2.

Damage caused by the earthquake and tsunami hitting Fukushima NPSs (1) Seismic ground motion and tsunami height observed at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS 1) Matters related to seismic ground motion a Seismic ground motion observation system and observation records The seismic ground motion observation system of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, as shown in Figure III-2-1, consists of seismometers installed on the first basement and the second floor of the reactor buildings, seismometers in underground down-hole array (five seismometers in each part hole) at two parts in the south and north of the site and observation record device. Seismometers observe acceleration time history of two horizontal and vertical components. Seismometers are installed at 53 points in Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. Seismic ground motion was recorded at 29 points out of them. However, according to TEPCOs investigation, records of acceleration time history were interrupted at around 130 to 150 seconds at seven points. TEPCOs investigation revealed that the cause was failure of recoding device software. Table III-2-1 shows the list of maximum acceleration of seismic ground motion observed in three components (east-west, north-south and vertical) at the base mat level of the reactor buildings. Maximum acceleration in horizontal direction was 550 Gal at Unit 2 (east-west) and that in vertical direction was 302 Gal at Unit 2. b Comparison between standard seismic ground motion Ss and seismic ground motion observed In the seismic back check, the standard seismic ground motion Ss (Ss-1 to Ss-3) are established to envelop the seismic ground motion caused by plate boundary earthquake off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture, intraslab earthquake5 beneath the site, earthquake by capable fault around the site and possible earthquake from diffuse seismicity. Table III-2-1 shows maximum response acceleration to the standard seismic ground
5

Intraslab earthquake: The earthquake caused by a fault rupture within a descending oceanic crust.

III-28

motion Ss at the site where seismometers were installed at the base mat level on the first basement level of the reactor buildings. The table shows that observed maximum acceleration is mostly smaller than maximum response acceleration to the standard seismic ground motion Ss. However, maximum acceleration observed in east-west direction at Units 2, 3 and 5 is larger than maximum response acceleration to Ss. Figure III-2-2(a) shows acceleration time history of east-west component in Unit 2. Figure III-2-2(b) shows the comparison chart between the response spectra of observed seismic ground motion at the base mat level of the reactor building of Units 2, 3 and 5 and the response spectra at the base mat level of the building, inputting the standard seismic ground motion Ss into the base mat. The Figure shows that the response spectra of observation records of Units 2, 3 and 5 exceeds the response to Ss with a period of 0.2 to 0.3 second. c Probabilistic seismic hazard assessment and exceedance probability of the standard seismic ground motion Ss The Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities was revised in 2006. Under the revised Guide, considering the residual risk, the standard seismic ground motion Ss exceedance probability is referred from the standpoint that the possibility of seismic ground motion exceeding the standard seismic ground motion Ss is undeniable. NISA instructed TEPCO to conduct seismic back check (evaluation of Ss adequacy and safety of facilities) based on revision of the Guide. TEPCO evaluated the standard seismic ground motion Ss exceedance probability according to the seismic hazard evaluation procedures of the Seismic PSA Implementation Standards of the Atomic Energy Society of Japan as a part of seismic back check, and reported to NISA. Figure III-2-3 shows the uniform hazard spectra of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. In the Figure, Ss-1H and Ss-2H response spectra are also shown. The figure shows exceedance probability of the standard seismic ground motion Ss is within the range of 10 -4 to 10-6 per year. 2) Matters related to tsunami a Tide level observation system and observed records

