CORPS
OPERATIONS
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PREFACE
This manual is a guide for employing US Army corps in war and operations other than war
(OOTW). It addresses corps combat operations and the integration and coordination of combat,
combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) as well as other joint and multinational
functions applicable to any theater. It discusses concepts and principles unique to the corps.
However, except when necessary, it does not address specific tactics, techniques, or procedures
(TTP).
The primary users of this manual are the corps commander and his staff, senior service and staff
college students, major subordinate corps units, and echelons above corps (EAC). Sister service
commanders and staffs will also find this manual useful in planning and conducting joint
operations.
The manual is filly compatible with Field Manual (FM) 100-5 and is consistent with current
joint and multinational doctrine. It assumes that the user has a fundamental understanding of the
concepts in FM 100-5, FM 100-10, FM 101-5 (authorized draft (D)).
Field Manual 100-5, the primary US Army doctrinal manual, implements Allied Tactical
Publication (ATP) 35-(B) (Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 2868). Field Manual 100-15
addresses US Army doctrine at the corps level and is filly compatible with ATP 35-(B) (STANAG
2868). It also complies with STANAGs 2079 and 2104 and Quadripartite Standardization
Agreement (QSTAG) 189.
The proponent of this publication is Headquarters (HQ), US Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC). Send comments and recommendations on Department of the Army (DA)
Form 2028 directly to Commandant, US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC),
ATTN: ATZL-SWW-D, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900).
Masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.
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INTRODUCTION
During the European wars that followed the French Revolution, Napoleon gained a pronounced
advantage over his opponents by grouping combined arms divisions into formations. These
formations, called corps, were capable of dispersed maneuver and independent action. The speed,
versatility, and agility of Napoleon’s corps changed the nature of land warfare and forced other
armies to adopt similar organizations. Since then, and in spite of vast changes in weapons and
equipment, the corps has remained a standard unit in western armies.
Corps have been important in US Army operations since the Civil War when Generals Sherman,
Thomas, Jackson, and Longstreet made their names as corps commanders. Corps have continually
demonstrated their value as maneuver forces of the field army and as forces capable of significant
independent action. In World War I (WWI), World War II (WWII), and the Korean War, the
corps served as the Army’s principal ground maneuver force.
Generals Patton and Stilwell successfully conducted independent operations with corps in
Africa and Asia during World War II, while Generals Collins, Haislip, Middleton, and Gerow,
among others, led corps that fought the battles of western Europe under command of Field Armies.
General Almond’s X Corps carried out the critical amphibious landing at Inchon and regained the
initiative for United Nations (UN) Forces in Korea. During the Vietnam War, field forces
performed corps functions. They had regional authority and considerable administrative and
logistic responsibilities. They also maintained the traditional tactical concerns normal to a corps.
Early in the 1970s, the US Army realigned and reduced headquarters layering to improve
command and control (C2). The corps assumed most of the field army’s administrative and logistic
functions. The realignment established the headquarters of a unified command, a specified
command, a combined command, or a joint task force (JTF) above the corps in the operational
chain. A theater Army, if established, would provide combat service support for deployed US
corps.
In the 1980s, the corps had organic armored and mechanized divisions along with an armored
cavalry regiment (ACR). Whatever its mission or exact composition, the corps was to conduct
the following critical functions:
Maintaining surveillance over an area to the corps’ front to provide an accurate picture of the
enemy as he is deployed 96 hours movement time from the forward line of own troops (FLOT)
extending as far as 300 kilometers (km) from the FLOT.
Fighting the enemy throughout the area of influence, 72 hours movement time from the FLOT
or from corps objectives.
Sustaining the battle by drawing together forces to carry the fight to successive enemy echelons.
Today, corps must possess the flexibility required to execute current warfighting doctrine and
be capable of projecting the forces necessary to support unforeseen operations. They must be able
to conduct simultaneous operations instead of the sequential operations against an echeloned threat
they were expected to face during the cold war era.
...
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Chapter 1
THE CORPS
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capability to synchronize these activities across all Operational planning concentrates on the design
of the battlefield functional areas. As such, corps are of campaigns and major operations. Campaign
uniquely suited to be Army Forces (ARFOR) head- plans set broad, long-term goals, such as control of
quarters or the joint force land component com- a geographic area, reestablishment of political
mander’s (JFLCC) headquarters of the joint task boundaries, or defeat of an enemy force in the
force. theater.
Corps usually link the operational and tactical The corps accomplishes its goals in phases in
levels of war. They may link operational and strate- most cases. Thus, the campaign plan normally pro-
gic levels of war as well. As such, they have the key vides a general concept of operations for the entire
role of translating the broad strategic and opera- campaign (lasting weeks or even months) and a
tional objectives of higher echelons into specific and specific plan for only the first phase of the cam-
detailed tactics to achieve those objectives. paign. Major operations are the coordinated ele-
Corps plan and conduct major operations and ments of a campaign. The outcome of a major
battles. They synchronize tactical operations in- operation will decisively impact the conduct of a
cluding maneuver, fires of organic artillery, naval particular phase of the campaign.
fires, supporting tactical air, and actions of their CS Tactical operations include battles and engage-
and CSS units. Doing so brings together the effects ments as parts of campaigns and major operations.
of these separate activities throughout the depth of Divisions, brigades, and smaller units may fight
the battlefield. engagements either as part of a battle or as separate
Corps also act as the force provider for other actions. Battles are larger than engagements and
headquarters tasked to control an operation. may involve numerous engagements over a large
Whether the corps is the supporting or the supported area that take days to resolve.
command, it should receive mission-type orders. Planning and executing tactical-level battles is a
Today’s corps is the central point on the battle- major role of the corps. The corps commander must
field where the commander synchronizes combat clearly understand the intent of the commanders
power to achieve tactical and operational advantage above him. Doing so will help him plan and execute
over the enemy. Critical corps roles include— battles that will achieve operational objectives. The
corps must simultaneously conduct close, deep, and
Planning and conducting operations with other rear operations as well as plan for future operations.
elements of the joint force to achieve campaign
objectives. When conducting simultaneous operations, the
corps must synchronize one or several collateral
Integrating available Air Force (AF), Navy, and operations with the main effort. Collateral opera-
Marine combat, CS, and CSS units, along with tions consist of major activities within the scope of
interagency support in land operations, including any combat operation. Examples of possible collat-
joint efforts in intelligence, target acquisition, eral operations are intelligence, counterfires,
target attack, electronic warfare (EW), suppres- deep/joint fires, special operations, joint suppres-
sion of enemy air defenses (SEAD), and CSS. sion of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD), humanitarian
assistance, and deception. These operations may
Collecting intelligence, anticipating enemy ac- draw on the same resources and normally require
tivities and intentions, and planning future special planning, synchronization, and unity of
actions. command and control.
Planning and conducting simultaneous opera-
tions in depth. A single organization under corps control usually
plans and executes these operations. They may be
Nominating targets for nuclear weapons employ- operations for which the corps is either best suited
ment in support of campaign objectives. to control or for which the corps should assume
responsibility because of the specific situation.
Planning and conducting effective deception
;
op-
erations-according to the higher echelon s decep- There are several reasons why the corps may want
tion plan. to assume this responsibility. The collateral
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operation may involve coordinating joint functions, in their theater. Such corps may have the advantage
employing scarce resources, focusing on attainment of having a larger logistic base composed of a
of critical objectives, or allowing subordinate ma- combination of US and host-nation (HN) resources.
neuver units to focus on other operations. The corps may be required to provide logistic sup-
The commander assigns collateral operations as port to other US forces or allies.
specific tasks in the operation order (OPORD) While major subordinate elements normally lo-
keyed to the overall concept of operations. Although cate with a forward-deployed corps, there may still
collateral operations require their own internal con- be some deployment of CONUS-based forces to
cept of operations, their concepts must be consistent support the corps. The time-phased deployment of
with the corps commander’s overall concept of these augmentation forces is of major concern and
operations. must be well-integrated into both tactical and sus-
tainment planning.
A corps headquarters may function as the Army
service headquarters of a subordinate joint force, the Corps with missions to respond to worldwide
JFLCC headquarters of a JTF, or as the JTF head- situations frequently fight as the largest ground
quarters itself. In such cases, the corps is responsible formation in the theater, possibly with the corps
for both operational and tactical planning and op- commander serving as the JTF commander. These
erational and tactical execution of the campaign. corps plan for employment in theaters of likely
The centerpiece of the corps’ operational responsi- hostilities.
bilities is participation in the development of a
supporting joint campaign plan. (See Joint Publica- The threat, which corps will encounter, is often
tion (JP) 5-00.1 for a detailed discussion.) poorly defined. Enemy forces may range from ir-
regulars to mechanized forces with a high degree of
By its nature, the corps will always fight as part technological sophistication to forces that are asym-
of a joint force, working closely with its sister metrically modernized.
services. The nature of current world politics, in
addition to US treaty commitments, means the corps Corps are capable of deploying anywhere in the
may fight as part of a multinational force. The world. For this reason, they must consider employ-
implications of these joint and combined operations ment of light, special operations, and armored ma-
are no different from those FM 100-5 and FM 100-7 neuver forces, capable of both rapid deployment and
discuss, but are of particular significance to the the ability to conduct operations in a variety of
corps. situations. Corps may require augmentation of se-
lected CSS forces to perform sustainment
operations.
The Corps as Part of a Larger
Ground Force
The Corps as a JTF Headquarters
The corps may be located in or deployed to a
theater to fight as a component of a larger ground A joint task force is composed of Army, Navy,
force. This situation occurs when a significant mili- Marine Corps, and Air Force assigned or attached
tary threat exists in a specific geographic region or elements or two or more of these services. It is
because of treaty obligations. constituted and so designated by the Secretary of
Defense, by a combatant commander, or by the
Currently, V Corps is forward-deployed in commander of a subordinate unified (subunified)
Europe, and I Corps is Continental United States command or an existing JTF. (See JP 1-02.) Nor-
(CONUS)-based, yet under the Combatant Com- mally, a JTF is established for a specific purpose or
mand of the US Pacific Command (PACOM). Un- task. Usually the task is limited in scope and dura-
der these conditions, the corps normally operates as tion and there is little need for centralized control of
part of a multinational force and is under the control logistics.
of a multinational command structure.
The corps commander, as the commander, JTF
Coalition forces usually have specific areas of (CJTF), is subordinate to the establishing authority
operations (AOs) and missions that should be rela- and must look to him for guidance, strategic
tively well-defined even before the outbreak of war direction, and missions for the joint force. In turn,
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the CJTF exercises OPCON or TACON of assigned US policies, treaty commitments, status of forces
forces. agreements (SOFA), coalition parties’ interests, and
The CJTF also forms a joint staff and establishes so on.
joint boards and centers, as necessary, to command These influences affect campaign and operational
and control the force. This ensures that the staff is planning and the establishment of rules of engage-
representative of the joint force, and it provides a ment (ROE) for the joint force. While conducting
structure for planning and executing joint operational-level planning, the JTF synchronizes
operations. the activities of land, air, maritime, special opera-
The corps may require augmentation to transition tions forces, space, and combined forces toward
to this joint staff structure. Augmentation maybe in military objectives that achieve the strategic end
the form of a deployable joint cell to provide initial state.
assistance or a major augmentation of personnel and Planners must include political, economic, infor-
equipment based on the JTF’s size and composition. mational, and interagency considerations in the
The establishing authority is responsible for pro- planning process and synchronize the execution of
viding augmentation to the JTF. However, the corps operations. Joint task force campaign plans must
commander, as the CJTF, must make his augmen- sequence these activities to achieve strategic
tation requirements known. (Chapter 4 contains de- objectives.
tails of corps augmentation for JTF operations.)
The corps as a JTF can conduct either tactical- or The Corps as the ARFOR or
operational-level operations. The mission, not the JFLCC Headquarters
size of the force, determines at which level the JTF
functions. When the focus is on conducting joint The CJTF establishes the organizational structure
operations to attain theater-strategic objectives, the of the JTF and exercises OPCON of all assigned and
JTF serves as an operational headquarters. How- attached forces. Joint Publication 5-00.2 outlines
ever, the commander must fully understand both the specific guidance for options for conducting JTF
tactical and operational-level environments to en- operations.
sure a supportive relationship exists between his
plans and operations and those of subordinate and One option for organizing a JTF and exercising
higher headquarters. OPCON is by creating service component com-
mands. As the name implies, a JTF-level service
The CJTF takes guidance from the establishing component command generally consists of forces
authority and assigns objectives and tasks for the from only one service that are assigned or attached
various components of the force. If planners have to a JTF. When a corps is placed under the OPCON
not developed a supporting campaign plan, the JTF of a JTF, the CJTF may designate the corps as the
may have to produce one. ARFOR headquarters giving it Title 10, Posse
Comitatus Act, responsibilities and, in most cases,
In any case, as an operational-level commander, OPCON of a number of assigned or attached forces.
the CJTF must identify the conditions the force
needs to attain strategic goals (ends). He must also When designated as the commander, ARFOR
detail the sequence of activities, from deployment (COMARFOR), or the JFLCC, the corps has the
or mobilization through redeployment or demobili- following additional responsibilities:
zation (ways), that will achieve those conditions.
Finally, he must identify the resources (means) the Coordinating with other JTF-level component or
force will need to apply to the effort. fictional commands.
Although the commander applies the military Coordinating with the service component com-
element of power, he also considers those inter- mand headquarters of the JTF establishing
agency, political, economic, informational, and authority for administrative and logistic support.
other resources that may be available and appropri-
ate for the task at hand. The CJTF must understand Planning and conducting operations in compli-
the strategic and regional environment, including ance with CJTF guidance and detailed plans.
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Providing liaison personnel to CJTF, other com- Assigns missions to subordinate units.
ponent commanders, and supporting command- Designates the main effort.
ers, as necessary or as directed by the CJTF.
Task-organizes the corps for combat.
Corps are uniquely suited to be the ARFOR or
JFLCC headquarters in a JTF. They are optimized Influences the battle by assigning missions.
for executing battle command functions the higher
headquarters of ground maneuver forces requires. Establishes priorities.
They can coordinate sustainment activities for sig- Assigns areas of operations.
nificant numbers of assigned or attached forces.
Allocates resources.
Corps can also perform joint and multinational
force coordination and liaison. In most cases, a Synchronizes operations within his battle space.
corps headquarters can be the ARFOUR or JFLCC His intentions and objectives guide the actions of
headquarters in a JTF without significant personnel his subordinate commanders and the corps staff
augmentation. during operations.
With the exception of small operations of limited The deputy corps commander extends the corps
scope and duration, the corps headquarters cannot commander’s span of control in areas and functions
simultaneously function as the JTF headquarters the commander designates and that mission, enemy,
and the ARFOR headquarters. If ARFOR require- terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T) fac-
ments are relatively small, the corps headquarters tors require. The deputy commander’s specific du-
may function in both capacities. Operations Just ties vary from one corps to another as well as over
Cause and Restore Hope are recent examples of a time. However, he is normally responsible for moni-
single headquarters performing both functions. toring or controlling several functions critically im-
portant to the corps operation’s success. Typical
duties include being the rear operations commander
ORGANIZATION or controlling a specific aspect of the close
OF THE CORPS operation.
The corps consists of a headquarters and a mix of The corps staff consists of coordinating and spe-
combat, CS, and CSS units. The headquarters plans, cial staffs, under the control of the chief of staff
directs, controls, and coordinates corps operations (CofS), and the personal staff, which reports di-
while employing its unit to accomplish its missions. rectly to the corps commander. Liaison elements
from outside organizations work with various corps
staff sections. Liaison may be provided to, provided
Corps Headquarters by, or be reciprocal with the following:
The corps headquarters consists of the corps com- Subordinate units.
mander, the deputy corps commander, and the corps The US Air Force (USAF).
staff, including liaison elements assigned to work
with the corps. The corps commander— The US Marine Corps (USMC).
Interprets and translates his superior command- The US Navy (USN).
ers’ intents into his own intent and concept of Special operations forces.
operations.
Echelons above corps.
Derives the corps’ mission.
The battlefield coordination element (BCE).
Provides planning guidance to focus the work of
the staff. Allied or coalition forces.
Sets objectives. Host nations.
States his intent. Government agencies.
Determines the concept of operations. Nongovernment agencies.
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The chief of staff supervises all activities of the are large numbers of liaison elements from these
coordinating and special staffs in compliance with agencies working at the corps; their coordination
the corps commander’s intent. The corps staff pro- with the corps staff is of great importance.
vides the commander with accurate and timely in-
formation, prepares analyses and estimates, and Second, the coordination of USAF, USMC, USN,
recommends courses of action (COA). and SOF support is especially critical at the corps
level. The corps staff must be sure they gain maxi-
Once the corps commander decides what is to be mum benefit by fully integrating available close air
done, the staff translates the commander’s decisions support (CAS), air interdiction (AI), tactical air
and intent into instructions and orders, issues the reconnaissance and aerial battlefield surveillance
orders, and ensures the execution of those orders. (TARABS), EW, counter air operations, tactical
The staff must anticipate future developments and airlift, naval gunfire, air and missile support, and sea
requirements as much as possible to ensure that the lift into the operation.
corps retains the tactical initiative. Field Manual
101-5 (D) discusses specific responsibilities of co- Third, the corps must continuously plan into the
ordinating, special, and personal staffs. future to anticipate battlefield conditions and then
move forces and assemble resources in time to
There are several key aspects of corps staff activi- successfully fight the enemy. To plan continuously,
ties that are different from lower echelons. First, the staff must anticipate conditions that may exist
because of the increased interface with multina- several days ahead. Figure 1-1 depicts a typical
tional forces, HN agencies, and sister services, there corps staff organization.
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presence and to seize and secure vital objectives. Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR)
The division conducts vertical assaults by airdrops
in the enemy’s rear to secure key terrain or to The ACR performs reconnaissance, security, and
interdict the enemy’s routes of resupply or with- economy of force operations for the corps. The
drawal, The division must depend on the USAF for regiment has organic air and armored cavalry units
airlift, CAS, and aerial resupply. that can operate as combined-arms teams over wide
Once on the ground, the division is essentially a areas and serve as reconnaissance or security forces.
dismounted force with limited wheeled and rotary-
wing mobility. The airborne division can be used in The regiment also has organic AD, FA, engineer,
a developed theater, especially to add depth to the MI, chemical, and CSS units. The regiment may
offense and defense. It is particularly well-suited for conduct offensive, defensive, or retrograde opera-
force-projection operations and can rapidly deploy tions. It is capable of independent operations but
in situations calling for early presence buildup of lacks infantry, a force artillery headquarters, and
combat forces. military police. The regiment may require augmen-
Air Assault Division. The AASLT division con- tation in these areas. (See FM 17-95 for details.)
ducts rapid-tempo tactical operations over extended
ranges. It combines strategic and operational mobil-
ity with an extremely high degree of tactical mobil- Aviation Brigade
ity within its AO.
The AASLT division can fight by projecting sig- The corps aviation brigade provides the corps
nificant combat power by transporting infantry, commander with a highly flexible maneuver force
field artillery (FA), and other combat and CSS units capable of performing a variety of combat, CS, and
using organic helicopter assets. It can also rapidly CSS missions across the entire range of military
concentrate, disperse, and redeploy its forces, mak- operations. Aviation units can rapidly maneuver to
ing it a highly responsive mobile force. provide the decisive component of combat power
throughout the depth of the battlefield during day,
Aviation is the prime mover, and aircraft are night, or adverse weather conditions. The aviation
integrated with ground forces. In addition, AASLT brigade can operate independently or, when prop-
operations generally involve insertions and extrac- erly augmented, become the controlling headquar-
tions under hostile conditions, as opposed to mere ters for other combined arms elements conducting
air movement of troops to and from secure locations ground operations.
about the battlefield. The division normally relies
on air or sea lift for strategic mobility but does The corps aviation brigade consists of an attack
possess a capability to self-deploy its organic regiment with three attack helicopter (AH)-64 at-
multiengined aircraft to locations in Central and tack battalions and an aviation group that consists
South America and the Caribbean. of an assault battalion, a command aviation battal-
ion, a CS aviation battalion, a medium helicopter
Separate Maneuver Brigades battalion, a light utility helicopter (UH) battalion,
and the air traffic services battalion.
Except for their size, separate armored, infantry,
light infantry, and mechanized infantry brigades
have essentially the same characteristics as their Primary missions of the corps aviation brigade
corresponding types of divisions. Separate maneu- include attack; air assault; air movement; target
ver brigades have organic cavalry, engineer, AD, acquisition; reconnaissance and security; air traffic
FA, MI, MP, and CSS units. services; enhanced command, control, and commu-
nications (C³); forward arming and refueling point
Separate maneuver brigades help reinforce ma- (FARP) operations; and command and staff sup-
neuver divisions but are capable of operating as port. Other missions include limited casualty evacu-
independent units. However, they are not capable of ation, combat search and rescue (CSAR), downed
sustained operations unless augmented. (See also aircraft recovery, rear area reconnaissance and sur-
FM 71-3 and FM 7-30.) veillance, and aerial mine delivery.
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nongovernment agencies, as required. In disaster MP brigade with USAF elements may conduct joint
relief operations, the corps signal brigade may assist operations during air base defense activities.
in restoring critical civilian communications.
The brigade maintains close liaison with HN civil
Theater tactical communications assets normally and military police and often provides civil-military
deploy in support of each corps JTF or air compo- operations (CMO) support. Joint and multinational
nent commander (ACC) to augment the corps signal operations with HN civil and military police might
brigade. These assets provide range extensions and occur during MP brigade missions.
automatic switching, and they support EAC, CS,
and CSS units. The corps signal brigade terminates
communications links from theater tactical net- Civil Affairs (CA) Brigade
works. The CA brigade, in support of the corps, normally
consists of a brigade headquarters and headquarters
Chemical Brigade company (HHC) and from three to five CA battal-
ions. Under the corps G5’s supervision, the brigade
The chemical brigade commands, controls, and headquarters analyzes the corps’ mission for CA
coordinates CS operations of attached chemical requirements, prepares the CA annex to corps plans
units. It also provides command and administrative and orders, and establishes liaison with joint service
and logistic support to attached chemical battalions. and other CA organizations.
The brigade commander recommends nuclear, bio-
logical, and chemical (NBC) mission priorities to The brigade headquarters company contains four
the corps commander. The brigade provides smoke technical support teams. Each team contains gov-
generator; NBC reconnaissance; and NBC decon- ernment, economics, public facilities, and special
tamination support (less patient decontamination) in functions sections. These sections provide CA tech-
the corps area. nical advice and assistance to unit commanders
throughout the corps area.
Brigade chemical battalions support corps units A CA battalion is normally attached to each divi-
in specified command or support relationships. The
brigade also evaluates and determines corps decon- sion and the COSCOM. Under the staff supervision
tamination, NBC reconnaissance, and smoke re- of the division G5 or the COSCOM CMO officer,
quirements. the battalion plans, coordinates, and supervises CA
activities as directed.
Military Police (MP) Brigade Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Tactical
The MP brigade usually has from three to six MP Support Battalion
battalions and provides battlefield circulation con- Corps PSYOP support normally consists of a
trol (BCC), area security, EPW and civilian internee PSYOP tactical support battalion with from one to
operations, and law-and-order support to the corps. three PSYOP tactical support companies. The bat-
It conducts reconnaissance and surveillance, to en- talion provides the corps with a corps PSYOP sup-
sure security of main supply routes (MSR), and area port element (CPSE). This element provides
reconnaissance of other key areas in the corps’ rear. interface with a PSYOP task force (POTF) or a joint
In support of rear operations, this brigade nor- PSYOP task force (JPTOF).
mally provides the initial Level II response force to Each tactical support company normally is in
counter threats that exceed base and base cluster direct support (DS) of a division, separate brigade,
defense capabilities. It can assist tactical combat or ACR. Tactical support companies provide prod-
forces in Level III responses. This brigade can be uct development and tactical dissemination.
designated as a tactical combat force for Level III
threats, operating independently or augmented ac-
cording to METT-T. Corps Support Command (COSCOM)
The MP brigade augments the organic MPs of COSCOM is the corps’ principal logistic orga-
committed maneuver units as required. The corps nization. It provides supply, field services,
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transportation (mode operations and movement Personnel service battalions are responsible for
control), maintenance, and combat health support critical tasks associated with the following systems:
(CHS) to the divisions and to nondivision corps data base management of personnel accounting and
units. The COSCOM is not a fixed organization and strength reporting, casualty operations manage-
contains a mix of subordinate units as required by ment, and personnel information management.
the corps’ size and configuration. They are also responsible for the following essential
personnel services: identification document, per-
Within the COSCOM are fictional control cen- sonnel evaluations, promotions and reductions, of-
ters; a materiel management center (MMC); the ficer procurement, and soldier actions.
movement control center (MCC); a medical bri-
gade; a transportation group (when three or more The PSB exercises C² over from two to six iden-
functional transportation battalions are assigned); tical personnel detachments and a modular postal
and corps support groups. These elements provide company. This modular structure enables com-
supply (less Class VIII), maintenance, and medical manders to tailor their organizations to support spe-
transportation and services to division and nondivi- cific missions in accordance with METT-T.
sion units.
Sustaining forces in any major regional contin- JOINT FORCE CAPABILITIES
gency (MRC) or lesser regional contingency (LRC)
requires the mobilization of selected reserve com- US Air Force
ponent (RC) units and personnel. Commanders can
organize these mixed active and RC packages into The USAF’s contributions to joint operations in-
modules tailored to the overall composition of the clude a range of missions and capabilities that meet
force. (See Chapter 3 for details.) Department of Defense (DOD)-mandated service
responsibilities and functions. Missions that most
directly affect corps operations include—
Finance Group
Counter air—to gain control of the aerospace
The finance group commands, controls, and co- environment.
ordinates the finance operations of all corps finance
battalions. It provides administrative and logistic Air interdiction—to delay, disrupt, divert, or de-
support to assigned finance battalions. The finance stroy an enemy’s military potential before it can
group normally has from two to six finance be brought to bear effectively against friendly
battalions. forces.
Finance battalions provide finance support to all Close air support-to support surface operations
corps divisional and nondivisional units. Finance by attacking hostile targets near friendly surface
support includes commercial vendor services and forces.
contracting support, military pay, disbursing, fund- Special operations—to influence the accomplish-
ing, accounting, travel pay, civilian pay, and non- ment of strategic or tactical objectives normally
US pay (for EPW, local hire labor, and so on). through low-visibility, covert, or clandestine
military actions.
Personnel Group (PG) Airlift—to deploy, employ, and sustain military
forces.
The PG mission is to sustain corps and EAC
personnel readiness and to exercise C² over person- Reconnaissance and surveillance-to collect in-
nel units. The PG manages critical personnel sys- formation from airborne, orbital, and surface-
tems and synchronizes the corps’ personnel network based sensors.
through the personnel management center (PMC) The USAF also performs specialized tasks to
formed from adjutant general (AG) and personnel enhance the execution of its missions. Tasks that
operations. The personnel group normally com- most often enhance corps operations include—
mands a headquarters detachment, personnel serv-
ice battalions (PSB), replacement companies, and Aerial refueling-to extend the range, payload,
the corps band. and flexibility of air operations.
1-11
FM 100-15
1-12
FM 100-15
operations. MAGTF air assets normally support the The indirect mode describes applications of mili-
MAGTF. Air sorties in excess of MAGTF direct- tary resources designed to train, advise, or assist
support requirements are provided to the JFC— interagency activities, nations important to US in-
terests, or surrogate forces pursuing US interests.
For tasking by the JFACC. The indirect mode of special operations encom-
For the support of other components of the joint passes engagements and economies of force that
force. deter an adversary’s use of force or that promote
peace.
For the joint force as a whole.
Special operations forces consist of four interde-
This reapportionment and/or reallocation of pendent elements: special operations command and
USMC tactical aviation sorties occurs when the JFC control headquarters (SOCCH), operational bases,
determines they are required for higher priority SOF supporting units, and SOF tactical units.
missions and to ensure unity of effort in accomplish- SOCCH integrates SO and SOF for unified or joint
ing the overall mission. commanders. SOF operational bases are versatile,
deployable organizations that command and control
Special Operations (SO) SOF tactical units for unified or joint commanders.
SOF supporting units conduct relatively inde-
Specially organized, trained, and equipped mili- pendent special operations. SOF tactical units are
tary and paramilitary forces conduct special opera- relatively small units with specialized, often uncon-
tions to achieve military, political, economic, or ventional, combat skills.
psychological objectives by generally unconven-
tional means in hostile, denied, or politically sensi- There are several characteristics that distinguish
tive areas. Special operations forces conduct mis- special operations direct and indirect employment
sions throughout the full range of military opera- from those of general forces. Special operations—
tions either independently or with general purpose
forces. Are specific tactical operations conducted by cer-
tified small units with unique talents who directly
Special operations differ from operations by strike or engage strategic and/or theater aims or
general purpose forces by— objectives.
Their degree of acceptable physical and political Planning begins at unified, joint, or interagency
risk. levels for SO execution requiring extensive, rig-
Their employment and operational techniques. orous rehearsal, and training by small units.
2
Their relative independence from friendly Execution occurs within a specifically tailored C
support. architecture.
Their dynamic interdependence on detailed op- Frequently include cover, clandestine, or low-
erational intelligence and indigenous assets
-
visibility operations and may be combined with
overt operations.
Special operations forces allow the unified or
joint force commander to perform critical, relatively Often occur at great distances from operational
small-unit missions that directly strike or engage the bases and employ sophisticated communications
aim or object of his operational design. systems and means of insertion, support, and
extraction to penetrate and return from hostile,
Special operations forces accomplish missions denied, or politically sensitive areas.
and tasks by director indirect modes of employing
military power and resources. The direct mode de- Occur throughout the range of military operations
scribes applications of military power designed to in war, conflict, and peacetime environments.
coerce or force the subjugation of an adversary’s
will. It includes strikes and maneuvers that cause Influence the will of foreign leaders to create
destruction, disruption, or denial of military conditions favorable to US strategic aims or
capabilities. objectives.
1-13
FM 100-15
Are often high-risk operations, have limited win- Often require a detailed knowledge of specific
dows of execution, and require first-time success. cultures and languages of a country or region.
1-14
Chapter 2
FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPS OPERATIONS
In combat a corps must be able to simultaneously The CINC may assign the corps commander
and continuously execute operations in depth. This various command responsibilities within a force-
requires careful planning and detailed coordination projection operation. For example, the corps com-
in order for the corps to bring to bear all available mander may be the commander of the senior tactical
resources at decisive times and places on the level headquarters in the theater and may be directly
battlefield. subordinate to an Army EAC headquarters. The
corps commander may also function as the com-
Commanders must understand force-projection mander of an operational-level headquarters, such
operations, battlefield visualization, the battlefield as a JTF, a JFLCC, or an ARFOR headquarters. (See
framework, and the basic capabilities of each bat- Chapter 4.)
tlefield operating system (BOS). Commanders must
also understand the complementary and reinforcing
effects of combined arms and joint capabilities to BATTLEFIELD
apply Army operations doctrine. VISUALIZATION
Battlefield visualization is a key aspect of battle
FORCE PROJECTION command and is the process whereby the com-
mander develops a clear understanding of his cur-
Future contingencies will most likely occur in rent state, envisions a desired end state and,
regions of the world where the US does not have
significant ground forces. Force projection is the
demonstrated ability to rapidly alert, mobilize, de-
ploy, employ, sustain, and recover to again operate
anywhere in the world. It is the key military element
of power projection.
As a member of the joint team, the Army corps is
often the organization of choice to deploy from
CONUS and/or forward presence locations and to
conduct operations associated with lesser regional
contingencies or operations that may develop into a
major regional contingency.
The corps is ideally suited for force-projection
missions. It has the fill extent of C², combat, CS,
and CSS assets with which to assemble an appropri-
ate mix of units to execute any force-projection
operation.
Because the corps is not a fixed force, it can be
tailored to any contingency worldwide. Therefore,
the corps brings tremendous versatility and lethality
to a warfighting commander-in-chief’s (CINC’s)
total force. It can execute the full range of land
combat operations and OOTW. Also, when prop-
erly tailored, it can execute both simultaneously.
(See Chapter 3 for details.)
2-1
FM 100-15
subsequently, visualizes the sequence of activity The second aspect of the commander’s vision is
that will move his force from its current state to the his ability to clearly discern a desired end state. This
end state. Once a commander has been assigned an initially involves foreseeing a feasible outcome to
area of operations (AO), he begins to visualize the the operation that would result in mission success
operation he will conduct before any mental con- and would leave the unit postured for the next
straints (for example, boundaries, phase lines (PLs), mission.
and fire control measures) are emplaced.
The first aspect in the commander’s visualization The third aspect of battlefield visualization is the
is gaining an understanding of the current state of commander’s ability to envision a sequence of ac-
his unit and that of the enemy. This includes gaining tions (an intellectual war game) that would cause his
an awareness of his own and the enemy’s status, force to arrive at the desired end state. Included in
including combat readiness, logistic status, location, the commander’s visualization are the contingen-
speed of advance, tempo of operations, known vul- cies (branches) and follow-on missions (sequels) his
nerabilities, and probable course of action. force might encounter.
Environmental factors for both the enemy and the Ultimately, the commander articulates his battle-
friendly force are also included. Environmental field vision to his subordinates and staff through the
factors include terrain and weather as well as human commander’s intent statement. The commander’s
factors such as morale and fatigue. Less tangible intent guides the development of the concept of
influences are cultural, religion, and similar factors. operations.
2-2
FM 100-15
BATTLEFIELD FRAMEWORK
A battlefield framework helps commanders relate
friendly forces to one another and to the enemy in
terms of time, space, and purpose. The concept of a
battlefield framework is not new, but the prolifera-
tion of military and advanced technology and the
influence of joint doctrine has caused the battlefield
framework to evolve.
The battlefield framework is relevant to any bat- rangement of the battlefield in order to gather infor-
tlefield, including those in OOTW. The following mation and dominate the enemy.
discussion applies primarily to conventional com-
bat operations.
The battlefield framework consists of four inter- Area of Operations (AO)
related components: area of operations (AO), area A commander is assigned an AO by his higher
of interest (AI), battle space, and a specific battle- commander. An AO is a three-dimensional volume
field organization. As a result of the battlefield prescribed by boundaries on the ground. It also
visualization process, the commander can translate includes the airspace above.
his vision into this framework.
The size of an AO depends on METT-T, but it
The commander mentally establishes an area in must be large enough for the commander to accom-
which he must focus intelligence-gathering means, plish his mission and protect the force. Boundaries
This will ensure he is aware of factors that may have may require frequent adjustment based on the actual
a near-term impact on the operation. This is called and projected rates of maneuver and the operational
the area of interest. environment.
The commander next determines the three- Commanders can use AOs to divide large areas
dimensional area in which he seeks to dominate the into smaller geographical areas in which tactical-
enemy. This volume is referred to as the com- level battles are fought. However, because of tech-
mander’s battle space. nological advances and the capabilities of current
battlefield systems, an assigned AO may not neces-
Finally, the commander lends structure to his sarily allow the commander to employ his organic,
assigned AO through a specific battlefield organi- assigned, and supporting assets to their fullest capa-
zation. This organization includes using boundaries, bilities.
phase lines, and similar measures.
Figure 2-1 graphically depicts two battlefield Area of Interest (AI)
components: the AO and the battlefield’s organiza-
tion within an AO. The other two components, battle The AI is a geographical area from which the
space and AI, are not shown. They are mental commander requires information and intelligence in
constructs commanders use to form an orderly ar- order to execute successful tactical operations and
2-3
FM 100-15
to plan for future operations. Because staffs need only those measures necessary to ensure the safety
time to process information and to plan or synchro- of the force while allowing for the initiative and
nize operations, the tactical commander’s AI is agility of subordinate commanders.
usually larger than his battle space and AO.
Battles and engagements are at times linear with
Normally, the AI includes any threat or charac- deep, close, and rear components. (See Figure 2-2.)
teristic of the battlefield environment that will sig- Although these components may be noncontiguous,
nificantly influence a commander’s current or they are not separate and distinct activities. They are
future mission. The AI also includes areas adjacent synchronized efforts throughout the entire depth of
to the AO (forward, flanks, and rear) in which the battlefield.
enemy actions and the environment will affect cur- Three closely related sets of activities-deep,
rent and future battles. Each commander determines close, and rear-characterize operations within an
his own AI. AO. Commanders fight throughout the depth and
breadth of their AO using deep, close, and rear
Battle Space operations simultaneously in a way that will appear
to the enemy as one continuous operation.
Battle space is the volume of area in which the
commander seeks to dominate the enemy. It is Simultaneous operations in depth seek to attack
through battlefield visualization that he decides the enemy concurrently throughout the depth of the
where, when, and how he will dominate the enemy battlefield. They also seek to mass both effects and
within his battle space. forces when and where necessary to accomplish the
mission.
A commander’s battle space expands and con-
tracts in relation to the ability to acquire and engage In executing simultaneous operations in depth,
the enemy with joint or multinational forces. It can the corps commander strives to paralyze the en-
change as the commander’s vision of the battlefield emy’s ability to act by—
changes. It is influenced by time, tempo, depth, and Dominating the enemy, either directly or indi-
synchronization. rectly, through attack or the threat of attack; by
A higher commander does not assign battle space. conducting fires, electronic warfare, combined
Although battle space is not shown on a map or arms maneuver; or by a combination of all of
computer monitor, it usually extends beyond the these actions throughout three dimensions-hori-
commander’s AO and may overlap with the battle zontal, vertical, and time.
space of other commanders. At the tactical level, the
area in which a commander dominates an enemy
(his battle space) is normally smaller than his AI.
Key considerations in determining the size of
battle space include the depth and resolution of
supporting intelligence, the commander’s concept
for employing both organic and supporting weap-
ons, and the disposition of the opposing force.
2-4
FM 100-15
Attacking, either directly or indirectly, enemy and react promptly to developments anywhere
centers of gravity and critical functions to destroy within it.
the cohesion of the enemy plan, such as the ability
to generate and sustain combat power. Deep Operations
Denying the enemy such sources of combat Corps deep operations are directed against enemy
power as his ability to maneuver or to provide fire forces and functions beyond the close battle. They
support. may be separated from the close battle in time or
Seizing, holding, or denying key terrain. space or both. The commander can execute deep
operations by combining maneuver, fire support,
Interdicting enemy lines of communications and/or command and control warfare (C²W) sup-
(LOC). ported by intelligence.
Seizing and retaining the initiative while control- By design, deep operations dominate the enemy
ling the tempo of operations. by—
A key aspect of simultaneous operations in depth Nulliying his firepower.
is tempo. Commanders control their tempo and Disrupting his C².
strive to control the enemy’s tempo. Commanders
determine the best sequence of operations that will Disrupting the tempo of his operations.
maintain the initiative and achieve a tempo of op- Destroying his forces.
erations to reach the desired objective. In deciding
on the required tempo, commanders consider many Preventing reinforcing maneuver.
factors (the command structure, geography, logis- Destroying his installations and supplies.
tics, public opinion, civilians, enemy reinforcement
capabilities). Breaking his morale.
A changing enemy situation complicates se- When conducting simultaneous attacks in depth,
quencing decisions for operations. Therefore, the the corps employs long-range intelligence-
sequence that commanders choose should not close acquisition and targeting assets, including EW and
future alternatives, but should be flexible enough to joint assets. The corps uses these to track enemy
accommodate change. forces, to complicate their operations, and to deter-
mine the effects of corps strikes in depth.
Simultaneous operations in depth directly impact The corps normally conducts deep operations
the enemy’s cohesion. Units are not restricted to against the enemy’s uncommitted forces or re-
fighting three sequential operations, nor do they sources to prevent him from using them where and
conduct operations in depth solely to establish fa- when he wants on the battlefield. Goals of deep
vorable conditions for the close fight. operations include—
Deep operations, combined with simultaneous Limiting the enemy’s freedom of action.
close operations, might be decisive in one operation.
In another, deep operations might set the conditions Altering the tempo of operations in favor of the
for future decisive close operations. Quickly arriv- corps.
ing at decisive operations is the aim. Denying the enemy the capability to concentrate
When executing simultaneous operations in depth, his forces.
the corps commander establishes procedures to set Isolating the close fight.
priorities and to request assets from EAC. He then
prioritizes distribution of resources to subordinate Destroying the enemy’s will to fight.
units to help them conduct their own operations. Whether in the offense or defense, deep opera-
tions perform one or more of the following func-
The METT-T factors determine the relationship tions:
between assets committed to close, deep, and rear
operations. The commander must see the entire AO Interdicting enemy LOCs.
2-5
FM 100-15
Preventing the enemy’s counterattack or his em- simultaneously with the development of the intelli-
ployment of follow-on forces. gence collection plan (decide).
Destroying units and critical targets. Target tracking occurs during the targeting func-
Cutting off routes of withdrawal. tion of detect, and it supports the targeting functions
of deliver and assess. The decide, detect, deliver,
Providing the commander with information and and assess targeting methodology is applicable for
intelligence about enemy capabilities in depth. air or ground assault as well as for delivery systems
The systems normally available to the corps for such as tactical air, attack helicopters, and electronic
deep operations are ground maneuver units, FA attack (EA).
(including rockets, missiles, and cannon artillery), Joint standardized control measures are used in
AI, AH units, AALST forces, airborne forces, the deep operations coordination process. They are
PSYOP, CA units, and EW assets. a flexible system of managing ground and air opera-
To ensure unity of effort and fully integrated use tions. An important control measure for deep opera-
of capabilities in deep operations, a single organi- tions is the fire support coordination line (FSCL).
zation within the corps must be responsible for The FSCL is a line that the appropriate ground
synchronization of all aspects according to the com- commander establishes to ensure coordination of
mander’s guidance. This organization is the deep fires and interdiction not under his control but which
operations coordination cell (DOCC). (See Chapter might directly affect his current tactical operations.
4 for details.) The FSCL is a permissive fire support coordinat-
When planning a deep operation, the targeting ing measure. When consulting with superior, sub-
methodology is a critical element (Figure 2-3). The ordinate, supporting, and affected commanders, the
decide, detect, deliver, and assess target methodol- appropriate land force commander establishes and
ogy enables the commander and staff to take the adjusts the FSCL within his boundary.
initiative in selecting high-payoff targets (HPTs)
before they actually present themselves in the target Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must
array. inform all affected commanders in sufficient time
to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide, both
Each function occurs both simultaneously and in the air and on the ground. Fire support coordina-
sequentially. Although not a separate function, tar- tion lines facilitate the expeditious attack of targets
get tracking is inherent throughout the targeting of opportunity beyond the coordinating line.
process. The staff must plan target tracking
Supporting elements may attack targets beyond
the FSCL, if the attack will not produce adverse
effects on or to the rear of the line. The FSCL is not
a boundary; the synchronization of operations on
either side of the FSCL is the responsibility of the
establishing commander out to the limits of the land
force’s boundary.
The decision on whereto place, or even whether
to use, a FSCL requires careful consideration. All
involved in the decision must understand that it is a
permissive fire control measure used to expedite
fires. It does not delineate AOs. Its greatest utility
is in facilitating the attack of time-sensitive targets.
(See JP 3-0 and JP 3-03 for in-depth discussions.)
Close Operations
Corps close operations include the battles and
engagements of its major maneuver and fire support
2-6
FM 100-15
units together with CS and CSS activities presently Only one unit conducts the main effort. Normally,
supporting them. The corps’ close operations usu- the commander visualizes the ultimate defeat of the
ally include the deep, close, and rear operations of enemy force by his main effort. In this regard, a
its committed divisions, separate maneuver bri- commander shifts and applies combat power as
gades, or cavalry regiments. necessary to reinforce his main effort. Designating
a main effort provides the focus that each subordi-
Not all activities that are part of close operations nate and supporting commander uses to link his
necessarily take place near the line of contact (LC). actions to the action of those around him.
An example would be counterfires directed against
enemy artillery supporting enemy forces in contact. The main effort is the part of a commander’s
Conversely, not all activities taking place near the concept that permits initiative but maintains direc-
LC are part of close operations. For example, target tion and cohesion. Supporting the main effort re-
acquisition may be seeking to locate deep targets quires synchronization of combat, CS, and CSS
even though intelligence resources may be in the resources.
same area where close operations are taking place.
(Security operations, such as covering and screen- Reserves give a commander options and flexibil-
ing forces, are part of close operations.) ity and provide an edge against uncertainty. They
exploit successes, gain opportunities, and expedite
Close fights occur where, when, and against victories. Commanders can use reserves to weight
whichever enemy units commanders choose to the main effort to maintain momentum, provide
commit assault formations. Concentrating the ef- security, and defeat enemy counterattacks. Reserve
fects of combat power in support of ground forces actions are not solely in response to unforeseen
becomes the commander’s focus in close battles. enemy actions.
Reconnaissance and security are critical to battles Close combat is normally required for decisive
and engagements. In general, reconnaissance and and lasting effects on the battlefield. It is also the
security are two different missions. However, at the type of combat that places soldiers at greatest risk.
tactical level both are closely related. Units conduct-
ing reconnaissance provide a degree of security. Rear Operations
Units conducting security missions use reconnais-
sance techniques. The corps conducts rear operations to assure free-
dom of maneuver and the continuity of operations,
Reconnaissance is the precursor to engagements including sustainment, clear C² arrangements, and
with the enemy. Reconnaissance actions yield infor- dedicated fire support. The corps must synchronize
mation on the disposition of an enemy’s force and the rear operations functions of terrain manage-
intent as well as environmental conditions. ment, security, sustainment, and movements with
Effective reconnaissance allows the commander the corps’ close and deep operations, in keeping
to gain and maintain contact with the enemy as well with the corps commander’s concept and intent.
as to direct friendly units into the fight. Reconnais- While G3s and S3s are responsible, overall, for
sance units orient their movement on the reconnais- terrain management, commanders of rear command
sance objective, which is either the enemy or the posts (CPs) usually position supporting units in rear
terrain. Reconnaissance units may have to fight for areas. Once in position, these units become a base
information, but they usually avoid decisive (a unit or multiunit position with a definite perime-
combat. ter) or part of a base cluster (a mission grouping of
bases and/or security requirements that lack a
Security, on the other hand, protects and con- clearly defined perimeter).
serves the combat power of friendly units. Security
is an inherent part of all military operations. At the Rear area operations include security operations
tactical level, security actions protect the command to ensure sustainment is not interrupted. Three lev-
against surprise attack and hostile air and ground els of responses to threat activities serve as guides
observation. All units conduct security actions for planning rear operations. Rather than focusing
while specific units may be tasked to conduct secu- on the size or type threat, these levels focus on the
rity missions (such as screen, guard, and cover). nature of friendly actions needed to defeat the threat:
2-7
FM 100-15
Level I threats can be defeated by base or base Coordinating and synchronizing corps rear op-
cluster self-defense measures. erations with close and deep operations in keep-
ing with the commander’s intent.
Level II threats are beyond base or base cluster
self-defense capabilities but can be defeated by Planning, organizing, directing, and coordinating
response forces, normally MP units with support- assigned and attached units to accomplish sus-
ing fires. tainment, terrain management, movement, and
security.
Level III threats necessitate a command decision
to commit a corps combined arms tactical combat NOTE: See Appendix C for a detailed discussion.
force (TCF) to defeat them. An MP brigade,
properly augmented, may be designated as the
TCF. BATTLEFIELD OPERATING
Continuous reconnaissance and timely intelli- SYSTEMS (BOS)
gence-collection and dissemination are essential for Commanders and organizations perform major
successful rear operations. Based on a thorough functions within each level of war in order to suc-
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and cessfully execute operations. These major functions
CI risk assessments, rear operations planning must are called operating systems. (See TRADOC Pam-
include— phlet (PAM) 11-9.)
Base and base cluster self-defense. The first level of war is the national military and
A response to defeat Level II attacks that exceed theater strategic level. Operating systems at this
base and base defense cluster capabilities. level include major functions that civil and military
organizations and unified, joint, and multinational
The commitment of a TCF to defeat a Level III strategic forces perform in order to successfully
threat. execute strategic plans and theater campaigns.
Rear area operations include planning and direct- At the operational level, operating systems in-
ing sustainment. Synchronizing these actions with clude the major functions that joint and multi-
the concept of operations is critical to the success of national operational forces perform in order to suc-
close and deep operations. Rear operations also cessfully execute the unified commander’s subordi-
ensure that sustainment is not degraded by and does nate campaigns and major operations.
not limit the force commander’s freedom of maneu-
ver and continuity of operations. At the tactical level, operating systems include
major functions the force performs to successfully
Movement control includes planning, prioritiz- execute operations (battles and engagements) in
ing, deconflicting, and executing movement plans, order to accomplish the operational commander’s
both internal and external (other US forces and host objectives.
nation) to a unit. Staff G3s and S3s are responsible,
overall, for directing the movement of tactical units These fictions, occurring on the battlefield, are
through or within AOs. the BOS. The BOS include intelligence, maneuver,
fire support, air defense, mobility and survivability,
Rear CPs are generally responsible for adminis- CSS, and C². They provide a structure for integrat-
trative moves and for prioritizing and deconflicting ing and synchronizing critical combat activities on
movements within rear areas as well as planning for the battlefield.
sustainment of tactical movements within the divi-
sion rear. NOTE: Specific considerations related to corps of-
fensive and defensive operations are in Chapters 5
The commander must give one specific indi- and 6, respectively.
vidual normally the deputy corps commander, the
responsibility and authority to control all aspects of
corps rear operations. His responsibilities include— Intelligence
Command and control of units task-organized for The corps is the primary echelon that processes
rear operations. and analyzes current intelligence from strategic-,
2-8
FM 100-15
operational-, and tactical-level sources. The corps The ACE develops and tracks critical targets,
then disseminates key products to tactical forces. performs all-source analysis, manages collection,
produces and maintains IPB products, and dissemi-
The corps commander drives the intelligence ef- nates combat information and intelligence. Intelli-
fort. He steers the focus of the intelligence system gence operations provide information on terrain,
by clearly designating his priority intelligence re- weather, and the enemy and how they interact to
quirements (PIR), targeting guidance, and other in- affect operations.
telligence requirements. He ensures that the
intelligence BOS is fully employed and synchro- The topographic engineer company provides
nized with the maneuver BOS and the fire support the G2 with analyses of the effects of terrain and
BOS (Figure 2-4). weather on combat operations. The USAF
The commander must also realize that intelli- weather team that supports the corps provides
gence resources are finite and that competing re- weather data. The staff weather officer (SWO)
quirements can dissipate the power of intelligence. and his team provide staff weather, forecasting,
Therefore, he must prioritize requirements in order and observing support to the corps and, with the G2,
to support his intent and concept of operations. help interpret the effects of weather on friendly and
enemy operations.
The analysis control element (ACE) is the syner-
gistic focus of military intelligence at the corps Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is the
level. Under the G2’s operational supervision, the commander’s responsibility and helps reduce the
ACE focuses the intelligence system on products uncertainty about the effects of the enemy, weather,
and services commanders need to plan and execute and terrain on operations. The IPB provides the
operations across the battlefield. framework for identifying what information the
2-9
FM 100-15
intelligence system must collect, analyze, inte- such systems as TROJAN SPIRIT and the mobile
grate, and present to support situation and target integrated tactical terminal (MITT).
development and decision-making processes. All
appropriate staff elements, coordinated by the G2, The electronic processing and dissemination sys-
execute IPB to achieve the commander’s stated tem (EPDS) can also receive, process, and dissemi-
requirements. nate signal intelligence (SIGINT) data from
national and theater systems. In addition, through
The corps MI brigade directly supports the corps the ADA brigade, the corps can receive airborne
commander and the G2 by providing multi- warning and control system (AWACS) data.
disciplined IEW support to the entire corps. The
brigade provides the commander and G2 a robust A mechanism to help the corps pull necessary
organic intelligence collection, processing, and dis- information from EAC theater or joint and/or na-
semination capability. In addition, it provides the tional agencies is the corps military intelligence
linkages to joint and national capabilities. Collec- support element (CMISE). Personnel from the thea-
tors organic to the corps MI brigade include— ter MI brigade form this element. The CMISE as-
sists the corps’ organic intelligence elements.
