Philippine Defense Policy in the 21st Century: Autonomous Defense or Back to the Alliance?

Author(s): Renato Cruz De Castro Source: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 3 (Fall, 2005), pp. 403-422 Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40023723 Accessed: 10/08/2010 02:08
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Philippine Defense the 21st Century:

Defense
or

Policy
the

in

Autonomous Alliance?

Back

to

Renato CruzDe Castro

a resultof the PhilippineSenate'sdecision not to ratifya new base its treatyon September16, 1991, the United Stateswithdrew forces in fromthe Philippines November1992.ThiseventheraldedManila's attempts to discontinue its alliance-baseddefense policy and forge an The independentdefense capability. Philippinegovernmentannouncedits to modernize its armed forces through the acquisition of modern plan fast-attack aircraft corvettes.In the postand crafts,reconnaissance aircraft, US basesera,the Philippinegovernment appeareddeterminedto undertake a seriesof decisionsandactionsaimedat developingan autonomousdefense such attemptsbegan to falter less than two years posture. Unfortunately, after the Philippine governmentpassed a law in 1995, providingfor the of . modernization the ArmedForcesof the Philippines(AFP) The financially constrained AFP could barely cover its basic manpower and logistics and had to be put requirements, even a modestmodernization programme on the backburner. of forces Thus,a fewyearsafterthe withdrawal American from the country,the Philippinesbegan looking again to the US for its defense needs. In 1998,Manilaformulateda visitingforcesagreementwith Washington, authorizingthe resumptionof large-scale cooperativemilitary activities between the two countries.The terroristattacksin NewYorkand on Washington September11, 2001 and the consequentAmericandecision to forma globalcoalitionagainst international terrorism havecreatedfurther to revitalizethe Republic of the Philippines-UnitedStates opportunities (RP-US)alliance. This article addresses two theoretically relevant questions regarding alliance durability. First,why does a state, given a choice of autonomous defense (byusingits owndomesticresources armsbuild-up)and seeking for allies (to providemilitaryresourcesand guarantees),opt for an alliance? Second,underwhatconditionswilla statefavourallianceoverautonomous defense? the examinesthe realist Usinga case-study approach, articlecritically explanationregardingallianceformation.It advancesthe notion that for
1 Originally presentedat the 2003AnnualNationalConferenceof the PhilippinePoliticalScience Association,23-25 October 2003, DavaoCity,the Philippines.

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manyThirdWorldstates,the domesticpoliticaleconomy (not the systemic variables perceivedsecuritythreats,the availability other allies,or the of of natureof the security is variable behindthe decision guarantees) the decisive to allywitha moreaffluentand powerfulstate.Following MichaelN. Barnett andJackS. Levy's alliancepolicy, studyof the domesticsourcesof Egyptian the article analyzesthe impact of the domestic political economy on the betweenallianceand internal Philippinestate,and discussesthe trade-offs mobilizationof resourcesin the post-Cold Warperiod. 2
The Political Economy of Security Policy

States generally have two major choices in addressing their security needs- autonomousdefensecapability alliances.Thisconceptdoes not and the fact that autonomousdefense build-upand alliance can be preclude combined,becausethe twochoicesare presumedto be produced optimally a convex productionpossibility maximizedover convex indifference set by curvesrepresentingthe country'spossiblecombinationof armsbuild-up/ alliancepossibilities.3 Normally, stateswill select the option that provides the greatest amountof security benefits,withthe leastpoliticaland economic is costs.4The developmentof an autonomousdefense capability considered the optimumor preferredchoice for states.Statesgenerally wantto exercise as much freedom as possible, to avoid being drawninto events that have harmful consequences, and to fend off restrictions on their actions, and with particularly respectto ensuringtheirsecurity exerciseof sovereignty. an autonomousdefense capability involvesimprovinga state's Developing ability to defend itself, through arms build-up or through acquisition, financedby eitherdomesticspendingor byaskingother statesto supplythe military capital,in exchangefor a shareof the defenseburden If the second option is not readilyavailable,a state pursuingautonomousdefense must increasethe capitalstructureof its militarycapability relyingheavilyon by domestic resourcesthrough taxation,borrowingor conscription.Usually, statesfind it extremelydifficultto pursue mostsmalland even medium-sized an autonomousdefense policy,because of inadequateindependent arms Theymayalso havea limiteddomesticresourcebase, productioncapability. base for achievingan economyof scale in the and an insufficientindustrial developmentand productionof armaments. States form and maintain alliances if they do not possess sufficient to resourcesand militarycapability providefor their own nationalsecurity
2 See MichaelN. BarnettandJack S. Levy,"TheDomestic Sourcesof Alliancesand Alignments: vol. International The Case of Egypt,1962-73," Organization, 45, no. 3 (summer 1991), p. 369-395. 3 John A.C. Conybeare,"Arms versusAlliances:The CapitalStructureof MilitaryEnterprise, Resolution 38. no. 2 (June 1994), p. 215. vol. Journalof Conflict 4 Glenn H. Synder,"Alliances, vol. Balance,and Stability, International Organization, 45, issue 1 (winter1991), p. 128.

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needs.5 More importantlyfor small and weak states, alliancesstrengthen their capacityto repel a common threat by granting them access to the resources of more powerful and wealthy partners. Alliances reinforce preexistingalignmentsby introducingelements of preciselegal and moral 6 obligations, as well as reciprocity. In alliances,states also expect some resourcesand a certain degree of political capitalfrom allies with whom they share common interests.Alliancesprovide a substantialincrease in as militarycapability they can triggera rapid infusion of funds and other resources such as military expertise, technology, equipment and even of personnel.7Statescan pursuea generalstrategy combiningautonomous defense and alliances.In reality,however,statesselect the means that are and balancethe political mostcost-effective readilyavailable. Theygenerally of acquiringmore armswith the politicalcostsof forgingalliances. benefits Most states try to find the equilibriumbetween improvingtheir military and capability takingthe politicalriskof divertingresourcesfor investment and At to the military. the same time, they managethe unreliability danger of entering into an allianceby armingin the form of "internal balancing" versustheir allies.8In a number of cases, a state'ssecuritypolicy does not relysolelyon either an armsbuild-upor an alliance,but ratherresidesin a prudentcombinationof the two.9 selecta policybasedsimplyon whatoption Weakandpoor states,however, is available,instead of making a prudent choice. They generally select defensebecausetheydo not havethe wherewithal alliances overautonomous to put together an independent defense policy, involvingdomestic arms build-up,that will enable their armedforces to confrontpotentialthreats. Armingrequireshuge resources,and with a limited resourcebase, a state mightfind thatthe politicalprice of additionalresourceextractionexceeds the marginal cost of entering into an alliance. The decision might be complicatedby the fact that the political elite may show little interest in strategicaffairsand focus only on the quantifiablecost of defending the a a country. Consequently, statemaynot be ableto formulate coherentpolicy when faced by an unforeseenexternal on how it can defend itself.10 Then, threat,a statemayjustseek security throughthe cheapestand mostavailable facedwithinternal meansat thatpointin time.Andif a stateis simultaneously
5 Ethan Barnaby Kapstein, The Political Economy of National Security:A Global Perspective(New