III-29

The tide level observation system consists of tide gauge and observation recording device. The tide gauge is installed in quiet area in harbor, and the tide level observation recoding device is installed in the data transfer building. According to the press conference of TEPCO (April 9), initial major tsunami arrived at around 15:27 (41 minutes later of mainshock occurrence) and tsunami height was approximately 4 m height. Though secondary major tsunami arrived at 15:35, the water level is unknown due to tide gauge failure. Maximum scale of the gauge is 7.5 m. The site height of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS is 10 m at Units 1 to 4, and 13 m at Units 5 and 6. At Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, tsunami rushed from the offshore area in front of the site, and most part of the site where main buildings were placed was flooded. TEPCO reported about the inundation height based on the results of trace investigation at flooding. The results of the report are shown in Figure III-2-4. The inundation height of the ocean-side site such as reactor buildings of Units 1 to 4, turbine buildings, etc. is O.P. approximately +14 to 15 m at points H to K in the Figure(O.P.: Onahama Port base tide level for construction). Experts estimate that the tsunami height caused by this earthquake is more than 10 m from the picture (refer to Fig. III-2-5) showing the overflow status of tsunami seawall (10 m) released by TEPCO. It is hence assumed that tsunami height at the sea water pump is more than 10 m. The average ground subsidence level is approximately 0.8 m along the coast area of Miyagi to Fukushima prefectures in this earthquake, and it is necessary to consider that the site height may change by ground subsidence when hit by tsunami. b Comparison between design basis tsunami height and observed tsunami height As shown in Figure III-2-6, in the application document for establishment permit, subject tsunami source is Chile Earthquake (M9.5 in 1960) and the design basis tsunami water level is 3.1 m. In 2002, TEPCO evaluated the design tsunami height based on the Tsunami Assessment Method for Nuclear Power Plants in Japan (2002) of the Tsunami Evaluation Subcommittee, the Nuclear Civil Engineering Committee, Japan Society of Civil Engineers (hereafter referred to as Tsunami Assessment Method of JSCE), assessing off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture Earthquake (M7.9 in 1938) shown in Figure III-2-6 as M8.0 voluntary, and the highest water level of each Unit was set as 5.4 to 5.7 m. According to the evaluation, elevation of Unit 6 sea water pump motor of

III-30

emergency diesel generator was raised up 20 cm and also that of sea water pump motor for High Pressure Core Spray was raised up 22 cm. Tsunami Assessment Method of JSCE above is also reflected in IAEA Tsunami Hazard Guide DS417. However, the tsunami recurrence period is not identified in the method, At the 32nd Joint Working Group for Earthquake, Tsunami, Geology, and Foundations under the Seismic and Structural Design Subcommittee (June 24, 2009) held in order to conduct examination related to earthquake, it was pointed out that although the investigation report about tsunami by the Jogan earthquake in 869 was made by National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology and Tohoku University, the earthquake causing the tsunami was not dealt with. Regarding this, NISA requested TEPCO at the 33rd Joint Working Group (July 13, 2009) to take into account the Jogan earthquake for evaluating design tsunami height when new knowledge on the tsunami of the Jogan earthquake is obtained. c Probabilistic tsunami hazard evaluation and exceedance probability of design basis tsunami height The Tsunami Assessment Subcommittee of JSCE is at work on consideration about probabilistic tsunami hazard analysis method. As a part of the consideration, the tsunami hazard assessment method and the trial assessment of tsunami exceedance probability (Fig. III-2-7) are already announced but not yet completed. Other trial assessment of tsunami hazard is also announced. 3) Matters related to damage a Matters related to external power supply system outside the site Figures III-2-8(a) and III-2-8(b) show the transmission network of external power supply of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS and the damage situation. As shown in the Figures, the Okuma Nos. 1 and 2 power transmission lines (275 kV) from Shin Fukushima Power Substation connected to the normal high voltage switchboards of Units 1 and 2 via the switchyards for Units 1 and 2, and in addition, TEPCO nuclear line (66 kV) from Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc. connected to the normal high voltage switchboard of Unit 1 via the switchyards for Units 1 and 2. As to Units 3 and 4, the Okuma Nos. 3 and 4