The Guardrail Common Sensor (GRCS).
Through the CMISE the corps can establish and
The unmanned aerial vehicle-short range maintain access with EAC intelligence data bases
(UAV-SR). and organizations. The CMISE allows the corps to
leverage these resources, and it bridges the gap
Long-range surveillance (LRS) units. between EAC intelligence organizations and eche-
lon corps and below users.
Counterintelligence and interrogator personnel.
Corps electronic warfare involves communica-
The GRCS is a fixed-wing, airborne-intercept and tions and noncommunications intercept and DF ac-
direction-finding (DF) system capable of providing tivities and both electronic jamming and electronic
near-real time target information on enemy commu- deception missions. The MI brigade possesses no
nications and radar systems. The UAV-SR has a organic jamming capability. As such, corps EW
maximum range of 300 kilometers and provides planners must rely on subordinate and joint EA
video or forward-looking infrared (FLIR) imaging systems to execute the corps’ EA concept.
for reconnaissance, surveillance, or battle damage
assessment (BDA). Long-range surveillance, inter- Electronic deception missions are integral to the
rogation, and CI personnel are capable of supporting overall deception plan the G3 develops and coordi-
the corps or reinforcing the capabilities of subordi- nates. Execution and synchronization of electronic
nate commands. jamming and deception missions require extensive
coordination between the G2 and G3.
Through a variety of automated processors the
corps can process and disseminate intelligence from Intelligence support to corps deep operations
theater and national sensors. The all-source analysis seeks to develop information on enemy activities
system (ASAS) is the processing and dissemination that can affect future corps close operations. This
backbone. The ASAS is augmented by special- collection effort must support the decide, detect,
purpose processors and communications, as neces- deliver, and assess process.
sary.
Based on the commander’s PIR and concept of
The joint surveillance target attack radar system operations, the overall collection effort must focus
(J-STARS) ground station module (GSM) receives on named areas of interest (NAI) and target areas of
and analyzes moving-target indicators (MTI). It can interest (TAI) to support corps actions such as firing
receive and exploit imagery from national-level deep artillery missions and launching deep ground
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery. maneuvers or air strikes.
The modernized imagery exploitation system Intelligence support to the corps’ close operation
(MIES) can receive and exploit imagery from na- includes not only the collection of enemy informa-
tional-level sensors in near-real time. It can then tion important to the corps, but also the augmenta-
disseminate secondary imagery to customers via tion of subordinate unit intelligence-collection
2-10
FM 100-15
capabilities. Operational control or attached MI Close with and strike the enemy the decisive blow
companies, platoons, or teams provide direct sup- when preconditions have been met.
port to divisions, the ACR, or separate brigades.
Because of their longer collection ranges, aerial
surveillance assets are normally retained in general Armored and Mechanized Infantry
support of the corps to support the main effort or a In the corps’ close operation, armored and mecha-
critical area of the battlefield. nized infantry maneuver elements close with and
Intelligence objectives in the corps’ close opera- destroy enemy forces. Firepower, protection from
tion key on information to help subordinate units enemy fire, and the speed of armored units create
conduct successful battles and engagements. Those the shock effect necessary to disrupt or defeat the
objectives also key on information necessary to enemy.
execute corps-level combat activities such as coun- Mechanized infantry has the same mobility as
terattacks, spoiling attacks, reinforcement, and re- armored forces, but less firepower and protection.
allocation of resources. Armored and mechanized infantry units are particu-
The staff prioritizes the collection effort to focus larly effective in conducting mobile combat against
on NAIs and TAIs, seeking to identify specific armored and mechanized threats in open terrain.
enemy formations and activities to trigger corps The corps allocates armored and mechanized ma-
actions. Intelligence support of the corps’ rear op- neuver elements based on the overall corps mission
eration focus on possible enemy activities that could along with a consideration of the abilities of these
interfere with the corps’ ability to support combat elements to effectively employ their combat sys-
operations. tems, given the terrain and expected enemy capa-
Human intelligence (HUMINT) is usually a ma- bilities and actions.
jor source of this information. Other sources, such Armored and mechanized infantry forces can also
as higher, adjacent, and subordinate units, will also perform as part of the security operation. They can
provide essential information. effectively conduct cover, guard, or screen missions
in both the offense and the defense. In addition,
armored and mechanized infantry maneuver ele-
Maneuver ments are particularly appropriate for incorporation
Maneuver includes movement to gain positional into the corps’ reserve or as a striking force. As such,
advantage over the enemy combined with all fires they can strike the enemy at the critical time and
directed to suppress, neutralize, and destroy the place to throw him off balance and to seize or retain
enemy. Maneuver should avoid enemy strengths the initiative. The elements can also effectively
and create opportunities to bring greater firepower reinforce critical areas or react to rear area threats
to bear on the enemy. involving mechanized and armored forces.
Corps maneuver elements are its divisions, sepa- Employing armored and mechanized infantry
rate maneuver brigades, the cavalry regiment, and maneuver elements in the corps’ deep operations
the aviation brigade. Maneuver is most effective will almost certainly be complex and involve sig-
when it employs surprise by approaching the enemy nificant risks. A deep operation will probably re-
from an unanticipated direction. quire at least a brigade and probably a division-size
force to attack well beyond the corps’ ability to
The objective of maneuver at the corps level can support it with responsive artillery, attack aviation,
be to— and CSS. Therefore, maneuver forces in deep op-
Move to exploit weaknesses or vulnerabilities in erations will probably require additional resources
enemy dispositions. and augmentation to operate for up to several days.
Move to a position of advantage to bring addi- Although using armored and mechanized infantry
tional firepower to bear on the enemy. maneuver in deep operations is complex and risky,
it can, if properly executed, be devastating to the
Move to exploit the effects of fires (both lethal enemy. To place an armored and mechanized
and nonlethal) on the enemy. maneuver force in the enemy’s rear area (where it
2-11
FM 100-15
can destroy such high-value targets (HVTs) as artil- Light forces can be effective in corps deep opera-
lery, reserves, follow-on forces, C² centers, and tions when they are quickly inserted in the enemy’s
logistic facilities) can be the stroke that tips the close rear using airborne or air assault, or when they allow
operation in the corps’ favor. themselves to be bypassed and remain undetected
as the enemy advances. These forces are most ef-
The commander will not normally dedicate ar- fective in small groups in the enemy rear, conduct-
mored and mechanized forces to the corps’ rear ing limited raids, sabotage, harassment, denying key
operation until such time as a significant Level III terrain, and providing information.
threat develops or is expected to develop. Because
fighting in the rear area can divert combat power Light forces are especially suited for opposed
from the main effort, commanders must carefully entry operations during force projection. These in-
weigh the need for such diversions against the pos- itial forces can either conduct simultaneous opera-
sible consequences and prepare to take calculated tions in depth to accomplish all the objectives of the
risks in rear areas. deployment and entry operation or seize a lodge-
ment area as part of a more encompassing campaign
A consideration that may lessen the risk is to plan.
designate the MP brigade, augmented according to
METT-T, as the rear area tactical combat force. When rapidly transported to the location of the
However, armored and mechanized assets routinely threat, light forces can be effective in the corps’ rear
perform this role. In addition, armored and mecha- operation. Their ability to fight in restrictive areas,
nized forces that are part of the corps reserve, or such as in cities and logistic complexes, is of great
otherwise committed, may have rear operations benefit. Their light antiarmor weapons and helicop-
contingencies. ter transportability are ideal for countering most rear
area threats.
Light Forces
Reconnaissance and Security
The commander uses light forces, in the same
respect as armored and mechanized forces, in the Reconnaissance is the precursor to all military
corps close operation to close with and destroy the operations. It provides information on terrain and
enemy. Light forces can effectively perform against the enemy to all commanders and staffs. Reconnais-
a heavy threat in restrictive terrain such as built-up sance may be mounted, dismounted, or aerial and
areas, thickly wooded areas, or in mountains. How- accomplished by either technical or human means
ever, they require augmentation with antiarmor (or a combination of both). The commander may
weapons, field artillery, CAS, attack helicopters, task any element assigned to or supporting the corps
ADA, and engineers. Commanders should not em- to perform reconnaissance operations.
ploy light forces in open terrain against heavy
forces. Security operations focus on corps forces and
facilities and provide reaction time, maneuver
Light forces are ideal for moving undetected over space, and protection to the corps. As with recon-
short distances, such as when establishing an initial naissance , any element assigned or supporting the
security force or when infiltrating an enemy’s de- corps might perform security operations. The three
fensive positions. They are also essential to coun- types of security missions are screen, guard, and
tering enemy infantry in any terrain, and are cover. (See Chapter 6.)
particularly effective when ground transportation or
helicopter support increases their mobility. The ACR is especially effective at conducting
corps reconnaissance and security operations. It can
When provided with transportation support and find the enemy, develop the situation, and conduct
augmented with antiarmor and artillery assets, the combat operations similar to an armored and/or
corps can employ light maneuver forces to follow mechanized maneuver brigade. Its organic aviation,
and support armored and mechanized forces. For as well as other CS and CSS, make the regiment an
operations in an NBC threat environment, light independent, brigade-size force, ideal for covering
forces require augmentation by corps NBC recon- force and security operations as well as a potent
naissance and detection assets. antiarmor counterattack force.
2-12
FM 100-15
The light cavalry regiment (LCR) is capable of Attack helicopter units provide the corps with an
rapidly deploying by strategic airlift to conduct extremely mobile combat force capable of engaging
operations in support of force projection. The regi- enemy armored vehicles during both day and night
ment can be tailored or task-organized, based on operations. These units are normally under corps
METT-T, and can provide incremental force pack- control to be employed at the key time and place to
ages to support a deploying corps during the initial support the corps’ scheme of maneuver. They are
stages of force-projection operations. It can also most effective when they can engage enemy
provide task-organized squadrons for employment formations—
by light divisions.
While moving on roads or in open terrain.
The commander can use the ACR in an economy During the hours of darkness.
of force role, but it may require infantry augmenta-
tion to conduct combat in restrictive terrain. The With CAS and artillery during joint air attack
ACR is equipped and trained to operate over a team (JAAT) operations.
significantly greater geographic area than are other
brigade-size maneuver elements. The LCR can also When they are already engaged with friendly
attack, defend, and delay in secondary areas to allow ground forces.
the corps commander to concentrate combat forces Commanders do not employ attack helicopter
elsewhere. units pure (without fire support) and not normally
in less than a battalion-size force. They may be
The commander can use the ACR with an ar- under the OPCON of a committed division. This is
mored and/or mechanized division to form an ex- one method the corps has of weighting the main
tremely potent deep attack force for the corps. While effort or reinforcing a critical sector.
limited as a deep attack force, the LCR can be used
to direct and control deep fires. The corps may retain control of aviation elements
in certain cases, such as when the corps controls the
Both the ACR and LCR can perform against an covering force in the defense or when the corps
armored or mechanized rear threat. They also have conducts flank or advanced guard operations in
the mobility to react quickly to air landings. How- offensive operations. Attack aviation units must
ever, their lack of infantry limits their effectiveness always be integrated into a combined arms team or
in close terrain or urban areas. be augmented to form a combined arms team.
Combat support operations in close operations
Aviation may include—
Corps aviation elements support the close opera- Providing assault helicopter support to infantry
tion by conducting combat, CS, and CSS functions conducting air assaults to seize key terrain or
in combined arms operations. During combat opera- facilities.
tions, the aviation brigade performs attack, recon- Providing mobility to light artillery.
naissance and security, AASLT, air combat, CAS,
and C² missions. Providing aerial communications platforms or
relocating signal nodes.
When used as a maneuver element, aviation must
be employed as a combined arms force. As such, it Emplacing scatterable mines to block enemy
requires augmentation in the form of intelligence, penetrations, turn enemy formations, or protect
fire support, engineer support, and so on. the flanks of corps counterattacks.
Aviation elements conduct CS operations by pro- Supporting critical C² activities.
viding fire support, target acquisition, and aerial Combat service support tasks in corps close op-
adjustment of indirect fires, by conducting air erations involve the airlifting of critical materiel and
movement operations, and by emplacing scatterable personnel needed to support the corps battle. This
mines. Aviation units can conduct CSS operations includes airlift support for—
through the air movement of personnel, equipment,
and supplies. Logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS).
2-13
FM 100-15
Movement of troops and personnel. In deep operations, the mobility and firepower of
attack helicopters is most effective when
Resupply. concentrated against enemy flanks or against ar-
Movement of critical high-priority Class IX mored and artillery units moving in the area beyond
supplies. the FLOT. The corps may use its attack helicopters
to destroy enemy formations in depth that could
Retrograde of reparable items. possibly disrupt or unhinge the close operation
Pre-positioning of fuel and ammunition. within the next 72 hours. These assets are particu-
larly well-suited for night operations.
Movement of maintenance contact teams.
The degree of sophistication and the aggressive-
Low-density, high-cost munitions when time, ness of enemy AD systems are major factors when
distance, situation, or the condition of roads in- conducting deep aviation operations. The opera-
hibit ground transportation. tion’s depth and duration are also critical.
Airlift should be part of the distribution system In all cases, planning for corps aviation deep
and not used just for emergency or immediate move- operations must be thorough and comprehensive.
ments. The G3 should allocate airlift assets to sup- The specific threat AD environment the corps com-
port CSS activities. If higher priority missions need mander faces will dictate the relative importance of
these assets, they can be withdrawn. each of the planning considerations.
Appropriate corps staff elements must estimate To ensure success in a high-threat AD environ-
effective and timely procedures for the joint plan- ment, corps deep aviation operations must be fully
ning and coordination of Army aviation operations. supported by elements of all the BOS. Long dis-
The focus of Army aviation in deep, close, and rear tances traversed over hostile territory will demand
operations requires continuous dialogue to synchro- heavy emphasis on J-SEAD.
nize joint and multinational warfighting capabili-
ties. Commanders must carefully synchronize the use
of cannon artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems
Joint planning and coordination are required to (MLRS), and Army tactical missile systems
minimize conflicts, duplication of effort, and fratri- (ATACMS) to suppress and destroy enemy forces
cide. Aviation operational planning considerations along the route or in the target area. The commander
include, but are not limited to, the following areas: must also plan to use USAF electronic warfare
capabilities as part of a deep attack package.
Thorough IPB (terrain analysis, route engage-
ment area (EA), battle position selection). In a more permissive AD environment, or when
available reaction time limits planning time for a
Intelligence (reconnaissance, target acquisition, joint operation, the corps commander may elect to
mission planning, execution). conduct a deep operation with his own attack and
Command and control procedures (forward/rear- CS assets.
ward passage of lines, battle handover, FLOT Contingency planning facilitated by predictive,
penetration, control measures required, commun- timely intelligence will allow the staff to prepare
ications support). force packages in accordance with the commander’s
Fire support. intent. This will allow a quick reaction to an execu-
tion fragmentary order (FRAGO) that can set the
Airspace deconfliction. operation in motion in minutes, rather than hours.
Sustainment requirements (Classes III and V, The corps may also use its assault and medium
recovery procedures, transportation, reconstitu- helicopters to conduct air assault of infantry troops
tion. in a deep operation or artillery raid. Such operations
Joint synchronization (CAS, J-SEAD). could include raids into the enemy’s rear area or the
seizing of critical terrain or facilities in advance of
Engineer support (pick-up zone (PZ), landing the corps’ attack, or attacks by fire using light
zone (LZ), FARP preparation). artillery placed temporarily behind enemy lines.
2-14
FM 100-15
Deep air assaults will need the same types of pro- The corps artillery commander is the corps fire sup
tection measures as for deep attack operations. port coordinator (FSCOORD). He is responsible for—
The use of aviation resources in corps deep op- Recommending fire support priorities.
erations will almost always result insignificant risk. Advising the corps commander on the best use of
The commander must carefully weigh this risk available fire support resources.
against the expected results and their impact on the
total corps battle. Developing the tire support plan.
A successfully conducted deep operation could Implementing the approved fire support plan.
be decisive to the corps battle. Because of its unique The FSCOORD also ensures that—
ability to move quickly over a wide area and to
respond quickly during both day and night, the Fires support the corps commander’s battle plan,
aviation brigade is well-suited for conducting corps including weighting the main effort.
rear operations. All aspects of the corps battle receive fire support.
Timely receipt of intelligence data presents the All fire support means are fully synchronized.
opportunity for attack helicopter elements to engage
enemy air assault formations before or during inser- The fire support effort is sustained throughout the
tion. In addition, attack helicopters may be the most battle.
responsive means to deal with enemy armored for- (See FM 6-20-30 for additional information on fire
mations in the rear area. The brigade’s assault heli- support of corps operations.)
copters provide a rapid and effective means of
moving ground combat troops to engage threats in
the corps rear area. Field Artillery (FA)
In the close operation the corps will use much of
Fire Support its field artillery to augment the fires of committed
divisions and separate maneuver brigades. Nor-
Fire support at corps level is the collective and mally, each committed division will receive an FA
coordinated use of FA, EA, Army aviation, USAF, brigade of from three to five cannon or rocket
and, when available, USMC and USN air assets in battalions.
support of the corps battle. Where available, naval Field artillery units will receive tactical missions
surface fire support also supports corps operations. in support of divisions and other maneuver ele-
(See Appendix A for planning factors.) ments. Reinforcing (R) or general support-reinforc-
Using Army aviation assets in a fire support role ing (GS-R) to division artillery are examples of such
presents unique planning and control considera- missions.
tions. Coordination is required between the aviation In addition to these artillery battalions, the artil-
brigade and the corps artillery. This coordination lery brigade headquarters, if attached, gives the
normally occurs in the fire support cell or in the division an additional artillery headquarters. This
DOCC of the main CP. facilitates artillery C², especially when the division
The commander employs fire support means is responsible for a large area.
throughout the depth of the battlefield to comple- The corps normally retains some field artillery
ment his scheme of maneuver. Fire support is most under its own control for use in a counterfire role
effective when its effects are massed. during close operations and in execution of corps
deep operations. Use of corps-controlled artillery in
The commander uses fire support to delay, dis- the close operation could include-–
rupt, or limit the enemy by destroying, neutralizing,
and suppressing enemy weapons, formations, and Counterfires to suppress enemy artillery.
facilities. Effective integration of fire support into Creating weak points or gaps in enemy defenses.
the combined arms operation is a decisive factor in
the corps battle. Support of JAAT operations.
2-15
FM 100-15
Blunting enemy penetrations or counterattacks. multinational forces may be necessary. (See JP 3-51
for specific procedures.)
Protecting the flanks of a corps counterattack or
spoiling attack. Electronic attack in support of the corps close
operation involves jamming key enemy C², fire
Suppression of enemy air defenses. support, intelligence, communications, and target
Field artillery will support the corps’ deep opera- acquisition systems. Jamming should occur during
tion by attacking enemy weapons, formations, sup- critical stages of the battle when degradation and
plies, and facilities that are capable of influencing disruption will be of the most benefit to the corps.
the close operation. Because of the vast array of Examples of electronic jamming in the corps close
possible targets in the enemy’s rear area, it may be operation include-
impossible to effectively attack all of them. There- Disrupting enemy counterattack forces.
fore, it is important that each target attacked repre-
sents the best possible payoff in terms of its Disrupting enemy command and fire support
relationship to the overall success of the corps battle. communications during corps counterattacks or
spoiling attacks.
The corps normally retains control of all of its
surface-to-surface missiles and some of its multiple- Disrupting enemy command nets as the corps
rocket fires rather than allocating them to subordi- covering force withdraws through the main battle
nate maneuver units. However, higher echelons area (MBA).
may impose controls over the corps’ longer range Disrupting enemy ADA communications and tar-
fire support systems, including the use of corps get acquisition as part of J-SEAD.
systems to conduct operational fires or in support of
air interdiction. Electronic jamming in support of the corps’ deep
operation will be limited to critical times and places
Field artillery support of the corps’ rear operation on the battlefield, as in the close operation. Exam-
must include at least on-order missions to provide ples of electronic jamming in the corps’ deep opera-
fire support to the units engaged with Level II or III tion include—
threats. It may also include pre-positioning some
artillery units in the corps’ rear that are solely com- Disrupting enemy ADA during attack helicopter
mitted to supporting the corps’ rear operation. or air interdiction of a corps deep target.
Suppressing enemy air defenses during airborne,
Electronic Attack (EA) air assault, or air extraction operations.
Electronic attack is one of the three components Disrupting enemy C² nets during deep maneuver
of electronic warfare (EW). The other two compo- operations.
nents are electronic warfare support (ES) and elec- Electronic jamming in support of the corps rear
tronic protection (EP). Electronic attack uses operation is limited. One example would be the use
electromagnetic energy to attack an enemy’s com- of jammers to mask critical corps communications
bat capability. It combines nondestructive actions to from interception and/or location by the enemy.
degrade or neutralize targets. Such actions might
include electromagnetic jamming and/or deception
and directed-energy (DE) devices. They might also Air Support
include the use of the destructive capabilities of
antiradiation missiles (ARMs) and DE weapons To achieve the necessary degree of joint coordi-
systems. nation, the Army and Air Force provide qualified
personnel to work with each others’ C² organiza-
The corps possesses no organic jamming capabil- tions. The Army provides a liaison element, the
ity. As such, corps EW planners must rely on sub- BCE. The BCE works with the supporting USAF
ordinate and joint EA systems to carry out the corps air operations center (AOC) on the ground. The
EA concept. (A J-SEAD operation using USAF and BCE works with the tactical air control center
subordinate division EA systems is one example.) (TACC) when afloat, if a naval officer is the
In addition, coordination of EA operations with JFACC. The supporting USAF provides an air
2-16
FM 100-15
support operations center (ASOC). The AF also Air interdiction operations destroy, neutralize, or
provides liaison elements, called tactical air control delay the enemy’s military potential before he can
parties (TACP), to work with each of the corps. effectively use it against friendly forces. Air inter-
diction occurs at such distance from friendly forces
The BCE understands each corps commander’s that detailed integration of each air mission with the
priorities and guidance and possesses the necessary fire and movement of friendly forces is not required.
knowledge of the battlefield situation. It processes Accurate and effective attack of targets tensor even
each corps’ requests for air support, monitors and hundreds of kilometers into the enemy’s rear can
interprets the land battle situation, and exchanges have a decisive effect on the corp’s battle.
current intelligence through face-to-face coordina-
tion with elements of the AOC. (See Chapter 4 for The higher commander may distribute AI assets
details.) to the corps commander. Normally, however, the
corps commander may only nominate targets for the
Air support of the corps close operation occurs air commander to attack.
primarily through CAS by USAF, USMC, and USN
aircraft. Close air support is defined as air attacks The execution of AI is the responsibility of the air
against hostile surface targets in close proximity to commander alone. Air interdiction in support of the
friendly forces that require detailed integration with Army commander disrupts the continuity of the
fire and movement of supported ground forces. enemy’s operations. Objectives may include—
Although the corps has control over some of the Reducing the enemy’s capability to employ
available CAS sorties, most sorties fall under the follow-on forces.
control of maneuver units for incorporation into Preventing the enemy from countering friendly
their fire support planning. Shifting CAS sorties
from one maneuver unit to another may become maneuver.
necessary to maximize their effect. Reducing the enemy’s ability to resupply his
The combination of CAS with attack helicopters committed forces.
and artillery can produce a highly effective JAAT. Although it is possible to nominate AI targets by
The corps requires support from the USAF with specific unit, time, and place of attack, it is generally
intelligence collection, jamming, and deception to more effective to describe to the air commander the
support close operations with airborne standoff desired results or objectives. This use of mission-
systems. type targets allows the air commander greater flexi-
bility in planning and executing the attack.
Airlift may also be a part of the air support of the However, commanders can recommend or request
corps’ close operation. Airlift may involve the air- specific munitions against a target particularly vul-
drop, extraction, or air-landing of ground forces and nerable to that munition. An example of a mission-
supplies when supporting the corps battle or when type target is, “Delay the 20th tank division east of
evacuating casualties. the Orange River until 271800ZOCT— ."
Air support of the corps’ deep operation can The corps’ AI targeting process does not stop with
include reconnaissance and surveillance, AI, EW, nomination of the targets or mission-type requests.
and airlift missions. It may also provide CAS in Refinement of target intelligence is continuous from
support of a deep maneuver force. the time the target nomination is made, to when the
The USAF or USN aviation conduct air recon- target is detected and tracked, and until it is finally
naissance and surveillance operations, which the attacked.
corps requests, to provide current information on The staff must plan intelligence to support the
specific targets. Air reconnaissance and surveil- BDA. The corps and USAF must share close and
lance uses visual and/or recording sensors to gain continuous intelligence, particularly for targets that
information on the disposition, composition, loca- have limited dwell time or cannot be accurately
tion, activities, and movements of enemy forces as located until just prior to attack.
well as his LOC and logistic activities. This can be
an important part of the detection step of the decide, The corps requires intelligence and EW support
detect, deliver, and assess targeting process. from the USAF for deep operations. The USAF’s
2-17
FM 100-15
multiple systems enhance the corps’ operations campaign plan. The corps could use nuclear
whether those operations are deep fires or deep weapons to-
maneuver by ground forces or Army aviation.
Create a window for future offensive action.
Army aviation’s deep maneuver will receive- Destroy, slow, or reduce reinforcing forces.
Electronic warfare support from the USAF. Create the time and space for maneuver against
Combat air patrol operations support. attacking echelons.
Destroy high-payoff targets.
Support from airborne standoff platforms for
communications between the helicopter attack Force dispersal of enemy units.
force and its parent unit or the corps’ main CP. The corps’ plan that supports the nuclear planning
Airlift may also support the corps’ deep operation of higher headquarters is called a nuclear option. An
by transporting an airborne element deep into the option is the basic element for providing nuclear
enemy’s rear or by conducting aerial resupply of a support. It is a discrete grouping of nuclear targets,
deep maneuver force. Air support of the corps’ rear Operational-level and corps commanders for-
operation may involve airlifting critical supplies or mally recommend nuclear targets as part of an op-
augmentation units and conducting the counter air tion. It has specific yields and is planned for a
campaign against enemy air attack. While CAS is specific geographic area, during a short time, and
not usually distributed to units in the corps’ rear, it for a specific purpose.
may be diverted from other missions to help counter
a Level II or III threat. Planning an option begins with mission receipt.
There are four phases in nuclear-option planning:
Weapons of Mass Destruction 1. Prewartime contingency planning, which is
based on the type of operation and attendant
Nuclear Weapons. The potential for nuclear war- constraints.
fare demands unique considerations for corps op-
erations. Commanders must understand the 2. Wartime planning, which supplements peace- time
environment the nuclear battlefield creates. They planning-and is based on controls and constraints
must factor battlefield nuclear warfare and nuclear from higher headquarters, terrain, and actual
target nomination into the design and conduct of threat intelligence.
operational and tactical plans. The effects of nuclear 3. Refinements to wartime planning, which meet
weapons can— changing situations and are used to update an option
Alter the balance between maneuver and fire- and are based on the latest threat intelligence.
power. 4. Refinements to approved options, which are
Change the battle tempo and the courses of cam- based on the situation just prior to target
paigns and battles. nomination.
Corps planners develop each option in concert
Hamper communications and diminish the effec- with the campaign plan and transmit it to higher
tiveness of centralized C². headquarters for approval. Throughout the process
Create a more lethal battlefield environment that each option is treated as a single entity.
would strain support operations. Only the President, as a member of the National
Political and strategic objectives rather than tac- Command Authorities (NCA), can authorize the use
(release) of US nuclear weapons. The NCA grants
tical effects will likely guide the employment of release through the US military chain of command
nuclear weapons. Not in all circumstances, but in to the combatant commander.
some, the corps may be involved in planning the use
of nuclear weapons. In such situations, the corps A corps commander will not be involved in re-
will nominate nuclear weapons targets to achieve ceiving release messages. He should, however, re-
operational and tactical objectives that support the ceive operational messages alerting him to the
2-18
requirements for nuclear nominations. If the corps participates in J-SEAD when corps-level operations
commander feels release of nuclear weapons is require it or when the higher headquarters directs.
feasible, he may ask the CINC to request release. This could be the case during a corps-level attack
helicopter operation, an air assault, or an airborne
The corps also receives strike warnings operation.
(STRIKWARN) from higher headquarters. The
corps uses formal STRIKWARN procedures to J-SEAD at corps level could involve—
warn lower and adjacent units. (Refer to FM 100-30 Corps artillery, to fire on enemy air defenses.
for details.)
Observation helicopters, to visually locate and
Nuclear Mitigation Techniques. Mitigation adjust fires.
techniques fall into three categories: actions before
an attack, actions during an attack, and actions after Corps EW elements, to locate enemy AD radars
an attack. Actions before an attack include long- and communications and to jam communications.
range planning, training, and maintenance. Actions Combat air participation may involve-
during an attack include all protective measures
taken to mitigate the effects of a nuclear detonation. Air reconnaissance and surveillance to locate the
Actions after an attack include recovery from the enemy.
effects and resumption of operations in a nuclear
environment. Airborne jamming.
Aircraft to attack enemy AD units.
Biological Weapons. The US has renounced the
use of biological weapons. Biological warfare is the J-SEAD in corps deep operations supports deep
intentional use, by an enemy, of biological agents attack helicopter, AASLT, and airborne operations.
or toxins to cause death and disease among person- It also helps protect aircraft conducting AI.
nel, animals, and plants. More rarely, it can be used
to deteriorate materiel. Germs can be delivered di- The first step of a successful deep air strike may
rectly, such as by artillery or aircraft spray, or indi- have to be an early and aggressive J-SEAD. Many
rectly through a vector, such as a flea or tick. Toxins of the same resources will participate in close J-
act in the field much like chemical agents. (See FM SEAD, with combat air probably playing a greater
3-100 for more information.) role because of the extended ranges.
A probable Level III threat to a corps rear area
Chemical. The US has renounced the use of might consist of either an airborne or heliborne
chemical weapons. Chemical agents come in var- assault with accompanying ADA systems. Com-
ied forms: gas, liquid, or aerosol. They can be manders must consider J-SEAD when responding
delivered by mines, artillery, rockets, bombs, or to this threat.
aircraft spray. Commanders must consider how
enemy chemical agent effects may alter their op-
erations. (See FM 3-100 for more information.) Air Defense (AD)
Air defense includes all measures designed to
Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense nullify or reduce the effectiveness of attack or sur-
(J-SEAD) veillance by hostile aerial platforms to preserve
combat power and maintain friendly freedom of
The ASOC provides the necessary interface with action. The Army uses offensive operations, defen-
the USAF to plan, request, and coordinate J-SEAD sive operations, and passive countermeasures to
operations in support of the corps. Elements of the accomplish its objectives. Air defense operations
corps play an important role in J-SEAD. The corps include a careful, thorough IPB and the use of—
plans and conducts localized suppression to protect
aircraft that must penetrate the FLOT and maneuver Maneuver forces and SOF.
in the enemy’s rear area. Air defense artillery fires.
Subordinate maneuver units conduct J-SEAD in Air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles.
the corps close operation in support of their own
CAS and attack helicopter operations. The corps Combat aircraft (Army and other joint forces).
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engineer support to corps aviation units for their Engineers support deep operations in the same
tactical deployment. Bridge companies can also manner as for the close fight, but their focus is to
off-load their bridges so they can be used as trans- keep open ground routes, drop zones (DZs), LZs,
portation assets. and other means of access deep forces need to
sustain the fight. This requires rapid clearing of
Countermobility supports close operations by re- remotely emplaced mines and repair of critical dam-
stricting enemy movement with the least effect on age. Engineers support the force’s countermobility
friendly maneuver. Engineers add space and time to efforts by terrain analysis, countermobility target
the battle by restricting the enemy’s ability to ma- nomination and advice, and by coordinating all
neuver large formations. The aggregate effect of countermobility systems into the deep operation’s
obstacles at the corps level supports the maneuver countermobility plan.
of its division and brigade-size forces while degrad-
ing the enemy’s ability to maneuver. Engineers assist rear operations with terrain
analysis and countermobility planning. They install
Corps obstacle planning primarily centers on ob- synchronized obstacles to block critical avenues and
stacle control. The corps develops obstacle restric- to deny facilities. They plan and execute situational
tions to ensure that division obstacles do not obstacles, when necessary, to block and isolate
interfere with the corps’ scheme of maneuver and threat forces operating in the rear. When time and
future operations. The corps also provides obstacle resources permit, corps engineers perform surviv-
emplacement authority to ACRs and separate bri- ability work in support of the corps’ rear operation.
gades using obstacle zones. Divisions may not place This work may involve digging in critical CSS
obstacles within restricted areas without the corps’ facilities.
approval.
General engineering support of the corps’ rear
The corps engineer provides advice on the em- operation keeps LOCS open and in good repair.
ployment of all scatterable mines in the corps area Corps engineers build, maintain, and repair roads
in support of the commander’s concept for obstacle and airfields. As time permits, they replace tactical
employment. The use of scatterable mines gives the bridges with more permanent fixed bridges. They
corps the ability to quickly place an obstacle in the coordinate with higher echelons and HN agencies
face of an enemy to turn, fix, block, or disrupt his to keep railroads, waterways, and transportation
advance or withdrawal. Also, by carefully monitor- nodes in operation.
ing and controlling emplacement and self-destruct
times, the corps can rapidly attack through a recently Combat engineer units have the mission to fight
created gap in the friendly obstacle system. as infantry when committed by the corps com-
mander. In planning to combat a Level II threat in
The corps commander is the approval authority the corps rear, engineer units may provide the com-
for the employment of all scatterable mines in the mander with an option as a response force. The
corps area. He may delegate the authority to employ commander must carefully weigh use of engineers
long self-destruct mines down to division and, with as infantry against the associated loss of effective
the corps’ concurrence, the division can delegate it engineer support.
down to brigade level. He may delegate the author-
ity to employ short self-destruct mines down as far A commander reorganizing an engineer battalion
as battalion level. The use of these mines must be as infantry must be cognizant of weapons system
well-coordinated so that a lower echelon does not and protection limitations of engineer units. He
inadvertently place an obstacle in the path of a future must also consider augmentation with mortars,
corps operation. antitank (AT) systems, fire support teams, commu-
nications, and so on.
Engineer survivability support of the corps’ close
operation consists of aiding corps units in their In war and OOTW environmental issues are a
survivability operations. Units dig in, according to major concern of the Army. With emerging new
the corps commander’s priority, directing typical laws and regulations, they will continue to have a
high-priority efforts toward corps artillery, ADA, growing impact on Army operations. Federal, state,
aviation, and key C² facilities. local, and HN governments have laws and
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FM 100-15
regulations to protect human health and natural and In the corps rear area, ammunition and petroleum
cultural resources from environmental degradation. battalions support divisions with GS ammunition
and bulk fuel. The habitual support relationship
Unit leaders must understand the laws and know between corps GS units and corps transportation
what actions to take. They must also ensure that unit units ensures timely distribution of ammunition and
personnel have the proper training and that they petroleum to the divisions.
comply with all requirements. (See FM 5-100-15
for a detailed discussion.) The CSGs will provide supply, services, and DS
maintenance to units within their geographic area of
responsibility, with one CSG per committed divi-
Combat Service Support (CSS) sion sector and one supporting the corps rear. The
Combat service support of corps operations con- COSCOM’s transportation group provides corps-
sists of manning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving, wide transportation.
and sustaining the soldier and his systems. The Nondivisional DS units receive their support (less
corps must totally integrate these CSS functions into Class VIII) from functional GS units. Aircraft main-
the planning and conduct of operations to provide tenance units support corps aviation assets. Estab-
the commander a combat multiplier with which he lishing and maintaining adequate LOC is necessary
can weight the battle. The commander and his staff because of—
must synchronize CSS operations with all other
operating systems to provide effective, continuous The large volume of supplies and materiel re-
support when and where necessary. quired to sustain the corps.
The finance group, personnel group, and the The number of casualties requiring movement for
COSCOM are responsible for providing CSS to the more definitive medical treatment.
corps. Within the COSCOM are— Movement of mail and replacement personnel.
The functional control centers (such as the MMC Reparable equipment requiring evacuation.
and the MCC).
Air Force support to the corps’ logistic operations
The medical brigade. includes air movement of Class IX repair parts via
The transportation group (if there are three or air LOC (ALOC); movement of high priority, low-
more fictional transportation battalions). density Class V products; and movement of Class
III supplies as requested by the corps. (See FM
Corps support groups (CSGs), including multi- 100-10 and FM 100-16 for discussions of CSS
functional corps support battalions (CSBs). linkages into the corps from higher supporting
echelons.)
The COSCOM supports corps units whether they
are operating in the division area or corps rear area. Host-nation support may provide much of the
It provides a CSB from the CSG forward to provide corps’ required logistic support. Organized units or
direct support to corps units operating in the division a contractor from the HN civilian sector can provide
area. It also provides liaison officers (LNOs) to HN support. The logistics civil augmentation pro-
work with the division support command gram (LOGCAP) can also augment HN support.
(DISCOM) and the corps units operating in the Civilian contractor support, either US, HN, or other
division area. The CSG usually assigns LOs who country, can be provided to either the host nation or
normally collocate with DISCOM headquarters. directly to the US. LOGCAP is designed primarily
for use where no multilateral or bilateral agreements
The nearest medical treatment facility (MTF) or treaties exist.
provides medical support for corps units operating
in the division area without regard for unit affili- In addition to supporting the corps, the COSCOM
ation. The task-organized corps support battalion may need to provide specified support to either a
provides other logistic support tailored to provide joint or multinational force, normally when the
supply, services, and maintenance. This element corps is the senior Army command in the theater of
will have attached to it all of the logistic units needed operations. The types of support that COSCOM can
to support corps units as well as the divisions. provide are fuel, food, water, common ammunition
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FM 100-15
items, field services support, transportation, and maneuver units transiting through or temporarily
combat health support. located in the corps rear, and units conducting tac-
Manning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving, and tical operations in the corps rear area. Of greater
importance may be the potential for disruption of
sustaining the soldier and his systems are logistics
functions necessary to preserve the fighting strength CSS of close and deep operations.
of divisional and nondivisional units. Close opera- The corps must plan for the protection of key
tions are the largest consumer of supplies (especially sustainment facilities and the LOCS identified to
fuel and ammunition) and producer of casualties and support committed maneuver units. The com-
damaged equipment and weapons systems. mander must position CSS units with redundancy
The key to success in sustaining the close opera- and flexibility in mind and must prepare to relocate
tion is prior planning. Forward pre-positioning of units should the tactical situation dictate. Airfields
supplies and CSS units, including medical treatment in the corps rear area will allow the delivery of
units, the selection of adequate supply routes and ALOC supplies and replacement personnel as well
alternates, and measures to protect CSS resources, as provide for evacuating the wounded and noncom-
is critical. batants from the AO.
Air Force and Army assets can provide aerial As with the other operating systems, force-
delivery of critical supplies by airdrop, container projection operations may require a CSS structure
delivery system (CDS), low-altitude parachute- to allow selected logistic management functions to
extraction system (LAPES), or airlanding as well as be accomplished from CONUS or from a forward-
air evacuation of wounded, on request to support presence location. By deploying only those func-
close operations. They must provide continuous, tional capabilities absolutely necessary, the corps
adequate support to forces in the close fight while can use split-based operations as a means of provid-
conserving assets and planning for future ing CSS to the force.
operations.
Deep operations may involve providing CSS to a The deployed CSS cell consists of personnel and
ground force before its organic CSS units link up equipment in modular components that provide a
with it or before the ground force returns to an area conduit for electronic transmission of logistic data
that is not subject to interdiction of the LOC. If the and message and voice communications traffic. The
corps must provide CSS to the force, arming, fuel- rear CSS cell continues to support the stay-behind
ing, fixing, and providing medical support are major force while concurrently interfacing with deployed
concerns. cells to provide the required support forward. Split-
The most critical aspect of providing support is to based operations apply to all logistic functions.
maintain a secure LOC, either air or ground, to Planners assess the capabilities and assets available
ensure the force receives timely and responsive in the theater and determine how to supplement
support. Air Force and Army delivery of critical them without unnecessary duplication.
supplies to forces conducting deep operations en-
hances those operations and helps maintain their
tempo. Positioning support units forward may re- Command and Control (C²)
duce response time.
In most cases, support of deep operations in- Command and control is the exercise of authority
volves the sustainment of aviation and artillery as- and direction by a properly designated commander
sets. The support of these assets normally will not over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the
involve the forward movement of additional corps mission. Command and control functions occur
logistic assets. Corps logistic units routinely operate through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,
in the division area to provide support to corps units communications, facilities, and procedures a com-
operating there. mander employs in planning, directing, coordinat-
ing, and controlling forces in the accomplishment
Sustainment of corps rear operations includes the of the mission. (See Chapter 4 for a detailed
support of CS and CSS units in the corps rear, discussion.)
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FM 100-15
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FM 100-15
The theater CINC must approve any PSYOP ac- Command (TASOSC). PSYOP units have no or-
tions the corps takes to target specific audiences. ganic air assets. Air dissemination of leaflets and
The approval process differs slightly during war and loudspeaker broadcasts require that the tactical
OOTW. In either case, the theater CINC may dele- commander allocate air assets to support PSYOP
gate authority for specific portions or products of missions.
the PSYOP campaign to a JTF or PSYOP POTF
commander. The corps coordinates the approval Because of PSYOP’s extreme sensitivity, em-
and dissemination of all PSYOP in the theater with ploying this asset requires care. Target audiences,
the unified command J3 and remains the responsi- themes, campaigns, and objectives normally require
bility of the CINC. approval at the CINC level or higher. PSYOP is
generally not employed against allied or friendly
PSYOP units develop and disseminate propa- civilians or military.
ganda designed to lower the morale and combat
efficiency and to fragment the loyalty of enemy Tactical PSYOP units are not normally assigned
forces throughout the AO. They design propaganda in support of allied or friendly civilians or military.
to build support among the civil population for Tactical PSYOP units can assist the host nation in
friendly combat operations and to reduce or neutral- providing information to its civilian or military popu-
ize civil support of enemy combat operations. They lation. Training teams can also help allies develop
counter enemy propaganda aimed at undermining tactical PSYOP capabilities.
friendly deep operations.
At the corps level, the tactical PSYOP battalion Civil Affairs Operations
supporting the corps can only disseminate and make
recommendations on propaganda. Production is the The CA mission is to support the military com-
responsibility of PSYOP units at EAC. mander’s relationship with governmental and non-
governmental agencies, other services, forces from
PSYOP units may persuade isolated and by- other nations, and international agencies. Civil af-
passed enemy forces to surrender, thus freeing fairs personnel meet with civil authorities and the
friendly combat forces to continue the attack. civilian population, promote mission legitimacy,
PSYOP print and broadcast capabilities can facili- and enhance the military effectiveness of the force’s
tate CA and MP efforts to reduce civil interference mission.
with military operations through refugee control
and information programs. Civil affairs units, like PSYOP units, routinely
work at the tactical level and are normally assigned
PSYOP units cooperate with CA and MP unit at corps and division level. The corps almost always
operations designed to control the local population operates in areas of the world where the impact of
and refugees, with the intent of facilitating military military operations on the civil population is a sig-
operations and obtaining the willing cooperation of nificant consideration.
the inhabitants. Their efforts may include reorient-
ing and educating the civil population in liberated The CA unit most often designated to support a
or occupied territory, providing information on the corps is a CA brigade. The brigade consists of
military situation, and limiting the psychological organic language teams, functional specialty teams,
effects of enemy deep operations in the friendly rear and tactical planning teams.
area. Specialized PSYOP units can also support
corps EPW camps by helping to control EPWs and From these teams is formed the civil-military cell
collecting intelligence. (CMC). The CMC, usually in the corps rear CP, is
manned by both assigned G5 section personnel and
PSYOP units have some unique requirements that supporting personnel.
often can only be supported from outside the normal
support channels. These requirements include mas- The CMC assists the G5 in preparing and main-
sive amounts of paper and maintenance of special- taining the CA estimate, annex, and periodic report
ized heavy print equipment. To meet these as well as numerous overlays and data that the corps
requirements, the corps coordinates support through tactical operations center (CTOC) cells use. Such
the Theater Army Special Operations Support data depict locations of foreign nation resources,
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FM 100-15
key public facilities and monuments, and cultural Civil affairs units locate and identify population
and/or religious shrines that should be protected. centers in the corps AI, and they anticipate popula-
tion movements that will occur in response to future
The CMC also provides the G5 with CMO input combat operations. Civil affairs units cooperate
to corps orders. It also recommends and prepares with local authorities, MPs, and PSYOP units to
CA force-allocation changes. In peacetime, the plan the movement of displaced local civilians and
CMC provides support to the G5 in planning and to minimize interference with close combat opera-
coordinating the preparation of CA annexes to tions. The unit’s efforts focus on control of dislo-
corps operations plans (OPLANS) and contin- cated civilians and evacuation of noncombatants
gency plans. The CMC also helps coordinate from the battle area. During retrograde operations,
exercise activities. CA units identify and locate local resources and
The CA brigade provides CA functional expertise facilities the force must evacuate or destroy to avoid
to man the corps civil-military operation center their use by the enemy.
(CMOC). The corps CMOC, under the G5’s staff Civil affairs units identify, locate, and assist in the
supervision, assists the corps commander and staff. acquisition of local resources, facilities, and support
The CMOC serves as the primary interface between that the corps requires to accomplish its mission.
the corps and— They coordinate and administer HN support agree-
Local civilian populations. ments and other forms of foreign nation support.
They assist rear area commanders with the control
Humanitarian organizations. and movement of dislocated civilians through the
corps area, the coordination of rear operations plans
Nongovernmental organizations (NGO). with local authorities, and the establishment of civil-
Private voluntary organizations, UN, and other military relations with existing local civil authorities
international agencies. and agencies.
In enemy territory, or in friendly territory where
Multinational military forces. there is a weak or ineffective civil government, CA
Foreign nation authorities. units may, at the direction of the NCA, establish a
temporary civil administration until existing politi-
Other US government agencies. cal, economic, and social conditions stabilize.
When the CMOC receives requests for assistance The corps G5 must see that CMO are thoroughly
from these various agencies, it-passes them to the integrated into all corps operations. The corps com-
CMC for staff action by the G5. mander will decide after his mission analysis where
to place his civil-military cell.
The commander’s mission analyses determines
the CMOC’s location. However, it should be acces- There are operations where CMO will be central
sible to the various organizations with which it to the corps’ mission and the G5 will be close to
coordinates. plans, intelligence, and current operations. For ex-
ample, in extreme situations, it may be necessary for
At the tactical level, CA units facilitate CMO by the military to execute some of the functions the US
providing interface between US military forces and country team normally performs. Higher intensity
HN or foreign authorities or military forces. Civil combat operations may not require the G5 to be
affairs units help the commander develop COAs immediately present. The G5 needs to be where he
that minimize the likelihood and/or effects of civil can coordinate all CMO and still be appropriately
interference with military operations. They locate responsive to the commander’s guidance and the
and identify significant arts, monuments, and ar- commander’s staff’s need for integration.
chives throughout the corps area, and they prepare
plans and directives to safeguard these cultural
properties. They also review plans and operations PUBLIC AFFAIRS (PA)
with respect to applicable laws and agreements and
help the commander, as required, to meet his moral The PA mission is to fulfill the military’s obliga-
and legal obligations. tion to keep the American people and the members
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FM 100-15
of the armed forces informed and to help establish well as to effectively communicate the policies,
the conditions that lead to confidence in America’s resolve, and actions through US and international
armed forces and their conduct of operations in news media. The staff must coordinate public af-
peace, conflict, and war. fairs PSYOP through the planning process and
continually exchange information during current
Corps commanders conduct PA operations that operations.
can affect strategic, operational, and tactical levels
of war. Such operations require special relationships
with joint, combined, interagency, and nongovern- Although PA, CA, and PSYOP each have discrete
mental organizations at various levels. audiences with tailored messages, there is a growing
information overlap between their audiences. The
The commander employs and adjusts PA activi- credibility of all three is lost if their messages con-
ties to inform the American public and his force as tradict one another.
2-29
Chapter 3
THE CORPS IN FORCE-PROJECTION
OPERATIONS
Future conflicts will most likely occur in regions more than 115,000 soldiers (approximately 7,500
of the world in which the US does not have signifi- from reserve components) and more than 145
cant ground forces. When a conflict threatens US Apache attack helicopters, 294 155-millimeter
national interests, the NCA may direct the regional (mm) self-propelled (SP) howitzers, 700 tanks,
unified CINC to commit US military forces to re- 1,000 armored personnel carriers (APC), and hun-
solve the situation. Any US Army corps must be dreds of other major items of equipment and thou-
ready to respond to the situation. This capability is sands of ancillary pieces.
referred to as force projection and is the essence of The key to success in such force-projection op-
US national military strategy. erations is synchronization of land, sea, air, SOF,
The US Army conducts OOTW throughout the and space capabilities. Force-projection operations
world. Combat service support units, in particular, are inherently joint operations. They usually begin
are heavily tasked to support ongoing OOTW mis- as a contingency operation; for example, as a rapid
sions, although combat and CS units may also be response to a crisis in either war or OOTW
employed. situations.
The nonavailability of corps units in support of Field Manual 100-5 describes force-projection
OOTW impacts specific forces available to the operations in eight stages (mobilization, pre-
corps for the execution of OPLANs for other re- deployment activity, deployment, entry operations,
gional contingencies. Units that habitually associate operations, war termination and postconflict opera-
with the corps may not be available for use in a tions, predeployment and reconstitution, and demo-
specific force-projection mission. Desert Shield is bilization) (Figure 3-2).
an example of a successful force-projection
operation.
Force-projection operations for Desert Shield
were initially based on a CONPLAN and draft
OPLAN developed as part of DOD’s deliberate
planning process. The OPLAN was translated into
an OPORD that provided deployment instructions
and priorities to Central Command’s service com-
ponents. It provided tasking direction to supporting
unified commands. The order also requested sup-
port from other government agencies.
Phase I of Desert Shield began on 7 August 1990
and lasted until mid-November. This phase’s design
was to deploy enough forces to deter further Iraqi
aggression; to prepare for defensive operations; and
to conduct combined exercises and training with the
multinational forces in theater. During this phase,
US strategic lift moved an ACR and four divisions
into the region. (See Figure 3-1, page 3-2.)
Logistic and administrative units were also
moved into the area to support not only Army forces,
but those of other US services and nations as well.
