City mayor opened up seven flea markets in that city. One of those streets was the "Heroes del '96" where petitioner Francisco Dacanay lives. Respondents city mayor and city engineer, issued vendors licenses to conduct vending activities on said street. In 1987, Antonio Martinez, as OIC city mayor of Caloocan City, caused the demolition of the market stalls. To stop Mayor Martinez' efforts to clear the city streets, some stallowners filed an action for prohibition in the RTC of Caloocan City (Civil Case No. C-1292), the court
R.A. No. 5185, Section 11, II:. The following actions by municipal officials or municipal councils, as provided for in the pertinent sections of the Revised Administrative Code shall take effect without the need of approval or direction from any official of the national government: Provided, That such actions shall be subject to approval or direction by the Provincial Board: (a) Authority to close thoroughfare under Section 2246;
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Sec. 2246. Authority to close thoroughfare. With the prior authorization of the Department Head, a municipal council may close any municipal road, street, alley, park, or square; but no such way or place aforesaid or any part thereof, shall be closed without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby.
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dismissed the petition and lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it had earlier issued, finding that the streets in question are of public dominion, hence, outside the commerce of man. After the decision came out, however, City Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr., as successor of Mayor Martinez, did not pursue the latter's policy of clearing the city streets. Invoking the trial court's decision, petitioner Dacanay wrote letters to Mayor Asistio, Jr., asking for the demolition of the stalls. As there was no response, Dacanay wrote President Corazon C. Aquino and later filed a complaint against Mayor Asistio and Engineer Sarne in the Office of the Ombudsman, charging them with dereliction of duty and manifest partiality constituting violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. As the stallholders continued to occupy Heroes del '96 Street through the tolerance of the public respondents, Dacanay filed a petition for mandamus, praying that the public respondents be ordered to enforce the final decision in Civil Case No. C-1292. In their Comment, public respondents through the City Legal Officer alleged that the vending area was transferred to Heroes del '96 Street to decongest Malonzo Street, which is comparatively a busier thoroughfare; that the transfer was made by virtue of Barangay Resolution No. 30 s'78; that while the resolution was awaiting approval by the MMC, the latter passed Ordinance No. 79-2, authorizing the use of certain streets and open spaces as sites for flea markets and/or vending areas; and that pursuant thereto, Acting MMC Mayor Virgilio P. Robles issued E.O. No. ordering the establishment and operation of flea markets in specified areas. Held: The disputed areas are public streets, as found by the trial court. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424, CC). Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract.
As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the public street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or licenses are null and void for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose health, peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are under legal obligation to protect. The Executive Order issued by Acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of Heroes del '96 Street as a vending area for stallholders who were granted licenses by the city government contravenes the general law that reserves city streets and roads for public use. Mayor Robles' Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians. As early as 1989, the public respondents had started to look for feasible alternative sites for flea markets. They have had more than ample time to relocate the street vendors. Disposition: Public respondents were ordered to to remove or demolish the market stalls within thirty (30)days from notice of the decision.
Macasiano vs. Diokno (1992)

Facts: On June 13, 1990, respondent Municipality of Paraaque passed Ordinance No. 86 s. 1990, which authorized the closure of five streets in Baclaran, and the establishment of a flea market thereon. The said ordinance was approved by the municipal council pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. 2, authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets, roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market and/or vending areas, under certain terms and conditions.
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The Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance No. 86 of the municipal council of respondent municipality subject to the following conditions, among others: that the streets are not used for vehicular traffic, and that the majority of the residents do not oppose the establishment of the flea market; and that that the use of the vending areas shall be temporary and shall be closed once the reclaimed areas are developed and donated by the Public Estate Authority. The municipal council of Paraaque issued a resolution authorizing Paraaque Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the operation, maintenance and management of flea markets. Respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement. Market stalls were then put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets. Petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel St. in Baclaran. Petitioner Macasiano wrote a letter to respondent Palanyag giving the latter ten days to discontinue the flea market; otherwise, the market stalls shall be dismantled. Respondents municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a joint petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction. The trial court issued an order upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 86 s. 1990 and enjoining petitioner Macasiano from enforcing his letter-order against respondent Palanyag. Hence, this petition was filed by the petitioner thru the OSG alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge. Issue: WON the ordinance issued by the Municipality of Paraaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets as sites for flea markets is valid Held: NO.
Based on Article 4247 of the CC, the streets under dispute are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress. One such example is the power to close roads as provided in Section 10, Chapter II of the LGC, which requires that the closure be in accordance with existing law and the provisions of this Code. However, the above legal provision should be read in accordance with basic legal principles, i.e. Article 424 of the Civil. Aside from the requirement of due process, the closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn from public use, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the LGU concerned. It is only then that the respondent municipality can "use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed" in accordance with the last sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of Blg. 337. Assuming in gratia argumenti that respondent municipality has the authority to pass the disputed ordinance, the same
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Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities or municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
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cannot be validly implemented because it cannot be considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to noncompliance with the conditions earlier imposed by the former. Respondent municipality has not shown any iota of proof that it has complied with the conditions precedent to the approval of the ordinance. Moreover, it is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area are congested with people, houses and traffic, restricting access by ambulances, fire trucks and ordinary commuters to streets in the area. The powers of a local government unit are not absolute. They are subject to limitations laid down by the Constitution and the laws. Also, the exercise of such powers should be subservient to paramount considerations of health and well-being of the members of the community. Disposition: Petition granted.
The Pilapils filed their Answer specifically denying the existence of a camino vecinal on their property and alleging, inter alia, that the enclosing of their property by a fence was done in the valid exercise of their right of ownership and that if the Colomidas were prejudiced thereby, they only have themselves to blame for buying said property without verifying its existing easements. As affirmative and special defenses, the Pilapils averred that the Colomidas were the ones who employed threats and intimidation; and that they even had a heavy bulldozer to enter their property, causing great damage to their plants and crops. During trial on the merits in Civil Case No. R-20732, the Colomidas presented offered in evidence Resolution No. 106 of the Municipal Council of Liloan passed, which authorized the the residents to repair and improve the camino vecinal in their sitio and a sketch showing that the camino vecinal traverses the property of the Pilapils. Upon the other hand, the Pilapils presented the Engineer Epifanio Jordan (the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator) who testified on Liloan's Urban Land Use Plan. Per the said plan, the camino vecinal in sitio Bahak does not traverse, but runs along the side of the Pilapil property. The TC rendered its decision in favor of the Colomidas. Issue: WON there exists a camino vecinal; and if so, WON the same traverses the property belonging to the petitioners Held: YES. NO. By any standard, the issue is quite simple and could have been easily resolved without much procedural fanfare if the trial court either took full advantage of the rule on pre-trial, or conducted an ocular inspection of the premises, and if the Colomidas moved for the appointment of a commissioner who could determine the exact location of the camimo vecinal. But the issue of the parties credibility has been rendered moot by the unrebutted evidence which shows that the Municipality of Liloan, through its Sangguniang Bayan,
Pilapil vs. Court of Appeals (1992)

Facts: The petitioners-spouses own a 6,598 sq.m. parcel of land in Sitio Bahak, Liloan, Cebu. Private respondents Colomidas purchased from the Cenizas a parcel of land. The Colomidas claimed that they had acquired from Sesenando Longkit a right of way which leads towards the National Road, which right of way, however, ends at that portion of the property of the Pilapils where a camino vecinal exists all the way to the said National Road. The Colomidas tried to improve the road of camino vecinal but the Pilapils harassed and threatened them with bodily harm from making said improvement. The Pilapils also threatened to fence off the camino vecinal. The Colomidas filed against the Pilapils a petition for injunction and damages with a prayer with the RTC of Cebu (Civil Case No. R-20732). On the other hand, the Pilapils filed against the Colomidas an action for damages in the MCTC of Liloan-Compostela, Cebu (Civil Case No. 93-R. )
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had approved a zoning plan which indicates the relative location of the camino vecinal. The establishment, closure or abandonment of the camino vecinal is the sole prerogative of the Municipality of Liloan. No private party can interfere with such a right. Thus, the decision of the Municipality of Liloan with respect to the said camino vecinal must prevail. It is thus pointless to concentrate on the testimonies of both witnesses since the same have become irrelevant. Under the applicable law in this case, Batas B.P. Blg. 337, the Sangguniang Bayan, the legislative body of the municipality, had the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations subject to the provisions of existing laws, and to provide for the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of municipal streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places, regulate the use thereof and prohibit the construction or placing of obstacles or encroachments on them, they being public property for public use. A camino vecinal is a municipal road. It is also property for public use. Pursuant, therefore, to the powers of a LGU, the Municipality of Liloan had the unassailable authority to (a) prepare and adopt a land use map, (b) promulgate a zoning ordinance which may consider, among other things, the municipal roads to be constructed, maintained, improved or repaired and (c) close any municipal road. The confusion regarding the party who directed Engineer Jordan to prepare the land use map is quite trivial and hence, did not affect the validity of the zoning map. In the first place, the mayor was both a member and the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan. Secondly, what invested the zoning map with legal effect was neither the authority of the person who ordered its preparation nor that of the person who actually prepared it, but its approval by the Sangguniang Bayan. Furthermore, with or without the order of
the Mayor or Sangguniang Bayan, Engineer Jordan, as the then Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, had the authority to prepare the plan. As further declared by Engineer Jordan, this camino vecinal passes the side of the land of Socrates Pilapil. The Colomidas presented no rebuttal witness to show that by the approval of the zoning map by the Sangguniang Bayan, they were effectively deprived of access to the national highway from their property. Disposition: Petition granted.
MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village Association (2000)

Facts: On December 30, 1995, respondent Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) received from petitioner MMDA, through its Chairman, a notice requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. Respondent instituted against petitioner before the RTC of Makati City an action for injunction, enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and the demolition of the perimeter wall. The TC denied issuance of a preliminary injunction. Respondent questioned the denial before the CA, which conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune Street. The CA issued a preliminary injunction and thereafter rendered a decision finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. The Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was, hence, the recourse to the SC. Citing the Sangalang cases, petitioner MMDA claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of
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these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. Issue: WON the MMDA has the mandate to open a private road to public traffic Held: NO. The MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a special metropolitan political subdivision as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution.
N.B.: The MMDA With the passage of R. A. No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a special development and administrative region and the administration of metrowide basic services affecting the region placed under MMDA. Metro-wide services are those which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual LGUs comprising Metro Manila. There are seven basic metro-wide services and the scope of these services cover the following: 1) development planning; 2) transport and traffic management; 3) solid waste disposal and management; 4) flood control and sewerage management; 5) urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter services; 6) health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and 7) public safety. The implementation of the MMDAs plans, programs and projects is undertaken by the LGUs, national government agencies, accredited peoples organizations, NGOs, and the private sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For this purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts, memoranda of agreement and other cooperative arrangements with these bodies for the delivery of the required services within Metro Manila. The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The Council is composed of the mayors of the component
cities and municipalities, the president of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors League and the president of the Metro Manila Councilors League. The Council is headed by a Chairman who is appointed by the President and vested with the rank of cabinet member. As the policy-making body of the MMDA, the Metro Manila Council approves metro-wide plans, programs and projects, and issues the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of said plans; it approves the annual budget of the MMDA and promulgates the rules and regulations for the delivery of basic services, collection of service and regulatory fees, fines and penalties.
The scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the seven basic services. Its powers are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is nothing in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. All its functions are administrative in nature as are actually summed up in the charter8 itself . Contrary to petitioners claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati and the MMC. The MMDA notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening. Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its authority under its charter to rationalize the use of roads. Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the scope of transport and traffic management. But by no stretch of the
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Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. -- x x x. The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters.
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imagination can this be interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinancemaking power, much less police power. Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, P. D. No. 824, the charter of the MMC, vested it greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA, such as the power to review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of cities and municipalities within Metropolitan Manila as well the exclusive powers to impose taxes and pass ordinances with penal sanctions. Moreover, the character of the MMDA as a mere administrative body is affirmed by the debate in Congress when the H.B. from which R.A. No. 7924 originated was first taken up by the Committee on Local Governments in the HOR. Said Hon. Ciriaco Alfelor, the committee chairman, the MMDA will not possess any political power. Disposition: Petition denied.
determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property. Section 9, Article III, Constitution. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Rule 67, Rules of Court: Expropriation Section 1. The complaint. The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a verified complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of expropriation, describe the real or personal property sought to be expropriated, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the separate interest of each defendant. If the title to any property sought to be expropriated appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect shall be made in the complaint. Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized government depositary. Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary. If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained and the amount to be deposited shall be promptly fixed by the court.
B. EMINENT
DOMAIN
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. - A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be
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After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties. Sec. 3. Defenses and objections. If a defendant has no objection or defense to the action or the taking of his property, he may file and serve a notice of appearance and a manifestation to that effect, specifically designating or identifying the property in which he claims to be interested, within the time stated in the summons. Thereafter, he shall be entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same. If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within the time stated in the summons. The answer shall specifically designate or identify the property in which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and extent of the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his property. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the answer or any subsequent pleading. A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the court, in the interest of justice, may permit amendments to the answer to be made not later than ten (10) days from the filing thereof. However, at the trial of the issue of just compensation, whether or not a defendant has previously appeared or answered, he may present evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for his property, and he may share in the distribution of the award. Sec. 4. Order of expropriation. If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of
expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be paid. After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and equitable. Sec. 5. Ascertainment of compensation. Upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within which their report shall be submitted to the court. Copies of the order shall be served on the parties. Objections to the appointment of any of the commissioners shall be filed with the court within ten (10) days from service, and shall be resolved within thirty (30) days after all the commissioners shall have received copies of the objections. Sec. 6. Proceedings by commissioners. Before entering upon the performance of their duties, the commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other proceedings in the case. Evidence may be introduced by either party before the commissioners
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who are authorized to administer oaths on hearings before them, and the commissioners shall, unless the parties consent to the contrary, after due notice to the parties to attend, view and examine the property sought to be expropriated and its surroundings, and may measure the same, after which either party may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the public use or purpose of the property taken, the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of the corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken. Sec. 7. Report by commissioners and judgment thereupon. The court may order the commissioners to report when any particular portion of the real estate shall have been passed upon by them, and may render judgment upon such partial report, and direct the commissioners to proceed with their work as to subsequent portions of the property sought to be expropriated, and may from time to time so deal with such property. The commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court of all their proceedings, and such proceedings shall not be effectual until the court shall have accepted their report and rendered judgment in accordance with their recommendations. Except as otherwise expressly ordered by the court, such report shall be filed within sixty (60) days from the date the commissioners were notified of their appointment, which time may be extended in the discretion of the court. Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of the court shall serve copies thereof on all interested parties, with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days within which to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire.
Sec. 8. Action upon commissioners report. Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section, or even before the expiration of such period but after all the interested parties have filed their objections to the report or their statement of agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken. Sec. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made. Sec. 10. Rights of plaintiff after judgment and payment. Upon payment by the plaintiff to the defendant of the compensation fixed by the judgment, with legal interest thereon from the taking of the possession of the property, or after tender to him of the amount so fixed and payment of the costs, the plaintiff shall have the right to enter upon the property expropriated and to appropriate it for the public use or purpose defined in the judgment, or to retain it should he have taken immediate possession thereof under the provisions of section 2 hereof. If the defendant and his counsel absent themselves from the
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court, or decline to receive the amount tendered, the same shall be ordered to be deposited in court and such deposit shall have the same effect as actual payment thereof to the defendant or the person ultimately adjudged entitled thereto. Sec. 11. Entry not delayed by appeal; effect of reversal. The right of the plaintiff to enter upon the property of the defendant and appropriate the same for public use or purpose shall not be delayed by an appeal from the judgment. But if the appellate court determines that plaintiff has no right of expropriation, judgment shall be rendered ordering the Regional Trial Court to forthwith enforce the restoration to the defendant of the possession of the property, and to determine the damages which the defendant sustained and may recover by reason of the possession taken by the plaintiff. Sec. 12. Costs, by whom paid. The fees of the commissioners shall be taxed as a part of the costs of the proceedings. All costs, except those of rival claimants litigating their claims, shall be paid by the plaintiff, unless an appeal is taken by the owner of the property and the judgment is affirmed, in which event the costs of the appeal shall be paid by the owner. Sec. 13. Recording judgment, and its effect. The judgment entered in expropriation proceedings shall state definitely, by an adequate description, the particular property or interest therein expropriated, and the nature of the public use or purpose for which it is expropriated. When real estate is expropriated, a certified copy of such judgment shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the property is situated, and its effect shall be to vest in the plaintiff the title to the real estate so described for such public use or purpose. Sec. 14. Power of guardian in such proceedings. The guardian or guardian ad litem of a minor or of a person judicially declared to be incompetent
may, with the approval of the court first had, do and perform on behalf of his ward any act, matter, or thing respecting the expropriation for public use or purpose of property belonging to such minor or person judicially declared to be incompetent, which such minor or person judicially declared to be incompetent could do in such proceedings if he were of age or competent. Moday vs. Court of Appeals (1993) Facts: In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89, which authorized the mayor to expropriate a onehectare lot along the national highway owned by petitioner Percival Moday for the site of Bunawan Farmers Center and other government sports facilities. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution, commenting that the expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan. Public respondent Municipality of Bunawan filed a petition for Eminent Domain against petitioner before the RTC. In 1991, public respondent filed a motion to take possession of the land stating that it had already deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary amount. The RTC granted the motion, holding that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective. Petitioners elevated the case in a petition for certiorari at the CA, but the same was dismissed by respondent appellate court. Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the subject property: the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall, the Municipal Motorpool and the Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium. Before the SC, petitioners sought to declare Resolution No. 43-89 of the Municipality of Bunawan as null and void. Petitioners claimed that because they did not support him in the last elections, the former mayor used the expropriation as a retaliatory act,
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even if there were other properties belonging to the municipality and available for the purpose. They alleged that the municipality owns a vacant seven-hectare property adjacent to petitioners' land, evidenced by a sketch plan. Issue: WON a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Held: YES. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is the government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. The power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The limitations on the power are that the use must be public, compensation must be made and due process of law must be observed. The necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character. The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is expressly provided for in Sec. 9, B.P. Blg. 3379. On the other hand, B.P. Blg. 337 grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove the resolution for the
municipality clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain. Moreover, the uncertified photocopy of the sketch plan does not conclusively prove that the municipality does own vacant land adjacent to petitioners' property suited to the purpose of the expropriation. The CA similarly held that the pleadings and documents on record have not pointed out any of respondent municipality's other available properties for the same purpose. The accusations of political reprisal are likewise unsupported by competent evidence. Consequently, the Court holds that petitioners' demand that the former municipal mayor be personally liable for damages is without basis. Disposition: Petition denied.
Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals (1993)

Facts: In 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the provincial governor to expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees. The province, through Governor Hon. Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against private respondents Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin. The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. The TC denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the province to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount provisionally fixed by the TC to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. In the CA, the San Joaquins asked for: 1) the dismissal of the complaints for expropriation on the ground of the inadequacy of the compensation being
Sec. 9. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.
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offered and (2) the nullification of Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988. The Solicitor General in his Comment stated that under Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. But the province must first secure the approval of the DAR of the plan to expropriate the lands for use as a housing project. The CA did not rule on the validity of the questioned resolution; neither did it dismiss the complaints. However, when it ordered the suspension of the proceedings until the Province of Camarines Sur shall have obtained the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to change the classification of the lands, it assumed that the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose. Province of Camarines Sur submitted that its exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot be restricted by the provisions of the CARL (R.A. No. 6657), particularly Section 65 thereof, which requires the approval of the DAR before a parcel of land can be reclassified from an agricultural to a non-agricultural land. Issues: 1. WON the expropriation is for a public purpose 2. WON the approval of DAR is necessary before an expropriated parcel of land could be converted from agricultural to nonagricultural use Held: 1. YES. The concept of public use has changed. Before, the idea was that the condemned property must actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.). Today, public use means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the
center would make available to the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution. As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero, Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum the general welfare. 3. NO. It is true that LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments. But Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that LGUs must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the CARL which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by LGUs to the control of the DAR. The closest provision of law that could justify the intervention of the DAR is Section 6510 of the CARL. However, as gleaned from the opening phrase of the provision, it applies only to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program
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SEC. 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for, agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.
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as it speaks of the lapse of five (5) years from its award. Also, the exclusive authority of DAR to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands is limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries. This interpretation is consistent with the rule that statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication. Moreover, to sustain the CA would mean that the LGUs can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of public works, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the DAR, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the DAR to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use. This would encroach upon the power of the legislative branch of the LGU to determine whether the use of the property is public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. Disposition: Petition granted.
Provincial Board of Bulacan passed a resolution disapproving and annulling Resolution No. 258, Series of 1975. However, in 1983, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, passed Resolution No. 21, Series of 1983, for the purpose of expropriating anew the respondent's land. The Provincial Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaid resolution. Ptitioner filed with the RTC of Malolos a special civil action for expropriation. Upon deposit of money with the PNB, the TC issued a writ of possession in favor of the petitioner. Respondent went to the IAC, which affirmed the TC's decision. However, on MR of the respondent, the IAC reversed its decision, holding that there is no genuine necessity to expropriate the land as there were several other roads for the same purpose and another more appropriate lot for the proposed public road. In refuting the petitioner's arguments, the private respondent contends that this Court may only resolve questions of law and not questions of fact such as those which the petitioner puts in issue in this case. The respondent further argues that this Court may not also interfere with an action of the Court of Appeals which involves the exercise of discretion. Issue: WON the expropriation, as insisted by the Municipality of Meycauayan, is proper Held: NO. The foundation of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain is genuine necessity which must be of a public character. The government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity therefor, as illustrated in this case. The records reveals that there are other connecting links between the roads sought be linked. The petitioner itself admits that
Meycauayan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (1988)

Facts: In 1975, respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence a parcel of land allegedly to enable the storage of the respondent's heavy equipment and various finished products. In the same year, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan passed Resolution No. 258, Series of 1975, manifesting the intention to expropriate the respondent's parcel of land. Respondent filed an opposition to the resolution with the Office of the Provincial Governor, which, in turn, created a special committee to investigate the matter. The Special Committee recommended the disapproval of the resolution as there was no genuine necessity to expropriate the property for use as a public road. Thus, the
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there are four such cross roads in existence. As also found by the CA, with the proposed road, there would be seven. The Special Committee found that in the vicinity there are other available road and vacant lot offered for sale situated similarly as the lot in question and lying idle, unlike the lot sought to be expropriated which was badly needed by the company as a site for its heavy equipment. The justification to condemn the same does not appear to be necessary and would only cause unjustified damage to the respondent. The desire of the Municipality of Meycauayan to build a public road to decongest the volume of traffic can be fully and better attained by acquiring the other available roads in the vicinity. The petitioner alleges that the environmental progress during the span of seven years between the first and second attempts to expropriate has brought about a change in the facts of the case. This allegation does not merit consideration as there is no evidence on record which shows a change in the factual circumstances. There is no showing that some of the six other available cross roads have been closed. Disposition: Petition denied.
donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. Respondent filed with respondent CFI of Rizal a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question. The respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the QC Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. The respondent court rendered a decision declaring Section 9 of the Ordinance null and void. In their petition for review before the SC, petitioners argued that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the general welfare clause is not a source of power for the taking of the property in this case, pointing out that if an owner is deprived of his property under the State's police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare. The respondent cited the case of a nuisance per se or the destruction of a house to prevent the spread of a conflagration. Issue: WON Section 9 of the Ordinance No. 6118, S1964 is a valid exercise of police power Held: NO. Section 9 of the Ordinance is not a mere police regulation but an expropriation without compensation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law. Police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for
Quezon City vs. Ericta (1983)

Facts: The Quezon City Council passed Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, which regulated the establishment and operation of private memorial type cemetery within QC. Section of the Ordinance provides that at least six per cent of the total area of the burial park shal be set aside for charity burial of deceased paupers who have been residents of QC for at least 5 years prior to their death. For several years, this section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven years after its enactment, the QC Council passed a resolution requesting the City Engineer to stop from further selling memorial park lots where the owners thereof have failed to
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instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six percent of the total area of private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. This taking is not covered by Section 12(t) of R.A. No. 537 (Revised Charter of Quezon City), which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. Further, when B.P. Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang Panlungsod may provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance, it simply authorizes the city to expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. It moreover requires that just compensation be paid to the owners of the private property. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to homeowners. Disposition: Petition dismissed.
Facts:
National Power Corp. vs. Jocson (1992)
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Arellano College had been planning to develop the land into a university but construction was halted by city authorities. Issue: Held: NO. R. A. No. 267 empowers cities to expropriate as well as to purchase lands for homesites. The word expropriating, taken singly or with the text, is susceptible of only one meaning. This power to expropriate, however, is necessarily subject to the limitations and conditions provided in the legislation. To authorize the condemnation of any particular land by a grantee of the power of eminent domain, a necessity must exist for the taking thereof for the proposed uses and purposes. In City of Manila vs. Manila Chinese Community (40 Phil. 349), the SC laid down the rule that the very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. Necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary. does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and property owner. Measured against this standard, necessity for the condemnation has not been shown in this case. The land in question has cost the owner P140,000. The people for whose benefit the condemnation is being undertaken are so poor they could not afford to meet this high price. On the other hand, the defendant not only has invested a considerable amount for its property and would have completed its development project a long time ago had it not been stopped by the city authorities. The development of a university that has a present enrollment of 9,000 students would be sacrificed. Any good that would accrue
City of Manila vs. Arellano College (1950)

Facts: Section 1 of R. A. No. 267 authorized cities and municipalities from contracing loans from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, PNB, and/or other entity or person at the rate of interest not exceeding eight per cent per annum for the purpose of purchasing or expropriating homesites within their respective territorial jurisdiction and reselling them at cost to residents of the said cities and municipalities. The City of Manila brought an action to condemn parcels of land belonging to respondent Arellano Colleges with a combined area of 7,270 sq. m. at Legarda Street, City of Manila before the CFI of Manila, for the purpose of constructing homesites thereon and reselling the same. The CFI dismissed the action, ruling that the aforequoted provision empowers cities to purchase but not to expropriate lands for the purpose of subdivision and resale.
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to the public from providing homes to a few families pales in comparison to the preparation of young men and women for useful citizenship and service to the government and the community, a task which the government alone is not in a position to undertake. The present occupants had petitioned for the purchase of the land. When they were referred by the President to the Rural Progress Administration, the national agency which handles lands for resale as homesites, their request was turned down after proper investigation. The Administration commented that the necessity of the Arellano Law College to acquire a permanent site of its own is imperative not only because denial of the same would hamper the objectives of that educational institution, but it would likewise be taking a property intended already for public benefit. The Mayor of the City of Manila himself confessed that he believes the plaintiff is entitled to keep this land. Disposition: CFI decision affirmed.
established the fact, under the law, that it has authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it may desire and that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question. Issue: WON the courts can inquire into the necessity of an expropriation Held: YES. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right, some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must find not only 1) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but also 2) that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. It is true that many decisions may be found asserting that what is a public use is a legislative question, and many other decisions declaring with equal emphasis that it is a judicial question. But, as long as there is a constitutional or statutory provision denying the right to take land for any use other than a public use, the question whether any particular use is a public one or not is ultimately a judicial question. Blackstone in his Commentaries on the English Law remarked that, so great is the regard of the law for private property that it will not authorize the least violation of it, even for the public good, unless there exists a very great necessity therefor. The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the
City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila (1920)

Facts: In 1916, the city of Manila filed a petition in the CFI of Manila for the expropriation of certain lands in Rizal Avenue. In its Answer, defendant Chinese Community of Manila denied that it was necessary that the parcels be expropriated for street purposes; that existing roads furnished ample means of communication for the public; that other routes were available for plaintiffs purposes; that the expropriation would disturb the resting places of the dead Chinese buried therein. In addition, defendant Ildefonso Tambunting alleged that he had offered a right of way for the extension over other land for no cost. The other defendants presented substantially the same defenses. CFI Judge Honorable Simplicio del Rosario decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation. From this judgment, the plaintiff appealed, arguing that once it has
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general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff. The cemetery in question seems to have been established under governmental authority. It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, would make the cemetery in question public property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property. Disposition: CFI decision affirmed.
Private respondent filed its Answer containing affirmative defenses and a counterclaim, alleging in the main that 1) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by the LGC; and 2) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. Thereafter, the TC dismissed the case. Petitioner then appealed to the CA, which affirmed in toto the TCs decision. Hence, petitioner appealed to the SC. Issue: WON the Paraaque Municipal Council Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993 is a substantial compliance with the requirement under the LGC Held: NO. Petitioner contended that the terms ordinance and resolution are synonymous for the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the LGU through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings. Petitioner cited Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which provides: If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings. This view is incorrect. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latters control and restraints, imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. In this case, Section 1911 of
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Municipality of Paraaque vs. V.M. Realty Corp. (1998)

Facts: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Paraaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land. The complaint was filed for the purpose of providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project. Petitioner previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter did not accept. The RTC of Makati issued an Order giving it due course then authorized petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 per cent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration.
Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless,
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RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. There was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. The case Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals, which the petitioner cited, is not in point because the applicable law at that time was B. P. Blg. 337, which had provided that a mere resolution would enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain.
upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people. Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language from resolution under B.P. 337 to ordinance under R. A. No. 7160 demands a strict construction. Section 19 of R. A. No. 7160, the law itself, prevails over the rule which merely seeks to implement it. The clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in the wording, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also requires that, in exercising the power of eminent domain, the chief executive of the LGU must act pursuant to an ordinance. Disposition: Petition denied.
City of Cebu vs. Sps. Dedamo (2002)

Facts: Petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo for the construction of a public road which shall serve as an access road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City. Petitioner deposited with the PNB the amount representing 15% of the fair market value of the property. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the purpose for which their property was to be expropriated was not for a public purpose but for benefit of a single private entity, the Cebu Holdings, Inc. Besides, the
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price offered was very low in light of the consideration of P20,000 per square meter, more or less, which petitioner paid to the neighboring lots. Thereafter, the parties executed an Agreement whereby the parties agreed to be bound by the report of the commissioners, with the spouses further agreeing to receive the amount of P1,786,400 as provisional payment. Pursuant to said agreement, the TC appointed three commissioners to determine the just compensation. Later, petitioner filed an MR alleging that the commissioners report was inaccurate since it included an area which was not subject to expropriation. The commissioners submitted an amended assessment, which was approved as the just compensation by the TC. The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the TC. Issue: WON the just compensation approved by the TC is valid and proper Held: YES. In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for the determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R. A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking. The petitioner misread the SCs ruling in National Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals. The Court in that case did not categorically rule that just compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. This is the general rule; however, it admits of an exception: where the Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Also, the TC followed the then governing procedural law on the matter, which was Section 5 of Rule 6712 of the Rules of Court.
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The parties voluntarily agreed to be bound by the report of the commission and approved by the trial court. The agreement is a contract between the parties. It has the force of law between them and should be complied with in good faith. Furthermore, during the hearing on 22 November 1996, petitioner did not interpose a serious objection. It is therefore too late for petitioner to question the valuation now without violating the principle of equitable estoppel. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. According to the records, the petitioner consented to conform with the valuation recommended by the commissioners. Finally, while Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that just compensation shall be determined at the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation, such law cannot prevail over the LGC, which is a substantive law. Disposition: Petition denied.
Republic vs. Court of Appeals (2002)

Facts: In 1969, petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings before the RTC of Bulacan, covering a total of 544,980 square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos to be
competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within which their report is to be filed with the court.
SEC. 5. Ascertainment of compensation. -Upon the entry of the order of condemnation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3)
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utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the Voice of the Philippines project. Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the property. In 1979, the TC issued an order condemning the subject properties and ordering the petitioner to pay the just compensation. The 76,589-square meter property previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-in-interest of private respondents, forms part of the expropriated area. The national government failed to pay respondents the compensation pursuant to the TCs decision so that in 1984, respondents filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. The Bulacan RTC granted the motion and issued a writ of execution. When the order was not complied with, respondents again filed a motion urging the TC to direct the provincial treasurer of Bulacan to release to them a portion of the sum deposited by petitioner at the inception of the expropriation proceedings in 1969, corresponding to their share of the deposit. The TC granted the motion. In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22, transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. The remaining portion was retained by the PIA. This fact notwithstanding, and despite the 1984 court order, the Santos heirs remained unpaid. No action was taken on the case until 1999 when petitioner filed a motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount of P4,664,000 by for the expropriated property of the late Luis Santos. This time, the Santos heirs submitted a countermotion to adjust the compensation to its current zonal valuation pegged at P5,000
per sq. m. or, in the alternative, to cause the return to them of the expropriated property. Ordering the return of the property to respondents, the TC ruled that the 1979 decision is longer enforceable, execution of the same having already prescribed. The CA outrightly denied the petition brought on appeal. Respondents contended that disbursement to them by the provincial treasurer of Bulacan in 1984 could not be considered as having interrupted the five-year period, since a motion, to be considered otherwise, should instead be made by the prevailing party, Also, they questioned the public nature of the use of the property, pointing out that its present use differs from the purpose originally contemplated. Issues: 1. WON the present use of some of the expropriated property is public in nature 2. WON laches operates against the ownership rights of the expropriating authority over the property Held: 1. YES. Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public use, which, decidedly, it is. 2. NO. Petitioner has exercised dominion over the property pursuant to the 1979 judgment. The exercise of such rights has amounted to at least a partial compliance satisfaction of the 1979 judgment, thereby preempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of non-execution. The right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. After condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title. Thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title
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against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance. In arguing laches against petitioner, respondents did not take into account that the same argument could likewise apply against them. Respondents first instituted proceedings for payment against petitioner five years after the 1979 judgment had become final. The unusually long delay in bringing the action to compel payment against herein petitioner would militate against them. N.B.: Just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition. It is fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred. The Bulacan TC, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and took the property in 1969. This allowance of interest, being an effective forbearance at 12% per annum, should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time. (See Article 1250 of the Civil Code. ) Disposition: Petition granted. Private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the expropriated property, deserve to be paid the just compensation fixed in the 1979 decision with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date of taking of the property until the due amount shall have been fully paid.
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Estanislao vs. Costales (1991)

Facts: Ordinance No. 44 was passed by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Zamboanga City, imposing a P0.01 tax per liter of softdrinks produced, manufactured, and/or bottled within the territorial jurisdiction of the city. Upon review by the Minister of, the effectivity of Ordinance No. 44 was suspended on the ground that it contravenes Section 19(a) of the Local Tax Code.
C. TAXATION AND FISCAL ADMINISTRATION 1. LOCAL TAXATION

Section 5, Article X, 1987 Constitution. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments. Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. Section 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in the manner provided by law, including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits. Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
The City of Zamboanga appealed said decision of the Minister of Finance to the RTC of Zamboanga City. The TC rendered a decision finding that the tax levied under said Ordinance is not among those that the Sanggunian may impose under the Local Tax Code, but nonetheless, it upheld its validity on the ground that the Minister of Finance did not take appropriate action on the matter within the prescribed period of 120 days after receipt of a copy thereof. In the petition for review on certiorari before the SC, the incumbent Secretary of Finance, represented by the Solicitor General, alleged that the TC erred when it held that the failure of the Minister of Finance to suspend the effectivity of Ordinance No. 44 within 120 days from receipt of a copy thereof rendered said Ordinance valid. Issue: WON Ordinance No. 44 is valid Held: NO. Section 23 of the Local Tax provides that in lieu of the graduated fixed tax prescribed under the Section 19 (tax on business), the city may impose a percentage tax on the sales of non-essential commodities at the rate of not exceeding 2% and on the sales of essential commodities at the rate of not exceeding 1%. In no case, however, shall the city impose both the graduated fixed tax and the percentage tax on the same subject. Thus, Ordinance No. 44 is ultra vires as it is not within the authority of the City to impose said tax, such authority being limited to the imposition of a percentage
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tax on the gross sales or receipts of said product which, being non-essential, shall be at the rate of not exceeding 2% of the gross sales or receipts of the softdrinks for the preceding calendar year. The tax being imposed under said Ordinance is based on the output or production and not on the gross sales or receipts as authorized under the Local Tax Code. Disposition: Petition granted.
enacted before or after the effectivity of the Local Tax Code, on the businesses of manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing, or dealing in, petroleum products subject to the specific tax under the NIRC. Respondent Municipality of Pililla, Rizal enacted Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1, S-1974 or the The Pililla Tax Code of 1974. Sections 9 and 10 thereof imposed a tax on business, except for those for which fixed taxes are provided in the Local Tax Code on manufacturers, importers, or producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature, including brewers. . . of liquors, distilled spirits and/or wines in accordance with the schedule found in the Local Tax Code, as well as mayor's permit, sanitary inspection fee and storage permit fee for flammable, combustible or explosive substances. Section 139 of the disputed ordinance imposed surcharges and interests on unpaid taxes, fees or charges.
Phil. Petroleum Corp. vs. Municipality of Pililia, Rizal (1991)

Facts: Petitioner Phil. Petroleum Corp. owns and maintains an oil refinery including 49 storage tanks for its petroleum products. The following laws and issuances regarding taxation are relevant to this case: Under Section 142 of the NIRC of 1939, manufactured oils and other fuels are subject to specific tax.
On June 28, 1973, P.D. No. 231 or the Local Tax Code was enacted. Sections 19 and 19 (a) thereof provide that the municipality may impose taxes on business, except on those for which fixed taxes are provided on manufacturers, importers or producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature, including brewers, distillers, rectifiers, repackers, and compounders of liquors, distilled spirits and/or wines in accordance with the schedule listed therein.
On March 30, 1974, P.D. No. 426 was issued amending provisions of P.D. 231 but retaining Sections 19 and 19(a) which provide that municipalities may impose taxes on business.
The Secretary of Finance issued Provincial Circular No. 26-73 directing all provincial, city and municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting any local tax imposed in old or new tax ordinances in the business of manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing, or dealing in petroleum products subject to the specific tax under the NIRC.
P.D. No. 436 was promulgated, increasing the specific tax on lubricating oils, gasoline, bunker fuel oil, diesel fuel oil and other similar petroleum products levied under Sections 142, 144 and 145 of the NIRC, and granting provinces, cities and municipalities certain shares in the specific tax on such products in lieu of local taxes imposed on petroleum products.
Provincial Circular Nos. 26-73 and 26 A-73 suspended the effectivity of Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1, in view of Provincial Circular Nos. 26-73 and 26 A-73.
Provincial Circular No. 26 A-73 was also issued instructing all city treasurers to refrain from collecting any local tax imposed in tax ordinances
Provincial Circular No. 6-77 was also issued directing all city and municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting
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storage fee on flammable or combustible materials imposed under local tax ordinance. On June 3, 1977, PD 1158 or the NIRC of 1977 was enacted. Section 153 thereof specifically imposes specific tax on refined and manufactured mineral oils and motor fuels.
This has been expressly held in the case Shell Philippines, Inc. vs. Central Bank of the Philippines. Also, while Section 2 of P.D. No. 426 prohibits the imposition of local taxes on petroleum products, said decree did not amend Sections 19 and 19 (a) of P.D. No. 231 as amended by P.D. 426, wherein the municipality is granted the right to levy taxes on business of manufacturers, importers, producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature. A tax on business is distinct from a tax on the article itself. Thus, if the imposition of tax on business of manufacturers, etc. in petroleum products contravenes a declared national policy, it should have been expressly stated in P.D. No. 436. The exercise by local governments of the power to tax is ordained by the present Constitution. To allow the continuous effectivity of the prohibition set forth in Provincial Circular No. 26-73 (1) would be tantamount to restricting their power to tax by mere administrative issuances. Under Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, only guidelines and limitations that may be established by Congress can define and limit such power of local governments. b. Provincial Circular No. 6-77 which enjoined all city and municipal treasurers from collecting the so-called storage fee on flammable or combustible materials imposed in the local tax ordinance of their respective locality frees petitioner from the payment of storage permit fee. The storage permit fee is a fee for the installation and keeping in storage of any flammable, combustible or explosive substances. Inasmuch as said storage makes use of tanks owned not by the Municipality, but by petitioner, same is obviously not a charge for any service rendered by the municipality as what is envisioned in Section 37 of the same Code. 2. NO. The trial court correctly held that since the power to tax includes the power to exempt thereof which is essentially a legislative prerogative, it follows that a
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for the collection of the business tax from 1979 to 1986; storage permit fees from 1975 to 1986; mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fees from 1975 to 1984. Petitioner, however, have already paid the last-named fees starting 1985. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent Municipality. Issues: 1. WON petitioner is liable to pay taxes on a) business and; b) storage fees, considering the fact that its oil products are already subject to specific tax under the NIRC and in view of Provincial Circular No. 6-77; 2. WON the mayor has authority to waive payment of the mayors permit and sanitary inspection fees Held: 1. Phil. Petroleum Corp. is liable for business taxes but not for storage fees. a. Pililla's Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 imposing the assailed taxes, fees and charges is valid especially Section 9 (A) which was lifted in toto and/or is a literal reproduction of Section 19 (a) of the Local Tax Code as amended by P.D. No. 426. It conforms with the mandate of said law. Even if Provincial Circular Nos. 26-73 and 26 A-73 suspended the effectivity of local tax ordinances imposing a tax on businesses involving petroleum products subject to specific tax under the NIRC, P.D. No. 426 amending the Local Tax Code is deemed to have repealed said circulars when Sections 19 and 19 (a) were carried over into P.D. No. 426 and no exemptions were given to manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, or dealers in petroleum products.
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municipal mayor who is an executive officer may not unilaterally withdraw such an expression of a policy thru the enactment of a tax. The waiver partakes of the nature of an exemption. Exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Tax exemptions are looked upon with disfavor. Thus, in the absence of a clear and express exemption from the payment of said fees, the waiver cannot be recognized. It is the lawmaking body, and not an executive like the mayor, who can make an exemption. Under Section 36 of the Code, a permit fee like the mayor's permit is required before any individual or juridical entity may engage in any business or occupation under the provisions of the Code. Disposition: Decision modified.
against the defendant Floro Cement Corporation for the period from January 1, 1974 to September 30, 1975. In its Answer, petitioner set up the defense that it is not liable to the taxes, alleging among others that the plaintiffs power to levy and collect taxes from defendant has been limited or withdrawn by Section 5213 of P.D. No. 463, and that it has been granted a CQTE. Further, petitioner argued that R.A. No. 3823 and P.D. No. 463 which are the basis for the exemption granted to defendant are special laws whereas, the municipal ordinance mentioned in the complaint which are based on P.D. No. 231 and P.D No. 426, respectively, are general laws; and that it is axiomatic that a special law cannot be amended and/or repealed by a general law unless there is an express intent to repeal or abrogate the provisions of the special law. In its Decision, the lower court ordered defendant to pay the manufacturers and exporters taxes. Hence, this appeal. Issue: WON Ordinances Nos. 5 and 10 apply to petitioner notwithstanding the limitation on the taxing power of local government as provided for in Section 52 of P.D. No. 231 and Section 52 of P.D. 463 Held: YES. The Court has consistently held that cement is not a mineral product but rather a manufactured product. While cement is composed of minerals, it is not merely an admixture or blending of raw materials, as lime, silica, shale and others. It is the result of a definite processthe crushing of minerals, grinding, mixing, calcining adding
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Floro Cement Corp. vs. Gorospe (1991)

Facts: Petitioner Floro Cement Corp., is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and selling, including exporting of cement. It was granted by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources a Certificate of Qualification for Tax Exemption (CQTE), entitling it to exemption for a period of five years from April 30, 1969 to April 29, 1974 from payment of all taxes, except income tax. The CQTE was later amended to take effect from May 17, 1974 to January 1, 1978. The Municipality of Lugait opposed petitioners application for extension of its exemption from all forms of taxes. This opposition, however, was not favorably acted upon by the Secretary of Finance. The Municipality later enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 5, otherwise known as the Municipal Revenue Code of 1974, pursuant to P.D. No. 231, and Municipal Ordinance No. 10, pursuant to P.D. No. 426. On the basis of these municipal ordinances, the Municipality filed with the SC a verified complaint for collection of manufacturers and exporters taxes
Sec. 52. Power to Levy Taxes on Mines, Mining Corporation and Mineral Products.Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, no province, city, municipality, barrio or municipal district shall levy and collect taxes, fees, rentals, royalties or charges of any kind whatsoever on mines, mining claims, mineral products, or on any operation, process or activity connected therewith.
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of retarder or raw gypsum. In short, before cement reaches its saleable form, the minerals had already undergone a chemical change through manufacturing process. On the exemption claimed by petitioner, the Court has laid down the rule that as the power of taxation is a high prerogative of sovereignty, the relinquishment is never presumed and any reduction or diminution thereof with respect to its mode or its rate, must be strictly construed, and the same must be coached in clear and unmistakable terms in order that it may be applied. The general rule is that any claim for exemption from the tax statute should be strictly construed against the taxpayer and that he who claims an exemption must be able to point out some provision of law creating the right; it cannot be allowed to exist upon a mere vague implication or inference. The petitioner failed to meet this requirement. As held by the lower court, the exemption mentioned in Section 52 of P.D. No. 463 refers only to machineries, equipment, tools for production, etc., as provided in Sec. 53 of the same decree. The manufacture and the export of cement does not fall under the said provision for it is not a mineral product. It is not cement that is mined, only the mineral products composing the finished product. Furthermore, by the parties own stipulation of facts submitted before the court a quo, it is admitted that Floro Cement Corporation is engaged in the manufacturing and selling, including exporting of cement. As such, and since the taxes sought to be collected were levied on these activities pursuant to Section 19 of P.D. No. 231, Municipal Ordinances Nos. 5 and 10, which were
Tuzon and Mapagu vs. Court of Appeals (1992)