III-31

transmission lines (275 kV) connected to the normal high voltage switchboard of Units 3 and 4 via the switchyards for Units 3 and 4 as well. For Units 5 and 6, the Yorunomori Nos. 1 and 2 transmission lines (66 kV) connected to the normal high voltage switchboard of Units 5 and 6, too. In addition, the normal high voltage switchboard of Unit 1, the normal high voltage switchboard of Unit 2, and the normal high voltage switchboard of Units 3 and 4 were connected mutually, and electric power interchange was possible. However, the switchyard for the Okuma No. 3 transmission line in the switchyards of Units 3 and 4 was under construction on the day when the earthquake occurred, and as a result, external transmission line in the total of six lines was connected to Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. The Shin Fukushima Power Substation is located approximately 8 km from the site, and the seismic intensity of this earthquake is estimated to be 6 upper. The earthquake caused damage to the breakers of the switchyards of Units 1 and 2. As to TEPCO nuclear line from Tohoku Electric Power, although it is not possible to estimate the cause, cables were damaged. Concerning Units 3 and 4, in addition to the Okuma No. 3 transmission line under construction, the breakers of Nos. 3 and 4 transmission lines on the side of Shin Fukushima Power Substation failed. In addition, for Units 5 and 6, one transmission line tower (tower No. 27) connecting to the switchyards of Units 5 and 6 was collapsed. As a result, all external power supplies of Units 1 to 6 were lost. b Sea water system pump and emergency power supply system in the site As to the sea water pump facilities for component cooling (height: 5.6 to 6 m) at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, all Units were flooded by tsunami as shown in Figure III-2-4. Whether or not they were damaged by wave power is under investigation. In addition, the Emergency Diesel Generators and switchboards installed in the basement floor of the reactor buildings and the turbine buildings (height: 0 to 5.8 m) were flooded except for Unit 6, and the emergency power source supply was lost. Regarding Unit 6, two out of three Emergency Diesel Generators were installed in the first basement of the reactor building and was flooded, but one Generator installed on the first floor of Diesel Generator building was not flooded and the emergency power supply was possible. (2) Seismic ground motion and tsunami observed at Fukushima Dai-ni NPS

III-32

1) Matters related to seismic ground motion a Seismic ground motion observation system, and observation records and observation seismic ground motion The seismic ground motion observation system of Fukushima Dai-ni NPS is basically similar to that of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS previously described in 2 (1). The seismometers are installed at 43 points in Fukushima Dai-ni NPS. All of these seismometers recorded the acceleration time history data of the seismic ground motion by this earthquake. However, in the same way as Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, recording of acceleration time history was interrupted at around 130 to 150 seconds at 11 points due to failure of recoding device software. Table III-2-2 shows observation records of maximum response acceleration in three components, two horizontal (east-west and north-south) and one vertical components, on the base mat of reactor building. Maximum acceleration in horizontal direction was 277 Gal at Unit 3 (north-south direction) and that of vertical direction was 305 Gal at Unit 1. b Comparison between standard seismic ground motion Ss and seismic ground motion observed The standard seismic ground motion Ss (Ss-1 to Ss-3) are established to envelop the seismic ground motion caused by plate boundary earthquake off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture, intraslab earthquake beneath the site, earthquake by capable fault around the site and possible earthquake from diffuse seismicity. Table III-2-2 shows maximum response acceleration to the standard seismic ground motion Ss at the site where seismometers were installed at the base mat level on the first basement level of the reactor buildings. The table also shows that maximum acceleration of observation records of all Units were smaller than maximum response acceleration to the standard seismic ground motion Ss. Figure III-2-9 shows the acceleration time history and the response spectra of observed seismic ground motion at the base mat level of the reactor building of Unit 3 whose acceleration in horizontal direction was highest. The figure also shows the response spectra on the base mat level inputting the standard seismic ground motion Ss into the base mat. The figure implies that the response spectra obtained from observation records

III-33

fall below the response spectra inputting the standard seismic ground motion Ss c Probabilistic seismic hazard assessment and exceedance probability of the standard seismic ground motion Ss Figure III-2-10 shows the uniform hazard spectra of Fukushima Dai-ni NPS. The response spectra of Ss-1H and Ss-2H are also shown. The Figure shows that the exceedance probability of the standard seismic ground motion Ss is within the range of 10-4 to 10-6 per year. 2) Matters related to tsunami a Tide level observation system and observed records The tide level observation system of Fukushima Dai-ni NPS is basically similar to that of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS previously mentioned in section 2.(1). According to the press conference of TEPCO on Apr. 9, initial major tsunami arrived at around 15:23 (37 minutes later of main shock occurrence) and next major tsunami at 15:35. After that, the circumstance is not clear. Because the tide gauge was damaged, the observation records were not preserved. As a result, tsunami time history and maximum tsunami height were not clear. TEPCO reported about the inundation height based on the results of trace investigation at flooding as well as Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS previously described in section 2.(1). Figure III-2-11(a) shows the report results. Fukushima Dai-ni NPS consists of the ocean-side area where seawater pumps, etc. are installed and the raised mountain-side area where reactor buildings, turbine buildings, etc. are installed. Tsunami at first flooded from the ocean-side area in front of the site. Afterward, as shown in the Figure, tsunami flooded from the narrow space between the south side of Unit 1 and the slope in the mountain-side area, and reached the back of the mountain-side area. There was no flooding except from the narrow place. The inundation height in the ocean-side area was O.P. approximately +6.5 to 7 m, and O.P. approximately +14 to 15 m in the mountain-side area ( O.P. means base level of Onahama Port construction). b Comparison between design basis tsunami height and observed tsunami height