York:McGraw-Hill Inc., 1992), p. 161. 6 Glen H. Synder,"Alliances,Balance, and Stability," International vol. Organizations, 45, no. 1 (winter1991), p. 124. 7 Barnettand Levy,"TheDomestic Sourcesof Alliances,"p. 374. 8 James D. Morrow,"ArmsVersusAllies: Trade-Offin the Search of Security," International vol. Organizations, 47, no. 2, p. 208. 9 Morrow, ArmsVersusAllies, p. 214. 10 For an interesting account of this case see Theo Farell, "World Culture and the Irish Army,
1922-1942," in Theo Farell and Terry Terriff, eds., TheSources Military Change:Culture,Politics, Technology of

(London, UK:Lynne Rienner Publishers,Inc., 2002), pp. 91-118.

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threats,its politicalleadershipmight be tempted to secure the additional externalresourcesnecessaryto ensuringthe survival the regime. of
The Impetus for Autonomous Defense

In 1946, the newlyindependent Philippine state signed three military agreementswith its former colonial master to enhance its weak military deterrentagainstanyexternalthreat: and capability to providea coordinated Assistance the Military Bases of 1947,the Military Program Agreement(MBA) of 1947 and the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951. The (MAP) by Philippinestried to establishan autonomousdefense capability forming a tri-service the armedforceson October4, 1947.However, threatposed by communistinsurgentsforced the AFPto deploy 26 combatbattalionteams for counterinsurgency the operations.11 Consequently, maintaskof the armycentredAFPwasthe conductof an anti-dissident campaignin the country's affectedareas.Becauseof the RP-US alliance,withinthe contextof the MDT, the AFP's conventional military function was limited to occasional participation in the SEATOmilitary exercises and joint exercises with This Americanforces in Philippine territory.12 arrangementled to a postbecame situation wherethe US forcesbasedin the Philippines independence the defacto armed forces against external threats, while the AFP was responsiblefor counterinsurgency operations. makean attempt The early1970s,however, the Philippinegovernment saw to develop some capabilities for an autonomous defense posture. The outbreak of the Muslim secessionist rebellion in the southern island of Mindanao,and the general reluctanceof the US to providethe AFPwith counterinsurgency weaponsmade the Philippinegovernmentrealizethatit for would have to supplyits own armedforceswith the necessaryhardware The AFP,specifically army,began acquiringvarious the internaldefense.13 non-American-madeweapon systems and equipment in line with its organizational expansion, brought about by the heightened Muslim in The insurgency Mindanao.14 Philippinegovernmentalso allocatedabout US$25 million annuallyto supportthe AFP'sresearchand developmentin

11 FortnatoU. Abat,"Toward Revitalized a unpublished Armyfor PhilippineDefense:A Proposal," MAthesis, Ateneo de ManilaUniversity, GraduateSchool of Business,September 1978, p. 42. 12 Abat, "Toward Revitalized a Armyfor Philippine Defense,"p. 42. 13 Ceasar Hombrebueno Bello, "The Philippine Defense Industry: Witnessing a Rebirth" (unpublished monograph, n.d.), p. 1. In an interview,former Secretaryof Defense FortunatoAbat stated that the outbreakof the Muslimrebellion in Mindanaowasan eye-openerfor the government to embarkon a self-reliantdefense posture, since the US refused to provideany militaryassistanceto the Philippine governmentand prohibited the AFPfrom using American-made militaryequipment. Washingtonwasapprehensiveof a possible adversereaction from the Arabstatesin light of the First Oil Crisisof 1973. In-personinterviewwith SecretaryFortunatoAbat, Quezon City,28January2003. 14 Abat, "Toward Revitalized a Armyfor Philippine Defense,"p. 137.

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Philippine Defense Policy: Autonomous Defense or Back to the Alliance1?

and hardware, gave tax holidaysand investmentincentivesto local military companiesproducingdefense materialfor the armedforces. This was the first achievingan autonomous Philippinegovernment's majorstep towards as defense capability, the programmewas aimed at enabling the AFP to conflictwithout conduct defensiveoperationsin any low-to medium-level relyingon its ally,the US.15 autonomousdefense posturewasboosted The Philippinegovernment's in the late 1980s.In 1989,the Department NationalDefenseand the AFP of conducted variouslong-rangeplanning exerciseswith the passageof the United NationsGeneralAssembly's of the Sea, and in connectionwith Law the brewingterritorialdisputes in the South China Sea, and the glaring inabilityof the Philippine Navy (PN) to patrol and secure the country's extensive maritime territory.16 The AFP leadership also pushed for the of the PN through the acquisitionof six fast attackcrafts modernization . (FAC) The military brassarguedthat the PN had no missileand bluetop and waterscapabilities askedthe PhilippineCongressfor funds to purchase sea maritime borders.17 shipsneeded for a sequential controlof the country's Forits part,the PhilippineSenateencouragedthe AFPto developa 15-year as armsacquisition withdrawal American of programme a hedge fora possible bases from the country and the consequent reduction of US military to assistance the Philippinearmedforces.The Senatealso directedthe AFP to formulatea general plan that would lessen Philippinedependence on the US security umbrella and develop the country's external defense at capability the end of the ColdWarin the early1990s.18 facilitiesin the Philippinesserved Duringthe ColdWar,the US military as a hub for American forward-deployed forces, enhanced their "surge increasedthe on-stationtime of navaland air forces by bringing capacity," them near the crisisand combat areas, and made availablehuge storage facilitiesfor prepositioningof crucialwar material. After the end of the Cold War,however,Maniladid not share Washington's securityconcerns. defenseplannersand military did not see anyimmediate Philippine analysts external threat to the Philippinesfor the next five yearsof the post-Cold In War era.19 fact,the government's facilities stated primeron the US military that "thePhilippinesfaced no externalenemies or threatsand that threats

15 See ArmedForcesof the Philippines,"The20-Year Defense Posture StrategicPlan:Self-Reliant (SRDP)Program"(Quezon City:CampEmilio Aguinaldo, September 2002), p. 2. 16 In-personinterviewwith GeneralAlfredo Filler (retired), 19 September 2002, Pasig City. 17 WalterBriones, "TheAFPin the 21st Century," M.A.thesis, National Defense College of the Philippines,Metro Manila,1995, p. 2. 18 Interviewwith GeneralAlfredo Filler. 19 US House Subcommitteeon Asian and PacificAffairsof the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Relationsand theMilitaryBasesAgreement (MBA) Review,98th Congress, 1st session, Hearing, U.S.-Philippine

17, 23 and 28June 1983, p. 86.