Facts: On March 14, 1977, the Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan, adopted Resolution No. 9 soliciting 1% donation of the palay threshed from the thresher operators who will apply for a permit to thresh. The proceeds will fund the construction of the Sports and Nutrition Center Building of the municipality. The treasurer, petitioner Lope Mapagu, prepared a document for signature of all thresher, owner, or operators who applied for a mayors permit. Private respondent Jurado tried to pay the P285.00 license fee for thresher operators but it was refused on the ground that he must failed to secure a mayors permit and sign the agreement to give 1% of the palay he would produce. Private respondent then filed for an action for mandamus with the CFI of Aparri to compel the issuance of the mayors permit and license. He filed another petition for declaratory judgment against the resolution for being illegal either as a donation or as a tax measure. The CFI dimissed private respondents claim for damages and upheld the challenged issuance. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the validity of Resolution No. 9 but declared that it is not mandatory. It held moreover that Mayor Tuzon and Treasurer Mapagu are liable to pay private respondent P20,000 as actual damages and P5,000 as moral damages. As for the Resolution, it was passed by the Sanggunian in the lawful exercise of its legislative powers granted by Article XI, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which provided that each LGU shall have the power to create its own source revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. And also under Article 4, Sec. 29, PD 231: The barrio council may solicit money, materials, and other contributions from private agencies and individuals.
enacted pursuant to P.D. No. 231 and P.D. No. 426, respectively, properly apply to petitioner.
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Issue: WON Resolution No. 9 is valid. Held: The Court did not pass upon the validity of the enactment as the issue was not raised in the petition. Instead, the Court remarked that the CA did not offer any explanation for its conclusion that the challenged measures are valid. The CA only stated that the Resolution was passed by the Sanggunian in lawful exercise of its legislative powers as granted by Article XI, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution. To the Court, the agreement seems to make a donation obligatory and condition precedent to the issuance of a mayors permit. This goes against the nature of a donation, which is an act of liberality and is never obligatory. The Court laid down certain requisites for measures to be considered a tax ordinance. It must be shown to have been enacted in accordance with the requirements of the Local Tax Code, including the holding of a public hearing, subsequent approval by the Secretary of Finance and the usual requisites for publication. Regarding petitioners liability for damages, it was held that they acted within the scope of their authority and in consonance with their honest interpretation of the resolution in question. It was not for them to rule on its validity. In the absence of a judicial decision declaring it invalid, its legality would have to be presumed. As executive officials of the municipality, they had the duty to enforce it as long as it had not been repealed by the Sangguniang Bayan or annulled by the courts.
Facts: Pursuant to Section 18714 of the LGC, Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the RTC Manila through Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. In the present petition, the Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is
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Drilon vs. Lim (1994)
Section 187. Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
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constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. Issue: WON Section 187 of the LGC is constitutional Held: YES. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances. This was an act not of control but of mere supervision. The Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187 as a similar provision in the Local Autonomy Act. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to wit, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure. However, the Court agreed with the findings of the trial court that all the procedural requirements had been observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only five days
within which to gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court. Notices of the public hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced by Exhibits G-1 to 17. The minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that the proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the approval of local development plans and public investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax ordinances. Disposition: Decision of RTC reversed as to unconstitutionality of Section 187 of the LGC but affirmed insofar as it found that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed.
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Marcos (1996)

Facts: In accordance to Section 14 of its charter R.A. No, 6958, petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment of realty taxes. In 1994, however, the Treasurer of the City of Cebu demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land in the amount of P2.229 million. MCIAA objected to the demand, asserting that its charter exempted it from payment of real taxes. It further argued that as an instrumentality of the government performing governmental functions, it was exempt from the taxes levied by local government units.
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Respondent City refused to cancel and set aside petitioners realty tax account on the ground that MCIAA is a GOCC whose tax exemption privilege has been withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and 23 of the LGC. When the City was about to issue a warrant of levy against the properties of petitioner, the latter was compelled to pay its tax account under protest. Thereafter, it filed a petition for declaratory relief, arguing that the taxing powers of local government units do not extend to the levy of taxes or fees of any kind on an instrumentality of the national government; and that while it is indeed a GOCC, it nevertheless stands on the same footing as an agency or instrumentality of the national government by the very nature of its powers and functions. The RTC ruled that the LGC was clear in revoking all tax exemptions or incentives granted, except those specifically provided for in the LGC, and the MCIAA did not fall under those exemptions. Issue: WON MCIAA is liable for the assessed realty taxes Held: YES. Since taxation is the rule and exemption therefrom the exception, the exemption may thus be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. While the charter of MCIAA expressly exempted it from paying taxes, the LGC later enacted in pursuance of Article X of the 1987 Constitution revoked all exemptions. Section 193 thereof provides, Unless otherwise provided for in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under RA No. 6938, non-stock and nonprofit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by natural or juridical persons, including GOCCs, Section 193 of the LGC prescribes the general rule, that is, they are withdrawn upon the
effectivity of the LGC, except those granted to local water districts, cooperatives duly registered with R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, and unless otherwise provided by the LGC. Section 193 is further qualified by Section 232, which allowed LGUs in Metropolitan Manila to levy real property taxes, and Section 234, which, while exempting real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions, added the phrase except when the beneficial use thereof had been grantedto a taxable person. Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon the effectivity of the LGC, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including GOCCs, except as provided in the said section, and the petitioner is, undoubtedly a GOCC, it necessarily follows that its exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its Charter has been withdrawn. The terms Republic of the Philippines and National Government are not interchangeable. The first is the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including the various arms through which political authority is made effective while National Government is the entire machinery of the central government, as distinguished from the different forms of local governments. Furthermore, if Section 234(a) intended to extend the exception therein to the withdrawal of the exemption from payment of real property taxes under the last sentence of the said section to the agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government mentioned in Section 133(o), then it should have restated the wording of the latter. The source of this exemption could be traced to P.D. No. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code, which exempts real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or
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any of its political subdivisions. While the same provision also exempts GOCCs, it added that the exemption shall not apply to real property the beneficial use of which has been granted to a taxable person. The lands upon which the taxes are being assessed previously belonged to the Republic but were transferred to the MCIAA. This transfer is an absolute conveyance of the ownership thereof and not only the beneficial use thereof. Finally, petitioner cannot claim that it was never a taxable person under its Charter because it was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except real property tax. Disposition: Petition denied.
respondent in a petition for declaratory relief with damages. In his Decision, respondent Judge declared as null and void Section 4(c) of Joint Assessment Regulation No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulation No. 2-85. He also declared that the penalty that should be imposed for delinquency in the payment of real property taxes should be two per centum on the amount of the delinquent tax for each month of delinquency or fraction thereof, until the delinquent tax is fully paid but in no case shall the total penalty exceed 24 per centum of the delinquent tax. Issue: WON the penalties for delinquent real property tax imposed on the properties of private respondent are valid Held: NO. The subject regulations must be struck down for being repugnant to Section 6615 of P.D. No. 464, which is the law prevailing at the time material to this case. As observed by the trial court, the penalty imposed under the assailed Regulations has no limit inasmuch as the 24% penalty per annum shall be continuously imposed on the unpaid tax until it is paid for in full unlike that imposed under Section 66 where the total penalty is limited only to twenty-four percent of the delinquent tax. Upon the other hand, under Section 66, the maximum penalty for delinquency in the payment of real property tax shall in no case exceed 24 per centum of the delinquent tax.
REAL PROPERTY TAXATION Secretary of Finance vs. Ilarde (2005)

Facts: Private respondent Cipriano P. Cabaluna, Jr. was the Regional Director of Regional Office No. VI of the Department of Finance (DOF) in Iloilo City. He failed to pay land taxes on certain lots and residential houses which he co-owns with his wife. A breakdown of the computation of the delinquent taxes and penalties for his lots and residential house as of May 1993 shows that more than 24% of the delinquent taxes were charged and collected from private respondent by way of penalties. He paid the taxes under protest. After private respondent retired from his post as Regional Director, he filed a formal letter of protest with the City Treasurer of Iloilo City contending that the computation of penalties was erroneous since the rate of penalty applied exceeded 24%, in contravention of Section 66 of P.D. No. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code. Respondent Assistant City Treasurer turned down private respondents protest, citing Sec. 4(c) of Joint Assessment Regulations No. 185 and Local Treasury Regulations No. 2-85 of DOF. These were assailed by private
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Section 66. Penalty for delinquency. - Failure to pay the real property tax before the expiration of the period for the payment without penalty of the quarterly installments thereof shall subject the taxpayer to the payment of a penalty of two per centum on the amount of the delinquent tax for each month of delinquency or fraction thereof, until the delinquent tax shall be fully paid: Provided, That in no case shall the total penalty exceed twenty-four per centum of the delinquent tax. The rate of penalty for tax delinquency fixed herein shall be uniformly applied in all provinces and cities.
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The regulations at issue are not sanctioned by E.O. No. 73. The underlying principle behind E.O. No. 73, is to advance the date of effectivity of the application of the Real Property Tax Values of 1984 from January 1, 1988, to January 1, 1987. Moreover, E.O. No. 73 did not, in any way, alter the structure of the real property tax assessments as provided for in P.D. No. 464. E.O. No. 73 did not touch at all on the topic of amendment of rates of delinquent taxes or the amendment of rates of penalty on delinquent taxes. E.O. No. 73, particularly in Section 2 thereof, has merely designated the Minister of Finance to promulgate the rules and regulations towards the implementation of E.O. No. 73, particularly on the application of the Real Property Values as of December 31, 1984. Despite the promulgation of E.O. No. 73, P.D. No. 464 remained to be good law. To accept petitioners premise that E.O. No. 73 had accorded the DOF the authority to alter, increase, or modify the tax structure would be tantamount to saying that E.O. No. 73 has repealed or amended P.D. No. 464. Repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed. Repeals by implication are not favored. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. As the trial court has found, there is no such inconsistency or repugnancy between E.O. No. 73 and Section 66 of P.D. No. 464. Assuming argumenti that E.O. No. 73 has authorized the petitioner to issue the objected regulations, such conferment of powers is void for being repugnant to the well-encrusted doctrine in political law that the power of taxation is generally vested with the legislature. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law they are intended to carry into effect, which in this case is merely to antedate the effectivity of the 1984 Real Property Tax values inasmuch as this is the raison dtre of E.O. No. 73.
Petitioner further argued that Joint Local Assessment/Treasury Regulations No. 2-86, or the implementing rules of E.O. No. 73, is not contrary to Section 66 of P.D. No. 464 inasmuch as the latter applies merely to simple delinquency in the payment of real property taxes while the former covers cases wherein there was failure to promptly pay the real property tax due, including the increase in tax as a result of the application of the 1984 New or Revised Assessment of the value of the subject property. P.D. No. 464 makes no distinction as to whether it is simple delinquency or other forms thereof. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. The fact that private respondent Cabaluna was responsible for the issuance and implementation of Regional Office Memorandum Circular No. 04-89, which implemented the subject regulations does not put him in estoppel from seeking the nullification of said regulations. He did so then in his capacity as the Regional Director and as such, he was a subordinate of the Secretary of Finance so that he was duty bound to implement subject regulations. Petitioner had no alternative but to carry out the orders and issuances of his superior. In the case at bar, however, petitioner is suing as a plain taxpayer, he having already retired as Regional Director. From January 1, 1992 onwards, however, the proper basis for the computation of real property tax payable by Cabaluna must be the LGC, inasmuch as Section 534 has expressly repealed the Real Property Tax Code. Disposition: Petition denied with modification as to real property taxes payable from the year 1992 onwards.
Benguet Corp. vs. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, et al. (1993)

Facts: In 1985, the Provincial Assessor of Zambales assessed petitioners tailings dam and the land thereunder as taxable improvements. The assessment was appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the Province of Zambales. On August 24, 1988, the appeal was dismissed
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mainly on the ground of the petitioner's failure to pay the realty taxes that fell due during the pendency of the appeal. Petitioner seasonably elevated the matter to respondent Central Board of Assessment Appeals. In its decision, the Board reversed the dismissal of the appeal but, on the merits, agreed that for purposes of taxation, the dam is considered as real property within the purview of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 415 of the New Civil Code. It is a construction adhered to the soil which cannot be separated or detached without breaking the material or causing destruction on the land upon which it is attached. The immovable nature of the dam as an improvement determines its character as real property, hence taxable under Section 38 of the Real Property Tax Code. Issue: WON the tailings dam is subject to realty tax as an improvement upon land within the meaning of the Real Property Tax Code Held: YES. Petitioner does not dispute that the tailings dam may be considered realty within the meaning of Article 415. It insists, however, that the dam is an integral part of the dam that does not constitute an assessable improvement. Thus, it cannot be subjected to realty tax as a separate and independent property although a considerable sum may have been spent in constructing and maintaining it. The Real Property Tax Code does not carry a definition of real property and simply says that the realty tax is imposed on real property, such as lands, buildings, machinery and other improvements affixed or attached to real property. In the absence of such a definition, we apply Article 415 of the Civil Code. Section 3(k) of the Real Property Tax Code defines improvement as a valuable addition made to property or an amelioration in its condition, amounting to more than mere repairs or replacement of waste, costing labor or capital and intended to enhance its
value, beauty or utility or to adopt it for new or further purposes. The term has also been interpreted as artificial alterations of the physical condition of the ground that are reasonably permanent in character." The tailings dam is an improvement. Even without it, petitioner's mining operation can still be carried out because the primary function of the dam is merely to receive and retain the wastes and water coming from the mine. There is no allegation that the water coming from the dam is the sole source of water for the mining operation so as to make the dam an integral part of the mine. In fact, as a result of the construction of the dam, the petitioner can now impound and recycle water without having to spend for the building of a water reservoir. And as the petitioner itself points out, even if the petitioner's mine is shut down or ceases operation, the dam may still be used for irrigation of the surrounding areas. As correctly observed by the Board, the Kendrick case is not applicable because it involved water reservoir dams used for different purposes and for the benefit of the surrounding areas. By contrast, the tailings dam in question is being used exclusively for the benefit of the petitioner. Curiously, the petitioner, while vigorously arguing that the tailings dam has no separate existence, just as vigorously contends that at the end of the mining operation the tailings dam will serve the local community as an irrigation facility, thereby implying that it can exist independently of the mine. Whether a structure constitutes an improvement so as to partake of the status of realty would depend upon the degree of permanence intended in its construction and use. The expression permanent as applied to an improvement does not imply that the improvement must be used perpetually but only until the purpose to which the principal realty is devoted has been accomplished. It is sufficient that the improvement is intended to remain as long as the land to which it is annexed is still used for the said purpose.
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National Development Co. vs. City of Cebu (1992)

Facts: Petitioner National Development Company (NDC), a GOCC, is authorized to engage in commercial, industrial, mining, agricultural and other enterprises necessary or contributory to economic development or important to public interest. It also operates, in furtherance of its objectives, subsidiary corporations one of which is the now defunct National Warehousing Corporation (NWC). In 1939, the President issued Proclamation No. 430 reserving Block no. 4, Reclamation Area No. 4 of Cebu City (4,599 sq. m.) for warehousing purposes under the administration of NWC. In 1940, a warehouse was constructed thereon. In 1947, E.O. 93 dissolved NWC with NDC taking over its assets and functions. Commencing 1948, Cebu City assessed and collected from NDC real estate taxes on the land and the warehouse thereon. NDC wrote the City Assessor demanding full refund of the real estate taxes paid to Cebu claiming that the land and the warehouse standing thereon belonged to the Republic and therefore exempt from taxation. Cebu did not acquiesce in the demand, hence, the present suit filed in the CFI of Manila. The CFI sentenced the City Treasurer to refund to NDC real estate taxes paid by it for the parcel of land and the warehouse erected thereon. The defendants appealed to the CA which, however, certified the case to the SC as one involving pure questions of law. Issue: WON the subject land and the warehouse constructed thereon are exempt from real property tax Held: YES as to the land reserved but NOT as to the warehouse.
A principal issue in this case is the interpretation of a provision of the Assessment Law, the precursor of the then Real Property Tax Code and the LGC, where ownership of the property and not use is the test of tax liability. Section, 3 par. (a), of the Assessment Law, on which NDC claims real estate tax exemption, provides Section 3. Property exempt from tax. The exemptions shall be as follows: (a) Property owned by the United States of America, the Commonwealth of the Philippines, any province, city, municipality at municipal district . . . To come within the ambit of the exemption provided in Art. 3, par. (a), of the Assessment Law, it is important to establish that the property is owned by the government or its unincorporated agency, and once government ownership is determined, the nature of the use of the property, whether for proprietary or sovereign purposes, becomes immaterial. What appears to have been ceded to NWC is merely the administration of the property while the government retains ownership of what has been declared reserved for warehousing purposes under Proclamation No. 430. A reserved land is defined as a public land that has been withheld or kept back from sale or disposition. Absolute disposition of land is not implied from reservation; it merely means a withdrawal of a specified portion of the public domain from disposal under the land laws and the appropriation thereof, for the time being, to some particular use or purpose of the general government. As its title remains with the Republic, the reserved land is clearly recovered by the tax exemption provision. The essential question then is whether lands reserved pursuant to Sec. 83 are comprehended in Sec. 115 of the Public Land Act and, therefore, taxable. Section 115 should be treated as an exception to Art. 3, par. (a), of the Assessment Law. While ordinary public lands are tax-exempt because title thereto belongs to the
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Republic, Sec. 115 subjects them to real estate tax even before ownership thereto is transferred in the name of the beneficiaries. Sec. 115 comprehends three (3) modes of disposition of Lands under the Public Land Act, to wit: homestead, concession, and contract. Liability to real property taxes under Sec. 115 is predicated on (a) filing of homestead application, (b) approval of concession and, (c) signing of contract. Since NDC is not a homesteader and no contract (bilateral agreement) was signed, it would appear, then, that reservation under Sec. 83, being a unilateral act of the President, falls under concession. Concession as a technical term under the Public Land Act is synonymous with alienation and is defined in Sec. 10 as any of the methods authorized by this Act for the acquisition, lease, use, or benefit of the lands of the public domain other than timber or mineral lands. Logically, where Sec. 115 contemplates authorized methods for acquisition, lease, use, or benefit under the Act, the taxability of the land would depend on whether reservation under Sec. 83 is one such method of acquisition, etc. Section 8 and 8816 of the Public Land Act provide that reserved lands are excluded from that which may be the subject of disposition. The effect of reservation under Sec. 83 is to segregate a piece of public land and transform it into non-alienable or
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non-disposable under the Public Land Act. Section 115, on the other hand, applies to disposable public lands. Clearly, therefore, Sec. 115 does not apply to lands reserved under Sec. 83. Consequently, the subject reserved public land remains tax exempt. However, as regards the warehouse constructed on a public reservation, a different rule should apply because the exemption of public property from taxation does not extend to improvements on the public lands made by pre-emptioners, homesteaders and other claimants, or occupants, at their own expense, and these are taxable by the state . . . Consequently, the warehouse constructed on the reserved land by NWC indeed should properly be assessed real estate tax as such improvement does not appear to belong to the Republic. Since the reservation is exempt from realty tax, the erroneous tax payments collected by Cebu should be refunded to NDC. Disposition: Case remanded to RTC of Manila to determine the proper liability of NDC, particularly on its warehouse, and effect the corresponding refund, payment or set-off, as the case may be.
Province of Tarlac vs. Judge Alcantara (1992)

Facts: Tarlac Enterprises, Inc. owns a piece of land located at Mabini, Tarlac, an ice drop factory, and machinery. The Provincial Treasurer found that real estate taxes for the years 1974 until 1992 have not been paid for the aforementioned properties. The company refused to pay after repeated demands so after the last demand in writing, the Provincial Treasurer filed a complaint for the payment of the realty taxes The lower court ruled ruled that P.D. No. 551 expressly exempts Tarlac Enterprises from paying the real property taxes demanded, it being a grantee of a franchise to generate, distribute and sell electric current for light. In lieu of said taxes, the court held that Tarlac
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property , nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. Sec. 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of section eighty-three shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared alienable under the provisions of this Act or by proclamation of the President
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Enterprises had been required to pay 2% franchise tax in line with the intent of the law to give assistance to operators in order to enable the consumers to enjoy cheaper rates. Citing the case of Butuan Sawmill, Inc. v. City of Butuan, the court further ruled that local governments are without power to tax the electric companies already subject to franchise tax unless their franchise allows the imposition of additional tax. Issue: WON Tarlac Enterprises, Inc. is exempt from the payment of real property tax under Sec. 40 (g) of P.D. No. 464 in relation to P.D. No. 551, as amended. Held: NO. Section 40(g) of P.D. No. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code provides that exemption from real property tax covers real property exempt under other laws. Tarlac Enterprises contends that the other laws referred to in this Section is P.D. No. 551 (Lowering the Cost to Consumers of Electricity by Reducing the Franchise Tax Payable by Electric Franchise Holders and the Tariff on Fuel Oils for the Generation of Electric Power by Public Utilities). Section 1 of P.D. No. 552 states any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding, the franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchises to generate, distribute and sell electric current for light, heat and power shall be two (2%) of their gross receipts. . . The phrase in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever nature in the second paragraph of Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 551 does not expressly exempt Tarlac Enterprises from paying real property taxes. Said proviso is modified and delimited by the phrase on earnings, receipts, income and privilege of generation, distribution and sale, which specifies the kinds of taxes and assessments which shall not be collected in view of the imposition of the franchise tax. Said enumerated items upon which taxes shall not be imposed, have no relation at all to, and are entirely different from real properties subject to tax.
There is no merit in Tarlac Enterprises contention that the real properties being taxed are necessary for the operation of its business of generation, distribution and sale of electric current and, therefore, should be exempt. While P.D. No. 551 was intended to give assistance to the franchise holders by reducing some of their tax and tariff obligations, to construe said decree as having granted such franchise holders exemption from payment of real property tax would unduly extend the ambit of exemptions beyond the purview of the law. The lower courts reliance on Butuan Sawmill is misplaced. In that case, the questioned tax is a tax on the gross sales or receipts of said sawmill while the tax involved herein is a real property tax. The City of Butuan is categorically prohibited therein by Sec. 2(j) of the Local Autonomy Act from imposing taxes of any kind . . . on persons paying franchise tax. On the other hand, P.D. No. 551 is not as allencompassing as said provision of the Local Autonomy Act for it enumerates the items which are not taxable by virtue of the payment of franchise tax. Exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority primarily because taxes are the lifeblood of government and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need. Thus, to be exempted from payment of taxes, it is the taxpayer's duty to justify the exemption by words too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be misinterpreted. Private respondent has utterly failed to discharge this duty. Disposition: Decision reversed and remanded to the lower court for computation of the real property taxes.
D. LOCAL LEGISLATION
SEC. 48. Local Legislative Power. - Local legislative power shall be exercised by the sangguniang panlalawigan for the province; the sangguniang panlungsod for the
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city; the sangguniang bayan for the municipality; and the sangguniang barangay for the barangay. SEC. 49. Presiding Officer. - (a) The vicegovernor shall be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan; the city vice-mayor, of the sangguniang panlungsod; the municipal vice-mayor, of the sangguniang bayan; and the punong barangay, of the sangguniang barangay. The presiding officer shall vote only to break a tie. (b) In the event of the inability of the regular Presiding officer to preside at a sanggunian session, the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer. He shall certify within ten (10) days from the passage of ordinances enacted and resolutions adopted by the sanggunian in the session over which he temporarily presided. SEC. 50. Internal Rules of Procedure. - (a) On the first regular session following the election of its members and within ninety (90) days thereafter, the sanggunian concerned shall adopt or update its existing rules of procedure. (b) The rules of procedure shall provide for the following: (1) The organization of the sanggunian and the election of its officers as well as the creation of standing committees which shall include, but shall not be limited to, the committees on appropriations, women and family, human rights, youth and sports development, environmental protection, and cooperatives; the general jurisdiction of each committee; and the election of the chairman and members of each committee; (2) The order and calendar of business for each session;
(3) The legislative process; (4) The parliamentary procedures which include the conduct of members during sessions; (5) The discipline of members for disorderly behavior and absences without justifiable cause for four (4) consecutive sessions, for which they may be censured, reprimanded, or excluded from the session, suspended for not more than sixty (60) days, or expelled: Provided, That the penalty of suspension or expulsion shall require the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) vote of all the sanggunian members: Provided, further, That a member convicted by final judgment to imprisonment of at least one (1) year for any crime involving moral turpitude shall be automatically expelled from the sanggunian; and (6) Such other rules as the sanggunian may adopt. SEC. 51. Full Disclosure of Financial and Business Interests of Sanggunian Members. - (a) Every sanggunian member shall, upon assumption to office, make a full disclosure of his business and financial interests. He shall also disclose any business, financial, or professional relationship or any relation by affinity or consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, which he may have with any person, firm, or entity affected by any ordinance or resolution under consideration by the sanggunian of which he is a member, which relationship may result in conflict of interest. Such relationship shall include: (1) Ownership of stock or capital, or investment, in the entity or firm to which the ordinance or resolution may apply; and (2) Contracts or agreements with any person or entity which the ordinance or resolution under consideration may affect. In the absence of a specific constitutional or statutory provision applicable to this situation, "conflict of
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interest" refers in general to one where it may be reasonably deduced that a member of a sanggunian may not act in the public interest due to some private, pecuniary, or other personal considerations that may tend to affect his judgment to the prejudice of the service or the public. (b) The disclosure required under this Act shall be made in writing and submitted to the secretary of the sanggunian or the secretary of the committee of which he is a member. The disclosure shall, in all cases, form part of the record of the proceedings and shall be made in the following manner: (1) Disclosure shall be made before the member participates in the deliberations on the ordinance or resolution under consideration: Provided, That, if the member did not participate during the deliberations, the disclosure shall be made before voting on the ordinance or resolution on second and third readings; and (2) Disclosure shall be made when a member takes a position or makes a privilege speech on a matter that may affect the business interest, financial connection, or professional relationship described herein. SEC. 52. Sessions. - (a) On the first day of the session immediately following the election of its members, the sanggunian shall, by resolution, fix the day, time, and place of its regular sessions. The minimum number of regular sessions shall be once a week for the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan, and twice a month for the sangguniang barangay. (b) When public interest so demands, special sessions may be called by the local chief executive or by a majority of the members of the sanggunian. (c) All sanggunian sessions shall be open to the public unless a closed-door session is ordered by an affirmative vote of a
majority of the members present, there being a quorum, in the public interest or for reasons of security, decency, or morality. No two (2) sessions, regular or special, may be held in a single day. (d) In the case of special sessions of the sanggunian, a written notice to the members shall be served personally at the member's usual place of residence at least twenty- four (24) hours before the special session is held. Unless otherwise concurred in by two-thirds (2/3) vote of the sanggunian members present, there being a quorum, no other matters may be considered at a special session except those stated in the notice. (e) Each sanggunian shall keep a journal and record of its proceedings which may be published upon resolution of the sanggunian concerned. SEC. 53. Quorum. - (a) A majority of all the members of the sanggunian who have been elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum to transact official business. Should a question of quorum be raised during a session, the presiding officer shall immediately proceed to call the roll of the members and thereafter announce the results. (b) Where there is no quorum, the presiding officer may declare a recess until such time as a quorum is constituted, or a majority of the members present may adjourn from day to day and may compel the immediate attendance of any member absent without justifiable cause by designating a member of the sanggunian, to be assisted by a member or members of the police force assigned in the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned, to arrest the absent member and present him at the session. (c) If there is still no quorum despite the enforcement of the immediately preceding subsection, no business shall be transacted. The presiding officer, upon proper motion duly approved by the
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members present, shall then declare the session adjourned for lack of quorum. SEC. 54. Approval of Ordinances. - (a) Every ordinance enacted by the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan shall be presented to the provincial governor or city or municipal mayor, as the case may be. If the local chief executive concerned approves the same, he shall affix his signature on each and every page thereof; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same. The sanggunian concerned may override the veto of the local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes. (b) The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive concerned to the sanggunian within fifteen (15) days in the case of a province, and ten (10) days in the case of a city or a municipality; otherwise, the ordinance shall be deemed approved as if he had signed it. (c) ordinances enacted by the sangguniang barangay shall, upon approval by the majority of all its members, be signed by the punong barangay. SEC. 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive. - (a) The local chief executive may veto any ordinance of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan on the ground that it is ultra vires or prejudicial to the public welfare, stating his reasons therefor in writing. (b) The local chief executive, except the punong barangay, shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or resolution adopting a local development plan and public investment program, or an ordinance directing the payment of money or creating liability. In such a case, the veto shall not affect the item or
items which are not objected to. The vetoed item or items shall not take effect unless the sanggunian overrides the veto in the manner herein provided; otherwise, the item or items in the appropriations ordinance of the previous year corresponding to those vetoed, if any, shall be deemed reenacted. (c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution only once. The sanggunian may override the veto of the local chief executive concerned by twothirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance effective even without the approval of the local chief executive concerned. SEC. 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. - (a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the sanggunian panlungsod or sangguniang bayan shall forward to the sangguniang panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development plans and public investment programs formulated by the local development councils. (b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents, inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of his comments or recommendations, which may be considered by the sangguniang panlalawigan in making its decision. (c) If the sangguniang panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The sangguniang panlalawigan
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shall enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken. (d) If no action has been taken by the sangguniang panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid. SEC. 57. Review of Barangay Ordinances by the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan. - (a) Within ten (10) days after its enactment, the sangguniang barangay shall furnish copies of all barangay ordinances to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned for review as to whether the ordinance is consistent with law and city or municipal ordinances. (b) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, fails to take action on barangay ordinances within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed approved. (c) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, finds the barangay ordinances inconsistent with law or city or municipal ordinances, the sanggunian concerned shall, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, return the same with its comments and recommendations to the sangguniang barangay concerned for adjustment, amendment, or modification; in which case, the effectivity of the barangay ordinance is suspended until such time as the revision called for is effected. SEC. 58. Enforcement of Disapproved ordinances or Resolutions. - Any attempt to enforce any ordinance or any resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program, after the disapproval thereof, shall be sufficient ground for the suspension or dismissal of the official or employee concerned.
SEC. 59. Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions. (a) Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or the resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program, the same shall take effect after ten (10) days from the date a copy thereof is posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol or city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may be, and in at least two (2) other conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned. (b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the posting of an ordinance or resolution in the bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol and the city, municipal, or barangay hall in at least two (2) conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned not later than five (5) days after approval thereof. The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in Filipino or English and in the language or dialect understood by the majority of the people in the local government unit concerned, and the secretary to the sanggunian shall record such fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the dates of approval and posting. (c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation within the province where the local legislative body concerned belongs. In the absence of any newspaper of general circulation within the province, posting of such ordinances shall be made in all municipalities and cities of the province where the sanggunian of origin is situated. (d) In the case of highly urbanized cities, the main features of the ordinance or resolution duly enacted or adopted shall, in addition to being posted, be published once in a local newspaper of general circulation within the city: Provided, That in the absence thereof the ordinance or resolution shall be published in any newspaper of general circulation.
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Section 9, Article X, Constitution. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral representation as may be prescribed by law.
Casio vs. Court of Appeals (1991)

Facts: The Coliseum in Gingoog City owned by petitioner Casio was a licensee of a cockpit. When the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Gingoog City passed Resolution No. 49, Code Ordinance, Series of 1984, which classified certain areas of the city as residential zones, declaring, among others, the site of Coliseum as such. The classification led to the cancellation of petitioner's license to operate the cockpit. Article 10 of the same resolution provides that changes in the zoning ordinance as a result of the review by the Local Review Committee shall be treated as an amended. And such amendment shall be carried out through a resolution of vote of the SP and shall take effect only after approval and authentication by the HSRC. Resolution No. 378 reclassified Block 125 as within the recreational zone, thus allegedly amending Resolution No. 49. Nine members of the sangguniang panlungsod, participated, with four members voting for the amendment, while four voted against, and with one abstention. The vice-mayor, as presiding officer, broke the deadlock by voting for the amendment. By virtue of Resolution No. 378, the succeeding city mayor issued to petitioner a permit to operate a cockpit which was later renewed. Private respondent Gingoog Gallera, Inc., protested the operation of Coliseum before the Philippine Gamefowl Commission (PGC) on the ground that no certificate of registration had as yet been issued by the PGC, although city mayor's permits were issued to petitioner. The PGC eventually sent a telegram to the city mayor to stop any cockfight in the Coliseum in view of its failure to register with the PGC. Thereafter, an action for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction was filed by Gallera before the RTC against
petitioner, on the ground that Resolution No. 378, purportedly amending zoning Ordinance No. 49, is invalid. Thus, Block 125 remained a residential zone. The TC rendered judgment in favor of private respondent, declaring the aforesaid mayor's permits null and void and ordering petitioner from further operating the cockpit in question. Upon appeal, respondent court affirmed the TCs decision. Issues: 1. WON Resolution No. 378 validly amended Resolution No. 49, reclassifying the subject block from residential to recreational zone 2. WON the mayors permits issued to petitioner were valid Held: 1. NO. Resolution No. 378 was declared invalid by the CA for failure to comply with the required three-fourths vote of the members of the SP. The pertinent provisions in the city charter and the LGC are of general application and embrace a wider scope or subject matter whereas Section 6.44, Article 10 of said ordinance regarding amendments thereto is a specific and particular provision. Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative. The higher requisite vote in Resolution No. 49 shall govern since municipal authorities are in a better position to determine the evils sought to be prevented by the inclusion of particular provisions in enacting a statute. 2. Since Resolution 387 is invalid, Block 125 where Coliseum is located remains classified as a residential area. Hence, the operation of a cockpit therein is prohibited. This is consonant with the rules and regulations promulgated by the PGC, specifically: Section 6, which mandates that cockpits be constructed and operated
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within the appropriate areas as prescribed in zoning laws; and Section 12, which provides that no cockpit shall be allowed to operate without the proper registration certificate. The issuance of a registration certificate by the PGC is a condition precedent before a mayors permit can be granted to petitioner. Since no such registration certificate was issued, the mayor's permits issued to petitioner are null and void. Even if by the time the SC resolved this issue, the disputed mayors permits were already functus officio, the Court still held that adjudication was in order to serve as a guide for the proper and legal issuance of mayor's permits to cockpits owners. Disposition: Petition denied.
Issue: WON petitioner, while acting as governor, temporarily relinquished the powers and functions of the vice-governor, including the power to preside over SP sessions Held: YES. The LGC provides only for modes of succession in case of permanent vacancy in the office of the Governor and the ViceGovernor (whether single or simultaneously) as well as in case of a temporary vacancy in the office of the governor. But, no such contingency is provided in case of temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor. When the vice-governor exercises the powers and duties of the governor, he does not assume the latter office. He only acts as the Governor but does not become the Governor. His assumption of the powers, duties and functions of the provincial chief executive does not create a permanent vacuum or vacancy in his position as the vice-governor. Necessarily, he does not relinquish nor abandon his position and title as vice-governor by merely becoming an acting governor. The LGC is silent as to whether in such capacity, the acting governor temporarily relinquishes the powers, functions, duties and responsibilities of the vice-governor, including the power to preside over the sessions of the SP. But he actually does. As a quasi-governor, for purposes of exercising his legislative prerogatives and powers, he is deemed as a non-member of the SP for the time being. The reason for this is that by tradition, the offices of the provincial governor and vicegovernor are essentially executive in nature, whereas plain members of the provincial board perform functions partaking of a legislative character. Under the LGC, the governor was deprived of the power to preside over the SP and is no longer considered a member thereof. This is clear from the law, when it provides that local legislative power shall be vested in the SP, which is the legislative body of the
Gamboa vs. Aguirre (1999)

Facts: In the 1995 elections, Rafael Coscolluela, petitioner Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr. and respondents Marcelo Aguirre, Jr., and Juan Y. Araneta were elected Negros Occidental Governor, Vice-Governor and SP members, respectively. Sometime in August of 1995, the governor designated petitioner as Acting Governor for the duration of the formers official trip abroad until his return. When the SP held its regular session on September 6, 1995, respondents questioned the authority of petitioner to preside therein and asked him to vacate the Chair. The latter, however, refused to do so. In another session, seven members of the SP voted to allow petitioner to continue presiding while four others voted against with one abstention. Respondents thereafter filed before the LC a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition. In the meantime, the Governor re-assumed his office. Later, the TC rendered a decision and declared petitioner as temporarily legally incapacitated to preside over the sessions of the SP during the period that he is the Acting Governor. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review.
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province and membership17.
enumerates
therein
its
Being the acting governor, the vicegovernor cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office, since the nature of the duties of the provincial governor call for a fulltime occupant to discharge them. Such is not only consistent with but also appears to be the clear rationale of the LGC wherein the policy of performing dual functions in both offices has already been abandoned. Disposition: Petition denied.
and registered representatives, may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the sanggunian concerned. (c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from Roman numeral I. The Comelec or its designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition. (d) Two (2) or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative. (e) Proponents shall have ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays, from notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number of signatures. (f) The petition shall be signed before the election registrar, or his designated representatives, in the presence of a representative of the proponent, and a representative of the sanggunian concerned in a public place in the local government unit, as the case may be. Stations for collecting signatures may be established in as many places as may be warranted. (g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Comelec, through its office in the local government unit concerned, shall certify as to whether or not the required number of signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain the required number defeats the proposition. (h) If the required number of signatures is obtained, the Comelec shall then set a date for the initiative during which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned for their approval within sixty (60) days from the date of certification by the Comelec, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set, after which
1. LOCAL INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM

SEC. 120. Local Initiative Defined. - Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. SEC. 121. Who May Exercise. - The power of local initiative and referendum may be exercised by all registered voters of the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. SEC. 122. Procedure in Local Initiative. (a) Not less than one thousand (1,000) registered voters in case of provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of barangays, may file a petition with the sanggunian concerned proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment of an ordinance. (b) If no favorable action thereon is taken by the sanggunian concerned within thirty (30) days from its presentation, the proponents, through their duly authorized
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1. Vice-Governor, as presiding officer, 2. regular elective SP members, 3. three elective sectoral representatives, and 4. those ex-officio members, namely: a. president of the provincial chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, b. president of the panlalawigang pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan, c. president of the provincial federation of sanggunian members of municipalities and component cities.
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the results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Comelec. SEC. 123. Effectivity of Local Propositions. - If the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification by the Comelec as if affirmative action thereon had been made by the sanggunian and local chief executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of votes, the proposition is considered defeated. SEC. 124. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year. (b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the sanggunians to enact. (c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the sanggunian concerned adopts in toto the proposition presented and the local chief executive approves the same, the initiative shall be canceled. However, those against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner herein provided. SEC. 125. Limitations upon Sanggunians. Any proposition or ordinance approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended by the sanggunian concerned within six (6) months from the date of the approval thereof, and may be amended, modified or repealed by the sanggunian within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of threefourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided, That in case of barangays, the period shall be eighteen (18) months after the approval thereof. SEC. 126. Local Referendum Defined. Local referendum is the legal process whereby the registered voters of the local government units may approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian. The local referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Comelec within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in
case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The Comelec shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum. SEC. 127. Authority of Courts. - Nothing in this Chapter shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Chapter for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the sanggunian concerned to enact the said measure. R. A. No. 6735 An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor I. General Provisions Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act." Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean: (a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely: a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution; a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
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(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action. (c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely: c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies. (d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters. (e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people. (f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required number of signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined by and submitted to the Commission on Elections, hereinafter referred to as the Commission. (g) "Local government units" refers to provinces , cities, municipalities and barangays. (h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, and Sangguniang Nayon. (i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal Mayors and Punong Barangay, as the case may be. Sec. 4. Who may exercise. The power of initiative and referendum may be exercised by all registered voters of the
country, autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. Sec. 5. Requirements. (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same with the Commission. (b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter. (c) The petition shall state the following: c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be; c.2. the proposition; c.3. the reason or reasons therefor; c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein; c.5. signatures of the registered voters; and petitioners or
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the legislative assembly of an autonomous region, province or city is deemed validly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the province or city, of which every legislative district must be
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represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein; Provided, however, That if the province or city is composed only of one (1) legislative district, then at least each municipality in a province or each barangay in a city should be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. (e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be deemed validly initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at least tenper centum (10%) of the registered voters in the municipality, of which every barangay is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. (f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly initiated if signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in said barangay. Sec. 6. Special Registration. The Commission on Election shall set a special registration day at least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative or referendum. Sec. 7. Verification of Signatures. The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election. II. National Initiative and Referendum Sec. 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. The Commission shall call and supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum. Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall, upon determining the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation and set the date of the initiative or referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days
from the determination by the Commission of the sufficiency of the petition. Sec. 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. (a) The Proposition of the enactment, approval, amendment or rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and approved by a majority of the votes cast by all the registered voters of the Philippines. If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the national law proposed for enactment, approval, or amendment shall become effective fifteen (15) days following completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. If, as certified by the Commission, the proposition to reject a national law is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the said national law shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall become effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of publication of the proposition and the certification by the Commission in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be rejected or amended shall remain in full force and effect. (b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite. (c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation by the Commission. Sec. 10. Prohibited Measures. The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition: (a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and
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(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity. Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. The petition shall contain a summary of the chief purposes and contents of the bill that the organization proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature. The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the enactment of any legislative measure before the House of Representatives except that the said initiative bill shall have precedence over the pending legislative measures on the committee. Sec. 12. Appeal. The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice thereof. III. Local Initiative and Referendum Sec. 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. (a) Not less than two thousand (2,000) registered voters in case of autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of barangays, may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative body, respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution. (b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30) days from its presentation, the proponents through their duly authorized and registered representative may invoke their
power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned. (c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). The Secretary of Local Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition. (d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative. (e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of autonomous regions, ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays, from notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number of signatures. (f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated representative, in the presence of a representative of the proponent, and a representative of the regional assemblies and local legislative bodies concerned in a public place in the autonomous region or local government unit, as the case may be. Signature stations may be established in as many places as may be warranted. (g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on Elections, through its office in the local government unit concerned shall certify as to whether or not the required number of signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain the required number is a defeat of the proposition. (h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission shall then set a date for the initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned for their approval within ninety (90) days from the date of certification by the Commission, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of autonomous regions, sixty (60) days in case of the provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The
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initiative shall then be held on the date set, after which the results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Commission on Elections. Sec. 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. If the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification by the Commission as if affirmative action thereon had been made by the local legislative body and local executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of votes, the proposition is considered defeated. Sec. 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year. (b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the local legislative bodies to enact. (c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the proposition presented, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner herein provided. Sec. 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. Any proposition or ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom, and may be amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative body within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided, however, that in case of barangays, the period shall be one (1) year after the expiration of the first six (6) months. Sec. 17. Local Referendum. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 hereof, any local legislative body may submit to the registered voters of autonomous region, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays for the
approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly enacted or approved. Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum. Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure. IV. Final Provisions Sec. 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all initiatives and referenda. Sec. 20. Rules and Regulations. The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act. Sec. 21. Appropriations. The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against the Contingent Fund in the General Appropriations Act of the current year. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the full implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act. Sec. 22. Separability Clause. If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective. Sec. 23. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
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Garcia vs. COMELEC (1994)

Facts: In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) in accordance with R.A. No. 7227. Petitioners Gov. Enrique Garcia et al. filed a petition with the SB of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10 and enact another one which would include certain pre-conditions such as the return of virgin forests and the Grande Island to Bataan, for the municipality to become a part of the SSEZ. The municipality did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission. Petitioners then resorted to their power of initiative under the LGC. They started to solicit the required number of signatures to cause the repeal of said resolution. Unknown to the petitioners, however, Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice Mayor and Presiding Officer of the SB, wrote a letter to the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of the petition for a local initiative and/or referendum because the exercise will just promote divisiveness. The COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject is merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance. 6 The COMELEC en banc further resolved to direct the Provincial Election Supervisor to hold action on the authentication of signatures being gathered by petitioners. Issue: WON Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10 is a proper subject of an initiative Held: YES. Respondents contended that under the LGC, only an ordinance can be the subject of initiative. This is incorrect, as clearly shown in the following: Section 32 of Article VI of the Constitution provides: The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body . . ." An act includes a resolution. Black defines an act as an expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote something done . . . as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards, and determinations . . . . The constitutional command to include acts (i.e., resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative was implemented by Congress when it enacted R. A. No. 6735 entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor. Thus, its section 3(a)18 expressly includes resolutions as subjects of initiatives on local legislations.
Similarly, its section 16 states: Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies Any proposition on ordinance or resolution approved through the
18
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean; (a) Initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely: a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution. a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution, or ordinance.
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system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom . . . . In its Resolution No. 2300 (In Re Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum, on National and Local Laws), the COMELEC likewise recognized resolutions as proper subjects of initiatives. Section 5, Article I of its Rules states that the power of initiative may be exercised to amend the Constitution, or to enact a national legislation, a regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or ordinance."
implications people.
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Disposition: Petition granted.
SBMA vs. COMELEC (1996)