III-34

In the application document for construction permit , subject tsunami source is Chile Earthquake (M9.5 in 1960) and the design basis tsunami height of each Unit is 3.1 to 3.7 m in the same way as Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. In the previously mentioned assessment based on the Tsunami Assessment Method for Nuclear Power Plants in Japan (2002), off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture Earthquake (M7.9 in 1938) was assessed as M8.0, in the same way as Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, and the design height of each Unit was 5.1 to 5.2 m. 3) Matters related to damage a Matters related to external power supply system outside the site The transmission network of external power supply of Fukushima Dai-ni NPS contain four lines including two lines of the extra high voltage switchyard on the site used in combination among Units 1 to 4 and the Tomioka Nos. 1. and 2 transmission lines outside the site (500 kV), and two lines of the Iwaido Nos.1 and 2 transmission lines (66 kV), and they connect to Shin Fukushima Power Substation, 8km upstream, and further, connect to Shin Iwaki Switchyard, approximate 40 km upper. Out of these transmission lines, power supply from Iwaido No.1 had been stopped for maintenance. The seismic intensity in the area around Shin Fukushima Power Substation is estimated to be 6 upper. The Tomioka No. 2 transmission line (500 kV) and the Iwaido No. 2 transmission line (66 kV) to Units 1 to 4 of Fukushima Dai-ni NPS stopped transmission due to failure of devices on the side of the switchboard, caused by strong ground motion in this earthquake. However, the power supply to Units 1 to 4 was continued since the Tomioka No. 1 transmission line could supply electric power (refer to Fig.III-2-8(a)). b Sea water system pump and emergency power supply system in the site The sea water pump facilities for component cooling of all Units (height: 6 m) were flooded by tsunami and lost its function except Unit 3, which was not flooded and kept its function. The Emergency Diesel Generators installed in the basement of the reactor buildings (height: 0 m) kept their functions for Unit 3 and 4, however, those for other Units lost

III-35

their functions by completely flooding (Fig. III-2-11(b)). As shown above, the sea water pump facilities for component cooling and the emergency diesel generator kept those functions only for Unit 3.

III-36

Vertical seismometer array

Unit5 RB

Unit5

Vertical array

Base stratum

Cross section

2nd floor

Seismometer at Base mat

Fig. III-2-1 Deployment of seismometers at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS and R/B in unit 5.

III-37

Table III-2-1 Max. acceleration values observed in reactor buildings at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS.
Loc. of seismometer (bottom floor of reactor bld.) Unit 1 Unit 2 Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit 5 Unit 6 Record*1 Max. acc. (Gal) NS 460*2 348*2 322*2 281*2 311*2 298*2 EW 447*2 550*2 507*2 319*2 548*2 444*2 UD 258*2 302*2 231*2 200*2 256*2 244 Max. response acceleration to the DBGM Ss (Gal) NS 487 441 449 447 452 445 EW 489 438 441 445 452 448 UD 412 420 429 422 427 415

*1 These are temporal values, and may be corrected later. *2 Each recording was interrupted at around 130-150 s from recording start time.
3000 (h=0.05)

Res_1FZ2011031114462R2_EW.waz Res_1f2_Ss-1_mat_EW.waz Res_1f2_Ss-2_mat_EW.waz Res_1f2_Ss-3_mat_EW.waz

Max. acc.
(Gal) Acceleration (gal)

Acceleration (Gal)