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rebels arisingfrom both communistinsurgencyand the right-wing military could not be addressedby US military presencein the country."20 Post-Cold security War relations Washington, with fromManila's viewpoint, which would require some representeda simple commercialtransaction, paymentsfrom Washingtonfor services rendered by the Philippines in hosting the US facilities, rather than a venture entered into for mutual interests.The Philippinegovernment's security positionregardingthe bases emphasized the economic dimension of these facilities. To the Aquino whatwas consequentialin the post-ColdWaralliancewas administration, increasedUS economic and military assistance that could hopefullysoothe domestic sensitivities over the sovereignty issue and would entice the Philippine Senate to ratify a new base agreement.21To the majorityof who the facilities, Filipinos favoured continuedpresenceof American military economic compensationbecame an important and to a certain degree, the only- consideration.22 The Philippine government ignored Washington'schanging strategic the calculationsregardingthe value of its Philippinebases. Consequently, the one-yearframeworkand technical political atmospheresurrounding base agreementbecame extremelycharged, negotiationsfor a new military a resultof the volatiledomesticsystems the twocountries,emotionalism, in era. and the evolvingsecurityenvironmentof the post-Cold-War posturing Afternearly11 monthsof difficultand emotionalnegotiation,the twoallies eventually signed a new bases agreement in June 1991. However, on September16, 1991, the PhilippineSenate,by a vote of 12 (against)to 11 (for) rejectedthe new bases agreement.This developmentcompelled the US governmentto turnoverClark Baseto the Philippineson November Air 1990.A yearlater,the US withdrew forcesfrom SubicNavalBase. its 26, The withdrawal Americanforces from the Philippinesled to tensions of were and challengesin RP-US relations.The US and the Philippines security stillalliesunder the 1951MDT. warnedManilathatit However, Washington would be difficult for the US to guarantee the external defense of the as fromwhichtheycouldoperate.23 forceslosta facility Philippines, American aid The Bushadministration reducedAmericaneconomicand military also to the Philippines 60 percentfor the fiscalyear1992.These developments by defense capability through an promptedthe AFPto plan for a self-reliant

20 "BasesPrimerPart2,"Philippine 19 25 DailyInquirer, September 1990, p. 49, FBIS-EAS-90-186, September 1990. 21 Philip BowringandJohn McBeth, "Basis Dependence: Military of FacilitiesRow StirsDebate on U.S. Regional Role,"FarEastern Economic Review 15(12 April 1990) , pp. 22-23. 22 John McBeth,"Senatorial 15 Far Economic Review (12 April 1990), p. 25. Privilege," Eastern 23 US House Subcommittee on Asian and PacificAffairsof the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Hearings, Implications of the U.S. Withdrawal from Clarkand SubicBases, 102nd Congress, 2nd session, 25

March1992, p. 35.

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initial ten-year modernization programme. In its early version, the focusedon developingthe AFP's conventional programme military capability through the purchaseof much-neededequipmentand a weaponssystem. The programmeprovidedfor the acquisitionof all-weather interceptorssites,a fleet of surfaceships,amphibious-landing planesradar transport ships and naval gunfire support capability. The total bill for this amounted to nearly140 billion Philippinepesos (US$560million at the 1990 exchange rate) spreadovera ten-year period.24 The withdrawal American of forcesfromthe Philippines, however, military undermined the AFP modernization programme. The Philippine governmentwasin no position to replace the US$200million that the US assistance until 1991,whichcoveredabout 67 providedannuallyin military This loss percentof the AFP'sacquisitionand routinemaintenancecosts.25 forcedthe Philippinegovernmentto foot the billfor the costof maintaining the AFP's members agingandalmostobsoleteequipment.Moresignificantly, of the Filipino political elite were not inclined to increase defense of forcesfromthe Philippines expenditures, despitethe withdrawal American and the consequentcut in US military assistanceto the AFP.Theybelieved that as an insular country, the Philippines was far removed from any immediate threat. For the legislators,any arms acquisitionmade for the AFPmodernizationprogrammewould be subjectedto and guided by the financialpriorityprocedures.26 PhilippineCongress's
The Modernization that Never Was

It took the PhilippineSenatealmostthreeyearsto debateand discussthe merits of the armsmodernizationlaw,which resulted in a divisionof the On upperchamber. the one hand,a groupof senatorsthoughtthatCongress shouldgrantthe AFPthe authority committhe governmentto long-term, to contracts,and to trustthe militaryto use its properjudgment in multi-year to On determiningwhatmilitaryhardware acquire,and when.27 the other hand, another group of senators was convinced that given the existing practicesand the military's unimpressiverecord in armsacquisitions,the governmentmightbe gettingnothing in returnfor its money.28 Duringthe numerousdeliberationson the bill, the legislatorspersistently arguedthat acquiring new hardwarefor the Philippine militarywould surely affect

24 LesandroAbadia, "The AFP in the Nineties," 1991 Fookien TimesYearbook (Manila:Fookien Times PublishingCompany,1991), p. 74. 25 John McBeth, "BrokenToys:Cash-Strapped Armed Forces Look Fora New Role,"FarEastern 9 Economic Review, September 1993, p. 29. 26 John McBeth,"BrokenToys," 29. p. 27 In-personinterviewwith Senator Orlando Mercado, 14 October 2003, Manila,Philippines. 28 Interviewwith Senator Orlando Mercado, 14 October 2003, p. 1.

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national priorities,as resourcesthat could have been used for economic and social projects would have to be spent on the AFP modernization programme.29 In February 1995,the PhilippineCongresspassedRepublicActno. 7898, the law providingfor the modernizationof the AFP.The law commitsthe governmentto establishingand funding a separatebudget for a 15-year modernizationprogramme.It calls for a modernizationprogrammethat will develop the AFP into a responsiveand effective force with external functionsto support defensecapability, wellaswithcivicanddevelopmental as the country's development.An importantcomponent of the programmeis the replacementof the AFP'sobsolete weaponssystemand the acquisition of modern militaryhardwarethat can be utilized for militaryand civilian purposes.The programmeemphasizesthe development of the AFP'sair and navalassetsto providethe Philippinemilitary withadequateairdefense, maritimesurveillance,patrol and response, and offshore territorieswith The patrolcapabilities.30 PhilippineAirForcewouldacquiretwosquadrons missile and gun systems.31 of multi-rolefighter aircraftand surface-to-air The PN would be given the biggest budget allocationfor the purchaseof threefrigates,six corvettes,12 offshorepatrolvesselsand 12 missileboats.32 In addition,the Navywouldalso acquirenine helicoptersand six fixed-wing aircraft developits navalaviationcapability. to The law, however, ensured that the allocation of resources for this additionaldefense expenditurehad to go througha verycomplex,legalistic and tediouslegislative programme process,and thatanyarmsmodernization for the AFPwouldbe determinedby the agendaof the legislators. Though they were obliged by the law to provide multi-yearfunding to the AFP felt modernization the programme, legislators thattherewasa need to reform RA7898,theyput in placea numberof the military establishment. Through in requirementsto ensure transparency what were expected to be multimillion-dollardeals.33 then Senator Orlando Mercadodeclared in his As sponsorshipspeech on the lawin 1994:"This[the law] involvesa visionfor the Armed Forces of the Philippines, which Congress, as the highest policymakingbody of government,now has the singular opportunityto