This effort ultimately involved the deployment of
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FM 100-15
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FM 100-15
mission-essential task list (METL) and readiness (ASCC) (Eighth US Army, US Army Europe
standing operating procedures (RSOP) reflect the (USAREUR), and USARPAC).
anticipation that the corps will participate in force-
projection operations. All RC units are assigned to either an Army
Reserve Command (ARCOM) or to a functional
The corps conducts continuous IPB of potential General Officer Command (GOCOM). An AR-
contingency areas and maintains its equipment and COM, commanded by a major general, is an organi-
contingency stocks at a high degree of readiness. zation with command of RC units located in a
Corps units conduct combat-related, mission-essen- specific area. Most GOCOMs are organized on a
tial training that includes deployment tasks relevant fictional (engineer, MP, CHS), rather than a re-
to anticipated unit missions. gional, basis.
If assigned a primary region or country of focus, The corps, with NG state area commands
the corps may conduct more specific training tar- (STARCs) and RC ARCOMs and GOCOMs, ap-
geted on the threat, culture, language, religion, and proves the METL of RC units having either a formal
geography of the targeted area. Normally the corps training affiliation or war-trace alignment to the
will rehearse OPLANs and CONPLANs during corps. That process, and the corps’ provision of
command post exercises (CPX). limited training resources to selected RC units, pro-
vides the corps an opportunity to influence the train-
The Army consists of the active component (AC), ing of selected RC units before mobilization.
the National Guard (NG), the Reserve Component
(RC), and the civilian workforce. Today’s AC struc-
ture requires RC assistance to meet the demands of MOBILIZATION
a major regional contingency.
Mobilization is the act of preparing for war or
During combat operations the corps operates with other emergencies through the assembling and or-
a mixture of AC and RC units. However, in peace- ganizing of resources. Corps mobilize after they
time it does not have command authority over non- receive a JOPES alert or warning order transmitted
federalized NG or RC units. through the Global Command and Control System
(GCCS).
The NG, in its role as the militia, is the nation’s
federal reserve. All NG units are commanded by The corps mobilization process entails a number
their respective governors until federalized by of activities to bring corps units to a previously
Presidential executive order. They can act as either determined state of readiness. Corps-level mobili-
a state or federally activated force to ensure domes- zation activities tend to duplicate corps-echelon ac-
tic tranquility. tivities it conducts during the predeployment and
deployment stages of force projection. Activities
The RC is structured under the Department of the include—
Army. The commanding general (CG) of Supervising individual equipment preparations
FORSCOM has command of all assigned RC troop that MSCs conduct, including assistance to unit
program units (TPUS) in CONUS, except for desig- family support groups.
nated SOF, through the US Army Reserve Com-
mand (USARC), which is a major subordinate Supervising MSC preparations for soldier readi-
command (MSC) of FORSCOM. ness processing (SRP), including preparing A-
bags, inventorying and procuring additional
The Commander, USARC, organizes, equips, shoring and tie-down items, morale and person-
stations, trains, and maintains the combat readiness nel services, personal property storage, preparing
of assigned units. The same laws that control how personnel manifests, and updating personnel’s
the AC can be employed in domestic situations that medical and dental screening and immunization
apply to the RC. records.
Reserve component TPUs located outside the Reviewing MSC vehicle and equipment deploy-
continental US (OCONUS) are commanded by their ment preparations, including unit vehicle assem-
regional Army service component commands bly area preparations, unit area equipment
3-3
FM 100-15
palletization, vehicle load cards preparation, and based operations and a portion of the corps head-
weighing accompanying equipment. quarters remains at home station.
The corps supports its MSC’s outload activities. When alerted for a contingency operation, the
It alerts its units and initiates recall and planning corps may request the activation of specific RC units
procedures (for assembling and organizing the or capabilities, such as a rear area operations center
corps’ available personnel, supplies, and materiel (RAOC). It may also provide limited assistance to
for active military service) in accordance with the affiliated mobilizing units. Individual mobilization
corps’ RSOP. augmentees (IMA) may round out both the corps
and installation staffs.
The corps initiates active operations security,
marshaling and outload, and communications Transfer of authority (TOA) of mobilizing RC
measures and procedures. While always important, units from their STARC or ARCOM/GOCOM to
OPSEC is critical during this stage to deny the the mobilization station commander occurs when
enemy intelligence he may use against the corps the mobilizing RC unit arrives at the mobilization
during predeployment and deployment activities station. Transferring the command of mobilizing
and entry operations. units to the corps generally occurs through the
ASCC or ARFOR after the mobilized unit arrives
Other steps involved in a national mobilization in theater, unless the RC unit mobilizes and com-
(such as calling up reserve forces, extending terms pletes validation before the corps departs from its
of service, increasing the production rates of end garrison location. Some RC units deploy directly
items of equipment) are acts of political will and are from their home station to the theater of operations,
well beyond the corps’, or of any military’s, author- given the appropriate urgency of need and readiness
ity to initiate. levels.
The corps’ participation in mobilization planning
is an integrated process. Joint Publication 4-05 iden- PREDEPLOYMENT
tifies the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ACTIVITY
(JCS), sister services, CINCs, and other agencies
engaged in mobilization planning. The Army Mo- When an unforeseen event occurs somewhere in
bilization and Operations Planning and Execution the world that requires the use of US military forces,
System (AMOPES) is the vehicle by which all theater strategic- and operational-level command-
Army organizations plan and execute actions to ers conduct crisis-action planning. JOPES CAP pro-
provide and expand Army forces and resources to cedures parallel those of the deliberate planning
meet the requirements of unified commands. process but are more flexible and responsive to
Mobilization of RC forces (within CONUS) is the changing events.
responsibility of the STARCs, ARCOMs/ CAP procedures provide for the timely flow of
GOCOMs, and installation garrisons; the Continen- information and intelligence, rapid execution plan-
tal United States Army (CONUSA); and USARC ning, and the expedient communication of NCA
and FORSCOM headquarters. A corps has no direct decisions to the CINCs. Concurrent and parallel
responsibilities under the FORSCOM Mobilization planning during CAP compresses the planning cy-
and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS) cle and facilitates early deployment action the corps
to mobilize RC units. and other organizations initiate.
The corps commander, as an installation com- In extremely time-sensitive cases, each CAP
mander, has RC mobilization responsibilities that phase can be compressed by decisions reached in
normally are passed to the garrison commander conference or if decisions are initially issued orally.
upon the alert of the corps. Before deploying into an In such cases, record communications will confirm
operational area, the corps commander and his staff decisions as soon as possible. Further, a crisis may
should be relieved of all installation responsibilities be so time-critical, or a single COA so obvious, that
to supervise and validate mobilizing RC units. This the first written directive the corps receives might
should occur even when the corps conducts split- be a deployment or an execute order.
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FM 100-15
Planners normally complete campaign plans dur- gic surprise does not necessarily mean loss of the
ing the execution planning phase of CAP. They are tactical surprise so important to opposed-entry
time-sensitive, iterative, and adaptive, depending on operations.
the mission and forces assigned.
Rapidly introducing forces into an operational
The theater campaign plan defines the command, area requires front-end loading by national and thea-
control, communications, and intelligence (C³I) and ter agencies of continuous. accurate, detailed, and
logistic relationships among the services for the timely intelligence. Therefore, key corps intelli-
corps. It also defines the sequencing and application gence personnel and equipment must arrive in thea-
of resources and should specify any multinational ter early. One of the first intelligence assets to
relationships. deploy with the corps is the deployable intelligence
support element (DISE).
In response to the receipt of a JOPES warning or
other message of a force-projection mission through The DISE provides forward-deployed corps ele-
the Worldwide Military Commmand and Control ments the capability of conducting split-based intel-
System (WWMCCS) or the Army Global Com- ligence operations. Corps split-based intelligence
mand and Control System (AGCCS), the corps con- operations are key to force projection IEW support.
ducts CAP parallel with that conducted under They allow the commander to deploy small, flexible
JOPES at higher echelons. JOPES planners base IEW assets tailored to the operation’s specific re-
their decisions on the best available information at quirements and logistic limitations.
the time.
The DISE uses long-haul and broadcast commu-
Some decisions are irreversible. Corps intelli- nications systems to access intelligence data bases,
gence, logistics, and communications preparations organizations, and systems outside the corps’ AO.
must begin as early as possible to allow command- The corps initially relies almost solely on national
ers time to develop adequate plans. and joint intelligence assets fed through a higher
Based on the JFC’s guidance for establishing echelon Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) to the DISE
operational capabilities during the initial phases of at the corps’ assault or main CP.
force-projection operations, the corps commander During multinational operations, the US will
recommends deployment priorities for his units. probably have the preponderance of intelligence
Subsequently, the JFC, with the theater CINC, de- capabilities and will need to provide LNOs to share
velops required delivery dates from which to adjust and disseminate authorized intelligence products.
or develop the time-phased force deployment list During a force-projection operation, the corps usu-
(TPFDL). ally needs to augment its HUMINT capability. This
The TPFDL includes assigned and supporting is especially true during 00TW because of the
forces (USAF airlift control elements; Army termi- increased utility of HUMINT under the circum-
nal operations units) that are to deploy to the opera- stances that commonly prevail during OOTW. Al-
tional area. The TPFDL establishes the joint force’s lied and/or coalition partners may possess an
lift priorities. extensive array of HUMINT and CI assets to assist
the corps.
The final approved TPFDL becomes the basis for
the corps’ development (in cooperation with the Anticipatory CSS planning during this stage is
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), state key to successful execution of later stages. Success-
highway regulatory agencies, and commercial ful force-projection operations require tailorable,
transportation mode operators) of its marshaling flexible logistics.
and deployment schedules
The size of the deploying force, the maturity of
During this stage of force-projection operations, the theater, HN support capabilities, the availability
the commander might establish an intermediate of in-theater stockage, resources pre-positioned
staging base (ISB) to pre-position C³I and logistic afloat, and the existing theater infrastructure will all
assets, based on METT-T. The decision to establish affect the logistic task organization. If there are no
an ISB probably will negate strategic surprise be- port facilities available to the corps, it may have to
cause of global news organizations. Loss of strate- conduct logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) operations,
3-5
FM 100-15
which will require early deployment of specialized political considerations while ensuring force protec-
engineer and logistic units. tion.
Split-based logistic operations from an ISB or ROE vary in different operations and sometimes
from CONUS/OCONUS bases can reduce initial change during the operation. Nothing in the ROE,
transportation requirements by precluding the trans- however, should negate a commander’s obligation
porting of noncritical personnel and equipment or to take all necessary and appropriate action to pro-
supply stocks into the theater. The corps com- tect his force.
mander must prioritize his lift requirements consis-
tent with METT-T.
The combatant commander establishes the se- DEPLOYMENT
quence in which corps units will deploy relative to
the movement of forces from the other services and Besides the actual movement of personnel and
other Army units. Early rulings on sequencing will equipment, the deployment stage includes actions
solidify the TPFDL, resolve the time required to that prepare the corps, its equipment, and supplies
deploy the corps, and initialize the theater distribu- for movement to the AO and for operations after
tion plan. the movement is complete. Deployment may be
deliberate or be in response to a crisis or natural
During this stage, the corps task-organizes, eche- disaster. Deployments may be from CONUS, from
lons, and tailors its forces based on the assigned OCONUS, or from both.
mission, concept of operations, available lift, and
other resources. The corps depends on TRANSCOM as the DOD
single manager for strategic lift. Lift may come from
Task organization is the process of forming sister services, other nations, or be contracted from
combined arms task forces (TF) with limited self- commercial sources. The corps also depends on
sustainment capabilities for rapid force projec- joint and/or HN or multinational air defense and
tion. The corps uses brigade-size units as the basic intelligence assets until its organic assets deploy
building blocks for task-organizing its units for into the theater.
force-projection operations.
Deployment requires local air (and sea if appro-
Echeloning is the organization of units for move- priate) superiority. Deployments normally occur in
ment. The likelihood of combat is the primary con- five phases: unit preparation, movement to the port
sideration when task-organizing and planning the of embarkation (POE), strategic lift, reception at the
echelonment of the force. port of debarkation (POD), and onward movement.
Many deployment tasks overlap or occur simulta-
Tailoring is the process of adjusting the echeloned neously. (See FM 100-17 for details.)
TF based on available strategic lift assets. Addi-
tional echeloning and tailoring considerations in- Several factors influence planning for strategic
cluding pre-positioning equipment), HN capa- deployment or unit movement by air and/or sea.
bilities, contract services, establishing an intermed- They include—
iate support base, and other infrastructure assets.
Existing automated unit equipment lists
Finally, a key consideration during this stage must (AUELs).
be rules of engagement (ROE). ROE are directives
that delineate the circumstances and limitations un- Time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD).
der which US forces initiate or continue engage-
ment with belligerent forces. Operation orders.
ROE reflect the law of armed conflict and opera- The commander’s intent.
tional considerations but are principally concerned Pre-positioned equipment.
with restraints on the use of force. Military com-
manders develop them giving consideration to the Available lift systems.
direction and strategy of political leaders. This
process must balance mission accomplishment with METT-T factors.
3-6
FM 100-15
Corps deployments are programmed via JOPES, as transmission to the Military Traffic Management
modified by the supported commander’s updated Command (MTMC). The MTMC is the ASCC of
operation plan. TRANSCOM. These actions help the staff compute
If the corps must respond to a short-notice con- lift requirements and schedule embarkation times.
tingency without existing plans, the staff must pre-
pare plans to quickly assess the corps’ status and Unit Preparation
movement requirements. While lift models and no-
tional data are acceptable for requirements estima- Commanders follow guidance they receive from
tion in contingency planning, calculating lift TRANSCOM and the CINC and/or JFC for task
requirements for execution demands actual unit em- organizing, echeloning, and tailoring units for flow
barkation data. All units must know not only the into the theater of operations. Commanders conduct
quantity of personnel and equipment they need to necessary deployment activities and individual and
transport, but also their equipment’s transportation collective training to attain the desired mission ca-
characteristics (cube, weight, outsize, oversize). pability in the shortest possible time consistent with
the planned deployment schedule.
The corps ensures that subordinate units provide
the necessary reports using the Transportation Co- In many cases at the corps level, activities occur-
ordinator Automated Command and Control Infor- ring in this phase of deployment are the same as
mation System (TCACCIS) to update their unit those occurring in the mobilization and predeploy-
movement data files. Corps units update their ment activity stages of force projection. Activities
AUEL to deployment equipment lists using include-
TCACCIS. They then submit these lists to the
installation transportation office (for CONUS units) Tailoring the force for employment.
or the corps MCC (for OCONUS units) for Planning and rehearsing the mission.
3-7
FM 100-15
Requesting immediate fill of personnel and The accepted method for deploying rotary-wing
equipment shortages and cross-leveling within aircraft is to have them fly to the POE (or to the
corps units. theater of operations if within range). Army
fixed-wing aircraft normally self-deploy into the
Completing SRP requirements. theater of operations.
Requesting supply and repair parts shortages on Installations place individual manpower and
high priority because of deployment status.
forces at the arrival/departure airfield control group
Identifyng and requesting container require- (A/DACG) and at the port support activity (PSA) to
ments. deploy and sustain designated units deploying to the
operational area. Based on TCACCIS data fed into
Reviewing requirements for classes of supply. JOPES, TRANSCOM provides movement instruc-
Identiying field service support shortages. tions to the corps. The corps supervises the decen-
tralized execution of these movement instructions
Gathering and disseminating available intel- by subordinate units as they move to the designated
ligence. POE via different transportation modes.
Reviewing LOC throughput capabilities for suf-
ficiency and alternatives. Strategic Lift
Identiying shortages and submitting requisitions Strategic lift begins when corps elements leave
to the appropriate Army and DOD agencies. (by air, land, and sea) the POE; it ends with theater
Identifying transportation shortfalls and making closure. TRANSCOM ensures the in-transit visibil-
force-tailoring decisions based on the pro- ity of forces and, with the Defense Logistics Agency
grammed availability of strategic lift assets. (DLA) and the Army Materiel Command (AMC),
transports supplies between CONUS and the opera-
Requesting movement clearances. tional area. In-transit data the unit movement coor-
A critical strategic and operational consideration dinators receive provide the necessary force-
for force-projection operations, which involve the tracking details to commanders at all levels.
potential for combat operations, is the early intro- Corps lead elements need to be able to receive
duction of credible and lethal forces. Planners can- updated intelligence while in-transit. As necessary,
not always count on having sufficient time to build the corps modifies its plans en route to meet chang-
combat power in theater. ing conditions in theater.
When forward-presence or HN forces are ade- The strategic deployment of forces can present
quate for force-protection purposes, the commander special C² problems for the planner. Planners can
may place less emphasis on combat forces and may
introduce more CSS units to better assist the deploy- minimize many of these problems by properly using
ment and buildup of combat power. For OOTW- unit deployment plans, clear change of OPCON
type contingencies (not involving likely combat statements, and the ability to react to changes in
operations), the commander may introduce CS and mission while en route to the objective area. Nor-
CSS units early on to provide critical services. mally, the supported CINC obtains combatant com-
mand (COCOM) or operational command
(OPCOM) of supporting corps units when they
Movement to Ports leave the departure airfield/port.
of Embarkation
Units that deploy a significant quantity of equip-
Rail is the preferred method for moving all ment via sealift should anticipate that soldiers will
wheeled vehicles from locations over one day’s become separated from their equipment during de-
driving distance from the POE and for moving all ployment. Therefore, unit commanders need to plan
tracked vehicles to the POE. Military convoy is the training accordingly. Units should also train on the
preferred method of moving wheeled vehicles to the specific threat, critical individual tasks, ROE, AO,
POE that are within one day’s driving distance. and cultural considerations.
3-8
FM 100-15
3-9
FM 100-15
The requirement for reliable communications can A forcible entry requires combat operations to
be simply stated in entry operations. Execution is land deploying forces into the theater. (See JP 3-18.)
difficult. Because of differences in equipment and Other than for small-scale raids, the corps is the
software between the services, other government Army’s preferred echelon for conducting forcible
agencies, other nations, and private organizations, entry operations. The corps echelon, alone, has the
it is doubtful if any large force will be 100-percent scope and mix of capabilities necessary for major
equipped with totally compatible communications forcible entry operations.
and data transmission means.
The forcible entry operation is at greatest risk
The corps signal staff will need to be innovative during the units’ movement directly into combat
in the development of work-around solutions to operations. That point is where corps units are most
technical and protocol problems. The establishment vulnerable and have the least available combat
of an en route C² capability will be critically power. Because the corps initially has limited com-
important. bat power available to it and most of it may be from
other service systems, it must quickly generate
For entry operations, communications systems enough combat power to protect the force and ac-
must be reliable, survivable, flexible, interoperable, complish the corps’ mission.
timely, and secure. Modern technology provides
communications capabilities far superior to those of Forcible entry operations require the fill synchro-
the past. Nevertheless, because of the ready avail- nization of joint capabilities. They will normally
ability in the open market of communications jam- occur under the theater CINC’s combatant com-
ming and imitative equipment, units may have to mand authority (for assigned forces) or OPCON (for
conduct forcible entry operations in a severely de- supporting command forces). Forcible entry forces
graded electronic environment. may also become OPCON to a JTF.
Entry operations in an unopposed environment
generally support HN or forward-presence forces. Examples of Forcible Entry
This, with HN assistance, is the preferred option for Operations
deploying into a theater of operations because it is Examples of forcible entry operations include
a low-risk operation and maximizes the capabilities coup de main, lodgement operations, and raids. A
of lift systems. coup de main combines entry and combat opera-
tions to achieve the operation’s objectives in a single
Early deploying units flow through aerial or sea major operation.
ports of debarkation (A/SPOD) into assembly areas
(AA). Corps units then— In the early morning hours of 20 December 1989,
a JTF, organized around the XVIII Airborne Corps,
Prepare to assist HN or forward-presence forces. conducted a forcible entry operation in Panama.
Protect the corps. (Even in apparently benign The operation was called Operation Just Cause.
entry operations force protection of the force The complexity and precision of the operation are
remains a critical command consideration.) evident in the mix of forward-deployed and US-
based conventional ground and special operations
Reconfigure the corps’ task organization. forces simultaneously hitting 27 targets throughout
Build combat capability, assembling sufficient, Panama. Although Operation Just Cause was an
sustained combat power to win the decisive bat- Army-dominated operation, the USAF made it pos-
tle and training and preparing for eventual sible for 4,500 soldiers from the 75th Ranger Regi-
employment. ment, the 7th Infantry Division (Light) (ID(L)), and
the 82d Airborne Division to deploy from four US
Conduct training. bases and be on the ground within 53 hours of the
President’s decision to intervene.
Acclimate the soldiers to the environment.
The USMC also participated in the operation,
NOTE: See FM 100-7, FM 100-10, and FM 55-1 contributing a light armored force to screen Pana-
for details. manian Defense Force escape routes. Once in
3-10
FM 100-15
theater, the deploying units linked up with the and amphibious operations. Within a forcible entry
13,000 soldiers already forward-deployed in Pan- context, airborne forces may be the assault force or
ama to conduct an operation that gained control of they may conduct follow-on operations from a
the entire country in a matter of days. lodgement after it has been secured by other forces.
The results of this coup de main was the restora- As an assault force, airborne forces normally
tion of a legitimate government in a matter of days reach the objective area by parachute insertion. As
and with few casualties. The use of rapid, over- a follow-on force, airborne forces may be inserted
whelming combat power can be decisive against a into the lodgement by many different means (air,
foe and can result in fewer casualties (for both sides) land, amphibious, or helicopter insertion).
and reduce collateral damage, while still accom-
plishing the assigned mission. Air assault forces may also be used as the assault
force, or they may conduct follow-on operations
An entry force conducts simultaneous synchro- into a lodgement area after it has been secured by
nized operations throughout the depth of the AO to other forces. As an assault force, AASLT units reach
overwhelm the opposing force. The simultaneous the objective area using helicopters staged from
neutralization of all opposing forces when accom- either ships or from an ISB. As a follow-on force,
plishing the assigned mission is the corps’ preferred AASLT units may be inserted into the lodgement
means of conducting forcible entry operations. by means different from their normal helicopter-
delivery method (air, land, or amphibious insertion).
If the coup de main becomes unsynchronized for
any reason (communications failure, unexpected Because airborne and AASLT forces are pre-
weather conditions, or early discovery by the en- dominately CONUS-based, planners must add aer-
emy) the degree of risk associated with the operation ial deployment to the time required to plan, rehearse,
increases significantly. When a coup de main is not and prepare troops and equipment for the mission.
possible, corps will typically gain, secure, and ex- As in Operation Just Cause, commanders can em-
pand a lodgement as part of a joint force before ploy airborne and AASLT forces with forward-
conducting further operations. presence forces in either the same operational area
or in adjacent operational areas.
To establish a military lodgement, friendly forces
must seize an airhead and/or beachhead. The intent NOTE: See also JP 3-18.1, FM 71-100-3, FM 90-
of a lodgement is to create maneuver room and 26, and FM 100-27.
provide for the continuous entry of follow-on forces The corps may also use amphibious forces as a
and materiel for subsequent operations. forcible entry assault force or a follow-on force
Forcible entry may often be the initial phase of a conducting operations from a lodgement after a
campaign. Commanders make maximum use of buildup of forces. Amphibious assault forces move
joint capabilities to provide early lethality and secu- from the sea into the lodgement area using a mix of
rity for the force. landing craft, amphibious vehicles, helicopters, and
ground-effect vehicles. A follow-on force can arrive
Raids are operations, usually small-scale, involv- by sea or by air.
ing a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure
information, confuse the enemy, or to destroy his Amphibious transports generally have limited
key installations. Raids end with a planned with- speed. If amphibious forces are not routinely de-
drawal once the assigned mission ends. While the ployed within a theater, their limited deployment
entire corps is unlikely to conduct a raid, the head- speed impacts their reaction time. That reaction time
quarters may plan and support a raid, which tailored may be days in length.
subordinate organizations conduct. The increased deployment time over airborne and
AASLT units is partially offset by the ability of
Types of Forcible Entry amphibious forces to plan, conduct leader rehears-
Operations als, and prepare troops and equipment en route to
the assault area. Both Army and I-JSMC units can
Types of operations the corps typically uses to conduct amphibious operations. (For details see
conduct forcible entry include airborne, AASLT, JP 3-02.)
3-11
FM 100-15
Airborne, air assault, and amphibious forces can Planning, Preparation, and Deployment
be components of a JTF within the same operational
area or in adjacent operational areas. Operation The planning phase of a forcible entry operation
Overlord during WWII illustrates the simultaneous encompasses that period of time extending from
use of multinational airborne and amphibious forces when the commander issues the initiating directive
to secure lodgements for the conduct of follow-on to the time of embarkation. The distinct designation
campaigns. of a planning phase is more important to the descrip-
tion of forcible entry operations than it is to real-
world application since planning continues
Phases of Forcible Entry throughout the operation.
Operations This phase starts with mission receipt. Crisis-
action planning procedures that establish command
A phase is a distinct period or subdivision of an relationships and the organizational structure of the
operation at the end of which the nature and char- entry force are used as a basis for planning, as is the
acteristics of the action usually change and another corps’ RSOP. All operating systems establish hori-
action begins. A corps normally phases its forcible zontal and vertical connectivity. Various elements
entry operations because of the mission’s scope, exchange LNOs, and time permitting, the staff iden-
duration, and complexity. Phasing helps the com- tifies and completes special training requirements.
mander and his staff divide an operation into man- The force then conducts rehearsals.
ageable parts, thus facilitating planning and
execution. A JTF is a likely organization for conducting a
forcible entry operation. If a forcible entry COA
Factors influencing phasing include the mission appears obviously superior during CAP, the com-
(or purpose), friendly and enemy situations, terrain, mander can establish a JTF before or during Phase
CSS, time, and distance. For discussion purposes III (COA development). This would allow the des-
only this chapter organizes forcible entry opera- ignated commander of the JTF, and his staff, to
tions into six phases: planning, preparation, and participate in the remainder of the planning process.
deployment; assault; force buildup; stabilization of
the lodgement; follow-on forces; and transition. In Once the NCA selects a COA, the JTF estab-
reality, these phases can be combined or lishing authority provides the approved COA to the
overlapped. JTF. The JTF must then complete its OPLAN.
3-12
FM 100-15
Warning ends once the NCA issues a JCS alert joint plans for military action by specifying how
order. The JCS alert order specifies— forces conduct operations to attain theater
The purpose for which the joint force is being objectives.
deployed. Campaign planning is the primary means of
The designation of the JFC. achieving strategic unity of effort and is the basis
for the planning of theater operations. In addition,
Command relationships. the campaign plan provides the JCS with informa-
tion it needs for intertheater coordination. (See
The forces available. JP 5-00.1 for campaign planning procedures.)
Timing considerations.
Joint planning uses a disciplined process using the
The first step, if not already completed, is to secure communications capability and the rapid in-
develop a planning schedule, establish planning formation processing of JOPES. Individuals from
responsibilities, and activate a liaison infrastructure each major section of the corps staff must be famil-
for coordination with other commands. iar with the JOPES process. In addition, the corps
must maintain access to GCCS both at the home
The corps commander may also be the JTF com- station and while deployed. (Joint Publication 5-O
mander. This is especially true for primarily land discusses joint operation planning in more detail.)
campaigns. Joint task forces having a forcible entry
mission may be organized around corps headquar- Under the direction of higher headquarters, the
ters that possess secure en route communications corps commander, with prospective subordinate
capabilities and the ability to produce and dissemi- commanders and supporting commanders, con-
nate intelligence and employ joint fires. siders those elements of the forcible entry OPORD
The staffing of a JTF headquarters formed around practicable at this stage. Key to its development
a corps headquarters should follow the force module is mission analysis, staff estimates (particularly lo-
concept in JP 5-00.2. The corps basic battle com- gistics and intelligence), and the commander’s con-
mand organization should progress to a joint struc- cepts for operations, organization, deployment, and
ture using these force modules to provide the CSS. (See FM 101-5 (D) for additional
required staff augmentation. The corps, if desig- information.)
nated a JTF, will receive augmentation from many The objective or mission of the forcible entry
sources, but the additional resources will primarily operation controls all planning and execution. If
come from the headquarters that establishes the JTF. METT-T factors prevent the corps from conducting
The corps commander formulates the ground tac- a coup de main, selection of the lodgement area is
tical plan to achieve the aim or intent of the overall the key decision the commander must make to allow
campaign plan. The ground tactical plan is normally subsequent actions to take place.
the driving force and rationale for all other planning When selecting the site of a lodgement area, the
and activities in forcible entry operations. The commander and staff must consider several criteria.
ground tactical plan specifies required actions in the For example, the area must facilitate mission ac-
objective area that will ultimately accomplish the complishment, and there must be sufficient port (air
assault force’s mission, and it addresses subsequent and sea) facilities as well as A/SPODs to supply and
or follow-on operations. maintain our forces. This includes the corps’ ability
Campaign plans are the operational extension of to restore or construct port facilities (including
the theater CINC’s strategy. They embody the thea- LOTS). It also includes the port’s capability for
ter CINC’s or JFC’s vision by depicting a series of quickly unloading and turning around aircraft
related operations through which to obtain strategic and/or ships and dispersing arriving supplies, sol-
objectives. diers, and equipment using local transportation sys-
tems (road, rail, inland waterway) within the
The CINC normally expresses strategy in general lodgement area.
terms of ends, ways, and means, with broad objec-
tives to give direction to the employment of forces. Airfield development includes ensuring there are
These objectives translate strategic concepts into sufficient airfields, or readily developed airfields, to
3-13
FM 100-15
provide bases for tactical air forces and Army fixed- in-flight refueling and the configuration of the air-
and rotary-wing aircraft. Planners must consider the craft load (airdrop or airland), impact the airlift’s
corps’ capability to repair airfields damaged by carrying capacity. Distance also factors into consid-
combat activities and enemy demolition activities erations on how rapidly the initial lift (air and sea)
and to construct new facilities. The weighting of this can be turned around to carry subsequent loads into
item in picking a lodgement depends on the suitabil- the lodgement area. This impacts the total number
ity of sustaining airfields outside the lodgement area of required lift systems.
to support the corps.
Determining the appropriate size of the assault
Planners must also consider air, land, and sea force requires force correlation between the assault
limiting factors. Air limiting factors include the force and the enemy defenders, taking into account
amount of friendly air support available during the the synchronized effects of precision fires air inter-
assault phase of the forcible entry operation and US diction, and C²W. Inclusion of forces from other
obtainment of air supremacy. The initial assault nations into either the initial assault force or into
must take place within range of effective air support follow-on forces requires the resolution of the addi-
by fixed-wing aircraft operating from ISB or navy tional command, operational, logistic, and other
aircraft carriers. factors involved in multinational operations.
Land limiting factors include enemy long-range The staff must make every effort to obtain de-
guns, missiles, and rockets, enemy coastal and LZ tailed information on the AO and of enemy activities
defenses, and enemy AD weapons (with their sup- in the combat area, including location, strength,
porting radars and C² nodes). There must be suffi- armament, and the capability of enemy forces to
cient space, with controlling terrain features, to interfere with the operation. The location of AD
enable US forces to secure the lodgement area and systems, the composition and types of defense for
accomplish future operations. airfields, DZs, landing fields/beaches, ports, and
other military or civil installations, and civilian mo-
When determining if sufficient space is available, rale are all important information requirements.
planners must also consider movement rates. The
corps must be able to compare movement rates All sustainment planning for a forcible entry op-
between enemy reserves and US assault forces. The eration is based on providing continuous and coor-
corps must also consider the ground forces’ ability dinated logistic support. Realizing that the time
to reinforce or relieve airborne or AASLT forces needed to procure an item can be a lengthy process
before they exhaust their accompanying logistic and that errors are not easily rectified, coordinated
support or before the enemy can mass superior planning at all levels is essential.
combat power against them.
The requirement to provide continuous support to
Limiting factors in amphibious operations in- the assault force with a support system based pri-
clude enemy surface warfare capabilities, sea mine- marily either at an ISB or afloat has a significant
field, coastal artillery and missile sites, and impact on CSS planning. The initial support is
submarines. Beach conditions (obstacles; traffica- “push” logistics. That is, CSS assets, anticipated
bility; degree of beach maintenance required; slope; during planning, move into the lodgement area in
and height, flow, and time of tides) are also limiting accordance with the landing plan. As the situation
factors. stabilizes, the staff initiates a logistic system for
subsequent support of base development.
Ideally, there should be spare systems and crews
available to provide airlift and sealift to accommo- The force must provide adequate and continuous
date maintenance failures, provide necessary crew support. Loss of support, even temporarily, may
rest, and replace estimated casualties without dis- provide the enemy an opportunity to regain the
rupting the tempo of the operation. The capacities initiative.
of A/SPOD determine the number of ports required
to outload the assault force. Preparations for a forcible entry operation include
air, sea, PSYOP, PA, CA, special operations, and
The distances between the departure airfields and deception activities that facilitate the corps’ entry.
the assault area, coupled with the availability of Entry forces attack known enemy formations,
3-14
FM 100-15
defensive positions, and minefield (ground and to avoid congestion while building up combat power
sea) by multiple means with the intent of reducing in the lodgement area.
the enemy’s fighting efficiency, lowering his effec-
tiveness, disrupting his combined arms synchroni-
zation, and splitting his defenses and reserve Assault
formations into nonsupporting groups. The joint force initiates the assault and secures the
Preparation involves training and rehearsing for airhead and/or beachhead. The assault force’s main
the mission. It also includes disrupting and/or de- advantage derives from achieving operational and
ceiving enemy satellite, radar, and other intelligence tactical surprise and the generation of overwhelm-
sensor coverage of the ISB and the approach routes ing combat power at decisive points by the applica-
into the projected lodgement area. Preparation in- tion of all means (joint, multinational, and/or
volves the use of CI and OPSEC to maintain tactical interagency) to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the
surprise for the operation. Preparations may be enemy force.
spread outside of the lodgement area to aid US
deception operations, if required. The corps headquarters must maintain the initia-
tive and prepare to receive follow-on forces to over-
Early insertion of SOF and LRSU into the target come the possibility of an initially superior enemy.
area is desired to provide a HUMINT source to Concentration of the effects of our forces and tacti-
confirm intelligence derived from technical means. cal surprise helps to achieve and maintain the initia-
These teams may be either under the control of the tive. The corps must render ineffective enemy
corps, as in the case of LRSU, or responsive to weapons systems capable of jeopardizing the suc-
requests from the corps commander, as in the case cess of the assault.
of SOF.
In the process of conducting simultaneous opera-
The corps’ deployment is based on the com- tions throughout the AO, the corps seeks to over-
mander’s deployment concept, which in turn is whelm its opponents throughout the depth and
based on his concept of operations and logistic breadth of the corps’ AO. Operation Just Cause
support, the availability of sea and air transporta- showed how assault and forward-presence forces
tion, the geographic location of deploying forces, can combine their effects to simultaneously attack
and the requirements and constraints associated multiple enemy positions in a coup de main.
with delivery of the corps into the objective area.
The concept for deployment provides the basis for Once execution of the plan begins and corps units
developing the deployment plan, arrival and assem- commit to the assault, the corps avoids radical
bly plan, sea and air movement plans, and marshal- changes in the scheme of maneuver. However, the
ing plans, as well as the embarkation and loading plan or order must allow the corps commander
plans associated with sea movement. sufficient flexibility to take advantage of the devel-
oping situation during execution.
The deployment of a corps into oversea land areas
requires the identification of priorities for the intro- Fires in support of forcible entry operations differ
duction of operational capabilities and the estab- from normal tactical fires in that the assault force
lishment of required delivery dates (RDD). These initially relies. on joint fires until the corps can
are key to the early conduct of military operations. deploy its fire support systems. Changes in fire
The process requires careful thought. While a corps support should be planned to provide for possible
commander may desire early introduction of attack rapid increase in the size of the corps’ AO and
helicopter battalions, engineer, base support, and should support simultaneous operations in depth.
aviation, maintenance units may be required before
attack helicopter battalions can be brought in. Planners must consider transition of C²; changes
to supported and supporting relationships; and other
Support units and materiel-handling equipment C² relationships to provide for efficient clearance of
essential to port and airfield throughput may neces- fires. They must clarify fire support planning, coor-
sarily precede the bulk of the force to be deployed. dination, and execution responsibility. Major
Planning and coordination are essential in sorting changes affecting the planned movement of any
out the best sequencing of required delivery dates corps forces and their support require adequate
3-15
FM 100-15
consideration of coordination and synchronization, The establishment of the TPFDD is one of those
time, and distance factors. early decisions that is not easily changed at a later
date. Commanders should take great care when
The corps employs assault forces on terrain that determining whether the TPFDD should be altered.
minimizes the impact of enemy obstacles and forti-
fications on the operation. The corps desires to limit If the TPFDD sequence is to be changed, the
the amount of breaching equipment that the assault associated massive synchronization and coordina-
force requires. Follow-on engineer forces will re- tion requirements may result in the disruption of the
place bridges, clear minefield, conduct route im- flow of units and supplies into the lodgement area.
provement operations, and repair ports (air and sea). If the situation does dictate changes, the corps staff
can coordinate needed changes in the arrival se-
quence through the theater CINC.
Force Buildup
Before the lodgement can be secured, the force Stabilization of the Lodgement
must rapidly build up from an initial small power
base. Protection of the lodgement area, and corps During this phase actions may include—
units within it, against enemy counterattacks and Preempting or defeating enemy counterattacks
hostile acts by nonmilitary elements of the local into the lodgement area.
population are the commander’s high-priority con-
siderations. He calls forward the reinforcing forces Expanding the lodgement.
that the mission, ROE, and other circumstances
require. All reinforcing forces must be ready for Sequencing combat, SOF, CS, and CSS forces
combat soon after arriving in the lodgement area. A into the lodgement area,
coup de main does not have a force buildup phase. Linking the force with airborne, AASLT, and/or
Corps fight a task-organized mix of forces and, SOF within or external to the lodgement area.
as such, have the flexibility to meet a variety of Conducting air base ground defense (ABGD).
situations and threats. If initial entry forces were
unable to conduct simultaneous operations in depth Evacuating casualties.
to accomplish all the objectives of the deployment Depending on the correlation of forces and the
and entry operation, reinforcing forces can help buildup of combat, CS, and CSS units and supplies,
seize or accomplish unfulfilled objectives. the attack continues to either expand the initial
The existence of little or no initial support within lodgement area for additional follow-on forces or to
the lodgement area may require the corps to develop accomplish the final objectives of the forcible entry
a large logistic organization within the lodgement operation.
area. To accomplish this, the corps may require In the process of stabilizing the lodgement area,
augmentation of selected CSS functions to perform the corps can use any combination of simultaneous
EAC sustainment operations. As such, the corps operations in depth and synchronized and/or coor-
could have both operational and tactical dinated assault that meets its needs. Typically this
responsibilities. involves some melding of offensive actions,
forward defense, augmentation of HN forces, and
All means of delivery are exploited to full capac- defense of decisive terrain.
ity to maximize the force buildup pipeline of units
and supplies flowing into and out of the lodgement
area. Forces and supplies usually use administrative Follow-On Forces
movement techniques to optimize the capabilities of
available lift systems. The arrival of the follow-on force may simulta-
neously occur during force buildup or be a separate
Throughput capability is critical during this stage. phase, depending on the tactical plan and the combat
Units must make provisions to clear follow-on sup- situation. The use of follow-on forces to help secure
plies and equipment immediately from off-load the lodgement may degrade follow-on mission
points to increase airlift or sealift efficiency. capabilities.
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FM 100-15
Coup de main operations also have a follow-on When hostilities cease or a truce goes into effect,
forces phase. During this phase, units that initially corps units transition to a period of postconflict
conduct the entry operation are replaced or aug- operations. This transition can occur even if residual
mented by forces more suitable for conducting war combat operations are still underway in portions of
termination and postconflict operations. These the AO. As operations approach the military end
forces typically include CA, engineer, MP, and CSS state, the corps commander must be aware of mis-
specialized functions. sion creep (where end state conditions change) that
would require a continuation of military operations.
Transition
This phase continues actions initiated in earlier Postconflict Operations
phases and may add actions for the reconstitution The commander must determine the end state for
and redeployment of the assault force. The joint military operations as early as possible in the plan-
force establishing authority may reallocate the joint ning process. It enhances the commander’s ability
entry force’s components to other missions on com- to anticipate postconflict operational considera-
pletion of the entry operation. Alternatively, this tions.
phase may mark the end of one phase of a campaign
and the start of another campaign phase for the joint This stage focuses on restoring order and mini-
force. mizing the inevitable confision that follows mili-
tary operations, reestablishing the infrastructure,
preparing for follow-on missions, and protecting the
force. It includes such diverse tasks as unit reposi-
OPERATIONS tioning, controlling EPWS, and taking care of dislo-
The operations stage of force projection consists cated civilians. Major cows missions will include
of missions that lead to or directly contribute to the moving people and equipment (both military and
accomplishment of the CINC’s campaign objec- civilian) and providing health services and humanit-
tives. The decisive operations phase may occur arian assistance.
immediately upon forcible entry or after a long The ultimate objective of this stage is the smooth
buildup. There are no notable changes in the types transition of responsibility back to civil authorities.
of corps combat operations. This transition may include the transfer of equip-
The corps conducts operations in war and OOTW ment and supplies to the host nation from corps
to achieve the higher commander’s intent. During units. Combat support and CSS assets will be heav-
war, the corps conducts offensive, defensive, and ily committed during this stage and may be used in
lieu of HN capabilities until HN capabilities can be
other operations identified in Chapters 5 through 8 reestablished.
of this manual. During OOTW the corps conducts
operations as discussed in Chapter 9.
REDEPLOYMENT AND
WAR TERMINATION AND RECONSTITUTION
POSTCONFLICT OPERATIONS Redeployment and reconstitution are complex
activities and may require contractor and HN sup-
port in addition to that which uniformed servicemen
War Termination and DOD civilians provide.
Successful combat operations are designed to
bring an end to the war. When acting as the JTF Redeployment
headquarters, the corps commander may have to
determine when the military end state has been Redeployment is the preparation and movement
reached (with a great deal of assistance from other of a corps from a theater to its follow-on designated
agencies). The key is to determine when to stop the CONUS or OCONUS base or to any other location
fighting. to meet ongoing requirements. Commanders
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FM 100-15
contend with all the same challenges as in deploy- Planning actions in the operational area to dispose
ment, balancing METT-T factors against available of equipment and/or supplies that are no longer
lift assets. An additional challenge is for personnel needed or to prepare those same items for move-
and equipment returning to the US to clear customs, ment to long-term storage locations.
Department of Agriculture, and US Public Health
Service (USPHS) requirements. Ports of embarkation-to-demobilization stations
or POE-to-CONUS demobilization center actions.
Force protection is as critical during this stage as
it is during any other stage of force projection. Demobilization station and/or CONUS demobi-
Redeployment activities must optimize the readi- lization center actions.
ness of redeploying forces and materiel to meet new Home station or home-of-record actions.
contingencies or crises. Its phases are-
Reconstitution for strategic movement. Within a theater of operations, corps ensure their
affiliated units complete the required planning,
Movement to redeployment assembly areas. movement, and disposition actions before transfer-
Movement to the POE. ring command of these units to the ARFOR or other
competent authority. Outside of an active theater of
Strategic lift. operations, corps commanders may have extensive
Reception at the POD. responsibilities for demobilization as installation
commanders. Demobilization installation responsi-
Onward movement. bilities are—
Expanded family support and media coverage of
Reconstitution welcoming and departure ceremonies.
Reconstitution begins in the theater before rede- The completion of all medical and dental actions
ployment. Activities include rebuilding unit integ- and/or examinations, line-of-duty determinations
rity and accounting for soldiers and equipment. and finance actions, legal and entitlement brief-
Reconstitution continues after arriving in CONUS ings, and personnel records updates for individual
or the home theater. Units must focus on— soldiers before their release from active duty.
Reconstitution of units and their assigned equip- Coordinating prescribed load list (PLL) and
ment to premobilization levels of readiness. authorized stockage list (ASL) accounts.
Regeneration of logistic stockpiles.
Coordinating GS and depot-level maintenance
Accountability of mobilized equipment and for returning equipment and supplies.
supplies.
Shipping equipment to home stations, equipment
Accountability of personnel and reconciliation concentration sites, and mobilization and training
with the standard installation division personnel equipment sites as determined by the CONUSA
system (SIDPERS) data base. in coordination with the National Guard Bureau
(NGB) and USARC.
DEMOBILIZATION Preparing movement orders for unit members to
return to their home station and individuals to
Demobilization returns RC units and materiel to their home-of-record.
their remobilization status or other approved pos-
ture. It assures rapid reconstitution and/or sub- Conducting property disposal operations in ac-
sequent mobilization to meet any other contingencies cordance with instructions received from DLA,
that may arise. Demobilization consists of the fol- AMC, and the Defense Property Disposal
lowing phases: Agency (DPDA).
3-18
Chapter 4
BATTLE COMMAND
Battle command is the art of battle decision mak- The corps commander is responsible for leading
ing, leading, and motivating soldiers and their or- and training the corps in peacetime so it will be
ganizations into action. Battle command embodies prepared for war. Leaders must develop units with
two vital components-command and control (C²). this warfighting focus as the cornerstone of all
activity.
Command consists of the ability to decide and the
ability to lead. However, battle command represents Future corps operations will always be joint and,
a refinement and maturation from the old concept in some cases, multinational operations. When the
of command and control to one that focuses on the corps commander is the commander of joint or
exercise of command and considers control as the multinational forces, he extends his battle command
subordinate means. activities to include the entire force.
The way the corps trains will be the way it
Battle command is the natural expansion of C² operates in war and in OOTW. The corps com-
brought on by changes in the scope, intensity, and mander determines what his leadership team and
tempo of current and future operations. Technology
provides an abundance of real-time information that
must meet the needs of more ambiguous, less certain
threat situations.
This chapter describes the fundamentals of corps-
level battle command. It establishes the basis for
utilization of the Army battle command system to
achieve success in military operations.
4-1
FM 100-15
subordinate organizations need to do, establishes or have the ability to foresee an achievable, desired end
reinforces standards, and trains the corps. state.
The corps commander identifies and explains the Battlefield visualization includes the com-
elements, the METL, and the standards he expects mander’s view of what his force is to do and the
the corps to meet. He then ensures that resources resources he will need to do it. He envisions a
and opportunities are available. sequence of actions (an intellectual war game) that
will cause his force to arrive at the desired end state.
The corps commander builds on the principles in The commander includes in his vision the contin-
FM 22-103 by providing purpose, direction, and gencies (branches) and follow-on missions (se-
motivation to his force. He provides purpose quels) the force might encounter when conducting
through his vision and focus on warfighting. He the operation. Ultimately, the commander’s battle-
provides direction by developing subordinate lead- field vision evolves into his intent and helps him
ers who can help prepare the corps to perform its develop his concept of operations.
mission, sustain it, and successfully apply warfight- The corps commander’s intent is a clear, concise
ing doctrine. He provides motivation by empower- statement of the what and why and how much risk
ing competent subordinates and rewarding those is acceptable. His concept of operations—
who do likewise because he knows that this is a
prerequisite for successful operations. Must convey to his subordinates his vision of how
to accomplish the mission in a manner that allows
The commander communicates his intent so oth- those subordinates’ maximum initiative.
ers understand what they must do, and then allows
subordinates to decide how to accomplish their mis- Is built around intelligence-gathering and the em-
sions. He engineers a command climate by focusing ployment of precision fires as a precursor to de-
attention on warfighting and competition against cisive maneuver.
standards, not against other units. He sets the stand- When properly constructed, provides the basis
ards and exemplifies courage, candor, competence, for—
and commitment.
Task organization.
Mutual trust and confidence is the basis that al-
lows the commander to call on his soldiers to imple- Scheme of maneuver.
ment his will on the battlefield. By his example, he Tasks to subordinates.
encourages decentralizing decision making to the
appropriate level and allows subordinates to deter- Terrain organization.
mine the methods to accomplish their missions.
Synchronization.
A critical element of the art of battle command is
the ability to visualize the battlefield. Battlefield Identification of critical collateral operations.
visualization is an essential leadership attribute and The commander’s concept includes—
is critical to accomplishing the mission. It is learned
and attained through training, practice, experience, The overall scheme of operations.
wisdom, and available battle command technolo- The necessary interfaces and coordination.
gies. It results from the commander’s understanding
of his higher commander’s intent, his assigned mis- The sequencing and phasing for the operation.
sion, an understanding of the enemy, and his knowl- His priorities.
edge of friendly force capabilities and limitations.
The risks he is willing to take.
The corps commander must be able to see how The focus for all subordinate unit operations and
enemy and friendly forces relate to each other over extends the corps commander’s intent throughout
time, space, and purpose and how external factors the entire force.
(such as terrain, weather, and illumination) impact
both. In visualizing the battlefield, the corps com- Each subordinate commander, in turn, develops
mander must fully understand his current state and his intent and concept of operations in consonance
4-2
FM 100-15
with the higher commander’s concept. This nesting the current operation. The leadership the corps
of intents and concepts provides unity of effort commander exercises most directly influences the
throughout the force to every maneuver and func- remaining tenets—initiative, agility, and versatility.
tional unit, with the focus being successful mission
accomplishment across the range of military Initiative
operations.
Success in execution of the concept requires the Initiative at the corps level consists of two related,
corps commander’s personal attention and perse- but independent, concepts. The first is initiative as
verance, his ability to recognize the need for it applies to the offensive spirit. The other is initia-
changes or modifications to the concept, and his tive as it applies to decentralization and intent.
ability to effect the necessary changes. Initiative encompasses the principle of war
The commander formulates a new concept or known as surprise. Corps achieve tactical surprise
revises it when there is a changing mission or situ- by acting in an unanticipated manner. Initiative is
ation. He continuously analyzes his mission and applicable in the offense, the defense, and in
maintains a continuous estimate of the situation, OOTW.
modifying his concept over time as the need arises. Setting or changing the terms of battle by action
The commander must be able to visualize the requires a constant effort. This concept of initiative
large and complex operation of his own force, as implies that the corps must always have an offensive
well as that of the enemy, and he must be able to orientation. The corps must drive the enemy to react
project that visualization into the future. The con- to the corps’ plan instead of the corps reacting to the
cept must be sufficiently detailed so the staff can enemy ’s.
develop plans and subordinate commanders can The other concept of initiative requires decentral-
take actions throughout the depth of the AO that ized decision authority within the corps. The mecha-
support the plan-even in the absence of subsequent nism through which decentralization occurs is the
guidance. mission order and the corps commander’s intent.
Commanders must be able to orchestrate all The climate set by the commander fosters subor-
the functions that help them affect their battle dinate initiative. Critical to the implementation of
space-intelligence, fires, force positioning, re- this intent is the team building between the corps
sourcing, deception, and timing. In addition, they commander, the staff, and subordinate command-
must have a total mission awareness of the opera- ers, especially in joint and multinational operations.
tion. The corps commander’s challenge is to estab-
lish the command climate that fosters bold, Division commanders focus their operations on
innovative risk-taking and the immediate exploita- the given mission and operate within the framework
tion of opportunities within the context of his intent. of the corps commander’s intent. By doing so they
have the freedom and responsibility to develop op-
portunities they might otherwise lose.
Tenets of Army Operations
There are five tenets of Army operations: initia- Agility
tive, agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility.
Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, The corps achieves agility through four means:
resources, and purpose. Corps commanders must 1. Mental flexibility of the commander and his
think in depth in order to conduct today’s opera- ability to visualize future operations.
tions, approve tomorrow’s operations, and plan for
future operations. 2. A well-trained, forward-thinking corps staff that
Synchronization is arranging activities in time thinks in sync with the commander.
and space to obtain overwhelming combat power at 3. A responsive battle command system.
the decisive time and place. Corps commanders
provide a clear statement of intent that subordinate 4. The capability of corps forces to rapidly
commanders use to arrange branches and sequels to anticipate and respond to change.