Unit 2 EW

2000

Observation DBGM Ss-1 DBGM Ss-2 DBGM Ss-3

1000 500 0 -500 -1000

0 50 100

550

Unit2 EW

(cm/s )1000
2

150

200

250

0 0.02

0.05

Res_1FZ2011031114463R2_EW.waz Res_1f3_Ss-1_mat_EW.waz Res_1f3_Ss-2_mat_EW.waz Res_1f3_Ss-3_mat_EW.waz

0.1 0.2 0.5

()

Time (s)

Period (s) ()
3000 (h=0.05)

Fig. III-2-2(a) Acceleration seismogram on the base mat at R/B in Unit-2 at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS.

Acceleration (Gal)

Unit 3 EW

2000

Observation DBGM Ss-1 DBGM Ss-2 DBGM Ss-3

Horizontal direction

(cm/s2 )1000

0 0.02

() Period (s)
3000 (h=0.05)

Acceleration (Gal)

Unit 5 EW

2000

Observation DBGM Ss-1 DBGM Ss-2 DBGM Ss-3

Velocity (cm/s)

Res_1FZ2011031114465R2_EW.waz Res_1f5_Ss-1_mat_EW.waz Res_1f5_Ss-2_mat_EW.waz Res_1f5_Ss-3_mat_EW.waz 0.5 0.05 0.1 0.2

(cm/s2 )1000

Ss-1H Ss-2H

UHS for 10-3, 10-4, 10-5 and 10-6 exceedance probability levels
0 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 5

Period (s)

()

Period (s)

Fig. III-2-2(b) Response spectra on the base mats at R/Bs at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS.

Fig. III-2-3 DBGM Ss and Uniform Hazard Spectra (UHS) for Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS.

Presented by TEPCO

III-38

 Fukushima Dai-ichi (Unit-1)

Reactor building Turbine building

Fukushima Dai-ichi (Unit-6)

Reactor building Turbine building

+10m +5m Cooling sea water pump motor

+13m +5m

Cooling sea water pump motor

+5.6m +5m

+5m 0m
Emergency Diesel Generator room

+10m +5m
Sea water intake pipe

+5.6m

Sea water intake pit Sea surface: 0m 0m

Cooling sea water pump

+13m +5.8m Diesel Emergency room Generator +13m

+5.7m +5.6m intake pit

Sea water 1 Sea surface: 0m 0m

Sea water intake pipe Cooling sea water pump

+13m +5m

+5.8m
At point F&G; more than O.P.+12m Inundation than 2m) depth: more

+5.6m

0m

At point E; O.P.+1415m Inundation depth: 01m) At point C; more than O.P.+11m Inundation depth: more than 6m) At point A; O.P.+1314m Inundation depth: 01m)

At point H; O.P.+1415m Inundation depth: 45m) At point I; O.P.+1415m Inundation depth: 45m) At point J; O.P.+1415m Inundation depth: 45m)

At point K; O.P.+1415m Inundation depth: 45m)

III-39

Unit-1 Unit-6 Unit-5

Unit-2

Unit-3

Unit-4

At point B; O.P.+1314m

At point D; O.P.+13.514.5m

Red: Inundation height (Inundation depth is indicated inside the parenthesis) Blue: Run-up height

Reference: The Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. Release [Online]. http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110409e9.pdf Partially modified by JNES.

Reference: The Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. Release [Online]. http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110409e9.pdf Partially modified by JNES.

Fig. III-2-4(a) Damage of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS due to the tsunami.

Reference: The Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. Release [Online] .http://www.tepco.co.jp/tepconews/p ressroom/110311/index -j.html

Fig. III-2-4(b) Photos showing plant damages at the Fukushima Dai -ichi NPS.

Cross section of Fukushima Dai-ichi (Unit-1)

Reactor building

Turbine building Cooling sea water pump motor Seawall Sea water (height:10m) intake pit Sea surface: 0m

+10m +5m
Emergency Diesel Generator room Sea water intake pipe

+5.6m +5m

0m

Cooling sea water pump

Seawall (height: 10m) Seawall

Reference: The Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc . Release [Online] .http://www.te pco.co.jp/tepconews/pressroom/ 110311/index -j.html

Fig. III-2-5 Tsunami getting over seawall at the Fukushima Dai -ichi NPS.