29 LiaisonOffice for Legislative Forces the Affairsof the ArmedForcesof the Philippines,Armed of Modernization (Quezon City,the Philippines:General Headquarters,Armed Forces of Act Philippines the Philippines,30 November 1996). 30 The AFP Modernization Program Management Office, ArmedForcesof the Philippines Modernization (Quezon City:Camp GeneralEmilio Aguinaldo, 1998), pp. 9-10. Program 31 "AFP ModernizationProgram:ExecutiveSummary, in Secretary Angelo Reyes presentation and before the CongressionalPlanning and Budget Departmentof the House of Representatives the LegislativeBudget Researchand MonitoringOffice of the Senate, Quezon City,11 November 2002, p. 4. 32 "AFP ModernizationProgram:ExecutiveSummary," 4. p. 33 In-personinterviewwith Senator Orlando Mercado, 14 October 2003, Manila,Philippines.

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RA shape."34 7898 specifiesa budget ceiling of 50 billion Philippinepesos (PHP) (US$2billion at the 1995 exchange rate) for a five-year rollingplan, divided into five components: force restructuring, acquisition, bases development,humanresourcedevelopmentand doctrinesdevelopment.35 It also stipulates that congressional funding for the modernization will only if there is a budget surplus. programme be made available More significantly, law requires a very cumbersomeprocurement the process and a complex acquisitionstructure.These two are separatebut and sequentialproceduresthat providea step-by-step level-by-level process for equipmentacquisition. The firstprocedureincludescomplexrulesthat entail numerous requirements,such as technical qualifications,foreign sources, amounts involved and securityconsiderations.Fulfilling all the requirementsin this procedure has caused delays in implementing the It programme. hasalsoforceda numberof reputabledefensemanufacturers out of the bidding process due to their inabilityto fulfill the numerous After contractor have will requirements.36 the biddingprocess,a prospective to deal with a multi-layered staffedby personnelwith unclear organization roles and lacking any experience in procurement procedure. This organization will then have to apply the law's complex and untested and requirements willhaveto dealwiththe competingpriorities procurement the three services. among
Footing the Bill

afterthe passage the lawin 1995,theAFPand the Congress of Immediately wereagainlockedin a 22-monthstandoffoverthe natureof the programme and on whetherthe economycouldaffordthe PHP331.62billion (US$13.24 billion at the 1996 exchange rate) price tag for the modernizationof the The Philippinemilitary. Congress,unsureof how it could come up withthe money,concludedthatthe Philippineeconomywasnot capableof financing the programme.Thus, it directed the AFP to reprioritizeand revise the programmeso that the total amount for the entire modernizationwould not exceed PHP170billion.37 AFPtriedto convincethe lawmakers The that this amountwouldnot be enough to develop the capabilities the armed of forces. The legislators,however,had made up their minds:the Philippine economy could simplynot afford the PHP 331.62 billion price tag. After
34 Liaison Office for LegislativeAffairsof the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

(Quezon City:General Emilio Aguinaldo, March2000), p. 3. Program 36 The AFPModernizationBoard,AFPModernization 2001 AnnualReport Program (Quezon City: Camp GeneralAguinaldo, 2001). pp. 6-7. 37 Raymond Quilop, "The Political Economy of Armed Forces ModernizationProgram:The Caseof the AFPModernizationProgram," A and Issues(January 2003), Digest: Forum Security Defense for p. 7.

35 Department of Defense, ImplementingGuidelines,Rules, and Regulations of theAFP Modernization

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much debate and discussion,both the Congressand the AFPagreed to a the wouldbe dividedinto compromise: implementationof the programme twophases.The firstphasewouldtotalnearlyPHP164.553 billion (US$6.62 billion at the 1996 exchange rate), while the original PHP 331.62 billion programme would be implemented if the Philippine economy grew sufficientlyto support the expenditure.As a consequence, the AFPwent backto the basicrequirements the programme. of on Eventually, December 2, 1996, the PhilippineCongresspassedJoint Resolutionno. 28, which providedfor the legislativeapprovalof the AFP modernization programme.The resolution,however, requiresthe defense establishment to submit to Congress an annual report of the AFP's programmeimplementation,along with the "estimated expendituresand consistentwith nationalsecuritypolicy"laid down proposedappropriation the PhilippineCongress.38 slowand tedious passageof the lawand The by the approval the modernization of the plandemonstrate Philippinepolitical elite'sgeneralreluctanceto drastically increasethe AFP's budget,and their distrust of the Philippine military when it comes to financial general transactions. A unique provisionof the law is that it requiresthe AFPto raisea large portionof the modernization camps,reservations, budgetbysellingmilitary excess equipmentand productsfrom the governmentarsenal.39 However, the AFPwouldhaveto askfor congressional beforeit could dispose approval and of its idle militaryreal estate to help raisefunds for the cash-strapped modernizationprogramme.As providedby the BasesConversion delayed Law or RepublicAct no. 7227, the Congresshas a mandate to reject or real approvethe sale of militaryreal estate, due to the manygraft-tainted From estate deals the legislatureswere investigatingin the early 1990s.40 1996to 1997,the AFPtop brassfound themselves busyrelocatingnumerous The AFPunitsfrombaselandsthatwereto be sold to realestatedevelopers. had to wait for the creation of the Bases Conversion AFP, however, DevelopmentAuthority(BCDA).The BCDAwascreatedby the Philippine and Congress, taskedto sell, leaseand negotiatethe developmentof military reservations were designatedby the governmentfor commercialuse. that Eventually, the 1997 Asian financial crisis caught up with the The peso depreciatedby almost40 percentvismodernization programme. a-vis US dollaras the economysufferedfroma significant the dropin foreign Due investment. to the inflatedcostof equipmentcausedbythe depreciation of the Philippinepeso, the AFPhad to postponethe PAF's plan to acquirea
38 See Republic of the Philippines, Congress of the Philippines, "JointResolution Expressing the Approvalby Both Houses of Congressof the AFPModernizationProgramPursuantto Republic Act No. 7898; OtherwiseKnownas The AFPModernizationAct" (Manila, July 1996), p. 2. 39 The AFP Modernization Program Management Office, ArmedForcesof the Philippines Primer Modernization (Quezon City:CampEmilio Aguinaldo, 1998), p. 15. Program: 40 In-personinterviewwith SenatorMercado, 14 October 2003.