4-3
FM 100-15
Any degradation of one of these means signifi- mander’s intent. It is a single unity of thought de-
cantly affects the ability of the corps to react to the veloped through interaction with the commander on
rapidly changing conditions when conducting op- a daily basis. The staff must thoroughly understand
erations. The most decisive factor affecting the the commander’s thought processes and how he
corps’ agility is the corps commander’s mental would react in any given situation.
flexibility and his ability to anticipate future
events. The CofS plays a key role in assisting the com-
mander in developing staff proficiency. Accelerated
The complexity and scope of corps operations are staff action (rapid, mental, and/or informal execu-
far greater than those of subordinate units. The corps tion of steps in the decision-making process) re-
commander must visualize future operations in time quires a thorough understanding of the process as
and space to maximize utilization of available as- well as frequent training under realistic stressful
sets. He must consider supportability and CSS im- conditions. (See FM 101-5 (D) for details.)
plications in greater depth than would subordinate
commanders. As a result, commanders require ac- Achieving agility requires a responsive battle
curate information. command system. The commander must be able to
command and control from any location on the
Commanders must also be prepared to act without battlefield. The system must provide timely and
hesitation in an environment of incomplete and accurate information and rapidly transform the
conflicting input. Waiting for confirmation or addi- commander’s decisions into specific directions to
tional details is often the same as deciding not to act. corps units. The commander provides the structure
The corps may lose opportunities while seeking for the system by organizing the staff, establishing
additional information. C² facilities, and defining battle command proce-
The commander must also be tenacious. The dures using the organizations, facilities, and proc-
friction of battle will be tremendous. Loss of com- esses this manual describes.
munications, inaccurate reporting, use of weapons
of mass destruction, loss of a command post, attacks The commander must develop the corps’ ability
within the corps rear area, and so forth, will work to react with speed and instill the aspect of force
against the commander’s will. agility at all levels of command. Agility hinges on
the commander’s ability to visualize the objective,
Tenacity demands that the corps accomplish the conceptualize the operation, and make decisions.
mission. However, tenacity does not imply rigidity. Physical agility is inculcated at lower levels by
The commander’s will must be strong, but flexible. stressing the ability to move, concentrate, strike, and
Calculated risk-taking must be the norm, not the sustain the momentum of operations. The com-
exception, if the corps is to be victorious. mander emphasizes these actions through task or-
ganization and training.
Command, and the decision making and problem
solving that come with it, do not occur in isolation. At this level, the corps must practice its capability
The commander’s staff and subordinates help de- to reorient divisions, change task organization,
velop, modify, and improve the initial versions of commit the reserve, or realign support relationships
plausible COAs. They also help develop future during all types of exercises if it is to perform well
COAs for events that most likely are not yet totally in combat. The corps must also train myriad support
clear. forces to react to and continuously support reorien-
The commander must develop, train, guide, and tation of combat forces. It is this trained and prac-
demand high standards of performance from all ticed physical and mental agility by all elements of
members of his staff. Doing so will ensure a well- the corps force that will ensure the ability of the
trained, smoothly functioning corps staff. This de- commander to synchronize corps activities in rap-
mands realistic, difficult training exercises with all idly changing circumstances.
the key players present and performing their staff
function as they would in battle. Battle command demands that leaders position
themselves where they can best command without
The ability to think in consort with the com- depriving them of the ability to respond to changing
mander is more than just understanding the com- situations. The commander must be able to go where
4-4
FM 100-15
he can best assess the operation and risks and make to rapidly and efficiently shift focus, tailor forces,
the necessary adjustments. and move from one role or mission to another.
Napoleon positioned himself on high ground The Army no longer emphasizes fighting a well-
overlooking the battlefield so he could directly known enemy on familiar battlefields with massive
sense the progress and requirements of the battle. forward-deployed forces. The Army must strategi-
Today’s corps commander cannot physically ob- cally deploy tailored force packages with the appro-
serve the entire battlefield, but the requirement to priate battle command apparatus at the moment of
“see” it remains. need, to fight a previously unforeseen enemy.
Therefore, the corps commander must be able to
Reports, including periodic situation reports, and orchestrate all resources available to him to locate,
other battle information systems, are a means of target, and defeat the adversary as rapidly as possi-
monitoring the battle. However, a face-to-face dis- ble at least cost.
cussion with a subordinate commander often tells a
commander more about a situation than he could get
from his staff in a long briefing. Tempo
The commander must be where he can effectively Tempo is the rate of speed of military action.
concentrate combat power at the point of decision. Tempo is not synonymous with speed. At times, the
There is little value to having the commander in the commander may wish to slow operations and induce
supporting effort’s AO unless the threatened failure the enemy to hasten his operations.
of that effort would result in the corps’ defeat. The corps commander’s responsibility is to take
The commander must also position himself where all appropriate actions required to dictate the pace
he can best enhance the corps’ morale. General of events in his battle space thereby gaining and
Patton often rode to the front in highly visible maintaining the initiative over the enemy. The com-
ground transportation. His return to rear areas was mander must sustain the initiative and control en-
likely to be in aircraft and other less visible means. emy tempo.
His readily apparent presence was integral to the In the age of instantaneous global information
fighting spirit of his commands. The ability to see exchange, the potential impact of the media on
the battlefield, concentrate combat power, and pro- national will and public opinion cannot be over-
mote command presence drives the corps com- estimated. Therefore, control of the tempo in mili-
mander to select his location for each particular tary operations is vital to their success.
case.
The increased tempo of future operations will be
manifested through requirements to move forces
Versatility rapidly, destroy the enemy quickly, and reset for
Versatility is the ability to perform in many roles subsequent operations before the enemy can recover
and environments during war and OOTW. It is the or respond. The commander who can master time
result of well-led, well-trained, and well-equipped will spare his forces while defeating the enemy.
forces as well as high standards and detailed
planning. Split-Based Operations
The corps commander provides the impetus for Future corps operations will require a battle com-
versatile units by understanding the dynamics of mand structure supported by selected elements that
force projection. He must anticipate the variety of may never deploy from home station or that may
missions and tasks his forces may need to accom- operate strictly from secure base areas. Modern
plish. Holding his units to high standards in training, communications equipment enhances access to
and in actual operations, he ensures that they can critical information because less time is spent de-
successfully conduct many different kinds of opera- ploying or moving these links in support of the
tions, either sequentially or simultaneously. operation.
Versatility requires competence in a variety of Systems that support the battle-command process
missions and skills. All commanders must be able must be modular and capable of supporting the
4-5
FM 100-15
commander from wherever he is on the battlefield. see the battlefield. He cannot be a prisoner of a
The challenge to commanders and staffs is to con- command post. Wherever he is on the battlefield, he
figure state-of-the-art communications, sensors, must retain access to the information he needs to
and automation systems into the most suitable and command and determine the actual location, com-
efficient package to provide the relevant infor- position, and organization of the headquarters
mation and required interoperability for success- elements.
fully conducting joint, combined, or interagency
operations. Many actions that enhance a CP’s ability to con-
duct effective operations may degrade survivability,
The corps commander and his staff must also and vice versa. For example, a rapidly mobile CP
have the flexibility to realign the structure and func- may lack the protection of a CP complex located
tions of its command posts according to the unique behind heavily fortified positions.
requirements of each mission and other factors in-
herent in force-projection operations. Such factors Striking the proper balance between operations
might include the availability of strategic lift, op- and survivability is the key to effective C². The
posed or unopposed entry requirements, technologi- commander should also pay attention to factors that
cal sophistication of HN infrastructure, and the are not diametrically opposed (SOPs, qualified per-
tempo of anticipated operations. sonnel, training, and so on).
In many operations, corps CPs are echeloned into
ORGANIZATION a tactical (TAC) CP, a main CP, and a rear CP. The
TAC CP controls corps close operations. The main
The corps commander exercises C² through the CP synchronizes all corps operations. The rear CP
Army Battle Command System (ABCS) from three performs rear security operations and sustainment
command posts and a command group. A CP pro- of the entire corps.
vides the means for a commander to exercise control
of his forces. Command posts support the corps To be effective, each CP must operate efficiently
commander by providing the structural framework as well as be able to survive in a highly lethal
to facilitate the planning, directing, controlling, and environment. In addition to the three CPs, a separate
coordination of corps operations. entity called the command group is formed and has
specific functions and characteristics.
Several factors affect where the corps com-
mander positions himself on the battlefield. First,
the commander must be where he can effectively Command Group (CG)
The command group’s primary purpose is to keep
the commander informed. When separated from the
corps’ CPs, the command group normally consists
of the commander and representatives from the G3,
G2, and fire support element (FSE). When the com-
mand group is at one of the corps’ CPs, it consists
of the commander and whoever is with him at the
time.
The command group must be able to receive
information and transmit battle decisions from
any place on the battlefield. It must be highly
mobile to allow the commander to move to the
point of decision and to afford an added measure
of security. Existing equipment limitations, cou-
pled with time and space considerations, may
require equipment augmentation to ensure that the
command group can function anywhere on the
battlefield.
4-6
FM 100-15
The command group’s primary functions are— It can relocate to any position on the battlefield.
To make a personal situation assessment. It can maintain continuous communications.
To provide leadership. It relies on its small signature and speed, in addi-
To provide intent. tion to collocating with other headquarters, for
security.
To provide guidance. It is controlled by the commander.
To make decisions.
Its secondary functions include- Tactical Command Post
Alternate means for subordinates to enter the The TAC CP primarily concentrates on conduct-
corps communications nets. ing corps close operations. It monitors deep and rear
Additional liaison capability (with subordinate operations only for their effect on close operations.
units). Because the main CP conducts detailed planning
Limited CP capability. and coordination, the TAC CP can remain small and
mobile. This enhances its mobility and minimizes
Command post redundancy. its signature. The TAC CP can operate mounted, but
The group’s characteristics are that— can be dismounted to take advantage of the local
environment.
It consists of the corps commander and selected The TAC CP’s organization is simpler and more
personnel. flexible than that of the main CP. It consists of a
It is small. single cell where current operations, intelligence.
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FM 100-15
fire support, CS, and CSS elements operate under To plan future (close, deep, and rear) operations.
the corps G3’s control (Figure 4-l).
To allocate resources.
Traditionally, the TAC CP positions well forward
in the vicinity of a division main CP. It may locate Its secondary functions are—
with or near critical elements, such as the main effort To be the alternate for the TAC CP.
division in the offense or the attacking unit in a
mobile defense. Regardless of the TAC CP’s loca- To be the alternate for the rear CP.
tion, the commander always locates where he can The main CP’s characteristics are that—-
best command the corps.
It is organized by cell.
The TAC CP’s primary functions are—
It is normally positioned in the forward portion of
To control close operations. the corps’ rear area.
To synchronize combat, CS, and CSS for close It is controlled by the chief of staff.
operations.
The main CP consists of—
To maintain the current close operations
situation. The corps tactical operations center (CTOC).
Its secondary functions are— The signal element.
To update requirements for CS and CSS for close The life support area.
operations. The security element.
To provide close situation information to the main The main CP is a large organization with atten-
CP. dant mobility and signature problems. It normally
To monitor deep and rear operations. locates in the general vicinity of the division rear
boundaries. If possible, it locates in a built-up area
The TAC CP’s characteristics are that— to hide its signature and take advantage of fixed
It is organized as a single, cohesive cell. facilities.
It can be mounted or dismounted. The main CP relocates as needed to enhance its
survivability. It must be capable of—
It positions forward.
Displacing while still retaining the ability to per-
It is controlled by the G3. form all of its required functions.
NOTE: See Appendix B for a more detailed Echeloned displacement (movement of the entire
description. CP by echelon or movement of each cell of the
CTOC by echelon).
Main Command Post Because of the unique signature of massed CPs
The main CP synchronizes the battle command and their greater vulnerability to acquisition and
system and provides continuity for corps operations. attack, the corps should disperse the cells of the
This CP has a broader orientation and is more command posts whenever feasible. In a dispersed
future-oriented than the TAC CP. It synchronizes configuration, each cell, operating at a separate
the entire corps battle, conducts corps deep opera- location, must possess the following distinct char-
acteristics:
tions, and plans all future operations.
The main CP’s primary functions are— They must be multidisciplined.
To synchronize corps operations. They must be able to conduct continuous opera-
tions while displacing (split operations or operat-
To conduct deep operations. ing during movement).
To synchronize combat, CS, and CSS units in They must be capable of independently entering
support of deep operations. communications networks.
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FM 100-15
They must have an independent power source. Command Post Headquarters Cell
They must have local security. The CP headquarters cell consists of the CofS, the
secretary of the general staff (SGS), and command
They must possess a command group C² liaison elements that the corps either receives or
capability. provides. The CP headquarters cell’s primary func-
tions include—
They must have an interoperable automation and
communications capability. Coordinating and synchronizing activities of the
main CP’s cells.
They must be able to share their data base with Providing guidance to the main CP’s staff.
other cells.
Analyzing situation information to anticipate
Because of the size and breadth of responsibili- requirements.
ties, the main CP must be functionally oriented to
facilitate synchronization. Within the main CP, Providing and accepting command liaison
multidisciplined cells are created to enhance and elements.
speed coordination. The cells include the CP head-
quarters cell, current operations cell, plans cell, Current Operations Cell
intelligence cell, fire support cell, and the CSS cell
(Figure 4-2). (Appendix B describes each of these The corp G3 plans and coordinates current and
cells in greater detail along with an expansion of the future operations and allocates resources to
functions each performs.) divisions fighting the battle. The G3 staff at the main
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FM 100-15
CP is divided into a current operations cell, ducts continuous IPB to support future operations
responsible for current combat operations, and a planning and as the basis for target development.
plans cell, responsible for planning future
operations. The intelligence cell interacts with the current
operations cell to provide enemy situation informa-
The current operations cell has the primary func- tion that impacts current operations. Interaction
tion of synchronizing current deep, close, and rear with the plans cell ensures that current and antici-
operations. It also controls deep maneuver opera- pated enemy situation information is included in the
tions; synchronizes combat, CS, and CSS in support development and analysis of future operations.
of deep operations; and maintains the current corps
situation. As part of the deep targeting process, the intelli-
gence cell implements the collection plan and noti-
Other functions of the current operations cell fies the tire support cell and current operations cell
include allocating resources to current operations when high-payoff targets are detected and tracked.
based on the commander’s guidance, developing The intelligence cell manages CI activities in sup-
branches to current operations, and providing cur- port of rear area security, OPSEC, and deception.
rent situation information to higher, lower, and
adjacent headquarters as well as the other cells of
the command posts. The current operations cell Fire Support Cell
monitors close and rear operations by maintaining The corps fire support cell manages fire support
communications with the TAC and rear CPs, resources under the FSCOORD’s supervision. Rep-
respectively. resentatives of aviation, ASOC, ANGLICO, air liai-
son officer (ALO) and or naval liaison officer
Plans Cell (NLO), TACP, EW, and chemical support elements
collocate with the fire support cell.
The plans cell plans future operations as sequels
for the current corps operation. It coordinates all The fire support cell—
combat, CS, and CSS activities with higher and Coordinates CAS, FA support, and EW.
adjacent headquarters. It also synchronizes future
operations within the corps during the development Develops corps-prioritized interdiction missions
of these plans. and target lists.
The major focus during this planning process is Controls all deep fires as part of the delivery
determining a concept for deep operations. The function of deep targeting.
plans cell must monitor the current situation for its Coordinates the use of airspace with the corps’
impact on future operations and make appropriate Army airspace command and control (A²C² ele-
adjustments. ment, which collocates with the fire support cell.
Coordinates USAF support through the ASOC
Intelligence Cell and/or ALO.
The corps G2 is the principal staff officer for all Interacts with the current operations cell to ensure
military intelligence and security matters. He ad- fire support assets are maximized for current op-
vises the corps commander on intelligence, CI, EW, erations.
and force-protection issues.
Provides representation in the Plans cell to inte-
The G2 directs the corps’ intelligence effort and grate fire support into future operations. Controls
focuses intelligence support from outside intelli- lethal and nonlethal deep fires.
gence organizations. He develops and executes the
corps intelligence plan through the corps’ intelli-
gence cell. Corps Deep Operations Coordination Cell
The intelligence cell requests, collects, and ana- Deep operations are operations directed against
lyzes intelligence information from all sources to enemy forces and functions not engaged in the close
produce and distribute combat intelligence. It con- battle. Successful deep operations at the corps level
4-10
FM 100-15
require the careful and continuous synchronization cell to ensure CSS assets and support are maximized
of activities between the corps’ G2, G3, EW officer, for the current operation.
aviation brigade, FSE, air defense element (ADE),
A²C² cell, ASOC, and other agencies as the require- To ensure supportability and integration of CSS
ments of the operation might dictate. into fhture operations, the CSS cell provides repre-
sentation to the plans cell. During operations when
The technique of using an ad hoc targeting cell to the corps disperses the main CP, the commander
focus the activities of all of the participants involved incorporates the elements of the CSS cell into the
in the planning and execution of deep operations is current operations and plans cells to reduce the
inefficient and inappropriate for missions of this administrative requirements for providing life sup-
magnitude. The solution is to use a deep operations port, communications, and security for another
coordination cell (DOCC), usually within the main location.
CP. The DOCC’s role is to act as the battle C²
facility, which exists to support the successful exe-
cution of deep operations. Command and Control Warfare (C²W) Cell
In the main CP, the DOCC positions so it can The C²W cell synchronizes all corps activities to
maintain visibility on the status of close and rear protect friendly C² activities while disrupting enemy
operations and continually assess their relationship C² activities. This cell contains the G3 deception,
with deep operations criteria as initially planned. EW, and OPSEC sections along with the PSYOP
Through the targeting process of decide, detect, support element from the tactical PSYOP battalion.
deliver, and assess, units select targets and allocate
and employ detection assets. Working together, and with the FSE, the various
cell elements coordinate their respective efforts to
The DOCC confirms and validates targeting data, build a synergistic C²W plan that supports the corps
determines if the original decide criteria for that commander’s mission and concept of operations. A
target remains in place, then allocates the attack C²W officer (for example, the chief of the deception
resource to engage the target. The DOCC must element) leads the cell. Whether or not the cell
accomplish the coordination for the allocation of reports to the G3 directly or through another cell,
intelligence and EW assets to perform BDA early such as plans, is a matter of command preference.
in the planning process for the deep operation.
Allocation of intelligence-collection assets to the The major functions of the C²W cell are-
assessment operation may be at the expense of
assets needed for ongoing detection operations. The To plan the corps’ overall C²W effort.
corps commander must continually balance these To develop counter-C² and C² protection
competing requirements and provide guidance to concepts to support the concept of operations.
the appropriate sections, agencies, and units.
The responsiveness of target-acquisition systems To establish C²W priorities to accomplish
and receipt of targeting information directly affect planned objectives.
the outcome of any deep operation. With the DOCC
in place, the battle C² process is continuous, inter- To determine the availability of C²W resources to
active, and driven by the commander’s intent, mis- carry out C²W plans.
sions, and events.
To recommend taskings to the G3 for C²W
operations.
Combat Service Support Cell
To coordinate corps C²W operations with higher
The CSS cell monitors the personnel and logistic echelons responsible for the overall C²W
situation through communications with the rear CP. campaign.
A staff judge advocate (SJA) representative moni-
tors the operational law situation from the CSS cell. To coordinate consolidated intelligence support
The CSS cell interacts with the current operations to C²W.
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FM 100-15
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FM 100-15
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FM 100-15
rearward CP and, perhaps, a CONUS sustaining The future vision of command posts is for agile,
base are relatively safe from high-level threats. immediately responsive, modular, forward CPs di-
The rearward CP would locate in the theater rectly supporting the commander’s immediate
where threat levels are low but close enough to the needs for commanding current operations and the
forward CP to be able to effectively perform its means to adjust plans for future operations. The
functions of detailed planning and analysis. In some forward CP must be capable of coordinating the
rare cases, the rearward CP may collocate in development of plans, synchronizing deep opera-
CONUS with the sustaining base. tions, and producing intelligence of immediate con-
cern to the commander.
The rearward CP collects, processes, stores, and
ships data as required. Large electronic pipelines As much as possible, the amount of detailed co-
link it to the sustaining base. The rearward CP, in ordination, analysis, and integration at the forward
addition to controlling the rear operations, responds CP should be limited so it can remain mobile. De-
to the forward CP’s requests for information and tailed staff work can best be accomplished at a static,
provides products in the form of analyses, targeting, secure rearward CP. The forward CP is modeled
graphics, future predictions, and written plans and after the current tactical CP and reinforced with
orders. additional staff elements, particularly in plans and
intelligence.
Both CPs require robust automation capabilities;
long-haul, high-volume communications; and ac- The forward and/or rearward CP configuration
cess to significant amounts of intelligence and lo- requires the maintenance of reliable communica-
gistic data. These CPs lack considerable mobility tions links between the two CPs, making distance
and must be secure. relatively unimportant. Some functions would then
4-14
FM 100-15
be able to remain at the home station, and staff Using a CV will also allow the commander to
actions could then pass electronically to and from assemble a small personal battle staff to help him
the TAC CPs in theater. (This is the idea behind assess the situation and control the operation. The
split-based operations.) CV is mobile enough to allow the commander to
position himself where he can best feel the pulse of
The commander must have the freedom to posi- the battle, influence the situation, and best invoke
tion himself wherever he feels he can best influence his will on the force in battle.
the situation in conducting a major operation, usu-
ally forward of his command posts. He must have
the necessary communications and automation ca-
pabilities to remain electronically connected to a BATTLE COMMAND
number of information sources: his forward CP; EXECUTION
higher, adjacent, and subordinate warfighting com-
manders; and broadcast-sensor information. Communications and Automation
Systems
Actions are underway to provide the com-
mander’s vehicle (CV) with sufficient capability for The corps has a unique role in battle command
the acquisition and communication of critical infor- activities as the integrator of higher level joint and
mation at all times. The vehicle’s integrated com- multinational systems with the Army Battle Com-
munications and automation suite provides the mand System (ABCS) (Figure 4-6, page 4- 16). The
commander access to processed or fused informa- ABCS provides the commander and his staff infor-
tion based on his specific requirements. mation they need to effectively plan, coordinate,
control, and direct operations.
Figure 4-5 depicts the linkage of air and ground
vehicles to form an integrated battle command sys- To be effective, the corps’ ABCS must link into
tem. This system is commander-centered and opti- a network that allows free and timely flow of infor-
mized to accomplish command functions. mation. The corps headquarters provides the link
4-15
FM 100-15
between the ABCS and the battle command systems integrated. The larger circle represents the seamless
of the next higher command. The corps is also the environment. Users connected to this environment
link between the ABCS and joint or theater Army transfer information regardless of the communica-
C² systems for sustainment of the corps. tions means.
The ultimate objective of all components of the Broadcast transmissions, as a common informa-
ABCS is to provide the warfighter and his force free tion service capability, have been added to the com-
transfer of information throughout the entire archi- ponents that make up the ABCS architecture.
tecture on a global basis. Global connectivity re- Broadcast transmissions do not eliminate the need
quires a seamless communications and automation for the other components within the architecture;
architecture; one that supports every phase of force they mitigate the stress currently placed on them.
projection and is adaptable to the full range of
military operations. Corps commanders must be The ABCS architecture extends from joint and
able to exchange relevant information with the strategic C³I systems via the Global Command and
CINCs, other service components, US government Control System (GCCS) through the theater of op-
agencies, allies and coalition partners, authorized erations. From there it extends to the operational
commercial agencies, and industry. and/or tactical headquarters, and it culminates in
near-real time digital links among the tactical BOS
The revised ABCS architecture represents the functions at brigade and below. Key components of
seamless nature of the automation and communica- this system are the Army WWMCCS Information
tions system. The five fictional automation sys- System (AWIS), the Standard Theater Army Com-
tems are integrated, interoperable, and they share mand and Control System (STACCS), and the
data through exchange of force-level information. ABCS.
The communications architectures and the inter- The AWIS provides strategic connectivity, and it
locking and overlapping spheres, are technically facilitates exchange of information on apportionment,
4-16
FM 100-15
allocation, and logistic support between Army plan- and below. It integrates with and processes
ners and combatant commands. The STACCS pro- information from ABCS, STACCS, joint, and
vides decision support to tactical and operational multinational theater AD operations. Functional
commanders, and it is the Army commander’s pri- applications include rapid dissemination of air
mary link to joint and combined systems, such as battle management information, hostile aircraft
the Contingency Theater Automated Planning Sys- cuing to fire units, and exchange of commander’s
tem (CTAPS) and the Joint Maritime Command essential information with other subsystems.
Information System (JMCIS).
5. The advanced field artillery tactical data system
The ABCS is the integration of five fictional (AFATDS), which provides automated
battlefield automated systems that provide situational integration of the fire support battle C² system
information and decision support to operational and for planning, coordinating, controlling, and
tactical commanders at corps and below. Current and executing joint and combined fires. AFATDS
future components of this system include— also performs all of the fire support operational
functions of automated allocation and distribution
1. The maneuver control system (MCS), which is of frees based on target-value analysis.
the primary information and decision support
system for the tactical commander and the The Army brigade and below (AB²) architecture
operational staff. The MCS allows timely is a system of digitally interoperable, BOS-specific,
control and synchronization of close, deep, and fictional applications designed to provide near-
rear operations. Commanders use it to distribute real time situational information to tactical com-
plans and estimates in support of future manders, on the move, down to vehicle or squad
operations. The MCS must be fully interoperable level. The AB² provides—
and should include EAC and subordinate
echelon battlefield automation systems. Automated friendly positional location informa-
tion.
2. The all source analysis system (ASAS), which is A display of adjacent units.
the IEW component. This is a mobile,
computer-assisted, IEW processing, analysis, Current tactical battlefield geometry for both
reporting, and technical control system. The friendly and enemy forces.
ASAS receives and rapidly processes large
volumes of combat information and sensor Automated situational reporting.
reports to provide timely and accurate targeting The capability to disseminate graphic and textual
information, intelligence products, and threat tactical orders.
alerts. The modules in this system continually
evolve to improve its ability to process and report Users of these automated systems must deal with
information and to interface with other systems. the danger that not all units will have ABCS auto-
mation and that the ability to use the electronic
3. The combat service support control system environment may be degraded or even fail. Com-
(CSSCS), which provides critical timely, manders must make efforts to provide compatible
integrated, and accurate automated CSS battle C² automation equipment to all participants
information, including all classes of supply, field in an operation. Special provisions are often re-
services, maintenance, CHS, personnel and quired for joint forces, multinational forces, acti-
movements, maneuver, theater commanders, vated reserve units, and many CS and CSS units.
and logistic and special staffs. The CSSCS The G3 will establish contingency distribution of
processes, analyzes, and integrates resource automation equipment and training plans to provide
information to support evaluation of current and limited training, equipment, and access as required.
projected force sustainment capabilities.
As the fielding of communications and automat-
4. The forward area air defense (FAAD) command, ion systems expands throughout the Army, the corps
control, and intelligence (C²I) system, which commander must be aware of the possibility of
provides the automated interface between the having information overload among subordinate
FAAD C²I nodes and weapons systems. FAAD commanders and possibly within his own headquar-
C²I is the AD component of ABCS at division ters. The potential for this condition occurring can
4-17
FM 100-15
be decreased by continual refinement of the commander can make timely decisions, consistent
hardware and software packages to ensure that with his vision of the intended outcome and pos-
flexibility is built into the systems. This flexibility tured to perform future operations.
will enable commanders and staffs to tailor infor-
mation flow to meet the specific requirements of a The corps commander’s key responsibility is to
given operation. conceptualize every operation. The commander no
longer monitors the decision-making process with
The electronic environment might be degraded periodic input at specified steps along the way. He
in varying degrees of severity from local single- must now drive the entire process.
frequency jamming to wholesale destruction of
electronics components that are sensitive to electro- From the initial intelligence preparation, through
magnetic pulse (EMP). A set of procedures dealing COA development, to the actual issuance of orders
with the entire spectrum of degradation must be and directives, the personal role of the commander
addressed within SOPs for each of the five battle- is central. Orders need to be simple and timely. The
field fictional area control systems (maneuver, role of the staff is defined and focused by the
fire support, intelligence and EW, CSS, and AD). direction the commander provides.
The SOP should address redundancy, records When time is available before or during an op-
storage, protection, OPSEC, decontamination, mes- eration the commander and staff follow a formal
sengers, and hardening. The CofS ensures the inclu- military decision-making process. Often, in the
sion of procedures to counteract degradation of the course of conducting an operation, the need exists
entire system. to expedite this process to take advantage of an
opportunity or changing battlefield condition. The
Whatever systems evolve over time, the ABCS commander and his staff will then employ a short-
will always require an integration of fielded and ened decision-making process. (See FM 101-5
developmental systems. The systems should be ca- (D), Chapter 4, for details.)
pable of being employed in developed and undevel-
oped theaters, in fixed or semi-fixed installations, The chief of staff must organize to take advantage
and in mobile networks while on the move. The key of the time available to prepare the force with the
objective is to functionally link strategic, opera- necessary orders and means to accomplish the mis-
tional, and tactical headquarters and to interoperate sion. He must do all of this in consonance with the
with joint and combined battle command systems commander’s concept.
across the range of military operations. Commanders issue warning orders announcing as
much information about the next operation as fea-
sible. This allows subordinate commanders time to
Planning, Executing, and begin preparation and reconnaissance. The process
Coordinating Operations of maintaining the running estimate by the battle
Planning staff is key to keeping the corps commander armed
with viable options.
While techniques and procedures may vary, plan-
ning and executing the fight are continuous and As information becomes available and is refined,
concurrent activities. The corps commander uses the commander’s visualization of the consequences
his assessment of current operations and his esti- and circumstances to be produced expand the con-
mate of the posture of the force in relation to future cept of mission analysis and initiates the synchroni-
operations to guide him and his subordinates zation effort by the staff. Battle synchronization
through planning, preparation, and execution. starts with the commander’s concept of operations.
The war-gaming process refines it.
The commander’s estimate and staff estimate
processes are continuous. This concurrent process The war-gaming process generates branches and
of maintaining the running estimate is key to keep- sequels essential for rapid response to changing
ing the commander armed with viable options. The operational conditions and situations. It helps to
commander is thereby able to dominate the enemy identify decision points and critical information re-
and set the terms of battle. If the staff properly quirements (CIR). This then drives the corps’ intel-
executes and synchronizes this process, the ligence and reconnaissance efforts.
4-18
FM 100-15
The staff prepares the necessary plans and orders coordination and cooperation among the corps and
based on the commander’s decision. The prepara- supporting joint forces.
tion should be a quick, established procedure. (The
format for orders is in FM 101-5 (D)). Joint doctrine must be clearly understood by all
participants. Procedures must be well-established to
Orders will be short and mission-oriented. Limi- ensure smooth and successful operations.
tations to subordinate commanders’ freedom will be
restricted to those required to ensure a coordinated The coordination requirement is both internal and
and synergistic accomplishment of the corps mis- external to the corps. As a result, coordination of
sion. In a time-critical situation, an order may be friendly COAs is of concern. The battle C² proc-
given orally but will be followed by a confirming esses of adjacent forces become interdependent and,
written FRAGO or OPORD. consequently, slows down the processes. This situ-
ation is further compounded in a multinational op-
eration because of the differences in language,
Executing organizations, facilities, and processes.
Control is the activity through which the com- One of the most visible means of effecting coor-
mander and staff operate to ensure the force accom- dination is the exchange of liaison officers. The
plishes the commander’s will and intent. The corps should staff, resource, form, train, and exer-
commander and staff effect control by establishing cise liaison elements before committing the corps to
orders, directives, SOPs, control measures, moni- any operation.
toring of the situation, and actions to correct aber- Liaison teams are a means for the corps to per-
rations. They also establish control by ensuring a form coordination, promote cooperation, and ex-
clear division of labor between the corps and its change essential information. As a minimum, these
subordinate units. teams must have reasonable life support capabili-
Effective and efficient execution of the com- ties, communications and automation equipment,
mander’s concept of operations requires the com- and transportation. In addition, they must have con-
mander and staff to issue explicit decisions and stant access to essential information and changes in
guidance concerning which echelons have respon- the commander’s intent or the concept of opera-
sibility and control over various activities within the tions. Each team should be capable of continuous
concept of operations. These decisions and state- operations to ensure timely information exchange,
ments of guidance also help synchronize battlefield coordination, and availability to the commander and
activities. staff.
The corps employs and transmits control meas- When possible, a corps should exchange liaison
ures through many means. Means could be required teams with higher, lower, and adjacent units. If
reports, graphic measures (boundaries, phase lines, reciprocal liaison is not possible, a corps must pro-
fire support coordination measures, and so on), vide liaison with its subordinate elements. When
coordinating instructions, functional area restric- moving through another force’s AO, or when con-
tions (ADA weapons status, restricted frequency ducting a passage of lines, a corps establishes liaison
lists, obstacle restrictions, and so on), SOPs, stand- with the element through which it passes.
ing orders, ROE, and other means. Coordination is no less important when consider-
ing the internal functioning of corps staff elements.
Coordinating Each CP (and the cells within these CPs) interacts,
exchanges information, and coordinates on a con-
Coordination is one of the major actions the corps tinuous basis.
staff performs when executing battle C². Generally,
coordination occurs within the other three func- Decision-making processes do not consist of se-
tions—plannifig, directing, and controlling. quential steps. A skilled, well-led, and properly pre-
pared staff will appear to flow through the process
Corps operations always occur in a joint environ- without hesitation or delays. Their success totally
ment and, at times, involve combined forces or depends on the commander’s personal influence and
nonmilitary agencies. Success requires close competence.
4-19
FM 100-15
JOINT BATTLE
SYNCHRONIZATION
Corps are capable of responding to worldwide
situations and will frequently fight as the largest
ground formation in the theater. There must be close
coordination between land operations and air
operations—
To synchronize the application of joint combat
power.
To optimize support.
To prevent friendly interference.
To achieve success throughout the corps’ AO.
4-20
FM 100-15
The BCE fusion section analyzes the most current Advises USAF airlift elements on ARFOR airlift
intelligence and the friendly situation to help refine requirements and intent.
and validate targets for attack during the execution
of the current ATO. It collocates with the enemy Reviews scheduled Army missions on the ATO.
situation correlation division (ENSCD) of the AOC. Monitors locations and conditions of LZs and/or
In addition, the fusion section collects BDA data on DZs.
Army-nominated targets.
Exchanges operational and logistic data with the
The BCE ADA section coordinates Army AD corps G3 Air and the G4 to facilitate immediate
activities with the AOC’s combat plans and opera- airlift requests for ARFOR.
tions sections. It exchanges information with the Corps LNOs to the BCE exchange information
control and reporting center (CRC), ARFOR air with BCE sections and respective corps staff ele-
defense headquarters, and the corps ADE. In addi- ments. They also provide the BCE with corps pri-
tion, the ADA section advises the area air defense orities for attack.
commander (AADC), who is usually the JFACC,
on all Army AD matters and status.
The BCE A²C² section coordinates the Army’s Corps Staff and Joint Service Interface
planned and immediate airspace matters with the The corps staff is organized to efficiently help the
AOC combat plans and operations sections for in- commander develop the concept of operations. The
clusion in the airspace control order (ACO). Such staff also helps synchronize the activities of the
matters include permissive and/or restrictive fire ASOC, ANGLICO, and/or TACP.
support coordination measures, ATACMS mis- Synchronization of these activities provides the
sions, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), special commander ready access to advice on the capabili-
electronics mission aircraft (SEMA), and attack ties and limitations of combat air to support corps
helicopter operations.
operations. Figure 4-9 depicts the functional rela-
The BCE intelligence section coordinates with tionships between these activities and members of
the corps and/or ARFOR G2 sections to obtain the corps staff. Division requests for CAS are for-
Army intelligence reports and collection require- warded to the corps to be integrated into the corps’
ments. It provides the AOC combat intelligence overall priorities.
division (CID) with information on the enemy’s The TACP provides advice and assistance to the
ground order of battle and helps develop targets. corps commander in planning air support for his
The BCE operations section monitors execution forces. The corps ALO or NGLO is the senior
of the current ATO and coordinates changes to USAF, USN, or USMC officer in the TACP.
ARFOR targets and priorities that occur during the Each member of the TACP provides advice on
battle. It collocates with the AOC combat operations the capability and availability of fighter and recon-
division. The BCE keeps the AOC updated on naissance assets to support the corps. They help
ARFOR operations, including providing updated develop and synchronize EW activities, interdiction
information on interdiction missions and targets. missions, target nomination, and pre-planned CAS.
The BCE operations section also stays abreast of the
current air situation by monitoring those sorties of The ASOC is the operational component of the
interest to Army commanders. Commanders can theater air control system designated to coordinate
then ensure that approved interdiction sorties are not and direct CAS and tactical air reconnaissance
cancelled or diverted without consultation with the (TAR). The ASOC is under the AOC’s OPCON.
appropriate headquarters. The ASOC normally collocates with the corps staff
at the corps’ main CP.
The BCE airlift section— The ASOC’s primary concern is the exchange of
Coordinates and monitors execution of airlift combat data between air and ground forces. Such
missions in support of Army operations. data includes the coordination and execution of
CAS for ground operations. The ASOC controls
Collocates with the AOC air mobility element. CAS and TAR sorties.
4-21
FM 100-15
The TACP reconnaissance liaison officer the corps receives a forecast of interdiction sorties
(RLO)— from the BCE plans section.
Operates with the intelligence cell of the main CP. The ALO at corps helps the G3 plan the employ-
ment of forecast interdiction sorties. The corps pri-
Advises on USAF tactical reconnaissance oritizes ALO requests then forwards its interdiction
resources. target nominations. Nominations will be either fixed
targets with precise locations and projected times
Coordinates reconnaissance operations. for attack or be in terms of mission-type orders with
Helps the intelligence cell prepare the integrated desired effects on a general type target at a general
air reconnaissance plan. location with a projected time for attack.
Helps prepare TAR requests. The TACP fighter liaison officer (FLO)--
Identifies requirements and initiates requests for Operates with the current operations cell, the
plans cell, and the fire support cell of the main
EW and air defense suppression missions in sup- CP.
port of reconnaissance operations.
Advises on the capabilities of USAF offensive
A corps G3 air representative collocates with the resources.
ASOC. He helps facilitate coordination and com-
munication between the ASOC and the corps. Helps develop Army requests for pre-planned
fighter support.
The corps planning process includes continuous
advice from the corps TACP on the capabilities and Requests Army J-SEAD support.
limitations of CAS. To ensure that CAS is respon-
sive in supporting corps operations, the commander Coordinates with the corps fire support cell and
must make known his CAS requirements early in the A²C² element to integrate artillery fire and air
the planning process. To aid in this determination, missions.
4-22
FM 100-15
Coordinates USAF scatterable mining missions Coordinates requests for immediate reconnais-
with corps engineers. sance missions.
The TACP tactical airlift liaison officer Provides assistance to the FLO and the fire sup-
(TALO)— port cell in developing requests for tactical air
support and expertise on enemy air and missile
Advises the CSS cell of the rear CP on all aspects capabilities.
of airlift capabilities and limitations.
Maintains the air intelligence situation, including
Helps the rear CP CSS cell prepare plans and enemy surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), sur-
requests for airlift support, airdrops, CDS opera- face-to-air missiles (SAMs), and J-SEAD threat
tions, and LAPES. priorities.
Coordinates with the airlift control center A corps G2 representative collocates with the
(ALCC) and other airlift agencies for airlift ASOC to facilitate coordination and communica-
support. tion between the ASOC and corps.
Advises TACPs on tactical airlift support. The ASOC close air support section—
The ASOC tactical air reconnaissance (TAR) Plans, coordinates, and controls CAS operations.
section—
Matches CAS and forward air controller (FAC)
Plans, coordinates, and controls TAR. resources with requests from subordinate TACPs.
Matches TAR resources with requests from the Exercises scramble authority (normally dele-
corps. gated to ASOC from AOC) over distributed im-
mediate sorties.
Reviews Army immediate reconnaissance re-
quests for completeness, feasibility, and applica- Diverts pre-planned airborne or assigns ground-
bility. alert CAS sorties to fill immediate CAS requests.
Coordinates with the ASOC intelligence target Orders launch of CAS alert sorties by contacting
analyst and the corps G2 representative. the appropriate wing operation center (WOC).
Assigns air reconnaissance targets to committed Diverts sorties, with the approval of the corps G3,
or alert sorties. from assigned CAS missions.
Obtains additional reconnaissance from AOC Requests replacement sorties from AOC combat
combat operations. operations to cover diverted missions.
Gives reconnaissance mission sightings to the Helps coordinate the use of Army EW and fires
corps main CP intelligence cell and the ASOC in support of J-SEAD.
sections.
The ASOC intelligence section— Joint Task Force Operations
Processes immediate CAS for target validation A JTF includes assigned or attached elements of
and force size and ordnance recommendations. two or more services. A JTF can be designated by
the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), a CINC, a
Recommends adjustments to pre-planned CAS subordinate unified commander, or by the com-
missions. mander of an existing JTF. A JTF is normally estab-
Assesses weapons effects for immediate requests lished when a mission has a specific limited
for CAS. objective and does not require overall centralized
control of logistics.
Recommends matching ground and airborne alert
ordnance loads to specific targets. Corps commanders and staffs must plan well in
advance for the transition from a single service
Coordinates weapons effects data for pre-planned headquarters with joint representation, to a joint
and immediate CAS attacks. headquarters capable of functioning as the
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FM 100-15
headquarters of a JTF. Joint doctrine establishes the tation requirements he needs for the task at hand and
structure, functions, responsibilities, limitations, coordinate support through the establishing author-
and guiding principles for JTF operations. ity. This augmentation is essential in the transition
of the corps to a JTF structure.
One purpose of this manual is to help Army units
develop operational and training plans for conduct- The CJTF must tailor augmentation for specific
ing activities as a JTF headquarters. Corps com- situations. The following areas usually require aug-
manders and staffs must consult appropriate joint mentation:
doctrinal publications for JTF operations and activi-
ties within the JOPES for both deliberate and crisis- Joint and special staff sections.
action planning. (See JP 5-03.1 and JP 5-03.11 for Specific functional area augmentation, such as
detailed guidance.) CA, movement control, and PSYOP.
To take resources from an existing organization Headquarters life support functions.
to build an ad hoc element degrades the capabilities
of both. It is generally more desirable to establish a Communications support.
JTF or ARFOR headquarters around the nucleus of
an established organization. Security support for the JTF headquarters.
When the corps is tasked to form a JTF headquar- Combatant commanders usually organize aug-
ters, it is imperative that all of the staff sections and mentation for the joint staff into packages based on
agencies have joint service representation. The the nature and tempo of developments and the ex-
corps staff must transition to a joint staff structure isting capabilities of the headquarters designated as
to ensure unity of effort within the task force. the JTF. These packages fall into three broad
categories:
Joint service representation on the staff should be
in relative proportion to the service composition of 1. Quick response cells to rapidly augment the JTF
the JTF. This will allow service components to fully headquarters with joint and operational area
participate in all staff processes. expertise during the early stages of a
crisis-action situation. (Figure 4-10 shows a
The JTF establishing authority is responsible for typical JTF staff organization.)
providing personnel and resources for the corps
when the corps is a JTF. However, the corps com- 2. Functional area augmentation to provide the JTF
mander. as the CJTF, must determine what augmen- with expertise not organic to its staff or to
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FM 100-15
4-25
FM 100-15
and conducts civil-military affairs, including trans- A joint civil-military engineering board
fer of control to civilian authorities. (JCMEB) to provide overall direction for civil-
In addition to the JOC, the J3 may also military construction efforts and to develop a civil
supervise— engineering support plan (again, the JTF engineer
may manage this activity).
A joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) to
coordinate targeting guidance and objectives and A joint medical regulating office (JMRO) to co-
to develop the joint target list. ordinate the movement of patients in and out of
the AO.
A joint rescue coordination center (JRCC), al-
though the CJTF may task a component com- A joint military blood program office (JMBPO)
mander to perform this function. to coordinate the distribution of whole blood
within the AO.
A joint EW staff of component representatives
and representatives of the J2 and J6. A joint mortuary affairs office (JMAO) to coor-
dinate mortuary affairs actions (normally tasked
A corps PSYOP support element (CPSE) to plan to the ARFOR).
and develop PSYOP support for the PSYOP cam-
paign plan. J5, Plans Directorate. The J5 conducts long-
range planning and preparation of the campaign or
A joint meteorological forecasting unit (JMFU) operations plan. The corps G3, plans division, with
to provide weather support. augmentation from the combatant command, forms
Activities associated with MP functions. the basis of the J5.
A civil-military cell (CMC) to provide CA and The J5 is responsible for coordinating TPFDD
civil-military affairs integration in OOTW. and monitoring force closure. He normally partici-
pates in JTCB and EW planning. He may establish
J4, Logistics Directorate. The J4 plans, coordi- a CMC in the joint operations center (JOC) to
nates, and supervises supply, maintenance, trans- coordinate CA and civil-military matters. This
portation, general engineering, health services, and would ensure proper coordination with any HN
other related logistic activities. Each service com- government or appropriate US embassy staff essen-
ponent of the combatant command is responsible for tial in OOTW.
the logistic support of its respective forces except
where the CJTF designates a single service respon- J6, Command, Control, Communications, and
sibility for a particular logistic function. Computer Systems Directorate. The J6 ensures
communications capabilities support the CJTF’s
The CJTF establishes logistic priorities for the operational concept. During planning, the
force, assigns terrain and facilities for use as support WWMCCS is the primary means of C² with higher
bases, and designates and maintains LOCs. The J4 headquarters.
supervises the activities of any required logistic-
related coordinating centers and boards. These may The WWMCCS is supplemented by secure voice
include— telephone and TACSAT. The WWMCCS intercom-
puter network (WIN) is the primary means for the
A joint movement center (JMC), which coordi- corps to input data that will drive the allocation of
nates strategic movement with TRANSCOM and necessary transportation resources to support force
ensures effective use of transportation assets. projection.
A subarea petroleum office (SAPO) formed
around elements from the combatant command’s Continuous access to WWMCCS is essential for
joint petroleum office (JPO) to augment the JTF effective C² and operations planning. This includes
in managing petroleum-related logistics. access to the system once the JTF deploys to its AO
(by deploying a WWMCCS terminal with the
A joint facilities utilization board (JFUB) to man- headquarters). During operations, WWMCCS re-
age real estate requirements, unless the JTF engi- mains the primary means of communications with
neer is designated a special staff officer and higher headquarters while TACSAT is the main link
assigned these duties. with assaulting forces.
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FM 100-15
The J6 is also responsible for frequency manage- option selection and COA development, and it re-
ment and may form a JCCC to provide overall sults in the development of OPLANs and OPORDs.
systems management. The joint communications
support element (JCSE) may augment joint task
force communications. Execution of joint operations is the final step.
Corps use JOPES during both the deliberate plan-
ning process and during CAP. Once deliberate plan-
Joint Special Operations ning is listed in a CINC’s deliberate OPLAN as a
possible JTF, the corps uses it to develop OPLANs
The commander of a JTF may create subordinate in response to potential contingency situations.
JTFs to meet specific mission requirements or to
simplify C² relationships. The JSOTF is an example The corps uses the CAP process in fast-develop-
of such a subordinate task force. ing situations where NCA are considering the com-
mitment of military forces. Although early
The JSOTF may be specifically established to augmentation to the corps staff usually includes
meet designated operational requirements or it may personnel with JOPES expertise from the combatant
be formed, for simplicity, around an existing force command staff, the time sensitivity of CAP dictates
structure. A JSOTF’s organization is similar to a that the corps have JOPES expertise on its staff.
conventional JTF. The JSOTF may have OPCON
of all SOF, less PSYOP, assigned to the JTF and or The deliberate-planning process results in the
SOF in support of conventional force commanders. approval of either an OPLAN or a contingency plan.
An OPLAN is a complete and detailed joint plan
that normally includes all annexes and TPFDD. A
A JPOTF normally plans, coordinates, and exe- contingency plan is an abbreviated plan that requires
cutes the theater PSYOP campaign plan. In some expansion, which includes the development of
cases, the CJTF may elect to create separate JTFs TPFDD files. The deliberate-planning process has
for PSYOP, the JPOTF, and for the joint civil- five phases:
military operations task force (JCMOTF). The na-
ture of the operation and the objective to be accom- 1. Initiation, where the staff identifies planning
plished ultimately determines specific command tasks.
relationships.
2. Concept development, where mission analysis
and COA development take place.
Command and Control
3. Plan development, where the staff prepares the
Commanders and staffs must integrate battle C² OPLAN and CONPLAN in detail, including
elements early in the deployment flow with the support and TPFDD annexes as appropriate.
combat forces during force-projection operations.
However, the JTF may elect to conduct split-based 4. Plan review, where the CJCS, the combatant
operations, leaving the majority of the C² structure commander, and other appropriate agencies
at a fixed base outside the operational area while a assess and validate plans.
small command element closes into the theater of
operations. The decision to conduct a split-based 5. Supporting plans, where the supporting
operation affects both the JTF staff structure and the commands finalize all actions required to
physical setup at both locations. support the basic plan.
Peacetime planning, CAP, and the execution of Crisis-action planning helps adjust existing con-
joint operations is accomplished through the tingency plans, or develops and executes OPORDs
JOPES. The JOPES translates policy decisions into where no plan exists, in response to an evolving
OPLANs and OPORDs in support of national secu- crisis. A crisis-action situation where a military
rity objectives. force is committed usually requires the rapid pro-
jection of combat power to achieve a quick resolu-
The JOPES is a continuous process that begins in tion to the crisis. Often, a forcible entry capability
response to perceived or identified threats to US will be required. The force may then have to simul-
security interests. It continues through military taneously fight and continue deployment of
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FM 100-15
4-28
FM 100-15
The delivery of joint fires must be synchronized United States doctrine clearly defines the impor-
to support the operations plan. Aggressive interface tance of articulating the commander’s intent when
between intelligence and acquisition systems, fire developing plans and orders. This practice may or
planners, operation planners, and delivery systems may not be used by non-US multinational com-
in the joint environment ensures that the corps can manders. United States commanders must ensure
apply overwhelming combat power at the decisive that all members of the multinational force recog-
point. This is the essential element of successful nize the importance of this requirement in all mili-
joint operations. tary operations.
Field Manual 100-8 identifies several potential
command and staff structures based on the needs,
CORPS MULTINATIONAL political climate, international restrictions, and ob-
OPERATIONS jectives of participating nations. These structures
generally fall into the categories of parallel, lead
Future military operations will always be joint nation, or integrated commands.
operations, and, in many cases, they will be con- In a parallel command structure there is no single
ducted in cooperation with other nations as multi- commander of all forces. Each nation in the force
national operations. Multinational operations are has a separate command structure. A principal fea-
military actions that military forces from two or ture of the parallel command structure is the exist-
more nations conduct, typically within the structure ence of a coordination center (Figure 4-13). As the
of a coalition or alliance. Existing alliances, estab- force matures, the participating nations send staff
lished over along time, or ad hoc coalitions, formed officers and LNOs to the coordination center to help
as a rapid response to unforeseen crises, can under- resolve issues involving sustainment, alert and
take multinational operations. warning, HN support, movement control, training,
and possibly, battle C².