Facts: On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted R. A. No. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992). Section 12 thereof provides for thec creation of a Special Economic and Freeport Zone and an SSEZ subject to the concurrence by resolution of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Olongapo and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa. (Antecedent facts in the Garcia case). On February 1, 1995, pursuant to Sec. 12 of RA 7227, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ, which included all the lands within the former Subic Naval Base, Grande Island and that portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong. Respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845, adopting a calendar of activities for local referendum on certain municipal ordinance passed by the SB of Morong. The Comelec then promulgated the assailed Resolution No. 2848 providing for the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10. Petitioner instituted the present petition for certiorari and prohibition contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 and alleging, inter alia, that public respondent was intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law. Issues: 1. WON this petition seeks to overturn the Garcia case which has long become final and executory
When Congress enacted R.A. No. 6735, it intended resolutions to be proper subjects of local initiatives. The debates confirm this intent.
Moreover, Section 120, Chapter 2, Title IX Book I of the Code merely defines the concept of local initiative as the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It does not, however, deal with the subjects or matters that can be taken up in a local initiative. t is section 124 which does. It provides that initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact. Contrary to the classic distinction between an ordinance and resolution i.e. that a resolution is used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion which is to have only a temporary effect while an ordinance is intended to permanently direct and control matters applying to persons or things in general it can not be argued that the subject matter of the resolution of the Municipality of Morong merely temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a permanent rule of conduct or government. The inclusion of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone has far reaching
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NO 2. WON respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and implementing its Resolution No. 2848 YES 3. WON the proposition sought to be submitted in the plebiscite is ultra vires, stressing that under Sec. 124 (b) the LGC, local initiative shall cover only such subjects or matters as are within the legal powers of the sanggunians to enact a PREMATURE question Held: 1. The only issue resolved in the earlier Garcia case is whether a municipal resolution as contra-distinguished from an ordinance may be the proper subject of an initiative and/or referendum. In the present case, petitioner is not contesting the propriety of municipal resolution as the form by which these two new constitutional prerogatives of the people may validly exercised. What is at issue here is whether Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10 as worded, is sufficient in form and substance for submission to the people for their approval, and in fine, whether the Comelec acted properly and juridically in promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848. 2. The process started by private respondents was an initiative but respondent Comelec made preparations for a referendum only. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an initiative. There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an initiative. Initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose. While initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is begun and consented to by the law-making body. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves without the
participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives, while referendum consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body. Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative are understandably more complex than in a referendum. From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for the Comelec to supervise an initiative more closely, its authority thereon extending not only to the counting and canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to the people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily understood and voted upon by the electorate. 3. The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ of prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. The COMELEC itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which the SC could take cognizance of in the exercise of its review powers. This does not mean that the Comelec itself has no power to pass upon proposed resolutions in an initiative. Quite the contrary, these matters are in fact within the initiatory jurisdiction of the Commission. In other words, while regular courts may take jurisdiction over approved propositions, the Comelec in the exercise of its quasi-judicial and administrative powers may adjudicate and pass upon such proposals insofar as their form and language are concerned. Accordingly, the question of whether the subject of this initiative is within the capacity of the Municipal Council of Morong
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to enact may be ruled upon by the Comelec upon remand and after hearing the parties thereon. Disposition: Petition granted. Initiative on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10 was remanded to the Comelec for further proceedings
Issue: WON Ordinance No. 25 is valid Held: NO. The law is clear. It needs only application, not interpretation. For the passage of 1) any ordinance or 2) any proposition creating indebtedness, the affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the municipal council shall be necessary. Other measures prevail upon the majority vote of the members present. Creating indebtedness refers to proposition and not to ordinance. The contention that only ordinances creating indebtedness require the approval of a majority of all the members of the municipal council is devoid of merit. The legislature did not intend to limit the requirement of a majority vote to ordinances creating a liability or appropriating money. To hold thus would be merely juggling with the words of the statute to give it a different meaning from that which was intended. The law requires that the yeas and nays shall be taken upon the passage of all ordinances, and the concurrence of a majority of the legislative body is necessary to their passage. If a proposition not in the form of an ordinance creates any liability, the requirement is the same, while as to other propositions, the majority of a quorum is sufficient. Disposition: Judgment reversed, with the Court directing that in the court of origin, another judgment would issue in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants for the sum of P400
B.
2. ACTS OF SANGGUNIAN
A. B. B.
ORDINANCE AND RESOLUTION FORMALITIES 1. VOTE
Ortiz vs. Posadas (1931)

Facts: Seven of the 12 members present, including the president of the Municipal Council of Tabaco, Albay, voted in favor of Ordinance No. 25, concerning cockpits. Six members voted against the ordinance, with three members absent. On whether or not the ordinance is valid, one judge of first instance of the province held in the affirmative, while another judge of first instance held an ordinance enacted under similar circumstances invalid. Section 224 of the Administrative Code reads as follows: SEC. 2224. Journal of Proceedings Majorities necessary for transaction of business. The council shall keep a journal of its own proceedings. The ayes and noes shall be taken upon the passage of all ordinances, upon all propositions to create any liability against the municipality, and upon any other proposition, upon the request of any member, and they shall be entered upon the journal. The affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the municipal council shall be necessary to the passage of any ordinance or of any proposition creating indebtedness; but other measures, except as otherwise specially provided, shall prevail upon the majority vote of the members present at any meeting duly called and held.
2. ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF
A VALID ORDINANCE
City of Manila vs. Laguio, et al. (2005)

Facts: Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses, one of which is the Victoria Court in Malate. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a petition for declaratory relief with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Alfredo S. Lim,
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Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila. MTDC prayed that the Ordinance No. 7783, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. The Ordinance prohibited the establishment and operation of certain forms of amusement services and facilities such as beer houses, night clubs, motels and inns. Judge Laguio rendered the assailed decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing the ordinance. Petitioners filed the present petition, alleging that the lower court erred in concluding that the subject Ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power; and that the questioned ordinance contravenes P.D. No. 499, which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein. Issue: WON Ordinance NO. 7783 is valid Held: NO. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and 6) must not be unreasonable. Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution and to the laws. The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that LGUs are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative
power, a delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. The Ordinance infringes the due process clause.
The two requirements for the valid exercise of police power 1) that it be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose; and 2) not unduly oppressive upon individuals is not met. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. The prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila. It is baseless and insupportable to bring within the classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance infringes on the fundamental right to liberty. Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the motels premises. Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government, as long as they do not run afoul of the law. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception.
The Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property.[ The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the
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Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed businesses. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. The Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners actions. It in no way controls or guides the discretion vested in them. It provides no definition of the establishments covered by it and it fails to set forth the conditions when the establishments come within its ambit of prohibition. The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments.
establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments. Disposition: Petition denied.

B.
3. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
Perez vs. Dela Cruz (1969)

Facts: In a private conference held at the office of the petitioner Perez, vice-mayor, the matter of selecting the secretary of the municipal board of the said city as well as the chairmen of the various standing committees of the said board came up for discussion. Seven city councilors were present, with Perez presiding. There, however, was a deadlock because the four Nacionalista Party councilors (private respondents) wanted to vote for a particular person as secretary of the board and to hold the chairmanship of the committee on markets for one of them. Perez expressed her intention to create a tie vote and then exercise her power as presiding officer to break the deadlock. Private respondents filed with the CFI of Camarines Sur a petition for prohibition to prevent Perez from casting her vote, except in the event of a tie vote, and from voting on any legislative proposal or measure or in any proceeding of the said board, except when the members thereof are equally divided. The respondent judge granted the prayer for a preliminary injunction. Perez filed a motion to dismiss which the respondent judge denied. Perez then file a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA. The appellate court issued a restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the writ of prohibitory injunction. Meanwhile, Perez and the Liberal councilors, with the four respondents councilors walking out of the session hall, passed an amendment to the Rules of Procedure of the Naga municipal board granting the chairman the right to vote as a member, and as presiding officer the right to vote again in case of a tie vote.
The Ordinance offends the equal protection clause. There are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Ordinance is ultra vires. Under the LGC, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the
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The CA thereafter dismissed Perez' petition for certiorari and dissolved the restraining order issued by it. Perez filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. Issues: 1) WON the vice-mayor of Naga city, besides being the presiding officer of the municipal board is also a member; Corollarily, WON she can vote twice: to create a deadlock and then to break it NO 2) WON the respondent judge had jurisdiction to issue the writ of prohibitory injunction against Perez YES Held: 1. NO. There is absolutely nothing in the charter of the City of Naga, which provides that the vice-mayor of the said city is a member of the municipal board thereof. In fact, the acting mayor designated to take over in case of sickness, absence or other temporary incapacity of the Mayor was the City Treasurer. Section 3 of the charter simply provides that the Vice-Mayor shall be the presiding officer of the City Council or Municipal Board in all chartered cities. It does not decree that the vice-mayor is a member of the city council or municipal board. We cannot read in the law something which is not there. Paragraph (g) of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure adopted by the municipal board of Naga City provides that the chairman cannot vote, except in case of a tie. However, a member of the Board acting as chairman may vote as a member and as chairman to break a tie. Perez insisted, however, that the above provision was amended by the municipal board headed by her to the effect that the chairman has become a member of the board who can vote and again, as a presiding officer, in case of a tie. Such insistence is a sheer exercise in futility because: The amended rule presupposes that the chairman is a member of the Board an assumption that is without legal basis;
The said amendatory rule was passed on March 5, 1968, almost two months after the filing on January 15, 1968, by the private respondents of their petition, that is, pendente lite; and And, although on the date the said amendment was passed, the restraining order of the CA was in force, there was no quorum in the board, as the four respondents councilors had walked out of the session hall, leaving only the three Liberal Party councilors and the petitioner.
The proposed amendment was, therefore, a complete nullity. 2. YES. The petitioner's final contention, invoking Vera vs. Avelino, is that as a legislative official, performing legislative functions, she is not subject to any prohibitory process by the courts. The doctrine in Vera is based on the principle of separation of powers and is not applicable to local governments. Moreover, executives at the local or municipal level are vested with both legislative and sometimes judicial functions, in addition to their purely executive duties. By explicit statutory command, courts are given authority to determine the validity of municipal proceedings. It is not disputed that the present proceeding for prohibition has for its objective to prevent the petitioner from electing the munnicipal council. In insisting to vote twice in the municipal board, she acted without jurisdiction, and may be validly prevented and restrained by a writ of prohibition. As to petitioner's assertion that the acts sought to be restrained are mere probable individual actuations beyond the reach of a prohibitory writ, suffice it to state that prohibition is essentially a preventive remedy. But petitioner's threat of voting twice in the municipal board was not an empty gesture, for the record shows that soon after the writ complained of was lifted by the CA, the petitioner proceeded to act by voting twice for the approval of an alleged amendment to the rules of procedure of the municipal board.
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Homeowners Association vs. Municipal Board of City of Manila (1968)

Facts: This is an action against the Municipal Board and the Mayor of the City of Manila for a declaratory relief brought by the Homeowners' Association of the Philippines, Inc. and its President, Vicente A. Rufino to nullify Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 of the City of Manila. The ordinance prohibited lessors of lands from increasing the rentals to certain amounts. The CFI of Manila rendered judgment declaring said ordinance ultra vires, stating, inter alia, that the power to declare a state of emergency exclusively pertains to Congress; that said ordinance disconstitutes an unreasonable and unjustified limitation on the use of private properties and arbitrarily encroaches on the constitutional rights of property owners. Issues:
The practical reason for this requirement is that, otherwise, a new and different law would be necessary to repeal it. That which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become a permanent law because Congress might not enact the repeal. 2. YES. Appellant assails the validity of the proceedings in the lower court upon the ground that, although petitioners had assailed Municipal Ordinance No. 4841, the Solicitor General had been neither heard nor notified in connection therewith, in violation of Section 4 of Rule 6419 of the Rules of Court. It should be noted, however, that appellant did not raise this question or invoke said Section 4, either in his answer or in a motion to dismiss in the lower court. Upon the other hand, the City Fiscal of Manila was notified therein. In fact, he filed a memorandum. Neither did his motion for reconsideration of the appealed decision touch upon said question, which was raised, for the first time, in a supplement to said motion for reconsideration. At any rate, the determination of the question is a matter left to the discretion of the Court. Inasmuch as said requirement is not mandatory but discretionary, noncompliance therewith affected neither the jurisdiction of the trial court nor the validity of the proceedings. In San Buenaventura vs. Municipality of San Jose, the Court held that the requirement regarding notification is not jurisdictional; and failure to notify will not be a sufficient ground to throw the case out of court. The purpose of the rule is to give the fiscal/Solicitor General a chance to participate in the deliberation. If it appears, however, that the ordinance in question is patently illegal, as in the present case, and the matter had already
19
1. WON Ordinance No. 25 is valid

NO. 2. WON the proceedings in the CFI are valid in view of the fact that the Solicitor General had not been notified and heard in the case (cf. Section 4, Rule 64) YES Held: 1. NO. Individual rights may be adversely affected by the exercise of police power to the extent only and only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. As a consequence, a law or ordinance as a means to tide over a critical condition, to be valid and legal, must be for a definite period of time, the length of which must be reasonable, in relation to the nature and duration of the crisis.
SEC. 4. Municipal or city ordinance. In any action involving the validity of a municipal or city ordinance the provincial or city fiscal or attorney shall be similarly notified and entitled to be heard; and if the ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional the Solicitor General shall also be notified and entitled to be heard.
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been passed upon by a competent court, the requirements of Section 4 of Rule 64 may be dispensed with. Disposition: Judgment affirmed.
collective views of the people may be expressed, crystallized and considered, and where disputes may be amicably settled. SEC. 385. Manner of Creation. - A barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, by law or by an ordinance of the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod, subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be conducted by the Comelec in the local government unit or units directly affected within such period of time as may be determined by the law or ordinance creating said barangay. In the case of the creation of barangays by the sangguniang panlalawigan, the recommendation of the sangguniang bayan concerned shall be necessary. SEC. 386. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A barangay maybe created out of a contiguous territory which has apopulation of at least two thousand (2,000) inhabitants ascertified by the National Statistics Office except in cities and municipalities within Metro Manila and other metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly urbanized cities where such territory shall have a certified population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the population of the original barangay or barangays to less than the minimum requirement prescribed herein. To enhance the delivery of basic services in the indigenous cultural communities, barangays may be created in such communities by an Act of Congress, notwithstanding the above requirement. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay shall be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. (c) The governor or city mayor may prepare a consolidation plan for
VIII. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS A. THE BARANGAY

BOOK III LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS TITLE ONE. - THE BARANGAY CHAPTER 1 - ROLE AND CREATION OF THE BARANGAY SEC. 384. Role of the Barangay. - As the basic political unit, the barangay serves as the primary planning and implementing unit of government policies, plans, programs, projects, and activities in the community, and as a forum wherein the
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barangays, based on the criteria prescribed in this Section, within his territorial jurisdiction. The plan shall be submitted to the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned for appropriate action. In the case of municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila area and other metropolitan political subdivisions, the barangay consolidation plan shall be prepared and approved by the sangguniang bayan concerned. CHAPTER 2 - BARANGAY OFFICIALS AND OFFICES SEC. 387. Chief Officials and Offices. - (a) There shall be in each barangay a punong barangay, seven (7) sangguniang barangay members, the sangguniang kabataan chairman, a barangay secretary, and a barangay treasurer. (b) There shall also be in every barangay a lupong tagapamayapa. The sangguniang barangay may form community brigades and create such other positions or offices as may be deemed necessary to carry out the purposes of the barangay government in accordance with the needs of public service, subject to the budgetary limitations on personal services prescribed under Title Five, Book II of this Code. SEC. 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and members who may be designated by law or ordinance and charged with the maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and property, or the maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay member who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in authority. CHAPTER 3 - THE PUNONG BARANGAY SEC. 389. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, and Functions. - (a) The punong barangay, as the chief executive of the barangay
government, shall exercise such powers and perform such duties and functions, as provided by this Code and other laws. (b) For efficient, effective and economical governance, the purpose of which is the general welfare of the barangay and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the punong barangay shall: (1) Enforce all laws and ordinances which are applicable within the barangay; (2) Negotiate, enter into, and sign contracts for and in behalf of the barangay, upon authorization of the sangguniang barangay; (3) Maintain public order in the barangay and, in pursuance thereof, assist the city or municipal mayor and the sanggunian members in the performance of their duties and functions; (4) Call and preside over the sessions of the sangguniang barangay and the barangay assembly, and vote only to break a tie; (5) Upon approval by a majority of all the members of the sangguniang barangay, appoint or replace the barangay treasurer, the barangay secretary, and other appointive barangay officials; (6) Organize and lead an emergency group whenever the same may be necessary for the maintenance of peace and order or on occasions of emergency or calamity within the barangay; (7) In coordination with the barangay development council, prepare the annual executive and supplemental budgets of the barangay; (8) Approve vouchers relating to the disbursement of barangay funds; (9) Enforce laws and regulations relating to pollution control and protection of the environment; (10) Administer the operation of the Katarungang Pambarangay in accordance with the provisions of this Code;
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(11) Exercise general supervision over the activities of the sangguniang kabataan; (12) Ensure the delivery of basic services as mandated under Section 17 of this Code; (13) Conduct an annual palarong barangay which shall feature traditional sports and disciplines included in national and international games, in coordination with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports; (14) Promote the general welfare of the barangay; and (15) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (b) In the performance of his peace and order functions, the punong barangay shall be entitled to possess and carry the necessary firearm within his territorial jurisdiction, subject to appropriate rules and regulations. CHAPTER 4 THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY SEC. 390. Composition. - The sangguniang barangay, the legislative body of the barangay, shall be composed of the punong barangay as presiding officer, and the seven (7) regular sangguniang barangay members elected at large and sangguniang kabataan chairman, as members. SEC. 391. Powers, Duties, and Functions. (a) The sangguniang barangay, as the legislative body of the barangay, shall: (1) Enact ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants therein; (2) Enact tax and revenue ordinances, subject to the limitations imposed in this Code;
(3) Enact annual and supplemental budgets in accordance with the provisions of this Code; (4) Provide for the construction and maintenance of barangay facilities and other public works projects chargeable to the general fund of the barangay or such other funds actually available for the purpose; (5) Submit to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan such suggestions or recommendations as it may see fit for the improvement of the barangay or for the welfare of the inhabitants thereof; (6) Assist in the establishment, organization, and promotion of cooperative enterprises that will improve the economic condition and well-being of the residents; (7) Regulate the use of multi-purpose halls, multipurpose pavements, grain or copra dryers, patios and other postharvest facilities, barangay waterworks, barangay markets, parking areas or other similar facilities constructed with government funds within the jurisdiction of the barangay and charge reasonable fees for the use thereof; (8) Solicit or accept monies, materials and voluntary labor for specific public works and cooperative enterprises of the barangay from residents, land owners, producers and merchants in the barangay; monies from grants-in-aid, subsidies, contributions, and revenues made available to the barangays from national, provincial, city or municipal funds; and monies from other private agencies and individuals: Provided, however, That monies or properties donated by private agencies and individuals for specific purposes shall accrue to the barangay as trust fund; (9) Solicit or accept, in any or all the foregoing public works and cooperative enterprises, such cooperation as is made available by national, provincial, city, or municipal agencies established by law to render financial, technical, and advisory
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assistance to barangays and to barangay residents: Provided, however, That in soliciting or accepting such cooperation, the sangguniang barangay need not pledge any sum of money for expenditure in excess of amounts currently in the barangay treasury or encumbered for other purposes; (10) Provide compensation, reasonable allowances or per diems as well as travel expenses for sangguniang barangay members and other barangay officials, subject to the budgetary limitations prescribed under Title Five, Book II of this Code: Provided, however, That no increase in the compensation or honoraria of the sangguniang barangay members shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all members of the sangguniang barangay approving such increase; (11) Hold fund-raising activities for barangay projects without the need of securing permits from any national or local office or agency. The proceeds from such activities shall be tax-exempt and shall accrue to the general fund of the barangay: Provided, That in the appropriation thereof, the specific purpose for which such fund-raising activity has been held shall be first satisfied: Provided, further, That no fund-raising activities shall be held within a period of sixty (60) days immediately preceding and after a national or local election, recall, referendum, or plebiscite: Provided, finally, That said fund-raising activities shall comply with national policy standards and regulations on morals, health, and safety of the persons participating therein. The sangguniang barangay, through the punong barangay, shall render a public accounting of the funds raised at the completion of the project for which the fund-raising activity was undertaken; (12) Authorize the punong barangay to enter into contracts in behalf of the barangay, subject to the provisions of this Code; (13) Authorize the barangay treasurer to make direct purchases in an amount not exceeding One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) at any one time for the
ordinary and essential needs of the barangay;
administrative
(14) Prescribe fines in amounts not exceeding One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for violation of barangay ordinances; (15) Provide for the administrative needs of the lupong tagapamayapa and the pangkat ng tagapagkasundo; (16) Provide for the organization of community brigades, barangay tanod, or community service units as may be necessary; (17) Organize regular lectures, programs, or fora on community problems such as sanitation, nutrition, literacy, and drug abuse, and convene assemblies to encourage citizen participation in government; (18) Adopt measures to prevent and control the proliferation of squatters and mendicants in the barangay; (19) Provide for the proper development and welfare of children in the barangay by promoting and supporting activities for the protection and total development of children, particularly those below seven (7) years of age; (20) Adopt measures towards the prevention and eradication of drug abuse, child abuse, and juvenile delinquency; (21) Initiate the establishment of a barangay high school, whenever feasible, in accordance with law; (22) Provide for the establishment of a non-formal education center in the barangay whenever feasible, in coordination with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, ; (23) Provide for the delivery of basic services; and (24) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.
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SEC. 392. Other Duties of Sangguniang Barangay Members. - In addition to their duties as members of the sangguniang barangay, sangguniang barangay members may: (a) Assist the punong barangay in the discharge of his duties and functions; (b) Act as peace officers in the maintenance of public order and safety; and (c) Perform such other duties and functions as the punong barangay may delegate. SEC. 393. Benefits of Barangay Officials. (a) Barangay officials, including barangay tanods and members of the lupong tagapamayapa, shall receive honoraria, allowances, and such other emoluments as may be authorized by law or barangay, municipal or city ordinance in accordance with the provisions of this Code, but in no case shall it be less than One thousand pesos (P=1,000.00) per month for the punong barangay and Six hundred pesos (P=600.00) per month for the sangguniang barangay members, barangay treasurer, and barangay secretary: Provided, however, That the annual appropriations for personal services shall be subject to the budgetary limitations prescribed under Title Five, Book II of this Code; (b) The punong barangay, the sangguniang barangay members, the barangay treasurer, and the barangay secretary shall also: (1) Be entitled to Christmas bonus of at least One thousand pesos (P=1,000.00) each, the funds for which shall be taken from the general fund of the barangay or from such other funds appropriated by the national government for the purpose; (2) Be entitled, during their incumbency, to insurance coverage which shall include, but shall not be limited to temporary and permanent disability, double indemnity, accident insurance, death and burial benefits, in accordance with Republic Act
Numbered Sixty-nine hundred forty-two (R.A. No. 6942), entitled "An Act Increasing the Insurance Benefits of Local Government Officials and Providing Funds Therefor"; (3) Be entitled to free medical care including subsistence, medicines, and medical attendance in any government hospital or institution: Provided, That such hospital care shall include surgery or surgical expenses, medicines, X-rays, laboratory fees, and other hospital expenses; In case of extreme urgency where there is no available government hospital or institution, the barangay official concerned may submit himself for immediate medical attendance to the nearest private clinic, hospital or institution and the expenses not exceeding Five thousand pesos (P=5,000.00) that may be incurred therein shall be chargeable against the funds of the barangay concerned; (4) Be exempted during their incumbency from paying tuition and matriculation fees for their legitimate dependent children attending state colleges or universities. He may likewise avail of such educational benefits in a state college or university located within the province or city to which the barangay belongs; and (5) Be entitled to appropriate civil service eligibility on the basis of the number of years of service to the barangay, pursuant to the rules and regulations issued by the Civil Service Commission. (c) Elective barangay officials shall have preference in appointments to any government position or in any government-owned or -controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, after their tenure of office, subject to the requisite qualifications and the provisions of the immediately preceding paragraph. (d) All duly appointed members of the barangay tanod brigades, or their equivalent, which shall number not more than twenty (20) in each barangay, shall be granted insurance or other benefits
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during their incumbency, chargeable to the barangay or the city or municipal government to which the barangay belongs. CHAPTER 5 - APPOINTIVE BARANGAY OFFICIALS SEC. 394. Barangay Secretary: Appointment, Qualifications, Powers and Duties. - (a) The barangay secretary shall be appointed by the punong barangay with the concurrence of the majority of all the sangguniang barangay members. The appointment of the barangay secretary shall not be subject to attestation by the Civil Service Commission. (b) The barangay secretary shall be of legal age, a qualified voter and an actual resident of the barangay concerned. (c) No person shall be appointed barangay secretary if he is a sangguniang barangay member, a government employee, or a relative of the punong barangay within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. (d) The barangay secretary shall: (1) Keep custody of all records of the sangguniang barangay and the barangay assembly meetings; (2) Prepare and keep the minutes of all meetings of the sangguniang barangay and the barangay assembly; (3) Prepare a list of members of the barangay assembly, and have the same posted in conspicuous places within the barangay; (4) Assist in the preparation of all necessary forms for the conduct of barangay elections, initiatives, referenda or plebiscites, in coordination with the Comelec; (5) Assist the municipal civil registrar in the registration of births, deaths, and marriages; (6) Keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay containing the
following items of information: name, address, place and date of birth, sex, civil status, citizenship, occupation, and such other items of information as may be prescribed by law or ordinances; (7) Submit a report on the actual number of barangay residents as often as may be required by the sangguniang barangay; and (8) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. SEC. 395. Barangay Treasurer: Appointment, Qualifications, Powers and Duties. - (a) The barangay treasurer shall be appointed by the punong barangay with the concurrence of the majority of all the sangguniang barangay members. The appointment of the barangay treasurer shall not be subject to attestation by the Civil Service Commission. (b) The barangay treasurer shall be of legal age, a qualified voter, and an actual resident of the barangay concerned. (c) No person shall be appointed barangay treasurer if he is a sangguniang barangay member, a government employee, or a relative of the punong barangay within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. (d) The barangay treasurer shall be bonded in accordance with existing laws in an amount to be determined by the sangguniang barangay but not exceeding Ten thousand pesos (P=10,000.00), premiums for which shall be paid by the barangay. (e) The barangay treasurer shall: (1) Keep custody of barangay funds and properties; (2) Collect and issue official receipts for taxes, fees, contributions, monies, materials, and all other resources accruing to the barangay treasury and deposit the same in the account of the barangay as
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provided under Title Five, Book II of this Code; (3) Disburse funds in accordance with the financial procedures provided in this Code; (4) Submit to the punong barangay a statement covering the actual and estimates of income and expenditures for the preceding and ensuing calendar years, respectively, subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book II of this Code; (5) Render a written accounting report of all barangay funds and property under his custody at the end of each calendar year, and ensure that such report shall be made available to the members of the barangay assembly and other government agencies concerned; (6) Certify as to the availability of funds whenever necessary; (7) Plan and attend to the rural postal circuit within his jurisdiction; and (8) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. SEC. 396. Other Appointive Officials. - The qualifications, duties, and functions of all other barangay officials appointed by the punong barangay shall be governed by the provisions of this Code and other laws or by barangay ordinances. CHAPTER 6 - BARANGAY ASSEMBLY SEC. 397. Composition; Meetings. - (a) There shall be a barangay assembly composed of all persons who are actual residents of the barangay for at least six (6) months, fifteen (15) years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines, and duly registered in the list of barangay assembly members. (b) The barangay assembly shall meet at least twice a year to hear and discuss the semestral report of the sangguniang barangay concerning its activities and finances as well as problems affecting the barangay. Its meetings shall be held upon call of the punong barangay or of at least
four (4) members of the sangguniang barangay, or upon written petition of at least five percent (5%) of the assembly members. (c) No meeting of the barangay assembly shall take place unless a written notice is given one (1) week prior to the meeting except on matters involving public safety or security, in which case notice within a reasonable time shall be sufficient. The punong barangay, or in his absence, the sangguniang barangay member acting as punong barangay, or any assembly member selected during the meeting, shall act as presiding officer in all the meetings of the assembly. The barangay secretary, or in his absence, any member designated by the presiding officer to act as secretary, shall discharge the duties of secretary of the barangay assembly. SEC. 398. Powers of the Barangay Assembly. - The barangay assembly shall: (a) Initiate legislative processes by recommending to the sangguniang barangay the adoption of measures for the welfare of the barangay and the city or municipality concerned; (b) Decide on the adoption of initiative as a legal process whereby the registered voters of the barangay may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance; and (c) Hear and pass upon the semestral report of the sangguniang barangay concerning its activities and finances. CHAPTER 7 KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY SEC. 399. Lupong Tagapamayapa. - (a) There is hereby created in each barangay a lupong tagapamayapa, hereinafter referred to as the lupon, composed of the punong barangay as chairman and ten (10) to twenty (20) members. The lupon shall be constituted every three (3) years in the manner provided herein. (b) Any person actually residing or working in the barangay, not otherwise expressly disqualified by law, and
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possessing integrity, impartiality, independence of mind, sense of fairness, and reputation for probity, may be appointed a member of the lupon. (c) A notice to constitute the lupon, which shall include the names of proposed members who have expressed their willingness to serve, shall be prepared by the punong barangay within the first fifteen (15) days from the start of his term of office. Such notice shall be posted in three (3) conspicuous places in the barangay continuously for a period of not less than three (3) weeks; (d) The punong barangay, taking into consideration any opposition to the proposed appointment or any recommendations for appointments as may have been made within the period of posting, shall within ten (10) days thereafter, appoint as members those whom he determines to be suitable therefor. Appointments shall be in writing, signed by the punong barangay, and attested to by the barangay secretary. (e) The list of appointed members shall be posted in three (3) conspicuous places in the barangay for the entire duration of their term of office; and (f) In barangays where majority of the inhabitants are members of indigenous cultural communities, local systems of es through their councils of datus or elders shall be recognized without prejudice to the applicable provisions of this Code. SEC. 400. Oath and Term of Office. - Upon appointment, each lupon member shall take an oath of office before the punong barangay. He shall hold office until a new lupon is constituted on the third year following his appointment unless sooner terminated by resignation, transfer of residence or place of work, or withdrawal of appointment by the punong barangay with the concurrence of the majority of all the members of the lupon. SEC. 401. Vacancies. - Should a vacancy occur in the lupon for any cause, the
punong barangay shall immediately appoint a qualified person who shall hold office only for the unexpired portion of the term. SEC. 402. Functions of the Lupon. - The lupon shall: (a) Exercise administrative supervision over the conciliation panels provided herein; (b) Meet regularly once a month to provide a forum for exchange of ideas among its members and the public on matters relevant to the amicable settlement of disputes, and to enable various conciliation panel members to share with one another their observations and experiences in effecting speedy resolution of disputes; and (c) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. SEC. 403. Secretary of the Lupon. - The barangay secretary shall concurrently serve as the secretary of the lupon. He shall record the results of mediation proceedings before the punong barangay and shall submit a report thereon to the proper city or municipal courts. He shall also receive and keep the records of proceedings submitted to him by the various conciliation panels. SEC. 404. Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. (a) There shall be constituted for each dispute brought before the lupon a conciliation panel to be known as the pangkat ng tagapagkasundo, hereinafter referred to as the pangkat, consisting of three (3) members who shall be chosen by the parties to the dispute from the list of members of the lupon. Should the parties fail to agree on the pangkat membership, the same shall be determined by lots drawn by the lupon chairman. (b) The three (3) members constituting the pangkat shall elect from among themselves the chairman and the secretary. The secretary shall prepare the minutes of the pangkat proceedings and submit a copy duly attested to by the chairman to the lupon secretary and to the
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proper city or municipal court. He shall issue and cause to be served notices to the parties concerned. The lupon secretary shall issue certified true copies of any public record in his custody that is not by law otherwise declared confidential. SEC. 405. Vacancies in the Pangkat. - Any vacancy in the pangkat shall be chosen by the parties to the dispute from among the other lupon members. Should the parties fail to agree on a common choice, the vacancy shall be filled by lot to be drawn by the lupon chairman. SEC. 406. Character of Office and Service of Lupon Members. - (a) The lupon members, while in the performance of their official duties or on the occasion thereof, shall be deemed as persons in authority, as defined in the Revised Penal Code. (b) The lupon or pangkat members shall serve without compensation, except as provided for in Section 393 and without prejudice to incentives as provided for in this Section and in Book IV of this Code. The Department of the Interior and Local Government shall provide for a system of granting economic or other incentives to the lupon or pangkat members who adequately demonstrate the ability to judiciously and expeditiously resolve cases referred to them. While in the performance of their duties, the lupon or pangkat members, whether in public or private employment, shall be deemed to be on official time, and shall not suffer from any diminution in compensation or allowance from said employment by reason thereof. SEC. 407. Legal Advice on Matters Involving Questions of Law. - The provincial, city legal officer or prosecutor or the municipal legal officer shall render legal advice on matters involving questions of law to the punong barangay or any lupon or pangkat member whenever necessary in the exercise of his functions in the administration of the katarungang pambarangay. SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. - The lupon
of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except: (a) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof; (b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions; (c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00); (d) Offenses where there is no private offended party; (e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon; (f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon; (g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement. SEC. 409. Venue. - (a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay. (b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of
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the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant. (c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated. (d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is located. Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may confront the punong barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice, or his duly designated representative, whose ruling thereon shall be binding. SEC. 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement. - (a) Who may initiate proceeding - Upon payment of the appropriate filing fee, any individual who has a cause of action against another individual involving any matter within the authority of the lupon may complain, orally or in writing, to the lupon chairman of the barangay. (b) Mediation by lupon chairman - Upon receipt of the complaint, the lupon chairman shall within the next working day summon the respondent(s), with notice to the complainant(s) for them and their witnesses to appear before him for a mediation of their conflicting interests. If he fails in his mediation effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the parties before him, he shall forthwith set a date for the constitution of the pangkat in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter. (c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses - While the dispute is under mediation, conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses and cause of action under existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the punong barangay. The
prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat secretary: Provided, however, That such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the punong barangay. (d) Issuance of summons; hearing; grounds for disqualification - The pangkat shall convene not later than three (3) days from its constitution, on the day and hour set by the lupon chairman, to hear both parties and their witnesses, simplify issues, and explore all possibilities for amicable settlement. For this purpose, the pangkat may issue summons for the personal appearance of parties and witnesses before it. In the event that a party moves to disqualify any member of the pangkat by reason of relationship, bias, interest, or any other similar grounds discovered after the constitution of the pangkat, the matter shall be resolved by the affirmative vote of the majority of the pangkat whose decision shall be final. Should disqualification be decided upon, the resulting vacancy shall be filled as herein provided for. (e) Period to arrive at a settlement - The pangkat shall arrive at a settlement or resolution of the dispute within fifteen (15) days from the day it convenes in accordance with this section. This period shall, at the discretion of the pangkat, be extendible for another period which shall not exceed fifteen (15) days, except in clearly meritorious cases. SEC. 411. Form of Settlement. - All amicable settlements shall be in writing, in a language or dialect known to the parties, signed by them, and attested to by the lupon chairman or the pangkat chairman, as the case may be. When the parties to the dispute do not use the same language or dialect, the settlement shall be written in the language or dialect known to them. SEC. 412. Conciliation. - (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. - No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding
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involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto. (b) Where Parties May Go Directly to Court. - The parties may go directly to court in the following instances: (1) Where the accused is under detention; (2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings; (3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property, and support pendente lite; and (4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. (c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural communities. - The customs and traditions of indigenous cultural communities shall be applied in settling disputes between members of the cultural communities. SEC. 413. Arbitration. - (a) The parties may, at any stage of the proceedings, agree in writing that they shall abide by the arbitration award of the lupon chairman or the pangkat. Such agreement to arbitrate may be repudiated within five (5) days from the date thereof for the same grounds and in accordance with the procedure hereinafter prescribed. The arbitration award shall be made after the lapse of the period for repudiation and within ten (10) days thereafter. (b) The arbitration award shall be in writing in a language or dialect known to the parties. When the parties to the dispute do not use the same language or
dialect, the award shall be written in the language or dialect known to them. SEC. 414. Proceedings Open to the Public; Exception. - All proceedings for settlement shall be public and informal: Provided, however, That the lupon chairman or the pangkat chairman, as the case may be, may motu proprio or upon request of a party, exclude the public from the proceedings in the interest of privacy, decency, or public morals. SEC. 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the assistance of counsel or representative, except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are not lawyers. SEC. 416. Effect of Amicable Settlement and Arbitration Award. - The amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten (10) days from the date thereof, unless repudiation of the settlement has been made or a petition to nullify the award has been filed before the proper city or municipal court. However, this provision shall not apply to court cases settled by the lupon under the last paragraph of Section 408 of this Code, in which case the compromise settlement agreed upon by the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat chairman shall be submitted to the court and upon approval thereof, have the force and effect of a judgment of said court. SEC. 417. Execution. - The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement. After the lapse of such time, the settlement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal court. SEC. 418. Repudiation. - Any party to the dispute may, within ten (10) days from the date of the settlement, repudiate the same by filing with the lupon chairman a statement to that effect sworn to before him, where the consent is vitiated by
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fraud, violence, or intimidation. Such repudiation shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of the certification for filing a complaint as hereinabove provided. SEC. 419. Transmittal of Settlement and Arbitration Award to the Court. - The secretary of the lupon shall transmit the settlement or the arbitration award to the appropriate city or municipal court within five (5) days from the date of the award or from the lapse of the ten-day period repudiating the settlement and shall furnish copies thereof to each of the parties to the settlement and the lupon chairman. SEC. 420. Power to Administer Oaths. - The punong barangay, as chairman of the lupong tagapamayapa, and the members of the pangkat are hereby authorized to administer oaths in connection with any matter relating to all proceedings in the implementation of the katarungang pambarangay. SEC. 421. Administration; Rules and Regulations. - The city or municipal mayor, as the case may be, shall see to the efficient and effective implementation and administration of the katarungang pambarangay. The Secretary of Justice shall promulgate the rules and regulations necessary to implement this Chapter. SEC. 422. Appropriations. - Such amount as may be necessary for the effective implementation of the katarungang pambarangay shall be provided for in the annual budget of the city or municipality concerned. CHAPTER 8 - SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN SEC. 423. Creation and Election. - (a) There shall be in every barangay a sangguniang kabataan to be composed of a chairman, seven (7) members, a secretary, and a treasurer. (b) A sangguniang kabataan official who, during his term of office, shall have passed the age of twenty-one (21) years shall be allowed to serve the remaining portion of the term for which he was elected.
SEC. 424. Katipunan ng Kabataan. - The katipunan ng kabataan shall be composed of all citizens of the Philippines actually residing in the barangay for at least six (6) months, who are fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age, and who are duly registered in the list of the sangguniang kabataan or in the official barangay list in the custody of the barangay secretary. SEC. 425. Meetings of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. - The katipunan ng kabataan shall meet at least once every three (3) months, or at the call of the chairman of the sangguniang kabataan or upon written petition of at least one-twentieth (1/20) of its members, to decide on important issues affecting the youth of the barangay . SEC. 426. Powers and Functions of the Sangguniang Kabataan. - The sangguniang kabataan shall: (a) Promulgate resolutions necessary to carry out the objectives of the youth in the barangay in accordance with the applicable provisions of this Code; (b) Initiate programs designed to enhance the social, political, economic, cultural, intellectual, moral, spiritual, and physical development of the members; (c) Hold fund-raising activities, the proceeds of which shall be tax-exempt and shall accrue to the general fund of the sangguniang kabataan: Provided, however, That in the appropriation thereof, the specific purpose for which such activity has been held shall be first satisfied; (d) Create such bodies or committees as it may deem necessary to effectively carry out its programs and activities; (e) Submit annual and end-of-term reports to the sangguniang barangay on their projects and activities for the survival and development of the youth in the barangay ;
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(f) Consult and coordinate with all youth organizations in the barangay for policy formulation and program implementation; (g) Coordinate with the appropriate national agency for the implementation of youth development projects and programs at the national level; (h) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as the sangguniang barangay may determine or delegate; and (i) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. SEC. 427. Meetings of the Sangguniang kabataan. - The sangguniang kabataan shall meet regularly once a month on the date, time, and place to be fixed by the said sanggunian. Special meetings may be called by the sangguniang kabataan chairman or any three (3) of its members by giving written notice to all members of the date, time, place, and agenda of the meeting at least one (1) day in advance. Notices of regular or special meetings shall be furnished the punong barangay and the sangguniang barangay . A majority of the members of the sangguniang kabataan shall constitute a quorum. SEC. 428. Qualifications. - An elective official of the sangguniang kabataan must be a citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter of the katipunan ng kabataan, a resident of the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to election, at least fifteen (15) years but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on the day of his election, able to read and write Filipino, English, or the local dialect, and must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. SEC. 429. Term of Office. - The sangguniang kabataan chairman and members shall hold office for a period of three (3) years, unless sooner removed for cause as provided by law, permanently incapacitated, die or resign from office.
SEC. 430. Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman. - The registered voters of the katipunan ng kabataan shall elect the chairman of the sangguniang kabataan who shall automatically serve as an exofficio member of the sangguniang barangay upon his assumption to office. As such, he shall exercise the same powers, discharge the same duties and functions, and enjoy the same privileges as the regular sangguniang barangay members, and shall be the chairman of the committee on youth and sports development in the said sanggunian. SEC. 431. Powers and Duties of the Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman. - In addition to the duties which may be assigned to him by the sangguniang barangay, the sangguniang kabataan chairman shall: (a) Call and preside over all meetings of the katipunan ng kabataan and the sangguniang kabataan; (b) Implement policies, programs, and projects within his jurisdiction in coordination with the sangguniang barangay ; (c) Exercise general supervision over the affairs and activities of the sangguniang kabataan and the official conduct of its members, and such other officers of the sangguniang kabataan within his jurisdiction; (d) With the concurrence of the sangguniang kabataan, appoint from among the members of the sangguniang kabataan, the secretary and treasurer, and such other officers as may be deemed necessary; and (e) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. SEC. 432. Sangguniang Kabataan Secretary. - The sangguniang kabataan secretary shall : (a) Keep all records of the katipunan ng kabataan and sangguniang kabataan;
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(b) Prepare and keep the minutes of all meetings of the katipunan ng kabataan and sangguniang kabataan; (c) Prepare all forms necessary for the conduct of registrations, elections, initiatives, referenda, or plebiscites, in coordination with the barangay secretary and the Comelec; and (d) Perform such other duties and discharge such other functions as the chairman of the sangguniang kabataan may prescribe or direct. SEC. 433. Sangguniang Kabataan Treasurer. - The sangguniang kabataan treasurer shall: (a) Take custody of all sangguniang kabataan property and funds not otherwise deposited with the city or municipal treasurer; (b) Collect and receive contributions, monies, materials, and all other resources intended for the sangguniang kabataan and katipunan ng kabataan; (c) Disburse funds in accordance with an approved budget of the sangguniang kabataan; (d) Certify to the availability of funds whenever necessary; (e) Submit to the sangguniang kabataan and to the sangguniang barangay certified and detailed statements of actual income and expenditures at the end of every month; and (f) Perform such other duties and discharge such other functions as the chairman of the SEC. 434. Privileges of Sangguniang Kabataan Officials. - The sangguniang kabataan chairman shall have the same privileges enjoyed by othersangguniang barangay officials under this Code subject to such requirements and limitations provided herein. During their incumbency, sangguniang kabataan officials shall be
exempt from payment of tuition and matriculation fees while enrolled in public tertiary schools, including state colleges and universities. The national government shall reimburse said college or university the amount of the tuition and matriculation fees: Provided, That, to qualify for the privilege, the said officials shall enroll in the state college or university within or nearest their area of jurisdiction. SEC. 435. Succession and Filling of Vacancies. - (a) In case a sangguniang kabataan chairman refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, is convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is removed from office, or has been absent without leave for more than three (3) consecutive months, the sangguniang kabataan member who obtained the next highest number of votes in the election immediately preceding shall assume the office of the chairman for the unexpired portion of the term, and shall discharge the powers and duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to the office. In case the said member refuses to assume the position or fails to qualify, the sanggunian member obtaining the next highest number of votes shall assume the position of the chairman for the unexpired portion of the term. (b) Where two (2) or more sangguniang kabataan members obtained the same next highest number of votes, the other sangguniang kabataan members shall conduct an election to choose the successor to the chairman from among the said members. (c) After the vacancy shall have been filled, the sangguniang kabataan chairman shall call a special election to complete the membership of said sanggunian. Such sangguniang kabataan member shall hold office for the unexpired portion of the term of the vacant seat. (d) In case of suspension of the sangguniang kabataan chairman, the successor, as determined in subsections (a) and (b) of this Section shall assume the
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position during suspension.
the
period
of
such
subdivision levels shall constitute the pambansang katipunan ng mga sangguniang kabataan. SEC. 437. Constitution and By-Laws. - The term of office, manner of election, removal and suspension of the officers of the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan at all levels shall be governed by the constitution and by-laws of the pederasyon in conformity with the provisions of this Code and national policies on youth. SEC. 438. Membership in the Sanggunian. - (a) A sangguniang kabataan chairman shall, upon certification of his election by the Comelec and during his tenure of office is elected as pederasyon president, serve as an ex-officio member of the sanggunian panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, without need of further appointment. (b) The vice-president whose president has president of a higher serve as ex-officio sanggunian concerned further appointment. of the pederasyon been elected as pederasyon shall member of the without need of
CHAPTER 9 - PEDERASYON NG MGA SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN SEC. 436. Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan. - (a) There shall be an organization of all the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan to be known as follows: (1) in pederasyon kabataan; municipalities, pambayang ng mga sangguniang
(2) in cities, panlungsod na pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan; (3) in pederasyon kabataan; provinces, ng mga panlalawigang sangguniang
(4) in special subdivisions, pederasyon ng kabataan; and
metropolitan political pangmetropolitang mga sangguniang
(5) on the national level, pambansang pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan. (b) The pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan shall, at all levels, elect from among themselves the president, vicepresident and such other officers as may be necessary and shall be organized in the following manner: (1) The panlungsod and pambayang pederasyon shall be composed of the sangguniang kabataan chairmen of barangays in the city or municipality, respectively; (2) The panlalawigang pederasyon shall be composed of presidents of the panlungsod and pambayang pederasyon; (3) The pangmetropolitang pederasyon shall be composed of presidents of the panlungsod and pambayang pederasyon; (c) The elected presidents of the pederasyon at the provincial, highly urbanized city, and metropolitan political
(c) The pederasyon president or vicepresident, as the case may be, shall be the chairman of the committee on youth and sports development of the sanggunian concerned. CHAPTER 10 - LINGGO NG KABATAAN SEC. 439. Observance of Linggo ng Kabataan. (a) Every barangay, municipality, city and province shall, in coordination with the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan at all levels, conduct an annual activity to be known as the Linggo ng Kabataan on such date as shall be determined by the Office of the President. (b) The observance of the Linggo ng Kabataan shall include the election of the counterparts of all local elective and appointive officials, as well as heads of national offices or agencies stationed or assigned in the territorial jurisdiction of the
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local government unit, among in-school and community youth residing in the local government unit concerned from ages thirteen (13) to seventeen (17). During said week, they shall hold office as boy and girl officials and shall perform such duties and conduct such activities as may be provided in the ordinance enacted pursuant to this Chapter.
1. KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY Morata vs. Go (1983)