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of fighterplanes,and the PN'sorderfor six offshore squadron multi-purpose The of patrolvessels.41 reappearance Muslimand communistinsurgentsin of the latterpartof 1998necessitatedthe transfer internalsecurity functions from the PhilippineNationalPolice (PNP) back to the AFP.Open clashes between the AFPand the Moro IslamicLiberationFront (MILF)led to a shift in the Philippinemilitary's priorities,awayfrom externaldefense and arms modernization and toward internal security concerns and the refurbishingof its old counterinsurgencyequipment. The AFP Internal SecurityOperationPlan projectedthat the AFPwould have to addressthe threatposed by the insurgentgroupsuntil 2005, thusforcingthe Philippine This is militaryto postpone its five-yearrolling plan beyond that year.42 another setback in the implementation of the arms modernization programme.
Back to the Alliance, 1996-2001

In the early 1990s, the regional securityenvironmentseemed relatively stableand benign, an opportunetime for the Philippinesto deliberatethe merits and disadvantagesof developing the country's external defense The was capability. Philippinegovernment clearlyawareof the need to shift its efforts awayfrom counterinsurgency and toward external defense, of consideringthe withdrawal the Americanforces in 1992. FromManila's of view, a credible force modernizationwas largely contingent on point domestic factors,such as the continuous positivegrowthof the country's economy and the willingnessof the Congressto fund such a programme. Philippine complacency,however,wasjolted by the discoveryof Chinese militarystructureson the MischiefReef in 1996. This incident stirredthe country into sounding the alarm over what it perceived as China's and In expansionist hegemonicdesignsin the SouthChinaSea.43 mid-1997, President Ramos accused China of threatening the security of another claimantto the Spratlys(the Philippines)and mentioned the presence of at Chinesewarships MischiefReef as proof of how sensitivea flashpointthe South ChinaSea could be.44By the late 1990s,the Philippinegovernment
41 The AFPModernizationBoard,AFPModernization 2001 AnnualReport, 4. Program p. 42 CeasarRonnie F. Ordoyo,Alexander S. Lopez, Emmanuel G. Cacdacand TomasP. Donato, "ABriefing the on AFPModernization Program" unpublishedmonograph (Pasay City, Philippines: Foreign ServiceInstitute,30 April 2003), p. 11. 43 Former Defense SecretaryAbat confirmed this to the author in an interview.According to him, the discoveryof Chinese forces on MischiefReef pushed the government to negotiate with the United States for a Visiting Forces Agreement. He also admitted that from the perspective of the defense establishmentand the AFP,Chinais deemed a long-termthreatto the Philippines (in-person interviewwith Abat, 28 January 2003, Quezon City). Also see William T. Tow,Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Convergent Security Seeking (Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001), p. 143. 44 Juliet Labogjavella,"FVR China,AskUS to Stay," Hits 8 Philippine DailyInquirer, May1997:pp. 11 and 22.

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had realized the importance of the American military presence in Filipino maintainingthe balanceof powerin the SoutheastAsianregion.45 decisionmakers policymakers and recognizedthe need to revivethe alliance with the US, which was severelydamagedby the two countries'failure to conclude a new base agreementin the early1990s.Furthermore, given the deficit in the national budget, the Philippine government saw the improvement of its security ties with Washington as vital to obtaining Americansupportfor modernizingthe ill-equipped AFP.46 These aforementionedeventsalso causedsome concernsamongleaders in Washington. They observedthat the People'sRepublicof China (PRC) was in the midst of a massivenavalbuildup as part of Beijing'sefforts to claimthe entireSouthChinaSea.47 discovery the structures The of prompted considerablediscussionin the Pentagon about Beijing'sintentions in the areaand madeWashington of considerthe possibility takingactionif China became involvedin a confrontationwith any of the claimants. The March 1996 TaiwanStraitcrisisaccentuatedUS concern over China'slong-term intentionsin the region, and exposed the limitationsof its flexible form of forward-defense posturein SoutheastAsiaand the SouthChinaSea. From Washington's perspective,China'swargamesand missiletests off Taiwan's coastlinecreatedthe appearance the US andthe PRC wereon a potential that collision course.48The incident showed that Beijing could forcibly take Taiwanand enforce its claims over the entire South China Sea, and gave credence to the possibility that Chinacould pose a long-termthreatto the and stability the Asia-Pacific of peace region.49 Facedwithan EastAsiancountrybent on underminingor even changing the regionalstatusquo, US defense plannersdecided to precludepossible Chinesehegemonyby maintainingadequateforces both permanentand American rotational for rapidpowerprojectionin the region.50 Likewise, defense plannersrealizedthat withoutany permanentlyforward-deployed forces in SoutheastAsia, Washingtonshould maximize its flexibilityand options through various and creative approaches to basing and access with arrangements host countriesin the region.Thus,theybegandesigning a rotationaldeploymentof Americanforces in the Philippinesthat would to and allowfor infrastructure improvements would keep facilities"warm"
45 "VFA Ensure Security," Philippine The will Star,16 May1999:p. 5. 46 Marichu The Then AFPModernization," Philippine VFA First, Villanueva, "Pentagon: Ratification 9 State, January1999:p. 2. 47 US House Subcommitteeon Asia of the Committee on InternationalRelations, Challenges in 3 U.S.-Asian 106th Congress,1st session, 10 February, Marchand 17 March1999, p. 18. Policy, 48 Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, Taiwan's International in (Boulder, System Security the Changing CO:Lynne Rienner Publishers,Inc., 1997), p. 69. 49 VanVrankenHickey, Taiwan Security, 69. 's p. 50 ZalmayKhalilzad,"Strategy in and Defense Planning for the Coming Century," ZalmayM. and Khalilzad DavidA. Ochmanek,eds., Strategy Defense and (SantaMonica, for Planning the21stCentury CA:Rand Corporation,1997), pp. 25-26.