The key to successful multinational operations is
the establishment of mutual trust and confidence An example of a command structure in UN ac-
between the respective senior commanders of the tivities is the coalition lead-nation command struc-
various military forces. United States commanders ture (Figure 4-14). All coalition members are
who work with multinational forces must know subordinated to a single commander. While this
how to coordinate activities among partners with structure has the advantage of unity of command,
dissimilar objectives and different military nations are reluctant to grant this degree of control
capabilities. to a commander from another nation. This problem
Commanders must possess a leadership style that
instills confidence and builds harmony between all
of the members of the force. All commanders must
work to establish rapport, mutual respect, and unity
of effort in the face of differing national agendas.
Multinational operations are inherently difficult
operations. There is a natural reluctance for com-
manders of forces of one nationality to place their
soldiers under the OPCON, TACON, or TACOM
of an officer of a different nationality.
There are problems with language, communica-
tions and automation equipment, tactics, and
procedures. These problems are lessened by the
exchange of LNOs and, when possible, the estab-
lishment of International Standardization Agree-
ments (ISAs), standing operating procedures
(SOPs), and clearly written, uncomplicated orders.
4-29
FM 100-15
is lessened by ensuring broad coalition repre- The corps commander must have a reasonable
sentation on the lead-nation headquarters staff. understanding of the multinational force’s equip-
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ment, doctrine, and capabilities. This is essential for
is an example of an integrated command structure developing plans and allocating resources in all
that provides unity of command in the multinational multinational operations. Conducting operational
setting. The commander is selected from one of the fires is difficult in any operation but especially so in
member nations; the staff and subordinate com- multinational operations where common methods
mands are multinational representatives. The lead- of control may not exist and where there are wide
nation commander decides the staff’s ultimate differences in capabilities.
composition. (Figure 4-15 is an example of an inte- The US corps commander may have access to
grated structure.) intelligence sources and methods that he cannot
share with the partners in multinational operations
There are several factors at the operational level even if he is subordinate to a non-US commander.
that the corps commander must consider as early as This situation certainly strains relationships and
possible in planning for multinational operations. In complicates attempts to establish trust. Fortunately,
addition to selecting the proper command structure, much of the coordination and negotiation for shar-
the commander must ensure that all participants in ing intelligence occur at national and strategic lev-
the operation understand the terminology used to els. (See FM 100-8 for other considerations.)
describe command relationships.
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FM 100-15
INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS deputy and vice versa. CORDS was responsible for
pacification, the destruction of the enemy’s insur-
Defense and promotion of US national interests gency infrastructure, and development efforts to
in war, conflict, and peace require the combined alleviate the causes of revolution.
efforts of all the instruments of national power. In
war, the military instrument has primacy and is CORDS enjoyed considerable success and
supported by other government and nongovernment contributed to the enemy’s decision to abandon
agencies. In peace and conflict, the relationship is insurgency methods for an approximation of con-
reversed, but the need for unity of effort assumes ventional war. CORDS owed its existence to the
even greater importance. personal direction of President Lyndon B.
Johnson and his advisor, Ambassador Robert
Among government organizations, there is no Comer, who became the first deputy commander,
true unity of command below the level of the Presi- MACV, for CORDS. No organization as formal and
dent and the National Security Council. That is, no elaborate is likely to be established absent similar
single agency of government can give authoritative high-level intervention.
direction to other departments and agencies. Com-
mand, as it is known in the armed forces, does not CORDS does, however, provide an example of
exist. Direction by consensus takes its place. interagency organizational efficiency, and can serve
as a model for military commanders and their civil-
One exception to this general rule is the statutory ian agency counterparts. Interagency relationships
authority of an ambassador over US government must be established through negotiation.
activities in the country to which he is accredited.
The law reads in part: Under the direction of the Agreements should be in writing, as memoranda
President, the chief of a mission to a foreign coun- of understanding or terms of reference, to ensure
try—(l) shall have full responsibility for the direc- understanding and to avoid confusion. Most such
tion, coordination, and supervision of all agreements are made at the unified command or JTF
Government executive branch employees in that level.
country (except for employees under the command
of a United States area military commander) (Title An Army corps reaches such agreements when it
22, USC). acts as the nucleus of a JTF or as an Army compo-
nent command. Moreover, local commanders can
The area military commander is generally consid- and should reach cooperative understanding with
ered to be a unified CINC who exercises combatant their civilian agency counterparts. That includes the
command. His forces are excluded from an ambas- corps or its elements.
sador’s directive authority. That means that a corps
or its major elements deployed for operations is not One caution is in order. There are serious legal
subject to the ambassador’s direction. On the other restrictions on the use of military personnel and
hand many corps activities in OOTW, such as mo- equipment, especially in OOTW. Therefore, the
bile training teams (MTT) and small exercises, are commander must consult the SJA when developing
subject to the ambassador’s approval. cooperative agreements.
There is precedent for a fully integrated inter- Relations with other government agencies and
agency organization. During the Vietnam War, the international and private organizations are so im-
Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Sup- portant to OOTW that the corps commander should
port (CORDS) organization integrated civilian and devote a major part of his personal attention to them.
military personnel from top to bottom. He should entrust day-to-day operation to a deputy
commander, executive officer, or chief of staff and
CORDS was headed by a civilian, with the per- provide the necessary commander’s intent so the
sonal rank of ambassador, who was also the deputy designated officer can function effectively.
commander, US Military Assistance Command
Vietnam (MACV), for CORDS. From national, The commander should make periodic checks on
through province, to district levels, military and the conduct of operations to assure himself that they
civilian personnel alternated in command positions. are progressing satisfactorily. However, his atten-
If a commander was military, he had a civilian tion should focus on interagency matters.
4-31
FM 100-15
The corps commander cannot give orders to other to take resources from units that do not deploy to
agencies. Instead, he must participate in consensus- support those that do.
building as one voice among equals. He must per-
suasively present the military view, but he must also Whether the corps is the supported or the support-
be ready to compromise. His preferences will be ing force, it must act as a bridge between tactical
accepted by other organizations only insofar as he operations and the interagency requirements of the
presents them convincingly and in a spirit of coop- operational and strategic levels of war. The corps’
eration. By doing so, other government and private appropriate attention to the requirements of inter-
agency officials will be inclined to accept the com- agency operations makes an important contribution
mander’s expertise in military matters and to listen to the national objective in any political-military
attentively to his opinions on the overall operation. environment.
4-32
FM 100-15
airspace users of the combined arms team and sup- Although assigned to an Army unit, the GLO
porting services. serves “with duty” at the USAF unit location, and
works with the operations or intelligence section of
The A²C² element’s primary tasks include- that unit. If the GLO is part of a liaison group, he
Coordinating and integrating airspace user re- may not habitually work with the same unit, but will
quirements within the corps AO. be sent to perform liaison duties for whatever Army
unit is being supported.
Maintaining A²C² information displays and The corps’ primary A²C² focus is on conducting
maps. battles in the forward portion of the combat zone, in
Developing and coordinating airspace control the corps’ rear boundary, and forward. Therefore,
SOPs, plans, and annexes to corps OPORDs and airspace control activities must synchronize all air-
OPLANs and disseminating airspace control or- space users of the combined arms team and support-
ders, messages, and overlays. ing services with corps close, deep, and rear
operations. Corps airspace control methodology
Approving, staffing, and forwarding to the next stresses the use of procedural control, relying on
higher headquarters requests for special use air- standing operating procedures, selected use of thea-
space. ter airspace control measures, and compliance with
the theater airspace control plan and SOPs.
The A²C² element at the main CP is the focal point
for all airspace control activities related to corps rear If the corps is the JTF headquarters, the com-
operations, deep operations, and the planning for mander’s and the staffs responsibilities may
future close operations. Airspace control activities change. Instead of coordinating and synchronizing
supporting the execution of close operations nor- Army assets in close, deep, and rear operations, they
mally pass through the TAC CP to the A²C² element must synchronize land, air, maritime, SOF, space,
at the main CP for further action. The TAC CP and and multinational forces. In addition, forces subor-
the A²C² element maintain close coordination at the dinated to the JTF may be organized on a functional
main CP to ensure that airspace requirements, which basis, such as designating the USAF commander as
changes to the tactical situation generate, are met in the JFACC.
a timely, effective manner. The CJTF has many diverse responsibilities in the
At the TAC CP there is no formal A²C² element. airspace arena. An Army corps staff has neither the
Designated representatives from selected staff and expertise nor capability to effectively plan and co-
liaision elements accomplish airspace control ordinate all aspects of joint airspace control.
functions. At a minimum, representatives include a The CJTF must personally involve himself, with
G3 officer, who is responsible for the A²C² effort all functional component commanders, in the devel-
and who is assisted by a fire support officer; an opment of the airspace control plan. The intent is for
aviation representative; an ADA representative; and the senior tactical and operational commanders to
the USAF liaison officer. express their airspace, ground, and maritime re-
quirements in mutually agreeable terms to meet the
The GLO provides the interface between the JFC’s operational objectives.
Army and supporting USAF units to facilitate the
conduct of tactical air support, airlift, and aerial Traditional relationships may change. Histori-
reconnaissance operations. The GLO may be as- cally, the corps has worked with the USAF for
signed to a specific Army unit or may be part of a tactical air support and interdiction. In larger unit
liaison group specifically organized to coordinate operations, where the corps was subordinate to an
operations between the services. Army EAC headquarters, the BCE worked for the
EAC headquarters, and the corps A²C² element
The GLO receives his guidance from the Army reported to the BCE. The corps, as a JTF, may have
unit being supported. This may be through direct the BCE assigned or under OPCON.
coordination with the Army unit or through another
coordination cell such as the BCE. The exact struc- The change in national military strategy and the
ture is theater-dependent. Navy’s redirection from deep water operations to
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FM 100-15
4-34
FM 100-15
For the purposes of C²W, destruction of a hostile in determining and implementing OPSEC measures
C² function means that function cannot perform that eliminate or reduce vulnerabilities.
permanently or for a given time. With this definition
in mind, the commander must clearly communicate The staff must also consider ways to prevent
his destruction intentions to the FSE so it can spread fratricide. Fratricide in this case is the degradation
limited fire support means to cover the most targets. of corps C² capabilities by friendly actions intended
It is important to remember that C²W will be com- to counter enemy C². Allocating frequencies, imple-
peting with other targets needing the same weapons menting deconfliction procedures, or establishing
systems. restricted frequency lists are examples of measures
that help reduce the occurrence of the problem.
C² Protection In C² protection, OPSEC measures deny target-
ing information to the enemy. Jamming disrupts
The corps commander bases C² protection plan- enemy communications between his sensors and his
ning on his concept of operations. The process fire support systems. Destruction is used in C² pro-
begins when the commander assesses the enemy’s tection to attack enemy information warfare re-
intelligence and counter-C² capabilities and identi- sources.
fies those corps characteristics vulnerable to the
enemy’s intelligence and counter-C² actions. Destroying enemy jammers, fire direction cen-
ters, and deception units protects corps C² capabili-
The G3 identifies priority characteristics that re- ties from lethal and nonlethal attack and deception
quire special protection as essential elements of operations. In turn, the corps can use deception to
friendly information (EEFI). The staff assists the G3 negate enemy targeting and surveillance assets.
4-35
Chapter 5
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
Surprise
Surprise at the tactical level means that the corps
attacks at a time, place, or in a manner the enemy
least expects, even when the enemy is anticipating
an attack. Achieving surprise requires the corps to
develop detailed and timely intelligence concerning
the enemy, weather, and terrain. Meanwhile, the
corps denies similar information to the enemy by
using deception and aggressive OPSEC measures.
5-1
FM 100-15
5-2
FM 100-15
body initiates contact. The covering-force mission units and organize march columns to facilitate an
statement includes what size force it is to defeat and immediate attack or, possibly, a hasty defense from
what size force it is to bypass. If the corps attacks a the march. When possible, commanders assign mul-
defending enemy, the covering force usually— tiple routes to subordinate units. Commanders may
commit elements of the main body to reduce pockets
Sufficiently penetrates the enemy’s security of resistance that the covering force contained or
forces and main defensive positions to facilitate bypassed.
the main body’s attack on the enemy’s main
defenses. The main body’s leading maneuver elements nor-
Identities the location and deployment of enemy mally furnish and control the advance guard. The
forces in main defensive positions. close proximity of the leading maneuver elements
during the march, and the possibility that these
Limits the ability of the enemy’s security forces elements may have to respond to a threat beyond the
to collect intelligence. capability of the advance guard, make this type of
C² arrangement preferable.
Disrupts the enemy’s deployment and commit-
ment of forces. The advance guard must maintain contact with
Because the covering force operates at extended the corps covering force. Either the advance guard
distances from the main body, it must be self-con- or its higher headquarters normally furnishes liaison
tained and task-organized with the necessary CS elements to the covering force. The corps may em-
and CSS to allow it to fight independently. The ploy an advance guard in lieu of a covering force.
corps normally provides CAS sorties and additional
FA, AD, NBC, reconnaissance, aviation, and engi- When the corps controls the advance guard, the
neer assets to the covering force. corps commander gives specific guidance to the
advance guard concerning the size of the enemy
The main body contains the bulk of the corps’ force it is to defeat or destroy. Main body forces
combat power. Commanders must task-organize normally furnish and control flank security for the
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FM 100-15
same reasons. However, if flank security units are with movement control teams or movement regulat-
operating under corps control, the commander ing teams.
needs to consider the specific security mission (nor-
mally guard or screen) assigned to these units. A movement to contact normally terminates on
an objective or limit of advance (LOA). It might
Given the probable extensive distances moving result in a meeting engagement where friendly
corps might cover, a flank screen mission is the forces attempt to fix the enemy with the minimal
norm. Also, extensive distances, especially on the force while maintaining freedom of action with the
flanks, normally necessitate allocation of aviation maximum combat power.
and direct support FA assets for these units.
The covering force, if designated, normally initi-
Rear security forces normally operate under corps ates the meeting engagement, develops the situ-
control. The usually extensive distances, created by ation, and defeats the enemy force within its
corps-controlled CS and CSS COSCOM units op- capability. If the enemy force is stronger than the
erating to the rear of the subordinate divisions in the covering force, the force may have to go over to the
main body, favor a separate corps-controlled unit. hasty defense and await the main body.
Normally, the corps TAC CP moves with the Subordinate unit advance guard elements move
leading division. The corps’ main CP remains rela- rapidly forward to reinforce the covering force,
tively stationary if the corps maintains communi- seize key or decisive terrain, or seek an exposed
cations between it and the leading elements. The enemy flank. If the corps is advancing on multiple
corps’ TAC and main CPs alternate control of the routes, main body forces normally attack from the
corps’ movement to contact as they leapfrog for- march to defeat or destroy the enemy force. If the
ward. The main CP’s initial location and subsequent enemy force is sufficiently strong and the corps’
movement rests on— advance restricted, leading units may occupy attack
How it can best control the corps’ initial move- positions until the corps can generate sufficient
ment. combat power.
Its subsequent attack from the march. Search and attack operations are a variation of the
movement to contact. The corps conducts search
The corps’ deep and rear operations. and attack operations by predominantly light forces
The TAC CP normally moves with, or immedi- to counter enemy forces operating in restricted ter-
ately to the rear of, one of the leading divisions. The rain, such as cities, jungles, mountains, and so forth.
primary consideration in determining the TAC CP’s
movement and positioning is how it can best control
corps close operations from the march and still This form of offense may also be appropriate in
assume the functions of the main CP when required. areas where the corps wants to deny enemy move-
ment. The corps may even leapfrog light units ahead
to conduct search and attack operations to facilitate
During the movement to contact, units should movement of the corps’ main body through restric-
anticipate a disruption of resupply. They should tive terrain. Based on METT-T, light units are nor-
carry water and Class I and Class III package prod- mally task-organized with aviation and some
ucts on their tactical and combat vehicles. They armored units.
should also carry enough additional supplies to
maintain them through the movement to contact and
the ensuing battle. Attack
Depending on the distance, the corps may plan In most instances, the corps transitions into the
and coordinate a refuel on the move (ROM), sup- attack after making contact with the enemy. The
ported by both COSCOM and DISCOM assets. In corps applies overwhelming combat power at the
addition to ROM sites, the corps may pre-position point of the main effort rupturing and destroying the
CSS units and supplies to support the move. Also, continuity of the enemy’s defense. The attack must
COSCOM may recover and evacuate all equipment make the enemy abandon his defense or face piece-
left in place. It may also effect movement control meal destruction.
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FM 100-15
The corps, synchronizing organic systems and operations that employ all the assets of corps and
joint assets, attacks the enemy throughout the depth joint and/or multinational forces available to the
of his defense keeping him off balance and limiting corps.
his freedom of action. The corps accepts risk in its Deliberate attacks are characterized by the devel-
zone of attack, achieving concentration at decisive opment of detailed intelligence on the enemy and
points and making use of tactical deception in sup- the preparation time to plan and rehearse the attack.
port of the attack. Forces normally conduct deliberate attacks from
The corps must meet a variety of threats that will defensive positions.
not necessarily follow specific models or templates. The corps covers its preparation for deliberate
Thorough and timely intelligence, or lack of it, will attacks by employing OPSEC measures, engaging
drive the corps commander to choose between a in deception, and selecting a time and location for
movement to contact and a deliberate attack. Forces the attack to achieve tactical surprise. Spoiling at-
conduct hasty attacks as a part of a larger operation, tacks enhance deception operations and prevent the
based on battle drill, unit SOPs, and FRAGOs. enemy from concentrating reserves.
Hasty Attack. Hasty attacks are the desired out- During a deliberate attack, CSS emphasizes the
come of meeting engagements. They are launched resupply of critical items (fuel and ammunition) and
with minimal preparation by either the unit in con- the provision of medical and maintenance support.
tact or by follow-on forces. The purpose of hasty The momentum of the attack may not allow for any
attacks is to (one) destroy the enemy before he can other CSS operations. The force needs to establish
concentrate forces or establish an effective defense priorities to weight the main effort and to support
or (two) fix the enemy using the smallest force shifting the main effort as the operation unfolds. The
necessary. Units maneuver against the exposed en- force must consider the effects of follow-on opera-
emy flank or rear to gain the initiative and over- tions to ensure a swift and smooth transition to the
whelm the enemy before he can react. exploitation and pursuit.
After receiving the IPB, the latest intelligence When attacking, the corps may use one, or a
update, and combat information, the commander combination, of the basic forms of maneuver (the
initiates the hasty attack using FRAGOs and forces frontal attack, the envelopment, the penetration, the
on hand. Simple, rehearsed plans and SOPs from turning movement, and the infiltration). Ideally, the
standard formations minimize the loss of synchro- corps will attempt to envelop the enemy’s flank (or
nization. Maintaining a reserve enhances the com- bypass his flank), seize decisive terrain or a decisive
mander’s flexibility by providing a force to exploit point in the enemy’s rear, and force him to come out
success or react to unforeseen contingencies. of his positions and react.
The hasty attack is usually the most risky offen- If the enemy does not have an assailable flank, the
sive operation. Information regarding the strength, corps may conduct a frontal attack or penetration.
disposition, and intentions of the enemy will be The corps also uses these forms of maneuver when
limited, and subordinate units must seize opportu- conducting an exploitation or pursuit.
nities and act within the commander’s intent to
respond to avariety of situations. Consequently,
war-gaming situations that the corps might confront Exploitation
is essential. Seldom will attacks annihilate a defending enemy
Because of time constraints that affect external force. More often, the enemy will attempt to disen-
support, the initial CSS package for a hasty attack gage, withdraw, and reorganize a coherent defense.
is normally limited to items that attacking units can Exploitation seeks to extend the destruction of the
carry. To sustain the attack, units use the same enemy force by maintaining offensive pressure and
resupply procedures as in a deliberate attack. by exploiting opportunities. The purpose of exploi-
tation is to prevent the enemy from reconstituting
Deliberate Attack. The corps conducts a deliber- an organized defense, counter-attacking, conduct-
ate attack when a hasty attack has failed or will not ing an orderly withdrawal, or continuing to support
succeed. Deliberate attacks are fully synchronized his operations.
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FM 100-15
Exploitation is the primary means of translating unable to continue. The follow and support force is
tactical success into operational advantage. It can be not a reserve.
directed by the next higher echelon or initiated by
the corps. The following factors usually indicate an The follow and support mission commits a unit to
opportunity to conduct an exploitation: accomplish any or all the following tasks:
An increase in EPWs, especially in leaders. Destroy bypassed units.
The disintegration of defending enemy units after Relieve in place any direct pressure or encircling
initial attacks. force that has halted to contain the enemy.
An increase in captured and destroyed enemy Block movement of reinforcements.
equipment. Secure lines of communications.
The presence of equipment from several units in Guard prisoners, key areas, and installations.
one formation.
Secure key terrain.
The lessening of enemy fires.
Control refugees.
The detection by deep surveillance operations of
a general enemy withdrawal. The exploitation force and the follow and support
force maintain direct communications. The corps
Commanders should follow up every attack with- commander ensures the accomplishment of forward
out delay. When conducting an exploitation, the echelonment of CSS elements in a timely manner to
corps attacks enemy support systems by— support the exploitation.
Expanding the area of envelopment or Since the exploitation continues day and night,
penetration. the exploiting force requires continuous mainte-
nance and sustainment support. Adequate mainte-
Securing decisive terrain deep in the enemy nance support must accompany the exploiting force,
rear. and the sustainment of the exploitation requires
Cutting the enemy’s major LOC and sources of well-timed movement of assets.
supply. The logistic structure’s ability to move forward
Disrupting enemy reserves and uncommitted with fuel, ammunition, and maintenance support
forces. often determines the force’s limits of advance.
Commanders and staffs must plan for and use aerial
Synchronizing corps deep operations and joint resupply to help exploitation units sustain the opera-
interdiction to disrupt the enemy’s attempts to tion, particularly until opening and securing ground
reestablish a coherent defense. LOC.
Positioning units to support the follow-on mis- As the exploitation continues, the corps plans a
sion or subsequent objectives. series of objectives so divisions can orient their
movement. The corps also designates routes, zones,
Commanders should not expect the units creating and relative dispositions. The corps may designate
the opportunity for the exploitation to perform the a limit of advance to control the advance of the
exploitation to an extended depth. Other units divisions. The corps must also look forward to the
should replace these units as soon as possible. A next operation to ensure that disposition of units and
mobile force specifically tasked for the purpose support assets will aid any new schemes of
should accomplish the full exploitation. maneuver.
Commonly, there are two missions associated
with an exploitation—follow and assume and fol- Pursuit
low and support. A follow and assume mission
commits one force to follow another when conduct- Pursuit normally follows a successful exploita-
ing an offensive operation. The follow and assume tion. Unlike an exploitation, the pursuit focuses on
force continues the offensive once the lead force is catching and destroying retreating enemy forces
5-6
FM 100-15
that can no longer organize a coherent defense. hampered by bypassed enemy units, road conges-
Destroying the enemy force is the goal of pursuit, tion, and disruption.
although the commander may also designate terrain
objectives. Opening and securing LOC suitable to support the
transportation of adequate supplies is also essential
Pursuit operations usually require a direct pres- to a successful pursuit. The pursuit, even more than
sure force and an encircling force (Figure 5-2). The the exploitation, is a transportation-intensive
corps can use tank and mechanized forces for both operation.
direct pressure and encircling forces. However,
even though tank-heavy forces are normally pre-
ferred as encircling forces, the corps may also use Forms of Maneuver
airborne and air assault forces.
Frontal Attack. A frontal attack strikes the enemy
Attack helicopters are essential. Close air support across a wide front over the most direct approaches.
and interdiction operate along with encircling The corps should only use a frontal attack when it
forces. The corps also synchronizes joint intelli- possesses overwhelming combat power and when
gence and attack systems to support the pursuit. the enemy is at a clear disadvantage. This could
During pursuit operations, the corps may encoun- occur if the enemy has been significantly weakened
ter encircled enemy forces and should plan for their or if the enemy is defending on an unusually wide
defeat. The size of an enemy force the corps may front, only part of which is within the corps zone of
bypass and how it is to deal with such forces must attack (Figure 5-3). Other reasons for conducting
be clear. frontal attacks are the lack of an assailable enemy
flank, critical time constraints, or the desire to deal
Sustainment arrangements must be flexible and a severe psychological blow to the enemy.
capable of rapid response during pursuit operations.
Fuel and ammunition commonly are the principal Envelopment. To conduct an envelopment, the
logistic requirements. The corps must plan aerial corps must find or envelop an assailable enemy
resupply to augment ground transportation assets flank, using a portion of its force to fix the enemy
while the remainder conducts the envelopment
5-7
FM 100-15
(Figure 5-4). Envelopment occurs either as a result Penetration. Either infantry or armored units,
of maneuver against an open flank or as a result of supported by concentrated fires and nonlethal
a penetration. In an envelopment, a supporting at- means, can achieve a penetration (Figure 5-6). A
tack distracts the enemy, fixes him in his main corps attacking division can penetrate a defending
defenses, and tries to get him to commit his reserve enemy division by concentrating sufficient combat
prematurely or in effectively (Figure 5-5). power against battalion-size defenses or by attacking
5-8
FM 100-15
5-9
FM 100-15
throughout the depth of the enemy division. (For The turning movement forces the enemy to divert
example, during the breaching operation in Opera- major forces to cope with the new threat or to
tion Desert Storm, the 1st Infantry Division (Mech) abandon his position. While a supporting attack may
concentrated battalions against enemy platoons. ) be required to fix the enemy in an envelopment, a
Corps supporting attacks and deep operations turning movement does not always require a fixing
normally fix or draw off enemy reserves that might attack. Because of the great distances between
react to the zone of penetration, or that are either forces, if a fixing attack occurs, each force must be
adjacent to and/or in subsequent positions outside sufficiently strong and mobile to operate
of the assigned zone of the division conducting the independently.
penetration. After penetrating the main defensive
position, the corps may commit trailing divisions to
either further penetrate or envelop subsequent en- Infiltration. Infiltration is another form of ma-
emy positions. neuver the corps can use to gain positional advan-
tage and to attack the enemy in depth while avoiding
Turning Movement. The corps may also envelop enemy strengths. The corps uses infiltration with
an enemy by striking deep and seizing decisive other forms of maneuver to unhinge a defending
terrain in the enemy’s rear, cutting his LOC, or enemy. Light infantry units up to brigade size are
isolating his forces. This deep maneuver differs best suited to conduct infiltrations.
from an envelopment chiefly by the depth of its
objectives and by what the commander intends it to
accomplish. In some circumstances, armored forces operating
In a turning movement, the corps avoids the main in small units conduct infiltrations. Since success
enemy force, passes around enemy defensive posi- requires avoiding detection, at least until the objec-
tions, and secures an objective deep in the enemy’s tive is reached, the size, strength, and composition
rear to make the enemy’s situation untenable of the corps unit conducting the infiltration is usu-
(Figure 5-7). ally limited. Consequently, specific objectives and
tasks assigned to this force will also be limited.
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FM 100-15
5-11
FM 100-15
5-12
FM 100-15
Mobile reserve formations, including helicopter mations. During the exploitation and pursuit, corps
units, which could influence attacks in the close deep operations normally focus on—
area.
Isolating the retreating enemy force and prevent-
Higher echelon enemy C² facilities. ing its reinforcement.
Key support facilities or infrastructure. Attacking the enemy at critical chokepoints.
Nuclear and chemical delivery systems. Disrupting, turning, and stopping lead elements
of the retreating enemy force.
Normally, the corps establishes specific respon-
sibilities for subordinate echelon deep operations. The purpose of deep operations might extend
Divisions focus on supporting close operations beyond shaping the close battle and establishing
while using supporting corps assets to conduct favorable conditions for the close fight. Deep opera-
counterfires. tions might even be the decisive operation against
enemy forces. As such, the corps might only con-
Corps augment counterfire operations, and attack duct close operations to facilitate cross-FLOT op-
deeper targets, with ATACMs and attack helicop- erations and to attack the enemy’s center of gravity.
ters. The corps establishes control measures to ease
and aid the shifting of responsibilities for deep
operations between itself and attacking divisions Reconnaissance and Security Operations
(advancing to a certain phase line or objective, for
instance). Before contacting the enemy main body, the
corps normally conducts reconnaissance forward of
The enemy’s counterattack forces are usually the corps, or it provides security. However, once the
high-payoff targets for corps deep operations ef- corps commits its main body forces, the attacking
forts. The corps identifies enemy formations pos- divisions provide their own security.
sessing significant firepower and the mobility to
easily influence the outcome of the corps attack if In some situations, the attacking divisions or the
they are not countered. main effort may control the corps’ covering force
or reconnaissance assets. Divisions normally desig-
The corps must disrupt or preclude such forces nate an advance guard and conduct a flank screen
from interfering with the penetration and/or en- of their most vulnerable flank. This option is usually
velopment of static enemy positions in main defen- more feasible from the standpoint of control. How-
sive positions. ever, the corps may elect to provide a separate
security force on a particularly sensitive flank bor-
Enemy attack helicopter units also pose a formi- dering the corps’ assigned zone.
dable threat because of their ability to mass and
maneuver in support of main defensive positions. The introduction of another corps-controlled ele-
Ideally, the corps identifies and considers such units ment between its deep operations area and the at-
for destruction while still in their assembly areas. tacking divisions only tends to increase the
coordination necessary between units and to com-
The corps jams enemy C² nets and disrupts his plicate the control and execution of close opera-
intelligence-collection efforts to preclude and/or tions.
disrupt the flow of information. The corps destroys
enemy command posts to disrupt his capability to During the exploitation and pursuit, the extended
provide direction and control. These actions de- distances and changing rates of advance make it
grade the cohesion of enemy defenses and limit his more feasible for the leading elements (exploiting
flexibility in altering his defensive scheme. Such force and encircling force) to control security to the
actions should be a priority corps effort unless an corps’ front and forward flanks. The more fluid the
effective enemy C² system is necessary to support corps operation, the more the corps must rely on air
a friendly deception. cavalry for reconnaissance and attack helicopters
for rapid response.
The corps continually monitors the progress of a
pursuit or exploitation against the development of a Flank security will be more difficult for the divi-
significant enemy threat by reinforcing enemy for- sions to coordinate and adequately cover. There-
5-13
FM 100-15
fore, the corps should provide assets to screen its Reserves provide the commander flexibility to
most vulnerable flanks. exploit success or to react to contingencies through
offensive action. They reinforce or maintain. the
The distance on a flank may be too extensive for momentum of the attack by—
a single unit. Therefore, the corps may elect to cover
the flank of leading echelons and to direct follow Exploiting success when the opportunity arises.
and support forces to cover their own flanks.
Countering enemy counterattacks against com-
mitted units.
Main and Supporting Attacks Sustaining the attack of a committed unit.
When attacking an enemy in prepared defensive Countering rear threats.
positions, the corps normally attempts an envelop-
ment to fix the enemy in his main defensive posi- A contingency for the use of the reserve should
tions, then defeat him in depth. If the enveloping be part of the corps plan. “Be prepared” tasks are
force cannot bypass the main defensive positions, given to the reserve to aid planning and execution.
the corps’ initial main attack focuses on penetrating Planners must also consider the aspects of time and
a point in the main defensive position while the space when positioning these forces.
supporting attacks fix any adjacent forces or mobile Normally, corps planning focuses on probable
counterattack forces that could react to the large-scale enemy counterattacks against commit-
penetration. ted divisions. If a corps contingency calls for the
The main effort would typically shift to a trailing reserve to be prepared to attack and defeat the
corps unit (usually a division) moving through the counterattacking enemy force, the reserve should
penetration once that unit assumes control of the possess at least comparable combat power. If the
zone and begins its attack against enemy defenses reserve lacks combat power and the commander
in depth. This shift does not normally occur until at only intends to block the counterattack, the reserve
least a brigade of the trailing division has passed force conducts a hasty defense.
through the penetration. Of the units attacking en- The reserve’s command and control is another
emy defenses in depth, priority generally goes to the important consideration. If the reserve makes con-
unit tasked with defeating a counterattack by large tact with the attacking enemy force before that force
mobile enemy formations. can influence the committed division, the corps may
opt to retain control of the reserve. If not, the corps
During the exploitation, the lead exploiting force may place the reserve under the committed unit’s
usually conducts the main attack while follow and control (OPCON/ attached). The key issue is who
support units conduct supporting attacks. In the can best control the possible convergence of the two
pursuit, the direct pressure force usually conducts friendly units and the coordination of their fires.
the main attack until such time that the enemy force
is destroyed or encircled. Once the enemy is encir- The commander may also commit the reserve to
cled, the corps’ main and supporting efforts are sustain the momentum of the attack of a committed
contingent on the concept to reduce the encircle- unit. If so, there are three basic options for its use:
ment. (See Chapter 8. )
1. The reserve continues the attack as a separate
force under corps control and is given responsibility
Reserve Operations for the remainder of the assigned zone of the
committed unit.
The corps reserve is not committed to a particular
COA. It does not have a planned, subsequent mis- 2. The reserve is placed under the control of the
sion. Its commitment solely depends on the flow of committed unit.
the battle. The corps commander establishes its 3. The reserve assumes control of the committed
planning priorities for likely contingencies. In addi- unit and the entire zone of attack.
tion to reserve forces, there are trailing units that,
although initially unengaged, are committed to a To exploit success, the commander can commit
subsequent COA. the reserve at any stage of the battle. However, in
5-14
FM 100-15
most instances it will be committed during the later in an attempt to rob the corps of initiative, flexibility,
stages of the battle once it achieves the majority of and agility.
the corps’ subordinate unit objectives. The reserve
will then probably be given a separate zone of attack If the corps’ offense is to be successful, it must
and an objective resulting from the flow of the battle keep LOCs open to sustain its attacking maneuver
(a target of opportunity). units. It must also detect and defeat enemy forces
that intend to interrupt the corps’ rear operations
If there is low risk to the rear, the reserve may also effort.
perform a be-prepared mission to respond to Level
III threats as the corps’ tactical combat force. This Level II threats during offensive operations will
chapter later addresses special considerations re- most likely be enemy special operations teams,
garding the composition and the size of this force. long-range reconnaissance units, and bypassed en-
emy elements. These threats’ primary objectives are
The corps should make prior provisions for des- C² and logistic facilities and disrupting and/or inter-
ignating another reserve once the commander com- dicting LOCs.
mits the initial reserve force. This is especially Where possible, corps rear MP brigade assets
important if commitment occurs during the early screen friendly C² facilities and critical sites from
stages of the battle and the reserve becomes deci- threat forces. The corps also establishes a rear op-
sively engaged. erations plan for base or base cluster defense to
During exploitation or pursuit, corps units operate counter the initial contact with threat forces.
at greater distances and normally move much more The MPs provide follow-on forces to engage and
rapidly than during an attack. Extended distances defeat Level I and II threats. The corps commander
make it difficult for a corps-controlled reserve to might designate an MP brigade as the TCF respon-
provide responsive support to either leading ele- sible for Level III threats.
ment (exploiting force or encircling force) during
these operations unless they are air mobile (attack The brigade is augmented according to METT-T
helicopter or air assault) forces. factors. The most likely Level III threat to a corps
rear during offensive operations is a large, mobile
The usual necessity to position a follow and sup- force or bypassed units intent on—
port force or a direct-pressure force immediately
behind the lead elements makes it difficult to locate Severing or disrupting the corps’ C².
a corps ground reserve in a position to support either
the exploiting or encircling force. Consequently, a Disrupting or destroying CSS to committed units
greater decentralization of assets and control of the and CSS facilities.
battle to these lead elements is usually necessary. Interdicting MSRs and supply points.
The exploiting or encircling force should be suf- Destroying CP facilities, airfields, aviation as-
ficiently weighted so reserves can obtain mainte- sembly areas, and arming and refueling points.
nance at their level. They can then sustain their
attacks and/or exploit success. Interfering with the commitment of corps
reserves.
Rear Operations The corps designates a TCF, usually of at least
brigade size, to contend with such a threat. Limited
The fluidity and quick tempo of corps offensive reaction times and extended distances require the
operations pose challenges to corps rear operations TCF to be extremely mobile and capable of moving
planning. The forward movement of units and sus- by air and/or by ground.
tainment (both being essential parts of rear opera-
tions) are critical if the corps is to maintain the The TCP must be able to destroy armor protected
initiative necessary for successful offensive vehicles and dismounted infantry as well as being
operations. able to suppress enemy ADA systems. Conse-
quently, the TCF typically consists of infantry,
The enemy looks for opportunities to counter the attack helicopter, and air cavalry elements with
corps’ attack. It will strike deep into the corps’ rear engineer and FA support. The TCF may also possess
5-15
FM 100-15
armored, mechanized, or motorized infantry units if Close air support and aviation assets for defensive
the situation dictates. areas, air avenues of approach, and likely enemy
The corps should anticipate the possibility of a engagement areas.
counterattack into its rear by a ground maneuver Key terrain, avenues of approach, and obstacles.
force from an adjacent enemy unit not within the
corps’ zone of attack. This is likely if the corps’ zone The G2 identifies rear area threats, such as enemy
of attack overlaps the lateral boundaries of two special operations forces and partisan activities, that
defending enemy units. Given this situation, a may interfere with C² and sustainment aspects of
brigade-size TCF may only be able to contain or the corps attack. He also synchronizes intelligence
block such a force’s attack. It may then be necessary operations with combat operations to ensure all
to defeat or destroy the force by either diverting corps IEW collection means provide timely infor-
assets from committed units or obtaining EAC mation in support of current operations. He recom-
support. mends specific reconnaissance tasks for the ACR,
realizing the commander may task the regiment to
The key consideration before diverting any corps conduct a security or attack mission.
assets from the decisive operation is whether the
corps can still accomplish its mission given the In keeping with the commander’s PIR, the G2
threat to its rear. Although the corps may be able to tasks collection assets to support the targeting proc-
sustain the temporary loss of support from its rear, ess (decide, detect, deliver, and assess). Collection
it cannot sustain the loss of its decisive operations. assets locate and track high-payoff targets and pass
(See also Appendix C.) targeting data to fire support elements.
Plans for offensive operations must contain pro- The capabilities of joint, multinational, and na-
visions for control of captured or constructed air- tional assets are synchronized into corps operations.
fields in the corps’ zone. Normally, the corps can A focused approach in allocating collection assets
operate two airfields until control of the airfields maximizes the capability of the limited number of
passes to other services. Air base defense remains assets available to the corps.
the corps’ responsibility unless it is assumed by a
higher headquarters, a sister service, or a host na-
tion. (See Appendix C for further discussion. ) Maneuver
The corps may conduct an initial attack as part of
a forcible entry operation after it arrives in the
PREPARING FOR CORPS theater of operations. Once in theater, corps units
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS preparing to attack remain dispersed until immedi-
ately before the attack.
Intelligence At the prescribed time, the corps concentrates
In the offense, the IEW effort helps the com- attacking units sufficiently to mass their effects at a
mander decide when and where to concentrate over- specific point in the enemy defense. This achieves
whelming combat power. Collection assets answer decisive results by appropriately weighting the main
the corps commander’s PIR and other information attack and main effort.
requirements, which flow from the IPB and the To achieve tactical surprise, this concentration
war-gaming process. Information required may in- occurs under strong OPSEC measures and within
clude— the parameters of the corps’ deception plan. If the
.
Enemy centers of gravity or decisive points. corps must move a considerable distance to gain
contact or attack the enemy, it conducts an approach
Location, orientation, and strength of enemy march to close with the enemy force.
defenses.
When the intelligence picture is incomplete or
Location of enemy reserves, fire support, and dated, the corps may conduct a movement to con-
other attack assets in support of defensive tact, employing its reconnaissance assets to find the
positions. enemy and determine his dispositions. If the mission
5-16
FM 100-15
dictates, the ACR and division cavalry squadrons ensuring the feasibility of task organizing between
develop the situation. heavy and light forces.
In a movement to contact, the ACR and division The preferred employment option at the corps
cavalry squadrons usually conduct a detailed recon- level is to employ light divisions as a division under
naissance of their respective zones. Once the corps corps control. The corps should ensure that the light
commander initiates contact and determines enemy division’s mission capitalizes on its unique capabili-
dispositions, he maneuvers divisions into the fight ties. Light infantry can—
to take advantage of the terrain and to exploit enemy
weaknesses. Conduct an initial penetration to facilitate a sub-
sequent attack by heavy forces.
The movement to contact may be particularly
applicable during OOTW when fighting against Conduct military operations on urbanized terrain
unsophisticated threats in restrictive terrain where (MOUT).
corps IEW systems are less effective. There, the Respond to rear area threats.
corps G2 would be increasingly dependent on
HUMINT resources, including ground reconnais- Attack over restrictive terrain.
sance. Conduct economy of force operations.
When the corps develops thorough and timely Light forces, given the factors of METT-T, may
intelligence on the enemy, the corps commander require augmentation to increase their effective-
normally conducts a deliberate attack. Although a ness, especially with regard to their antiarmor capa-
subordinate unit’s deliberate attack plans are de- bility and mobility needs. The corps should assign
tailed, the corps’ plan must retain flexibility to fa- light units’ missions based primarily on command
cilitate branches and sequels. estimate considerations.
Corps units should vary the tempo of operations, Light forces can be attached to heavy forces or
concentrate rapidly to strike the enemy, then dis- vice versa. However, light units should not be so
perse and move to subsequent objectives. These overburdened with augmentation that they lose their
actions will keep the enemy off balance and pre- unique capabilities.
clude his effective employment of weapons of mass
destruction. Before the main attack, the corps may A heavy brigade normally is placed OPCON to a
conduct a feint, demonstration, or reconnaissance in light division. Normal CSS accompanies any at-
force to deceive the enemy and/or test his tached or OPCON forces.
dispositions.
The support concept must ensure that the losing
The corps might employ both heavy and light organization retains its ability to support its remain-
forces when preparing for offensive operations. To ing forces. This is particularly true in the case of the
capitalize on each type’s unique capabilities while light division since its DISCOM is an austere or-
minimizing their limitations, the corps must deter- ganization not easily divisible into) brigade support
mine— packages.
The appropriate level where mixing should occur. When the corps employs heavy and light forces
The tasks they are to accomplish. together they must be used so that light forces
dominate the close terrain. By controlling close
The appropriate command or support relation- terrain, light units prevent enemy light forces from
ships. effectively using it to interfere with the corps’ of-
The required amount and type of augmentation fensive action.
and/or support they are to provide to the force. Friendly light forces can deny enemy heavy
The CSS concept. forces easy access through close terrain. Doing so
forces the enemy to fight dismounted to protect his
Corps augmentation normally is required if heavy tanks and to engage friendly infantry. The corps can
forces are attached to light forces. Command rela- then use friendly heavy forces to strike the decisive
tionship considerations are an essential factor in blow at the chosen time and place.
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FM 100-15
In offensive operations, heavy forces can lose the Execute corps deep operations in concert with
ability to maneuver when confronted by enemy other corps assets.
forces that are dominating key terrain along friendly
routes of advance. However, light divisions can Deny, through electronic attack, enemy use of
conduct dismounted attacks over rugged terrain to critical C², fire support, and intelligence systems.
close with and destroy enemy forces and seize the The corps’ TAC and main CPs must always know
terrain. They can also air assault with the covering the locations of friendly units. The command must
force to secure the decisive or key terrain to aid the ensure that organic fire support agencies and sup-
movement of the main body. porting joint assets clearly understand the ground
Staffs must consider several factors when plan- scheme of maneuver so they can maximize their
ning this type of operation. Light forces will need— capabilities for the greatest effect.
Additional transportation assets to rapidly move Timely execution of joint fires is critical when
the light unit’s combat elements into forward conducting offensive operations. All fire support
assembly areas. providers in support of the corps attack must under-
Additional artillery to enhance the divisions’ ca- stand coordination measures and procedures for
pability to engage the enemy with indirect fires controlling fires. The FSCL gives sister services
and to execute counterfires. greater freedom of action in the area beyond the
FSCL and facilitates operations in depth. The
Additional intelligence assets. FSCL’s location is METT-T dependent. Considera-
Additional attack helicopter assets. tions include—
Allocation of CAS sorties. The location of enemy forces.
Additional antiarmored assets to protect against The anticipated rate of the friendly advance.
an armored threat.
The scheme of maneuver, including the maneu-
Support of light forces once inserted. ver of Army aviation units.
The desired tempo of operations.
Fire Support
Allocating and synchronizing all elements of fire
support, especially joint fires and nonlethal systems, Air Defense
complements and weights the corps’ main effort. The corps’ AD units provide low-to high-altitude
Synchronization also helps the corps control the air defense coverage throughout the battlefield.
tempo of the attack. In an attack, fire support Units are arrayed to provide as much overlapping
assets— coverage as possible. Coverage focuses on protect-
Conduct intense and concentrated preparatory ing key corps assets in the attack, such as CPs,
fires before and during the initial stages of the aviation assembly areas, FA locations, logistic
attack. bases, and reserve assembly areas. Forward area air
defense assets generally provide static or mobile
Conduct suppressive fires to isolate the objective point defense.
of the main attack and to help fix enemy forces
during supporting attacks. High- to medium-altitude air defense (HIMAD)
assets are optimized during AD coverage. As the
Provide continuous suppression to allow attack- corps advances, AD coverage also advances in order
ing formations to close with the enemy. to ensure umbrella protection remains continuous.
Conduct SEAD missions, some of which are ap- The corps integrates AD systems into the protec-
propriate for nonlethal attack assets. tion that sister services and coalition partners pro-
Supplement division counterfires to diminish or vide. This avoids duplication of effort while
stop the enemy’s ability to effectively employ providing redundancy in protection to high-priority
artillery. assets.
FM 100-15
The corps’ AD brigade provides HIMAD and Complex obstacles require detailed engineer esti-
theater missile defense (TMD) coverage for the mates and appropriate engineer assets.
corps. Corps ADA brigade FAAD elements aug-
ment organic division ADA units based on METT- Corps planners must anticipate breaching re-
T. The corps’ main effort receives priority coverage, quirements in time to adequately provide breaching
particularly in areas where the attack is vulnerable units with additional engineer assets, such as plows,
to enemy air action, such as river-crossing sites and rakes, and supplementary artillery for smoke and
mountain passes. counterfire. When possible, all units conduct
breaching operations in-stride to allow the force to
Air defense assets in an attack must focus on maintain the attack’s momentum.
protecting critical assets in order to maintain mass.
In some circumstances, such as during an approach Corps engineer units operating in the corps’ rear
march, the corps may establish an ISB for CS and area (usually conducting general engineering or sur-
CSS units, including HIMAD assets. vivability tasks) also have the potential to serve as
a Level II response force to rear area threats. These
engineer units require time to assemble because
Mobility and Survivability they are normally dispersed when conducting engi-
The corps allocates engineer assets to the main neer missions on an area basis. They require aug-
effort to give it a greater mobility capability. The mentation in the areas of fire support and antitank
engineer focus is on mobility, then countermobility. capabilities.
The corps places engineer brigade units forward Chemical reconnaissance units orient on vulner-
to augment the divisions conducting the main at- abilities that the IPB process identifies. The corps
tack. Engineering tasks include— positions decontamination assets to support the
scheme of maneuver and arrays smoke units, par-
Improving and maintaining LOCs by replacing ticularly infrared-defeating assets to counter likely
armored vehicle launched bridges (AVLB) with enemy sensors.
other types of bridging.
Improving routes.
Combat Service Support
Providing general engineering for follow-on
forces and logistic units. Responsive support of corps offensive operations
requires CSS from forward locations and sustain-
Augmenting reconnaissance forces in terrain ment assets that are as mobile as the maneuver units
analysis, especially in bridge classification and they support. Offensive operations require large
mobility analysis for routes of advance. amounts of POL, and the provision of continuous
Emplacing obstacles on the corps’ flanks and support depends on open and secure LOCs.
against likely enemy avenues of approach Combat service support units position them-
throughout the corps zone. selves and their materiel as close to maneuver forces
Maintaining key facilities, such as airfields and as the situation allows, commensurate with the level
landing strips. of risk the commander is willing to accept. Sustain-
ment locations support the commander’s priorities,
Conducting survivability engineer operations to with the main attack as the principal focus. Trans-
protect key assets, such as aviation assembly portation units must optimize their assets to rapidly
areas; petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL); and deliver supplies and replacement personnel to
ammunition points. maneuver units when needed.
Protecting other designated critical facilities, in Lengthening LOCs requires frequent forward
priority.
movement of stocks and sustainment units and the
Keys to effective counterobstacle operations are establishment of forward logistics bases (FLBs).
contingency planning, well-rehearsed breaching The forward movement of sustainment units and
operations, and trained engineers familiar with unit stocks must be timed to minimize the impact on
SOPs who are integrated into the attack formation. support to maneuver units.
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FM 100-15
The corps can use captured supplies and materiel to defend the Northern Kuwait border to prevent the
to supplement corps stocks and to increase the Iraqis from reseizing Kuwait.
corps’ operating and safety levels. A CA area study
can pinpoint potential locations of enemy supplies The corps’ major combat elements were four
and materiel. armored divisions. one mechanized division. an ar-
mored cavalry regiment. the corps aviation brigade.
and four field artillery brigades employing 145.000
Command and Control soldiers.
While preparing for offensive operations, the The overall corps plan was drawn up in six
commander continually visualizes the current phases:
situation and formulates a plan to get the forces Phase 1. Movement from the ports to tactical
under his command to the intended end state. The assembly areas (TAA). Some VII Corps convoys
commander goes where he can best influence the traveled more than 500 kilometers.
battle. where his moral and physical presence can
be felt. and where his will for victory can best be Phase 2. Movement from TAAs to forward
expressed. understood. and acted on. The com- assembly areas (FAA) and zones. To enhance the
mander exercises command from wherever he is on deception that the central command’s
the battlefield. (CENTCOM’s) attack would occur in the east. VII
Corps delayed the movement of the corps until only
In the attack. the corps TAC CP usually moves days before the attack.
with the division conducting the main effort. The
commander moves with the TAC CP and com- The corps rehearsed its LD/LC formation as it
mands the corps from this forward location. The moved into zone. Distances for corps units ranged
main and rear CPs displace forward into the corps from 60 to 160 kilometers. This phase included
zone as the attack progresses or the situation per- demonstrations and feints. such as the 1st Cavalry
mits. The commander maintains control of deep and Division’s operations at Wadi Al Batin.
rear operations by either echeloning these CPs so
there is no break in continuity or by handing over Phase 3. Penetration and envelopment of for-
control to another CP until the movement is ward defenses. The 1st Infantry Division (Mecha-
complete. nized) (ID(M)) conducted a deliberate breach of the
Iraqi defenses west of Wadi Al Batin while the 2d
Key to battle command is the ability to commu- ACR. 1st Armored Division. and 3d Armored Divi-
nicate. The signal structure must ensure redundant sion bypassed enemy positions to the west..
systems are available to allow for communications
throughout the corps. The corps also must be able Phase 4. Defeat of the enemy’s tactical re-
to communicate with adjacent units. supporting serves. The 1st United Kingdom (UK) Armored
joint forces. and if appropriate. HN or coalition Division passed through the 1st Infantry Division
forces. A critical component is the exchange of (Mechanized) and attacked to defeat enemy ar-
liaison teams to ensure unity of effort and a common mored reserves behind Iraqi forward defenses.
understanding of the commander’s intent. Phase 5. Destruction of the Republican Guard.
Phase 6. Defense of Northern Kuwait.