Facts: Respondents Victor Go and Flora D. Go filed in the CFI of Cebu, presided by respondent Judge Valeriano P. Tomol, Jr., a complaint against petitioners Julius Morata and Ma. Luisa Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus damages amounting to P49,400.00. On the allegation that all the parties are residents of Cebu City, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by the plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation process required by P.D. No. 1508 (Kataranungang Pambarangay Law), as well as the absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties. The motion was opposed by private respondents. Respondent judge issued an order denying the motion to dismiss. Petitioners argued that P.D. No. 1508 is so broad as to apply to actions cognizable not only by the metropolitan trial courts and municipal trial courts, but also by the regional trial courts. Upon the other hand, respondents would limit its coverage only to those cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial courts and municipal trial courts. Issue: WON P.D. No. 1508 applies to actions cognizable only in the metropolitan trial courts and municipal trial courts Held: NO. The Lupon has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes involving
parties who actually reside in the same city or municipality. The law, as written, makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil disputes that should be compromised at the barangay level, in contradistinction to the limitation imposed upon the Lupon as regards its authority over criminal cases. In fact, in defining the Lupon's authority, Section 2 of said law employed the universal and comprehensive term all. By compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the intervention of the barangay leader and other respected members of the barangay, the animosity generated by protracted court litigations between members of the same political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and cooperation, is avoided. The conciliation process at the barangay level is likewise designed to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in court in order to decongest its clogged dockets and, in the process, enhance the quality of justice dispensed by it. Thus, to say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of this objective. It was pointed out by the respondent judge that Sections 11, 12, and 14 of the law speak of the city and/or municipal courts as the forum for the nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. This circumstance cannot be construed as a limitation of the scope of authority of the Lupon. The sections relied upon by respondent judge deal with the nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration awards obtained at the barangay level, regardless of the amount involved or the nature of the original dispute. There is nothing in the context of said sections to justify the thesis that the mandated conciliation process in other types of cases applies exclusively to said inferior courts. Moreover, C. J. Enrique Fernando had issued Circular No. 22, instructing judges to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions and proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons. Such Circular has been addressed not only
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to judges of city and municipal courts, but also to all the judges of the courts of first instance, circuit criminal courts, juvenile and domestic courts and courts of agrarian relations, now known as regional trial courts under B.P. No. 129. Disposition: Petition granted.
requirement of conciliation proceedings before the Lupon Held: YES. The LGC, specifically Chapter 7, Title I, Book III thereof, revised the P.D. No. 1508, expressly repealing the law on Katarungang Pambarangay. One of the new significant features of the revised law is Section 410, which provides for the the suspension of the prescriptive periods of offenses during the pendency of the mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process. Sec. 410. Procedure Settlement. x x x for Amicable
Uy vs. Contreras (1994)

Facts: Petitioner Uy subleased from respondent Susanna Atayde the other half of the second floor of a building located at corner Reposo and Oliman Streets, Makati. The sublease contract expired. However, the petitioner was not able to remove all her movable properties. An argument arose between the petitioner and Atayde when the former sought to withdraw from the subleased premises her remaining movable properties. The argument degenerated into a scuffle between the petitioner and Atayde and several of Atayde's employees. Private respondents filed a complaint with the barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati. On the date of the confrontation of the parties, only the petitioner appeared. Two informations for slight physical injuries were subsequently filed against the petitioner with the MTC of Makati. In her counter-affidavit, the petitioner specifically alleged the prematurity of the filing for failure to undergo conciliation proceedings. Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss the criminal cases for non-compliance with the requirement of P.D. No. 1508 on prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa. Public respondent Judge Contreras denied the motion to dismiss. Private respondents contended that the prior referral of the dispute to the lupon is not required if the case may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. On the other hand, the OSG agreed with the petitioner that the criminal cases should be dismissed for non-compliance with certain sections of the LGC in relation to Section 7, Rule VI of the Rules Implementing P.D. No. 1508. Issue: WON the criminal cases should be dismissed for failing to comply with the
(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses. While the dispute is under mediation, conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses and cause of action under existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the punong barangay. The prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat secretary: Provided, however, That such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the punong barangay. This provision is aimed at maximizing the effectiveness of the process, discouraging any intentional delay of the referral to a date close to the expiration of the prescriptive period and then invoking the proximity of such expiration as the reason for immediate recourse to the courts. It also affords the parties sufficient time to cool off and face each other with less emotionalism and more objectivity. In the proceeding before the court a quo, the parties did not know of the repeal of P.D. No. 1508 by the LGC. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal should have exerted enough diligence to inquire from the private respondents if prior referral to the lupon was necessary before filing the informations. Respondent judge did not do
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any better. His total unawareness of the provisions on the Katarungang pambarangay in the LGC is distressing. In view of the private respondents' failure to appear at the first scheduled mediation, no complaint for slight physical injuries could be validly filed with the MTC of Makati at any time before such date. The filing then of the criminal cases was premature. Respondent judge could not take refuge under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (or Section 41220(b)(4) of the LGC), which states that the parties may go directly to court where the action is about to prescribe. This is because pursuant to Section 410(c) of the Code, the prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a maximum period of sixty days when the
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private respondents filed their complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela Makati. Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents are estopped from disavowing the authority of the body which they themselves had sought. Granting arguendo that the petitioner did inflict the alleged physical injuries, the penalty therefor would only be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure. Under the RPC, these penalties are light and would prescribe in two months. The running of the prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the private respondents' complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati, and automatically suspended for a period of sixty days. If no mediation or conciliation could be reached within the said period of suspension and, accordingly, a certification to file action is issued, the private respondents would still have fifty-six days within which to file their separate criminal complaints for such offense. Private respondents contention that they could not agree on a compromise that they had to request the barangay captain to issue a certification to file action is untenable. The request is dated nearly one and a half months after the criminal cases were filed. Evidently, this was done to make it appear that they had substantial compliance with the requirement. But because they failed to appear at the initial confrontation, they had no right to demand the issuance of a certification to file action. Disposition: Petition granted.
Sec. 412. Conciliation. (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon chairman or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto. (b) Where parties may go directly to court. The parties may go directly to court in the following instances: (1) Where the accused is under detention; (2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings; (3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property, and support pendente lite; and (4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.
Wingards vs. Mejia (1995)

Facts: Three administrative complaints were filed against respondent Judge Servillano Mejia of the MTC of Santa Maria, Pangasian. They were an offshoot of three criminal cases decided him involving the Wingarts and Col. Rodulfo Munar. Complainant Johan L.H. Wingarts was the accused in two criminal cases filed in the said MTC for malicious mischief and grave
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threats. Thereafter, the Wingarts made a counter-charge against Col. Munar resulting in the third criminal case for usurpation of authority docketed in the same court. In the administrative complaint relative to the criminal case for malicious mischief, respondent judge was charged with malicious delay in the administration of justice. The case allegedly dragged for one year and four months in respondent's sala and was ultimately dismissed in a decision after an ocular inspection of the burned premises. Complainants also charged respondent judge in their second complaint with incompetence, ignorance of the law and abuse of authority for taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2664 for grave threats and for issuing a warrant of arrest against him despite lack of prior barangay conciliation. The said case was later dismissed and indorsed to the barangay official concerned. The third complaint charged respondent judge with rendering an unjust decision in the criminal case for usurpation of authority. Complainants insisted that in the said criminal case, the two accused, both military lawyers, violated the prohibition against their appearing in civil courts without the necessary authorization. However, , respondent judge acquitted both accused. In his comment, respondent judge explained that he took cognizance of the criminal case for grave threats in the belief that there had been substantial compliance with the requirements of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law since a certification of the barangay captain regarding a confrontation of the parties had been duly submitted him. Anent Criminal Case No. 2664, the OCA held that had respondent Judge exercised greater prudence, he could have known at the outset that under Art. 408(c) of the LGC, offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding P5,000.00 require prior
barangay conciliation. He should have remanded the case to the lupon instead of taking cognizance thereof and prematurely issuing the warrant of arrest against the accused. Issue: WON respondent judge is administratively liable for incompetence and ignorance of the law for taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2664 Held: YES. Judges are directed to desist from improvidently receiving and desultorily acting on complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of the Lupon Tagapamayapa. The proceedings before the lupon are a precondition to the filing of any action or proceeding in court or other government office. Such an initiatory pleading, if filed without compliance with the precondition, may be dismissed on motion of any interested party on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action. Disposition: Respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00, with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely
Corpuz vs. Court of Appeals (1997)

Facts: Alvarado and Corpuz were two of the tenants of a certain Lorenzo Barredo who, in May 1988, decided to sell his property to the tenants. Due to economic difficulties, however, Alvarado executed an Affidavit of Waiver granting Barredo the right to sell his house to any person who can afford it. Barredo sold his house to Corpuz, thus establishing a tenancy relationship between Corpuz and Alvarado. In October 1991, Corpuz sent a written notice to Alvarado demanding that he vacate the room which he was occupying because the children of Corpuz needed it for their own use. Alvarado refused to vacate the room as demanded. Corpuz then filed an action for unlawful detainer.
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In his answer, Alvarado raised as one of the defenses the fact the dispute was not referred to the Lupong Tagapayapa. The MTC rendered a decision ordering Alvarado to vacate the room. Alvarado appealed to the RTC. The RTC reversed the MTC's decision on the ground that the purported sale between Corpuz and Barredo was the subject of a controversy pending before the National Housing Authority (NHA) which must be resolved first by the said agency. It also concluded that the Affidavit of Waiver executed by Alvarado and Barredo was a forgery. Corpuz elevated his case to the CA. The appellate court, however, found affirmed the assailed judgment in its entirety. Issues: 1. WON Corpuz unlawful detainer suit should be suspended until the resolution of the case lodged in the NHA impugning the sale of the property NO 2. WON the action should be dismissed on the ground that the ejectment suit was not referred to the Lupon as required by P. D. No. 1508 NO Held: 1. NO. It is elementary that the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over ejectment cases. As the law now stands, the only issue to be resolved in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases is the physical or material possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto. The defendant should not trifle with the ejectment suit, which is summary in nature, by the simple expedient of asserting ownership thereon. Thus, the controversy pending before the NHA for the annulment of the Deed of Sale and assailing the authenticity of the Affidavit of Joint Waiver cannot deter the MTC from taking cognizance of the ejectment suit merely for the purpose of determining who has a better possessory right among the parties.
Alvarado, however, is not without remedy. A judgment rendered in an ejectment case shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title nor shall it be conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession. 2. NO. This defense was only stated in a single general short sentence in Alvarado's answer. In Dui v. Court of Appeals, that failure of a party to specifically allege the fact that there was no compliance with the barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense. A perusal of Alvarado's answer reveals that no reason or explanation was given to support his allegation, which is deemed a mere general averment. In any event, the proceeding outlined in P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower court had already acquired over the subject matter and the parties therein. Disposition: Petition granted.
Bonifacio Law Bellosillo (2002)
Office
vs.
Judge
Facts: In an ejectment suit, Judge Bellosillo of the MTC of QC referred the case to the barangay conciliation despite the fact that it was alleged in the verified complaint that the case had already been referred to the barangay. A copy of the Certification to File Motion was likewise attached to the verified complaint. Atty. Ricardo Salomon of the Bonifacio Law Office filed a compliance with the MTC, attaching a copy of his complaint filed before the barangay and the minutes of the proceedings. No action was taken by the court. He then inquired personally with the court about the status of the case and he was told that no action could be taken unless the Order had been complied with. He decided not to pursue the case and filed a notice to withdraw complaint. But respondent denied the withdrawal on the basis of the action already taken thereon.
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Atty. Salomon then filed a Notice of Dismissal but the same was still unacted upon by respondent. It was only after a year from the time the complaint was filed that respondent ordered that summons be served on defendants. When defendants failed to file an Answer, Atty. Salomon filed a Motion to Render Judgment in accordance with the Rule on Summary Procedure. However, instead of rendering judgment, respondent merely required defendants to comment on the motion to render judgment. After defendants filed their comment, respondent still did not act on the said motion. The judge, however, said that since there was a failure of settlement of mediation proceedings before the Barangay Chairman, it is necessary for the Pangkat to be constituted anew so that parties may have a second opportunity toamicably settle their dispute. Atty. Salomon Jr. charged Judge Bellosillo with ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, and obvious partiality. The OCA found respondent either ignorant or negligent in referring the case back to the barangay despite the presence of what it considered to be a valid Certification to File Action. Issue: WON respondent judge exercised grave abuse of discretion and ignorance of the law when he remanded the case to the barangay for conciliation Held: NO. The records reveal that the Certification was improperly and prematurelyissued. In what appears to be a pre-printed standard form, the x beforethe second enumerated statement clearly shows that no personal confrontationbefore a duly constituted Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo took place. Respondents position that the Pangkat was not constituted, and that no face to face conciliation of the parties had taken place before it is substantiated by the Minutes submitted by complainant. Evidently, complainant failed to complete the barangay conciliation proceedings. The Complaint before the barangay was dated February 16, 1996 while the hearing
was scheduled for February 26, 1996 and was reset for February 29, 1996. And yet, the Certification to File Action was issued on March1, 1996, less than fifteen days after the first scheduled hearing before the barangay chairman. His referral of the case back to the barangay cannot be equated with gross ignorance of the law. Neither does it constitute grave abuse of discretion or obvious partiality. Thereafter, complainant filed a Motion praying that the proceedings already held before the barangay be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. Acting on the Motion, respondent judge issued the summons and opted to continue with the court proceedings without insisting on strict compliance with the mandated barangay proceedings. Section 18 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, however, provides that such cases may be revived only after the requirement for conciliation has been complied with. Nevertheless, respondent judges error is judicial in nature and cannot be corrected in administrative proceedings. At any rate, however, the Judge committed an error when he did not render judgment within 30 days from the expiration of the period to file and answer. Respondent rendered judgment on the case only on January 7, 1998, almost a year from the time the case had been deemed submitted for resolution. Unacceptable is his explanation that he waited for the defendants to avail themselves of their right to appeal the Order deeming the case submitted for resolution. He has no duty to wait because the law mandates him to act and decide the case promptly. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Disposition: Judge Reynaldo B. Bellosillo was found guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision and was ordered to pay a fine of P11,000 to be taken from his retirement benefits.
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Mendova vs. Judge Afable (2002)

Facts: In an affidavit-complaint, Abraham L. Mendova charged Judge Crisanto B. Afable of the MCTC of San JulianSulat, Eastern Samar, with ignorance of the law relative to a criminal case for slight physical injuries. Complainant Mendova alleged that he filed with the Office of the Barangay Chairman of Poblacion San Julian a complaint for slight physical injuries against Robert Palada. Barangay Chairman Ronie D. Quintua, in his Certification confirmed such fact. Pangkat Chairman Eufemia L. Cabago also certified in the Minutes In Settling Disputes that the case was set for hearing on March 16, 22 and 29, 1998, but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. On May 4, 1998, complainant filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Julian Sulat, Eastern Samar a complaint for slight physical injuries against Palada. On November 3, 1998, respondent judge dismissed the case on the ground of prescription. In his complaint to the OCA, Mendova alleged that in dismissing the case, respondent judge showed his ignorance of the law when he did not apply the provisions of Section 410(c)21 of the LGC.
21
In his comment, respondent admitted that he had a mental lapse as he was thinking of the rule on prescription under the RPC. Saying that the lapse was due to heavy workload and that such was the first kind of mistake he has ever committed in his career as a trial judge for 10 years, he begged for kindness and understanding. The OCA found respondent guilty as charged. Issue: WON respondent judge is liable administratively for dismissing the criminal case on the ground of prescription Held: NO. An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration, or an appeal. For, obviously, if subsequent developments prove the judges challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against him at all. Besides, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable. It is only where the error is so gross, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith that administrative sanctions may be imposed against the erring judge. Based on the records, the complainant did not bother at all to file a motion for reconsideration of respondent judges decision dismissing the criminal case. No reason was advanced by complainant why he failed to do so. Thus, his instant administrative complaint is premature. According to complainant, Robert Palada committed the crime of slight physical injuries on February 15, 1998. On February 18, 1998, complainant filed his complaint with the Office of the Barangay Chairman at Poblacion, San Julian, Eastern Samar. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 410(c) of the LGC, such filing interrupted the prescriptive period and started to run again upon receipt by the complainant of the
Section 410. Settlement. xxx
Procedure for Amicable
(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses. While the dispute is under mediation, conciliation or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses and causes of action under existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the Punong Barangay. The prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary: Provided, however, That such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the punong barangay."
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Certification to File Action issued by the Pangkat Secretary. However, records fail to show when complainant received the Barangay Certification to File Action. The undated certification he submitted merely states that the case was set for hearing before the barangay on March 16, 22 and 29, 1998, and that the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. When he filed the criminal case for slight physical injuries with respondent's court, until the dismissal of the case, he still failed to present proof of his receipt of the Barangay Certification to File Action. Clearly, he could not now fault respondent judge for dismissing the case on the ground of prescription. While respondent admitted his mistake, the same may not be considered ignorance of the law. If at all, it can only be an error of judgment. Disposition: Petition dismissed.
respondent rendered an award dismissing their claim for holiday pay for December 4, 1992 since not all people can vote in the said election but only qualified youths. Issue: WON the SK election on December 4, 1992 was a local/national election within the contemplation of Art. VII, sec. 3 of the CBA so as to entitle petitioner's members to holiday pay Held: The election for members of the SK may properly be considered a local election within the meaning of Art. VII, sec 3 of the CBA and the day on which it is held to be a holiday, thereby entitling petitioners members at the AMS Farming Corp. to the payment of holiday on such day. December 4, 1992 was a nonworking holiday and this was announced in the media. In Proclamation No. 118 dated December 2, 1992 President Ramos declared the day as a special day. On the other hand, the term general elections means, in the context of SK elections, the regular elections for members of the SK, as distinguished from the special elections for such officers. The fact that only those between 15 and 21 take part in the election for members of the SK does not make such election any less a regular local election. The Constitution provides, for example, for the sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives of, among others, women and youth. Only voters belonging to the relevant sectors can take part in the election of their representatives. Yet it cannot be denied that such election is a regular national election and the day set for its holding, a holiday.
2. SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN ALU vs. Lerondo-Montejo (1994)

Facts: Petitioner Associated Labor Unions ALU-TUCP and private respondent AMS Farming Corporation entered into a fiveyear CBA. Art. VII, sec 3. of the CBA provides that on regular holidays, the employees shall receive basic pay even if they do not work on those days and 200% of their daily pay if they are required to report to work. The President of the Philippines declared December 4, 1992 a special day for the holding of election for Sangguniang Kabataan (SK). Employees covered by the CBA subsequently filed claims for the payment to them of holiday pay for that day. Private respondent, however, refused their claims on the ground that December 4, 1992 was not a regular holiday within the contemplation of the CBA. At the voluntary arbitration, the parties agreed that the SK election day was a holiday as decreed by the President of the Philippines. Later, however, public
Mercado vs. Board of Election Supervisors (1995)

Facts: Petitioner Jose M. Mercado was proclaimed winner in the 1992 election for chairman of the SK of Barangay Mabalor, Ibaan, Batangas. He won over his over his rival, private respondent Crisanto P. Pangilinan by one vote, 49 to 48.
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Pangilinan filed a formal protest with the BES questioning the results of the election. He alleged that the Board of Election Tellers (BET) Chairman, drinking gin and Coke during the counting, had invalidated some votes without consulting the other board members. The Board of Election Supervisors (BES) ordered the reopening of the ballot box and the recount of the votes for SK Chairman. The recount reversed the earlier tally to 51 to 49 in favor of Pangilinan. Mercado then filed with RTC Batangas City a petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the annulment of Pangilinan's proclamation. He assailed the jurisdiction of the BES to act on the protest filed by Pangilinan as the ground cited therein was allegedly in the nature of an election protest properly cognizable by the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court. The RTC dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. He moved for reconsideration but the same was also denied. Before the SC, Mercado assailed COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 (which governs the conduct of SK elections) because it makes the BES the final arbiter of election contests involving the SK in contravention of Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code which vests in the proper metropolitan or municipal trial court original jurisdiction over such contests and, in contravention of Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution which lodges on such courts exclusive original jurisdiction over contests involving elective barangay officials. Issue: WON COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 is valid Held: YES. Petitioners contention is without merit for it assumes that the SK election is an election involving elective barangay officials within the purview of the aforesaid statutory and constitutional provisions. Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and that portion of paragraph (2), Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution on the
COMELEC's exclusive appellate jurisdiction over contests involving elective barangay officials refer to the elective barangay officials under the pertinent laws in force at the time the Omnibus Election Code was enacted and upon the ratification of the Constitution. That law was B.P. Blg. 337 (old LGC) and the elective barangay officials referred to were the punong barangay and the six sangguniang bayan members. They are the same officers referred to by the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines on election of barangay officials. Metropolitan and municipal trial courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over contests relating to their election. The decisions of these courts were appealable to RTCs. Contests involving elections of SK (formerly KB) officials do not fall within Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and paragraph 2, Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution and that no law in effect prior to the ratification of the Constitution had made the SK chairman an elective barangay official. His being an ex-officio member of the sangguniang barangay does not make him one for the law specifically provides who are its elective members, viz., the punong barangay and the seven regular sangguniang barangay members who are elected at large by those who are qualified to exercise the right of suffrage under Article V of the Constitution and who are duly registered voters of the barangay. The Court recognized the consequences of the quasi-judicial acts performed by the BES pursuant COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 under the operative fact doctrine; thus, it was held that the RTC is competent to review the decision of the BES in election controversies within its level. As correctly stated by the petitioner, it is a basic principle in administrative law that the absence of a provision for the review of an administrative action does not preclude recourse to the courts. Disposition: Petition granted.
Garvida vs. Sales (1997)
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Facts: Petitioner Lynette Garvidas application for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo was denied by the BEt on the ground that she, being then 21 years and 10 months old, exceeded the age limit for membership. She filed a Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter with the MCTC. The said court found petitioner qualified and ordered her registration. The BET appealed to the RTC but the presiding judge therein inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association with petitioner. Garvida then filed her COC for the position of SK Chairman in Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. Election Officer Rios disapproved petitioners certificate of candidacy again due to her age. Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Asperin who allowed her to run. Private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate had earlier filed with the COMELEC en banc a Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy against petitioner for falsely representing her age. The COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the BET and BOC of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the election. On election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondents votes of 76. The BET did not proclaim petitioner as the winner; Hence, the instant petition for certiorari. Later, however, the BET proclaimed petitioner as the SK chairmanelect. When she ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the Municipality of Bangui, she won as Auditor and was proclaimed thus. In her petition before the SC, petitioner argued that Section 3 (b) of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is unlawful, ultra vires and beyond the scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the LGC. According to her, the Code itself does not provide that the voter must be exactly 21 years of age on election day
and that as so long as she did not turn 22 years old, she was still 21 on election day and therefore qualified. Issue: WON petitioner was properly disqualified for having exceeded the age requirement Held: YES. Under Section 424 of the LGC, a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months; (c) 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the SK or in the official barangay list. Upon the other hand, Section 428 of the Code requires that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one year immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years but not more than 21 years of age on the day of his election; (e) able to read and write; and (f) must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications of a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan. Section 424 of the Code sets a members maximum age at 21 years only. There is no further provision as to when the member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other hand, Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old on the day of his election. The addition of the phrase on the day of his election is an additional qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or on the day he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be more than 21 years old on the day of election. The phrase not more than 21 years of age means not over 21 years, 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year because that would be more than 21 365-
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day cycles. Not more than 21 years old is not equivalent to less than 22 years old, contrary to petitioners claims. The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day. The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public policy and if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be declared ineligible. To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court deemed it necessary to order that the vacancy be filled by the SK member chosen by the incumbent SK members of Barangay San Lorenzo by simple majority from among themselves. The member chosen shall assume the office of SK Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term. Disposition: Garvida was declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 SK elections and was ordered to vacate her position.
consolidated bill reset the SK and Barangay elections to July 2002 and lowered the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but not more than 18 years of age. Montesclaros filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, seeking to prevent the postponement of the SK elections and to prevent the reduction of the age requirement for membership in the SK. The consolidated bill was approved by both Houses and later on signed into law as R. A. No. 9164. Held: In the instant case, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. Petitioners prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK moreover does not present an actual justiciable controversy. Also, the Court has also no power to dictate to Congress the object or subject of bills that it should enact into law. Under R.A. No. 9164, Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the LGC. Every law passed by Congress is always subject to amendment or repeal by Congress. The Court cannot restrain Congress from amending or repealing laws, for the power to make laws includes the power to change the laws. The Court cannot also direct the Comelec to allow over-aged voters to vote or be voted for in an election that is limited under R.A. No. 9164 to youths at least 15 but less than 18 years old. A law is needed to allow all those who have turned more than 21 years old on or after May 6, 2002 to participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Youths from 18 to 21 years old as of May 6, 2002 are also no longer SK members, and cannot participate in the
Montesclaros vs. COMELEC (2002)

Facts: On December 4, 2001, COMELEC issued Resolution Nos. 4713 and 4714 to govern the SK elections on May 6, 2002. On February 18, 2002, petitioner Antoniette V.C. Montesclaros sent a letter to the COMELEC, demanding that the SK elections be held as scheduled on May 6, 2002. On the other hand, then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo, wrote letters to the Speaker of the House and the Senate President about the status of pending bills on the SK and Barangay elections. In his letters, the COMELEC Chairman intimated that it was operationally very difficult to hold both elections simultaneously in May 2002. Instead, he expressed support for the bill of Senator Franklin Drilon proposing to hold the Barangay elections in May 2002 and postpone the SK elections to November 2002. Petitioners received a copy of COMELEC En Banc Resolution No. 4763 recommending to Congress the postponement of the SK elections to November 2002. On March 6, 2002, the Senate and the HOR passed their respective bills postponing the SK elections. The Bicameral Committees
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July 15, 2002 SK elections. Congress will have to decide whether to enact an amendatory law. Petitioners remedy is legislation, not judicial intervention. Petitioners moreover have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit. A party must show that he has been, or is about to be denied some personal right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled. A party must also show that he has a real interest in the suit. With the passage of R.A. No. 9164, the right to be SK members is limited to those who on the date of the SK elections are at least 15 but less than 18 years old. Not falling within this classification, petitioners have ceased to be members of the SK and are no longer qualified to participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Moreover, while the State policy is to encourage the youths involvement in public affairs, this policy refers to those who belong to the class of people defined as the youth. Congress has the power to define who are the youth qualified to join the SK, which itself is a creation of Congress. Those who do not qualify because they are past the age group defined as the youth cannot insist on being part of the youth. Finally, the petition must also fail because no grave abuse of discretion attended the postponement of the SK elections. They have also not shown that the Comelec acted illegally or with grave abuse of discretion in recommending to Congress the postponement of the SK elections. R.A. No. 9164 is now the law that prescribes the qualifications of candidates and voters for the SK elections and fixes the date of the SK elections. RA No. 9164 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and will apply to the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Disposition: Petition dismissed.
SEC. 440. Role of the Municipality. - The municipality, consisting of a group of barangays, serves primarily as a general purpose government for the coordination and delivery of basic, regular and direct services and effective governance of the inhabitants within its territorial jurisdiction. SEC. 441. Manner of Creation. - A municipality may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered only by an Act of Congress and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be conducted by the Comelec in the local government unit or units directly affected. Except as may otherwise be provided in the said Act, the plebiscite shall be held within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of its effectivity. SEC. 442. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A municipality may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the provincial treasurer, of at least Two million five hundred thousand pesos (P=2,500,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on the 1991 constant prices; a population of at least twenty-five thousand (25,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office; and a contiguous territory of at least fifty (50) square kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population or income of the original municipality or municipalities at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newlycreated municipality shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the municipality proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund of the municipality concerned, exclusive of special funds, transfers and non-recurring income. (d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the
B. THE MUNICIPALITY
TITLE TWO. - THE MUNICIPALITY CHAPTER 1 - ROLE AND CREATION OF THE MUNICIPALITY
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effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. CHAPTER 2 - MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS IN GENERAL SEC. 443. Officials of the Municipal Government. - (a) There shall be in each municipality a municipal mayor, a municipal vice-mayor, sangguniang bayan members, a secretary to the sangguniang bayan, a municipal treasurer, a municipal assessor, a municipal accountant, a municipal budget officer, a municipal planning and development coordinator, a municipal engineer/building official, a municipal health officer and a municipal civil registrar. (b) In addition thereto, the mayor may appoint a municipal administrator, a municipal legal officer, a municipal agriculturist, a municipal environment and natural resources officer, a municipal social welfare and development officer, a municipal architect, and a municipal information officer. (c) The sangguniang bayan may: (1) Maintain existing offices not mentioned in subsections (a) and (b) hereof; (2) Create such other offices as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the municipal government; or (3) Consolidate the functions of any office with those of another in the interest of efficiency and economy. (d) Unless otherwise provided herein, heads of departments and offices shall be appointed by the municipal mayor with the concurrence of the majority of all the sangguniang bayan members, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations. The sangguniang bayan shall act on the appointment within fifteen (15) days from the date of its submission; otherwise, the same shall be deemed confirmed. (e) Elective and appointive municipal officials shall receive such compensation, allowances and other emoluments as may be determined by law or ordinance, subject to the budgetary limitations on personal services as prescribed in Title Five, Book Two of this Code: Provided, That no increase in compensation of the mayor, vice-mayor, and sangguniang bayan
members shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the elective local officials approving such increase.
CHAPTER 3 - OFFICIALS AND OFFICES COMMON TO ALL MUNICIPALITIES Article One. - The Municipal Mayor SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. - (a) The municipal mayor, as the chief executive of the municipal government, shall exercise such powers and perform such duties and functions as provided by this Code and other laws. (b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall: (1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the municipal government, and in this connection, shall: (i) Determine the guidelines of municipal policies and be responsible to the sangguniang bayan for the program of government; (ii) Direct the formulation of the municipal development plan, with the assistance of the municipal development council, and upon approval thereof by the sangguniang bayan, implement the same; (iii) At the opening of the regular session of the sangguniang bayan for every calendar year and, as may be deemed necessary, present the program of government and propose policies and projects for the consideration of the sangguniang bayan as the general welfare of the inhabitants and the needs of the municipal government may require; (iv) Initiate and propose legislative measures to the sangguniang bayan and, from time to time as the situation may require, provide such information and data needed or requested by said sanggunian in the performance of its legislative functions; Appoint all officials and employees whose salaries and wages are wholly or mainly paid out of municipal funds and whose
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appointments are not otherwise provided for in this Code, as well as those he may be authorized by law to appoint; (vi) Upon authorization by the sangguniang bayan, represent the municipality in all its business transactions and sign on its behalf all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such other documents made pursuant to law or ordinance; (vii) Carry out such emergency measures as may be necessary during and in the aftermath of man-made and natural disasters and calamities; (viii) Determine, according to law or ordinance, the time, manner and place of payment of salaries or wages of the officials and employees of the municipality; (ix) Allocate and assign office space to municipal and other officials and employees who, by law or ordinance, are entitled to such space in the municipal hall and other buildings owned or leased by the municipal government; (x) Ensure that all executive officials and employees of the municipality faithfully discharge their duties and functions as provided by law and this Code, and cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings against any official or employee of the municipality who may have committed an offense in the performance of his official duties; (xi) Examine the books, records and other documents of all offices, officials, agents or employees of the municipality and in aid of his executive powers and authority, require all national officials and employees stationed in or assigned to the municipality to make available to him such books, records, and other documents in their custody, except those classified by law as confidential; (xii) Furnish copies of executive ordersissued by him to the provincial governor within seventy-two (72) hours after their issuance: Provided, That municipalities of Metropolitan Manila Area and that of any metropolitan political subdivision shall furnish copies of said executive orders to the metropolitan authority council chairman and to the Office of the President;
(xiii) Visit component barangays of the municipality at least once every six (6) months to deepen his understanding of problems and conditions therein, listen and give appropriate counsel to local officials and inhabitants, inform the component barangay officials and inhabitants of general laws and ordinances which especially concern them, and otherwise conduct visits and inspections to the end that the governance of the municipality will improve the quality of life of the inhabitants; (xiv) Act on leave applications ofofficials and employees appointed by him and the commutation of the monetary value of leave credits according to law; (xv) Authorize official trips outside of the municipality of municipal officials and employees for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days; (xvi) Call upon any national official or employee stationed in or assigned to the municipality to advise him on matters affecting the municipality and to make recommendations thereon, or to coordinate in the formulation and implementation of plans, programs and projects, and when appropriate, initiate an administrative or judicial action against a national government official or employee who may have committed an offense in the performance of his official duties while stationed in or assigned to the local government unit concerned; (xvii) Subject to availability of funds, authorize payment of medical care, necessary transportation, subsistence, hospital or medical fees of municipal officials and employees who are injured while in the performance of their official duties and functions; (xviii) Solemnize marriages, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding; (xix) Conduct a palarong bayan, in coordination with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, as an annual activity which shall feature traditional sports and disciplines included in national and international games; and (xx) Submit to the provincial governor the following reports: an annual report containing a summary of all matters pertaining to the management, administration and development of the municipality and all
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information and data relativeto its political, social and economic conditions; and supplemental reports when unexpected events and situations arise at any time during the year, particularly when man-made or natural disasters or calamities affect the general welfare of the municipality, province, region or country. Mayors of municipalities of the Metropolitan Manila Area and other metropolitan political subdivisions shall submit said reports to their respective metropolitan council chairmen and to the Office of the President; (2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the municipality and the exercise of its corporate powers provided for under Section 22 of this Code, implement all approved policies, programs, projects, services and activities of the municipality and, in addition to the foregoing, shall: Ensure that the acts of the municipality's component barangays and of its officials and employees are within the scope of their prescribed powers,functions, duties and responsibilities; (ii) Call conventions, conferences, seminars or meetings of any elective and appointive officials of the municipality, including provincial officials and national officials and employees stationed in or assigned to the municipality at such time and place and on such subject as he may deem important for the promotion of the general welfare of the local government unit and its inhabitants; (iii) Issue such executive orders as are necessary for the proper enforcement and execution of laws and ordinances; (iv) Be entitled to carry the necessary firearm within his territorial jurisdiction; (v) Act as the deputized representative of the National Police Commission, formulate the peace and order plan of the municipality and upon its approval, implement the same and exercise general and operational control and supervision over the local police forces in the municipality in accordance with R.A. No. 6975; (vi) Call upon the appropriate law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or sedition or to apprehend violators of the law when public interest so requires and the municipal police forces are inadequate to cope with the situation or the violators;
(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided for under Section 18 of this Code,particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agro-industrial development and countrywide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall: (i) Require each head of an office or department to prepare and submit an estimate of appropriations for the ensuing calendar year, in accordance with the budget preparation process under Title Five, Book II of this Code; (ii) Prepare and submit to the sanggunian for approval the executive and supplemental budgets of the municipality for the ensuing calendar year in the manner provided for under Title Five, Book II of this Code; (iii) Ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the municipality are collected, and that municipal funds are applied in accordance with law or ordinance tothe payment of expenses and settlement of obligations of the municipality; (iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance; (v) Issue permits, without need of approval therefor from any national agency, for the holding of activities for any charitable or welfare purpose, excluding prohibited games of chance or shows contrary to law, public policy and public morals; (vi) Require owners of illegally constructed houses, buildings or other structures to obtain the necessary permit, subject to such fines and penalties as may be imposed by law or ordinance, or to make necessary changes in the construction of the same when said construction violates any law or ordinance, or to order the demolition or removal of said house, building or structure within the period prescribed by law or ordinance; (vii) Adopt adequate measures to safeguard and conserve land, mineral, marine, forest, and other resources of the municipality; provide efficient and effective property and supply management in the municipality; and
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protect the funds, credits, rights and other properties of the municipality; and (viii) Institute or cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings for violation of ordinances in the collection of taxes, fees or charges, and for the recovery of funds and property; and cause the municipality to be defended against all suits to ensure that its interests, resources and rights shall be adequately protected; (4) Ensure the delivery of basic services and the provision of adequate facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code and, in addition thereto, shall: (i) Ensure that the construction and repair of roads and highways funded by the national government shall be, as far as practicable, carried out in a spatially contiguous manner and in coordination with the construction and repair of the roads and bridges of the municipality and the province; and (ii) Coordinate the implementation of technical services rendered by national and provincial offices, including public works and infrastructure programs in the municipality; and (5) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (c) During his incumbency, the municipal mayor shall hold office in the municipal hall. (d) The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto.
(2) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, appoint all officials and employees of the sangguniang bayan, except those whose manner of appointment is specifically provided in this Code; (3) Assume the office of the municipal mayor for the unexpired term of the latter in the event of permanent vacancy as provided for in Section 44, Book I of this Code; (4) Exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the municipal mayor in cases of temporary vacancy as provided for in Section 46, Book I of this Code; and, (5) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (b) Thevice-mayor shall receive a monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty five (25) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto.
Article Three. - The Sangguniang Bayan SEC. 446. Composition. - (a) The sangguniang bayan, the legislative body of the municipality, shall be composed of the municipal vicemayoras the presiding officer, the regular sanggunian members, the president of the municipal chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, the president of the pambayang pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan, and the sectoral representatives, as members. (b) In addition thereto, there shall be three (3) sectoral representatives: one (1) from the women; and, as shall be determined by the sanggunian concerned within ninety (90) days prior to the holding of local elections, one (1) from the agricultural or industrial workers; and one (1) from the other sectors, including the urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, or disabled persons. (c) The regular members of the sangguniang bayan and the sectoral representatives shall be elected in the manner as may be provided for by law. SEC. 447. - Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. - (a) The sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions
Article Two. - The Vice Mayor SEC. 445. Powers, Duties and Compensation.(a) The vice-mayor shall: (1) Be the presiding officer of the sangguniang bayan and sign all warrants drawn on the municipal treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang bayan;
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and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the municipality as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: (1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective municipal government, and in this connection shall: (i) Review all ordinances approved by the sangguniang barangay and executive orders issued by the punong barangay to determine whether these are within the scope of the prescribed powers of the sanggunian and of the punong barangay; (ii) Maintain peace and order by measures to prevent and lawlessness, disorder, riot, violence, or sedition and impose penalties violation of said ordinances; enacting suppress rebellion for the
logging and smuggling of logs, smuggling of natural resources products and of endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming, and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance; (vii) Subject to the provisions of this Code and pertinent laws, determine the powers and duties of officials and employees of the municipality; (viii) Determine the positions and the salaries, wages, allowances and other emoluments and benefits of officials and employees paid wholly or mainly from municipal funds and provide for expenditures necessary for the proper conduct of programs, projects, services, and activities of the municipal government; (ix) Authorize the payment of compensation to a qualified person not in the government service who fills up a temporary vacancy or grant honorarium to any qualified official or employee designated to fill a temporary vacancy in a concurrent capacity, at the rate authorized by law; (x) Provide a mechanism and the appropriate funds therefor, to ensure the safety and protection of all municipal government property, public documents, or records such as those relating to property inventory, land ownership, records of births, marriages, deaths, assessments, taxation, accounts, business permits, and such other records and documents of public interest in the offices and departments of the municipal government; (xi) When the finances of the municipal government allow, provide for additional allowances and other benefits to judges, prosecutors, public elementary and high school teachers, and other national government officials stationed in or assigned to the municipality; (xii) Provide for legal assistance to barangay officials who, in the performance of their official duties or on the occasion thereof, have to initiate judicial proceedings or defend themselves against legal action; and, (xiii) Provide for group insurance or additional insurance coverage for barangay officials, including members of barangay tanod brigades and other service units, with public or private insurance companies, when the finances of the municipal government allow said coverage.
(iii)Approve ordinances imposing a fine not exceeding Two thousand five hundred pesos (P=2,500.00) or an imprisonment for a period not exceeding six (6) months, or both in the discretion of the court, for the violation of a municipal ordinance; (iv) Adopt measures to protect the inhabitants of the municipality from the harmful effects of man-made or natural disasters and calamities and to provide relief services and assistance for victims during and in the aftermath of said disasters or calamities and their return to productive livelihood following said events; (v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the municipality; (vi) Protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, illegal
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(2) Generate and maximize the use of resources and revenues for the development plans, program objectives and priorities of the municipality as provided for under Section 18 of this Code with particular attention to agroindustrial development and countryside growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall: (i) Approve the annual and supplemental budgets of the municipal government and appropriate funds for specific programs, projects, services and activities of the municipality, or for other purposes not contrary to law, in order to promote the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants; (ii) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code and applicable laws and upon the majority vote of all the members of the sangguniang bayan, enact ordinances levying taxes, fees and charges, prescribing the rates thereof for general and specific purposes, and granting tax exemptions, incentives or reliefs; (iii) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code and upon the majority vote of all the members of the sangguniang bayan, authorize the municipal mayor to negotiate and contract loans and other forms of indebtedness; (iv) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code and applicable laws and upon the majority vote of all the members of the sangguniang bayan, enact ordinances authorizing the floating of bonds or other instruments of indebtedness, for the purpose of raising funds to finance development projects; (v) Appropriate funds for the construction and maintenance or the rental of buildings for the use of the municipality and, upon the majority vote of all the members of the sangguniang bayan, authorize the municipal mayor to lease to private parties such public buildings held in a proprietary capacity, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations; (vi) Prescribe reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the jurisdiction of the municipality; (vii) Adopt a comprehensive land use plan for the municipality: Provided, That the formulation, adoption, or modification of said plan shall be in coordination with the approved provincial comprehensive land use plan;
(viii) Reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the municipality, subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code; (ix) Enact integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the approved comprehensive land use plan, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations; establish fire limits or zones, particularly in populous centers; and regulate the construction, repair or modification of buildings within said fire limits or zones in accordance with the provisions of the Fire Code; (x) Subject to national law, process and approve subdivision plans for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes and other development purposes, and collect processing fees and other charges, the proceeds of which shall accrue entirely to the municipality: Provided, however, That, where approval by a national agency or office is required, said approval shall not be withheld for more than thirty (30) days from receipt of the application. Failure to act on the application within the period stated above shall be deemed as approval thereof; (xi) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant the exclusive privilege of constructing fish corrals or fish pens, or the taking or catching of bangus fry, prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of any species or fish within the municipal waters; (xii) With the concurrence of at least twothirds (2/3) of all the members of the sangguniang bayan, grant tax exemptions, incentives or reliefs to entities engaged in community growth-inducing industries, subject to the provisions of Chapter 5, Title I, Book II of this Code; (xiii) Grant loans or provide grants to other local government units or to national, provincial and municipal charitable, benevolent or educational institutions: Provided, That said institutions are operated and maintained within the municipality; (xiv) Regulate the numbering of residential, commercial and other buildings; and, (xv) Regulate the inspection, weighing and measuring of articles of commerce. (3) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant franchises, enact ordinances
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authorizing the issuance of permits or licenses, or enact ordinances levying taxes, fees and charges upon such conditions and for such purposes intended to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants of the municipality, and pursuant to this legislative authority shall: (i) Fix and impose reasonable fees and charges for all services rendered by the municipal government to private persons or entities; (ii) Regulate any business, occupation, or practice of profession or calling which does not require government examination within the municipality and the conditions under which the license for said business or practice of profession may be issued or revoked; (iii) Prescribe the terms and conditions under which public utilities owned by the municipality shall be operated by the municipal government or leased to private persons or entities, preferably cooperatives; (iv) Regulate the display of and fix the license fees for signs, signboards, or billboards at the place or places where the profession or business advertised thereby is, in whole or in part, conducted; (v) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, authorize and license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks: Provided, That existing rights should not be prejudiced; (vi) Subject to the guidelines prescribed by the Department of Transportation and Communications, regulate the operation of tricycles and grant franchises for the operation thereof within the territorial jurisdiction of the municipality; (vii) Upon approval by a majority vote of all the members of the sangguniang bayan, grant a franchise to any person, partnership, corporation, or cooperative to establish, construct, operate and maintain ferries, wharves, markets or slaughterhouses, or such other similar activities within the municipality as may be allowed by applicable laws: Provided, That, cooperatives shall be given preference in the grant of such a franchise.
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the municipality in order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall: (i) Declare, prevent or abate any nuisance; (ii) Require that buildings and the premises thereof and any land within the municipality be kept and maintained in a sanitary condition; impose penalties for any violation thereof, or upon failure to comply with said requirement, have the work done and require the owner, administrator or tenant concerned to pay the expenses of the same; or require the filling up of any land or premises to a grade necessary for proper sanitation; (iii) Regulate the disposal of clinical and other wastes from hospitals, clinics and other similar establishments; (iv) Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports; (v) Regulate the sale, giving away or dispensing of any intoxicating malt, vino, mixed or fermented liquors at any retail outlet; (vi) Regulate the establishment and provide for the inspection of steam boilers or any heating device in buildings and the storage of inflammable and highly combustible materials within the municipality; (vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and mainte nance of entertainment or amusement facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places of entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community; (viii) Provide for the impounding of stray animals; regulate the keeping of animals in homes or as part of a business, and the
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slaughter, sale or disposition of the same; and adopt measures to prevent and penalize cruelty to animals; and (ix) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of funeral parlors and the burial or cremation of the dead, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations. (5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities, shall: (i) Provide for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and conservation of communal forests and water sheds, tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest development projects; (ii) Establish markets, slaughterhouses or animal corrals and authorize the operation thereof, and regulate the construction and operation of private markets, talipapas or other similar buildings and structures; (iii) Authorize the establishment, maintenance and operation of ferries, wharves, and other structures, and marine and seashore or offshore activities intended to accelerate productivity; (iv) Regulate the preparation and sale of meat, poultry, fish, vegetables, fruits, fresh dairy products, and other foodstuffs for public consumption; (v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places and approve the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of the same; establish bus and vehicle stops and terminals or regulate the use of the same by privately-owned vehicles which serve the public; regulate garages and the operation of conveyances for hire; designate stands to be occupied by public vehicles when not in use; regulate the putting up of signs, signposts, awnings and awning posts on the streets; and provide for the lighting, cleaning and sprinkling of streets and public places; (vi) Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges, prohibit the putting up of encroachments or obstacles thereon, and, when necessary in the interest of public welfare, authorize the
removal of encroachments constructions in public places;
and
illegal
(vii) Subject to existing laws, provide for the establishment, operation, maintenance, and repair of an efficient waterworks system to supply water for the inhabitants; regulate the construction, maintenance, repair and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protect the purity and quantity of the water supply of the municipality and, for this purpose, extend the coverage of appropriate ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of said water supply and within one hundred (100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping station, or watershed used in connection with the water service; and regulate the consumption, use or wastage of water; (viii) Regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of water, gas, sewer, and other pipes and the construction, repair and maintenance of public drains, sewers, cesspools, tunnels and similar structures; regulate the placing of poles and the use of crosswalks, curbs, and gutters; adopt measures to ensure public safety against open canals, manholes, live wires and other similar hazards to life and property; and, regulate the construction and use of private water closets, privies and other similar structures in buildings and homes; (ix) Regulate the placing, stringing, attaching, installing, repair and construction of all gas mains, electric, telegraph and telephone wires, conduits, meters and other apparatus; and, provide for the correction, condemnation or removal of the same when found to be dangerous, defective or otherwise hazardous to the welfare of the inhabitants; (x) Subject to the availability of funds and to existing laws, rules and regulations, establish and provide for the operation of vocational and technical schools and similar postsecondary institutions and, with the approval of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, fix and collect reasonable fees and other school charges on said institutions, subject to existing laws on tuition fees; (xi) Establish a scholarship fund for poor but deserving students residing within the municipality in schools located within its jurisdiction;
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(xii) Approve measures and adopt quarantine regulations to prevent the introduction and spread of diseases; (xiii) Provide for an efficient and effective system of solid waste and garbage collection and disposal and prohibit littering and the placing or throwing of garbage, refuse and other filth and wastes; (xiv) Provide for the care of paupers, the aged, the sick, persons of unsound mind, disabled persons, abandoned minors, juvenile delinquents, drug dependents, abused children and other needy and disadvantaged persons, particularly children and youth below eighteen (18) years of age and, subject to availability of funds, establish and provide for the operation of centers and facilities for said needy and disadvantaged persons; (xv) Establish and provide for the maintenance and improvement of jails and detention centers, institute sound jail management programs, and appropriate funds for the subsistence of detainees and convicted prisoners in the municipality; (xiv) Establish a municipal council whose purpose is the promotion of culture and the arts, coordinate with government agencies and non-governmental organizations and, subject to the availability of funds, appropriate funds for the support and development of the same; and (xvii) Establish a municipal council for the elderly which shall formulate policies and adopt measures mutually beneficial to the elderly and to the community; provide incentives for non-governmental agencies and entities and, subject to the availability of funds, appropriate funds to support programs and projects for the benefit of the elderly; and (6) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (b) The members of the sangguniang bayan shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-four (24) as prescribed under R.A. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto: Provided, That, in municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila Area and other metropolitan political subdivisions, members of the sangguniang bayan shall receive a minimum monthly compensation
corresponding to Salary grade twenty-five (25).
Muez vs. Ario (1994)