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enable the rapid startof operationsin a crisis.The Philippines'strategic locationin the SouthChinaSeamakesit an idealsitefromwhichUS aircraft or could quickly respondto eithera Taiwan SouthChinaSea contingency.51 Strait,and Also,in the eventof anothermajorcrisisoccurringin the Taiwan the need for Washington to come to Taipei's defense, the US defense of saw community the necessity usingairbasesin Luzonfor logistical support Strait andcombatmissions.52 Thus,a yearafterthe Taiwan crisis, Washington to arrangement" Manilathatcouldfacilitatethe regular proposedan "access entry of US military personnel, warships and aircraft into Philippine territory.53 In late 1996, the two countries conducted a series of negotiations to establish a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which provided legal guarantees for US troops deployed in the Philippines during military exercisesand ship visits.Manilaand Washington spent almosttwoyearsof tense and impassionednegotiationsbefore an accord could be drafted.54 betweenthe twoalliesimmediately The prospectof a SOFA triggereda howl from a numberof nationalistand left-wing of protest organizations.These accused the Philippinegovernmentof bringingback groups immediately the US bases to the country.They also accusedthe governmentof forging an agreementthatwouldcausethe countryto abdicateits sovereignty the to the fray, on the publicto US.55 powerfulCatholicChurch The joined calling oppose anyagreementbetweenManilaand Washington. In the lightof itsfinancialdifficulties, the however, Philippine government had no choice but to look to the US for militaryassistance.The proposed agreementprovidedno direct linkagebetween its signing and ratification and US securityassistance.Nevertheless,Manila did expect some arms transfersfrom Washingtonuntil the Philippine economy could afford to Members the US Congress of modernization programme.56 payfor a military that then told theirFilipinocounterparts the USwasreadyto providemilitary in Under a bill passed assistance the form of surplusdefense equipment.57 in 1999, the US Congresspromisedto donate A-4 Intruderattackplanes, classCoastGuardcutter,and otheravailable UH-1helicopters,a PointEvans
51 Khalilzad,"Strategy Defense Planning for the Coming Century," 23-29.Also see, Crisis and p. in the TaiwanStrait,edited byJames R. Lilley and Chuck Downs (Fort MacNair,Washington,D.C.: National Defense UniversityPress,D.C., 1997). 52 ZalmayZhalulzadet al., "TheUnited Statesand Asia:Towarda New U.S. Strategyand Force Structure," 77-78. pp. 53 C.E.Yap,"U.S.Seek RP Route for Ships, Fighters," Business 18-19July 1997:p. 8. World, 54 RaymondG. Falgue,"Very PassionateNegotiations,"Business 18 World, February1998:pp. 1-3. 55 Earl Parreno, Nes Barrameda,Rhowena B. Parugnao, Danilo P. Lucas and RaffyJimenez, 4 "Draft RP-USDeal DrawsHowls of Protest..." TheManila Times, December 1997:pp. 1-4. 56 See Doug Bandow, "Needless Entanglements: Washington's Expanding Security Ties in no. SoutheastAsia,"Policy Analysis, 401, 24 May2001: p.5, availableonline at the Cato Organization Web site, at <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-401es.html>,site last accessed 3 August 2005. 57 Jess Diaz, "U.S.ReadiesMilitary Assistanceto RP," 29 Standard, May1999:pp. 1-6. Philippine

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navalpatrolcraft.However, there wasa catch.The Pentagonexplicitlytold the Philippinesthatif it wantedto maintaina capablemilitary witha role to "it playin regionalsecurity, shouldtrainand exercisewiththe U.S.military."58 On February 1998,the twosidessignedthe VisitingForcesAgreement 11, A (VFA). year later,in 1999, the PhilippineSenate ratifiedthe PhilippineUS Visiting Forces Agreement, which paved the way for the large-scale Balikatan 2000. Less than ten yearsafter the militaryexercisesin February lastAmericanmarineleft Subicnavalbase, Philippinenationalleadershad in to confrontthe starkrealitythatpreserving strategicequilibrium East the Asiadepended on US bilateralsecuritycommitmentsand on maintaininga balance of power based on Americanforwarddeploymentin the region. The VFA been deemedimportant the post-1992 of has for revival the alliance for two reasons.One, the agreement facilitatedthe resumptionof largescale militaryexercisesfor the two allies;and two, it providedthe political framework for the development and implementation of an AFP modernization under the guidanceof the US. In the aftermath programme of the ratificationof the VFA,the two countries began a defense policy The dialogueaimedat evaluating Philippinedefense requirements. US also resumedits practiceof providingits allywith militaryequipmentthrough the Foreign Military AssistanceProgram(FMAP)and the ExcessDefense Articles(EDA)Program.From 2001 to 2002, the US gave the Philippines This one cutterandUH-1helicopters.59 military 200M-35 trucks, CoastGuard is crucialto strengthening Manila's internalsecurity capabilities. equipment
The Post 9/11 Revitalization of the Alliance

in The terrorist attacks the US on September11, 2001and the consequent American campaign against global terrorismgave more impetus to the after9/11, President of alliance.Immediately revitalization the Philippine-US Arroyo became one of the first Asian leaders to declare support for Washington's campaignagainstglobal terrorism.She offered Washington access to formerAmericanmilitaryfacilitiesin the Philippines,and later issued a 14-stage counterterrorismprogramme to provide intelligence exchanges with the US. Manilaused its offer of diplomaticand political supportto the US as a meansof bolsteringthe twocountries'alliance,badly of strainedby the Americanwithdrawal its forces in 1992, and to put the Philippines back on the radar screen of Washington's policy makers. and for Washington, its part,took franticstepsto providefinancial,military
58 CarlitoPablo,"CohenSaysNo AutomaticU.S. Defense of RP," 8 DailyInquirer,August Philippine 1998:pp. 1-16. 59 DomingoL. Siazon, , "Challenges Opportunities RP-US Relationsin the 21st Century, for and Jr. 2000), p.l, availableonline at <http://www.pia.gov.ph/philtoday/ Today (July-September Philippines ptO4/rpus.htm>.

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assistance countriessupporting US campaign to the diplomatic against global terrorism. The Philippinesbecame one of the prioritycountrieswhere the US could expand its antiterrorism campaignto a globallevel.60 and Alarmedby suspectedlinksbetweenAbu-Sayyaf al-Qaeda and other has Islamicmilitants,Washington deemed it imperativeto activelysupport its ally'scounterterrorism and capability, to developfurtherinteroperability betweenthe twocountries'armedservices.61 Assistingthe Philippinesin its counterinsurgency operationagainstthe Abu-Sayyaf presentedWashington with a provingground for an emergingfacet of the Bush administration's counterterrorismstrategy supplying militaryhardwareand training to countriestryingto bring domestic insurgenciesto heel.62For Manila,the country'sparticipationin the war on terror underscoresits return to an withits superpower a resultof the Filipinopolitical alliancerelationship ally, to elite'sunwillingness paythe cost of an autonomousdefense posture. Alliance Componentsof the Revitalized ties The presentsecurity betweenthe Philippines the US haveassumed and a form totallydifferentfrom that of their Cold Wardefense relationship, involvedthe stationing forward-deployed of whichprimarily American forces The revitalizedalliance consists of the two allies on Philippine territory. assistance joint training,the resumptionof US military cooperatingthrough to strengthen the Philippines' counterterrorismcapability,militaryand and of politicalconsultation, the institutionalization an accessarrangement for Americanforces operatingin SoutheastAsia.
Joint Military Exercises