EXECUTING CORPS
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS VII Corps’ Execution
The VII Corps’ Plan for Operation On 23 February 1991. the 2d ACR bypassed Iraqi
Desert Storm defenses to the west and crossed into Iraq in prepa-
ration for the corps attack. Attack helicopter-64 and
During Operation Desert Storm. the VII Corps’ artillery raids intensified in the corps zone. Early on
mission was to attack to penetrate and envelop Iraqi 24 February, the 1st ID(M) penetrated the Iraqi
defenses to destroy the Republican Guard forces in defenses east of the 2d ACR while the regiment
zone. After the attack. the VII Corps was to prepare pushed 30 kilometers to the north.
5-20
FM 100-15
With increasing evidence of success against the mored Division. At this point, VII Corps had com-
Iraqis, the CINC of CENTCOM accelerated the pleted the destruction of the front-line units of the Iraqi
attack schedule. The VII Corps would attack by 26th Division and was commencing the envelopment
1500 that day. The 1st and 3d Armored Divisions of the Iraqi 52d Armored Division to the east.
would follow the zone cleared by the 2d ACR while
the 1st ID(M) conducted a deliberate breach of the By evening, the 1st Armored Division was 100
Iraqi defenses (Figure 5-8). kilometers inside Iraq, engaging a dug-in infantry
brigade first with Apaches, then ground forces, near
The 1st UK Armored Division conducted a for- Al-Busayyah. The 2d ACR continued its offensive
ward passage of lines through the breach lanes and cover, destroying company-size elements of the
conducted an envelopment against the western flank Iraqi 50th Brigade, 12th Armored Division.
of the Iraqi tactical reserves behind their forward
defenses. The 1st Cavalry Division conducted a By midnight, the 1st UK Armored Division com-
movement to contact from the 1st Division breach pleted its forward passage through the 1st ID(M).
to the Wadi Al Batin. The corps’ main effort then switched to the main
enveloping force.
At daybreak on 25 February the corps resumed
the attack. To increase the momentum of the attack, On 26 February, the 75th and 42d Field Artillery
the 1st Armored Division was committed on the 2d Brigades shifted to support the 1st and 3d Armored
ACR’s left flank. By midday, the ACR was in Divisions, and the 1st Cavalry Division was re-
contact with a brigade of the 12th Armored Divi- leased to the corps. The 1st Cavalry division raced
sion. Within the hour, the 1st and 3d Armored 250 kilometers in 24 hours, attempting to join the
Divisions were in contact with dug-in infantry from corps’ attack on the Republican Guard.
the Iraqi 26th Infantry Division.
In the early morning, the 1st Armored Division
Simultaneously, the 1st ID(M) occupied the stormed Al-Busayyah, destroying enemy forces and
beachhead line and was passing the 1st UK Ar- supply stocks (Figure 5-9). The 1st UK Armored
5-21
FM 100-15
Division continued its flank attack against the tacti- Early on the morning of 27 February, the VII
cal Iraqis reserve northeast of the breach site. Corps completed destruction of the Tawakalna Di-
vision and continued to press the attack to destroy
By afternoon, the corps’ main effort, starting the remaining Republican Guard Divisions. The 1st
with the 2d ACR, came in contact with the and 3d Armored AH-64s ranged ahead of their
Tawakalna Division of the Republican Guards divisions, employing search and attack techniques.
initiating the Battle of Wadi Al Batin (Figure 5-1 0).
The 2d ACR developed the situation in the 73 By midmorning, the corps came in contact with
Easting engagement and was directed to pass the Medina Division and remnants of the Iraqi 10th
through the 1st ID(M). and 12th Armored Divisions in an engagement that
came to be called Medina Ridge. The corps was
The 1st Armored Division deep operations went deployed with four divisions on-line. The corps
after elements of the Iraqi Adnan Division, while 3d commander desired to conduct a double envelop-
Armored Division deep operations were focused ment with the 1st Cavalry Division and 1st ID(M),
against the reserves of the 9th Brigade, in which they but because of the tactical situation, he delayed the
were in contact. Corps deep operations went after double envelopment for 24 hours.
the Iraqi 10th Armored Division in two separate
attacks. Central Command Air Force (CENTAF) Late in the day, the corps destroyed or had in full
interdiction assisted in isolating the Republican retreat remaining Republican Guard forces. By the
Guards by hitting targets near the Kuwait City- evening, the 1st ID(M) cut the Kuwait City-Basrah
Basra highway. highway. The VII Corps’ attack covered 90 kilome-
5-22
FM 100-15
ters in 90 hours, destroying five armored divisions. Provided food, including 1.1 million meals, 115
Only the Hammurabi Division escaped nearly intact. tons of bulk foodstuffs, 2. 1 million gallons of
bulk water, and 640,000 bottles of water.
At 0800 on 28 February, the cease fire went into
effect without the double envelopment having been Provided medical care to approximately 17,000
executed. The reasons for the corps’ overwhelming people.
success included surprise, speed, and applying over-
whelming combat power at the point of the attack.
Patrolled occupied populated areas.
Almost immediately after declaring the ceasefire, Built and maintained refugee camps.
the corps began humanitarian relief operations. It
also continued its tactical operations of force pres-
ence as well as preparations to resume the offense, Provided additional supplies, including fuel, in-
if necessary. The corps’ humanitarian relief secticide, tents, medical supplies, and water stor-
operations— age facilities.
5-23
FM 100-15
5-24
Chapter 6
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
Preparation
In a deliberate defense, corps elements arrive in
the AO before the enemy. This usually allows them
6-1
FM 100-15
measures within their AOs through deception and combat power. In area defense, the corps selects
OPSEC. As technology proliferates, the corps’ abil- EAs where it can defeat the enemy by massing the
ity to protect the force and retain OPSEC becomes effects of overwhelming combat power from mutu-
more difficult because of— ally supporting positions. Committing the reserve is
The threat of short and midrange ballistic and one way of quickly generating mass.
cruise missiles use, especially during the early The threat may force the corps to repeatedly mass
stages of force-projection operations. to counter new enemy thrusts. The commander then
employs economy of force measures in less critical
Widespread proliferation of advanced technol- sectors to generate mass at decisive points. Obsta-
ogy systems. cles, security forces, and fires help reduce risks from
Greater media access, which provides near-real- economy of force measures.
time information to potential adversaries.
Flexibility
Disruption
Tactical flexibility stems from detailed planning
The corps disrupts the attacker’s tempo and syn- (particularly in IPB), a clear and concise com-
chronization to prevent him from massing his com- mander’s intent, and rehearsals. Flexibility enables
bat power at the point of attack by— the commander to quickly shift the corps’ main
effort without losing synchronization.
Employing all precision fires, both lethal and
nonlethal, before the enemy arrives in the MBA. Constituting and utilizing a reserve in every op-
eration allows the commander to gain initiative and
Defeating or misleading enemy reconnaissance preserve flexibility. Selecting a COA that facilitates
forces. a number of branch plans or contingencies also
Conducting deep operations that destroy critical enhances flexibility. Centralized planning and de-
support infrastructure, fire support assets, C² centralized execution allow subordinate command-
nodes, and AD sites. ers to act independently within the commander’s
intent. Last, the corps’ defensive plan must facilitate
Disrupting or destroying key formations or their a rapid transition to the offense.
timely introduction into the battle.
Conducting C²W operations that strike at the Forms of Defense
heart of enemy C² systems.
The two primary forms of defense are mobile and
Coordinating with the joint team to synchronize area defense. They apply at both the tactical and
joint assets. Conducting spoiling attacks that operational levels of war. The major difference
preempt enemy attacks. between the two is the orientation of the defense.
The attacking enemy must never be allowed to The mobile defense orients on the destruction of the
set. Even if he makes temporary gains in an area enemy force. (See Figure 6-1.) The area defense
defense, the friendly force must counterattack the orients on terrain retention.
enemy’s penetration before he can consolidate his
gains. Commanders must also plan to mitigate the
disruptive effects of enemy attacks, especially Mobile Defense
against weapons of mass destruction. The mobile defense employs a combination of
fire and maneuver, offense, defense, and delay to
Mass and Concentration defeat enemy attacks. It includes—
The corps seeks to mass the effects of overwhelm- Forces conducting an area defense or delay to
ing combat power at the decisive point to defeat the shape the enemy penetration.
enemy attack. In mobile defense, the striking force A mobile striking force.
is the principal vehicle by which the corps com-
mander generates the effects of overwhelming A reserve, if resources permit.
6-2
FM 100-15
6-3
FM 100-15
depth. The corps commander may organize the AO penetration. The corps commander then assigns the
in a linear manner or have units operate in noncon- security force screen, guard, or cover missions.
tiguous AOs per METT-T. In either case, com-
manders generally organize their defensive sectors Screen Mission. The corps commander assigns
into five complementary elements: the security force a screen mission when covering a
large area. The screen, deploying forward of the
1. A security operation forward and to the flanks FEBA, provides the least degree of security. Mis-
of the corps’ MBA. sions include—
2. A continuous deep operation against specific Providing early warning to MBA units to protect
targets and/or organizations within the corps’ them from surprise and provide time for them to
sector. reposition forces to meet the enemy attack.
3. The MBA. Delaying and harassing the enemy with support-
ing indirect fires.
4. Reserve operations in support of the MBA. Destroying enemy reconnaissance elements
5. Rear operations necessary to ensure con- within its capability to deny the enemy informa-
tinuity of support. tion regarding friendly MBA defensive positions.
This defensive organization does not dictate a The screening force is a combined-arms force
sequential operation, rather it facilitates simultane- consisting of a mix of ground and air maneuver
ous operations in depth, tactical responsibilities, and units. If the screen is under corps control, the ACR
a better understanding of the battlefield. The close is the unit best suited to conduct this particular
fight is usually the decisive fight, but not always. mission. Otherwise, a composite combined-arms
Deep operations might, therefore, be decisive. organization should be formed.
Guard Mission. The guard mission accomplishes
Security Force Operations all tasks of a screen mission and prevents enemy
engagement of the main body through combat op-
The corps typically conducts security force op- erations. The guard force operates within supporting
erations to its front (forward of the FEBA) and range of the main body.
flanks. The security force generally operates under Cover Mission. The cover mission accomplishes
corps control, but may be delegated to subordinate all the tasks of a guard mission except that it operates
MBA units within their assigned sectors. However, as a tactically self-contained force, apart from the
security operations normally provide support where main body. Typically, the corps controls the cover-
the corps commander intends to defeat or destroy ing force. When it delegates control of covering
the enemy. force operations to subordinate MBA divisions,
Security force operations normally support the they usually employ brigade-size elements in that
commander’s intent of where he wants to defeat or role.
destroy the enemy. Traditionally, this is the close A covering force conducts operations to either
operation. However, the commander must also syn- defend against or delay an attacking enemy force.
chronize security force operations with all aspects The covering force’s mission dictates whether it will
of operations in depth. It may be the corps’ first conduct a delay or defense.
opportunity to seize the initiative from the attacking
enemy. When a commander uses a strong covering force
with adequate depth, the covering force can expect
In addition to identifying the main effort and to fight a major engagement. It might also defend
attritting lead echelons, the security force’s mission rather than delay, which would cause follow-on
might be to shape the enemy’s penetration. Security enemy forces to commit themselves to a particular
operations are similar for both mobile and area action, thus disclosing their main attack.
defense, except that in the mobile defense, the corps
commander normally retains control of the covering If the covering force’s mission is to defend, tasks
force to ensure unity of effort in shaping the include the specific enemy force it is expected to
6-4
FM 100-15
defeat or to destroy before battle handover. In a arms integrity and damages his ability to react once
delay operation, the corps commander will state he arrives in the MBA. Specifically, priority targets
whether the covering force is to delay forward of a for the covering force often include enemy recon-
specific terrain feature for a specified time (high naissance units, AD systems, CL vehicles, obstacle
risk) or whether preservation of the force (low risk) breaching equipment, and NBC-capable delivery
is of primary importance. systems.
Tasks inherent to a covering force might Destroying accompanying AD systems in the
include- CFA improves the capability of attack helicopters
Forcing the enemy to prematurely deploy and and USAF aircraft to attack in depth. Destruction of
commence his attack. AD radars, which electronic intelligence systems
locate, denies the enemy the capability to direct his
Identifying the enemy’s main effort. own AD systems. Destruction of enemy obstacle
clearing assets reduces his breaching capability be-
Reducing the enemy’s strength by either destroy- fore arrival in the MBA. Both the physical destruc-
ing specific maneuver units and/or stripping away tion of key CL equipment and the nonlethal
essential assets (FA, ADA, engineer units, for electronic attack against key enemy C² elements
example). disrupt the enemy’s ability to synchronize current
Shaping the penetration of the enemy’s attack. and future operations.
In many situations, the ACR is well-suited to The corps enhances unity of effort when it con-
conduct corps covering force operations. In some trols the covering force. Considerations include the
situations, such as those involving irregular forces form of defense, the size of the sector, the com-
in restrictive terrain, the covering force may require mander’s ability to communicate with subordinate
other type forces capable of conducting covering units, the availability of controlling headquarters,
force operations. Such forces would include ma- and the number of units operating in the area. When
neuver divisions or a division-size force consisting the corps controls the covering force, subordinate
of ground and aviation brigades. The corps uses its MBA units maintain liaison with units operating to
organic surveillance means, reports from the cover- their front. In this situation MBA units should—
ing force, and higher level intelligence inputs to Monitor covering force radio nets to get a picture
determine (or confirm) the axis and strength of the of the battle.
enemy main attack.
If possible, the covering force causes the enemy’s Establish and maintain liaison with covering
lead divisions to become decisively engaged while force units forward of their positions.
attempting to penetrate the covering force area Prepare for actions at the battle handover line
(CFA). This may reveal the intended location of the (BHL).
main attack and will alter the rate at which enemy
forces close on the MBA. Maintain liaison during passage of covering force
units.
The covering force might also cause the commitm-
ent of follow-on forces by either defeating or Commanders should only delegate control of the
destroying lead units. If possible, the CFA should covering force to subordinate units by exception.
be deep enough that the enemy’s artillery would Having separate MBA unit-controlled covering
have to displace to subsequently range MBA forces. forces tends to slow reporting and to fragment the
This action would significantly lessen the effective- corps commander’s overall view of the battle. Sepa-
ness of enemy preparatory fires and reduce the rate control also makes a coordinated covering-
number of artillery weapons immediately available force fight harder to conduct and divides the
to the enemy commander as the MBA battle is attention of MBA commanders between the cover-
joined. ing force and the MBA fight.
Deliberate targeting of specific elements of the Normally, additional combat, CS, and CSS units
attacking formation by the covering force aids MBA augment the covering force. Typical support in-
defense. It destroys the enemy force’s combined cludes additional FA, aviation, engineer, AD, NBC,
6-5
FM 100-15
reconnaissance, and smoke generator units. Sepa- or in the corps rear where there will be time to rearm,
rate brigades conducting covering force operations refuel, or reconstitute, if necessary. The security
require less augmentation than division brigades, as force passes through MBA units as quickly as pos-
the latter lack organic CS and CSS assets. Screen sible to minimize their vulnerability to indirect fires.
operations do not require extensive augmentation
because they derive support from the main body. Security to the corps flanks during the defense is
the inherent responsibility of the committed maneu-
Only CSS assets immediately essential to the ver units within their AO. However, the corps may
operation (fuel, ammunition, medical, and limited task a specific unit to provide security if the corps
maintenance) position themselves forward in the flank is significantly vulnerable. The corps may also
CFA. Such assets withdraw when no longer re- task a specific unit to provide security if the corps
quired or the risk of their loss becomes unacceptably has accepted risk in the MBA with an economy of
high. force operation not having sufficient forces to per-
form the flank security mission. A flank security
Combat service support for the covering force force’s typical missions in the defense are either
with a defend mission requires pre-positioning sup- screen or guard missions.
plies, forward positioning of maintenance, and large
quantities of obstacle materials and ammunition. A
delay mission requires less time for terrain prepara- Deep Operations
tion, but pre-positioning supplies at subsequent de-
lay lines or positions is still critical to support the Many of the aspects of corps deep operations in
planned operation. offensive operations (Chapter 5) also apply in corps
defensive operations. Overall, corps deep opera-
A key aspect of any security force operation is tions in the defense help achieve depth and simulta-
battle handover. To aid in control of handing the neity and secure advantages for future operations.
battle over to the MBA unit, the corps establishes a Deep operations disrupt the enemy’s approach to
PL designated as the BHL. The MBA commander . and movement in the MBA, destroy high-payoff
and the security force commander coordinate the targets, and deny or interrupt vital components of
location of the line and recommend its location to enemy operating systems. Some key high-payoff
the higher commander. However, it remains the targets will be the enemy’s trailing or reserve eche-
corps commander’s responsibility to establish the lons, HIMAD sites, key C² nodes, and key infra-
line. structure.
The MBA commander controls the ground for- As in offensive operations, the deep fight may be
ward of the FEBA out to the BHL. He places secu- decisive—defeating or deterring the enemy before
rity forces, obstacles, or fires in this area to canalize he can reach MBA forces. The corps controls deep
the enemy and facilitate the withdrawal of security operations similarly to its control of offensive op-
force elements. erations. However, it might designate the FSCL
closer to the FEBA to better facilitate joint fires.
The BHL is also where control of the battle passes
from the security force to the MBA force. Typically
it is forward of the FEBA. Main battle area forces Close Operations
can then bring direct fires to bear on the enemy to
facilitate security force activities, such as disen- Ultimately, the MBA force’s mission is to defeat
gagement, withdrawal, or passage of lines. the enemy attack or to destroy the attacking enemy
force. Missions cover the entire spectrum of opera-
Security force and MBA units coordinate specific tions-defending, delaying, attacking, or perform-
passage lanes and other details. When possible, the ing in an economy of force role. Units also conduct
boundaries of security force units coincide with forward and rearward passages of lines. However,
those of MBA units. they normally avoid being bypassed unless it fits
within the corps commander’s intent.
When directed to do so, the security force hands
over the battle to MBA forces, then moves to a Mobile Defense. The corps conduct a mobile
designated area and prepares for future operations. defense when it orients on the enemy force as op-
This normally will be a position deeper in the MBA posed to retaining terrain. METT-T conditions may
6-6
FM 100-15
dictate that the corps conducts a mobile defense in striking force’s components should include the
two instances: when defending a large AO against maximum combat power available to the com-
a mobile enemy force, or when defending against mander at the time of the attack. At a minimum, it
an enemy force with greater combat power, but less should have equal or greater combat power than the
mobility. A mobile defense incurs great risk, but force which it must defeat or destroy. Fire support
also stands a greater chance of inflicting a decisive assets can offset maneuver force shortfalls.
defeat and even destroying the enemy force.
When conducting a mobile defense, the corps
Both corps and divisions conduct mobile de- commander may need to commit his reserves to help
fenses. When the corps conducts one, subordinate defending units shape the battlefield. Attack heli-
units generally conduct an area defense or delay to copters are ideal for this role. The commander must
shape the penetration or attack as part of the corps not commit his striking force except to deliver the
striking force. Commanders generally do not assign decisive blow to the enemy force. The striking force
the mission of a mobile defense to subordinate units becomes the main effort upon commitment.
except in an economy of force role.
The corps designates obstacle-restricted zones
The corps commander may choose to shape the that allow subordinate units flexibility and guid-
battlefield by defending in one sector, to deny terrain ance. Corps topographic engineering provides the
to the enemy while delaying in another to create the needed terrain products to support the IPB process.
illusion of success. This perceived enemy success Specific terrain analysis products assist in maneuver
in the delaying sector may create an opportunity for planning and in designing obstacle systems to com-
the striking force to attack. The corps may also plement maneuver plans. Priority of effort for the
entice the advancing enemy into an engagement mobile defense is to mobility for the striking force
area by appearing to uncover or weakly defend an and to countermobility for units conducting an area
area into which the enemy desires to move. defense. Engineers prepare necessary strongpoints
Critical to the mobile defense’s success is the and help units improve survivability positions.
commander’s vision of the battlefield and the time
and place he chooses for the striking force to attack. Area Defense. The corps conducts an area de-
Visualization of the battlefield includes a decisive fense when the orientation of the defense is to deny
point. That is, an advantage point on the battlefield the enemy designated terrain for a specified time. In
where the commander foresees allowing the enemy an area defense, the corps commander allocates
to proceed in order for the striking force to accom- sufficient combat power against enemy avenues of
plish its mission. approach to achieve a reasonable chance of success,
even without the commitment of the reserve. He
A force-oriented objective or engagement area assumes risk in less threatened sectors and allocates
usually indicates a decisive point. The staff synchro- forces in an economy of force role. Maneuver
nizes the corps’ activities in time and space to within an area defense usually consists of reposi-
sufficiently mass striking force effects at the right tioning within defensive positions or sectors and
time and place. counterattacks.
The striking force is a self-sufficient, task-organ- Commanders conducting an area defense plan for
ized, combined-arms unit. It is a committed force, counterattacks by their reserves. They plan spoiling
not a reserve. The object of a striking force’s attack attacks and counterattacks to disrupt the enemy and
normally is to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy. to prevent him from massing or exploiting success.
Maneuver (fires coupled with movement) can They also conduct contingency planning to counter
achieve decisive defeat. It is also possible to deci- assumed enemy penetrations of forward defenses.
sively defeat the enemy by massing fires from a
position that allows excellent observation and fields The priority of effort for engineer operations in
of fire. the area defense is survivability and/or counter-
mobility operations. Units concentrate on terrain
Spoiling attacks help break up the enemy’s mo- reinforcement and emplacing obstacles to turn, fix,
mentum, disrupt his timetable, cause him to shift his block, or disrupt enemy forces. As in the mobile
forces, or just buy time for friendly forces. A defense, engineers also prepare required
6-7
FM 100-15
strongpoints and help units improve survivability resource in the mobile defense because so much of
positions. the corps’ combat power is allocated to the striking
force.
Sustained combat in the MBA normally generates
the largest requirement for supplies and services. In The reserve can be as large as one-third of the
a protracted defense, the corps’ ability to sustain its combat power, but normally not smaller than a
forces significantly influences the battle’s outcome. brigade-size element. If needed, the reserve is the
The defense of the MBA requires a mix of forward- corps commander’s principal means of influencing
deployed and echeloned logistic units to allow for the close fight. It is usually supported with addi-
orderly withdrawal or advance. tional assets (artillery, CAS, attack helicopters, IEW
assets, engineer, chemical, CSS).
Combat service support efforts must stress ade-
quate supply of fuel and ammunition, rapid evacu- Once the commander commits the reserve, it
ation of wounded, and repair as far forward as generally is the corps’ main effort. Once a reserve
possible. The emphasis is on maintaining the corps becomes committed, the commander designates an-
at the highest level of combat power possible. Only other reserve.
by doing this can the corps hope to have the strength
to transition to an effective offense. Reserves must be available to counterattack by
fire or by fire and maneuver. The corps com-
Planning considerations and operational tech- mander’s intent should specify whether the reserve
niques to improve CSS to defending units include- is to counterattack by fire or assault the objective or
Selecting ammunition transfer points (ATP) and enemy force. The reserve must remain agile in order
pre-positioning limited stockages of ammunition to respond to a penetration that has occurred earlier
in the MBA. than, or at a different location than, that visualized
by the senior commander.
Displacing from rear areas, on a scheduled basis,
push packages of certain critical items (ammuni- Ideally, units launch local counterattacks imme-
tion, NBC defense supplies, POL, and selected diately after attacking forces enter the position and
repair parts) so interruptions in communications have not had time to reorganize and establish them-
do not disrupt the flow of supplies. selves or maintain the operational tempo that al-
lowed them to penetrate. Since this period is
Prepackaging Class IV and Class V obstacle ma- relatively short, the force must judiciously deliver
terial (normally requisitioned items) into brigade- counterattacks on the local commander’s initiative.
size push packages to expedite delivery. The object is to block the enemy penetration, defeat
the enemy attack, eject the enemy force, and restore
Conducting resupply operations during periods of conditions necessary to support the senior com-
limited visibility “to reduce chances of enemy mander’s concept and intent.
interference.
Echeloning CSS units in depth throughout the The reserve’s normal composition includes ar-
defensive area to allow for continued limited mored, mechanized, and/or aviation forces. How-
ever, the reserve may also include AASLT forces
support. supported by attack helicopters and CAS if the
Employing and dispatching maintenance support concept for their employment calls only for a rela-
teams as far forward as possible to reduce unit tively short operation, a quick linkup by heavy
evacuation requirements to a minimum and to fix forces, or an extraction.
the force as far forward as possible. The reserve may also employ light forces in re-
stricted terrain. The corps aviation brigade HQ can
Reserve Operations be the reserve HQ for short periods when properly
augmented.
The corps retains a reserve in either form of
defense. The reserve is an uncommitted force avail- The timely movement of reserves from their AAs
able for commitment at the decisive moment. It to the point of commitment can be a major planning
provides flexibility for the commander through of- and execution problem. Although the main CP is
fensive action. The reserve is more difficult to responsible for reserve movement, deconfliction
6-8
FM 100-15
between maneuver and CSS movements in the corps defend or delay, shaping the battlefield for the coun-
rear is the rear CP’s responsibility. terattack by the strike force. This affords him the
time necessary to precisely commit the striking
force. The striking force commander must receive
Rear Operations near-real time updates during the movement to con-
The success of corps defensive operations may tact to ensure he engages the enemy force at the
hinge on its success in conducting rear operations. desired time and place.
Threat operations, ranging in size from individual Intelligence in the area defense focuses on iden-
saboteurs to enemy airborne or air assault insertions tifying where and when the corps commander can
in the corps’ rear, will target key corps units, facili- most decisively counterattack the enemy’s main
ties, and capabilities. These threat activities, espe- effort or exploit enemy vulnerabilities. Intelligence
cially at smaller unit levels, may even precede and EW support identifies, locates, and tracks the
hostilities. enemy’s main attack. It provides the commander
Corps defensive planning must address the early time to allocate sufficient combat power to
detection and immediate destruction of threat forces strengthen the defense at the point of attack. Intelli-
attempting to operate in the corps’ rear. The opera- gence also identifies friendly vulnerabilities and key
tion may require additional emphasis on rear opera- defensible terrain.
tions based on the form of defense. (See Appendix
C for a discussion of corps rear operations planning Maneuver
considerations.)
The corps commander’s intent and the nature of
The degree of risk the force accepts during a the threat determine whether the corps conducts a
mobile defense invariably passes to the rear opera- mobile defense or an area defense. In many cases,
tions commander. This risk increases the threat to the corps’ mission statement specifies whether the
support forces and may impact their ability to con- corps is to conduct a force-oriented or terrain-
tinue operations at the anticipated level. oriented defense. If the corps is also a JTF headquar-
ters or JFLCC, then the CJTF should have the
flexibility to determine the form of defense. The
PREPARING FOR CORPS corps must specify to its subordinate units whether
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS they are to conduct a force- or terrain-oriented de-
fense.
In the defense, the corps typically organizes the
Intelligence battlefield into deep, close, and rear AOs. Two
The corps G2 maximizes preparation time to fully additional concerns within close operations are se-
employ and synchronize the corps’ IEW architec- curity and reserve operations. Corps units might
ture. Organic corps collection systems for a filly operate in noncontiguous AOs, which preclude a
deployed MI brigade can detect and track enemy linear organization. This is normally the case when
units out to approximately 200 kilometers. Beyond the corps’ striking force executes a deep maneuver
that, the corps relies on EAC, joint, and some na- as part of a mobile defense. Deep operations initially
tional systems downlinked into the corps’ HQ. The focus on any of the following:
corps almost totally relies on EAC, joint, and na- Selective high-payoff targets.
tional systems during the early stages of force-
projection operations. Isolating approaching enemy forces from its
higher headquarters.
In the mobile defense, intelligence requirements
focus on ascertaining precise enemy location, Supporting forces.
strength, and intent. The G2 must find the enemy’s Attrition of enemy combat power.
main avenue of approach and the location of his
follow-on forces. Answers to these intelligence re- In the MBA, the corps commander assigns defen-
quirements allow the corps commander to properly sive sectors. based on METT-T, to the units con-
array his forces in an economy of force role to ducting an area defense or delaying against the
6-9
FM 100-15
penetrating enemy force. These are the forces that An underlying purpose of all defensive opera-
shape or defeat the enemy. tions is to create the opportunity to transition to the
In a mobile defense, the commander may want to offense. Therefore, all contingency corps must be
able to fight the heavy-light mix. Light infantry
yield ground quickly to allow the enemy to think he forces will likely conduct early deployment and
has been successful or to entice him to a decisive secure the lodgement for follow-on armored and
point where the striking force can attack him. The mechanized forces.
corps commander may also select EAs where he
desires to destroy the enemy. Commanders also use In an area defense, light infantry forces can de-
EAs to orient maneuver and fires for deep fend in restricted terrain and along linear terrain
operations. features. They provide the TCF when adequate
The striking force constitutes the maximum com- ground or air transportation is available.
bat power available to the commander at the time of If commanders anticipate contact with enemy
the attack. In a corps, this is normally a multiple- armor, light infantry units should construct a strong-
division force, under the corps commander’s con- point defense. Light infantry possesses an extremely
trol. It can be as large as two-thirds of the combat limited capability to conduct counterattacks to re-
power available to the corps at the time of the attack. store a position or to repel a penetrating enemy
Before the main battle, the striking force with- force.
draws to attack positions and prepares for the deci-
sive attack. It may deploy all or some of its elements In a mobile defense, light forces generally con-
to- duct some form of area defense (including the
strongpoint) to shape the penetration. The corps can
Deceive the enemy as to the force’s purpose. air-insert light infantry as part of the striking force.
Occupy dummy battle positions. Assigning correct command and support relation-
ships is critical to successful C² of armored-light
Create a false impression of unit boundaries (es- operations. This applies equally to combat, CS, and
pecially when operating with armored-light CSS units. However, augmenting a light force with
forces or multinational forces). CS and CSS assets from an armored formation may
Deep maneuver by the striking force includes well create a heavy-light mix without task-organiz-
major logistic considerations, such as potentially ing maneuver forces. For instance, using a corps FA
establishing a forward logistic base (FLB). Deep brigade with self-propelled guns and rocket artillery
maneuver by the striking force may be a component systems in support of a light division raises many of
of the corps’ deep operations. the same considerations as attaching an armored
brigade to a light division.
The attack by the striking force should be part of
a devastating attack in depth by the corps to isolate When combat assets are provided to a light force,
the penetrating enemy force and to defeat or destroy they are normally assigned a support relationship
it, if possible. When facing a large penetrating en- that lessens the CSS burden on the light force. This
emy force, corps operations in depth may repeatedly ensures that the commander who provides the assets
isolate portions of the enemy force and attack them retains the flexibility to shift assets as the situation
with the striking force. dictates. An armored brigade, normally OPCON to
alleviate CSS responsibility, is the unit of choice to
An area defense is similar to a mobile defense task-organize with a light division. Light forces are
except that its execution is more static. The reserve normally attached to armored units.
in an area defense is a combined-arms force that
may be as large as one-third of the force. Spoiling Combat service support assets are generally left un-
attacks and counterattacks in an area defense disrupt der the parent headquarters’ command and assigned
the enemy and contain expected enemy penetra- a mission to support the light or armored-light force.
tions. Subordinate commanders must also retain a As with CS assets, there are circumstances that
reserve to rapidly contain, defeat, or block enemy dictate organizing CSS assets to the light force. In
forces before they can consolidate any gains. such cases, attachment is generally the best option.
6-10
FM 100-15
6-11
FM 100-15
The striking force may attack through a short- striking force to ensure synchronization and unity
duration, scatterable minefield after the mines have of effort. The corps commander provides the strik-
self-destructed. The striking force must ensure the ing force commander the decisive point, objective,
axis of advance is clear or conduct an in-stride or EA where the corps commander desires the strik-
breach, if necessary. ing force to destroy the enemy. The corps com-
mander provides the anticipated size and compo-
Commanders should task-organize engineer units sition of the penetrating enemy force as well as
with reconnaissance elements in front of the striking provide complete supporting graphics (especially
force. Highly mobile engineer forces should be obstacle emplacements).
well-forward and integrate into the striking force’s
leading maneuver formations.
When the penetrating enemy force reaches the
Follow-on engineers conduct route improve- decision point to commit the striking force, the
ment, replace assault bridges with other bridges, and commander provides updated information on any
expand obstacle breaches. Engineers with flank changes, even as the striking force is moving to
units focus on countermobility to impede potential attack the penetrating enemy force. The signal sup-
enemy counterattacks. Corps engineers in the corps port system will be challenged to meet the demands
rear area perform general engineering functions. of a fluid mobile defense,
Military police contribute to mobility by conduct-
ing battlefield circulation control (BCC). Military
police also enhance battlefield survivability by con- Accepting risk is a critical aspect of a mobile
ducting area security and defeating rear area threats defense. The defending force retains the bulk of the
during response-force operations. combat power in the striking force. The corps com-
mander only allocates sufficient forces for the area
Chemical personnel contribute to survivability, defense to shape the battlefield.
perform vulnerability assessments, and recommend
actions to commanders. For example, obscurants
defeat threat sensors and aid in deception planning The risks are twofold. First, static or defending
as well as in camouflage and concealment. forces usually are insufficient in strength to defeat
the enemy alone. Therefore, the mobile defense’s
success depends on the successful commitment of
Combat Service Support the striking force. Second, the force may not be able
The greater the distance the striking force attacks to entice or maneuver the enemy into the area the
from main defensive positions, the greater the defending commander intends. This might preclude
amount of supplies the force will need. The defend- the decisive employment of the striking force.
ing force will require significant quantities of barrier
material and ammunition; the striking force will
require greater amounts of fuel, ammunition, and In an area defense, subordinate echelons normally
maintenance. exercise a greater degree of autonomy than in the
mobile defense. Depending on the size of the sector,
Medical evacuation from the striking force area subordinate echelons may control the bulk of the
poses significant challenges. When the striking reserves. The corps may only retain a small, highly
force is at a significant distance from the support mobile reserve.
bases, CSS units must secure an FLB. The com-
mander must designate his priorities for CSS and
consider any changes in priorities and when they Subordinate commanders fight their engage-
might occur. ments within their AOs, and the senior commander
retains a reserve to assist the most threatened sector.
There usually is less risk because commanders
Command and Control should have adequate forces to defend the AO and
When conducting a mobile defense, the corps stand a reasonable chance of defeating the enemy,
generally retains control of the covering force op- even without committing the reserve. They usually
eration, the area defense, and the attack by the accept greater risk in less critical sectors.
6-12
FM 100-15
6-13
FM 100-15
in order to deceive the Iraqis as to the true location on the concept the corps adopts to achieve attack
of the coalition’s attack. objectives.
The attack may consist of units not in contact
TRANSITIONING TO (corps reserves and newly assigned units) or units
currently in positions along the LC (defending
THE OFFENSE MBA units) or both. Using units not currently in
contact is the preferred option, since defending
Planning considerations for transitioning from MBA units may still be decisively engaged.
the defense to the offense are based on the following
situation: Another consideration of using units not in con-
tact occurs when they are operating in noncontigu-
The enemy attack against the corps has reached ous AOs. The corps would then rapidly mass the
its culminating point. effects of overwhelming combat power with the
main effort. This might require the commander to
The enemy is transitioning into a hasty defense. adopt economy of force measures in some AOs
The corps has sufficient assets to accomplish its while temporarily abandoning others in order to
assigned offensive mission. generate sufficient combat power. (See Chapters 5
and 7 for planning considerations for the commitm-
Commanders plan for a sequel to offensive op- ent of these units.)
erations in advance, preferably before the defensive
battle begins. The transition must be timely and If units in contact also participate in the attack,
rapid to keep the enemy from establishing prepared the corps commander must retain sufficient forces
defenses and/or receiving reinforcements. In many in contact to fix the enemy. He concentrates for the
instances, the attack against such an enemy will attack by reinforcing select subordinate units (divi-
complete his defeat and/or destruction. sions and separate brigades) so they can execute the
attack and, if necessary, maintain the existing de-
In a mobile defense, transitioning to the offense fense. He can also adjust the defensive boundaries
for the corps generally follows the striking force’s of subordinate units so entire units (preferably bri-
attack. In an area defense, the corps designates a gade size, but no smaller than battalion) can with-
portion of its units to conduct the attack, depending draw and concentrate for the attack.
6-14
Chapter 7
RETROGRADE OPERATIONS
7-1
FM 100-15
developed a defeatist attitude. Commanders at every commander to clearly identify sustainment relation-
level can minimize this risk by— ships once corps units enter the COMMZ.
Thorough planning, efficient control, and aggres- The prioritization of movement C², as well as the
sive leadership at all levels. means of movement, are key to movement planning.
Within the context of the commander’s concept of
Maintaining an aggressive attitude throughout the operations and intent, the corps must prioritize—
command,
What is to be moved (for example, light infantry
Orienting the entire command on the purpose of troops versus sustainment stocks).
the operation.
The limited ground and air movement means
Ensuring a constant flow of information from all available to the corps.
units.
The routes over which movements are to take
The complexity and fluidity of retrograde opera- place.
tions and the absolute need to synchronize the entire Complicating this most complex requirement is
corps operation dictates the need for detailed, cen- the necessity for the corps to coordinate all corps
tralized planning and coordination with decentral- movements with the COMMZ commander and to
ized execution. To ensure success, units must request additional movement support and move-
integrate tactical deception into all aspects of the ment priorities within the COMMZ.
retrograde. Rear operations planning considerations
are also similar for each type of retrograde
operation. DELAY
Terrain management becomes critical during ret-
rogrades. The corps must identify successive rear The corps conducts delay operations—
boundaries for committed maneuver units. To To gain time when insufficient forces are avail-
clearly identify the area of responsibility for a corps able to attack or to defend.
in retrograde, coordination between combat zone
and communications zone (COMMZ) commanders When the defensive plan calls for drawing the
is essential. Higher commanders must resolve, and attacker into an unfavorable situation.
make known to the affected commanders, problems To gain time to establish or reestablish a defense.
concerning the responsibility for the protection, re-
location, evacuation, and destruction (less medi- To cover a defending or withdrawing unit.
cal) of CSS facilities and other installations, To protect a friendly unit’s flank.
including identifying who has authority to direct
such action. To participate in an economy of force or decep-
tion effort.
The discussion of terrain management issues
drives corps rear security operations. Not only must Delay actions may facilitate a retirement by—
the corps clearly define who is responsible for the Covering the deployment, movement, retirement,
security of units, especially CSS units, it must also or withdrawal of friendly forces.
coordinate with the COMMZ commander to clearly
identify who is responsible for corps units conduct- Harassing, exhausting, weakening, and delaying
ing the retrograde once they enter the COMMZ. enemy forces.
Sustainment of retrograde operations poses sev- Exposing enemy weaknesses.
eral challenges. Planning must balance the require- Shaping the enemy penetration.
ment to sustain subordinate maneuver forces with
the requirement for early displacement of corps Drawing the enemy into a trap.
sustainment facilities. This would both free terrain Avoiding undesirable combat.
for operational use by maneuver forces and support
the continuing conduct of the retrograde. Again, the Conforming to movement of other friendly
corps must coordinate with the COMMZ forces.
7-2
FM 100-15
7-3
FM 100-15
combat units, FA, ADA, and engineers can aIso indicates the amount of desired delay between po-
serve as a covering force. sitions, using phase lines for control, as appropriate.
The corps commander prescribes the covering Combat service support during a withdrawal fo-
force’s mission, composition, and initial location. cuses on fueling, arming, and recovering the force.
The covering force may accomplish its mission by Prioritization is METT-T dependent and may vary
delay on successive positions, by delay on alternate from one unit to another.
positions, or by a combination of the two. It can also Withdrawals require extensive movement control
attack, defend, feint, or demonstrate. provisions that establish priorities of movement and
The main body of the corps disengages and con- preclude congestion on routes. Detailed traffic con-
tinues its movement rearward. The corps com- trol plans are made at all echelons; their execution
mander then relies on the covering force and organic is decentralized. In support of its withdrawal, the
and supporting reconnaissance to maintain contact corps plans and conducts EW, cover and deception
with enemy forces. To facilitate coordination of operations, and obstacle and denial operations.
movement, the majority of corps combat and CS
units are normally attached to divisions. The corps
holds a small reserve. The aviation brigade, when RETIREMENT
task-organized, is well-suited for this mission.
Early in the withdrawal, units in the forward Retirement is a retrograde movement in which a
defense area, except delaying or security elements, force not engaged with the enemy moves to the rear
disengage from contact with enemy forces. When in an organized manner. It is administrative in nature
operating on an extended front, the corps com- and execution; however, commanders must con-
mander frequently attaches corps artillery units to sider security and develop CONPLANs to deal with
divisions. He may also attach designated corps ar- enemy capabilities to employ Level I, II, and III
tillery units to the covering force. Control of these threats into the rear area and along the routes. (See
units reverts to corps artillery as soon as practicable. Appendix C.)
The corps ADA brigade commander or the re- If the corps is moving to a new area, it may
gional ADA commander normally hold centralized transition into a movement to contact. Task organi-
OPCON of most nondivision ADA. However, the zation of the corps, as it moves along the retirement
corps commander must ensure that sufficient ADA route, should ease its transition into the next
assets support the covering force. operation.
Corps engineer units have two basic missions
during withdrawal. They enhance and maintain mo- Some situations might dictate that a corps conduct
bility of the corps and degrade or counter the en- a tactical move during a retirement (for example, on
emy’s mobility. a nuclear battlefield when the enemy situation is
vague). As in all tactical moves, all-round security
The corps’ withdrawal plan includes control of the main body is necessary using advance, flank,
measures that are necessary to ensure a coordinated and rear security forces. Combat service support
operation. The corps establishes lateral boundaries operations in the retirement increase fuel consump-
between divisions, phases of the operation, and tion but decrease ammunition consumption.
7-4
Chapter 8
OTHER OPERATIONS
The corps may be required to conduct other op- continue the attack beyond the bridgehead, they use
erations (such as river crossings, encirclements, a shallow bridgehead.
movement, reconstitution and so on) in combina-
tion, sequentially, or as part of the offense or de- If the corps intends to pass a follow-on division
fense. Such operations are difficult, complex, and through the bridgehead, it will need more depth. The
often involve risk. Methods for conducting other river-crossing operation is complete once the
operations vary according to METT-T factors as bridgehead is secure, the necessary elements have
they apply to each situation. moved to the far shore, and the river obstacle no
longer limits the continuation of the attack.
In some cases, the division conducting the assault
RIVER CROSSING crossing of the river will not have the combat power
or will not be organized to fight all the way from the
River crossings are a division responsibility and river to the bridgehead line. The corps may then
are planned in detail at division level. The corps has designate a division intermediate objective or phase
specific fundamental planning and resourcing re- line where the lead division can pause to reorganize,
sponsibilities for river-crossing operations, espe- build up combat power, or where the corps can
cially for deliberate crossings of large water commit trailing forces.
obstacles. The corps determines if its subordinate divisions
The corps develops its river-crossing plan con- will cross the river on a wide front, involving two
currently with the scheme of maneuver for the over- or more divisions, or on a narrow front, involving
all operation the river crossing supports. The goal one division (Figure 8-1 ). Generally, a crossing on
of the river crossing, whether an offensive or retro- a wide front is preferred because it projects combat
grade crossing, is to move corps units across a water power more rapidly across the obstacle and keeps
obstacle with the minimum impact on the corps’ the corps more dispersed. The corps might cross on
ability to rapidly generate combat power. a narrow front if the scheme of maneuver requires
it or if the corps does not have the equipment it needs
to support a wide front crossing.
Offensive Crossing
The corps designates the bridgehead for an offen-
sive river crossing and normally depicts it graphi-
cally using a bridgehead line or a set of division
objectives. The bridgehead is the area on the far
bank the corps must secure to continue the offen-
sive. It must provide space for combat, CS, and
critical CSS elements necessary for the corps to
continue the attack. It must also-
Be defensible.
Be large enough to maneuver and deploy the
force required to continue the mission.
Facilitate continuation of the operation.
The bridgehead’s depth depends on both terrain
considerations and the corps’ scheme of maneuver.
If the division(s) conducting the crossing also
8-1
FM 100-15
The corps controls much of the special equipment One MP company with augmentation from a
and support units that maneuver units require to corps MP company to support the traffic control
conduct river crossings. To support a one-division plan (at least one platoon per brigade crossing
crossing of a large river generally requires the fol- area).
lowing corps units:
One or more ADA battalions (depending on the
Two or more corps combat engineer battalions crossing frontages and the number of bridge
(one battalion per brigade crossing area). and/or raft sites) and possibly defensive counter
One or more engineer assault bridge companies air support.
(depending on the river’s width and crossing
frontages). Combat service support for the divisions con-
ducting the river crossing is no different than sus-
One or more smoke generator and NBC recon- tainment operations during the offense or defense.
naissance companies (depending on the crossing Transportation support for engineer units and bridg-
frontages). ing material is the primary concern; maintenance of
8-2
FM 100-15
bridging equipment and fuel requirements are sec- enemy’s pursuit may well include envelopment tac-
ondary considerations. tics to secure crossing sites and to cut off the retro-
grade force before it can cross. Security forces
Other corps support to maneuver units could in- position early to counter all enemy attempts, includ-
clude specific intelligence-collection concerning ing those of battalion-size air assault or airborne
river conditions or helicopter support to a division insertions.
or brigade conducting air assaults on the far shore.
(See FM 90-13 for more information.) The commander must get all nonessential CS and
CSS across the river early and disperse them in loca-
tions that can support the operation. Units may have
Retrograde Crossing to destroy bridging equipment they cannot quickly
Planning and executing river crossings during recover and that is in danger of being captured.
retrograde operations are similar to offensive river When possible, units should recover bridging
crossing operations. However, there are two special equipment early and replace it with assault float
considerations. bridging and unit assets that they can recover
First, command, control, and coordination are quickly. Units might need to destroy existing bridg-
difficult in a retrograde crossing. Delaying, defend- ing and other crossing means (such as ferries).
ing, and supporting forces must have explicit mis- Close coordination with the delaying force is
sions and tasks. Commanders are to plan and necessary to keep from cutting off friendly forces
execute deception to conceal the extent of the op- not yet across. (See FMs 5-102 and 90-13 for de-
eration and the sites of the actual crossing. Smoke, tailed discussions.)
electronic deception, and dummy sites reduce the
enemy’s capability to disrupt the crossing. Units
must also apply OPSEC measures. ENCIRCLEMENT OF A
Second, there may be few retrograde crossing FRIENDLY FORCE
sites that friendly forces control. Therefore, they
will be vulnerable to attack early in the operation. Encirclement occurs when the enemy has cut all
Planning and developing additional crossing sites ground routes of evacuation and reinforcement. A
help mitigate this probability. unit may become encircled—
The force must protect crossing sites. The com- When ordered to remain in a strong position on
mander should expect detection and counter it. The key terrain to deny the enemy passage through a
8-3
FM 100-15
vital chokepoint following an enemy break- establishes local security throughout, and insists on
through. passive measures. The commander must also
rapidly establish communications with higher head-
When given a mission of becoming encircled as quarters and internally between units.
part of a larger plan.
The commander must stay informed about the
When unintentionally cut off from friendly battle outside the encirclement. This information
forces. will help him plan his breakout as well as enable
Through its own maneuvers, losses, errors, ex- him to provide information about the enemy’s rear
haustion, or other cause, a friendly attacking force area to higher headquarters. The commander must
may find itself in such an unfavorable position that also plan procedures for caring for EPWs and civil-
the advantage passes to the enemy. The enemy then ian refugees.
has a prospect of success using an encirclement. The commander must also establish a reserve. If
From the corps’ perspective, encirclement is a con- mobile forces are available, he establishes a cen-
cern whether it pertains to the entire corps or to a trally located reserve to take advantage of interior
portion of the corps. lines. If only light forces are available, he estab-
Once encircled, the corps commander must lishes small local reserves to react to potential
clearly understand the mission, if assigned, and the threats.
higher commander’s plan. Knowing the overall The commander is to reorganize fire support un-
mission and plan helps him determine whether the der centralized control. He positions ADA and avia-
next higher commander wants his force to breakout tion assets throughout the area to limit vulnerability
or to defend the position. to counterfires. When considering available fires, he
If the force is free to break out, timing is critical. includes the possible use of CAS from outside the
The corps should attempt to break out before the encirclement.
enemy has time to effectively block escape routes. The defensive commander must also reorganize
If the corps cannot break out, the commander con- CSS. After he assesses the corps’ CSS posture, he
tinues to defend while planning for linkup or exfil- centralizes all supplies and establishes strict ration-
tration. ing and supply economy procedures. If possible, he
should arrange aerial resupply and casualty evacu-
In all cases, the commander must promptly make ation by aviation and air support. He must also
his decision to break out, attack deep, defend, or establish centralized medical and graves registra-
exfiltrate and execute it with resolve. The longer a tion operations.
force remains encircled, the more depleted it be-
comes, and the more organized and stronger the Other considerations include limiting vulnerabil-
containing enemy becomes. ity to enemy nuclear or chemical weapons, includ-
ing planning to break out early based on anticipated
If the mission is to defend, the corps must act enemy use; maintaining morale; or continuing the
rapidly to preserve itself. The commander assumes defense.
control of all encircled forces and assesses the over-
all defensive posture of the force. In assuming an The commander can use engineers to improve
effective defense and contributing to the combat the defended area to preclude enemy forces from
effort, the commander has several responsibilities. splitting the force through penetrations of the pe-
He must reestablish the chain of command and a rimeter. An energetic defense and rapid reaction by
viable defense. That is, he must quickly establish an reserves and the defense in depth can defeat such
all-round defense on defensible terrain. The force attempts. As the battle weakens the force, it may
may have to attack to seize the ground. The com- have to reduce the size of the perimeter. The force
mander must expeditiously reorganize and consoli- must maintain a cohesive defense.
date his force.
The encircled commander must also plan sub-
To establish security, the commander positions sequent operations. There are two options available.
security forces as far out as possible to provide early The commander can conduct a breakout in the di-
warning. He initiates vigorous reconnaissance, rection of friendly forces or attack deeper toward
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FM 100-15
8-5
FM 100-15
8-6
FM 100-15
Once the commander selects his reduction sets and infantry attacks on vulnerable armored
method, he must determine his reduction technique, formations could follow. The objective being the
or simply, how he will employ that reduction eroding of the total combined arms strength of the
method. Reduction by fire alone contains only one pocket by eliminating specific combat and CS ele-
technique—application of overwhelming fire-and ments. Commanders and staffs can use this tech-
requires decisions on selection of munitions, deliv- nique in combination with the other reduction
ery means, and targets. Reduction by fire and ma- techniques.
neuver incorporates at least four techniques:
reduction by continuous external pressure, divide- The fourth technique, reduction by infiltration,
and-conquer, selective reduction, and reduction by moves friendly forces through the perimeter of the
infiltration. encirclement, isolating and reducing small portions
of the pocket without external interference.