Facts: Mayor Irisari of Loreto, Agusan del Sur summoned to his office complainant Apolinario S. Muez for conference respecting a land dispute which Muez had with one Tirso Amado. As complainant failed to attend the conference, Mayor Irisari issued a warrant of arrest against him. The warrant was served on complainant by CFC Redelio Caballes and Cpl. Rolando Limayan and by virtue of it complainant was brought before Mayor Irisari. Complainant filed a complaint against Mayor Irisari for grave misconduct and usurpation of judicial function with the Office of the Ombudsman as well as administrative complaint for violation of the Constitution, misconduct in office and abuse of authority with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur. The investigating officer of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a case for usurpation of judicial function against the Mayor Asuero Irisari. The criminal case was later assigned to respondent Judge Ciriaco Ario on account of the inhibition of the first judge. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, acting on the administrative complaint against the mayor, found him guilty of misconduct in office and abuse of authority and accordingly ordered him suspended for eight months without pay. On appeal, however, the DILG reversed on the ground that what the mayor had issued to the complainant, although denominated "Warrant of Arrest," was actually just an invitation or a summons. Respondent Judge Ario reconsidered his previous order and dismissed the case. Muez then sent two letters to the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission charging respondent judge with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.
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Issue: WON respondent judge should be held administratively liable Held: YES. While respondent judge may have acted in good faith, he should nevertheless be administratively held liable. The acts alleged in the information constitute a crime. Under Art. 241 of the RPC, the crime of usurpation of judicial authority involves the following elements: (1) that the offender is an officer of the executive branch of the government; and (2) that he assumes judicial powers, or obstructs the execution of any order or decision rendered by any judge within his jurisdiction. These elements were alleged in the information. Mayor Irisari was an officer of the executive branch. It is not true that what he had issued against the complainant was not a warrant of arrest. It was. It was so stated in rather plain terms. The mayor no longer has the power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the LGC, conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. The function of determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges. The issuance of the warrant when there was before him no criminal case, but only a land dispute, only made it worse for the mayor, for it would then appear that he assumed a judicial function which even a judge could not have done. It cannot be pretended that Mayor Irisari merely intended to invite or summon
Muez to his office because he had precisely done this the day before he issued the warrant of arrest, and he ordered the arrest of complainant because the latter had refused to appear before him. The summons issued by Mayor Irisari shows clearly that he understood the difference between a summons and a warrant of arrest. Respondent Judge Ciriaco Ario should have known that the case of Mayor Irisari was not before him on review from the decision of an administrative agency and, therefore, there was no basis for applying the rule on substantiality of evidence. What was before him was a criminal case and he should have considered solely the facts alleged in the information in resolving the motion to dismiss of the accused. At the very least, he showed poor judgment and gross ignorance of basic legal principles. Disposition: Respondent judge was fined with P5,000 and was enjoined to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties.
Greater Balanga Development Corp. vs. Municipality of Balanga (1994)

Facts: This case involves a parcel of land in Barrio San Jose located behind the Balanga Public Market. It was registered in the name of petitioner Greater Balanga Development Corporation. Petitioner had earlier donated to the Municipality of Balanga the present site of the Balanga Public Market. In 1987, upon conducing a relocation survey in the area, petitioner discovered that certain portions of the property had been "unlawfully usurped and invaded" by the Municipality of Balanga, which had allowed the construction of shanties and market stalls. Petitioner later applied with the Office of the Mayor of Balanga for a business permit to engage in business in the said area. The mayors permit was granted.
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However, the Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga passed Resolution No. 12, s-88 annulling the Mayor's permit issued to petitioner. Pursuant to said Resolution, Mayor Banzon, issued E.O. No. 1, s-88 revoking the permit insofar as it authorized the operation of a public market. Petitioner filed the instant petition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory aimed at the reinstatement of the Mayor's permit. The Court did not issue the preliminary reliefs prayed for. Respondent asserted that Resolution No. 12, s-88 of the Sangguniang Bayan, was a legitimate exercise of local legislative authority and. On the contrary, petitioner asserted that the executive order and the resolution in question were quasi-judicial acts and not mere exercises of police power. Issue: WON Resolution No. 12, s-88 and E.O. No. 1, s-88 are a valid exercise of police power Held: NO. Lot 261-B was originally owned and registered in the name of Aurora T. Banzon Camacho, who subdivided the land into nine lots. She denoted some of the lots to the Municipality of Balanga which now comprise the Balanga Public Market, and sold others to third persons. Five buyers of certain portions of Lot 261-B filed Civil Case No. 3803 against Camacho for partition and delivery of titles. The TC rendered a decision ordering the defendant to segregate the definite portions sold to the plaintiffs and deliver to them the corresponding titles thereto. This decision was affirmed by the CA. The defendant elevated the matter to the SC but the petition was denied for lack of merit. The question of ownership over Lot 261-B had already been settled with finality by the SC in 1983. When the Mayor's permit was revoked, five years had already elapsed since the case was decided. Petitioner obtained in its name TCT No.
120152 "without any memorandum of encumbrance pertaining to any decision rendered in any civil case". Clearly, for all intents and purposes, petitioner appeared to be the true owner of Lot 261-B-6-A-3 when respondents revoked its permit to engaged in business on its own land. Assuming arguendo that Lot 261-B-6-A-3 was actually one of those awarded to the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3803 and the TCT of petitioner is spurious, this still does not justify the revocation of the Mayor's permit. According to the records, the Sangguniang Bayan did not establish or maintain any public market on the subject lot. The resolution merely mentioned the plan to acquire the lot for expansion of the public market adjacent thereto. Until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court, the landowner cannot be deprived of its right over the land. The Sangguniang Bayan has the duty in the exercise of its police powers to regulate any business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe the conditions under which a municipal license already issued may be revoked. But the anxiety, uncertainty, restiveness among the stallholders and traders allegedly caused by petitioner cannot be a valid ground for revoking the permit. After all, the stallholders and traders were doing business on property not belonging to the Municipal government. Moreover, the manner by which the Mayor revoked the permit transgressed petitioner's right to due process. The alleged violation of the Balanga Revenue Code was not stated in the order of revocation, and neither was petitioner informed of this specific violation until the Rejoinder was filed in the instant case. The knowledge of the pendency of Civil Case No. 3803 could not ipso facto nullify any claim petitioner had on the lot. This necessitated first and foremost a determination of the exact parameters of the lot and a finding that petitioner is not the true owner thereof.
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Disposition: E.O. No. 1, s-88 and Resolution No. 12, s-88 issuedby respondents were nullified.
C. THE CITY
TITLE THREE. - THE CITY CHAPTER 1 - ROLE AND CREATION OF THE CITY SEC. 448. Role of the City. - The city, consisting of more urbanized and developed barangays, serves as a general-purpose government for the coordination and delivery of basic, regular, and direct services and effective governance of the inhabitants within its territorial jurisdiction. SEC. 449. Manner of Creation. - A city may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, only by an Act of Congress, and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be conducted by the Comelec in the local government unit or units directly affected. Except as may otherwise be provided in such Act, the plebiscite shall be held within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of its effectivity. SEC. 450. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or, (ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newlycreated city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and nonrecurring income. SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. - A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided, however, That the criteria established in this Code shall not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities. Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent component cities shall be independent of the province. SEC. 452. Highly Urbanized Cities. - (a) Cities with a minimum population of two hundred thousand (200,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office, and with the latest annual income of at least Fifty Million Pesos (P=50,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the city treasurer, shall be classified as highly urbanized cities. (b) Cities which do not meet the above requirements shall be considered component cities of the province in which they are geographically located. If a component city is located within the boundaries of two (2) or more provinces, such city shall be considered a component of the province of which it used to be a municipality. (c) Qualified voters of highly urbanized cities shall remain excluded from voting for elective provincial officials. Unless otherwise provided in the Constitution or this Code, qualified voters of independent component cities shall be governed by their respective charters, as amended, on the participation of voters in provincial elections. Qualified voters of cities who acquired the right to vote for elective provincial officials prior to the classification of said cities as highly-urbanized after the ratification of the Constitution and before the effectivity of this Code, shall continue to exercise such right. SEC. 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. - It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. CHAPTER 2 - CITY OFFICIALS IN GENERAL
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SEC. 454. Officials of the City Government. (a) There shall be in each city a mayor, a vicemayor, sangguniang panlungsod members, a secretary to the sangguniang panlungsod, a city treasurer, a city assessor, a city accountant, a city budget officer, a city planning and development coordinator, a city engineer, a city health officer, a city civil registrar, a city administrator, a city legal officer, a city veterinarian, a city social welfare and development officer, and a city general services officer. (b) In addition thereto, the city mayor may appoint a city architect, a city information officer, a city agriculturist, a city population officer, a city environment and natural resources officer, and a city cooperatives officer. The appointment of a city population officer shall be optional in the city: Provided, however, That cities which have existing population offices shall continue to maintain such offices for a period of five (5) years from the date of the effectivity of this Code, after which said offices shall become optional. (c) The sangguniang panlungsod may: (1) Maintain existing offices not mentioned in subsections (a) and (b) hereof; (2) Create such other offices as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the city government; or (3) Consolidate the functions of any office with those of another in the interest of efficiency and economy. (d) Unless otherwise provided herein, heads of departments and offices shall be appointed by the city mayor with the concurrence of the majority of all the sangguniang panlungsod members, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations. The sangguniang panlungsod shall act on the appointment within fifteen (15) days from the date of its submission, otherwise the same shall be deemed confirmed. (e) Elective and appointive city officials shall receive such compensation, allowances, and other emoluments as may be determined by law or ordinance, subject to the budgetary limitations on personal services prescribed under Title Five, Book II of this Code: Provided, That, no increase in compensation of the mayor, vice-mayor and sangguniang panlungsod members shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the said local officials approving such increase.
CHAPTER 3 - OFFICIALS AND OFFICES COMMON TO ALL CITIES Article One. - The City Mayor SEC. 455. Chief Executive; Powers, Duties and Compensation. - (a) The city mayor, as chief executive of the city government, shall exercise such powers and perform such duties and functions as provided by this Code and other laws. (b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the city mayor shall: (1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the city government, and in this connection, shall: (i) Determine the guidelines of city policies and be responsible to the sangguniang panlungsod for the program of government; (ii) Direct the formulation of the city development plan, with the assistance of the city development council, and upon approval thereof by the sangguniang panlungsod, implement the same; (iii) Present the program of government and propose policies and projects for the consideration of the sangguniang panlungsod at the opening of the regular session of the sangguniang panlungsod every calendar year and as often as may be deemed necessary as the general welfare of the inhabitants and the needs of the city government may require; (iv) Initiate and propose legislative measures to the sangguniang panlungsod and as often as may be deemed necessary, provide such information and data needed or requested by said sanggunian in the performance of its legislative functions; (v) Appoint all officials and employees whose salaries and wages are wholly or mainly paid out of city funds and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in this Code, as well as those he may be authorized by law to appoint; (vi) Represent the city in all its business transactions and sign in its behalf all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such other documents upon authority of the sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance;
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(vii)Carry out such emergency measures as may be necessary during and in the aftermath of man-made and natural disasters and calamities; (viii)Determine the time, manner and place of payment of salaries or wages of the officials and employees of the city, in accordance with law or ordinance; (ix) Allocate and assign office space to city and other officials and employees who, by law or ordinance, are entitled to such space in the city hall and other buildings owned or leased by the city government; (x) Ensure that all executive officials and employees of the city faithfully discharge their duties and functions as provided by law and this Code, and cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings against any official or employee of the city who may have committed an offense in the performance of his official duties; (xi) Examine the books, records and other documents of all offices, officials, agents or employees of the city and, in aid of his executive powers and authority, require all national officials and employees stationed in or assigned to the city to make available to him such books, records, and other documents in their custody, except those classified by law as confidential; (xii) Furnish copies of executive orders issued by him, to the provincial governor in the case of component city mayors, to the Office of the President in the case of highly-urbanized city mayors, and to their respective metropolitan council chairmen in the case of mayors of cities in the Metropolitan Manila Area and other metropolitan political subdivisions, within seventy-two (72) hours after their issuance; (xiii) Visit component barangays of the city at least once every six (6) months to deepen his understanding of problems and conditions, listen and give appropriate counsel to local officials and inhabitants, inform the component barangay officials and inhabitants of general laws and ordinances which especially concern them, and otherwise conduct visits and inspections to ensure that the governance of the city will improve the quality of life of the inhabitants; (xiv) Act on leave applications of officials and employees appointed by him and the
commutation of the monetary value of their leave credits in accordance with law; (xv) Authorize official trips of city officials and employees outside of the city for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days; (xvi) Call upon any national official or employee stationed in or assigned to the city to advise him on matters affecting the city and to make recommendations thereon; coordinate with said official or employee in the formulation and implementation of plans, programs and projects; and, when appropriate, initiate an administrative or judicial action against a national government official or employee who may have committed an offense in the performance of his official duties while stationed in or assigned to the city; (xvii) Authorize payment for medical care, necessary transportation, subsistence, hospital or medical fees of city officials and employees who are injured while in the performance of their official duties and functions, subject to availability of funds; (xviii) Solemnize marriage, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding; (xix) Conduct an annual palarong panlungsod, which shall feature traditional sports and disciplines included in national and international games, in coordination with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports; and, (xx)Submit to the provincial governor, in the case of component cities; to the Office of the President, in the case of highly-urbanized cities; to their respective metropolitan authority council chairmen and to the Office of the President, in the case of cities of the Metropolitan Manila Area and other metropolitan political subdivisions, the following reports: an annual report containing a summary of all matters pertinent to the management, administration and development of the city and all information and data relative to its political, social and economic conditions; and supplemental reports when unexpected events and situations arise at any time during the year, particularly when man-made or natural disasters or calamities affect the general welfare of the city, province, region or country; (2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city and in the exercise
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of the appropriate corporate powers provided for under Section 22 of this Code, implement all approved policies, programs, projects, services and activities of the city and, in addition to the foregoing, shall: (i) Ensure that the acts of the city's component barangays and of its officials and employees are within the scope of their prescribed powers, duties and functions; (ii) Call conventions, conferences, seminars, or meetings of any elective and appointive officials of the city, including provincial officials and national officials and employees stationed in or assigned to the city, at such time and place and on such subject as he may deem important for the promotion of the general welfare of the local government unit and its inhabitants; (iii) Issue such executive orders for the faithful and appropriate enforcement and execution of laws and ordinances; (iv) Be entitled to carry the necessary firearm within his territorial jurisdiction; (v) Act as the deputized representative of the National Police Commission, formulate the peace and order plan of the city and upon its approval, implement the same; and as such exercise general and operational control and supervision over the local police forces in the city, in accordance with R.A. No. 6975; (vi) Call upon the appropriate law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or sedition, or to apprehend violators of the law when public interest so requires and the city police forces are inadequate to cope with the situation or the violators; (3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided for under Section 18 of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agro-industrial development and countryside growth and progress and, relative thereto, shall: (i) Require each head of an office or department to prepare and submit an estimate of appropriations for the ensuing calendar year, in accordance with the budget preparations process under Title Five, Book II of this Code;
(ii) Prepare and submit to the sanggunian for approval the executive and supplemental budgets of the city for the ensuing calendar year in the manner provided for under Title Five, Book II of this Code; (iii) Ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the city are collected, and that city funds are applied to the payment of expenses and settlement of obligations of the city, in accordance with law or ordinance; (iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance; (v) Issue permits, without need of approval therefor from any national agency, for the holding of activities for any charitable or welfare purpose, excluding prohibited games of chance or shows contrary to law, public policy and public morals; (vi) Require owners of illegally constructed houses, buildings or other structures to obtain the necessary permit, subject to such fines and penalties as may be imposed by law or ordinance, or to make necessary changes in the construction of the same when said construction violates any law or ordinance, or to order the demolition or removal of said house, building or structure within the period prescribed by law or ordinance; (vii) Adopt adequate measures to safeguard and conserve land, mineral, marine, forest, and other resources of the city; provide efficient and effective property and supply management in the city; and protect the funds, credits, rights and other properties of the city; and (viii) Institute or cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings for violation of ordinances in the collection of taxes, fees or charges, and for the recovery of funds and property; and cause the city to be defended against all suits to ensure that its interests, resources and rights shall be adequately protected; (4) Ensure the delivery of basic services and the provision of adequate facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code and, in addition thereto, shall: (i) Ensure that the construction and repair of roads and highways funded by the national government shall be, as far as practicable, carried out in a spatially contiguous manner
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and in coordination with the construction and repair of the roads and bridges of the city, and in the case of component cities, of the city and of the province; and (ii) Coordinate the implementation of technical services, including public works and infrastructure programs, rendered by national offices in the case of highly urbanized and independent component cities, and by national and provincial offices in the case of component cities; and (5) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (c) During his incumbency, the city mayor shall hold office in the city hall. (d) The city mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade Thirty (30) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto. Article Two. - The City Vice-Mayor SEC. 456. Powers, Duties and Compensation. (a) The cityvice-mayor shall: (1) Be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlungsod and sign all warrants drawn on the city treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang panlungsod; (2) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, appoint all officials and employees of the sangguniang panlungsod, except those whose manner of appointment is specifically provided in this Code; (3) Assume the office of the city mayor for the unexpired term of the latter in the event of permanent vacancy as provided for in Section 44, Book I of this Code; (4) Exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the city mayor in cases of temporary vacancy as provided for in Section 46, Book I of this Code; and (5) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (b) The city vice-mayor shall receive a monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty eight (28) for a highly urbanized city and Salary Grade twenty six (26) for a component city, as prescribed under
R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto. Article Three. - The Sangguniang Panlungsod SEC. 457. Composition. - (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, the legislative body of the city, shall be composed of the city vice-mayor as presiding officer, the regular sanggunian members, the president of the city chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, the president of the panlungsod na pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan, and the sectoral representatives, as members. (b) In addition thereto, there shall be three (3) sectoral representatives: one (1) from the women; and, as shall be determined by the sanggunian concerned within ninety (90) days prior to the holding of the local elections, one (1) from the agricultural or industrial workers; and one (1) from the other sectors, including the urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, or disabled persons. (c) The regular members of the sangguniang panlungsod and the sectoral representatives shall be elected in the manner as may be provided for by law. SEC. 458. - Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: (1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in this connection, shall: (i) Review all ordinances approved by the sangguniang barangay and executive orders issued by the punong barangay to determine whether these are within the scope of the prescribed powers of the sanggunian and of the punong barangay; (ii) Maintain peace and order by measures to prevent and lawlessness, disorder, riot, violence, or sedition and impose penalties violation of said ordinances; enacting suppress rebellion for the
(iii) Approve ordinances imposing a fine not exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) or an imprisonment for a period not exceeding
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one (1) year, or both in the discretion of the court, for the violation of a city ordinance; (iv) Adopt measures to protect the inhabitants of the city from the harmful effects of manmade or natural disasters and calamities, and to provide relief services and assistance for victims during and in the aftermath of said disasters or calamities and their return to productive livelihood following said events; (v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city; (vi) Protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of logs, smuggling of natural resources products and of endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming, and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance; (vii) Subject to the provisions of this Code and pertinent laws, determine the powers and duties of officials and employees of the city; (viii) Determine the positions and the salaries, wages, allowances and other emoluments and benefits of officials and employees paid wholly or mainly from city funds and provide for expenditures necessary for the proper conduct of programs, projects, services, and activities of the city government; (ix) Authorize the payment of compensation to a qualified person not in the government service who fills up a temporary vacancy or grant honorarium to any qualified official or employee designated to fill a temporary vacancy in a concurrent capacity, at the rate authorized by law; (x) Provide a mechanism and the appropriate funds therefor, to ensure the safety and protection of all city government property, public documents, or records such as those
relating to property inventory, land ownership, records of births, marriages, deaths, assessments, taxation, accounts, business permits, and such other records and documents of public interest in the offices and departments of the city government; (xi) When the finances of the city government allow, provide for additional allowances and other benefits to judges, prosecutors, public elementary and high school teachers, and other national government officials stationed in or assigned to the city; (xii) Provide legal assistance to barangay officials who, in the performance of their official duties or on the occasion thereof, have to initiate judicial proceedings or defend themselves against legal action; and (xiii) Provide for group insurance or additional insurance coverage for all barangay officials, including members of barangay tanod brigades and other service units, with public or private insurance companies, when the finances of the city government allow said coverage; (2) Generate and maximize the use of resources and revenues for the development plans, program objectives and priorities of the city as provided for under Section 18 of this Code, with particular attention to agroindustrial development and city-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall: (i) Approve the annual and supplemental budgets of the city government and appropriate funds for specific programs, projects, services and activities of the city, or for other purposes not contrary to law, in order to promote the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants; (ii) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code and applicable laws and upon the majority vote of all the members of the sangguniang panlungsod, enact ordinances levying taxes, fees and charges, prescribing the rates thereof for general and specific purposes, and granting tax exemptions, incentives or reliefs; (iii) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code and upon the majority vote of all the members of the sangguniang panlungsod, authorize the city mayor to negotiate and contract loans and other forms of indebtedness;
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(iv) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code and applicable laws and upon the majority vote of all the members of the sangguniang panlungsod, enact ordinances authorizing the floating of bonds or other instruments of indebtedness, for the purpose of raising funds to finance development projects; (v) Appropriate funds for the construction and maintenance or the rental of buildings for the use of the city; and, upon the majority vote of all the members of the sangguniang panlungsod, authorize the city mayor to lease to private parties such public buildings held in a proprietary capacity, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations; (vi) Prescribe reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the jurisdiction of the city; (vii) Adopt a comprehensive land use plan for the city: Provided, That in the case of component cities, the formulation, adoption or modification of said plan shall be in coordination with the approved provincial comprehensive land use plan; (viii) Reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city, subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code; (ix) Enact integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the approved comprehensive land use plan, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations; establish fire limits or zones, particularly in populous centers; and regulate the construction, repair or modification of buildings within said fire limits or zones in accordance with the provisions of the Fire Code; (x) Subject to national law, process and approve subdivision plans for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes and other development purposes, and to collect processing fees and other charges, the proceeds of which shall accrue entirely to the city: Provided, however, That where approval of a national agency or office is required, said approval shall not be withheld for more than thirty (30) days from receipt of the application. Failure to act on the application within the period stated above shall be deemed as approval thereof; (xi) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant the exclusive privilege of constructing fish corrals or fish pens, or the taking or catching of bangus fry, prawn fry or
kawag-kawag, or fry of any species or fish within the city waters; (xii) With the concurrence of at least twothirds (2/3) of all the members of the sangguniang panlungsod, grant tax exemptions, incentives or reliefs to entities engaged in community growth-inducing industries, subject to the provisions of Chapter 5, Title I, Book II of this Code; (xiii) Grant loans or provide grants to other local government units or to national, provincial, and city charitable, benevolent or educational institutions: Provided, That, said institutions are operated and maintained within the city; (xiv)Regulate the numbering of residential, commercial and other buildings; and, (xv) Regulate the inspection, weighing and measuring of articles of commerce. (3) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, enact ordinances granting franchises and authorizing the issuance of permits or licenses, upon such conditions and for such purposes intended to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants of the city and pursuant to this legislative authority shall: (i) Fix and impose reasonable fees and charges for all services rendered by the city government to private persons or entities; (ii) Regulate or fix license fees for any business or practice of profession within the city and the conditions under which the license for said business or practice of profession may be revoked and enact ordinances levying taxes thereon; (iii) Provide for and set the terms and conditions under which public utilities owned by the city shall be operated by the city government, and prescribe the conditions under which the same may be leased to private persons or entities, preferably cooperatives; (iv) Regulate the display of and fix the license fees for signs, signboards, or billboards at the place or places where the profession or business advertised thereby is, in whole or in part, conducted; (v) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, authorize and license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial
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breeding of gamecocks: Provided, existing rights should not be prejudiced;
That
(vi) Subject to the guidelines prescribed by the Department of Transportation and Communications, regulate the operation of tricycles and grant franchises for the operation thereof within the territorial jurisdiction of the city; (vii)Upon approval by a majority vote of all the members of the sangguniang panlungsod: grant a franchise to any person, partnership, corporation, or cooperative to do business within the city; establish, construct, operate and maintain ferries, wharves, markets or slaughterhouses; or undertake such other activities within the city as may be allowed by existing laws: Provided, That, cooperatives shall be given preference in the grant of such a franchise. (4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall: (i) Declare, prevent or abate any nuisance; (ii) Require that buildings and the premises thereof and any land within the city be kept and maintained in a sanitary condition; impose penalties for any violation thereof; or, upon failure to comply with said requirement, have the work done at the expense of the owner, administrator or tenant concerned; or require the filling up of any land or premises to a grade necessary for proper sanitation; (iii) Regulate the disposal of clinical and other wastes from hospitals, clinics and other similar es ta bl is hm en ts ; (iv) Regulate the establishment, operation and cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports; (v) Regulate the sale, giving away or dispensing of any intoxicating malt, vino, mixed or fermented liquors at any retail outlet; (vi) Regulate the establishment and provide for the inspection of steam boilers or any heating device in buildings and the storage of inflammable and highly combustible materials within the city; (vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or
amusement facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community; (viii)Provide for the impounding of stray animals; regulate the keeping of animals in homes or as part of a business, and the slaughter, sale or disposition of the same; and adopt measures to prevent and penalize cruelty to animals; and, (ix) Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of funeral parlors and the burial or cremation of the dead, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations. (5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities, shall: (i) Provide for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and conservation of communal forests and water sheds, tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest development projects; (ii) Establish markets, slaughterhouses or animal corrals and authorize the operation thereof by the city government; and regulate the construction and operation of private markets, talipapas or other similar buildings and structures; (iii)Authorize the establishment, maintenance and operation by the city government of ferries, wharves, and other structures intended to accelerate productivity related to marine and seashore or offshore activities; (iv) Regulate the preparation and sale of meat, poultry, fish, vegetables, fruits, fresh dairy products, and other foodstuffs for public consumption; (v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places and approve the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of the same; establish bus and vehicle stops and
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terminals or regulate the use of the same by privately-owned vehicles which serve the public; regulate garages and the operation of conveyances for hire; designate stands to be occupied by public vehicles when not in use; regulate the putting up of signs, signposts, awnings and awning posts on the streets; and provide for the lighting, cleaning and sprinkling of streets and public places; (vi) Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments or obstacles thereon and, when necessary in the interest of public welfare, authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal constructions in public places; (vii)Subject to existing laws, establish and provide for the maintenance, repair and operation of an efficient waterworks system to supply water for the inhabitants and to purify the source of the water supply; regulate the construction, maintenance, repair and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protect the purity and quantity of the water supply of the city and, for this purpose, extend the coverage of appropriate ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of said water supply and within one hundred (100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping station, or watershed used in connection with the water service; and regulate the consumption, use or wastage of water and fix and collect charges therefor; (viii) Regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of water, gas, sewer, and other pipes and the construction, repair and maintenance of public drains, sewers, cesspools, tunnels and similar structures; regulate the placing of poles and the use of crosswalks, curbs, and gutters; adopt measures to ensure public safety against open canals, manholes, live wires and other similar hazards to life and property; and regulate the construction and use of private water closets, privies and other similar structures in buildings and homes; (ix) Regulate the placing, stringing, attaching, installing, repair and construction of all gas mains, electric, telegraph and telephone wires, conduits, meters and other apparatus; and provide for the correction, condemnation or removal of the same when found to be dangerous, defective, or otherwise hazardous to the welfare of the inhabitants; (x) Subject to the availability of funds and to existing laws, rules and regulations, establish and provide for the operation of vocational
and technical schools and similar postsecondary institutions and, with the approval of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and subject to existing law on tuition fees, fix and collect reasonable tuition fees and other school charges in educational institutions supported by the city government; (xi) Establish a scholarship fund for the poor but deserving students in schools located within its jurisdiction or for students residing within the city; (xii) Approve measures and adopt quarantine regulations to prevent the introduction and spread of diseases; (xiii) Provide for an efficient and effective system of solid waste and garbage collection and disposal; prohibit littering and the placing or throwing of garbage, refuse and other filth and wastes; (xiv) Provide for the care of disabled persons, paupers, the aged, the sick, persons of unsound mind, abandoned minors, juvenile delinquents, drug dependents, abused children and other needy and disadvantaged persons, particularly children and youth below eighteen (18) years of age; and, subject to availability of funds, establish and provide for the operation of centers and facilities for said needy and disadvantaged persons; (xv) Establish and provide for the maintenance and improvement of jails and detention centers, institute a sound jail management, and appropriate funds for the subsistence of detainees and convicted prisoners in the city; (xvi) Establish a City council whose purpose is the promotion of culture and the arts, coordinate with government agencies and non-governmental organizations and, subject to the availability of funds, appropriate funds for the support and development of the same; and (xvii) Establish a City council for the elderly which shall formulate policies and adopt measures mutually beneficial to the elderly and to the community; provide incentives for non-governmental agencies and entities and, subject to the availability of funds, appropriate funds to support programs and projects for the benefit of the elderly; and (6) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.
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(b) The members of the sangguniang panlungsod of component cities shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-five (25) and members of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly- urbanized cities shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-seven (27), as prescribed under R.A. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto.
motion to dissolve the injunction and to dismiss the case. Lim filed with the CA petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against Bistro and Judge Wilfredo Reyes. The CA found that the TC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. On July 1, 1993, Manila City Ordinance No. 778314 took effect. On the same day, Lim ordered the WPD Command to permanently close down the operations of Bistro, which order the police implemented at once. Issue: WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the TC Held: NO. The authority of mayors to issue business licenses and permits is beyond question. The law expressly provides for such authority. Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. On the other hand, Section 455 (3) (iv) of the LGC provides that the city mayor may Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the condition upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. The power, however, to suspend or revoke licenses and permits is expressly premised on the violation of the conditions of these permits and licenses. The mayor has the power to inspect and investigate private commercial establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses and permits. However, he has no power to order a police raid on these establishments in the guise of inspecting or investigating these commercial establishments. Lim acted beyond his authority when he directed policemen to raid the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant. Such act of Lim violated Ordinance No. 771618, which expressly prohibits police raids and inspections. Under the LGC, this responsibility devolves upon the City Health Officer or his representative, and the City Treasurer.
Lim and Garayblas Appeals (2002)
vs.
Court
of
Facts: Bistro filed before the TC a petition for mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for TRO or writ of preliminary injunction, against Lim in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila. Allegedly, policemen under Lims instructions inspected and investigated Bistros license as well as the work permits and health certificates of its staff, causing the stoppage of work in Bistros New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant. Lim also refused to accept Bistros application for a business license, as well as the work permit applications of Bistros staff, for the year 1993. The TC issued the first assailed TRO. Later, it granted the writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction. However, despite the TCs order, Lim still issued a closure order on Bistros operations, even sending policemen to carry out his closure order. Bistro filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt against Lim and the policemen. At the hearing of the motion for contempt, Bistro withdrew its motion on condition that Lim would respect the courts injunction. However, on several dates thereafter, Lim, acting through his agents and policemen, again disrupted Bistros business operations. Lim later filed a motion to dissolve the injunctive order and to dismiss the case. Lim insisted that the power of a mayor to inspect and investigate commercial establishments and their staff is implicit in the statutory power of the city mayor to issue, suspend or revoke business permits and licenses. The TC denied Lims
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Lim has no authority to close down Bistros business or any business establishment in Manila without due process of law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and the LGC. There is no provision in these laws expressly or impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down private commercial establishments without notice and hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be void. The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. Lims exercise of this power violated Bistros property rights. Lim did not charge Bistro with any specific violation of the conditions of its business license or permits. Still, Lim closed down Bistros operations even before the expiration of its business license. Lim also refused to accept Bistros license application for 1993, in effect denying the application without examining whether it complies with legal prerequisites. Disposition: Petition denied.
SEC. 526. Application of this Code to Local Government Units in the Autonomous Regions. - This Code shall apply to all provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays in the autonomous regions until such time as the regional government concerned shall have enacted its own local government code.
F. THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO

Section 1, ARTICLE X, Constitution. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. AUTONOMOUS REGIONS Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed. Section 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government. Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws. The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of
D. THE PROVINCE E. APPLICATION OF THE CODE AUTONOMOUS REGION

TO
LGUS
IN THE
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the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: (1) Administrative organization; (2) Creation of sources of revenues; (3) Ancestral domain and natural resources; (4) Personal, family, and property relations; (5) Regional urban and rural planning development; (6) Economic, social, and tourism development; (7) Educational policies; (8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and (9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region. Section 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the National Government. Republic Act No. 9054 AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN AND EXPAND THE ORGANIC ACT FOR THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6734, ENTITLED AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO AS AMENDED PREAMBLE The people of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to develop a just and humane society and establish a Regional Autonomous Government that is truly reflective of their ideals and aspirations within the framework of the Constitution and national sovereignty, as well as the territorial integrity of the Philippines, and to secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of autonomy, democracy, peace, justice and equality, do ordain and promulgate this
Organic Act through the Congress of the Philippines. ARTICLE I NAME AND PURPOSE Section 1. The name of the Autonomous Region shall be the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao unless provided otherwise by the Regional Assembly. The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall be governed by the Regional Government. ARTICLE II THE AUTONOMOUS REGION AREA AND SEAT OF GOVERNMENT Section 1. Expanded Autonomous Region. (1) The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao which, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, is composed of the four provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, is hereby expanded to include the provinces and cities, enumerated hereunder, which vote favorably to be included and in the expanded area of the autonomous region and for other purposes, in a plebiscite called for that purpose in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution. The new area of autonomy shall then be determined by the provinces and cities that will vote/choose to join the said autonomy. It is understood that Congress may by law which shall be consistent with the Constitution and in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, provide that clusters of contiguousMuslim-dominated municipalities voting in favor of autonomy be merged and constituted into a new province(s) which shall became part of the new Autonomous Region. (2) Plebiscite Coverage. The plebiscite shall be conducted in the provinces of Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, Sarangani, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur and the newly created Province of Zamboanga Sibugay, and (b) in the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Kidapawan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa, Digos, Koronadal, Tacurong, and Zamboanga. Section 2. Result of the Plebiscite
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(a) In the four provinces, if the majority of the voters of the four provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi vote in favor of the above-mentioned proposed amendments, the amendments are deemed ratified. Otherwise, the amendments are deemed rejected except as regards the inclusion of the provinces and cities that vote for their inclusion in the Autonomous Region as provided in this Organic Act, in which case, the said provinces and cities shall become members of the autonomous region. (b) In the provinces or cities proposed for inclusion in the expanded area of the autonomous region. A majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite in every province or city in favor of the inclusion of the province or city as members of the expanded area of the autonomous region as provided in this Organic Act shall effect their membership in the autonomous region. Section 3. Seat of Autonomous Government. The regional legislative assembly, hereinafter referred to as the Regional Assembly, shall by law, fix the permanent seat of government of the regional government in any province or city that is a member of the autonomous region, taking into consideration accessibility and efficiency in which its mandate may be carried out under this Organic Act. Until the seat of the Regional Government is transferred as provided above, its provisional seat shall be in Cotabato City. The Regional Assembly elected after the plebiscite mentioned in this Organic Act, shall, within its term, identify the site of the permanent seat of the Regional Government. The central government, which shall also mean the national government, shall appropriate funds for the transfer of the provisional seat to its permanent site as determined by the Regional Assembly. ARTICLE III GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES Section 1. Integral Part of the Republic. - The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall remain an integral and inseparable part of the national territory of the Republic as defined by the Constitution and existing laws. The Autonomous Region shall be governed and administered in accordance with the laws enacted by the Regional Assembly and by this Organic Act.
Section 2. Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts. The Regional Autonomous Government shall adopt the policy of settlement of conflicts by peaceful means, and renounce any form of lawless violence as an instrument of redress. Section 3. Devolution of Powers. - The Regional Government shall adopt a policy on local autonomy whereby regional powers shall be devolved to local government units particularly in areas of education, health, human resource, science and technology and people empowerment. Until a law implementing this provision is enacted by the Regional Assembly, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, shall continue to apply to all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays within the autonomous region. The Regional Assembly may not pass any law to diminish, lessen, or reduce the powers, functions, and shares in the internal revenue taxes of the said local government units as provided by Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. Section 6. Budgetary law, Rules and Regulations. - Pending the enactment of a regional budgetary law, the budgeting process of the Regional Government shall be governed by pertinent rules and regulations prescribed by the Department of Budget and Management. Section 7. First Regular Elections. - The first regular elections of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and members of the regional legislative assembly under this Organic Act shall be held on the second Monday of September 2001. The Commission on Elections as may be necessary for the conduct of said election. The election of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) set forth in Republic Act No. 8953 is hereby reset accordingly. The funds for the holding of the ARMM elections shall be taken from the savings of the national government or shall be provided in the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Section 8. Regional Government Authority Over Natural Resources. The incumbent Regional Governor, the Regional Vice Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly of the
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Autonomous Region In Muslim Mindanao shall continue in office pursuant to existing laws and until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. Section 9. Preferential Rights of Inhabitants and Their Safeguards. - Within one (1) year from its organization, the Regional Assembly shall, by law, create a code commission on Muslim and a code commission on tribal laws. Each code commission shall have three (3) members. The code commissions shall codify tribal laws and Islamic laws and jurisprudence within (3) years from their creation and submit the same to the Regional Assembly for enactment into law. The Chairs and Commissioners of the code commission shall be entitled to reasonable per diems for the work. Section 10. Initial Funds for the Regional Government. - The sum of Fifteen Million pesos (P 15, 000,000.00), which shall be charged against the contingent Fund of the President, is hereby appropriated for the initial organizational requirements of the Regional Government. Any deficiency shall be taken from savings of the central government or national government. An amount not exceeding Ten million pesos (P 10, 000, 000. 00) thereof shall be allotted to the Commission on Elections shall determine the manner of campaigning and deputization of government agencies for the purpose. The Commission on Elections shall adopt measure to ensure the dissemination of the said impartial information campaign. Section 11. Annual Assistance. - In addition to the regular annual allotment to fund the regular operations of the Regional Government, such amounts as may be needed to fund the infrastructure projects duly identified, endorsed, and approved by the Regional Economic and Development Planning Board as created herein shall be provided by the central government or national government as annual assistance for six (6) years after the approval of this Organic Act, and shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).The annual assistance herein mentioned shall be appropriated and disbursed through a Public Works Act duly enacted by the Regional Assembly. The national programs and projects in the autonomous region shall continue to be financed by central government or national government. Section 12. Sectoral Representatives. - The sectoral representatives mentioned in
Section 3, Article VI of this Organic Act, shall be chosen by the sectoral groups concerned at sectoral conventions called for the purpose by the Commission on Elections. The sectoral conventions shall be held within three (3) months after the date of the holding of the simultaneous plebiscites mandated by this Organic Act. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) shall formulate the rules and regulations to ensure equitable sectoral representations in the Regional Assembly. It shall identify and accredit to sectoral representation in the Regional Assembly. The Regional Assembly shall enact a law for the election of marginalized and underrepresented sectors, following the principle of proportional representation, within its first term following the approval of this Organic Act. Section 13. Plebiscite and Effectivity of this Organic Act. - The Organic Act shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast in the four (4) provinces constituting the present Autonomous Region In Muslim Mindanao pursuant to Republic Act No. 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. A separate plebiscite shall be held simultaneously with the plebiscite mentioned in the preceding paragraph in the Provinces of Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur. Lanao del Norte, Palawan, Saranggani, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur and the newly created Province of Zamboanga Sibugay, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princessa, Zamboanga, Digos, Koronadal, Tacurong, and Kidapawan to determine by majority vote cast in every province and city whether or not the voters approve the inclusion of their respective provinces or cities in the autonomous region. Only provinces and cities shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. If the majority of the votes cast in the said plebiscite in the four (4) provinces favor the amendments to Republic Act 6734, the amendments will be deemed ratified. Section 14. Plebiscite Information Campaign. - The Commission on Elections shall conduct an information campaign on the plebiscite in every municipality, city, and province where the plebiscite is held. Public conferences, assemblies, or meetings on dates before the plebiscite day, itself, shall be held to inform
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the residents thereof regarding the significance and meaning of the plebiscite and to help them to cast their votes intelligently. Free, full, and constructive discussion and exchange of views on the issues shall be encouraged. For this purpose, the assistance of persons of known probity and knowledge may be enlisted by the Commission on Elections, the Regional Government, the local government units or interested parties to act as speakers or resource persons. Section 15. Promulgation of Rules; Appropriations for Simultaneous plebiscites The Commission on Elections shall within fifteen (15) days from the approval of this Organic Act, promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the conduct of the plebiscites. The amount necessary for the conduct of the plebiscites shall be charged against any savings of the appropriations of the Commission on Elections and any deficiency thereof, shall be augmented from the contingent fund. Section 16. Zone of Peace and Development. - The Special Zone of Peace and Development in the Southern Philippines, the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development, and the Consultative Assembly created under Executive Order No. 371 dated October 2, 1996, are deemed abolished and shall cease to exist of the date of the approval of this Organic Act in the said plebiscites. If this Organic Act is rejected in the said plebiscites, the aforementioned bodies shall continue to exist only in the four (4) provinces constituting the present ARMM and in the provinces and cities that opt to join the expanded autonomous region until abolished by law. Section 17. Separability Clause. - The provisions of this Organic Act are hereby declared to be separate and in the event one or more of such provisions are held unconstitutional, the validity of other provisions shall not be affected thereby. Section 18. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, and other issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Organic Act, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Section 19. Effectivity Clause. - This Organic Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its complete publication in at least two national newspapers of general
circulation and one local newspaper of general circulation in the autonomous region.
Disomangcop vs. Datumanong (2004)