III-40

30S

1960 Chilean earthquake

1938 Fukushimaken-Oki earthquake
35S

Fukushima Daiichi NPS

45S

Near Field Tsunami

50S

Far Field Tsunami

80W 70W

Maximum water level = 4.4m + O.P.1.3m = O.P.+5.7m Minimum water level = -3.6m O.P.0.0m = O.P.-3.6m
Reference: Takao (2010) [ Online] . http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic -s ymposiu m10/presentationdata/3_sessionB/B -11.pdf R/B Partially modified b y JNES. S/B T/B O.P.+1013m
Maximum water level

Fig. III-2-6 O.P.+5.7m tsunami level evaluated by TEPC O for the Design Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. Fukushima Daiichi NPS Mean tide level
O.P.+0.8m

O.P.-3.6m Minimum water level

Annual probability of exceedance

Average 0.95 Fractile 0.84 Fractile We assessed and confirmed the safety of the Fractile 0.50 nuclear plants based on the JSCE method 0.16 Fractile 0.05 Fractile which was published in 2002.

Tsunami height (m)

Reference: The Tsunami Evaluation Subco mmittee, The Nuclear Civil Engineering Committee, JSCE (2010) [Online] .http://www.jstage. jst.go.jp/article/jscejb/63/2/168/_pdf/ -char/ja/

Fig. III-2-7 Evaluation results of tsunami hazard curves based on near - and far-field tsunami sources for Yamada villages, Iwate Pref..

III-41

Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

40km

8km
Futaba-line No.1,No.2 let-off only, 500kV

66kV Switchyard

Extra-high-voltage Switchyard R/B T/B

Unit 6 Unit 5

ex. Startup Transformer

Tower Collapsed

Yorunomori-line No.1, No.2 (66kV)

Startup Transformer Extra-high -voltage Switchyard CB Collapsed

R/B T/B

R/B T/B

Unit 1 Unit 2

Okuma-line No.1, No.2 (275kV)

R/B T/B

Extra-high -voltage Switchyard R/B T/B

ex. Tower
CB Collapsed , etc. Shin-fukushima Transforming Station (TEPCO) Okuma-line No.3, No.4 (275kV)

Unit 3 Unit 4

CP Submerged Startup Transformer

R/B T/B

Reserved Construction Transformer Tomioka-line

ex. Switchyard

Shin-Iwaki Switch Station

(66kV)

: Interruption of power supply and/or damaged zone

Tomioka Transforming Station (Tohoku Electric Power

Co., Inc.)

Pacific Ocean

Reference: The Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc . Release [Online] . http://info.nicovideo.jp/pdf/2011 -03 -18_1930_touden_genpatsu.pdf http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/kk -np/info/tohoku/pdf/23032202.pdf
40km km
Fukushima Dai-ni NPS

Startup Transformer Iwaito-line No.1, No.2 (66kV) 66kV Switchyard

R/B

T/B

Unit 1

3 lines out of 2 system 4 lines failed. Outside power received by 1 line

R/B

T/B

Unit 2

R/B Tomioka-line No.1, No.2 (500kV) Extra-high-voltage Switchyard Startup Transformer

T/B

Unit 3

Shin-fukushima Transforming Station (TEPCO)

R/B T/B

Unit 4
Pacific Ocean

Shin-Iwaki Switch Station

: Interruption of power supply and/or damaged zone

Reference: The Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc . Release [Online] . http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/kk -np/tiiki/pdf/230325.pdf

Fig. III-2-8(a) Damage of external power supply systems for the Fukushima Dai-ichi and Dai -ni NPSs (1). III-42

Okuma line 1L (O-81) Circuit Breaker damaged

Okuma line 2L (O-81) Circuit Breaker damaged

Okuma line 3L, Ground wire (disconnected)

Okuma line 3L & 4L, Steel structure for lead-in (tilted)

Yorunomori line, Cable in substation (subsidence)

Landslide of slope

Overview of landslide

Collapsed tower

Reference: The Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc . Release [Online] . http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp -com/release/betu11_e/ima ges/110516e23.pdf http://www.tepco.co.j p/en/press/corp -com/release/betu11_e/ima ges/110516e19.pdf http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp -com/release/betu11_e/ima ges/110516e20.pdf

Fig. III-2-8(b) Damage of external power supply systems of the Fukushima Dai-ichi and Dai-ni NPSs (2).