AfterUS military facilitieswerewithdrawn from the Philippinesin 1992, Manila Washington and conductedan average sixto eightmilitary of exercises a year.63In 2002, however, there wasa dramatic increasein the numberof in exercises,as the AFPand the US military military participated 15 exercises in bilateraland multilateral training.These activities rangedfrom the largescaleandhighlypublicized counterterrorism exercisedubbed six-month-long Balikatan-02-0l, 4,385Philippineand US combattroops,to a shortinvolving Construction term,low-key, highlyspecializedexerciselabelledRunway yet
60 See Bob Woodward,BushAt War(NewYork,NY:Simon and Schuster,2002), p. 217. 61 General RichardMyers,"U.S.Wantsto Help Philippines Fight Terrorism," Department US of State (February28, 2003 press briefing) p. 1, online at the<www.usembassy.it/file2003_02/alia/ a3022804.htm>last accessed May1, 2005. 62 Dan Murphy, The Science Monitor, "Long-Term Strategy EmergesOut of the Philippines," Christian 03July 2002:p. 2, availableat <www.csmonitor.com/2002/0703/p07s02-woap.html>, accessed 24 last July 2002. 63 RaulLeyritana, Ang, Vic Castroand RafaelMariano,"Briefing Art Paperon R.P.-U.S. Security Relations,"(PasayCity:Foreign ServiceInstitute,30 April 2003), p. 4.

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Exercise exerciseengagedthe services AFPandUSArmy of 2002.The runway engineersin jointly constructinga range control tower,an attachedthreeroom barracks a runway. well, the twoallieshave conductedvarious and As in exercises aimedatimproving RP-US armedforces'combatreadiness joint/ combined operations and enhancing interoperabilitythrough training exchanges of skills, knowledge and techniques in conventionalwarfare; O2 2002-02,CARAT and TalonVision02.64 examplesincludeBalikatan In 2003, the Pentagon, in order to strengthen the AFP's military counterterrorism made the commitmentto 65a) train trainingprogramme, two additional light reaction companies (LRC) and eight light infantry battalionsfor counterterrorism; boost the operationaland intelligence b) of capabilities the SouthernCommand;c) enhance the AFP'sstaffskillsin intelligence,civilaffairs,medicaland informationoperations;and d) train a PAF the helicoptercrewin night flying.Notably, twoallieshavealsobegun in exercisesthatinvolveotherAsianallies, participating multilateral military such as Thailandin RIMPAC and West,Thai MTWSEX Marcie03-1.
Resumption US MilitaryAssistance of

The cessationof military in the early1990sled to a rapiddeterioration aid of the Philippinemilitary's US-mademilitaryhardware, which was heavily on American-made dependent spareparts,logisticalsupportand technical The annualdefensebudget,however, not big enough to cover was expertise. the cost of maintenanceand capitaloutlay,as 85 percent of the budget is allocatedfor personalservicessuch as militarypayand pensionsfor always veterans and retirees.66 the military Consequently, AFP'sAmerican-made hardware deteriorated wasretiredfromservice.Forexample,out of the and Philippine Army's102 M-113armoured personnel carriers,only 64 are combatcapable.As of 2001, the PAFhad only 18 combat-ready helicopters, Ol fiveair-worthy A fighterplanes,andone serviceable 30 cargo/transport F-5 plane. The PN is in an even worsestate,as it can only deploy 18 operational and mostlyWorldWarII-eravessels to patrol the country'svast maritime The Philippinearsenalis not even capableof producingenough territory. need and the projectilesthat ammunitionfor the AFPcounterinsurgency aremanufactured limitedto use for smallarms.Thissituationhasforced are limited the AFPto importartillery shellsfromThailand,using the country's

64 See Scott Carlson, Dustin W. Perry and MarlonJ. Martin, "Balikatan2002-02: Enhancing Forum (winter2002-03), pp. 32-42. Asia-Pacific Philippine-U.S.SecurityRelations," 65 Leyritanaet al., Annex E, "Highlightsof Accomplishments:Philippine Defense Attache in Washington,2003." 66 Secretary Angelo Reyes, "Presentation before the Congressional Planning and Budget Department," Quezon City: Congressional Planning and Budget Department of the House of and and BudgetResearch MonitoringOfficeof the Senate,11 November Representatives the Legislative 2002, p. 3.

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foreign exchange reservesduring the militaryoperationagainstthe MILF in2000.67 After 9/11, Manilareceived a ten-fold increase in US assistance,from US$1.9 million in 2001 to US$19 million in 2002, in FMFas Washington deemed it worthwhileto strengthenthe AFP'scounterterrorism capability. The Philippinesalso receivedUS$29.5millionin EDAin the form of 15,000 M-16A1 UH-1 helicoptersand a rifles, 35 M35 trucks,three night-capable Cyclone-class patrol boat, as well as an additionalUS$10 million in antiterroristassistance.More significantly,in 2003 the AFP received US$20 millionworthof sparepartsfor its C-130s,UH-1Hhelicopters,M-35trucks and patrolboats.CurrentU.S. securityassistancenow include the training of anti-terrorism LightReactionCompaniesof the APF,logisticsand other to increasethe general efficiencyof the Philippinemilitary, the programs TerroristInterdiction Program,new educational assistancefor Filipino Muslims,and a general support for institutionaleconomic and political reformsin Philippinesociety.68
AccessArrangements Institutionalizing

On November 22, 2002, the two countries signed a five-yearMilitary afteralmostsixyearsof difficultand (MLSA) LogisticSupport Arrangement emotionalnegotiations.The agreementis considereda low-leveltechnical betweenthe two countries'armedservices.Nevertheless,the arrangement arrangement is significant for three reasons. First, it provides the structure framework the provisionof logisticsupport, and for administrative and servicesbetweenthe AFPand the US ArmedServices,in both supplies peacetime and conflict situations. The agreement also sets the legal and the of framework, facilitates reciprocal provision logisticsupport, supplies and services between the two allies in activities involving combined operations, peacekeeping operations and other multilateral military operationsunder the United Nations. Second, the agreementlowers the cost of the allies' securitycooperationby minimizingadministrative outlay andenablingbotharmedservices developinteroperability operational to and in strategies dealingwithpossibleexigencies.Third,and more importantly, it signifiesthatthe twogovernments determinedto implementa formal are accessarrangement and despite oppositionfrom both leftistorganizations nationalistindividualsthat vehementlyoppose the presence of American forces in the country.
67 Angelo Reyes, "Presentationbefore the CongressionalPlanning and Budget Department," pp. 8-9. 68 See Deputy AssistantSecretaryof State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,MathewP. Daley, "Increased CooperationNeeded to CombatTerrorism" Testimonybefore the United StatesHouse of Representatives,October 29, 2003, p. 4. (Distributedby the Bureau of InternationalInformation U.S. Departmentof StateWebsite:http://usinfo.state.gov) http://manila.usembassy.gov/ Programs, wwwhrl47.html.Lastaccessed 20 October,2005.