Facts: Pursuant to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6734, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created. Then President Corazon C. Aquino issued several Executive Orders placing seven government agencies, including the DPWH, under the control and supervision of the Autonomous Regional Government of the ARMM. In 1999, then DPWH Secretary Gregorio R. Vigilar issued D.O. 119 which shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur. In 2001, then President Joseph E. Estrada approved and signed into law R.A. 8999 which established an engineering district in the First District of Lanao Del Sur. Congress later passed R. A. No. 9054 which amended and expanded the organic act of the ARMM. It was later ratified in a plebiscite. Petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang filed the instant petition, in their capacity as Officer-in-Charge and District Engineer/Engineer II, respectively, of the First Engineering District of the DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur. Petitioners sought the following reliefs: (1) to annul and set aside D.O. 119; (2) to prohibit respondent DPWH Secretary from implementing D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999 and releasing funds for public works projects intended for Lanao del Sur and Marawi City to the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office and other administrative regions of DPWH; and (3) to compel the Secretary of the DBM to release all funds for public works projects intended for Marawi City and the First District of Lanao del Sur to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur only. They pointed out that the challenged D.O. has tasked the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office with functions that have already been devolved
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to the DPWH-ARMM First District in Lanao del Sur. Issues:
Engineering
1. WON
R.A No. 8999 is unconstitutional 2. WON D.O. No. 119 is invalid 3. WON the public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion Held: 1. It is unnecessary to declare R. A. No. 8999 as unconstitutional because it, in the first place, never became operative. The first ARMM Organic Act, R.A. 6074, as implemented by E.O. 426, devolved the functions of the DPWH in the ARMM which includes Lanao del Sur (minus Marawi City at the time) to the Regional Government. By creating an office with previously devolved functions, R.A. 8999, in essence, sought to amend R.A. 6074. The amendatory law should therefore first obtain the approval of the people of the ARMM before it could validly take effect. Absent compliance with this requirement, R.A. 8999 has not even become operative. Upon the other hand, the amendatory R.A. 9054 advances the constitutional grant of autonomy by detailing the powers of the ARG covering, one of which is its jurisdiction over regional urban and rural planning. R.A. 8999, however, ventures to reestablish the National Government's jurisdiction over infrastructure programs in Lanao del Sur. R.A. 8999 is patently inconsistent with R.A. 9054, and it destroys the latter law's objective. Clearly, R. A. 8999 is antagonistic to and cannot be reconciled with both ARMM Organic Acts. It contravenes true decentralization which is the essence of regional autonomy. And by regional autonomy, the framers of the Constitution intended it to mean meaningful and authentic regional autonomy. To this end, Section 16, Article X limits the power of the President over autonomous regions. The
provision also curtails the power of Congress over autonomous regions. The diminution of Congress' powers over autonomous regions was confirmed in Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, wherein the Court held that the omission (of as may be provided by law) signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from Congress and to break Congress' 'control' over local government affairs. The challenged law creates an office with functions and powers which, by virtue of E.O. 426, have been previously devolved to the DPWH-ARMM, First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur. The use of the word powers in E.O. 426 manifests an unmistakable case of devolution. 2. YES. D.O. 119 is violative of the provisions of E.O. 426. The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the same powers, is a duplication of the DPWHARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur formed under the aegis of E.O. 426. The department order, in effect, takes back powers which have been previously devolved under the said E.O. The DPWH's order, like spring water, cannot rise higher than its source of powerthe Executive. Further, in its repealing clause, R.A. 9054 states that all laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, and other issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Organic Act, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. With the repeal of E.O. 124 which is the basis of D.O. 119, it necessarily follows that D.O. 119 was also rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts. 3. YES. Public respondents implemented R.A. 8999 despite its inoperativeness and repeal. They also put in place and maintained the DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office in accordance with D.O. 119 which has been rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts. Disposition: prohibition Petition granteda writ of was issued commanding
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respondents to desist from implementing R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119.

N.B.: Regional Autonomy Under R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054 The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the separate development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions. These cultures, as a matter of right, must be allowed to flourish. Autonomy, as a national policy, recognizes the wholeness of the Philippine society in its ethnolinguistic, cultural, and even religious diversities. It strives to free Philippine society of the strain and wastage caused by the assimilationist approach. Policies emanating from the legislature are invariably assimilationist in character despite channels being open for minority representation. As a result, democracy becomes an irony to the minority group. Regional autonomy is also a means towards solving existing serious peace and order problems and secessionist movements. Parenthetically, autonomy, decentralization and regionalization, in international law, have become politically acceptable answers to intractable problems of nationalism, separatism, ethnic conflict and threat of secession. However, the creation of autonomous regions does not signify the establishment of a sovereignty distinct from that of the Republic, as it can be installed only within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. Regional autonomy is the degree of selfdetermination exercised by the local government unit vis--vis the central government. In international law, the right to selfdetermination need not be understood as a right to political separation, but rather as a complex net of legal-political relations between a certain people and the state authorities. It ensures the right of peoples to the necessary level of autonomy that would guarantee the support of their own cultural identity, the establishment of priorities by the community's internal decision-making processes and the management of collective matters by themselves.
Regional autonomy refers to the granting of basic internal government powers to the people of a particular area or region with least control and supervision from the central government. The objective of the autonomy system is to permit determined groups, with a common tradition and shared social-cultural characteristics, to develop freely their ways of life and heritage, exercise their rights, and be in charge of their own business. This is achieved through the establishment of a special governance regime for certain member communities who choose their own authorities from within the community and exercise the jurisdictional authority legally accorded to them to decide internal community affairs.
Abbas vs. COMELEC (1989)

Facts: This case relates to the plebiscite in 13 provinces and nine cities in Mindanao and Palawan scheduled on November 19, 1989, in implementation of R. A. No. 6734, the Organic Act of ARMM. Petitioners prayed that the Court: (1) enjoin the COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional. Petitioners argued that certain provisions of R. A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement, which is the covenant between the GRP and MNLF that took effect on December 23, 1976. It provided for the establishment of Autonomy in the southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines, enumerating the 13 provinces as areas of autonomy. Issue: WON R. A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
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1. Article II, section 1(1)22 makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained; 2. Some of the areas covered by the law do not share common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics; 3. Article XIX, section 1323 thereof grants the President the power to merge regions, a power which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the President Held: NO. The Court found it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the nature of the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine Government whether under public international or internal Philippine law. In the first place, it is now the Constitution itself that provides for the creation of the ARMM. The standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734, therefore, is what is so provided in the Constitution. 1. NO. Under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act
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shall be region.
included
in
the
autonomous
The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the 13 provinces and nine cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an ARMM and (2) which provinces and cities shall compromise it. The creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this. For if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose. It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units. 2. NO. Guided by the standards laid down by the Constitution, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law. 3. NO. What is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of administrative regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region, which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, which was made as part of the law of the land by P.D. Nos. 1 and 742. Administrative regions are not territorial
There is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.
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. . . Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided, however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.
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and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. Disposition: Petition dismissed.
Pandi vs. Court of Appeals (2002)

Facts: On August 9, 1993, Dr. Jarmila Macacua, Regional Director and Secretary of the DOH of the ARMM, issued a Memorandum designating Dr. Lampa Pandi, who was then DOH-ARMM Assistant Regional Secretary, as OIC of the IPHOAPGH, Lanao del Sur. In the same Memorandum, Macacua detailed Dr. Mamasao Sani, then the provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City. On September 15, 1993, Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan issued Office Order No. 07 designating Dr. Amer Saber also as OIC of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. Sani filed a complaint with the RTC challenging the Memorandum transferring him to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City, alleging that he is the holder of a permanent appointment as provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. Saber, on the other hand, filed with the CA a petition for quo warranto with prayer for preliminary injunction, claiming that he is the lawfully designated OIC of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. Meanwhile, on October 29, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued E.O. No. 133, transferring the powers and functions of the DOH in the region to the Regional Government of the ARMM. Macacua thus again issued a Memorandum reiterating Pandis designation as OIC of the IPHOAPGH, Lanao del Sur, as well as Sanis detail to the Regional Office of the DOHARMM in Cotabato City. Pandi and Macacua filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the issues had
become moot and academic. Pandi and Macacua cited as reason the enactment by the ARMM Regional Assembly of the Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 25, otherwise known as the ARMM Local Government Code, as well as the execution of the Memorandum of Agreement dated March 14, 1994 between the DOH of the National Government and the ARMM Regional Government. The CA held that Saber is the lawfully designated OIC of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, ruling that Lanao del Sur Governor Mahid Mutilan has the power and authority to appoint the provincial health officer under Section 478 of the LGC. Issues: 1. WON an incumbent provincial health officer can be assigned to another province and if so, who can order such assignment 2. Who between the Provincial Governor and the ARMM Secretary of Health can designate the OIC in the provincial health office of Lanao del Sur? 3. Who is empowered to appoint the provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur the Provincial Governor, the Regional Governor or the ARMM Secretary of Health? Held: 1. YES, by the Head of the Regional Department of Health. When Macacaua appointed Sani, the powers and functions of the DOH were not yet transferred to the Regional Government, and the Secretary of Health of the National Government still exercised the power to assign the provincial health officers in the ARMM. Consequently, the directive of Macacua detailing or assigning Sani to the Regional Office in Cotabato City is void. However, Macacua issued another Memorandum reiterating Sanis detail or assignment to the Regional Office in Cotabato City. This second Memorandum was issued after the issuance of E.O. No.
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133 which expressly transferred supervision and control over all functions and activities of the Regional Department of Health to the Head of the Regional Department of Health. The second detail or assignment of Sani to the Regional Office in Cotabato is within the authority of Macacua as Regional Secretary of Health. Thus, the second detail of Sani is valid. 2. The ARMM Secretary of Health. When Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan designated Saber as OIC of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, the provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur was still a national government official paid entirely from national funds. The provincial health officer was still appointed by the national Secretary of Health to a region and not to a province. The Secretary of Health was also the official authorized by law to assign the provincial health officer to any province within the region. Indisputably, Provincial Governor Mutilan had no power to designate Saber as Officer-in-Charge of IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. Consequently, the designation of Saber is void. The provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur became a provincial government official only after the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, which was enacted by the Regional Assembly on January 25, 1994 and approved by the Regional Governor on March 3, 1994. Prior to the ARMM Local Code but after the issuance of E.O. No. 133, the Regional Governor appointed the provincial health officer while the Regional Secretary of Health could assign the provincial health officer to any province within the ARMM. The Provincial Governor had no power to appoint or even designate the OIC of the provincial health office. The CAs reliance on Section 478 of the LGC as Provincial Governor Mutilans authority to appoint Saber is misplaced. Section 478, which provides that [T]he appointment of a health officer shall be mandatory for provincial, city and municipal governments, is not a grant of power to governors and mayors to appoint local health officers. It is simply a directive
that those empowered to appoint local health officers are mandated to do so. In short, the appointment of local health officers, being essential for public services, is a mandatory obligation on the part of those vested by law with the power to appoint them. Moreover, the LGC did not amend the Organic Act of 1989. 3. The Regional Secretary of Health. Macacua, as Regional Director and Regional Secretary of Health, designated Pandi OIC of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, on August 9, 1993 and again on November 6, 1993. The first designation is void since the Regional Secretary at that time did not yet exercise supervision and control over the provincial health offices of the ARMM. However, the second designation of Pandi is valid since at that time E. O. 133 had already been issued vesting in the Regional Secretary of Health supervision and control over all functions and activities of the DOH in the ARMM. The designation of Pandi, however, while valid is only temporary in nature, good until a new designation or a permanent appointment is made. As of November 6, 1993, Macacua was the official vested by law to exercise supervision and control over all provincial health offices in the ARMM. The Regional Secretary, by virtue of E.O. No. 133, assumed the administrative powers and functions of the Secretary of Health of the National Government with respect to provincial health offices within the ARMM. The official exercising supervision and control over an office has the administrative authority to designate, in the interest of public service, an OIC if the office becomes vacant. But after the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the Regional Secretary of Health lost the authority to make such a designation. Under the ARMM Local Code, the provincial health officer became for the first time an official of the provincial government even though he is appointed by the Regional Governor and draws his salary from regional funds. The power of supervision and control over the provincial health officer passed from the Regional Secretary to the Provincial Governor. From then on,
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the Provincial Governor began to exercise the administrative authority to designate an OIC in the provincial health office pending the appointment of a permanent provincial health officer. Disposition: Petition granted.
G. CORDILLERA ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 220 July 15, 1987 CREATING A CORDILLERA ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 1, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, there shall be created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras; WHEREAS, Section 15, Article X of the Constitution provides that the autonomous region in the Cordilleras shall consist of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of the Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines; WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 6, Article XVIII of the Constitution, the President has the power to continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened; WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 14, Article X of the Constitution, the President shall provide for regional development councils or other similar bodies composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives from non-governmental organizations within the regions for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units in the region; WHEREAS, the incumbent President is sympathetic to the common desire of the peoples of the Cordilleras to be immediately granted meaningful participation in the conduct of their affairs, in order to enable them to prepare for regional autonomy;
WHEREAS, the constitutional mandate for the creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras has been preceded by the movement for local autonomy and administrative decentralization before and since the period of authoritarian rule (September 1972 February 1986), as manifested by the work of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the 1976 resolution of governors and other leaders from the Cordilleras, and finally the regional autonomy representations at the 1986 Constitutional Commission; WHEREAS, on September 13, 1986, the President of the Philippines met with the representatives of the Cordillera Bodong Administration and the Cordillera People's Liberation Army, presided over the alasiw (exchange of peace tokens) to signify the sipat (cessation of hostilities), and acknowledged their aspirations for Cordillera autonomy; WHEREAS, the immediate creation of a Cordillera Administrative Region is a sound and reasonable measure by which the people of the Cordilleras can immediately participate in the pursuit of peace and development and enjoy the benefits thereof; WHEREAS, the Constitution envisions the building of a just and humane society, and the National Government is pursuing the goals of national reconciliation, peace, unity and development in the country; WHEREAS, pending the convening of the first Congress and the enactment of the organic act for a Cordillera autonomous region, there is an urgent need, in the interest of national security and public order, for the President to reorganize immediately the existing administrative structure in the Cordilleras to suit it to the existing political realities therein and the Government's legitimate concerns in the areas, without attempting to pre-empt the constitutional duty of the first Congress to undertake the creation of an autonomous region on a permanent basis; NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree: Sec. 1. Cordillera Administrative Region. There is hereby created a Cordillera Administrative Region, hereinafter referred to as the CAR.
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Sec. 2. Territorial Coverage. For purposes of the CAR, the region shall consist of the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, KalingaApayao and Mt. Province and the chartered city of Baguio. Until otherwise provided by the Cordillera Executive Board (CEB), the seat of the CAR shall be Baguio City. The National Government shall provide appropriate offices therefor. Sec. 3. Purposes. The CAR shall have the following purposes: (a) Administer the affairs of government in the region as defined in Section 4 and 5 below; (b) Accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units of the region; and (c) Prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Sec. 4. Scope of Authority and Responsibility. The CAR shall have authority and responsibility in the region over the following: (a) Regional administrative system; (b) Economic, social and cultural development; (c) Agricultural, commercial and industrial development and promotion of tourism; (d) Infrastructure development; (e) Urban and rural development, protection of ancestral domain and land reform; (f) Regional educational system, including the establishment and maintenance of educational institutions and the formulation of educational policies to cultivate the indigenous Cordillera cultures and inculcate traditional values; (g) Health, sports, welfare and social services; (h) Development of indigenous laws and political institutions, particularly those of direct democracy and collective leadership, as well as the promotion of indigenous institutions and processes for conflict resolution and dispute settlement;
(i) Preservation and enhancement of indigenous customs, traditions, languages and cultures; (j) Strengthening of the bodong system of tribal unity and cooperation; (k) Protection and preservation of the cultural identity, values, mores and norms of the various ethno-linguistic groups in the Cordilleras; (l) Promotion of social justice and protection of human rights, particularly the rights of women, children, the elderly and disadvantaged groups, as well as the rights of people's organizations; and (m) Such other matters as may be authorized by law or delegated by the President for the promotion of the general welfare. Sec. 5. Powers and Functions. The CAR shall coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the areas enumerated in Section 4. Accordingly, it shall be vested with, among others, the following powers and functions: (a) Coordinate with the local government units as well as with the executive departments of the National Government in the supervision of field offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the region; (b) Appoint, supervise, control and discipline personnel of the CAR and of such other offices as may be funded by it; (c) Manage and control funds, facilities and equipment appropriated for the CAR; (d) Advise the National Government matters affecting the Cordilleras; on
(e) Undertake studies towards codifying the customary laws of the tribes, including the pagtas of the bodong system; and (f) Promulgate and implement resolutions, rules and regulations necessary to achieve effectively the purposes of this Executive Order and to carry out the powers and functions of the CAR.
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Sec. 6. Peace and Regional Security. Within the framework of the Constitution and applicable laws, the restoration and maintenance of peace within the region shall be a major concern of the CAR. A regional security force shall be organized to assist in the defense and security of the region subject to guidelines issued for this purpose by the President after consultations with the CAR, other organizations, and appropriate agencies of the Government. The defense and security of the region shall be the responsibility of the National Government. Sec. 7. Structure of the CAR. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly and a Cordillera Executive Board. Sec. 8. The Cordillera Regional Assembly. Within the framework of the Constitution, laws and policies of the National Government, the Cordillera Regional Assembly shall be the policy-formulating body which shall articulate and harmonize the interests and aspirations of the people of the Cordilleras. It shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) representatives to be appointed according to the following guidelines: (a) Each municipality shall have one (1) representative; (b) Baguio City representatives; shall have ten (10)
among its members. The chairman shall be the titular head of the CAR. The President shall also appoint members from non- governmental organizations as well as representatives of the municipalities and of Baguio City upon nomination of their respective municipal and city councils. Sec. 9. Sessions. The Assembly shall convene once every year for a five-day regular session starting on the 25th day of April provided, however, that a regular session shall be held in 1987. The Chairman may call a special session as may be necessary. A special session may also be convened upon the initiative of the majority of all the members of the Assembly. During the regular session, the Assembly shall: a) Discuss the annual report of the Executive Board and the proposed budget for the CAR; b) Initiate Cordilleras; plans and programs for the
c) Discuss and resolve inter-tribal issues and conflicts; d) Formulate policies affecting the Cordilleras consistent with national and local laws; and e) Identify priority projects and development program for the region. The decisions of the Assembly shall be implemented by the Cordillera Executive Board. Sec. 10. The Cordillera Executive Board. The Cordillera Executive Board shall be the development body and implementing arm of the CAR. The President shall appoint the twenty-nine (29) regular members of the Board as follows: (a) Mayor of Baguio City and the five (5) Governors of the provinces enumerated in Section 2; (b) six (6) representatives from the Cordillera Bodong Administration, one of whom shall be its chief executive; (c) twelve (12) representatives from the different ethno-linguistic groups in the Cordillera; and (d) five (5) representatives from non-governmental organizations.
(c) The non-governmental organizations shall be entitled to a total of eighteen (18) representatives twelve (12) of whom shall come from the major non- governmental organizations in the region to be determined according to the size of their membership and six (6) from province based non-governmental organizations. (d) Each tribe shall send to the Assembly one (1) representative. Tribal representatives shall be chosen by tribes in a manner consonant with Constitution and in harmony with indigenous decision-making processes in Cordilleras. the the the the
The Assembly shall be headed by a Chairman who shall be appointed by the President from
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All regional directors of the line departments of the National Government shall be nonvoting ex-officio members of the Executive Board. Sec. 11. Executive Director. The Cordillera Executive Board shall be headed by a full-time Executive Board who shall be headed by a fulltime Executive Director who shall be appointed by the President from among its regular members. The Executive Director shall have the following functions: (a) Act on behalf of the President as Chief Executive Officer of the CAR; (b) Preside over the meetings of the Executive Board; (c) Initiate the proposed budget and annual report for the CAR for the approval of the Executive Board; (d) Supervise, control and discipline personnel of the Executive Board and of such other offices as may be funded by it; (e) Coordinate and supervise the Executive Committees and the Cordillera Bodong Administration; and (f) Perform all other functions assigned by law, the President, the Cordillera Regional Assembly or the Executive Board. Sec. 12. The Executive Committees. The Cordillera Executive Board may create executive committees to assist in the implementation of its powers and functions. Each committee shall be headed by a member of the Executive Board. Sec. 13. The Cordillera Bodong Administration. The Cordillera Bodong Administration shall be incorporated into the CAR as a commission and shall hereinafter be referred to as the CBA. In the territorial units where it is effective, the CBA shall have the following powers and responsibilities: (a) Promote respect for the customs and usages of the tribes concerned;
(b) Foster unity among the various communities in the Cordilleras and promote regional confederation; (c) Observe the traditional practice of direct democracy and collective leadership in the Cordilleras within the context of and in harmony with administrative mechanisms of the National Government; (d) Preserve and develop the communal social order and economic system; (e) Perform all functions of the Executive Committees referred to in Section 12; and (f) Perform such other functions as may be determined by the Executive Board. The definition and identification of the territorial units of the CBA shall be submitted to and confirmed by the Executive Board and adopted by the Assembly. The CBA shall be supervised by and be responsible to the Cordillera Executive Board. Sec. 14. CBA Budget. The CAR, through the Executive Board, shall allocate part of its budget for the operation of the CBA. Sec. 15. Compensation. The Chairman and members of the Assembly as well as the Executive Director and members of the Executive Board shall receive allowances and per diems as determined by the President in accordance with existing laws and regulations. The city mayor and governors who are members of the Board shall receive additional emoluments as may be allowed by law. The Chairman of the Assembly shall receive such additional allowances as may be necessary to perform the functions of his office. The Executive Director and the heads of the Executive Communities shall receive an annual compensation to be determined by the Executive Board. Sec. 16. Civil Service Rules and Regulations. For purposes of the CAR, exemptions from Civil Service rules and regulations may be provided by the Civil Service Commission.
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Sec. 17. Period of Existence. The CAR and its Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous regional government shall have been established and organized under an organic act passed by Congress in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution. Sec. 18. Term of Office. The term of office of the members and officers of the Assembly and Executive Board shall be coterminous with the period of existence of the CAR. The city mayor, the governors, and the regional directors shall hold office as members of the Executive Board only during the term for which they were elected and/or appointed. Sec. 19. Rules of Procedures. The Assembly and the Executive Board shall each adopt by a majority vote of their members their own rules of procedure as well as rules and regulations on discipline and privileges. They shall also prescribe rules and regulations regarding internal organization, sessions, meetings and quorum. Sec. 20. Projects. The CAR, through its Executive Board, shall monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local government projects in the region within the purview of Section 5(a) hereof. Sec. 21. Appropriations and Funds. There is hereby appropriated from available funds of the National Treasury the amount of five (5) million pesos for the operation of the CAR for the fiscal year 1987. Thereafter, an annual appropriation for its budget shall be included in the General Appropriations Act. The President and appropriate national departments and agencies shall make available sources of funds for priority physical, social and economic development programs and projects as recommended by the CAR. The collection, custody, use and disbursement of public funds in the CAR shall be governed by its resolutions, rules and regulations of the Executive Board consonant with national laws, rules and regulations. Sec. 22. Taxes and Resources. The CAR shall receive an equitable share of the taxes and other government revenues generated in the CAR territorial coverage. For this purpose, as part of the BIR allotment in the region, the
CAR and the local government units within the Cordillera Administrative Region's territorial coverage shall have at least fifty percent (50%) share of such taxes and other government revenues to be distributed as follows: ten percent (10%) to barangays, ten percent (10%) to municipalities, fifteen percent (15%) to provinces or cities, fifteen percent (15%) to the CAR. To ensure proper implementation of the principle of equitable sharing, the President shall direct the Department of Finance and appropriate national departments and agencies to coordinate with the CAR. Sec. 23. Grants, Donations, Gifts. Within the framework of pertinent laws and regulations, the CAR shall be authorized to receive grants, donations or gifts, provided that such grants, donations or gifts shall be administered, obligated and disbursed in accordance with the terms thereof, or in the absence of such terms, in such manner as a majority of the executive Board may determine. Sec. 24. Relationship with the National Government. The President shall have the power of general supervision over the CAR and the local government units therein and shall issue the appropriate guidelines therefor. The President may also call upon the appropriate executive departments and agencies of the National Government to assist the CAR as may be necessary. The Executive Director shall submit a semiannual report to the President. Sec. 25. Transitory Provisions. 1) The Executive Board shall conduct a study on the territorial coverage of the Cordillera autonomous region to be established under an organic act to be passed by the Congress under Section 15 and 18, Article X, of the Constitution. This territorial coverage may include provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographic areas contiguous to the territory defined under Section 2. 2) The President may call upon the Assembly to assist her in constituting the Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission. Consonant with Section 3(c) hereof, the CAR shall contribute in a meaningful and appropriate manner to the work of the
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Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission and in the preparation of the organic act by Congress for the Cordillera autonomous region. 3) Pursuant to Section 2, the main offices of the CAR shall be located at the Cordillera House in Baguio City until otherwise determined by the Cordillera Executive Board. Sec. 26. Separability Clause. The provisions of this Executive Order are hereby declared to be separable, and in the event any one or more of such provisions are held unconstitutional, such shall not affect the validity of other provisions. Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. For purposes of the CAR and for the duration of its existence, and all laws, acts, presidential decrees, executive orders, proclamations and/or administrative regulations which are inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly. Sec. 28. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately upon signing and publication as required by law.
the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly created under E. O. No. 220. On March 8, 1990, Congress enacted R. A. No. 6861 setting the elections in the Cordillera Autonomous Region of Ifugao on the first Monday of March 1991. The following day, the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the nonratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The COMELEC merely noted said petition. On March 30, 1990, the President issued A. O. No. 160 declaring among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all the offices created under E. O. No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic Act. The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and R. A. No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit. Issue: WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region Held: NO. The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, must then, be applied in this case. Based on Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution, the keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that region is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term region used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is
Ordillo vs. COMELEC (1990)

Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to R.A. No. 6766 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The official COMELEC results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. On the same date, the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum for the President reiterating the COMELEC resolution. Before these, the Executive Secretary on February 5, 1990 issued a Memorandum granting authority to wind up
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supported by the fact that the 13 regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. (Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972)) To become part of a region, Ifugao must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case. Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 strengthens the petitioner's position: Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the R. A. No. 6766 provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government and local government units. It further provides that the Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay within the Autonomous Region.
powers over the province of Ifugao. And since Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, populationwise, it would have too many government officials for so few people. Article XII, Section 10 of the law creates a Regional Planning and Development Board composed of the Cordillera Governor, all the provincial governors and city mayors or their representatives, two members of the Cordillera Assembly, and members representing the private sector. The Board has a counterpart in the provincial level called the Provincial Planning and Development Coordinator. If it takes only one person in the provincial level to perform such functions while on the other hand it takes an entire Board to perform almost the same tasks in the regional level, it could only mean that a larger area must be covered at the regional level.
Article XXI, Section 13 (B) (c) alloting the huge amount of P10 M to the Regional Government for its initial organizational requirements cannot be construed as funding only a lone and small province.
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area. Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of R. A. No. 6766 vest the legislative power in the Cordillera Assembly whose members shall be elected from regional assembly districts apportioned among provinces and the cities. If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera Assembly shall then be elected only from the province of Ifugao creating an awkward predicament of having two legislative bodies exercising their legislative
Section 16 of Article V calls for a Regional Commission on Appointments with the Speaker as Chairman and members coming from different provinces and cities in the Region. Under the respondents view, the Commission would have a Chairman and only one member. It would never have a quorum.
Section 3 of Article VI calls for cabinet members, as far as practicable, to come from various provinces and cities of the Region. Section 1 of Article VII creates a system of tribal courts for the various indigenous cultural communities of the Region. Section 9 of Article XV requires the development of a common regional language based upon the various languages and dialects in the region which regional
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language in turn is expected to enrich the national language. Moreover, the province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of the total population of the areas enumerated in Article I, Section 2 (b) of R. A. No. 6766 which include Benguet, Mountain Province, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao and Baguio City. It has the second smallest number of inhabitants from among the provinces and city above mentioned. The total population of the five provinces and one city is 1,332,000 according to the 1990 Census. The Courts decision in Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC is not applicable in the case at bar, contrary to the view of the Secretary of Justice. This case established the rule to follow on which provinces and cities shall comprise the autonomous region. However, nothing in the Abbas decision deals with the issue on whether an autonomous region could exist despite the fact that only one province or one city is to constitute it. Disposition: Petition granted.
3. WON E.O. No. 220 infringed upon the local autonomy of the provinces and city composing the CAR Held: 1. NO. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. Because the procedure for the creation of the autonomus region as outlined in the Constitution is complex and takes time, the President saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime. E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. The bodies it created merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and NGOs in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras. 2. NO. The CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations. The CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered areas. Considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the CAR and the indispensable participation of the line departments of the National Government, the CAR may be considered as a regional coordinating agency of the National Government. 3. NO. Local autonomy in the Constitution refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or the decentralization of government authority. On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just
Cordillera Broad Coalition Commission on Audit (1990)
vs.
Facts: E.O. No. 220, issued by President Corazon Aquino in the exercise of her legislative powers, created the CAR to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Several consolidated petitions assailed the constitutionality of the E.O. on the ground that it: 1) preempted the enactment of an organic act by the Congress; 2) contravened the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political subdivision; 3) breached the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces and city which compose the CAR. Issues: 1. WON E.O. No. 220 is unconstitutional
2. WON the CAR is a territorial and political subdivision
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administrative autonomy in these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions (Art. X, sec. 18).
H. METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

Section 11, Article X, Constitution. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executive and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination.
Citing the Sangalang cases, petitioner MMDA claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. Issue: WON the MMDA has the mandate to open a private road to public traffic Held: NO. The MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a special metropolitan political subdivision as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the seven basic services. Its powers are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is nothing in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. All its functions are administrative in nature as are actually summed up in the charter24 itself . Contrary to petitioners claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati and the MMC. The MMDA notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening. Petitioner MMDA
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MMDA vs. Bel-Air Villages Association (2000)

Facts: On December 30, 1995, respondent Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) received from petitioner MMDA, through its Chairman, a notice requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. Respondent instituted against petitioner before the RTC of Makati City an action for injunction, enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and the demolition of the perimeter wall. The TC denied issuance of a preliminary injunction. Respondent questioned the denial before the CA, which conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune Street. The CA issued a preliminary injunction and thereafter rendered a decision finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. The Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was, hence, the recourse to the SC.
Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. -- x x x. The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters.
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simply relied on its authority under its charter to rationalize the use of roads. Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the scope of transport and traffic management. But by no stretch of the imagination can this be interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinancemaking power, much less police power. Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, P. D. No. 824, the charter of the MMC, vested it greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA, such as the power to review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of cities and municipalities within Metropolitan Manila as well the exclusive powers to impose taxes and pass ordinances with penal sanctions. Moreover, the character of the MMDA as a mere administrative body is affirmed by the debate in Congress when the H.B. from which R.A. No. 7924 originated was first taken up by the Committee on Local Governments in the HOR. Said Hon. Ciriaco Alfelor, the committee chairman, the MMDA will not possess any political power. Disposition: Petition denied.
N.B.: The MMDA With the passage of R. A. No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a special development and administrative region and the administration of metrowide basic services affecting the region placed under MMDA. Metro-wide services are those which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual LGUs comprising Metro Manila. There are seven basic metro-wide services and the scope of these services cover the following: 1) development planning; 2) transport and traffic management; 3) solid waste disposal and management; 4) flood control and sewerage management; 5) urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter services; 6) health and sanitation,
urban protection and pollution control; and 7) public safety. The implementation of the MMDAs plans, programs and projects is undertaken by the LGUs, national government agencies, accredited peoples organizations, NGOs, and the private sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For this purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts, memoranda of agreement and other cooperative arrangements with these bodies for the delivery of the required services within Metro Manila. The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The Council is composed of the mayors of the component cities and municipalities, the president of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors League and the president of the Metro Manila Councilors League. The Council is headed by a Chairman who is appointed by the President and vested with the rank of cabinet member. As the policy-making body of the MMDA, the Metro Manila Council approves metro-wide plans, programs and projects, and issues the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of said plans; it approves the annual budget of the MMDA and promulgates the rules and regulations for the delivery of basic services, collection of service and regulatory fees, fines and penalties.
MMDA vs. Garin (2005)

Facts: Respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR). His drivers license was confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila. The TVR directed him to report to the MMDA Traffic Operations Center Port Area Manila after 48 hours from date of apprehension. It was also stated therein that criminal case shall be filed for failure to redeem license after 30 days. Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary injunction, contending that, in the absence of any IRR, Sec. 5(f) of R.A. No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The respondent further contended that the
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provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority. The TC rendered the assailed decision in favor of respondent. In its appeal before the SC, the MMDA argued that Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 was validly passed in the presence of a quorum. Moreover, it asserted that the basis for the summary confiscation of licenses is Sec. 5(f) of R.A. No. 7924 itself, and that such power is self-executory. Meanwhile, on August 12, 2004, the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani Fernando, implemented Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for the use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring motorists are issued an MTT and that traffic enforcers may no longer confiscate drivers licenses as a matter of course in cases of traffic violations. Issue: WON Section 5(f) of R.A. No. 7924, which authorizes the MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations, is valid Held: The case has been rendered moot and academic by the implementation of Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004. The petitioner, however, is not precluded from implementing any scheme that would entail confiscating drivers licenses. But for the proper implementation of MMDAs future programs, the SC deemed it appropriate to make the following observations: 1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the exercise of its police power. The petitioner correctly pointed out that a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted by the state, which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its police power, in the interest of the public
safety and welfare, subject to procedural due process requirements.
the
It is the legislature, in the exercise of police power, which has the power and responsibility to regulate how and by whom motor vehicles may be operated on the state highways. 2. The MMDA is not vested with police power. In MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., the SC held that R.A. No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature. Tracing the legislative history of R.A. No. 7924 creating the MMDA, the SC concluded in that case that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power, and, unlike its predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. 3. Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations. The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or nonmoving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4136[18] and P.D. No. 1605[19] to the contrary
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notwithstanding, and that (f)or this purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature, the petitioner is not precluded and in fact is duty-bound to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs. This is consistent with the ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a development authority created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector, which may enforce, but not enact, ordinances. This is also consistent with the fundamental rule of statutory construction that a statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it. Disposition: Petition dismissed.
panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day. (c) Candidates for the position of Mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day. (d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day. (e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day. (f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
Abella vs. COMELEC (1991)

Facts: Petitioner Benjamin P. Abella was the official candidate of the LP for provincial governor of Leyte in the local election held on February 1, 1988. The private respondent Adelina Y. Larrazabal is the wife of Emeterio V. Larrazabal, the original candidate of the Lakas ng BansaPDP-Laban who was disqualified by the COMELEC on January 18, 1988, for lack of residence. The day before the election, Adelina filed her own COC in substitution of her husband. The following day Silvestre de la Cruz, a registered voter of Tacloban City, filed a petition to disqualify her for alleged false statements in her certificate of candidacy regarding her residence. De la Cruz came to the SC Court, which issued a TRO, enjoining the provincial board of canvassers of Leyte from proclaiming Larrazabal as the winning candidate in the event that she obtains the winning margin of votes. Petitioner Abella, after raising objections during the canvass of the election returns, seasonably elevated them to the COMELEC. He later filed a complaint with the Law Department of the COMELEC charging the
IX. MUNICIPAL OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES A. ELECTIVE OFFICIALS 1. QUALIFICATIONS

SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. (b) Candidates for the position of governor, vicegovernor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or Mayor, vicemayor or member of the sangguniang
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private respondent with falsification and misrepresentation of her residence in her COC. The Second Division of the COMELEC upheld all the challenged rulings of the provincial board of canvassers, mostly on the ground that the objection raised were merely formal and did not affect the validity of the returns or the ballots. Upon appeal, the SC affirmed the resolution of the Second Division and ordered the COMELEC to directly hear and decide the disqualification case against Larrazabal. In view of this ruling, the COMELEC lifted its TRO against Adelinas proclamation paving her assumption to the Office of Governor of Leyte while the hearings in the disqualification case continued. Later, the second division of the COMELEC in a 2-1 vote rendered a decision disqualifying Larrazabal as governor. This decision was affirmed by the Commission en banc in a resolution which, at the same time, disallowed Abellas proclamation as governor of Leyte. The position of petitioners De la Cruz and Abella was that Larrazabal is neither a resident nor a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte as she claimed but a resident and registered voter of Ormoc City, a component city of the province of Leyte but independent of the province pursuant to Section 12, Article X of the Constitution. On the other hand, respondent Larrazabal maintained that she was a resident and a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte. Issues: 1. WON the disqualification of Larrazabal was proper on the ground of failing to meet the residence requirement 2. WON the prohibition against the registered voteres of independent component cities and highly urbanized cities from electing provincial officials necessarily means a prohibition of the registered voters to be elected as provincial officials
3. WON Abella, who obtained the second highest number of votes, should be installed as regular Governor of Leyte Held: 1. YES. As regards the principle of animus revertendi, the Court ruled in the case of Faypon v. Quirino that the determination of a persons legal residence or domicile largely depends upon intention which may be inferred from his acts, activities and utterances. There is no evidence to prove that the petitioner temporarily left her residence in Kananga, Leyte in 1975 to pursue any calling, profession or business. What is clear is that she established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considers herself a resident therein. The intention of animus revertendi not to abandon her residence in Kananga, Leyte, therefore, is not present. The fact that she occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte through the years does not signify an intention to continue her residence therein. It is common among us Filipinos to often visit places where we formerly resided specially so when we have left friends and relatives therein. Anent the issue of whether or not the petitioner is a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, she insists that she is such a registered voter based on the following antecedents: 1) She cancelled her registration in Ormoc City on November 25, 1987, and 2) she then transferred her registration to Kananga, Leyte on November 25, 1987 by registering thereat and 3) she later voted on election day (February 1, 1988) in Kananga, Leyte. The evidence, however, shows that her supposed cancellation of registration in Ormoc City and transfer of registration in Kananga, Leyte, is not supported by the records. As found by the COMELEC, her story is marked by so many bizarre cirumtances not consistent with the ordinary course of events or the natural behavior of persons. For one, it was only
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two weeks after the election day that the Registrar certified for the first time that there were two voters lists, the first without the names of the Larrazabals and the second, submitted by the Chairman of the Board for Precinct which contained the spouses Larrazabals' names. 2. YES. Section 12, Article X25 of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from highly-urbanized cities, component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are independent of the province. In the same provision, it provides for other component cities within a province whose charters do not provide a similar prohibition. Necessarily, component cities like Ormoc City whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are treated like highly urbanized cities which are outside the supervisory power of the province to which they are geographically attached. This independence from the province carries with it the prohibition or mandate directed to their registered voters not to vote and be voted for the provincial elective offices. Moreover, Section 89 of R. A. 17926, independent of the constitutional provision, prohibits registered voters of Ormoc City from voting and being voted for elective offices in the province of Leyte. The phrase shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the provincial governor
25
and the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte connotes two prohibitions one, from running for and the second, from voting for any provincial elective official. 3. NO. The voters of the province voted for Larrazabal in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. In the Frivaldo and Labo cases, this is precisely the reason why the candidates who obtained the second highest number of votes were not allowed to assume the positions vacated. Disposition: Petitions dismissed.
Frivaldo vs. COMELEC (1989)

Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter and its President, Salvador Estuye filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the US on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The League, moreover, was not a proper party because it was not a voter.
Sec. 12, Art. X, Constitution. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
26
Sec. 89. Election of provincial governor and members of the Provincial Board of the members of the Provincial Board of the Province of Leyte The qualified voters of Ormoc City shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte.
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The respondent COMELEC decided to set the case for hearing on the merits. Frivaldo then came to the SC in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the COMELEC orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. In his Reply, Frivaldo cited the Nottebohm Case, where a German national's naturalization in Liechtenstein was not recognized because it had been obtained for reasons of convenience only. He also contended that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270 because the Special Committee provided for therein had not yet been constituted. Issue: WON was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988 Held: NO. Article XI, Section 9 of the Constitution states that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution allegiance at all times. Section 42 of the LGC specifically requires that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. In the COC he filed, Frivaldo described himself as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a US citizen of the United States in 1983 per the certification from the US District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California. This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. Nevertheless, he claims it was
forced on him as a measure of protection from the persecution of the Marcos government. However, his feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. There were many other Filipinos in the US similarly situated as Frivaldo, like the martyred Ninoy Aquino, but they did not take the oath of allegiance to the US, unlike the petitioner. The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. That case is irrelevant because it dealt with a conflict between the nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third state is involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the US is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its national. If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. Frivaldo claims that by actively participating in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the US. Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the United States as his adopted country. Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines. At best, what might have happened was that he became a stateless individual. Frivaldo's contention regarding the nonformation of the Special Committee under LOI 270 seems to suggest that the lack of that body rendered his repatriation unnecessary. This argument is specious. It would allow all Filipinos who have renounced this country to claim back their abandoned citizenship without formally
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rejecting their adopted state. Surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings. The argument that the petition filed with the COMELEC should be dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. The fact that Frivaldo was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse the patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. This rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. Disposition: Petition dismissed.
considering that the petition for quo warranto against him was not filed on time. Private respondent Luis L. Lardizabal denied that the filing fee was paid out of time. When he filed his petition, the COMELEC treated it as a pre-proclamation controversy. No docket fee was collected although it was offered. It was only on February 8, 1988, that the COMELEC decided to treat his petition as solely for quo warranto. Issues: 1. WON Labo Jr. was a citizen of the Philippines on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988 2. WON Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest number of votes in the election, can replace Labo Jr. as mayor Held: 1. NO. The petitioner was not, on the on the day of the local elections, a citizen of the Philippines. He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City. There are two administrative decisions on the question of the petitioner's citizenship. The first was rendered by the COMELEC on May 12, 1982, and found the petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines. The second was rendered by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) on September 13, 1988, and held that the petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines. The latter decision took into account the official statement of the Australian Government that the petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of that date by reason of his naturalization in 1976. The petitioner did not question the authenticity of the above evidence. Neither did he deny that he obtained an Australian passport which he used in coming back to the Philippines, when he declared before the immigration authorities that he was an alien. He later asked for the change of his status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen. He also
Labo Jr. vs. COMELEC (1989)