The first technique, reduction by continuous ex- In addition to selecting reduction methods and
ternal pressure, is the classic siege. The encircling techniques, the encircling commander identifies
force contains the encirclement, bombards the special planning considerations for his entire force
pocket with fire, and attacks the perimeter of the as well as for specific members of his combined
pocket in a battle of attrition. arms team, including—
This technique is obviously not the most advan- The effects of a pause to reorganize.
tageous technique for the encircling force. In the
first place, the encircled force usually has the ad- Maneuver and fire support control measures.
vantage of the stronger form of combat—the de- Continuous reconnaissance.
fense. Second, the encircled force usually has the
advantage of interior lines, allowing it quickly to Encirclement isolation.
transfer forces within its defensive perimeter. Last,
as a result of these two defensive advantages, the Psychological operations.
attacking force can expect to suffer a greater number Electronic warfare.
of casualties in comparison with those the defenders
will experience. In comparison with the other tech- Use of nuclear weapons.
niques, reduction by continuous external pressure
has few, if any, advantages unless the encircling Creation and employment of a mobile reaction
force has an overwhelming force advantage. force.
The technique of divide-and-conquer, on the Combat service support.
other hand, is a much more viable and less costly Dealing with an outside enemy force attempting
operation. It is also the technique German and So- to assist the encircled force.
viet armies used against pockets of resistance during
World War II. Once the force surrounds and con-
tains a pocket, the encircling force launches a pene- LARGE-UNIT MOVEMENT
tration to divide the pocket in two. Another
penetration then divides these pockets into smaller Commanders must understand the magnitude and
ones. These penetrations and divisions continue importance of corps-size movement. Those move-
until resistance subsides. This technique eliminates ments will be successful when based on anticipation
the pocket’s advantage of interior lines. and prior planning, command involvement at all
levels, and strict discipline.
The third technique, selective reduction, attacks
the cohesion of the encircled force by focusing on Corps, divisions, and brigades will be powerful
the sequential destruction of specific targets (for weapons in any kind of conflict as long as they have
example, a situation where the encircled force is the space to move and concentrate quickly in fast-
strong in AD and artillery assets). The encircling developing situations. They can only do that where
force might focus on eliminating the pocket’s AD the road nets or cross-country conditions allow them
systems first, then use air and ground forces to to march and maneuver on multiple routes and
eliminate its artillery. Armored attacks on CSS as- avenues of approach.
8-7
FM 100-15
Movements are generally classified into two For movements, planners must plan for fire sup-
broad categories-tactical and administrative. port. The corps also acquires and provides the nec-
However, the distinction is often not clear. The essary intelligence to allow planning and execution
primary consideration in movements is to ensure of the move. The engineers build, upgrade, and
that forces arrive at the proper place, at the proper repair routes and bases needed to support large unit
time, in effective condition, and in the best forma- movements.
tion to accomplish assigned missions.
For CSS, the corps’ initial concern is to sustain
Joint Publication 1-02 and FM 101-5-1 define an the movement, primarily by providing adequate
administrative movement as one in which the com- refueling and maintenance support. However, the
mander arranges troops and vehicles to expedite corps must also consider echelonment of assets to
their movement and to conserve time and energy best support the follow-on operation, the extent the
when he anticipates no enemy interference, except move will disrupt normal resupply activities, and
by air. A tactical movement is a movement within the impact civilian vehicles and refugees will have
a combat zone when contact with the enemy is on the move.
possible or anticipated. These considerations exist whether or not the
The critical difference is in the organization of the commander anticipates enemy contact during or
moving units. In a tactical movement, the com- after completing the movement. There are also sev-
mander organizes elements to facilitate combat eral concerns which arise as a result of the size of
while administrative movements maximize trans- the task. For example, the staff must analyze the
portation resources. transportation network to ensure it is sufficient to
accommodate the anticipated move while allowing
The G3 plans and directs all tactical movements. the continued support of ongoing operations.
Under the direction of the G3, the G4, with the
COSCOM MCC, plans and coordinates the execu- Large-unit movements can heavily impact the
tion of administrative moves. The forms of tactical operations of other formations. The diversion of
movement include tactical road march, approach assets necessary to accomplish such movements
march, and combat formations. will limit support to other units until completion of
the move.
Detailed plans are necessary for either type move- Huge columns of vehicles cutting across virtually
ment. The staff must consider the same elements all MSRs will make it difficult to accomplish any-
they evaluate in planning combat operations as in thing more than routine resupply for the duration of
planning movements. the move. Proper march discipline and traffic con-
Elements having the greatest influence on the trol should permit infiltration traffic to pass between
disposition of forces are the mission, proximity of serial and convoy gaps in the columns, but the
enemy ground forces, terrain, and enemy aviation. amount of such traffic would be limited.
If the movement is a tactical move, the organization In most AOs, a large-unit move at night will
must be combat-loaded or organized. If it is not require a time-consuming incremental shifting of
tactical, planners organize for efficiency. forces over multiple nights and multiple routes.
Planners also include contingencies for actions Another major consideration is the significant amount
during the movement, therefore the organization for of time required for the formations to close into their
administrative movements cannot disregard com- AAs on arrival at a new location, followed by addi-
bined arms and combat considerations (C², maneu- tional time required to resupply and reorganize.
ver, fire support, intelligence, engineers, and CSS). The movement of large-size formations requires
considerable planning and careful control during
Command and control includes terrain manage- execution. Planning must be expeditious, giving all
ment, A²C², and ROE. Planners also address the concerned sufficient time to prepare.
scheme of maneuver, timing, security, deception,
enemy, weather, organization of forces, and the There must be a complex control and support
transportation network, including traffic regulation apparatus in position to facilitate the execution of
and control. the move. For corps, these considerations are
8-8
FM 100-15
similar whether the movement is of a subordinate columns with four routes for each of two leading
unit, a unit passing through the corps, or the entire divisions and by—
corps conducting the move.
Moving at a daylight rate of march of 30 kilome-
Additional control measures for which the corps ters per hour (kph).
is responsible include route designations, ground
and air traffic control, and establishing time lines. Maintaining a 50-meter (m) interval between
Corps can move either by rail, water, air, or road vehicles.
marches. Limiting gaps to 2 minutes between march units and
Movement of large forces is more economical by 5 minutes_between serials (1,000 m and 2,500 m at
30 kph). On eight routes at that interval and speed,
rail, but the staff must conduct an availability study the corps column length and pass time become
of transportation means, as well as consider the manageable, and divisions can deploy to fight in
effect on such movements, before making a deci- a reasonable amount of time.
sion. The lack of fuel, tires, or motor facilities may
direct movement of all or a portion of the force by Under these conditions, the 25,000 vehicles of the
rail. See FM 55-20 and FM 55-65 for in-depth corps would occupy about the same total road space
information on rail movements. of 2,500 kilometers (km) (1,250 km of occupied
road space plus 1,300 km for gaps). Distributed over
The responsibilities of a unit being moved by eight routes, the average corps column would be
water are the same as for rail movement. Field only 320-km long and would pass in 10.5 hours at
Manual 55-65 gives details relative to water 30 kph. A reinforced division (6,000 vehicles)
movement. marching on four routes would average 155-km per
Movement by air is normally the most responsive column and would pass in just over 5 hours.
means. The characteristics of air movement are Support for such a move (everything from circu-
speed and flexibility. However, adverse weather, lation control to route repair, from fuel resupply to
limited landing facilities, and enemy air activity can maintenance of vehicles) is an enormous task. In a
limit air movements. Also, the aircraft available for move across the theater, it is an operational under-
an air movement may not be able to ship bulky and taking of great complexity.
heavy items. See FM 55-12 for further discussion.
In theaters where long-range sensors can expose
Moving a typical corps by tactical road march dispositions at great distance and where self-direct-
entails the movement of at least 25,000 vehicles, ing antiarmor munitions and air maneuver can alter
assuming the corps has three divisions, an ACR, and circumstances rapidly, fluid movement is crucial,
supporting troops. The corps would occupy road the real essence of “agility.” It is supported by
space of 2,500 kilometers if it marched at the normal well-executed deception operations and effective
interval of 100 meters between vehicles ( 10 vehicles air and missile defenses. Logistic and route mainte-
per kilometer) even without gaps between march nance are also important supports to maneuver and
units and serials. Pass time at 25 kilometers per hour cannot be treated as afterthoughts.
would be more than 4 days.
Corps, divisions, and brigades must train, plan,
To conduct tactical operations, the corps must and refine their movement capabilities in peace if
march on multiple routes at the greatest possible they are to fight effectively in the early stages of
speed, making the most economical use of road war. Their staffs should train routinely and repeti-
space. Economizing road space requires greater ve- tively to produce orders on short notice and to adjust
hicle density on the routes in use, a function of road movements in progress.
shorter intervals between vehicles and minimal gaps
between march units and serials. Increasing the Neither good staff work nor inventive command-
number of routes adds flexibility and speed. Con- ers can be relied on to offset inadequacies in small
densing intervals and gaps increases risks. unit march discipline and training. Standards for
tactical marching must be stringent; the ability to
The corps can shorten its movement time and march must extend all the way into the companies
accelerate its deployment by marching in division if a division is to move well. If a single battalion
8-9
FM 100-15
8-10
FM 100-15
during the logistic and personnel estimate process The site must be large enough to accommodate the
and on the levels of combat power the commander unit as well as corps/division assets involved in the
desires. Not all units regenerate after a battle; only reconstitution operation. The corps includes regen-
those critical to the follow-on mission and that eration in its requirements to the ASCC.
require timely return to combat are regenerated.
Analysts base the decision to reconstitute a unit
Leadership is critical to the success of any recon- on reports and on-site assessments of a unit’s status
stitution effort. For the corps commander that means in regard to personnel, equipment, and cohesion.
anticipating the need for reconstitution and building The condition of the unit determines the exact
it into his plan. He must address both the tangible nature of reconstitution actions needed to restore
and intangible aspects of the rebuilding process. A the unit and allows planners to refine estimates into
unit requiring reconstitution will have serious prob- requirements.
lems in the intangible areas of morale, unit cohesion,
unit pride, and esprit de corps.
The staff must critically assess the unit while it is
An assessment of the unit’s collective perspective still in contact. This assessment provides the infor-
of the true reality of the situation must be a part of mation necessary to determine if the unit requires
the prereconstitution assessment. The mental atti- reconstitution and will provide a basis to determine
tude of unit personnel will affect the reconstitution requirements. Final assessment occurs when a unit
effort. The leadership challenge lies in reestablish- is removed from combat. The assessment provides
ing pride, morale, cohesion, and esprit de corps complete information on the unit’s requirements for
through programs— reconstitution.
To develop or replace key leaders.
To assimilate replacements as members of the The type and quantity of supplies and equipment,
team. personnel requirements, and reestablishment of
leadership and cohesion are all factors in the time
To reestablish cohesion and mission performance the unit requires for reconstitution. Reconstitution
capability. may require several days or several weeks.
To reestablish or reinforce standardized proce-
dures to facilitate restoration to an effective, co- The commander must make the decision to recon-
hesive combat unit. stitute a unit, and to what readiness level, as early
as possible to allow CSS to collect assets and to
The corps commander’s assessment of the in- remove the unit from combat. This may also be the
tangible aspects of a subordinate unit’s combat first time when the unit can conduct deliberate de-
potential is an important factor in determining the contamination.
unit’s reorganization or regeneration. His per-
sonal involvement, and that of other senior leaders
in the chain of command, is essential in helping Units (brigade or smaller) requiring regeneration
the unit being reconstituted recover its full combat support will receive this support from a task-
potential. organized element (normally battalion-size). This
element’s mission is to provide all CSS (including
Planners base the critical planning for reconsti- medical, replacement, and decontamination) that
tution on loss data in logistics and personnel esti- the unit being regenerated requires.
mates. Logisticians identify units that expect to
suffer heavy losses and units whose follow-on Each EAC will provide backup support, as re-
missions require a specified level of readiness.
Planners then include the requirements for re- quired. The factors of METT-T determine the actual
placement personnel and equipment in the opera- regeneration site. When conducting regeneration,
tion’s CSS requirements. CSS units are diverted from their primary mission.
Therefore, CSS planners must prioritize support,
Planners must also select a reconstitution site both for DS and GS, including distribution of weap-
where it would be reasonably safe from enemy ons systems since some units receive little or no
activity and beyond the range of enemy artillery. support during the regeneration period.
8-11
FM 100-15
8-12
FM 100-15
Forward Passage of Lines During the passage, the passing unit augments the
traffic control capability of the unit in contact.
A forward passage of lines is an operation in
which a unit passes through another unit that is in Close coordination and understanding between
contact with the enemy to continue the attack. The commanders and staff are essential for the smooth
unit in contact remains in place and supports the transfer of control during forward passage of lines.
passing unit until its fires are masked. Before transfer of responsibility, the passing unit
may be TACON to the stationary unit in the area
After receiving a warning order directing an op- affected by the passage.
eration that would require a passage of lines, the
passing commander and his staff establish liaison Both commands should determine a time or iden-
with the unit in contact. Based on METT-T factors, tifiable event when responsibility for the area the
the passing unit normally collocates a command passage will affect will transfer to the commander
element (TAC or main CP) with the TAC or main of the passing unit. The staff should disseminate this
CP of the unit in contact. Commanders and staffs of information to the lowest levels of both organiza-
involved units coordinate— tions.
Exchange of intelligence. The indirect-fire means of the unit in contact
normally support the passing unit. This allows the
Exchange of tactical plans, including obstacle passing unit’s fire support assets to continue the
plans. move to firing positions to support the continuation
Exchange of SOPs. of the attack. After responsibility for the AO trans-
fers to the passing unit, the commander of the pass-
Plans for reconnaissance by elements of the pass- ing unit coordinates all fires.
ing units.
The unit in contact furnishes the following CS and
Security measures during the passage. CSS assistance to the passing unit:
Selection of routes and designation of guides. Evacuation of casualties and EPW.
Selection of attack positions. Civilian and straggler control.
Priorities for use of routes and facilities and pro- Use of areas and facilities (for example, water
visions for movement control. points, medical).
When and under what conditions commanders
will transfer control of the AO. Route priority and traffic control.
Fire support and other combat support that the Evacuation of disabled vehicles.
unit in contact is to provide. Support by the unit in contact terminates when the
What CSS the unit in contact is to provide. passing unit’s maneuver elements move out of di-
rect fire support range. However, artillery fires and
Exchange of liaison personnel. other area and long-range weapons may remain in
support until either higher headquarters redirects
Command relationships between units, including them or when the passing unit coordinates move-
CS and CSS units and facilities and the unit in ment passage.
contact in whose area they may plan to locate.
Measures to minimize vulnerability to enemy Rearward Passage of Lines
NBC munitions.
Deception plans. A rearward passage of lines is an operation in
which a unit effecting a retrograde movement
The passing unit has priority for use of routes to passes through the sector of a unit occupying a
and within the AO of the unit in contact. Traffic rearward defensive position. Planning procedures
control within the AO is the responsibility of the unit for a withdrawal through a rearward position are
in contact until the passing unit assumes control. similar to those for a forward passage of lines.
8-13
FM 100-15
The commanders and staffs of the units involved Once initiated, relief operations are vulnerable to
coordinate the same details as in a forward passage enemy attacks. Any unnecessary delays during exe-
of lines. The passing unit and the unit in position cution provide the enemy additional time to acquire,
prepare and carefully coordinate a vehicle recogni- target, and fire mass destruction munitions. Inter-
tion plan. mingling of forces places increased burdens on C²
systems.
Coordination is critical to the successful execu-
tion transfer of control and responsibility between Hasty and deliberate relief-in-place operations
stationary and passing commanders. The area af- differ only in the depth and detail of planning. Units
fected by the passage, either in the zone of attack or conduct all relief operations, once initiated, as
the sector of defense, becomes the responsibility of quickly as possible.
the stationary force commander.
In a deliberate relief, units exchange plans and
Coordination is even more critical when the rear- liaison personnel; conduct briefings and detailed
ward passage is staggered or incremental across the reconnaissance; and publish written orders with de-
sector or AO. This transfer of control might require tailed instructions. Units plan and execute a hasty
that the passing commander relinquish control of relief from oral or fragmentary orders.
certain elements that may remain in contact at the The relieved unit designates liaison personnel
time of the transfer of responsibility. from combat, CS, and CSS units. Liaison personnel
The unit in position furnishes the passing unit all remain with the relieving unit until obstacle, fire
possible assistance, including combat, CS, and CSS support, and counterattack plans are coordinated.
assistance. Fire support by the unit in position is The relieving unit order includes the time of
critical to the passing unit, especially when covering relief, units to be relieved and the sequence, some
the withdrawal of elements left in contact during a discussion on future missions, restrictions for ad-
delay. vance parties, security, time and place for the issu-
ance of the order, and routine route priorities.
Relief in Place Commanders achieve coordination and synchroni-
zation primarily through overlay graphics, event
A relief in place is a combat operation in which sequences, and movement plans.
one unit replaces all or part of another unit. A relief For deliberate relief operations, the TAC CP,
in place normally occurs when the unit to be relieved reinforced with selected coordinating and special
is defending. staff officers, collocates with the main CP of the unit
The relieving unit usually assumes the same re- being relieved. When time is short in a hasty relief
sponsibilities and generally deploys in the same a smaller advance party, consisting primarily of
configuration as the relieved unit. Command and TAC CP personnel, quickly moves to the main CP
control of a relief in place operation is facilitated by of the relieved unit. They conduct liaison functions
close coordination by all commanders involved for other staff agencies, coordinate the relief, and
through the collocation of unit CPs. issue FRAGOs. Meanwhile, subordinate units
move to designated AOs.
If forward elements are capable of defending the
AO, it is preferable to execute the relief in place To maintain security, units must make maximum
from rear to front. This facilitates movement and use of the relieved unit’s radio nets and operators.
terrain management. Units use the command frequency of the relieved
units at all levels to effect relief operations. The
Relief-in-place operations are categorized as relieved units’ signal officer remains in charge of
hasty or deliberate. Considerations common to both communications throughout the relief operation.
are secrecy, speed, and control.
For fire support the preferred technique is to
A relief must be concealed from the enemy for as relieve artillery last. If possible the relieved units’
long as possible. Accordingly, at first warning that artillery remains in place until all units have been
a relief operation is required, units to be relieved relieved. If the relief is for the purpose of continuing
should initiate a plan for deception and OPSEC. the attack, both corps’ artillery remain in support.
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FM 100-15
Artillery assets are not relieved weapon for Ammunition and equipment incompatibility may
weapon unless limited firing positions are available. make exchange more difficult.
Until the change of command, all artillery remains
under the relieved commander’s control. This re- Deception plans must be believable and must
quires close coordination with the units to be target the appropriate enemy decision-making
supported. level.
8-15
FM 100-15
manders of the converging forces. Higher head- equipment may not properly interface because of
quarters also assigns the converging forces’ sub- technical or security reasons. Converging forces
sequent mission after they complete the linkup. will also need to establish any additional commu-
nications necessary to support the operation, in-
Converging forces will maintain command and cluding the exchange of signal operations
staff liaison during the planning phase and through- instructions (SOI).
out the duration of the operation. Command liaison
elements must be capable of continuous operations
and sufficiently equipped to communicate with their The converging forces jointly establish any addi-
headquarters. tional control measures (including linkup points, if
not already established) to support the operation.
This is especially critical during a joint and/ They also coordinate CS or CSS to facilitate the
or combined operation when communications linkup operation and/or the subsequent mission.
8-16
Chapter 9
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
(OOTW)
Army doctrine recognizes that OOTW consists of missions in South America to JTFs supporting civil
raids, NEO, peace enforcement, humanitarian assis- authorities in domestic disaster relief operations.
tance, peacekeeping, and nation assistance. Joint Operations other than war have also included
publications in the 3-07 series outline joint OOTW overseas humanitarian assistance as well as opera-
doctrine. Field Manual 100-5, FM 100-19, FM 100- tions of greater risk, such as NEO, in less than
20, and FM 100-23 are the Army’s primary doc- benign circumstances. These demands come in ad-
trinal references for OOTW. Operations other than dition to the constant requirement to maintain com-
war encompass a wide range of activities where bat readiness in both forward-deployed and
military forces perform actions used for purposes CONUS-based units.
other than the large-scale combat operations we
usually associate with war.
Although OOTW often occur outside the US,
they also include military support to US civil
authorities. Military OOTW usually involve a com-
bination of air, land, sea, space, and special opera-
tions forces (as well as the efforts of government
agencies and nongovernment organizations) in a
complementary fashion.
The US government may apply any combination
of national power to achieve national strategic goals
whether they are political, economic, informational,
or military. In OOTW, military forces typically
support or otherwise integrate efforts with diplo-
matic, economic, and informational agencies or
organizations.
When the corps performs OOTW, it will typically
use warfighting doctrine found in this and other
manuals. The corps commander and his staff must
temper doctrine with judgment appropriate for the
specific situation. They use METT-T factors during
the command estimate process to appropriately
task-organize and plan OOTW missions. The corps
must stress a unified effort with the other services
and with the civil, military, and police agencies of
host nations.
Since its founding, the Army has continuously
performed missions and tasks not directly related to
war. Since the end of the Cold War, American
involvement in OOTW has included crisis response
in combat situations as well as participation in non-
combat activities. Contributions range from engi-
neer well-drilling detachments performing TOE
9-1
FM 100-15
Early identification of situations that might re- war. This frees subordinate division headquarters to
quire the commitment of corps assets in OOTW supervise the tactical operations of their organic
missions is essential. Early identification provides units. This also allows the commander to adapt to
additional time to conduct planning and specialized circumstances that require the corps’ main effort to
training that METT-T factors and political condi- be a CS or CSS operation with combat units in
tions of specific OOTW missions require. Special support to provide security.
operations forces are most suitable for conducting Corps can conduct split-based operations when
early assessments because of their rapid deployabil- required. In addition, when properly supported,
ity, interpersonal communications skills, area orien- corps can operate in either developed or undevel-
tation, and language capabilities. oped theaters under all physical and climatic envi-
Doctrine for OOTW emphasizes the overriding ronments. Finally, a corps’ capability to address a
requirement to provide security for the force, and variety of threats (rioters, light infantry, and forces
the population when appropriate, in the operational of nature) often make it an ideal choice for use in
area. The threat may be man, nature, or both. Estab- OOTW.
lishing an effective intelligence network to identify
situational threats is essential.
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN
For OCONUS operations, corps planning should WAR PRINCIPLES
include the possibility that OOTW forces may be-
come engaged in combat operations. In a parallel Many of the time-tested principles that apply to
planning process within the corps’ overall plan for warfare also apply to OOTW. Other considerations
the OOTW mission, the commander and staff that are equally important include—
should develop CONPLANs that address the need
for increased security force protection, possible The objective.
evacuation, or possible combat operations. Unity of effort.
Legitimacy.
THE CORPS’ SUITABILITY Perseverance.
FOR OOTW Restraint.
The operational prerequisite for any response is Security.
adaptability. Corps are adaptable because they pos-
sess a robust nucleus of combat, CS, and CSS forces To be successful in OOTW, corps commanders
with which to accomplish OOTW mission require- must understand these principles and apply them to
ments. Since corps are not fixed organizations, the their operations. (For more information see JP 3-07,
corps headquarters may control assets not habitually FM 100-20, and FM 100-5. See also Figure 9-1.)
associated with the corps’ echelon.
The corps headquarters routinely operates with The Objective
joint and multinational forces. With the corps re- In OOTW, as in war, the corps commander en-
ceiving augmentation from other services and the sures that the mission is translated into clearly de-
establishing authority, it can assume an expanded fined and attainable objectives. Operations other
role. For example, it might be a JTF headquarters than war do not always have a tight focus (for
controlling both joint and multinational forces. The example, multiple functions may be involved in a
corps headquarters also possesses the organic capa- single mission). As a result, the corps commander
bility to communicate with higher Army and other may not receive a clear, succinct mission. However,
agencies as required. his mission statement and intent must clearly trans-
late the political or strategic objective into mission-
The corps can use many of its operational capa- type orders.
bilities, developed for warfighting, in OOTW.
These capabilities include a command focus that can In OOTW, the corps’ military objective is often
operate at both the operational and tactical levels of a part of national, political, or humanitarian
9-2
FM 100-15
Legitimacy
Civilian and military leaders can best establish
legitimacy when all parties understand the political,
economic, cultural, and military aspects of the op-
eration. Legitimacy in OOTW primarily involves
three areas:
Legitimacy of the government or agency exercis-
ing authority.
Legitimacy for the presence of US forces in an
AO.
objectives. Therefore, the corps’ objective may be Legitimacy in the execution of law-and-order
a limited one. operations.
Although the corps commander measures success The legitimacy of the foreign government the US
against a stated mission, he must recognize the military is to support may play a vital role in domes-
likelihood of the operation expanding (mission tic public opinion. Legitimacy will also influence
creep). He must guard against a tendency to expand the support the indigenous population will provide.
the stated mission in an effort to accomplish more Because corps activities in OOTW support political
than is appropriate. On the other hand, keeping the objectives, commanders must be aware of the im-
political goals and objectives in mind, commanders pact their operations will have on how its public
must understand that the directing authority may perceives the host government.
expand their goals, objectives, and mission based on
perceived successes or setbacks. How soldiers conduct themselves when not in-
volved in the operation may affect the population’s
view of the legitimacy of US operations. In cases
Unity of Effort where a government does not exist, and to avoid
unintended legitimization of individuals or organi-
Unity of effort involves coordination through co- zations, the corps must use caution.
operation and the pursuit of common interests.
Unity of command, a principle of war, is essential Information affects both political and military
in any military operation. However, it may not be objectives. The corps commander must view infor-
attainable in OOTW. Often, the environment will mation as a means to influence the legitimacy of his
be multinational and/or interagency, where a single operations with both friendly and enemy forces.
chain of command does not exist.
Military PSYOP, civil affairs, and public affairs
In selected OOTW activities, the military will be are the corps commander’s primary means of com-
working for another government agency. Therefore, municating to foreign and internal audiences his
unity of effort is the practical alternative. actions and intentions. PSYOP and CA units are
9-3
FM 100-15
well-suited for both short-term and long-term authority for and the limits of military action. Re-
OOTW missions. The corps commander’s coopera- straints are also found in the mission statement, the
tion with the media is important— TOR, and the ROE (FM 100-20).
To strengthen the legitimacy of the operation. Restrictions on types of force, weapons used, and
ROE help prevent escalation of the violence in an
To promote both foreign and domestic popular activity. The commander refines restraints in the
support. mission statement and clearly communicates them
To provide accurate information to the public. to subordinate units. The mission, situation, and
laws (domestic and international) shape each opera-
The American public should view corps involve- tion. The host nation and other countries can also
ment in OOTW as legitimate. A corps cannot con- impose restraints.
trol this; it obeys the legal orders of the NCA. The
corps must act within its means to sustain its legiti- Military planners normally develop ROE in con-
macy. The corps’ role and conduct must be appro- junction with other agencies, services, or national
priate to the situation. authorities. They must continually review ROE
based on the changing situation and update or
When supporting domestic civil authorities, the change them as necessary. The ROE are never sub-
corps must understand the letter and intent of the stitutes for the commander’s inherent responsibility
laws that govern such support. National guard (NG) to protect his force. Units and soldiers have the right
units perform state missions at the discretion of their (duty) to defend themselves.
respective state or territorial governor. Regular
Army and RC units support domestic civil authori-
ties only under certain conditions. (See FM 100-19.) Security
All operations contain some degree of risk.
Perseverance Therefore, regardless of the mission, commanders
The corps should achieve its OOTW objectives must secure their forces. The presence of corps units
as soon as possible. However, the causes of conflict in any operation around the world will bring about
often tend to be persistent and not readily amenable a wide range of actions and reactions. Army com-
to a near-term solution. Conflict resolution is time- manders must take appropriate measures to ensure
consuming and may require a long-term military hostile factions do not acquire an unexpected
commitment. In some situations, conflict may be a advantage.
semipermanent state. The military’s objective will Commanders and staffs should never believe that
be to lessen the conflict. nonhostile missions or environments do not contain
Corps elements in OOTW must exercise patience risk. No matter what the mission, the American soldier
and perseverance to continue the mission for as long outside the US is always a lucrative target for extremist
as required. In selected operations, such as groups (terrorists, criminals, and so on).
peacekeeping operations, success may be measured
by the ability of the corps to sustain the status quo. Where appropriate, corps units plan for the pos-
If so, the corps’ mission is to provide a climate in sibility of combat operations. Seemingly benign
which other elements of power can work for a situations may possess inherent circumstances that
solution. Therefore, the corps must be adaptable, would place US soldiers at risk. Commanders must
patient, and determined for as long as the mission consider the security challenges inherent in many
dictates. OOTW missions when planning and executing
operations.
9-4
FM 100-15
9-5
FM 100-15
9-6
FM 100-15
9-7
FM 100-15
9-8
FM 100-15
dominate shows of force as they do for all OOTW. Nation assistance to help develop economic alter-
The corps coordinates its operations with the af- natives to drug production, exportation, and
fected host nation. distribution.
American military support of foreign counterdrug
Support to Civil Authorities operations is normally coordinated by the regional
CINC, his special operations command, and the
Support to civil authorities operations provide various country military assistance groups. Corps
temporary support, under law. They normally occur involvement normally is limited to supervising the
when an emergency overwhelms the capabilities of preparation, deployment, and possible sustainment
civil authorities. Support can be as diverse as— of small specialized units to meet CINC or SOF
operational shortfalls.
Temporary augmentation of air traffic controllers
or postal workers because of strikes. Corps support of interdiction efforts may center
on monitoring and detecting illegal drugs in transit.
Restoration of law and order in the aftermath of It also may involve the integration of the C³I sys-
a riot. tems of all agencies participating in the interdiction
Protection of life and federal property. effort by the corps.
9-9
FM 100-15
subordinate units will generally need to make an important task for corps planners and operators.
extraordinary effort to exchange liaison at all eche- (See FM 100-6 for more information.)
lons with diverse organizations. Their actions can
help all participating organizations achieve unity of Information-gathering must begin early, before
effort. deployment of corps units. The commander may
elect to send a task-organized assessment team into
Civilian organizations, in particular, do not have the AO to gather information on key issues, or he
the communications, data processing, and other may establish initial liaison with agencies, HN and
equipment to facilitate control to the extent that the multinational forces, and SOF teams operating in
corps has. Therefore, the corps may have to provide the region. Liaison teams deploy as soon as
additional equipment, operators, communications- practical.
electronics operating instructions (CEOI), or other
support and services to civilian participants. As the OOTW mission clarifies and the deploy-
ment of military forces begins, the demand for
Just as in war, the corps commander tailors his information at every level will be intense. The com-
corps based on OOTW mission requirements. Corps mitted force, whatever its size, may need the results
participation might include small units supporting a of nationally sourced intelligence analysis.
joint, multinational, or interagency operation. How-
ever, the corps might be responsible for the entire The CJTF will need the benefit of” on the ground”
mission (possibly as a JTF and/or ARFOR head- observation, analysis, and recommendations. Every
quarters). level will want similar information. Decision mak-
ers cannot afford to wait for deployments to be
Significant staff augmentation would then be nec- complete before getting the necessary information.
essary from the Army and other service components
and the CINC staff. Whatever the mission and level Information operations for OOTW are critically
of participation, the corps task organization for important to the overall success of the mission.
OOTW might be radically different than for normal Special planning areas include influencing the en-
combat operations because of unique mission re- emy (if there is one), educating and informing the
quirements. The following discussion highlights population, supporting media operations, and pro-
some unique OOTW considerations. viding command information.
9-10
FM 100-15
9-11
FM 100-15
especially critical during OOTW. For example, the archy, and soon). While military police units are the
discipline and actions of squads and platoons per- first considered for law-and-order missions, with
forming humanitarian relief operations are, in many minimal training, infantry units may perform ex-
cases, far more visible than in larger combat tremely well in manning static guard posts, reinforc-
operations. ing police patrols, and crowd control.
Events of only tactical-level consequence in war Planning considerations include protecting key
may have operational or strategic implications in economic infrastructures, maintaining general law
OOTW. Realistic ROE are critical. Commanders and order, establishing a civil defense effort, and
must identify ROE early in the operation’s planning protecting the government infrastructure. When
process. planning for the use of military forces to execute law
enforcement operations in CONUS, corps com-
In OOTW, as in war, the commander seeks to manders must consider the restrictions that the
position his force to effectively execute the mission. Posse Comitatus Act places on the military.
The corps’ power may be based on combat, CS, and
CSS forces or on any combination of the three. It
makes no difference whether the enemy is insur- Fire Support
gents, rioters, or flood waters.
In OOTW the corps still plans for the use of fires.
In some OOTW missions, maneuver planning These will be both lethal and nonlethal, provided by
may consist of positioning logistic units to optimize corps, joint, or multinational assets. The political
their capabilities to provide service or supplies for nature and the need to maintain legitimacy for
relief operations. As mentioned before, the main OOTW missions makes careful mission analysis
effort for the corps may be general engineering and precise use of lethal or nonlethal fires essential.
functions or providing shelter, food, clothing, and
medical care and security. The corps must use lethal fires sparingly in offen-
sive operations. In defensive situations, the corps
There are many similarities in planning consid- uses what is necessary to protect the force. Precise
erations for combat operations and OOTW. How- planning and delivery of fires allows the com-
ever, the battlefield organization may not lend itself mander to preclude unwanted collateral damage and
to a close, deep, and rear organization. The avoid possible political ramifications.
commander should try to organize corps operations The corps will generally employ fire support co-
to comply with HN administrative structure (city or ordination measures. For example, it may use re-
county boundaries, local police districts, or with strictive fire control measures to minimize potential
civilian agency boundaries). In many cases, the damage to important cultural structures or dense
means of executing close, deep, and rear operations population areas.
will change.
The corps must ensure it carefully synchronizes
Information operations may become the primary both restrictive and permissive fire support coordi-
means of conducting deep operations. Close opera- nation measures with a ROE analysis. Nonlethal
tions in many OOTW missions may more closely fires may be the primary means of fire support in
resemble doctrinal rear operations conducted in many forms of OOTW. The corps can use nonlethal
support of combat operations. Corps planning fires to confuse, deceive, delay, disorganize, or lo-
should also consider the possibility for noncontigu- cate the opposition.
ous AOs and split-based operations.
In addition to providing security and law and Air Defense
order for the corps’ organic elements, the com-
mander may need to conduct law-and-order mis- Air defense operations in OOTW are different
sions in OOTW. In many OOTW missions, local from conventional AD operations. The layered AD
government infrastructure will be incapable of pro- umbrella that exists for the corps on a conventional
viding the necessary security and law and order for battlefield may not exist in an OOTW environment.
itself or its population. This could be for any number Early warning radars, multiple weapons systems,
of reasons (hurricanes, tornadoes, insurgences, an- EAC air defense command facilities, and offensive
9-12
FM 100-15
9-13
FM 100-15
load, and distribute equipment, fuel, ammunition, organization, and resourcing of the other services’
and other materials. personnel systems. There must be provisions to
account for non-Army military members, civilians,
Contracting support is one of the corps logisti- and even HN personnel. Commanders must also
cian’s principal tools in accomplishing the mission. consider coordination requirements with national
Planning should consider resources available in and international agencies, departments, and
theater, supplies that higher HQ or outside agencies officials.
(such as the UN) will provide, and supplies that the
corps can contract for, thus avoiding having to
transport them into theater. In most OOTW scenar- Resources Control
ios, contracting support will have to deploy into In many OOTW missions the corps will need to
theater with the corps’ initial elements. assist the HN or local governments in maintaining
control of key or critical resources. Resources con-
Combat Health Support trol involves planning and executing operations that
help the HN’s local government or multinational
Combat health support in many OOTW scenarios force in their efforts to maintain positive control
will greatly expand beyond that usually required to over supplies, materiel, terrain, and the population.
support the corps. Required CHS may include care Maintaining control will preclude these items being
for civilians and their farm animals as well as US used by opposing elements. In civil disaster situ-
military personnel. The corps medical staff must ations this could mean restoring local governmental
plan for this eventuality. The success of disaster infrastructure and protecting vital utility services
relief or humanitarian assistance operations may until the HN force can assume the mission.
well hinge on the corps’s ability to provide medical,
dental, veterinary, and preventive health-related
services and support. Legal Services
The corps enters OOTW missions as a result of
Personnel Services political directives or special circumstances with
political or social ramifications. Therefore, corps
Personnel elements are especially important in commanders and staff will need a variety of legal
OOTW because they provide support to command- services.
ers and soldiers involved in the operation. For most Services may range from providing legal inter-
OOTW scenarios, initial deployment forces in the pretations of the mission to providing legal counsel
AO must be able to manage the critical functions of for redress of claims against the US government or
personnel accounting and strength reporting, casu- of US claims against other countries. Other areas of
alty operations, and postal support. legal services include—
Elements of the corps’ personnel management Planning for property and personal grievances
center will be required to maintain personnel readi- under criminal law.
ness of the deployed force and to synchronize the
personnel network. Modular personnel units (PSBs Filing and processing claims.
and postal companies) will incrementally deploy to Providing legal assistance.
establish the theater data base and to provide per-
sonnel support, as the operation and METT-T fac- Assisting HN governments and military forces
tors dictate. regarding terms of status of forces agreements
and other international law issues.
The nature of OOTW suggests that most opera-
tions will be joint. In the transition to the joint staff,
the J1/G1, with assistance from the AG, must help Battle Command
develop the personnel support component of the
JTF structure. Battle command, although fundamentally un-
changed, must be adjusted to the varied situations
Augmentation from EAC personnel staffs and inherent in OOTW. Each OOTW situation is
units may be required to ensure integration, task- unique. There is no single battle command option
9-14
FM 100-15
that works best for all. Corps commanders and their Planning Considerations
subordinates must be flexible in modifying standard
arrangements to meet the specific requirements of Because the OOTW mission may not warrant the
each situation and to promote unity of effort. complete commitment of the entire corps, the corps
HQ may elect to conduct split-based operations. A
forward CP can operate in the AO while the rear CP
Command Considerations may operate from its CONUS base.
Operations other than war missions often come Although the commander must guard against an
with unclear or ad hoc chains of command. The expansion of corps missions; the corps’ task organi-
numerous players, not normally in the corps’ chain zation must also allow for the possible rapid transi-
of command, as well as nonstandard task organiza- tion to combat operations or other OOTW missions.
tions will require adjustments to the corps’ C² ar- Also, the corps force must not overwhelm poten-
chitecture. In addition, mission requirements for tially scarce transportation assets or the austere thea-
OOTW require innovative leadership and staffs to ter infrastructure.
develop appropriate COAs. Although the decision- Operations other than war require corps combat,
making process for OOTW is the same as for com- CS, and CSS units to operate in concert with US and
bat operations, the information within the process foreign civilian agencies of government, intern-
may vary widely from that of conventional ational organizations, and private organizations. Ele-
operations. ments of the corps’ support command may play
major roles.
Some OOTW missions may require the corps to
act as a JTF and/or ARFOR headquarters, which The corps must be prepared to accept attachment
will pose significant challenges for the corps com- or OPCON of units from many external sources,
mander and his staff. Normally, the corps separates including other Army organizations, joint forces,
the two functions. However, it may retain both roles and allied or coalition military services. It may
in short-duration, low-risk OOTW missions. assume OPCON of other US or foreign government
agencies. The corps must coordinate with and sup-
During OOTW, the corps will probably conduct port public or private civilian organizations.
interagency operations to a much greater extent than
during conventional operations. When the corps HQ Because of the often short period of time available
is also the ARFOR, it may act as the executive agent to plan and conduct force-projection operations for
for certain activities and the services for the joint an OOTW mission, logistic planners must develop
force. The degree to which this applies depends on comprehensive logistic support packages for use in
the particular OOTW mission and the service or various OOTW scenarios. Planning should consider
agencies involved in the mission. Inmost cases, the the needs of the response force, the corps’ available
CINC and the ASCC augment the corps staff with resources, resources provided in the theater of op-
appropriate expertise to act as the JTF or ARFOR eration by other organizations, transportation re-
headquarters. strictions, and supplies that will be potentially
contracted.
The corps normally executes OOTW as contin- Planning for the transition out of the OOTW
gency operations. As in any contingency operation, mission and the redeployment and demobilization
the CINC determines the EAC chain of command. (if required) of corps units should begin as early as
possible. Preferably, this is before beginning the
Regardless of how complex the EAC chain of OOTW mission.
command may be, the corps commander must still
establish clear command relationships between Military forces may best conduct refugee control,
corps units. As the CAP process develops, subordi- reestablishing civil order and public services, medi-
nate commanders should participate through a par- cal assistance, and other activities during the initial
allel planning process and help the corps staff stages of an OOTW mission. Some OOTW mis-
develop and staff subordinate unit mission state- sions typically begin with significant military in-
ments (and their perceived end states) up the chain volvement, then move increasingly toward civilian
of command. dominance as the potential for armed violence or
9-15
FM 100-15
environmental threats wane and civil infrastructures corps controls a wide variety of combat and CSS
and control are reestablished. units. The corps COSCOM contains many of the
The corps’ presence and its ability to operate in CSS assets that are essential during OOTW.
crisis environments under extreme conditions may Under OOTW conditions, even if assigned the
give it a prominent role in operations where other role of a JTF headquarters, the corps still ultimately
agencies are the lead. Corps subordinate units need works for the regional CINC or international force
to work competently in this environment while commander. However, the senior DOS official in
properly subordinating military efforts to the a country during overseas operations, or the appro-
agency in charge. To be effective, planning and priate official in another federal agency during do-
conducting OOTW activities require a variety of mestic support operations, will direct the overall
perspectives and expertise and the cooperation and effort. However, even though that person may have
assistance of other services, government agencies, OPCON over corps units, command remains in
and alliance or coalition partners. military channels. If combat arises during overseas
Corps doctrine addresses OOTW as an important operations, the corps may revert to the direct control
component of the full range of Army operations. of the CINC or another appropriate commander
While OOTW do not preclude combat operations, (such as the CJTF).
in most cases success will entail use of military Normal unit training for OOTW focuses on
capabilities in roles other than traditional combat.
combat-related mission essential tasks, many of
The corps is well-suited to conduct OOTW be- which are applicable in OOTW. Once alerted for a
cause its headquarters is capable of the complex mission, units conduct specialized training in ac-
management of OOTW. With proper augmentation cordance with the CJTF’s or CINC’s directives.
the corps commander can serve as an ARFOR or This specialized training may require some ex-
JTF commander in OOTW. (See Chapter 4.) The tended time to complete.
9-16
Chapter 10
INFORMATION AGE TECHNOLOGIES
AND CORPS OPERATIONS
10-1
FM 100-15
aircraft are loaded with weight-reduced im- systems, communications systems, and logis-
aging infrared, millimeter wave and optical tics activities, the corps will be able to rapidly
correlators designed to exchange informa- receive, process, and distribute information with
tion with other members of the combined- its subordinate units. The goal of digitization is
arms team. to create a global information network that sup-
The defender is no match for the violent as- ports commanders at all echelons. The corps
must be capable of supporting joint and multina-
saulting force. What he sees seems like pure tional operations with secure connectivity be-
magic—not a battle—but an almost instanta- tween all elements of the force.
neous blanket of destruction directed with
pinpoint accuracy across his entire force. Technology gains are beginning to have major
The M1A2+s and M2A3+s, in a 10- to 15- effects on how the corps manages, transports,
second wave of firing, take out the enemy’s processes, and presents information that supports
dug-in tanks and AT weapons with one-shot, synchronized activities on the battlefield. Im-
one-kill precision strikes, completely de- proved voice capabilities (mobile subscriber
stroying his direct-fire defense. equipment (MSE), cellular phones, satellite
links), imagery directly downlinked to ground
It is over in a few minutes. terminals, broadcast technologies, facsimile,
video, color graphics, global positioning systems
FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS (GPSs), digital overlay mapping, and data basing
are increasingly more available to lower echelon
Many changes are likely to occur in corps opera- units.
tions as the Army exploits the benefits of informat- More information is available faster, processed
ion-age technologies. To meet future requirements, more quickly, and easier to understand and visualize
the corps must become more capable as it becomes than ever before. This gives commanders and sol-
smaller. The ideas in this chapter are not prescrip- diers rapid
. access to extremely complete and accu-
tive; they represent an evolution of how the corps rate information. All of these capabilities create
may gather, analyze, distribute, and act on opportunities to improve the way the corps plans,
information. prepares for, and executes land operations.
Advances in technology continue to shape the
way the Army conducts warfare. The pace of opera-
tions is now greater than ever. The age of digitiza- BOS IMPLICATIONS
tion is shifting how the Army operates. New
technology will eliminate- When digitization is applied across battlefield
operating systems, the corps can focus a concen-
Communications that are limited because of line trated effort as a result of the opportunities each
of sight (LOS) restrictions. BOS provides.
The need for soldiers to navigate by maps and Intelligence provides—
compass.
Increased accuracy and timeliness of intelligence
Hierarchical information flow. data collection and dissemination.
Bottlenecked theater communications networks. Improved operational efficiency through creation
Static command posts. of the relevant common picture for the force.
Cold War C² systems of ground-based, grid-net- Maneuver provides—
worked architectures will no longer meet the needs Rapid depiction of friendly unit dispositions
of the corps’ force-projection requirements. Digiti- along with associated control measures.
zation of the battlefield is one of the ways the Army
has chosen to transition to the twenty-first century. Precision maneuver through accurate identifica-
tion of enemy locations.
As the Army continues to expand the use of
digital capabilities to sensors, intelligence fusion Pinpoint navigation through the use of a GPS.
10-2
FM 100-15
10-3
FM 100-15
maneuver, conduct precision fires, protect the force, gathering and processing systems with both lethal
win the battlefield information war, and sustain and nonlethal means, while improving its ability to
combat power. rapidly process, distribute, and protect friendly in-
formation.
Through digitization, friendly units will be able
to move precisely at great speed and effectively Digitization will also improve early warning and
employ weapons of superior range and lethality. the ability to accurately forecast requirements and
Enhancements in command and control, intelli- provide timely delivery of resources. The corps
gence, target detection, and fire control will allow commander can then protect and sustain the force
the corps to conduct decisive maneuver in combi- anywhere in the world. All of these improvements
nation with simultaneous precision fires. The result in the corps’ ability to be dominate in future
corps will be able to attack enemy information- land warfare.
10-4
Appendix A
To make accurate decisions, commanders and Corps support command assets as required to
staff officers must have a firm understanding of the support task organization, including the following
capabilities, limitations, and employment consid- corps support depending on METT-T factors:
erations of organic and supporting friendly forces.
Commanders and staffs can use the information in – A DS maintenance company.
this appendix for preliminary planning. They can – Missile maintenance support.
also use this information to understand and apply
various corps assets to the battlefield. This appendix – Aircraft maintenance support.
provides generic planning considerations by service
and specialty. – A surgical team.
– An air ambulance.
CORPS TASK ORGANIZATION – Transportation.
CONSIDERATIONS – Mortuary affairs.
Although situation-dependent, division (as well – Ammunition support.
as separate brigade and ACR) commanders can
expect to receive a portion of the corps’ assets to – Port/airfield clearance.
accomplish their assigned missions. A commander – A field services company.
of a committed division may receive the following
additional support depending on METT-T factors: Other combat support (a command aviation
company of the corps aviation brigade) and
Additional maneuver units (an ACR, a separate CSS assets (a transportation company) as
brigade, an AH battalion, or a ground maneuver required.
brigade from another division within the corps).
Close air support allocation and priority of effort
Air defense artillery assets (an ADA battalion or (time, location, target type, or situational
ADA batteries of guns and/or short-range considerations).
missiles).
Priority of corps GS assets.
Chemical assets.
Naval surface fire support and ANGLICO
Engineer assets (an engineer battalion or an engi- assistance.
neer group with attached engineer battalions or A commander of an uncommitted division may
companies and a bridge company). receive, with the exception of FA, MP, and CAS
Field artillery assets (an FA brigade with an ap-
propriate mix of FA units).
Military intelligence assets.
Military police assets (an MP company).
Psychological operations assets.
Signal assets as required to support task organi-
zation (a node center or extension switch).
Civil affairs assets (a CA battalion with both
financial specialists and generalists).
A-1
FM 100-15
A-2
FM 100-15
Involves active measures such as using combat – Reduce the enemy’s battlefield reserves.
fighter aircraft and air defense artillery.
Attacks are normally executed by the ACC as part
Involves passive measures, such as— of a systematic and persistent campaign in sup-
Not involving weapons systems. port of the JFC’s strategy.
Radar coverage for early warning. Includes actions against land force targets nomi-
nated by the LCC or the Army corps, which are
Protective construction (for example, hardened in a position to have a near-term effect on the
sites). corps battle but are not yet in close proximity to
ground forces.
Cover, camouflage, deception, dispersion, and
frequent movement of personnel and equip- Targets are nominated by corps commanders and
ment. are prioritized according to nominations of all
corps/service components in theater and the
JFC’s objectives.
SEAD, J-SEAD, and Air Interdiction
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)— Requires joint coordination during planning.
Operations neutralize, destroy, or temporarily de-
grade enemy AD systems. Close Air Support, Reconnaissance and
Surveillance, and Airlift
Goal is to allow friendly aviation forces to effec-
tively perform other missions without interfer- Close Air Support (CAS)—
ence from enemy air defense. Are attacks against hostile surface forces that are
Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses in close proximity to friendly forces and which
(J-SEAD)– require detailed integration into the supported
commander’s scheme of fire and maneuver.
May be part of SEAD operations; land force
surface-to-surface weapons will complement To be successful, must be responsive to the
these efforts. ground commander’s needs.
Is conducted by the ACC at the theater level Enhances surface force operations by providing
against surface-to-air defense systems. the capability to deliver a wide range of weapons
Are planned and conducted in localized areas by and massed firepower at decisive points.
battalion and larger land units to protect aviation Is conducted—
and friendly aircraft; localized J-SEAD opera-
tions can use FA, attack helicopters, direct fire – To blunt an enemy attack on a friendly
weapons, and EW. position.
Air Interdiction (AI)— — To help obtain and maintain the land offensive. .
Delays, disrupts, or destroys the enemy’s poten-
tial before he can use it effectively against – To provide cover for friendly movements.
friendly forces. Targets are selected by the ground commander.
May—
Is planned, directed, and controlled by elements
– Reduce the enemy’s capability to mount an of the theater air control system.
offensive.
Reconnaissance and Surveillance—
– Restrict the enemy’s freedom of action and
increase vulnerability to friendly attack. Objectives are to collect information from air-
borne, orbital, and surface-based sensors to iden-
– Prevent the enemy from countering an increase tify the enemy’s composition, capability, and
in friendly strength. intent.
A-3
FM 100-15
2 2
S2/G2 normally handles preplanned requests for Requests are sent through A C facilities to the
aerial reconnaissance; the appropriate TACP ACA.
handles immediate requests.
Minimum-Risk Route (MRR)—
Airlift—
At NATO is known as the low-level transit route
Objectives are to deploy, employ, and sustain (LLTR).
military forces by the timely movement, delivery,
and recovery of personnel and equipment. Represents minimum hazard to friendly USAF
aircraft transiting a specific area.
Through mobility operations, allows the JFC to
maneuver fighting forces to exploit an enemy’s Is recommended by the corps and sent through
weakness. the LCC to the ACA.
May be categorized as either strategic or theater; Normally begins at the corps rear boundary and
corps requests— ends at the FSCL.
— For strategic airlift are handled through Should be changed frequently to prevent enemy
exploitation.
TRANSCOM channels.
May extend below the coordinating altitude to
– For theater airlift are handled through Army increase aircraft survivability.
logistic channels, with variations for the imme-
diacy of the request. Should be active in the corps at any onetime with
several inactive alternates.