III-43

Table III-2-2 Max. accelerations values observed in reactor buildings at the Fukushima Dai-ni NPS.
Loc. of seismometer (bottom floor of reactor bld.) Unit 1 Fukushima Dai-ni Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Record*1 Max. acc. (Gal) NS 254 243 277*2 210*2 EW 230*2 196*2 216*2 205*2 UD 305 232*2 208*2 288*2 Max. response acceleration to the DBGM Ss (Gal) NS 434 428 428 415 EW 434 429 430 415 UD 512 504 504 504

*1 These are temporal values, and may be corrected later. *2 Each recording was interrupted at around 130-150 s from recording start time.

Max. acc.
(Gal) Acceleration (Gal)
1000 500 0 -500 -1000
0

277

Unit 3, NS

Horizontal

Horizontal direction
Res_2FZ2011031114463R2_NS.waz 50 100 150 Res_2F3_mat_Ss-1H_NS.waz Time Res_2F3_mat_Ss-2H_NS.waz (s) () Res_2F3_mat_Ss-3H_NS.waz
200 250

3000

(h=0.05)

(cm/s2 )1000

Acceleration (Gal)

Unit 3, NS

2000

Observation DBGM Ss-1 DBGM Ss-2 DBGM Ss-3

velocity (cm/s) Velocity (cm/s)

Ss-1H Ss-1H Ss-2H Ss-2H

0 0.02

Annual probability 10-5 and 10 UHS for 10-33 104 , of5 exceedance-6 , -4 6 (10 , 10 , 10 -410 10-310,10 ) -510 exceedance probability levels -6
0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 5

() Period (s)

Period (s) Period (s)

Fig. III-2-9 Acceleration seismogram and response spectra on the base mat at R/B in Unit-3 at the Fukushima Dai-ni NPS.

Fig. III-2-10 DBGM Ss and Uniform Hazard Spectra (UHS) for the Fukushima Dai-ni NPS.

Presented b y TEP CO

III-44

 Fukushima Dai-ni (Unit-4)

Reactor building Turbine building Cooling sea water pump motor

+12m +0m
Emergency Diesel Generator room Sea water intake pipe

Sea water

+4m

+6.0m intake pit

0m Sea surface: 0m
Cooling sea water pump

At point D; O.P.+6.5m Inundation depth: 2.5m) At point C; O.P.+7m Inundation depth: 3m)

At point E; O.P.+7m Inundation depth: more than 3m) At point F; O.P.+1415m Inundation depth: 23m) At point G; more than O.P.+14.1m Inundation depth: more than 2.1m)

III-45
Red: Inundation height (Inundation depth is indicated inside the parenthesis) Blue: Run-up height : Estimated pathway of tsunami inflow

At point B; O.P.+67m Inundation depth: 23m) At point A; O.P.+78m Inundation depth: 34m)

At point H; more than O.P.+14m Inundation depth: more than 2m)

At point J; O.P.+13.7m Inundation depth: 1.7m) At point M; O.P.+12.3m Inundation depth: 0.3m) At point O; O.P.+12.3m At point N; more than O.P.+12.4m Inundation depth: 0.4m) At point L; O.P.+12.9m Inundation depth: 0.9m) At point I; O.P.+14m

Unit-4

Unit-3 Unit-2

Unit-1
At point K; more than O.P.+14m Inundation depth: more than 2m)

Reference: The Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. Release [Online]. http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110409e10.pdf Partially modified by JNES.

Fig. III-2-11(a) Damage of Fukushima Dai-ni NPS due to the tsunami.

Damages of heat exchanger room and heat exchanger (Unit 1)

Damages of reactor building and emergency diesel generator (Unit 1)

Presented by TEPCO

Fig. III-2-11(b) Dama ge of Fukushima Dai -ni NPS due to the tsunami.

III-46