Facts: Petitioner Ramon Labo Jr. was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City on January 20, 1988. The petition for quo warranto was filed by the private respondent on January 26, 1988, but no filing fee was paid on that date. This fee was finally paid on February 10, 1988, or 21 days after his proclamation. Petitioner came to the SC, asking that COMELEC be restrained from looking into the question of his citizenship as a qualification for his office. The allegation that he is a foreigner, he said, is not the issue. The issue is whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter,
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categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia in a number of sworn statements voluntarily made by him. The decision of the COMELEC quaintly dismissed all these acts as mistakes that did not divest the petitioner of his citizenship. This ruling is totally baseless. The petitioner is not an unlettered person who was not aware of the consequences of his acts, let alone the fact that he was assisted by counsel when he performed these acts. The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance. The petitioners claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual national is a specious argument. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost and among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. All of these are applicable to the petitioner. Moreover, it does not appear on record that he has reacquired his Philippine citizenship either by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. Qualifications for office are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. Here, the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, was not qualified to continue serving as such. 2. NO.
The Court reversed its latest ruling on the issue in the 1985 case of Santos vs. COMELEC, reverting to its ruling in the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office. However, in the absence of a statute which asserts a contrary legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. Disposition: Petitioner was declared not a citizen of the Philippines and disqualified from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City.
Labo Jr. vs. COMELEC and Ortega (1992)

Facts: Shortly after petitioner Ramon Labo Jr. filed his COC, petitioner Roberto C. Ortega filed on March 26, 1992, a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the COMELEC, seeking to cancel Labo's COC on the ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated therein that he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Respondent COMELEC rendered a resolution on May 9, 1992 canceling Labos COC. Labo filed a motion to stay implementation of said resolution until after he shall have raised the matter before the SC. The COMELEC resolved that Labo may still continue to be voted as candidate for City Mayor of Baguio City on May 11, 1992, subject to the final outcome of the case in the event the issue is elevated to the SC either on appeal or certiorari. Labo filed the instant petition for review with prayer, among others, for a judgment declaring him as a Filipino citizen. Ortega, on the other hand, filed a petition for
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mandamus praying for the implementation of the COMELECs May 9, 1992 resolution. Labo contended that he is a Filipino citizen and that he can prove his Filipino citizenship. He also submitted that no finding was made either by the Commission on Immigration or the COMELEC as regards his specific intent to renounce his Philippine citizenship. Issues: 1. WON Labo is a citizen of the Philippines 2. WON disqualification of Labo entitles Ortega, who received the next highest number of votes, to be proclaimed as the winning candidate for mayor Held: 1. NO. Labo did not submit in the instant case any evidence, if there be any, to prove his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship either before the SC or the COMELEC. On this score alone, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by COMELEC in cancelling his COCC and declaring that he is not a Filipino citizen pursuant to the Courts ruling in the 1989 case of Labo v. COMELEC. Petitioner Labo claims, however, that Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code operates as a legislatively mandated special repatriation proceeding and that it allows his proclamation as the winning candidate since the resolution disqualifying him was not yet final at the time the election was held. This argument is strained, quixotic and untenable. In the first place, Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646.27 Based
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on this provision, the COMELEC can legally suspend the proclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception of the winning number of votes notwithstanding, especially so where he failed to present any evidence before the COMELEC to support his claim of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Petitioner Labo's status has not changed in the case at bar. Despite the favorable recommendation by the Solicitor General on his application for repatriation, the Special Committee on Naturalization had yet acted upon said application. In the absence of any official action or approval by the proper authorities, a mere application for repratriation, does not amount to an automatic reacquisition of the applicant's Philippine citizenship. 2. NO. While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect. Citing Abella vs. COMELEC and the earlier Labo vs. COMELEC, the Court ruled that it is incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified, the votes intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be considered null and void. This would amount to disenfranchising the electorate. The people of Baguio City opted to elect petitioner Labo in the honest belief that Labo was then qualified. Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to be disqualified and cannot assume the office.
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or the Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
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The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity of their votes by notoriously throwing away their votes. But this is not the situation obtaining here. It has not been shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by the COMELEC itself to be voted for as its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course to Labo's COC had not yet become final. As a consequence of petitioners' ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred. This should be filled by the vice-mayor, in accordance with Sec. 44 of the LGC. Disposition: Petitions dismissed. J. Gutierrez Jr. (Concurring and dissenting): Labos oath of allegiance to Australia was null and void because he was not qualified to be an Australian citizen. This is clear from the certification of Australia's Embassy officials. Labo's taking an oath as citizen of a foreign country was based on his marriage to a citizen of that country. It turns out, however, that Labo's marriage was bigamous and void because his Australian wife had an existing valid marriage. Not being married to her, Labo could not become an Australian. Not being qualified to become an Australian citizen, his oath of allegiance to that country was meaningless act. It should not deprive him of his Philippine citizenship.
Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. Petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines, and that his COC be cancelled. The Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution granting the petition. The MR filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said date while Lee placed second. The Comelec en banc affirmed the Resolution of the Second Division. Lee filed a supplemental petition praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon. In an order, the Comelec en banc directed the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate. Accordingly, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon. Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying for the annulment of the proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 had been granted. As such, when the said Comelec order was released and received by Frivaldo, there was no more legal impediment to his proclamation. The Comelec First Division promulgated a resolution proclaiming Frivaldo as the governor. Issues: 1. WON the repatriation of Frivaldo is valid and legal; If so, WON it seasonably cured his lack of citizenship; If not, WON it may be given retroactive effect 2. WON Frivaldo's judicially declared disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship is a continuing bar to his eligibility to run
Frivaldo vs. COMELEC (1996)

Facts: Private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his COC for the office of Governor of
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3. WON the proclamation of Lee, a runnerup in the election is valid and legal Held: 1. YES. The issue of citizenship must be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the election date or the date the COC was filed. The repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994. Frivaldo was naturalized as an American citizen on January 20, 1983. In Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections (June 23, 1989), the SC, by reason of such naturalization, declared Frivaldo not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. On February 28, 1992, the RTC of Manila granted the petition for naturalization of Frivaldo. However, the SC in, Republic of the Philippines vs. De la Rosa, et al (June 6,1994) overturned this grant, and Frivaldo was declared not a citizen of the Philippines and ordered to vacate his office. On the basis of this latter SC ruling, the Comelec disqualified Frivaldo. Hem however, claims to have been successfully repatriated. The presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo was not successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior to his naturalization in the US a naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his country to offer once more his talent and services to his people.
Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) beganhe was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications. So too, even from a literal construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the LGC speaks of Qualifications of Elective Officials, not of candidates. The law intended citizenship to be a qualification distinct from being a voter, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a separate qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification, not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter in the area or territory he seeks to govern. Frivaldos repatriation retroacts to the date of his application. It is true that under the Civil Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is curative or remedial in nature or when it creates new rights. A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new remedy (i.e. for Filipino women who had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and who could not, under the existing law (C. A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation until after the termination of their marital status. 2. NO. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a persons future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire or lose his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law.
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3. NO. There has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of Sorsogon was fully aware of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, in other words, that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible. Lee was obviously not the choice of the people of Sorsogon. As held in the case of Labo, the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. Disposition: Petitions dismissed.
Held: NO. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their father's' country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition. Dual allegiance, as provided in Article IV, 5 of the Constitution, is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. Unlike those with dual allegiance, it should suffice for candidates with dual citizenship if, upon the filing of their COCs, they elect Philippine citizenship, considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. The record shows that Manzano was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus
Mercado vs. Manzano (1999)

Facts: Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice-mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Manzano ranked first in the election with 103,853 votes against Mercados 100,894. The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the US. In its resolution, Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the COC of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen. The COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution reversing the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati. The board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati. Issue: WON Manzano should be disqualified from running for vice-mayor for having dual citizenship
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sanguinis, while the US follows the doctrine of jus soli, at birth at least, he was a national both states. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law, so that now he is solely a Philippine national. The COMELEC en banc was incorrect in holding that by voting in Philippine elections Manzano renounced his American citizenship. It must have had in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the US28. This provision, was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. SC in Afroyim v. Rusk as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations. Nevertheless, in the COC that he filed, Manzano declared himself to be a naturalborn Filipino citizen. In effect, he elected Philippine citizenship and renounced his American citizenship. No law requires the election by dual citizens of Philippine citizenship be made upon age of majority. There is, therefore, no merit in Mercados contention that renunciation was ineffective because Manzano filed the said COC when he was already 37 years old, long after he has reached the age of majority. Finally, there is nothing much to be made of the fact that Manzano admitted that he is registered as an American citizen in the BID and that he holds an American passport. Until the filing of his COC on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. Disposition: Petition dismissed.
Facts: Petitioner Teodulo M. Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he joined the U.S. Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen. Even after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the United States. In 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the U.S. Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 to the Special Committee on Naturalization. His application was approved on November 7, 2000, and, on November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. His application was approved by the Election Registration Board. On February 27, 2001, he filed his COC stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for two years. On March 5, 2001, respondent Neil M. Alvarez, who was the incumbent mayor of Oras and who was running for re-election, sought the cancellation of petitioners COC on the ground that the latter had made a material misrepresentation by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided therein for only about six months. The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case before the elections. Meanwhile, petitioner was voted for and received the highest number of votes. He was proclaimed mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. He subsequently took his oath of office. Later, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted private respondents petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioners COC. Issue: WON Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for at least one year before the elections held on May 14, 2001
Coquilla vs. COMELEC (2002)

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"A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory."
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Held: NO. The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence, that is, the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). First, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen. From then on and when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien. As held in Caasi v. Court of Appeals, immigration to the U.S. by virtue of a greencard constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. Second, it is also not true that petitioner reestablished residence in this country in 1998 when he came back to prepare for the mayoralty elections. The only evidence of petitioners status when he entered the country on four occasions from 1998-2000 is the statement Philippine Immigration [] Balikbayan in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. Under 2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a foreign country and returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is entitled to a visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one year. When petitioner entered the country on the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to have waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as
a citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. This is even bolstered by the fact that he did not obtain an Immigrant Visa and a corresponding Immigrant Certificate of Residence by which he could have waived his non-resident status. Thus, he clearly lacked the requisite residency. Third, petitioners registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in January 2001 is not conclusive of his residency despite 117 of the Omnibus Election Code, which requires that a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. As held in Nuval v. Guray, however, registration as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent case questioning a candidates lack of residency. Disposition: Petition dismissed.
2. DISQUALIFICATIONS
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; (c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic; (d) Those with dual citizenship; (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad; (f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and (g) The insane or feeble-minded.
Caasi vs. Court of Appeals (1990)
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Facts: Two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective; the disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the private respondent Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the U. S., not of Bolinao. He was elected to said position in the local elections of January 18, 1988. Miguel admitted that he holds a green card, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the U. S. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the U. S. for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao and that he voted in all previous elections. After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC with the exception of Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr., dismissed the petitions, saying that possession of a green card does not sufficiently establish that Miguel has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. Issues: 1. WON a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the U.S. 2. WON Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988 Held: 1. YES. Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the U. S. merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by the
U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently. As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S., the country in which he resides (3 CJS 527). This is in return for the protection given to him during the period of his residence therein. Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office, not during his tenure as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), which provides that Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. 2. NO. The law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. Therefore, his act of filing a COC for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office. Without such prior waiver, he was disqualified to run for any elective office. Moreover, the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his permanent resident status before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988.
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Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess (Sec. 42, LGC). Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the U. S. and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three months after his return to the Philippines in November 1987. The clear policy behind the Omnibus Election Code is to exclude from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country without mental reservations or purpose of evasion. The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland. Miguel would have the Court believe that he applied for immigration to the U.S. under false pretenses; that all this time he only had one foot in the U. S. but kept his other foot in the Philippines. Even if that were true, the Court held it impermissible to be a party to his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it, and giving him the best of both worlds so to speak. Disposition: The election of Miguel was annulled.
attempted grand theft of personal property. Rodriguez is therefore a fugitive from justice which is a ground for his disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the LGC. The COMELEC dismissed Marquez quo warranto petition. Marquez challenged the COMELEC dismissal before the SC. The crux of said petition is whether Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice as contemplated by Section 40(e) of the LGC based on the alleged pendency of a criminal charge against him. The Court in Marquez, Jr. vs. COMELEC declared that a fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. But whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice under this definition was not passed upon by the Court. That task devolved upon the COMELEC upon remand of the case to it. In the May 8, 1995 election, Rodriguez and Marquez ran again for the position of governor. This time, Marquez challenged Rodriguez' candidacy via petition for disqualification based principally on the same allegation that Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice. After the promulgation of the Marquez decision, the COMELEC found Rodriguez to be a fugitive from justice and ordered him ineligible from assuming the office of the Governor. At any rate, Rodriguez again emerged as the victorious candidate in the election. Issue: WON Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice Held: NO. A fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates ones flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or
Rodrigues vs. COMELEC (1996)

Facts: Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr. were protagonists for the gubernatorial post of Quezon Province in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-elected governor. Marquez challenged Rodriguez victory via petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC. Marquez revealed that Rodriguez left the U. S. where a charge is pending against the latter before the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and
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punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. Rodriguez case just cannot fit in this concept. His arrival in the Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985 preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court by almost five months. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant to speak of yet at such time. However, Marquez and the COMELEC in its Commissions Evaluation seem to urge the Court to re-define fugitive from justice. They espouse the broader concept of the term as culled from foreign authorities, i.e., that one becomes a fugitive from justice by the mere fact that he leaves the jurisdiction where a charge is pending against him, regardless of whether or not the charge has already been filed at the time of his flight. The law of the case doctrine forbids the Court to craft an expanded re-definition of fugitive from justice which is at variance with the Marquez decision. This doctrine means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice) are involved in the Marquez decision and the instant petition. The Marquez decision was an appeal from Marquez quo warranto petition). Therefore, what was irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule in the Marquez decision must govern the instant petition. Besides, to re-define fugitive from justice would only foment instability in our jurisprudence when hardly has the ink dried in the Marquez decision. Disposition: Petition granted. Assailed resolutions of the COMELEC were set aside.
Dela Torre vs. COMELEC (1996)

Facts: Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre via the instant petition for certiorari sought to nullify two resolutions issued by the COMELEC allegedly with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The assailed resolutions declared the petitioner disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the last May 8, 1995 elections, citing as the ground therefor, Section 40(a) of the LGC. In disqualifying the petitioner, the COMELEC held that petitioner was found guilty by the MTC for violation of P.D. 1612, or the Anti-fencing Law. Petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) does not apply to his case inasmuch as the probation granted him by the MTC on December 21, 1994 which suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences flowing therefrom, rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well. Issues: 1. WON the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude 2. WON a grant of probation affects Section 40 (a)'s applicability Held: 1. YES. Moral turpitude is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as an an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted
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and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the SC to determine. The Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not. This guideline nonetheless proved short of providing a clear-cut solution, for in International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, the Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statue. The elements of the crime of fencing which are: 1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed; 2. The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquiresany article which have been derived from the proceeds of the said crime; 3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and 4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another. Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by the fence of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one's rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. The duty not to appropriate, or to return, anything acquired
either by mistake or with malice is so basic it finds expression in some key provisions of the Civil Code on Human Relations and Solutio Indebiti. The same underlying reason holds even if the fence did not have actual knowledge, but merely should have known the origin of the property received. Verily, circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the object of the sale may have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such circumstances include the time and place of the sale, both of which may not be in accord with the usual practices of commerce. The nature and condition of the goods sold, and the fact that the seller is not regularly engaged in the business of selling goods may likewise suggest the illegality of their source. 2. NO. The legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. Petitioner's conviction of fencing is a crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification found in Section 40 (a), subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation. Clearly then, petitioner's theory has no merit. Disposition: Petition dismissed.
Magno vs. COMELEC (2002)

Facts: Private respondent Carlos Montes petitioned for the disqualification of petitioner Nestor Magno as mayoralty candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the May 14, 2001 elections on the ground that petitioner was previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery. It appears that on July 25, 1995, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 3 months and 11 days of arresto mayor as minimum to 1 year 8 months and 21 days of prision
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correccional as maximum, for each of the four counts of direct bribery. Thereafter, petitioner applied for probation and was discharged on March 5, 1998. The COMELEC rendered a decision declaring that petitioner was disqualified. The COMELEC cited Section 12 of the BP 881 or the Omnibus Election Code which explicitly lifts the disqualification to run for an elective office of a person convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude after five years from the service of sentence. According to the COMELEC, inasmuch as petitioner was considered to have completed the service of his sentence on March 5, 1998, his five-year disqualification will end only on March 5, 2003. Petitioner on the other hand argued that direct bribery is not a crime involving moral turpitude. Likewise, he cites Section 40 of the LGC, which he claims is the law applicable to the case at bar. Thus, the two-year disqualification period imposed by Section 40 of the Local Government Code expired on March 5, 2000. Meanwhile, Sonia Lorenzo was proclaimed by the COMELEC as the duly elected mayor. Thus, petitioner filed a supplemental petition to the SC wherein he assailed the proclamation of Lorenzo on the ground that the propriety of his disqualification was still under review by the Court. Petitioner likewise asked the Court to declare him as the duly elected municipal mayor instead of Sonia Lorenzo. Issues: 1. WON the crime of direct bribery involves moral turpitude 2. WON it is the Omnibus Election Code or the Local Government Code that should apply in this situation Held: 1. YES. By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of direct bribery:
1. the offender is a public officer; 2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another; 3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and 4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance of his official duties. Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. 2. The Local Government Code should apply in this case. Thus, petitioners disqualification ceased as of March 5, 2000. The Omnibus Election Code was approved on December 3, 1985 while the Local Government Code took effect on January 1, 1992. It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. In enacting the later law, the legislature is presumed to have knowledge of the older law and intended to change it. Furthermore, the repealing clause of Section 534 of the LGC states that: (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative
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regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Also, Article 7 of the Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and not the other way around. When a subsequent law entirely encompasses the subject matter of the former enactment, the latter is deemed repealed. Section 40 specially and definitively provides for disqualifications of candidates for elective local positions. On the other hand, Section 12 of BP 881 speaks of disqualifications of candidates for any public office. It deals with the election of all public officers. Thus, Section 40, insofar as it governs the disqualifications of candidates for local positions, assumes the nature of a special law which ought to prevail. The intent of the legislature to reduce the disqualification period of candidates for local positions from five to two years is evident. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law. Unfortunately, however, the Court could not rule on the validity of Sonia Lorenzos proclamation and the declaration of petitioner as the rightful winner. Inasmuch as Sonia Lorenzo had already been proclaimed as the winning candidate, the legal remedy of petitioner would have been a timely election protest. Disposition: COMELEC resolutions reversed.
the May 8, 1995 elections. Lingating alleged that in 1991, during his first term as mayor, along with a municipal councilor of Lapuyan and several other individuals, Sulong was administratively charged with dishonesty, falsification of public documents, malversation, etc. and that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur found him guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office. Sulong denied that the decision in the administrative case had become final and executory. He averred that after receiving a copy of the decision, he filed a MR and/or notice of appeal thereof; and that the complainant Lingating had not yet filed his comment thereon, as ordered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Thus, his motion had remained pending. Sulong also denied that he had been removed from office by virtue of the decision in the said case. Because the COMELEC was unable to render judgment before the elections of May 14, 2001, Sulong was voted for in the elections and was thereafter proclaimed. Later, however, the COMELECs First Division declared him disqualified. The COMELEC en banc issued reversed this resolution of the First Division. Petitioner contended that the COMELEC en banc erred in applying the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC in holding that the reelection of respondent Sulong in 1992 and 1995 as mayor of Lapuyan had the effect of condoning the misconduct. Petitioner cited Reyes v. COMELEC in which it was held that an elective local executive officer, who is removed before the expiration of the term for which he was elected, is disqualified from being a candidate for a local elective position. Issue: WON Sulongs re-election in 1992 and 1995 operated as a condonation of his previous misconduct, thus making him qualified to run again in the 2001 elections Held: NO.
Lingating vs. COMELEC (2002)

Facts: On May 3, 2001, Atty. Manuel Lingating filed with the Provincial Election Supervisor in Pagadian City a petition for the disqualification of Cesar B. Sulong, pursuant to Section 40(b) of the LGC, which disqualifies from running for any elective local position those removed from office as a result of an administrative case. Sulong had previously won as mayor of Lapuyan on January 18, 1988 and was reelected in the May 11, 1992, and again in
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The petitioner in the Reyes case invoked the ruling in Aguinaldo, in which it was held that a public official could not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelection operated as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct. But in Aguinaldo, before the question of the validity of the removal could be decided, the term of office during which the alleged misconduct was committed expired. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. However, Reyes cannot at the same time be applied to this case because it appears that the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has not until now become final. Sulongs motion for reconsideration, which had yet been acted upon, prevented the decision from becoming final. While the Local Government Code on disciplinary actions is silent on the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the same cannot be interpreted as a prohibition against the filing of a motion for reconsideration. The filing of such motion should be encouraged before an appeal is resorted to as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of evidence. There is thus no decision finding respondent guilty to speak of. As Provincial Secretary of Zamboanga del Sur Wilfredo Cimafranca attested, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan simply considered the matter as having become moot and academic because it was overtaken by the local elections of 1992. Neither could the succession of the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, and the highest ranking municipal councilor of Lapuyan, Romeo Tan, to the offices of mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, be considered proof that the decision in the administrative case had become final. It appears that the succession was made pursuant to a
provision Local Government Code, which makes decisions in administrative cases immediately executory. Disposition: Petition dismissed.
Flores vs. Drilon (1993)

Facts: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992, under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) was assailed in this case. Under this provision, the mayor of Olongapo City shall be appointed as the chairman of SBMA for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of the law. Petitioners Roberto Flores et al., employees of the U.S. Facility at the Subic, Zambales argued that the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 infringes on the following constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that [n]o elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure, because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that [t]he President shall . . . . appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint, since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code, for the reason that the appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject posts made by respondent Executive Secretary on April 3, 1992 was within the prohibited 45-day period prior to the May 11, 1992 Elections.
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Issue: 1. WON Section 13 (d) violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts 2. WON Congress encroached on the appointing authority of the President Held: 1. YES. The appointment of an elective official like Mayor Gordon to another government post is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent. Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B29 of the Constitution expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. It is argued that Sec. 94 of the LGC permits the appointment of a local elective official to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office. But, the contention is fallacious. Section 94 is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land. Moreover, the constitutionality of Sec. 94 of LGC is not the issue here.
While the second paragraph of Section 7, Article IX-B authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic and planning agency; the VicePresident, who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City. This argument is based on a wrong premise. Congress did not contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of appointment. The phrase shall be appointed unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. 2. YES. The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers to the appointee. In other words, the choice of the appointee is a fundamental component of the appointing power. Once the power of appointment is conferred on the President by Congress, such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject post be filled with a presidential appointee, the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. The President is effectively precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment is no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of appointment.
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Sec. 7, Art. IX-B. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
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His appointment being invalid, notwithstanding, Gordon remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, or one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised . . . . under color of a known election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public . Disposition: The proviso was declared unconstitutional; consequently, the appointment pursuant thereto of Mayor Richard J. Gordon, is invalid.
Private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate had earlier filed with the COMELEC en banc a Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy against petitioner for falsely representing her age. The COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the BET and BOC of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the election. On election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondents votes of 76. The BET did not proclaim petitioner as the winner; Hence, the instant petition for certiorari. Later, however, the BET proclaimed petitioner as the SK chairmanelect. When she ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the Municipality of Bangui, she won as Auditor and was proclaimed thus. In her petition before the SC, petitioner argued that Section 3 (b) of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is unlawful, ultra vires and beyond the scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the LGC. According to her, the Code itself does not provide that the voter must be exactly 21 years of age on election day and that as so long as she did not turn 22 years old, she was still 21 on election day and therefore qualified. Issue: WON petitioner was properly disqualified for having exceeded the age requirement Held: YES. Under Section 424 of the LGC, a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months; (c) 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the SK or in the official barangay list. Upon the other hand, Section 428 of the Code requires that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one year immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years but not more than 21 years of age on the day of his election; (e) able to read and write; and (f)
Garvida vs. Sales (1997)

Facts: Petitioner Lynette Garvidas application for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo was denied by the Board of Election Tellers (BET) on the ground that she, being then 21 years and 10 months old, exceeded the age limit for membership. She filed a Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter with the MCTC. The said court found petitioner qualified and ordered her registration. The BET appealed to the RTC but the presiding judge therein inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association with petitioner. Garvida then filed her COC for the position of SK Chairman in Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. Election Officer Rios disapproved petitioners certificate of candidacy again due to her age. Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Asperin who allowed her to run.
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must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications of a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan. Section 424 of the Code sets a members maximum age at 21 years only. There is no further provision as to when the member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other hand, Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old on the day of his election. The addition of the phrase on the day of his election is an additional qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or on the day he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be more than 21 years old on the day of election. The phrase not more than 21 years of age means not over 21 years, 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year because that would be more than 21 365day cycles. Not more than 21 years old is not equivalent to less than 22 years old, contrary to petitioners claims. The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day. The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public policy and if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be declared ineligible. To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court deemed it necessary to order that the vacancy be filled by the SK member chosen by the incumbent SK members of Barangay San Lorenzo by simple majority from among themselves. The member chosen shall assume the office of SK Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term. Disposition: Garvida was declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 SK elections and was ordered to vacate her position.
3. ELECTION CASES INVOLVING LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFICIALS Galido vs. COMELEC (1991)
Facts: Perfecto Galido and Saturnino Galeon were candidates during the 1988 local elections for the position of mayor in the Municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, Province of Bohol. Galido was proclaimed duly-elected Mayor by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. On 25 January 1988, Galeon filed an election protest before the RTC of Bohol. After hearing, the said court upheld the proclamation of Galido. Galeon appealed the RTC decision to the COMELEC. Through its First Division, the COMELEC reversed the TC's decision and declared Galeon the duly-elected mayor. The COMELEC held that the fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the initial C after the name Galido were marked ballots and, therefore, invalid. The first petition for certiorari filed by Galido was dismissed by the SC for failing to comply with Circular No. 1-88. Undaunted, he filed another petition for certiorari. The Court granted the TRO prayed for Galido and required the parties to submit their comments. Galeon moved for the dismissal of the petition for certiorari before the SC, for the following reasons: 1. Final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective municipal offices are final and executory, and not appealable. 2. The petition involves pure questions of fact as they relate to appreciation of evidence (ballots) which is beyond the power of review of the Court. 3. Exactly the same petition involving identical allegations, grounds and legal issues was dismissed with finality by the Court. The inadvertent issuance of a TRO by the Court in this case has wreaked havoc and chaos in the municipality of
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Garcia-Hernandez where Galeon already assumed his position.
has
Issue: WON the decisions of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials, being final and executory and not appealable, preclude the filing of a special civil action of certiorari Held: NO. The COMELEC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials and has appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. (Article IX (C), Section 2 (2), paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution). Under Article IX (A) Section 7 of the Constitution, it is stated: "(U)nless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each (Constitutional) Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." On the other hand, Article IX, (C), Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the Constitution relied upon by Galeon, provides that decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable. The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to the Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari. The function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court or tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
As correctly argued by the COMELEC, it has the inherent power to decide an election contest on physical evidence, equity, law and justice, and apply established jurisprudence in support of its findings and conclusions; and that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretion, the exercise of which should not be controlled unless such discretion has been abused to the prejudice of either party. The records disclose that Galeon had already assumed the position of Mayor as the duly-elected mayor of the municipality by virtue of the COMELEC decision. The main purpose of prohibition is to suspend all action and prevent the further performance of the act complained of. In this light, the petition at bar has become moot and academic. Disposition: Petition dismissed. TRO earlier issued was lifted.
Rivera vs. COMELEC (J. Padilla; 1991)

Facts: Petitioner Juan Garcia Rivera and private respondent Juan Mitre Garcia II were candidates for the position of Mayor of Guinobatan, Albay, during the local elections in January 1988. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Rivera as the duly elected Mayor. Garcia filed an election protest with the RTC Legazpi City. After due hearing, the TC rendered found Garcia to have obtained 6,376 votes as against Rivera's 6,222. Rivera appealed to the COMELEC. Through its First Division, the COMELEC sustained with modification the appealed judgment of the RTC. Garcia commenced to discharge the duties and functions of Mayor of Guinobatan, by virtue of a writ of execution implementing the COMELEC decision. He continued as mayor until when he was served notice of the SCs TRO, issued upon Rivera's motion. Rivera in his petition for certiorari cited Article IX-C, Section 2, Par. (2) of the 1987 Constitution, in relation to Part VII, Rule 39, Section 1 of the COMELEC Rules of
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Procedure. He argued that the questioned COMELEC decision is not one that became final and executory unless restrained by the Court as provided under Section 3, Rule 39 of the COMELEC Rules, as said rule applies only to decisions in preproclamation cases and petitions to deny due course or to disqualify a candidate, and postpone or suspend elections. Upon the other hand, Garcia contended that the Constitution declares the decisions of the COMELEC on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials to be final, executory and not appealable (Article IX-C, Sec. 2, par. (2), 1987 Constitution). Also, Riveras submission that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in misappreciating at least 10 votes in Garcia's favor is actually an error in judgment, correctible by appeal, not by a petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65, Section 1, of the Rules of Court. Issue: WON the decisions of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials, being final and executory and not appealable, preclude the filing of a special civil action of certiorari Held: NO. The Court had occasion to resolve the same issue in Galido vs. COMELEC (1991) and Flores vs. COMELEC (1990). In Flores, the Court held that the provision of Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution applies only to questions of fact and not of law. That provision was not intended to divest the Court of its authority to resolve questions of law as inherent in the judicial power conferred upon it by the Constitution. Actually, the main thrust of the present petition for certiorari is that the respondent COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the decision of its First Division, annulling the proclamation of the petitioner as the duly elected Mayor of Guinobatan, Albay and when it did not exclude from the total votes
of Garcia at least ten (10) votes which were allegedly misappreciated in Garcia's favor. The said decision was not arrived at capriciously or whimsically by respondent COMELEC. A painstaking re-evaluation of the questioned 67 ballots was made by the COMELEC en banc. In fact, 14 ballots originally adjudicated in Garcia's favor were overruled by the Commission en banc, thus reducing the number of votes in his favor to 894 votes out of the 2,445 contested ballots. On the other hand, 16 ballots were added in Rivera's favor, thus increasing the votes in his favor to 1,087 votes. Moreover, the appreciation and reevaluation of ballots are factual determinations. It is settled that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of administrative bodies are final unless grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual determinations. There is none in this case. Disposition: Petition dismissed. TRO was lifted. J. Regalado, concurring: Under the present state of the law and jurisprudence, no appeal lies from the decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC or, for that matter, the CSC and COA. Dario vs. Mison, et al. clarified that the recourse by certiorari from said constitutional commissions to this Court, authorized by Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, refers to the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, the authorized modes of appeal, i.e., ordinary appeal and appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, cannot be availed of. Such decisions, orders or rulings are not, however, invulnerable to an original civil action of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus invoking the original jurisdiction of the Court, under its power of control and supervision over the lower courts, to pass upon errors of jurisdiction imputed to said commissions. This is inevitable and justified because no appeal or any other plain,
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speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law lies from said adjudications. That Section 7, Article IX-A30 is supposed to be the general rule while Section 2(2), Article IX-C31 is a special rule does not constitute a justification for a dichotomous treatment. Both rules, instead of being discrete and inconsistent, should be complementary and consonant. If, under the situation envisioned in Section 7, Article IX-A the possibility of jurisdictional errors warrants availment of the extraordinary writ of certiorari, the same could just as well exist in the commission's dispositions stated in Section 2(2), Article IX-C. Section 2(2) is clear. It merely declares the adjudications stated therein final, executory and not appealable but it does not declare them unassailable on jurisdictional errors which may have attended the same. Had the contrary been intended by the Constitutional Commission, it could readily have so provided. Yet the deliberations on this particular provision
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show that the remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus were categorically agreed and intended to be available in this particular instance. J. Narvasa, dissenting: 1. Pursuant to Section 7, Article IX-A, a review of any decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC may be sought by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt thereof, by filing a petition for certiorari with the Court. It is not clear whether the mode contemplated is that governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, i.e., an appeal taken by a petition for review on certiorari, or that set out in Rule 65 of the Rules, i.e., the special civil action of certiorari. This Court has since had occasion, however, to interpret said Section 7 as referring to the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court conformably to Aratuc v. COMELEC. However, the final, executory and unappealable character of the COMELEC's rulings, orders or decisions in election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices is pronounced not by statute or presidential issuance, but by the Constitution itself. It cannot be gainsaid that while Congress may not deprive the SC of its constitutionally stated powers, that self-same Constitution may itself effect that deprivation; and this appears to be precisely the purpose and intent of said Section 2, Article IX-C. 3. The Constitution prescribes none of the three traditional modes of appeal as a procedure for the review of decisions or rulings of the COMELEC. It has singled out the special action of certiorari under Rule 65 as the sole method for the review of the COMELEC's judgments and rulings, in general. But even this mode of review is, by specific provision, eliminated as regards, particularly, election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices. Hence, the institution by the petitioner in this Court of the special civil action of certiorari at bar, in an effort to nullify and
Article IX-A, Section 7. Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
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Article IX-C, Section 2, (2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
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set aside the decision of the COMELEC en banc in the election contest between him and Garcia on the theory that the COMELEC had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion is totally unavailing and must be dismissed. For it is precisely that action (the general mode of review of COMELEC decisions) that is proscribed. 4. To allow review of COMELEC decisions on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices by certiorari as a special civil action, and not as a mode of review, would make the constitutional proviso in question a dead thing; for then, every party aggrieved in any such contest would seek to make the specious distinction between certiorari as a special civil action and as a mode of review, and said election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices will always be subject of review through certiorari as a special civil action.
(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994.
Borja vs. COMELEC (J. Mendoza; 1998)

Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was re-elected mayor for another term of three years ending June 30, 1998. Capco filed a COC for mayor of Pateros relative to the 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that. The Second Division of the COMELEC ruled in favor of petitioner and declared Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros. However, on motion of Capco, the COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2, reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible. Accordingly, Capco was voted for in the elections and was proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. This is a petition for certiorari brought to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC and to declare that Capco is disqualified to serve another term as Mayor of Pateros, Metro Manila. Borja contends that Capcos service as mayor from September 2, 1989 to June 30, 1992 should be considered as service for full one term, and since he thereafter served from 1992 to 1998 fpr two more terms as mayor, he should be considered to have served three consecutive terms
4. TERM OF OFFICE;
THE
THREE-TERM LIMIT RULE
Section 8, Article X, Constitution. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. SEC. 43. Term of Office. - (a) The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be provided for by law, except that of elective barangay officials: Provided, That all local officials first elected during the local elections immediately following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
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within the contemplation of Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Sec. 43(b) of the LGC. Issue: WON Capcos succession to the position of mayor in 1989 and serving for the unexpired portion of the term should be construed as service of a full term, thereby disqualifying him to run in the 1998 elections pursuant to the three-term limit rule Held: NO. It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. 1. Not only historical examination but also textual analysis supports the COMELECs ruling that Section 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The purpose of the second sentence is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term. There is a difference between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the HOR who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. On the other hand, the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. In a real sense, therefore, such Representative serves a term for which he was elected. Rather than refute what we believe to be the intendment of Art. X, 8 with regard to elective local officials, the case of a Representative who succeeds another confirms the theory. 2. Borja cited Art. VII, Section 4 of the Constitution which provides for succession of the Vice-President to the Presidency in case of vacancy in that office. After stating that The President shall not be eligible for
any reelection, this provision says that No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time. By analogy, Borja contended that the vicemayor should likewise be considered to have served a full term as. The absence of a similar provision in Art. X, Section 8 on elective local officials throws in bold relief the difference between the two cases. It underscores the constitutional intent to cover only the terms of office to which one may have been elected for purpose of the three-term limit on local elective officials, disregarding for this purpose service by automatic succession. There is another reason why the VicePresident who succeeds to the Presidency and serves in that office for more than four years is ineligible for election as President. The Vice-President is elected primarily to succeed the President in the event of the latters death, permanent disability, removal or resignation. In running for VicePresident, he may thus be said to also seek the Presidency. Hence, service in the presidency for more than four years may rightly be considered as service for a full term. This is not so in the case of the vicemayor. Under the LGC, he is the presiding officer of the sanggunian and he appoints all officials and employees of such local assembly. He has distinct powers and functions, succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy therein being only one of them. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit. 3. To prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy embodied in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. The other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. A consideration of the historical background of Section 8 reveals that the
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members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. Some commissioners went on record against perpetually disqualifying elective officials who have served a certain number of terms as this would deny the right of the people to choose Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved. Disposition: Petition dismissed.
same post. Lonzanida was proclaimed winner. The First Division of the COMELEC granted the petition for disqualification upon a finding that Lonzanida had served three consecutive terms. This was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc. Lonzanida argued that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit, because he was not the duly elected mayor. On the other hand, the Solicitor-General contended that Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and section 43 (b) of the LGC speak of service of a term and so the rule should be examined in this light. Issue: WON Lonzanidas assumption of office in 1995 to 1998, although he was unseated before the expiration of the term on the ground that he was not the dulyelected mayor, should be counted as service for one full term Held: NO. In the case of Borja vs. COMELEC, the Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms (or voluntarily renounced the office for any length of time). The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. 1. Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. After a reappreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a
Lonzanida vs. COMELEC (J. GonzagaReyes; 1991)
Facts: Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. Lozanida assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before the RTC of Zambales, which in a decision declared a failure of elections. Both parties appealed to the COMELEC. The COMELEC declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio. The COMELEC issued a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post, which he obeyed, and Alvez assumed office for the remainder of the term. In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his COC for mayor. His opponent Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the
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proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers, he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest. 2. Lonzanida cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term. Under Section 8, voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. This is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. The respondents contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms. Disposition: Petition granted. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding Lonzanida disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections was set aside.
Petitioner Raymundo Adormeo and Talaga were the only candidates who filed their COCs for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections. Adormeo filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Talaga, Jr. on the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for three consecutive terms. Adormeo contended that Talagas candidacy as Mayor constituted a violation of Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Talaga responded that he was not elected for three consecutive terms but only for two consecutive terms. He pointed to his defeat in the 1998 election by Tagarao. Because of his defeat the consecutiveness of his years as mayor was interrupted, and thus his mayorship was not for three consecutive terms of three years each. Respondent added that his service from May 12, 2001 until June 30, 2001 for 13 months and 18 days was not a full term, citing Lonzanida vs. COMELEC. The COMELEC, through the First Division, found Talaga disqualified for the position of city mayor. The COMELEC en banc reversed this ruling. Issue: WON the unexpired portion of the term of office that Talaga served after winning the recall election in 2000 is considered a full term, thus disqualifying him to run again by reason of the threeterm rule Held: NO. In Borja vs. COMELEC, the Court held that the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. Likewise, in the case of Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, the Court ruled that the two
Adormeo vs. COMELEC (J. Quisumbing;

2002)
Facts: Private respondent Ramon Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992. He served the full term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998, he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001.
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conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: a) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. 1. Accordingly, COMELECs ruling that private respondent was not elected for three consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two years he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. 2. Fr. Joaquin Bernas comment that If one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed, as pointed out by the COMELEC en banc, is pertinent only to members of the HOR. Unlike local government officials, there is no recall election provided for members of Congress. 3. Neither can Talagas victory in the recall election be deemed a violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as voluntary renunciation for clearly it is not. In Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, the Court said that voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Thus, when Talaga won in the recall election ousting Tagarao, the latter was involuntary severed from office. Such involuntary severance constituting an interruption of continuity of service, Talaga thus did not fully serve the 1998-2001 term. Disposition: Petition dismissed.
On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) at the Gymnasium of Barangay San Jose to initiate the recall of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates who assumed office as Puerto Princesa's mayor on June 30, 2001. Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition to nullify and deny due course to the Recall Resolution. The COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution dismissing for lack of merit Socrates' petition. The COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election. On August 23, 2002, Edward M. Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election. Several individuals filed petitions to disqualify Hagedorn on the ground that he is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post. In a resolution, the COMELEC's First Divisiondismissed for lack of merit the disqualification case, declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. The COMELEC en banc affirmed the resolution declaring Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. Issue: WON Hagedorn is disqualified to run for mayor in the recall election Held: 1. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the
Socrates vs. COMELEC (J. Carpio; 2002)

Facts: These are three consolidated petitions for certiorari seeking the reversal of theresolutions issued by the COMELEC in relation to the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.
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intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service. What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term. 2. In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate reelection after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001 in which he did not run. Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections and served in full his three consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn's service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. An involuntary interruption occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive character of Hagedorn's service as mayor. 3. As held in the case of Adormeo, one who wins and serves a recall term does not serve the full term of his predecessor but only the unexpired term. The period of time prior to the recall term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes an interruption in continuity of service. In the same manner, Hagedorn's recall term does not retroact to include the tenure in office of Socrates. To make Hagedorn's recall term retroact to June 30, 2001 creates a legal fiction that unduly
curtails the freedom of the people to choose their leaders through popular elections. The concept of term limits is in derogation of the sovereign will of the people to elect the leaders of their own choosing. Term limits must be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the sovereign will of the people. Disposition: Petitions dismissed. The TRO enjoining the proclamation of the winning candidate in the recall election was lifted. C. J. Davide, dissenting: 1. The dichotomy made in the ponencia between voluntary renunciation of the office as used in Section 8 and involuntary severance from office is unnecessary, if not misplaced. Hagedorn cannot have suffered involuntary severance from office because there was nothing to be severed. Disqualification is, definitely, not synonymous with involuntary severance. 2. Even if we concede that involuntary severance is an act which interrupts the continuity of a term, the rule laid down in Lonzanida vs. COMELEC is not applicable here. The involuntary severance in Lonzanida was one that took place during any of the three terms. In the case of Hagedorn, no such involuntary severance took place during any of his three terms. The voluntary renunciation referred to in Section 8, and Section 43(b) must take place at any time during either the first, second, or third term of the three consecutive terms. This is very clear from the last clause of Section 8, which reads: shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. The purpose of the provision is to prevent an elective local official from voluntarily resigning from office for the purpose of circumventing the rule on the belief that the term during which he resigned would be excluded in the counting of the threeterm rule. 3. Hagedorn cannot likewise avail of the ruling in Adormeo vs. COMELEC because in
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that case Talaga did not win in his second reelection bid, or for a third term, in the May 1998 elections. He won in the recall election of 12 May 2000. Hagedorn, as earlier stated, fully served three successive terms.
November 1992, and in the violating the Constitution itself.
process
Issue: WON R. A. 7056 is unconstitutional Held: YES. 1. At the core of this controversy is Article XVIII, Sections 232 and 533 (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution. It is clear from these provisions that the terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992. It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned sections that the term of synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years. That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the records of the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission. With the clear mandate of the 1987 Constitution to hold synchronized (simultaneous) national and local elections in the second Monday of May, 1992, the
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Mendoza vs. COMELEC (J. 2002) 5. TENURE OF OFFICE Osmea vs. COMELEC (J. Paras; 1991)
Facts: In controversy in this case is the validity and constitutionality of R. A. No. 7056, An Act Providing for the National and Local Elections in 1992, Pave the Way for Synchronized and Simultaneous Elections Beginning 1995, and Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, which was signed into law on June 20, 1991. The suit was instituted by several local elective officials by way of a petition for Prohibition, mandamus and Injunction. They prayed for the declaration of R. A. No. 7056 as unconstitutional because: 1. It violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday of May 1992. 2. By providing that all incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified, it violates Section 2, Article XVIII. 3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of the law, which in effect, shortens the term or tenure of office of local officials violates Section 8, Article X. 4. Section 8, providing for the campaign periods for Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the provision of Section 9, Article IX. 5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in the laware not sufficient, much less, valid justification for postponing the local elections to the second Monday of
Sec. 2, Art. XVIII. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. 33 Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992. The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
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inevitable conclusion would be that R. A. No. 7056 is clearly violative of the Constitution because it provides for the holding of a desynchronized election. 2. But this is not all. There are other provisions of the Constitution violated by R. A. No. 7056. For one, there is Section 2, Article XVIII which provides that the local official first elected under the Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7056, these incumbent local officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. It has been held that it is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term. 3. Under Section 9, Article IX of the Constitution, the election period shall commence 90 days before the day of election and shall end 30 days thereafter, unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases. The filing of the COC and the ensuing campaign period must be embraced or circumscribed within that election period of 90 days, except when in special cases, the Comelec (not Congress) alters the period. But R.A. 7056 provides for a different campaign period: 130 days for the President and the Vice-President; 90 days for Senators; and 45 days for Members of the HOR and local elective officials, before the day of elections. Disposition: R. unconstitutional. A. 7056 declared
member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice-governor, Mayor or vicemayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein. (b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay. (c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by the drawing of lots. (d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors. For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office. For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election. SEC. 45. Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian. - (a) Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian where automatic successions provided above do not apply shall be filled by appointment in the following manner: (1) The President, through the Executive Secretary, in the case of the sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities; (2) The governor, in the case of the sangguniang panlungsod of component cities and the sangguniang bayan; (3) The city or municipal Mayor, in the case of sangguniang barangay, upon recommendation of the sangguniang barangay concerned.
6. Vacancies and Succession

SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. - If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or Mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or Mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice-governor, Mayor, or vicemayor, the highest ranking sanggunian
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(b) Except for the sangguniang barangay, only the nominee of the political party under which the sanggunian member concerned had been elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the same political party as that of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office. In the appointment herein mentioned, a nomination and a certificate of membership of the appointee from the highest official of the political party concerned are conditions sine qua non, and any appointment without such nomination and certification shall be null and void ab initio and shall be a ground for administrative action against the official responsible therefor. (c) In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who does not belong to any political party, the local chief executive shall, upon recommendation o;O7 of the sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy. (d) In case of vacancy in the representation of the youth and the barangay in the sanggunian, said vacancy shall be filled automatically by the official next in rank of the organization concerned. SEC. 46. Temporary Vacancy in the Office of the Local Chief Executive. - (a) When the governor, city or municipal Mayor, or punong barangay is temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties for physical or legal reasons such as, but not limited to, leave of absence, travel abroad, and suspension from office, the vice-governor, city or municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member shall automatically exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the local chief executive concerned, except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees which can only be exercised if the period of temporary incapacity exceeds thirty (30) working days. (b) Said temporary incapacity shall terminate upon submission to the appropriate sanggunian of a written declaration by the local chief executive concerned that he has reported back to office. In cases where the temporary incapacity is due to legal causes, the local chief executive concerned shall also submit
necessary documents showing that said legal causes no longer exist. (c) When the incumbent local chief executive is traveling within the country but outside his territorial jurisdiction for a period not exceeding three (3) consecu tive days, he may designate in writing the officer-incharge of the said office. Such authorization shall specify the powers and functions that the local official concerned shallexercise in the absence of the local chief executive except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees. (d) In the event, however, that the local chief executive concerned fails or refuses to issue such authorization, the vice-governor, the city or municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, as the case may be, shall have the right to assume the powers, duties, and functions of the said office on the fourth (4th) day of absence of the said local chief executive, subject to the limitations provided in subsection (c) hereof. (e) Except as provided above, the local chief executive shall in no case authorize any local official to assume the powers, duties, and functions of the office, other than the vicegovernor, the city or municipal vice- Mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, as the case may be. SEC. 47. Approval of Leaves of Absence. - (a) Leaves of absence of local elective officials shall be approved as follows: (1) Leaves of absence of the governor and the Mayor of a highly urbanized city or an independent component city shall be approved by the President or his duly authorized representative; (2) Leaves of absence of a vice-governor or a city or municipal vice-mayor shall be approved by the local chief executive concerned: Provided, That the leaves of absence of the members of the sanggunian and its employees shall be approved by the vice-governor or city or municipal vicemayor concerned; (3) Leaves of absence of the component city or municipal Mayor shall be approved by the governor; and (4) Leaves of absence of a punong barangay shall be approved by the city or municipal mayor: Provided, That leaves of absence of
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sangguniang barangay members shall be approved by the punong barangay. (b) Whenever the application for leave of absence hereinabove specified is not acted upon within five (5) working days after receipt thereof, the application for leave of absence shall be deemed approved.
the payment of his salary for his services as the acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. In the meantime, however, the issue on the governorship of Leyte was settled and Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed the Governor of the province of Leyte. During the pendency of the petition, the provincial treasurer of Leyte, Florencio Luna allowed the payment to Menzon of his salary as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte in the amount of P17,710.00. The dismissed Menzons petition, prompting respondent Leopoldo Petilla to request Governor Larrazabal to direct the Menzon to pay back all the emoluments and compensation which he received while acting as the Vice-Governor of Leyte. Issues/Held: 1. WON there was a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor NONE. There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu contrario, there is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office. Applying the definition of vacancy to this case, it can be readily seen that the office of the Vice-Governor was left vacant when the duly elected ViceGovernor Petilla was appointed Acting Governor. In the eyes of the law, the office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor. There is no satisfactory showing that Petilla, notwithstanding his succession to the Office of the Governor, continued to simultaneously exercise the duties of the Vice-Governor. The nature of the duties of a Provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them. The fact that the Secretary of Local Government was prompted to appoint Petilla shows the need to fill up the position during the period it was vacant. The Department Secretary had the discretion to ascertain whether or not the Provincial Governor should devote all
Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC, supra
Menzon vs. Petilla (J. Gutierrez; 1991)

Facts: On February 16, 1988, by virtue of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte, the Secretary of Local Government Luis Santos designated the Vice-Governor, Leopoldo E. Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte. The petitioner Aurelio D. Menzon, a senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was also designated by Secretary Luis Santos to act as the Vice-Governor for the province of Leyte. Menzon took his oath of office before Senator Alberto Romulo. The Provincial Administrator, Tente U. Quintero inquired from the Undersecretary of the Department of Local Government, Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., as to the legality of the appointment of the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor of Leyte. In his reply letter Undersecretary Rubillar, Jr. stated that since B.P. 337 has no provision relating to succession in the Office of the Vice-Governor in case of a temporary vacancy, the appointment of the Menzon as the temporary Vice- Governor is not necessary since the Vice-Governor who is temporarily performing the functions of the Governor, could concurrently assume the functions of both offices. As a result of the foregoing communications, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, in a special session, issued Resolution No. 505 where it held invalid the appointment of the petitioner as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. Menzon filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and mandamus for the nullification of Resolution No. 505 and for
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his time to that particular office. Moreover, it is doubtful if the Provincial Board, unilaterally acting, may revoke an appointment made by a higher authority. 2. WON the Secretary of Local Government has the authority to make temporary appointments YES. For about two years after the governatorial elections, there had been no de jure permanent Governor for the province of Leyte. The two-year interregnum which would result from the respondents' view of the law is disfavored as it would cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the people. Under the circumstances and considering the silence of the LGC regarding temporary vacancies in the Office of the ViceGovernor, the Court ruled that, in order to obviate the dilemma, the President, acting through her alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, may remedy the situation. The Court declared valid the temporary appointment extended to the Menzon to act as the Vice-Governor. It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of vacancies. In the absence of any contrary provision in the LGC and in the best interest of public service, there is no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly here. As between the President who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, there is no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides otherwise. The appointment of the petitioner, moreover, is in full accord with the intent behind the (old) LGC. There is no question that Section 49 in connection with Section 52 shows clearly the intent to provide for continuity in the performance of the duties of the Vice-Governor.
By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, the mode of succession provided for permanent vacancies may likewise be observed in case of a temporary vacancy in the same office. In this case, there was a need to fill the vacancy. Menzon is himself the member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes. The Department Secretary acted correctly in extending the temporary appointment. Even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of Local Government, possesses no power to appoint the petitioner, at the very least, Menzon is a de facto officer entitled to compensation. For a long period of time, Menzon exercised the duties attached to the Office of the Vice-Governor. He was acclaimed as such by the people of Leyte. Upon the principle of public policy on which the de facto doctrine is based and basic considerations of justice, it would be highly iniquitous to now deny him the salary due him for the services he actually rendered as the acting Vice-Governor of the province of Leyte. The compensation, however, following the example in Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code, and pursuant to the proscription against double compensation must only be such additional compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the Office of the Vice-Governor. Disposition: Court granted the MR. The additional compensation which Menzon has received, in the amount exceeding the salary authorized by law for the position of Senior Board Member, shall be considered as payment for the actual services rendered as acting Vice-Governor and may be retained by him.
Docena vs. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar (J.

Cruz; 1991)
Facts: Two persons are claiming the same position in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar (SPES) by virtue of
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separate appointments extended to them by the same authority. The first appointment was replaced by the second appointment, which was subsequently withdrawn to reinstate the first appointment, but this was later itself recalled in favor of the second appointment. To add to the confusion, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has joined the fray and taken it upon itself to decide who as between the two claimants is entitled to the office. Luis B. Capito, who had been elected to and was serving as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar (SPES) died in office and petitioner Agustin B. Docena was appointed to succeed him. The record does not show why, but private respondent Socrates B. Alar was appointed, also by Secretary Luis T. Santos, to the position already occupied by Docena. The reaction of the SPES was to pass, Resolution No. 1 dated January 8, 1991, where it declared that the recall order issued by Secretary Santos recalling the appointment of Atty. Alar has no legal basis. Secretary Santos issued another recall order, this time addressed to Docena. Docena then came to the SC in a petition for mandamus to compel the respondents to recognize and admit him as a lawfully appointed member of the SPES. He also sought to hold them officially and personally liable in damages for their refusal to do so in spite of his clear title to the disputed office. Issue: WON Docena is entitled to be appointed to the position vacated by Capito Held: YES. The pertinent legal provision is Section 50 of the LGC which provides that in case of a permanent vacancy in local sanggunians, the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Local Government, shall appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy; the governor, in the case of
sangguniang bayan members; or the city or municipal mayor, in the case of sangguniang barangay members. Except for the sangguniang barangay, the appointee shall come from the political party of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy, and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office. From the tenor of the appointment extended to Docena there is no question that it was intended to be permanent. As such, it was to be valid for the unexpired portion of the term of the deceased member. The said appointment had been accepted by Docena, who had in fact already assumed office as member of the SPES. For all legal intents and purposes, Docenas appointment had already become complete and enforceable at the time it was supposed to have been superseded by the appointment in favor of Alar. The respondents are ambivalent about the power of the Secretary of Local Government to recall his appointments. They described the appointment as whimsical, capricious and wishy-washy but they had no similar complaints about the recall of Docena's appointment although also apparently indecisive. On the contrary, they maintained a deep silence about this other recall and insisted simply that the subsequent appointment of Alar had invalidated the earlier appointment of Docena. Docena's appointment having been issued and accepted earlier, and he having already assumed office, he could not thereafter be just recalled to accommodate Alar. The appointment was permanent in nature. Docena had already acquired security of tenure in the position and could be removed therefrom only for any of the causes, and conformably to the procedure, prescribed by the LGC. These requirements could not be circumvented by the simple process of recalling his appointment. The Court did not award damages, there being no sufficient proof to overcome the presumption that the respondents have acted in good faith albeit erroneously. Nevertheless, Docena is entitled to the
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payment of the salaries and other benefits appurtenant to the office of a Member of the SPES, from the time of his assumption of office and until he is actually admitted or reinstated. Disposition: Petition granted. Docena was declared the lawfully appointed member of the SPES.
Issue: WON the employees were validly appointed Held: YES. 1. The CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the prohibition cited by De Rama applies only to presidential appointments. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. De Rama certainly did not raise the issue of fraud on the part of the outgoing mayor who made the appointments. Neither did he allege that the said appointments were tainted by irregularities or anomalies that breached laws and regulations governing appointments. 2. A thorough perusal of the records reveal that the CSCs ruling is supported by the evidence and the law. The 14 employees were duly appointed following two meetings of the Personnel Selection Board held on May 31 and June 26, 1995. There is no showing that any of the private respondents were not qualified for the positions they were appointed to. Moreover, their appointments were duly attested to by the Head of the CSC field office at Lucena City. By virtue thereof, they had already assumed their appointive positions even before De Rama himself assumed his elected position as town mayor. Consequently, their appointments took effect immediately and cannot be unilaterally revoked or recalled by De Rama. 3. Upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointees assumption of the position in the civil service, he acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either by revocation of the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and hearing. The person assuming a position in the civil service under a completed appointment acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the position. This right is protected not only by statute, but by the Constitution as well. There was no previous notice, much less a hearing accorded to the employees. Clearly, it was De Rama who acted in
B. APPOINTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS COMMON MUNICIPALITIES, CITIES AND PROVINCES
TO
ALL
De Rama vs. Court of Appeals (; 2001)

Facts: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal employees. He alleged that the appointments of the said employees were midnight appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution.34 The CSC denied petitioners request for the recall of the appointments of the 14 employees, for lack of merit. Mayor de Rama failed to present evidence that subject appointments should be revoked or recalled. As a matter of fact, said appointments were even approved by the Head, Civil Service Field Office, Lucena City when submitted for attestation. Moreover, the constitutional prohibition cited by De Rama applies only to the President. Consequently, De Rama filed a petition for review before the CA. The CA held that there was no abuse of the power of appointment on the part of the outgoing mayor.
34
Article VII, Section 15, Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
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undue haste to remove the private respondents without regard for the simple requirements of due process of law. In doing so, he overstepped the bounds of his authority. 4. Neither can De Rama question the CSCs jurisdiction to affirm or revoke the recall. Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code specifically provides that an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission. Thus, it is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment, but only when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service law and regulations. 5. Section 20 of Rule VI also provides that appointments may only be recalled on the following frounds: (a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agencys Merit Promotion Plan; (b) Failure to pass through the agencys Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and employees relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations. Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the above-cited grounds. And yet, the only reason advanced by the petitioner to justify the recall was that these were midnight appointments, which the CSC correctly ruled as applicable only to the President or Acting President. If ever there were other procedural or legal requirements that were violated in implementing the appointments of the private respondents, the same were not seasonably brought before the CSC. These cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Disposition: Petition dismissed. 1. Leagues of Local Barangay Unit and Elective Officials
CHAPTER I LEAGUES OF GOVERNMENT UNITS Article One. - Liga ng Mga Barangay
LOCAL
SEC. 491. Purpose of Organization. - There shall be an organization of all barangays to be known as the liga ng mga barangay for the primary purpose of determining the representation of the Liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto. SEC. 492. Representation, Chapters, National Liga. - Every barangay shall be represented in said liga by the punong barangay, or in his absence or incapacity, by a sanggunian member duly elected for the purpose among its members, who shall attend all meetings or deliberations called by the different chapters of the liga. The liga shall have chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels. The municipal and city chapters of the liga shall be composed of the barangay representatives of municipal and city barangays, respectively. The duly elected presidents of component municipal and city chapters shall constitute the provincial chapter or the metropolitan political subdivision chapter. The duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the Metropolitan Manila chapter and metropolitan political subdivision chapters shall constitute the National Liga ng mga Barangay. SEC. 493. Organization. - The liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels directly elect a president, a vicepresident, and five (5) members of the board of directors. The board shall appoint its secretary and treasurer and create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the chapter. A secretary-general shall be elected from among the members of the national liga and shall be charged with the overall operation of the liga on the national level. The board shall coordinate the activi ties of the chapters of the liga. SEC. 494. Ex-Officio Membership in Sanggunians. - The duly elected presidents of the liga at the municipal, city and provincial levels, including the component cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, shall serve as ex-officio members of the sangguniang bayan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang panlalawigan, respectively. They
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shall serve as such only during their term of office as presidents of the liga chapters, which in no case shall be beyond the term of office of the sanggunian concerned. SEC. 495. Powers, Functions and Duties of the Liga. - The Liga shall: (a) Give priority to programs designed for the total development of the barangays and in consonance with the policies, programs and projects of the national government ; (b) Assist in the education of barangay residents for people's participation in local government administration in order to promote united and concerted action to achieve country-wide development goals; (c) Supplement the efforts of government in creating gainful employment within the barangay; (d) Adopt measures to promote the welfare of barangay officials; (e) Serve as a forum of the barangays in order to forge linkages with government and nongovernmental organizations and thereby promote the social, economic and political well-being of the barangays; and (f) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions which will bring about stronger ties between barangays and promote the welfare of the barangay inhabitants. Article Two. - League of Municipalities SEC. 496. Purpose of Organization. - There shall be an organization of all municipalities to be known as league of municipalities for the primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting municipal government administration, and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto. The league shall form provincial chapters composed of the league presidents for all component municipalities of the province. SEC. 497. Representation. - Every municipality shall be represented in the league by the municipal mayor or in his absence, by the vice-mayor or a sanggunian member duly elected for the purpose by the members, who shall attend all meetings and participate in the deliberations of the league.
SEC. 498. Powers, Functions and Duties of the League of Municipalities. - Theleague of municipalities shall: (a) Assist the national government in the formulation and implementation of the policies, programs and projects affecting municipalities as a whole; (b) Promote local autonomy at the municipal level; (c) Adopt measures for the promotion of the welfare of all municipalities and its officials and employees; (d) Encourage people's participation in local government administration in order to promote united and concerted action for the attainment of country-wide development goals; (e) Supplement the efforts of the national government in creating opportunities for gainful employment within the municipalities; (f) Give priority to programs designed for the total development of the municipalities in consonance with the policies, programs and projects of the national government; (g) Serve as a forum for crystallizing and expressing ideas, seeking the necessary assistance of the national government, and providing the private sector avenues for cooperation in the promotion of the welfare of the municipalities; and (h) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as the league may prescribe for the welfare of the municipalities. Article Three. - League of Cities SEC. 499. Purpose of Organization. - There shall be an organization of all cities to be known as the League of Cities for the primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting city government administration, and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto. The League may form chapters at the provincial level for the component cities of a province. Highly-urbanized cities may also form a chapter of the League. The National League shall be composed of the presidents of the league of highly-urbanized cities and the presidents of the provincial chapters of the league of component cities.
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SEC. 500. Representation. - Every city shall be represented in the league by the city mayor or in his absence, by the city vice-mayor or a sanggunian member duly elected for the purpose by the members, who shall attend all meetings and participate in the deliberations of the league. SEC. 501. Powers, Functions and Duties of the League of City. - The league of cities shall: (a) Assist the national government in the formulation and implementation of the policies, programs and projects affecting cities as a whole; (b) Promote local autonomy at the city level; (c) Adopt measures for the promotion of the welfare of all cities and its officials and employees; (d) Encourage people's participation in local government administration in order to promote united and concerted action for the attainment of country-wide development goals; (e) Supplement the efforts of the national government in creating opportunities for gainful employment the cities; (f) Give priority to programs designed for the total development of cities in consonance with the policies, programs and projects of the national government; (g) Serve as a forum for crystallizing and expressing ideas, seeking the necessary assistance of the national government and providing the private sector avenues for cooperation in the promotion of the welfare of the cities; and (h) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as the league may prescribe for the welfare of the cities. Article Four . - League of Provinces SEC. 502. Purpose of Organization. - There shall be an organization of all provinces to be known as the League of Provinces for the primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting provincial and metropolitan political subdivision government administration, and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto. For this purpose, the Metropolitan Manila Area and any metropolitan political
subdivision shall be considered as separate provincial units of the league. SEC. 503. Representation. - Every province shall be represented in the league by the provincial governor or in his absence, by the provincial vice-governor or a sanggunian member duly elected for the purpose by the members, who shall attend all meetings and participate in the deliberations of the league. SEC. 504. Powers, Functions and Duties of the League of Provinces. - The league of provinces shall: (a) Assist the national government in the formulation and implementation of the policies, programs and projects affecting provinces as a whole; (b) Promote local autonomy at the provincial level; (c) Adopt measures for the promotion of the welfare of all provinces and its officials and employees; (d) Encourage peoples participation in local government administration in order to promote united and concerted action for the attainment of countrywide development goals; (e) Supplement the efforts of the national government in creating opportunities for gainful employment within the province; (f) Give priority to programs designed for the total development of the provinces in consonance with the policies, programs and projects of thenational government; (g) Serve as a forum for crystallizing and expressing ideas, seeking the necessary assistance of the national government and providing the private sector avenues for cooperation in the promotion of the welfare of the provinces; and (h) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as the league may prescribe for the welfare of the provinces and metropolitan political subdivisions. Article Five. Leagues - Provisions Common to all
SEC. 505. Funding. (a) All leagues shall derive its funds from contributions of member local government units and from fund-raising projects and activities without the necessity of securing permits therefor: Provided, That the
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proceeds from said fund-raising projects and activities shall be used primarily to fund the projects for which the said proceeds have been raised, subject to the pertinent provision of this Code and the pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. (b) All funds of leagues shall be deposited as trust funds with its treasurer and shall be disbursed in accordance with the board of director's resolutions, subject to pertinent accounting and auditing rules and regulations: Provided, That the treasurer shall be bonded in an amount to be determined by the board of directors. The funds of a chapter shall be deposited as chapter funds and funds of the national league shall be deposited as national funds. SEC. 506. Organizational Structure. - To ensure the effective and efficient administration, the leagues for municipalities, cities and provinces shall elect chapter- level and national-level boards of directors and a set of officers headed by the president. A secretary-general shall be chosen from among the national league members to manage the day to day operation and activities of the national league. The board of directors on the chapter or national level may create such other positions as may be deemed necessary for the management of the chapters and of the national league. The national board of directors of the leagues for municipalities, cities or provinces shall coordinate programs, projects and activities of chapter and the national-level league. SEC. 507.- Constitution and By-laws of the Liga and the Leagues. - All other matters not herein otherwise provided for affecting the internal organization of the leagues of local government units shall be governed by their respective constitution and by-laws which are hereby made suppletory to the provision of this Chapter: Provided, That said Constitution and By-laws shall always conform to the provisions of the Constitution and existing laws. CHAPTER 2 - LEAGUES AND FEDERATIONS OF LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFICIALS SEC. 508. - Organization - (a) Vice-governor, vice-mayors, sanggunian members of barangays, municipalities, component cities, highly-urbanized cities and provinces, and other elective local officials of local government units, including those of the Metropolitan Manila area and any metropolitan political subdivisions, may form their respective leagues or federation, subject to
applicable provisions of this Title and pertinent provisions of this Code; (b) Sanggunian members of component cities and municipalities shall form a provincial federation and elect a board of directors and a set of officers headed by the president. The duly elected president of the provincial federation of sanggunian members of component cities and municipalities shall be an ex-officio member of the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned and shall serve as such only during his term of office as president of the provincial federation of sanggunian members of component cities and municipalities, which in no case shall be beyond the term of office of the sanggunian panlalawigan concerned. SEC. 509. Constitution and By-laws. - The leagues or federations shall adopt a Constitution and by-laws which shall govern their internal organization and operation: Provided, That said Constitution and by-laws shall always conform to the provision of the Constitution and existing laws. SEC. 510. Funding. - The leagues and federations may derive their funds from contributions of individual league or federation members or from fund-raising projects or activities. The local government unit concerned may appropriate funds to support the leagues or federation organized pursuant to this Section, subject to the availability of funds.
David vs. COMELEC (J. Panganiban;1997)

Facts: In G.R. No. 127116, petitioner Alex David, in his capacity as barangay chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Kalookan City and as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas, filed a petition for prohibition to prohibit the holding of the barangay election scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997. In G.R. No. 128039, petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter filed a petition to have Section 43(c) of R. A. No. 7160 (LGC) declared as unconstitutional. The said section provides that the term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994.
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It was petitioners common contention that their current term is five years, as provided in R. A. No. 6679. This law reset the November 1988 barangay elections to March 28, 1989 and provided for a five year-term which began on May 1, 1989 and ended on May 1, 1994. Petitioners further averred that although Sec. 43 of the LGC reduced the term of office of all local elective officials to three years, such reduction does not apply to barangay officials because:
1. R.A. 6679 is a special law applicable

only to barangays while the LGC is a general law which applies to all other LGUs;
candidate obtaining the highest number of votes shall automatically be the punong barangay. On the other hand, the LGC mandates a direct vote on the barangay chairman by the entire barangay electorate, separately from the seven kagawads. Hence, under the Code, voters elect eight barangay officials: the punong barangay plus the seven kagawads.
Indeed,
2. The LGC does not expressly or

impliedly repeal R.A. 6679 insofar as the term of barangay officials is concerned;
3. While Sec. 8 of Article X of the 1987

Constitution fixes the term of elective local officials at three years, the same provision states that the term of barangay officials shall be determined by law; and Issues/Held: 1. WON the term of office of barangay officials: is governed by R.A. 6679 NO. The LGC should govern.
during barangay elections held on May 9, 1994, the voters actually and directly elected one punong barangay and seven kagawads. If we agree with the thesis of petitioners, it follows that all the punong barangays were elected illegally and thus, petitioner Alex David cannot claim to be a validly elected barangay chairman.
Congress, in enacting the
a. The LGC was enacted later than

R.A. 6679. It is basic that in case of an irreconciliable conflict between two laws of different vintages, the later enactment prevails. The rationale is simple: a later law repeals an earlier one because it is the later legislative will. b. Contemporaneous acts and statements have shown adherence to the LGC.
GAA of 1997, appropriated the amount of P400 M to cover expenses for the holding of barangay elections that year. Likewise, Congress ordained that a general registration of voters shall be held immediately after the barangay elections in 1997.
In Paras vs. COMELEC, the
R.A.
6679 requires the barangay voters to elect seven kagawads and the
Court said that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled in May 1997. This judicial decision, per Article 8 of the Civil Code, is now a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
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c. Petitioners are wrong about R.A.

6679, being a special law, prevails over the LGC. The LGC is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to LGUs. Section 43(c) is a special provision that applies only to the term of barangay officials who were elected on the second Monday of May 1994. With such particularity, the provision cannot be deemed a general law. The LGC is a special law insofar as it governs the term of office of barangay officials.
d. In its repealing clause, the LGC

states that all general and special laws x x x which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. There being a clear repugnance and incompatibility between the two specific provisions, they cannot stand together. The later law, the LGC, should thus prevail in accordance with its repealing clause. 2. WON the LGC is unconstitutional insofar as it shortened such term to only three years NO. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, limiting the term of all elective local officials to three years, except that of barangay officials which shall be determined by law, was an amendment proposed by Constitutional Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. According to Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., the amendment was readily accepted without much discussion and formally approved. Although the discussions in the Constitutional Commission were very brief, they nonetheless provide the exact answer to the main issue. As may be determined by law precisely means as provided for in the LGC. 3. WON petitioners estopped from claiming a term other than that provided under the LGC
YES. If the applicable law is R.A. 6679, then David could not have been elected chairman of his barangay because under R.A. 6679, the kagawad candidate who obtained the highest number of votes was to be automatically elected barangay chairman. Thus, the punong barangay should have been Ruben Magalona, who obtained the highest number of votes among the kagawads (150), which was much more than Davids 112. The electorate should have elected only seven kagawads and not one punong barangay plus seven kagawads. Following petitioners own theory, the election of David as well as all the barangay chairmen of the two Liga petitioners was illegal. Disposition: Petition denied.
2. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS CANNOT HIRE PRIVATE COUNSEL Alinsug vs. RTC of Negros Occidental
(J. Vitug;1993)
Facts: Petitioner Zonsayda L. Alinsug, a municipal clerk, was detailed to the Office of the newly-proclaimed Mayor Rolando Ponsica. Alinsug absented herself from work allegedly to attend to family matters. She had asked permission from the personnel officer but not from the mayor. Mayor Ponsica issued Office Order No. 31, suspending Alinsug for one month and one day for a simple misconduct, which can also be categorized as an act of insubordination. The order carried with it forfeiture of her benefits. Alinsug filed with the RTC of Negros Occidental, a petition for injunction with damages against Mayor Ponsica and the municipal treasurer. The latter filed an answer to the petition, through private practitioner Samuel SM Lezama, with a counterclaim for damages. Alinsug filed a motion asking that the answer be expunged from the record and that respondents be declared in default on the ground that since they were sued in their official capacities, they should have been represented by either the municipal legal officer or the provincial legal officer or
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prosecutor as provided for by Sec. 481 (b) [i] and [3] of LGC. The respondents opposed the motion. Manifesting that the municipality of Escalante has no legal officer, they asserted that both the LGC and the Administrative Code of 1987 do not have any provision relative to the duty of any provincial legal officer or prosecutor to represent a municipality or its officials in suits filed against them by an employee or a private individual. Moreover, since the petitioner prayed for the award of moral damages, on the strength of this Court's ruling in Albuera v. Torrens, their hiring of a private counsel was justified. Later, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Daniel M. Villaflor entered his appearance as counsel for the respondents in their official capacities. The TC then issued an Order denying Alinsugs motion. Issues/Held: 1. WON a private counsel may represent municipal officials sued in their official capacities YES. The key to resolving the issue of whether a local government official may secure the services of private counsel, in an action filed against him in his official capacity, lies on the nature of the action and the relief that is sought. The Court arrived at this principle by looking at its previous rulings in the following cases:
Supreme Court, when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province, and when, in a case involving the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved, as heir legatee, creditor or otherwise;
Ramos v. Court of Appeals where

the Court ruled that a municipality may not be represented by a private law firm which had volunteered its services gratis, in collaboration with the municipal attorney and the fiscal, as such representation was violative of the old Administrative Code;
Correa vs. CFI where the Court
held that in the discharge of governmental functions, municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers, but only to the extent that, they have acted by authority of the law.
Albuera vs. Torres where the
Court said that a provincial governor sued in his official capacity may engage the services of private counsel when the complaint contains other allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied by them in their private capacity. Urbano vs. Chavez where the Court held that the Solicitor General cannot represent the accused in a criminal case, for that which is unlawful is not the word or deed of the State, but is the mere wrong or trespass of those individual persons who falsely speak and act in its name.
De Guia v. The Auditor General where the Court held that the municipalitys authority to employ a private attorney is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal would be disqualified to serve and represent it; Enriquez, Sr. v. Gimenez which enumerated instances when the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent in court a particular municipality: if and when original jurisdiction of case involving the municipality is vested in the
2. WON respondents had been in default on account of their having filed their answer through a private counsel
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NO. While the petition was filed against respondents as public officials, its allegations were also aimed at questioning certain acts that can well bring the case beyond the mere confines of official functions. Specifically, Alinsug averred that her suspension was an act of political vendetta by the Mayor because her family supported his rival candidate in the elections. The petition then went on to claim moral and exemplary damages, as well as litigation expenses, as shown by its prayer. Moral damages cannot generally be awarded unless they are the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are not awarded if the defendant had not acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner nor in the absence of gross or reckless negligence. A public official, who in the performance of his duty acts in such fashion, does so in excess of authority, and his actions would be ultra vires that can thereby result in an incurrence of personal liability. Thus, the respondents were not improperly represented by a private counsel, whose legal fees shall be for their own account. Disposition: Petition dismissed. The lower court was directed to proceed with dispatch in resolving the special civil action before it.
Mendiola filed a motion in behalf of the municipality with the RTC of Morong, Rizal for the examination of PPCs gross sales for the years 1976 to 1978 and 1984 to 1991 for the purpose of computing the tax on business. PPC filed a manifestation to the effect Pililla Mayor Nicomedes Patenia received from it the sum of P11,457,907.00 as full satisfaction of the SC judgment, as evidenced by the release and quitclaim documents executed by said mayor. Accordingly, the TC denied the motion for examination and execution of judgment. Atty. Mendiola filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that the total liability of PPC amounted to P24,176,599.00, while the amount involved in the release and quitclaim executed by Mayor Patenia was only P12,718,692; and that the said mayor could not waive the balance which represents the taxes over the law firm of Atty. Mendiola had registered two liens for alleged consultancy services of 25% and attorneys fees of 25%. Atty. Mendiola, again in behalf of the municipality, filed a petition for certiorari with the SC, which was referred to the CA for proper disposition. PPC filed a motion questioning Atty. Mendiola's authority to represent petitioner municipality. Consequently, respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private counsel in violation of law and jurisprudence. Issue: WON Atty. Mendiola had the authority to file a petition in behalf of the Municipality of Pililla Held: NO. 1. Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that the provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except 1) in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or 2) in cases where the municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the
Municipality of Pililla vs. Court of Appeals (J. Regalado;1994)

Facts: The RTC of Tanay, Rizal rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 057-T in favor of petitioner Municipality of Pililla, Rizal, against private respondent Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC), ordering the latter to pay: 1) the tax on business, 2) storage permit fee, 3) mayor's permit fee, (4) sanitary inspection fee, and (5) the costs of suit. The SC affirmed the aforesaid judgment and remanded the same to the trial court for execution. In connection with the execution of said judgment, Atty. Felix E.
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same province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province. Under the above provision, complemented by Section 3, R. A. No. 2264 or the Local Autonomy Law, only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipalitys authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. 2. For the aforementioned exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality's case must appear on record. In the instant case, there is nothing in the records to show that the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla on appeal, hence the appearance of Atty. Mendiola is without authority of law. 3. The fiscals refusal to represent the municipality, as submitted by Atty. Mendiola, is not a legal justification for employing the services of private counsel. Unlike a practicing lawyer who has the right to decline employment, a fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office. The municipal council should instead have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal to handle and prosecute its case in court, pursuant to Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. 4. The contention of Atty. Mendiola that PPC cannot raise for the first time on appeal his lack of authority to represent the municipality is untenable. The legality of his representation can be questioned at any stage of the proceedings. 5. A client, by appearing personally and presenting a motion by himself, is considered to have impliedly dismissed his lawyer. Atty. Mendiola cannot pretend to be authorized to continue representing the
municipality since the latter is entitled to dispense with his services at any time. The authority to represent the municipality has been revoked by the municipality when the latter, through the municipal mayor and without said counsels participation, entered into a compromise agreement with PPC and thereafter filed personally with the lower court two pleadings, Satisfaction of Judgment and a Release and Quitclaim. 6. The client has also an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer. Even the lawyers right to fees from their clients may not be invoked by the lawyers as a ground for disapproving or holding in abeyance the approval of a compromise agreement. The lawyers concerned can enforce their rights in the proper court in an appropriate proceeding, but said rights may not be used to prevent the approval of the compromise agreement. Disposition: Petition denied.
Ramos
vs.
Court
of
Appeals
(J.
Panganiban; 1997)
Facts: Petitioners Antonio C. Ramos, Rosalinda M. Perez, Norma C. Castillo, and the Baliuag Market Vendors Association, Inc. filed a petition with the RTC of Bulacan for the Declaration of Nullity of Municipal Ordinances No. 91 (1976) and No. 7 (1990) and the contract of lease over a commercial arcade to be constructed in the municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan. During the hearing on the petitioners motion for the issuance of preliminary injunction, the Provincial Fiscal appeared as counsel for respondent Municipality of Baliuag, which opposed the petition. A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the TC. The Provincial Fiscal and the Provincial Attorney, Oliviano D. Regalado, filed an Answer on behalf of respondent municipality. At the pre-trial conference, Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos appeared, manifesting that he was counsel for respondent municipality. He filed a motion to dissolve injunction and a motion to
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admit an Amended Answer with motion to dismiss. Provincial Attorney Oliviano D. Regalado appeared as collaborating counsel of Atty. Romanillos. The Provincial Fiscal did not appear. It was Atty. Romanillos who submitted the Reply to petitioners Opposition to respondents motion to dissolve injunction. It was also Atty. Romanillos who submitted a written formal offer of evidence for the municipality. Petitioners moved to disqualify Atty. Romanillos from appearing as counsel for municipality and to declare null and void the proceedings participated in and undertaken by Atty. Romanillos. Atty. Romanillos and Atty. Regalado filed a joint motion stating, among others, that Atty. Romanillos was withdrawing as counsel for respondent municipality and that Atty. Regalado, as his collaborating counsel for municipality, is adopting the entire proceedings participated in/undertaken by Atty. Romanillos. Respondent Judge Camilo Montesa issued the Order which denied petitioners motion to disqualify Atty. Romanillos as counsel for the municipality, and on the other hand, granted Atty. Regalados motion to formally adopt the entire proceedings including the formal offer of evidence. In support of his foregoing action, respondent Judge reasoned: Upon appeal, the CA dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration. Issues/Held: 1. WON a municipality can be represented in a suit against it by a private counsel NO. a. Only the provincial fiscal, provincial attorney, and municipal attorney should represent a municipality in its lawsuits. Only in exceptional instances may a private attorney be hired by a municipality when the municipality is an adverse party in a case involving the provincial government
or another municipality or city within the province. This strict coherence to the letter of the law appears to have been dictated by the fact that the municipality should not be burdened with expenses of hiring a private lawyer and that its interests would be best protected if a government lawyer handles its litigations (Alinsug vs. RTC). Similarly, under Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, the provincial fiscal (whose functions were transferred to the provincial attorney under the Decentralization Act of 1967) shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except 1) in cases where original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or 2) in cases where the municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the same province. In the latter case, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province. None of the foregoing exceptions is present in this case. b. Atty. Romanillos appearance as collaborating counsel of the provincial prosecutor and the provincial attorney is unlawful. Private lawyers may not represent municipalities on their own. Neither may they do so even in collaboration with authorized government lawyers. This is anchored on the principle that only accountable public officers may act for and in behalf of public entities and that public funds should not be expended to hire private lawyers. 2. WON the provincial attorney can adopt with legal effect the proceedings undertaken by an unauthorized private counsel of a municipality YES. Although a municipality may not hire a private lawyer to represent it in litigations, in the interest of substantial justice, a municipality may adopt the work already performed in good faith by such private lawyer, which work is beneficial to it (1)
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provided that no injustice is thereby heaped on the adverse party and (2) provided further that no compensation in any guise is paid therefor by said municipality to the private lawyer. But for the private lawyers work to bind the municipality, such must be expressly adopted, as in this case. It does not appear that the adoption of proceedings undertaken by Atty. Romanillos would have resulted in any substantial prejudice to petitioners interest. To declare the said proceedings null and void, notwithstanding the formal adoption thereof by Provincial Attorney Regalado, who is authorized to represent the municipality, and to require trial anew to cover the same subject matter, to hear the same witnesses and to admit the same evidence adduced by the same parties cannot enhance the promotion of justice. Disposition: Petition denied.
concurrence of the COA as required by COA Circular No. 86-255. An administrative complaint was then filed against Governor Salalima, Vice Governor Azaa, and several members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan relative to the questioned retainer contract and the disbursementof public funds in payment thereof. Issue/Held: 1. WON petitioners exceeded their authority in hiring private lawyers to represent the Province of Albay YES. The SC has ruled in Municipality of Bocaue, et al. v. Manotok, that local government units cannot be represented by private lawyers and it is solely the Provincial Fiscal who can rightfully represent them. This ruling applies squarely to the case at hand because Sec. 481 of the LGC is based on Section 1681 of the Revised Administrative Code which was the subject of interpretation in the abovecited case.. 2. The entire transaction was attended by irregularities.
Salalima vs. Guingona (J. Davide; 1996)

Facts: The National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a case against the Province of Albay questioning the validity of the auction sale, which the Province conducted because of NPCs failure to pay real property taxes assessed. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay, through Resolution No. 0 1-90, authorized respondent Governor to engage the services of a Manila-based law firm (Cortes & Reyna Law Firm) to handle the case against NPC. Later, the Province also engaged the services of Atty. Cornago. This is despite the availability of the Provincial Legal Officer, Atty. Ricafort, who already filed the Provinces comment on the NPC petition. A retainer agreement was entered into which provided that Atty. Cornago and the law firm shall receive P50,000 as acceptance fee and 18% of the value of the property subject matter of the case which is P214 M. The province had already paid P7,380,410.31 as attorneys fees when the COA disallowed further disbursements for lack of the requisite prior written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General and the written
First, the disbursements to the lawyers amounting to P7,380,410.31 were disallowed by the Provincial Auditor on the ground that these were made without the prior written conformity of the Solicitor General and the written concurrence of the COA as required by COA Circular No. 86-25 5. Resolution No. 0 1-90 authorized the respondent Governor to sign and confirm a retainer contract for legal services with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm. But the retainer contract signed by respondent Governor was not only with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm but also with Atty. Jesus R. Cornago, another entity. In so doing, the Governor
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exceeded his authority under Resolution No. 01-90. Moreover, only Atty. Cornago who appeared as collaborating counsel of record of the Province in the SC case. The Solicitor General, in his letter to Governor noted that the Province is represented by Attys. Ricafort Cornago and Glenn Manahan but not by the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm. Furthermore, the memorandum filed for the Province was signed by Atty. Cornago and not by the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm. And yet, six of the ten checks paid by the Province and amounting to more than P3.6 million were issued in favor of the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm through Atty. Antonio Jose Cortes. The attorneys fees are not only unreasonable but also unconscionable. The contingent fee of 18% of the P2l4 M claim of the Province against NPC amounts to P38.5 million. The Provinces legal officer, Atty. Ricafort had already filed a comment on NPCs petition, which comment already covers the basic issues raised in the petition. When Atty. Cornago filed an appearance for the Province, the petition has already been given due course by the SC and the only pleading to be filed by the parties was a memorandum. Surely, one memorandum could not be worth P38.5 million.
unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of funds; and 2) Sec. 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 2. WON the petitoners could still be held administratively liable for the anomalous retainer contract NO. The petitioners could no longer be held administratively liable. This is so because public officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term. The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregard or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people. Disposition: Petition partly granted. The penalty of suspension on petitioners was annulled, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil or criminal actions against them.
- Furthermore, the professional character and social standing of Atty. Cornago are not such as would merit a P38.5 million fee for the legal services rendered for the Province. During the hearing, the Governor admitted that he had hired Atty. Cornago not on the basis of his competency and standing in the legal community but because they were schoolmates at San Beda College of Law. 3. The retainer contract containing such exorbitant attorneys fees may also be violative of the following: 1) COA Circular No. 85-55-A prohibiting irregular,
C. DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
SEC. 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. - An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds: (a) Disloyalty Philippines; to the Republic of the
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
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(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty; (d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor; (e) Abuse of authority; (f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang barangay; (g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; and (h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws. An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court. SEC. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. - A verified complaint against any erring local elective official shall be prepared as follows: (a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an independent component city or component city shall be filed before the Office of the President; (b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be filed before the sangguniang panlalaw igan whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the President; and (c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be final and executory. SEC. 62. Notice of Hearing. - (a) Within seven (7) days after the administrative complaint is filed, the Office of the President or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, and commence the investigation of the case within ten (10) days after receipt of such answer of the respondent. (b) When the respondent is an elective official of a province or highly urbanized city, such hearing and investigation shall be conducted in the place where he renders or holds office.
For all other local elective officials, the venue shall be the place where the sanggunian concerned is located. (c) However, no investigation shall be held within ninety (90) days immediately prior to any local election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed within the said period. If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the 90-day period immediately preceding local election, it shall be deemed automatically lifted upon the start of aforesaid period. SEC. 63. Preventive Suspension. Preventive suspension may be imposed: (a)
(1) By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or an independent component city; (2) By the governor, if the respondent is an elective official of a component city or municipality; or (3) By the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of the barangay. (b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence: Provided, That, any single preventive suspension of local elective fficials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further, That in the event that several administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first suspension. (c) Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended elective official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him, which shall be terminated within one hundred twenty (120) days from the time he was formally notified of the case against him. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect, or request, other than the appeal duly filed, the duration of such delay shall not be counted in computing the time of termination of the case.
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(d) Any abuse of the exercise of the power of preventive suspension shall be penalized as abuse of authority. SEC. 64. Salary of Respondent Pending Suspension. The respondent official preventively suspended from office shall receive no salary or compensation during such suspension; but, upon subsequent exoneration and reinstatement, he shall be paid full salary or compensation including such emoluments accruing during such suspension. SEC. 65. Rights of Respondent - The respondent shall be accorded full opportunity to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel, to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to require the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence in his favor through the compulsory process of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum. SEC. 66. Form and Notice of Decision. - (a) The investigation of the case shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from the start thereof. Within thirty (30) days after the end of the investigation, the Office of the President or the sanggunian concerned shall render a decision in writing stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the reasons for such decision. Copies of said decision shall immediately be furnished the respondent and all interested parties. (b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office. (c) The penalty of removal from office as a result of an administrative investigation shall be considered a bar to the candidacy of the respondent for any elective position. SEC. 67. Administrative Appeals. - Decisions in administrative cases may, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, be appealed to the following: (a) The sangguniang panlalawigan, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlungsod of component cities and the sangguniang bayan; and (b) The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component
cities. Decisions of the Office of the President shall be final and executory. SEC. 68. Execution Pending appeal. - An appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. The respondent shall be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event he wins such appeal. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments during the pendency of the appeal.
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THE LAW

ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS N. DIZON REYES | 2 SEMESTER, AY 2011-2012

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND IN THE PHILIPPINES NATURE

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Vilas vs. City of Manila (1911)

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III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

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San Juan vs. Civil Service Commission (1991)

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Pimentel vs. Aguirre (2000)

Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals (1991)

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provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy;

Since local governments remain

"Supervision" and "investigation"

Cordillera Broad Coalition Commission on Audit (1990)

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Limbona vs. Mangelin (1989)

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Pelaez vs. Auditor General (1965)

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Municipality of Kapalong vs. Moya (1988)

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B. Creation of municipal corporations 1. Constitutional provisions

Alvarez vs. Guingona (1996), supra

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territorial jurisdiction of the government unit concerned; and

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trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.

Cawaling vs. COMELEC (2001)

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Pelaez vs. Auditor General (1965), supra

De facto municipal corporations Attack against incorporations validity of

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7. Beginning of corporate existence of municipal corporations

ALTERATION AND DISSOLUTION CORPORATIONS

A. Nature of Power 1. Necessity for defining territorial boundaries B. Manner or Mode

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VI. PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENTS

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Padilla vs. COMELEC (1992)

deleted because the plebiscite involve all the units affected.

Tan vs. COMELEC (1986)

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