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alliance a indicationof the twocountries'revitalized Finally, remarkable is the intense politico-military consultationbetween their armed services and defense departments.InJuly 2002, afterthe six-month-long BalikatanMutualDefenseBoardformulateda 02-01exercisein Mindanao,the RP-US workplan thatcallsfor increasedand sustained highlyconfidentialfive-year securitycooperation.The plan providesfor the formationof a trainedand the well-equipped RapidDeploymentForce (RDF)in the AFP, construction of bases and stagingareasfor the RDF,and the developmentof the AFP's and competence forjoint /combined force operationswith the capability USArmedForces.Both sidesalso recognizedthe need to strengthenthe 51MDTbyadaptingto a changingsecurity characterized environment year-old In transnationalthreats such as global terrorism.69 August 2002, US by Defense SecretaryDonald Rumsfeld and Philippine National Defense Secretary Angelo Reyessigned an agreementcreatinga bilateralDefense Board.The boardwill enable civilianofficialsfrom both countriesto Policy matters takeon the tasksof politically managingthe allianceand addressing of common securityinterests.70
Whither Autonomous Defense?

InJanuary2002, PresidentArroyoaskedCongressto allocateadditional funds to the long-delayed modernization programmeof the AFP.However, instead of heeding her call for additional funds, the Philippine Senate reducedthe proposedbudgetfromPHP10 billion (US$200million) to PHP 4 billion (US$80 million). Almostseven yearsafter RA 7898 was passed,a in numberof senatorscontinuedto be verywaryof the corruptpractices the arms acquisitiondeals, and thus remained lukewarmabout the military's massivespendingfor the AFPmodernizationprogramme.71 government's The legislatorsalso reasonedthat since the US wasprovidingthe AFPwith militarytrucks,artillery, helicoptersand communicationequipment,there was no more need to purchase military material, and that the AFP modernization budget should be used insteadfor the recruitmentof more government troops and the conscription of more members for the More CitizensArmed Forces GeographicalUnit (CAFGU).72 paramilitary
69 Philippine-U.S.Mutual Defense Board, "NewsRelease no. 0202-02:Joint Statement by the Philippine-U.S.MutualDefense Board,"Honolulu, Hawaii,27June 2002, p. 30, availableat <http:// last www.pacom.mil/news/news2002/rel020-02.html>, accessed 22July 2002. 70 Jim Garmone, "U.S.,Philippine Contacts to Expand,"American 13 Forces Service, Information August 2002: p. 1, available online at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2002/ site n08132002_200208134.html>, last accessed 14 August 2002. 71 In-personinterviewwith Senator Orlando Mercado,October 14, 2003, Manila,p. 1 72 Jenee GraceU. Rubrico,"SenateFinance Body Starts," Business Manila:December 12, World, 2001: p. 1.

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thana yearafterCongress passedthe reducedbudget,the DBMdepartment has not releasedany of the funds, because of the reportedshortfallin the This to allocation the government. wasattributed the government's reserve by dismal tax collection, which resultedin the countryincurringa PHP 130 billion (US$2.5billion) budget deficitin 2002.73 Obviouslydisappointed over the lack of funding and the Philippine Congress's reluctance to allocate resources for additional military This upgradingprogramme. expenditures,the AFPformulateda capability programmeprimarilyfocuses on simply repairing existing PN and PAF American-made equipment,such as the UH-1helicopters,C-130transports, SecondWorldWar-vintage F-27reconnaissance aircraft, landingship tanks It vessels.74 alsoreducesthe acquisition military of hardware (LST)andpatrol to onlytwofast-craft utility(FCU)transport ships,usedfor coastaloperations and worth PHP 150 million (estimatedUS$28 million). Consideringthe the AFP's limitedexternaldefensecapability, country's currentdefensepolicy is premised on the need to promote Philippine security arrangements and with with the US.75 bilaterally multilaterally other countries,especially The 2003 Joint Defense Assessment (JD which outlines the AFP's A), and requirements, a direct resultof the Philippines'effort was capabilities to promote its securityrelationswith the US. The JDA commitsthe US to helping its allydevelopa defense programmethatwill improveits abilityto A threats. seniorexecutivesteeringcommittee respondto nationalsecurity of representatives from the US Defense SecurityCooperation composed of Agency,Officeof the Secretary Defense/Policy,theJoint Staffand the US Pacific Command are providing oversight and guidance to the JDA Planning and Implementation Group of the Philippine Department of NationalDefense. TheJDAis forcingthe Philippinedefense establishment the to implementa numberof reforms: adoptionof a strategy-driven, multidefense planning system,an overallincrease in the defense budget, year and the streamlining of personnel in order to increase the budget for operationand maintenance,as well as for capitalexpenditure.76
Philippine Defense Policy in the Twenty-first Century

The Philippinecasestudyrevealsthata smallandweakstatemightchoose to enter an alliancesimplybecauseit does not have the domesticresource
73 SeeJames Hookway,"Manila Comes to the Rescue,"FarEastern Economic vol. Review, 165, no. 37 (19 September2002), pp. 12-16. 74 The AFPModernization Modernization 2002 Board,AFP Program: Accomplishment (Quezon Report City:Departmentof National Defense, 2003), pp. 29. 75 Departmentof National Defense, "Overview the FY2004 AFPBudget:A CapableAFPfor a of Strong Republic,"Presentation to the Senate Finance Sub-Committee"C",PasayCity,30 October 2003, p. 25. 76 See the United StatesSecretaryof Defense, Report theU.S.-Philippine Defense Assessment of Joint (Washington,DC:Departmentof Defense, 23 April 2001), pp. 21-26.

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base to pursuean autonomousdefense policy.Giventhat the extractionof domesticresourceshas provenextremelydifficult,the Philippineshas had in no other recoursethan to rely on the cheapestdefense means available the post-Cold War period: entering into an alliance. The Philippine elite does not have experienceis complicatedby the fact that the country's the political will to allocate economic resourcesfor the maintenance of credibleandindependentarmedforces.The Philippines chosenalliance has because it is the only availablecourse of action, spurredon more by the immediateinternal threatsposed by communistand Muslimsecessionist insurgents than by a threat from external powers. Without any viable domesticeconomic baseand politicalwill,the Philippinestatecould simply not affordthe prudent combinationof autonomousdefense and alliance. Currently,the Philippine government is exploring alternativemeans to modernizeits armedforces. However,it will need time, resourcesand the elite'spoliticalwill to developa strongand capableAFP,and consequently, to takean autonomousdefense posture.In the meantime,the Philippines' close alliancewiththe US is the onlyavailable feasibleoption in the face and of an uncertainand changinginternationalenvironment.
De La Salle University, Manilla, Philippines,May, 2005

Ml