— For when movements are known or projected
in advance, are handled as planned requests Must avoid areas where intense ground combat is
through normal logistic channels as part of the projected and where there will be areas of high
JMC’s daily airlift allocation. airspace use, such as—
– For when air movement requirements are iden- – Field artillery areas.
tified too late for normal coordination, are han- – Air defense areas.
dled as immediate.
— Once identified by the Army, are transmitted – Drop zones.
directly to the AOC, normally by a TALO. – Army aviation operations areas.
High-Density Airspace Control Zone (HI-
Airspace Command and Control DACZ)—
Coordinating Altitude— Is requested by the maneuver force commander
Is a procedural method to separate fixed-wing and (division or higher).
rotary-wing aircraft. Restricts airspace from users not involved with
Is determined by the theater airspace control maneuver force commander’s operation.
authority (ACA). Returns ADA weapons control authority (within
Normally extends from the corps rear boundary the HIDACZ) to the maneuver force commander.
to the FLOT. Requires ACA approval.
May extend forward of the FLOT.
Airspace Restricted Area— US Navy and US Marine Corps
Naval Surface Fire Support Considerations
Is also known as the restricted operations area
(ROA) and/or restricted operations zone Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (AN-
(ROZ). GLICO)—
Is normally activated for DZs, ADA weapons- Is a USMC unit specifically designed for support
free zones; and so on. of division-size units.
A-4
FM 100-15
Provides control and liaison for the employment Flat trajectories that are relatively unsuitable for
of naval surface fire support and USN and USMC the attack of targets in defiladed positions and
close air support. that restrict the attack of targets close to front-line
troops when the gun-target line passes over
Is normally attached to a US Army division for a friendly troops.
specific operation.
The fact that the dispersion Pattern of the naval
Tactical Missions include— gun is elliptical with-the long axis of the pattern
Direct support; for example— along the direction of fire; however, this pat-
tern—
– A ship in direct support (normally to a battal-
ion) delivers both planned and call-fire – Can be particularly effective when fire can be
missions. brought to bear on the long axis of an enemy
target.
– Call-fires are requested and adjusted by a shore
fire control party of the supported unit or by an – Allows fire to be brought close to friendly front
air spotter. lines when the gun-target line parallels those
lines.
General support; for example—
NOTE: See also Figure A-1.
– Is assigned to ships supporting units of brigade
size or larger.
Supporting Naval Air Missions and Tasks
– Normally has an air observer who adjusts the Strike Warfare includes—
fires of a GS ship or it has an LNO who assigns
the fires of the ship to a battalion shore fire Close air support.
control party.
Offensive counter air.
Capabilities include— Interdiction.
Selection of the most favorable gun-target line Antisurface Warfare includes—
within the limits imposed by hydrography.
High rates of fire. Convoy and shipping protection.
Accuracy. Antiinvasion operations.
A variety of weapons and munitions. Antishipping operations and embargo.
Antisurface action group operations.
High initial velocity and flat trajectory for direct
fire against fortifications. Protection against small boat and terrorist attack.
Limitations include— Antisubmarine Warfare includes attack of sub-
marines and support assets.
Ship/shore communications dependent on radio
transmission. Antiair Warfare includes defensive counter air.
Changing gun-target lines when the ship is under Mine Warfare includes—
way. Offensive sea mining.
Inaccuracies in unobserved fires and initial salvos Defensive operations (mine countermeasures).
in areas where navigational aids are lacking or
obscured by poor visibility (employing radar bea- Reconnaissance includes—
cons ashore can minimize this). Area search.
Limited magazine capacity of fire support ships. Shadowing and surveillance.
Firing positions possibly limited by unfavorable Reconnaissance sweep.
hydrographic conditions or the presence of
mines. Postattack reconnaissance and BDA.
A-5
FM 100-15
Armed reconnaissance. parts of the US fleets and are subject to the respec-
tive fleet commanders’ OPCON.
Electronic order of battle collection.
There are three types of organizations within each
Command,3
Control, Communications, and Intel- FMF: Marine divisions (MARDIVs), Marine air-
ligence (C I) includes— craft wings (MAW), and force service support
Airborne early warning. groups (FSSG). Elements of the FMFs are task-
organized into Marine air-ground task forces
Strike coordination. (MAGTFs) for combat operations.
Electronic Warfare includes— Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs)—
Electronic attack. Are combined-arms forces, under the direction
Electronic warfare support measures. and control of a single commander, consisting of
ground, air, and CSS elements capable of operat-
Electronic protection. ing as independent units or as part of a joint or
combined task force.
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses includes—
3 Include four major elements:
Attack of enemy C I.
Strike support and protection. 1. A command element (CE) that provides a single
headquarters for command and coordination of
Logistics includes— ground, air, and CSS forces.
Carrier onboard (COB) delivery. 2. A ground combat element (GCE) task-
Aerial refueling. organized to conduct ground operations and
constructed around an infantry unit varying in
Search and Rescue includes— size from a reinforced infantry battalion to a
reinforced MARDIV.
Fleet search and rescue.
3. An aviationcombat element (ACE)
Combat search and rescue. task-organized to provide all or a portion of the
fictions of USMC aviation (normally one per
Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) MAGTF).
The largest portion of USMC operating forces are 4. A combat service support element (CSSE)
located within fleet marine forces. They are integral task-organized to provide the MAGTF with the
A-6
FM 100-15
A-7
FM 100-15
– Has more combat power than a MEU. Is the largest and most combat capable of the
three MAGTFs.
– Currently transitioning to a MEF (forward)
stucture. Is capable of a broad spectrum of amphibious
operations and subsequent operations ashore.
– Is composed of—
Takes from 60 to 70 USN amphibious ships to
Approximately 16,000 personnel. deploy a MEF.
ACE commanded by a brigadier general. May be forward-deployed aboard naval am-
phibious ships but will normally be found
A GCE regimental landing team (RLT) con- forward-deployed ashore.
sisting of an infantry regiment, reinforced by
an artillery battalion, tank company, combat Is composed of—
engineer company, reconnaissance company,
assault amphibian vehicle company, light ar- Approximately 53,000 personnel.
mored vehicle company, and TOW platoon. A CE commanded by a major general or
An ACE consisting of a Marine aircraft lieutenant general.
group (MAG) (reinforced) containing fixed- A GCE that is normally a MARDIV (rein-
and rotary-wing aircraft; command, control, forced).
and air defense elements; and an air field
support detachment. An ACE consisting of a task-organized
MAW that may include elements of other
A CSSE capable of providing 30 days combat aircraft wings for additional combat power.
support to a MEB before resupply is required.
A CSSE that is normally an FSSG or FSSG
The Marine expeditionary force (MEF) (Figure (reinforced) and that provides up to 60 days
A-4)— logistic support before resupply is required.
A-8
FM 100-15
A-9
FM 100-15
Presents a significant electronic, visual, and infra- Functions effectively in an intense ECM
red signature. environment.
Requires extensive logistic support for fuel and Presents a significant electronic, visual, and infra-
missile resupply. red signature.
Establishes launch capability in approximately 30 Requires extensive logistic
-
support for fuel and
minutes after movement. mis~ile resupply.
Establishes launch capability in approximately 45
The corps has OPCON of the corps ADA brigade, minutes after movement.
but the ADA brigade and the Patriot battalion must
be employed under weapons control procedures and The corps has OPCON of the corps ADA brigade,
measures of the AADC. However procedures and but the ADA brigade and the Hawk battalion must
measures must support the corps commander’s be employed under weapons control procedures and
concept of operations and still complement the measures of the AADC.
theater AD mission. (See Figures A-6 and Figure The Corps Chaparral Battalion (National
A-7.) Guard)—
The Corps Hawk Battalion (National Guard)— Provides air defense of corps assets against low-
altitude air attacks.
Is only fielded in NG units.
Batteries are mobile and can engage hostile air-
Provides low- to medium-altitude air defense of craft at night and during some periods of limited
corps assets against the air-breathing threat. visibility.
Operates during all types of weather both day and Provides little armor protection for crew and
night. material.
A-10
FM 100-15
A-11
FM 100-15
A-12
FM 100-15
A-13
FM 100-15
A-14
FM 100-15
Direct support to nondivision units in their area rate brigades, and ACRs held in reserve; the rear
as well as GS supply, backup maintenance, and CSG also supports hospitals and replacement
field services to the division. units that normally operate in the rear of the
combat zone.
Logistic support (less personnel, finance, and
CHS) to nondivision forces operating in a divi- Reinforcing support to the forward CSGs; the rear
sion area; support is on an area basis. CSG’s subordinate units maintain the bulk of the
corps’ GSS base from which to resupply forward
General support supply to the division, separate CSG GS and DS units.
brigades, or ACR; depending on task organiza-
tion, this may include GS-level ammunition, pe- Corps support of petroleum, ammunition, trans-
troleum, and general supplies. portation, aviation intermediate maintenance
(AVIM), airdrop, and mortuary affairs as well
Area support to units in the CSG’s area of respon- as—
sibility behind the division’s rear boundary.
– General support supply units assigned to the
Reinforces DS maintenance and field service sup- rear CSG that provide supplies to DS units.
port to divisions, separate brigades, and ACRs.
– Trucks that may throughput bulk Class III,
Is allocated one per division; METT-T deter- Class IV, and Class V supplies from the corps’
mines CSB organization. rear area to the division support area (DSA).
Corps Support Group (CSG) (Rear). The rear – May also push water forward to support chemi-
CSG consists of multifunctional CSBs, which pro- cal unit requirements in the division AO.
vide area support in the corps rear, and fictional
battalions, which provide corps support forces and Medical Brigade. The medical brigade com-
reinforcing support to forward CSGs (Figure A- mands and controls all corps medical units not or-
13). They also provide— ganic to divisions, separate maneuver brigades, and
cavalry regiments (Figure A-14). It also—
Logistic support (less personnel, finance, and
CHS) on an area basis to units employed in or Controls and provides staff supervision for medi-
passing through its AO, including divisions, sepa- cal groups; a medical logistic battalion; and
A-15
FM 100-15
A-16
FM 100-15
Transportation battalions provide corps-wide Corps Movement Control Center (CMCC). The
support. CMCC—
Transportation cargo transfer companies support Provides centralized movement control and high-
mode-change. way regulation.
Corps Materiel Management Center (CMMC). Monitors transportation usage.
The CMMC—
Forecasts transportation needs.
Provides centralized control of all GSS within the
corps. Coordinates transportation
-
support activities with
the CMMC.
Maintains asset visibility of selected DS level
stocks in Class II, packaged Class III, IV, VII, and NOTE: See also Figure A-17.
IX supplies.
Personnel Support. Personnel support is a major
Manages DS maintenance support operations. element of CSS. Personnel services encompass the
tactical functions of manning and the personnel
NOTE: See Figure A-16. service support portion of sustaining soldiers and
A-17
FM 100-15
– Provides finance support to all Army com- – Provides C for PSB, a replacement company,
mands and to soldiers located within the corps’ and a band.
boundary; supports joint and combined com- – Provides personnel service support to corps,
mands as directed, including— divisions, and other units on an area support
Military pay. basis.
Commercial vendor services. – Maintains strength of all area units.
Disbursing and funding. – Monitors and reports casualties.
Accounting. – Recommends priority for replacements and
Foreign national pay. projects future personnel requirements.
– Provides replacements to area units.
– Provides postal support.
– Includes the band.
NOTE: See also Figure A-19.
A-18
FM 100-15
The public affairs office— Tasks and prioritizes the work of a topographic
engineer company from the theater topographic
– Advises and informs the commander regarding battalion placed in direct support to the corps.
PA guidance.
Provides staffing for a corps staff engineer sec-
— Makes staff estimates and assesses PA impact tion that supports each corps CP.
of command actions. During force-projection operations, could func-
— Satisfies soldiers’ needs for military and do- tion as the theater engineer and regional contin-
mestic information. gency engineering manager (RCEM), with
augmentation required in the areas of real estate
– Coordinates media representatives’ logistic acquisition, construction management, and con-
needs. struction contracting support.
— Gathers and releases newsworthy information. NOTE: See also Figure A-20.
– Explains command operations to the media in
easily understandable terms.
— Provides PA units (press camp headquarters
and mobile PA detachments) to assist the corps
PAO, and other units without a dedicated PAO,
in the performance of command and public
information services.
– Responds to media queries.
– Distributes command information.
— Trains “working with the media” to command-
ers and their subordinates.
— Acts as a focal point for the commander to
interface with media.
— Uses resources to communicate internally and
externally.
– Helps enhance morale.
Corps Engineer
The Corps Engineer Brigade—
Commands and controls all corps engineer units
that are not organic to divisions, separate maneu-
ver brigades, and cavalry regiments.
Reinforces engineers organic to divisions, sepa-
rate brigades, and cavalry regiments.
Controls and staff-supervises theater engineer
forces operating in the corps area.
Provides mobility, survivability, and sustainment
engineering support to the corps based on
METT-T.
A-19
FM 100-15
A-20
FM 100-15
Are normally task-organized with attached engi- Performs survivability and tank-ditching during
neer light equipment companies. deliberate defensive operations in forward bri-
gade areas; general engineering along MSRs and
The Engineer Battalion (Combat (Heavy)— combat trails in other corps close operations
Executes a wide variety of horizontal and vertical areas; and sustainment engineering, survivability,
construction missions, often simultaneously. and tank-ditching operations in corps rear areas.
Is rapidly deployable by ship, relatively self- The Engineer Company (Topographic) (DS)—
sustaining, and able to operate independently in Builds and maintains the corps topographic dig-
remote areas. itized terrain data base using the Army tactical
Constructs and provides rapid repair of facilities command and control system (ATCCS) and vari-
such as airfields, roads, bridges, theater of opera- ous topographic support systems (TSS).
tions structures, and prefabricated structures. Provides digitized terrain information to produce
Manages and assists in the construction of ports, products that are available to all command levels
pipelines, wells, power plants, and power distri- from corps to brigade.
bution networks with augmentation from theater Employs cartographic and reproduction assets
engineer forces. that provide corps units with critical terrain data
Can be task-organized to the corps or division to and products (LOS, air and ground masking, air
reinforce their general engineering effort and and ground mobility corridors, image maps, in-
augment their earthmoving capability. telligence or operations overlays/overprints,
modified combined obstacle overlays (MCOO)
The Engineer Company (Light Equipment) and and so on).
Engineer Company (Light Equipment (Air-
borne)— Interfaces with the G2 ACE at corps and division
to enhance the IPB process and aid in the visuali-
Support light, air assault, and airborne engineer zation of the battlefield for all corps operations.
forces with down-sized, rapidly deployable engi-
neer equipment. Provides a terrain analysis team to the ACE to
conduct ongoing analysis of the effects of terrain
Are normally attached to corps or division light, and weather on combat operations as an integral
air assault, or airborne battalions but can be task- part of the continuous IPB process.
organized to support corps wheeled or mecha-
nized battalions. Provides a second terrain analysis team in GS to
other corps headquarters.
Perform survivability and sustainment engineer-
ing missions in support of early deploying force- Provides to the corps precise TSS that verifies
projection forces to establish forward logistics geodetic data that military intelligence and fire
bases until heavier corps and theater engineer support systems use.
forces arrive.
The Engineer Company (Ribbon Bridge)—
The Engineer Company (Combat Support
Equipment— Employs a dependable, versatile ribbon floating
bridge system that can be rapidly emplaced in a
Is a rapidly deployable, equipment-intensive combat environment.
company that possesses significant earth-moving
capability. Is normally task-organized with a corps engineer
battalion (mechanized or wheeled) or under a
Is normally attached to corps mechanized or combat engineer group as part of river-crossing
wheeled battalions to augment the battalion’s operations.
earth-moving capability.
Ensures that ribbon bridge components can be
Can operate independently under the combat en- transported by specialized bridge trucks or sling-
gineer group. loaded by helicopters to the bridge site.
A-21
FM 100-15
Provides additional logistic haul capability for the Providing adequate FA support for committed
corps when ribbon bridge components are down- combat units; FA support—
loaded.
– Is most responsive to maneuver units when in
The Engineer Company (Panel Bridge) and En- direct support.
gineer Company (Medium Girder Bridge (MGB))—
– Provides minimum support for committed
Rapidly emplaces tactical standard fixed bridg- units (one FA battalion in direct support of each
ing, either panel bridges (normally Bailey committed brigade).
bridges) or MGB over wet or dry gaps in a close
combat environment. – Includes no more than one FA unit in direct
Emplaces fixed bridging to replace float bridging support of a maneuver unit.
or to bridge gaps that exceed the AVLB’s – Is achieved by additional FA units assigned
capabilities. the mission of reinforcing or GS-R to a DS
Is normally task-organized with a corps engineer unit.
battalion (mechanized or wheeled) or under a Giving weight to the main attack in the offense or
combat engineer group to support gap-crossing to the main effort in the defense, including—
operations.
Provides additional logistic haul capability for the – Reinforcing or GS-R missions that can be as-
corps when fixed-bridge components are down- signed to provide additional responsive fires to
loaded. maneuver forces.
The Medium Girder Bridge (MGB) Company— – Being positioned and assigned a zone of fire to
concentrate fires.
Provides four 30.5-meter (100-foot) Class-60
bridges or two 48.6-meter (160-foot) Class-60 – Allocating ammunition to provide for more
bridges. support in critical areas.
Has sufficient personnel and equipment to simul- Facilitating future operations, including—
taneously assemble two bridges.
– Ensuring success in the face of unforeseen
Can provide 32 five-ton dump trucks for other events and smoothly transitioning from one
missions when bridging is immobilized. phase of an operation to another.
The Panel Bridge Company—
– Assigning tactical missions and positioning FA
Provides two 24.4-meter (80-foot) Class-50 and/or ammunition allocations.
Bailey bridges or one 58.5-meter (192-foot)
Class-60 Bailey bridge. – Assigning on-order missions that allow field
artillery to anticipate future needs.
Normally receives augmentation from an engi-
neer combat battalion to construct bridges. – Current tactical missions, positioning, and al-
locations that planners can modify to anticipate
When the bridge is off-loaded, 28 five-ton dump future requirements.
trucks are available for other missions.
Providing immediately available FA support for
Corps Field Artillery the corps commander to influence the action,
including—
Corps Field Artillery Considerations include—
– Assigning GS or GS-R missions to FA units
Providing FA assets for close support (DS and R) making them responsive to the commander.
of subordinate elements and keeping enough as-
sets under corps control (GS-R and GS) to influ- – Ensuring GS or GS-R units have adequate po-
ence the close and deep operations at critical sitions and ammunition to support the corps
times and places. commander.
A-22
FM 100-15
Providing maximum feasible centralized control, Provides 16 UAVs, 4 ground control stations, and
including— 2 launch or recovery sections in GS of the corps
and, when required, DS of subordinate divisions,
– A high degree of centralized control in defen- brigades, and regiments.
sive situations to ensure the commander can
influence the situation when the enemy has the Intercepts and locates communications and non-
initiative and his actions are difficult to predict. communications emitters using receiver and DF
equipment mounted in special electronic mission
– A lesser degree of centralized control in an aircraft and controlled electronically from a
offensive situation when the supported force ground-based integrated processing facility.
has the initiative that will allow FA command-
ers wider latitude. Provides near-real time signal intelligence analy-
NOTE: See also Figures A-21 and A-22. sis and reporting of information collected by
operators controlling receivers and DF equip-
ment on board special electronic mission
Corps Military Intelligence aircraft.
The MI Battalion (Headquarters, Headquarters Conducts day and night imagery collection using
and Operations)— electro-optical and infrared cameras mounted in
2
Provides C for brigade headquarters and other UAVs.
units under brigade control.
Provides near-real time imagery analysis and re-
Provides the analysis and control company to the porting of imagery collected by UAVs.
G2 for multidiscipline intelligence and CI analy-
sis; intelligence-collection management and syn- The MI Battalion (Tactical Exploitation (TE))
chronization; support to targeting and target Reserve Component (RC)—
development; and IEW technical control.
Augments the CI and interrogation capability of
Provides logistic and administrative support to the MI brigade.
subordinate MI units.
Provides a document exploitation section.
Provides intelligence special purpose communi-
cations, automation, and broadcast intelligence NOTE: See also Figures A-23 and A-24.
terminals to support corps IEW operations.
The MI Battalion (Tactical Exploitation (TE))–
Plans, executes, and sustains CI, interrogation,
and LRS operations.
Provides 16 CI teams in GS of the corps and,
when required, DS of subordinate divisions, bri-
gades, and regiments.
Provides 121 interrogation teams in GS of the
corps and, when required, DS of subordinate di-
visions, brigades, and regiments.
Provides 18 LRS teams in GS of the corps.
The MI Battalion (Aerial Exploitation(AE))—
Plans and coordinates aerial reconnaissance and
surveillance operations.
Provides 12 RC-12 special electronic mission
aircraft, one integrated processing facility, and
associated support systems in GS of the corps.
A-23
FM 100-15
A-24
FM 100-15
A-25
FM 100-15
A-26
FM 100-15
A-27
FM 100-15
Key power generation and distribution facilities, Coordinates corps PSYOP support requirements
lines transformers, and grid monitoring centers. with the POTF/JPOTF.
Airfield and critical transportation nodes. Performs detailed PSYOP support planning.
Key choice points (such as bridges, tunnels, Conducts PSYOP assessments.
locks, dams, and mountain passes or routes in
restrictive terrain) on vital locations. Provides tactical PSYOP companies to the sup-
ported corps’ attached divisions.
Rescue and evacuation missions.
Tactical reconnaissance.
The Tactical Support Company—
Civil Affairs (CA) Provides PSYOP staff support to division and
The CA Brigade- brigade headquarters.
Commands and controls from three to five battal- Disseminates PSYOP products (loudspeaker
ions not attached to subordinate corps units. messages, leaflets, posters, and so on) and con-
ducts face-to-face communications at the tactical
Plans and conducts CA in support of corps level.
operations.
Executes PSYOP actions at the tactical level in
The CA Battalion— support of PSYOP programs.
Plans and conducts CA in support of a DISCOM Coordinates division and brigade PSYOP support
or COSCOM. requirements with the POTF/JPOTF.
Provides CA teams to serve as CA staff elements Psychological Operations Considerations in-
for the major subordinate elements of a division clude the following:
or the area support groups of a COSCOM.
The corps must ensure continuity with strategic
Civil Affairs Planning Considerations include the and operational PSYOP being conducted at EAC.
following:
Civil affairs must be filly integrated into corps Augmentation of the PSYOP battalion by indige-
operations to minimize civil interference and nous writers, announcers, illustrators, and interpret-
maximize HN support. ers will enhance the operational effectiveness of the
unit.
When the corps is operating in a friendly nation
having an effective government, CA support will NOTE: See also Figure A-27.
primarily consist of coordination and liaison;
when operating in enemy territory or in a friendly
nation with a weak or ineffective government, CA
units may have to establish a temporary civil
administration until existing conditions stabilize.
The corps commander must comply with interna-
tional and US national law and, where applicable,
with foreign national law.
A-28
Appendix B
This appendix contains lists of the functions that Main Command Post
corps CPs or CP cells perform. These lists are an Headquarters Cell
expansion of the functions Chapter 4 addresses.
However they are not an all-inclusive listing of The major functions of the headquarters cell
every task each CP or cell must perform. are--
To coordinate and synchronize the activities of
the main CP.
TACTICAL, MAIN, AND REAR
To provide guidance to the staff at the main CP.
COMMAND POSTS
To analyze situation information to anticipate
Tactical Command Post future requirements.
The major functions of the TAC CP are- To provide and accept command liaison ele-
ments.
To control corps close operations. To plan for local security of the main CP.
To monitor the execution of corps plans. To arrange for the movement of the main CP or
specific cells.
To synchronize combat, CS, and CSS in support
of close operations To receive and accommodate visitors.
To issue warning orders and FRAGOs in support To plan for the assumption of TAC or rear CP
functions at the main CP.
of close operations.
To maintain current close operations situation Current Operations Cell
information.
The major functions of the current operations cell
To assess the current tactical situation. are—
To assess the status and capabilities of friendly To synchronize current corps close, deep, and
forces. rear operations.
To issue warning orders and OPORDS.
To monitor the status of CS and CSS in close
operations. To modify OPORDs as required.
To update CS and CSS requirements of close
operations.
To provide close operations situation information
to the main CP.
To monitor deep operations for effects on close
operations.
To monitor rear operations for effects on close
operations.
To plan for local security of the tactical CP.
B-1
FM 100-15
B-2
FM 100-15
B-3
FM 100-15
Rear Command Post To maintain civil affairs status and control civil
Headquarters Cell affairs operations.
The major functions of the headquarters cell To coordinate corps public affairs support.
are— To coordinate corps HN and/or LOGCAP
To coordinate and synchronize the activities of support.
the rear CP. To support reconstitution efforts as directed.
To provide guidance to the staff at the rear CP. To coordinate tactical airlift, with the help of the
To analyze the rear operations situation for its CMCC’s plans, programs, and operations divi-
impact on current and future operations. sion, which validates and commits aviation assets
allocated for logistic support.
To plan for the assumption of main CP functions.
To plan and control reconstitution. Operations Cell
The major function of the operations cell are-
Combat Service Support Cell
To plan and conduct rear security operations.
The major functions of the CSS cell are—
To complete and continually update IPB of the
To collect, analyze, and provide CSS situation rear area.
information.
To gather and disseminate early warning of en-
To monitor personnel, finance, and logistic emy activities in the corps rear area (for example,
operations. air attacks, NBC activities).
To recommend the positioning of CSS units in the To designate response forces to react to rear
rear area to best support the overall corps threats beyond the abilities of bases and/or base
operation. clusters to defeat Level H threats.
To identify key CSS units and activities that To request the commitment of the TCF to defeat
require priority protection. Level III threats beyond the abilities of the re-
sponse forces.
To plan and, in coordination with the CMCC’s
highway traffic division, control administrative To coordinate TCF operations.
movements.
To ensure responsive fire support for both re-
To designate MSRs and alternate MSRs. sponse forces and the TCF.
To establish priorities for administrative To integrate available HN forces into the rear
movements. security plan.
To plan and control CHS operations. To synchronize combat, CS, and CSS in support
of rear security operations.
To collect, analyze, and provide religious support
information. To plan and control terrain management in the
corps’ rear area, with the G3.
To coordinate and reroute administrative move-
ments so as not to conflict with tactical To prepare plans for and control of reconstitution
movements. efforts, with the CSS cell.
To help plan and control tactical movements in To monitor current close and deep operations
the rear area (with the help of the CMCC’s high- situation information.
way traffic division in deconflicting the moves).
To direct, control, and designate areas of respon-
To monitor incoming augmentation units (force sibility for subordinate RAOCs. (See Appen-
tracking). dix C.)
B-4
FM 100-15
B-5
Appendix C
REAR OPERATIONS
The main CP synchronizes the corps’ rear opera- and engineers) normally position where they can
tions with close and deep operations. The rear CP’s control key terrain or improve the defensive capa-
staff must thoroughly plan and integrate each of the bility of key bases and base clusters within the corps
rear operations functional areas (terrain manage- area. Other factors affecting unit positioning include
ment, security, sustainment, movements) into a current rear area IPB, the subordinate units’ mission
comprehensive rear operations concept that sup- requirements, and considerations of the unit being
ports the commander’s concept and intent. The positioned.
corps must be able to conduct the full spectrum of The rear IPB, analysis of METT-T factors, and
rear operations in conventional and NBC the commander’s risk assessment dictate whether
environments. units are to disperse throughout the corps rear to
As with close and deep operations, deception is enhance survivability or group together in mutual
an integral part of all rear operations planning. The support. Another consideration in placement should
rear operations deception effort must integrate joint, be the requirement for joint air base defense, which
combined, and HN assets and support the overall Air Force security police and MPs usually conduct.
corps deception plan. A key terrain management decision is the posi-
NOTE: This appendix implements STANAG 2079. tioning of corps support groups. These groups are
employed both in support of committed divisions
and in area support of the corps.
REAR COMMAND The rear CP, through subordinate RAOCs, posi-
tions CSGs within the rear area based on the factors
The G3 task-organizes the rear command to mentioned above, consideration of the corps’ de-
support rear operations. Annex A of the corps’ ception plan, and the recommendation of the
OPLAN lists units with specific rear operations COSCOM commander. Support groups desiring to
functions under the rear command. The rear opera- position subordinate units within division rear areas
tions commander is then able to employ resources must coordinate directly with responsible division
in accordance with METT-T factors. rear CPs. (See FM 71-100 for further discussion.)
Subordinate units also establish liaison relation- Another key terrain management decision is the
ships with the rear CP. Numerous units operating in positioning of units being reconstituted. Since these
the rear are not assigned to the rear command, but
do come under the rear command’s control for
security operations and terrain management.
TERRAIN MANAGEMENT
The corps G3 is the overall corps terrain manager.
He positions some units, such as the corps reserve
and the aviation brigade, in the corps’ rear area. The
rear CP operations cell, with the G3, is responsible
for positioning the remainder of the units (including
EAC, joint, and HN assets) in the rear area.
The operations cell, with the CSS cell, positions
units based on the corps’ mission, concept of opera-
tions, and commander’s intent. Combat support
units with a higher level of combat capability (MPs
C-1
FM 100-15
units may be committed before the planned are not in conflict and are integrated in the overall
reconstitution is complete, the rear CP, with the G3, concept of operations.
positions these units where the force can best
achieve the reconstitution effort and where the units,
or portions thereof (for example, redundant fire SECURITY
support assets), can be employed in support of rear
and/or close operations if necessary. The corps conducts rear security operations (in
NATO, rear area security) to assure freedom of
Once positioned, the responsible RAOC desig- maneuver and continuity of operations. The opera-
nates the units in the corps’ rear area as either bases tions cell and subordinate RAOCs plan and execute
(unit or multiunit positions with definite perimeters) rear security operations based on guidance from the
or base clusters (groupings of bases based on mis- rear operations commander.
sion and/or security requirements lacking a clearly
defined perimeter). The responsible RAOC desig- Corps rear security operations must display the
nates a commander for each base and base cluster. same initiative, agility, versatility, depth, and syn-
Base and base cluster commanders are responsible chronization required for close and deep operations.
for positioning units within their respective areas of They must support the overall corps deception plan
responsibility. and may also include rear operations deception ef-
forts. The four components of corps rear security
Bases and base clusters fall under the corps rear operations (intelligence, base and base cluster self-
CP’s OPCON and its subordinate RAOCs for rear defense, response operations, and combined-arms
operations. Normal unit mission guidance and pri- TCF operations) form the framework on which rear
oritization remains the responsibility of unit parent security operations are based.
commands. The corps MP brigade, not the RAOC,
determines mission taskings for an MP battalion
operating within a RAOC area of responsibility. Intelligence
Hospitals and other medical units in the rear area The IPB is a continuous, integrated, and compre-
must be incorporated into a base cluster tasked with hensive analysis of the effects of enemy capabilities,
providing the medical unit with security. In addi- terrain, and weather on the operation, overtime. The
tion, the threat to medical units must not be aggra- IPB should extend throughout the entire area of
vated by positioning them near possible enemy interest (including forward, rear, and adjacent areas)
target priorities (such as nuclear storage facilities, focusing primarily on specific units and/or NAI that
Class V supply points, and so on). the commander designates.
Based on the tactical situation or direction from The intelligence section of the rear CP is the
the G3, the rear operations cell, with the CSS cell, interface with the intelligence system. As such, this
directs the repositioning of units within the corps’ section needs a direct link into the ACE at the corps’
rear area. The appropriate RAOCs accomplish re- main CP. This link allows information to pass in
positioning. When required, such directed reloca- both directions in a timely manner.
tions should be coordinated with the affected unit’s The RAOC receives IPB products from the main
higher headquarters to ensure continuity of mission CP. These products should be the same as those for
accomplishment. maneuver elements. They should include the intel-
Units entering or desiring to relocate within the ligence estimate, with event and decision support
corps’ rear area must coordinate with the rear op- templates, that include avenues of approach and the
erations cell and affected RAOCs to ensure that their mobility corridors for the entire area.
desired locations do not conflict with current or If properly constructed, the IPB will contain the
projected rear operations positioning or movement information necessary to do the detailed intelligence
priorities. Conflicts that the rear CP cannot resolve planning for rear operations. Items of consideration
are referred to the rear operations commander for with regard to the rear area include—
resolution. Further, the operations cell, through the
G5, must coordinate with HN authorities to ensure Enemy avenues of approach through the entire
that corps and HN facility and/or unit positioning area.
C-2
FM 100-15
Most likely air avenues of approach. Force protection in the rear area should also focus
on gathering and disseminating early warning infor-
Likely priority activities and targets for threat mation regarding threat air activities. This informat-
forces. ion is critical to subordinate RAOCs, response
forces, and the TCF. It allows them to anticipate
Named areas of interest relating to activities in the threat airborne or AALST insertions in the rear area.
enemy’s rear area that would indicate prepara- It is also critical to bases and base clusters so they
tions for an AASLT or airborne operation. may adjust their level of security based on the
The most likely and most dangerous enemy threat assessed threat. The rear operations cell collects
actions. early warning information from several sources:
2 2
The battlefield conditions under which the threat The A C element at the main and TCF CPs.
is most likely to initiate a Level III operation in Air defense artillery units in the corps’ rear area.
the rear area.
The USAF’s TACP.
The RAOC then collates IPB products from the
intelligence cell at the corps’ main CP with raw data The airlift LNO at the corps’ rear CP.
that units provide. Data include information that Other USAF control teams that may be operating
units gather when in or moving through the corps’ in the corps rear.
rear area (for example, MPs performing BCC and
area security missions; bases and base clusters; and A two-way sharing of early warning information
convoys). is critical to defense of joint assets. Once warning
is received, the operations cell immediately notifies
The RAOC then develops its own support IPB, the TCF and subordinate RAOCs who pass the
adding NAIs and information requirements, possi- information to response forces and bases and base
ble or potential LZs and DZs, and other related clusters.
information. The RAOC passes the additional infor-
mation requirements to the ACE.
Base and Base Cluster Self-Defense
The staff disseminates this IPB, along with infor-
mation on the current enemy situation, through sub- Each base and base cluster commander must de-
ordinate RAOCs to all units in the corps’ rear area. velop a defense plan to detect, defeat, and minimize
This intelligence forms the basis for planning and the effects of Level I and limited Level II threat
conducting the other three components of rear secu- attacks on his base or base cluster (including NBC
rity operations. (See FM 34-130 and FM 34-7 for attacks). Each commander bases his defense plan
further discussion.) on—
Other intelligence support available for rear op- The IPB, which the corps’ rear CP provides.
erations includes counterintelligence. Counter- His own IPB.
intelligence analysts assist the rear CP in developing
lists for high-value targets the force should protect. The current intelligence situation.
Analysts can also provide liaison teams to work with The CI risk assessment.
local police and civilian and MI agencies. This
liaison is critical in neutralizing Level I threats. The analysis of his unit’s mission requirements.
The operations cell is responsible for force pro- Preparation of the defense plan may include a
tection. All intelligence assets available to the corps need for engineer support. Engineer operations in
help minimize the enemy’s ability to attack the rear support of rear operations include area and point
area. Counterintelligence personnel can also help denial, MSR maintenance, and area damage control.
collect and evaluate data from their sources and To maximize unit mission accomplishment, defense
interface with HN agencies to complement their plans must be flexible and allow for differing de-
own efforts. Electronic protection, as an element of grees of security based on the probability of threat
EW, further enhances force-protection efforts. activity.
C-3
FM 100-15
Defense plans should, as a minimum, address the RAOC for intelligence, tactical information, and
following critical considerations: direction and with their parent organization for unit
mission guidance. In addition, base and base cluster
Clear delineation of defense C2. commanders establish communications with and
Assignment of defensive sectors of responsibility direct the defensive operations of other units occu-
for subordinate units. pying terrain within their base or base cluster.
Integration of all available weapons into the
defense plan. Response Force Operations
Identification of unit reaction forces to bolster the The operations cell designates forces (normally
defense during an attack. MPs) to respond to bases or base clusters under
attack by Level II threat forces. Once designated,
Use of listening posts (LPs) and/or observation response forces must—
posts (OPs).
Air, ground, and NBC attack alarm systems. Coordinate with supported RAOCs and bases or
base clusters to conduct a joint IPB.
Obstacle planning.
Review base and base cluster self- defense plans.
Use of smoke (if available).
Exchange SOI information.
Area damage control, addressing both damage
prevention and repair. Identify response force contingency plans to
counter likely enemy activities.
Integration of HN response plans and units.
Since an objective of response operations is to
Internal AD measures. eliminate a threat without requiring premature com-
Fire support planning, including the JAAT (if mitment of the TCF, response forces integrate avail-
available). able FA, Army aviation, JAAT, and CAS fire
support into their plans. With the main CP fire
Request procedures for response and tactical support cell, the operations cell establishes proce-
combat forces. dures by which response forces can call for fire
Area warning and reporting system. support.
Commanders provide defense plans— Because the purpose of response force operations
is to help bases or base clusters return to mission
To the RAOC exercising OPCON of the base or accomplishment rather than diverting sustainment
base cluster. resources to self-defense, forces must focus on
timely response to make ‘the enemy disengage from
To MPs providing area security and/or BCC in the attack. Response forces integrate available fire
the vicinity of the base or base cluster. support into their efforts to force the enemy to break
To forces (normally MPs) that are to respond to off the attack. The response force then fixes and
attacks on’ the base or base cluster beyond its destroys the rear threat using close combat tech-
self-defense capability. niques and by applying artillery, Army aviation,
JAAT, and/or CAS, as available.
The RAOC consolidates defense plans and pro-
vides appropriate data to the rear operations cell for The corps commander’s concept and intent, the
integration into the overall corps rear fire support rear IPB, and the rear operations commander’s es-
plan. To maximize mutual support and to prevent tablished protection priorities drive response force
fratricide, the RAOC coordinates defense plans planning. Response forces incorporate this informa-
with adjacent bases and base clusters as well as tion into their own IPB and, with the rear CP opera-
those of joint, multinational, and HN forces. tions cell and affected RAOCs, position themselves
where they can best—
Separate base and base cluster commanders es-
tablish operations centers capable of maintaining Detect major enemy incursions (for example,
24-hour communications with the respective DZs and LZs).
C-4
FM 100-15
Interdict enemy forces en route to key corps Once designated, the TCF establishes liaison with
facilities. the rear CP. The rear CP operations cell provides
the TCF with—
Respond to priority facilities in the corps’ rear.
The current rear IPB.
Corps MPs are normally assigned as the corps’ Friendly unit dispositions.
rear response force. The size of the response force
is based on the current rear IPB and the rear opera- Defense plans.
tions commander’s risk assessment. Mission re-
quirements normally exceed the capability of Priorities for protection.
available MP assets. Therefore, the rear operations The rear operations commander’s concept of op-
commander will either have to— erations and intent.
Set priorities for corps MPs and accept risks in The fire support plan.
those areas having a lesser priority.
Based on this information, the TCF conducts its own
Augment MPs with additional fires and/or with IPB, develops its concept of operations, and for-
combat multipliers to enhance their response wards it to the rear operations cell for coordination
ability. and approval.
Assign the response mission to another unit under Once committed to rear operations, the TCF or-
his control. ganizes its forces for combat and positions them
where they can best counter likely enemy Level III
Should response forces encounter or engage en- operations. The TCF focuses on likely threat targets
emy forces beyond their ability to defeat, they are critical to the corps, ground and air avenues of
to immediately notify the appropriate RAOC and approach, DZs, and LZs. The TCF positions its
maintain contact with the enemy force to delay supporting field artillery where it can best range
and/or disrupt the enemy until the TCF is com- likely threat targets and where it can interdict enemy
mitted. forces en route to probable targets in the corps rear
area.
The TCF conducts direct coordination with corps
Tactical Combat Force Operations MP or other response forces regarding the exchange
As part of the corps’ overall organization for of reconnaissance information, battle handoff pro-
combat, the G3 designates a TCF capable of defeat- cedures, and contingency plans for TCF operations.
ing Level III forces that may attempt to operate in The operations cell assigns specific reconnaissance
the corps’ rear area. In addition, the G3 develops responsibilities to both the response force and the
contingency plans for the commitment of a TCF to TCF to preclude duplication of efforts.
support subordinate division responses to Level III Commitment of a TCF to perform rear operations
attacks within division rear areas, The overall corps under the rear operations commander’s OPCON is
IPB, analysis of METT-T factors, and the corps a decision the corps commander makes. Once com-
commander’s risk assessment dictate whether a mitted, the TCF is normally the sole combat force
TCF is dedicated to rear operations or given a be- in the corps designated to perform combat opera-
prepared rear operations mission. tions against Level III threats.
Once committed, the TCF becomes OPCON to Premature commitment of the TCF against a spe-
the rear operations commander. The TCF is nor- cific threat could rob the rear operations commander
mally a composite force, comprising ground ma- of the flexibility and initiative he requires to counter
neuver, Army aviation, and FA units under the the overall enemy threat to the corps’ rear. There-
command and control of the senior maneuver unit fore, the TCF is not normally committed until the
headquarters. The actual size of the TCF depends rear operations commander determines that both
on IPB and METT-T factors and the degree of risk base and base cluster defense forces and/or response
the commander is willing to accept. forces are unable to counter the threat, and the
C-5
FM 100-15
enemy poses such a risk to the corps that commit- Level II operations, the TCF will receive priority of
ment of the TCF is a necessity. fires, fire support control measures, and guidance
regarding who can call for and adjust fires (normally
Once the rear operations commander decides to limited to response forces to prevent fratricide).
commit the TCF, the operations cell designates an
AO for the TCF. All units within the designated TCF
area of operations become OPCON to the TCF for Fire Support
rear security operations until the threat is
eliminated. The operations cell, with the FSCOORD, is re-
sponsible for the overall planning of rear area fire
The operations cell establishes control measures, support. The FSCOORD considers all available fire
as necessary, to ensure TCF unity of command support systems, including those of units reconsti-
within its area of operations. The operations cell tuting, transiting, or temporarily located in the corps
coordinates with the CSS cell to ensure that move- rear area, when planning support of rear operations.
ments in the corps rear area do not impede TCF
operations. If the tactical situation so warrants, the The operations cell collates base, base cluster, and
operations cell requests the corps G3 to divert addi- response force fire support plans it receives from
tional combat power to support the TCF. subordinate RAOCs and coordinates the composite
rear operations fire support plan with both the corps
Based on the likelihood of the threat conducting FSCOORD and the TCF. The operations cell,
multiple Level III operations within the corps area, and/or the respective RAOC, reviews requests for
the operations cell may recommend to the G3 that CAS either from response forces or the TCF and
he designate an additional TCF from within the forwards them to the main CP.
corps’ resources or that he request additional com-
bat forces from the next higher command. In any Should the TCF with its supporting FA be com-
case, the operations cell must continue to plan for mitted to a Level III threat operation, the operations
additional TCF operations within the corps’ rear cell coordinates with the FSCOORD for on-order
area until such time that the TCF eliminates the fires to assist bases and base clusters and/or re-
current threat and the TCF is prepared to respond to sponse forces in countering other Level II or III
additional Level III threats. threat incursions.
While the operations cell establishes priorities
and procedures, subordinate RAOCs coordinate the Air Base Defense
handover of combat responsibility from response Air Force bases in the corps’ rear area are critical
forces to the TCF. Depending on the situation, the facilities that planners must include in the overall
operations cell may task response forces to conduct corps rear operations plan. As with any commander
a rearward passage of lines through a stationary of a base in the corps rear, the air base commander
TCF, support a forward passage of the TCF, or is responsible for self-defense against Level I
establish blocking positions while the TCF attacks threats.
the enemy from the flanks. Based on the TCF com-
mander’s recommendation, the operations cell de- Should an air base receive a Level II attack,
cides whether response forces may remain OPCON response forces (normally MPs) may become OP-
to the TCF or be released from OPCON to allow CON to the air base commander until the threat is
them to resume other priority missions. defeated. As with Level III threat response planning
throughout the corps rear, a TCF is designated to
While the operations cell coordinates with the defeat Level III threat attacks on air bases.
corps FSCOORD for fire support for response
forces, the TCF, if already under the rear operations With the affected air base commander, the rear
commander’s OPCON, may also be tasked by the operations commander designates a TCF area of
rear operations cell to coordinate fire support pro- operations and places all external base defense
vided to response forces in contact with Level II forces in the AO under the OPCON of the TCF until
threat forces. Such fire support is not normally the threat is defeated. The commander of the air base
provided to units countering Level I threat forces. If may need to retain control of sufficient assets to
tasked to coordinate and/or provide fire support to maintain security of critical resources. The rear
C-6
FM 100-15
operations commander, the commander of the air The CSS cell, through the G5, also coordinates
base, and the TCF commander must closely with HN authorities for support of corps rear opera-
coordinate such requirements. (See FM 19-1 and tions. It identifies HN capabilities and negotiates
FM 90-30 for further discussion.) with HN authorities to ensure HN support is pro-
vided in accordance with existing agreements. Fur-
ther, it coordinates with the host nation to ensure
SUSTAINMENT that HN activities do not interfere with corps
sustainment operations.
The CSS cell of the rear CP plans and directs
sustainment operations within the corps. Synchro-
nization of sustainment with the corps commander’s MOVEMENTS
concept of operations and intent and with the corps’
deception plan is critical for the success of close, Tactical and administrative movements within
deep, and rear operations. Critical sustainment func- the rear area are critical to close, deep, and rear
tions that the CSS cell of the rear CP accomplishes operations. Often, movements within the corps’
include— area are an integral part of the corps’ deception plan.
Movement control includes planning, coordinating,
Analyzing the commander’s concept and intent and executing movements both internal to the corps
and developing an integrated sustainment plan. and external (other US forces and the host nation)
to the corps.
Recommending the positioning of CSS units to
the operations cell where they can best support The corps conducts movement planning both
the command. within US channels at the cows’ rear CP and with
HN movement planners. In addition to planning and
Identifying to the operations cell critical CSS controlling movements of US forces, the CSS cell
facilities and movements that require priority coordinates with the corps provost marshal and
protection. appropriate HN authorities to establish adequate US
straggler and HN population control measures.
Developing a CSS support plan and coordinating
CSS support for units in the corps’ rear area.
Monitoring the status of sustainment operations Tactical Movements
within the corps. The G3 at the main CP, with the rear CP, directs
the movement of tactical units through or within the
Positioning CSS units requires a thorough knowl- corps rear area, with the exception of TCF move-
edge of the current IPB and the corps commander’s ments once the TCF is committed in the corps’ rear
concept and intent. While CSS units normally posi- area. The rear CP helps plan and control movements
tion close to MSRs to facilitate timely support, they within the rear area.
should not position along likely threat avenues of
approach or near likely threat LZs or DZs. The G3 establishes priorities and designates
routes or zones for tactical movements. The rear CP
Combat service support units position in depth to ensures that administrative moves do not conflict
minimize the effect of threat attacks on the overall with tactical moves (CSS cell), designates alternate
sustainment effort. The CSS cell must anticipate, routes for administrative movements (CSS cell),
plan, and coordinate the relocation of CSS units in and plans for sustainment of tactical movements
the rear area should the tactical situation so dictate within the corps’ rear (operations and CSS cells).
or should the corps commander adjust his concept The MCC helps plan, coordinate, and support all
of operations. tactical moves traversing the corps’ rear area.
COSCOM executes the CSS cell’s sustainment The operations cell plans the tactical movement
plan and recommends the location of CSGs to the of the corps TCF in consonance with the TCF’s
operations cell. It directs subordinate units, moni- concept of operations. The operations cell coordi-
tors their ability to provide support, and makes rear nates the rerouting of CSS movements with the CSS
operations recommendations to the rear CP. cell during the movements of the TCF. The cell must
C-7
FM 100-15
also coordinate rerouting off CSS movements rapid shifting of sustainment and other forces
around areas designated as TCF areas of operations. through the corps’ rear area.
Should the corps’ TCF be tasked to combat a The corps’ CSS cell coordinates with division
Level III threat in a division rear area, the division CSS cells to ensure that designated corps MSRs
gains OPCON of the TCF and plans its movement support division sustainment operations. The CSS
within the division area. Should the corps commit cell plans alternate MSRs and identifies critical
its reserve through the division rear area, the divi- points that require either positive control or special
sion rear CP operations cell supports the corps security considerations. The cell passes this infor-
movement by ensuring division CSS movements mation to the operations cell for coordination with
are rerouted so as not to conflict with the corps’ the corps provost marshal and engineer who ensure
tactical movement. (See FM 71-100 for further the development of ADC contingency plans should
discussion.) threat forces interdict MSRs.
C-8
Glossary
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AA assembly areas AI air interdiction
2 2
AC Army airspace command and AID Agency for International
control Development
AADC area air defense commander ALCC airlift control center
AASLT air assault ALO air liaison officer
AAv Army aviation ALOC air line of communications
AB2 Army brigade and below AMC U.S. Army Materiel Command
ABCS Army battle command system AMO aviation medical officer
ABGD air base ground defense AMOPES Army Mobilization and
Operations Planning and
abn airborne Execution System
AC active component anal analysis
ACA airspace control authority ANGLICO air and naval gunfire liaison
ACC air component commander company
ACE analysis control element; AO area of operations
airspace control element AOC air operations center
ACO airspace control order APC armored personnel carriers
ACR armored cavalry regiment APERS antipersonnel
acty activity APICM armor-piercing improved
ACU area common user conventional munition
ACUS Army common user system AQF advanced Quick Fix
AD air defense ARCOM Army command
ADA air defense artillery ARFOR Army force
A/DACG arrival/departure airtleld control ARLO air reconnaissance liaison officer
group ARM antiradiation missile
ADC area damage control armt armament
ADCOORD air defense coordinator ARNG Army National Guard
ADDS automatic data distribution system ASAS all-source analysis system
ADE air defense element ASCC Army service component
AE aerial exploitation command
adj adjustment ASL authorized stockage list
admin administration aslt assault
AF US Air Force ASOC air support operations center
AFATDS advanced field artillery tactical A/SPOD aerial/sea ports of debarkation
data system ASPS all-source production system
AG adjutant general AT antitank
AGCCS Army Global Command and ATACMS Army tactical missile systems
Control System ATCCS Army tactical command and
AH attack helicopter control system
Glossary-1
FM 100-15
Glossary-2
FM 100-15
Glossary-3
FM 100-15
Glossary-4
FM 100-15
Glossary-5
FM 100-15
Glossary-6
FM 100-15
Glossary-7
FM 100-15
Glossary-8
FM 100-15
SOCCE special operations command and TARABS tactical air reconnaissance and
control element aerial battlefield surveillance
SOCCH special operations command and TASOSC Theater Army Special Operations
control headquarters Support Command
SOCOORD special operations coordinator TCACCIS Transportation Coordinator
SOF special operations forces Automated Command and
Control Information System
SOFA status of forces agreement
TCF tactical combat force
SOI signal operations instructions
TCP traffic control plan
SOP standing operating procedures
TE tactical exploitation
SP self-propelled
TENCAP tactical exploitation of national
SPCE survey planning and coordination capabilities
element
TF task force
Spt support
tfc traffic
sqdn squadron
TLAM tactical land attack missile
SR short range tactical munitions dispenser
TMD
SRP soldier readiness processing transfer of authority
TOA
SSM surface-to-surface missile tactical operations center
TOC
STACCS Standard Theater Army TOE table of organization and
Command and Control System equipment
STANAG standardization agreement topo topographical
STARC State Area Command TOR terms of reference
STRIKWARN strike warning TOW tube-launched, optically tracked,
subs subsistence wire-guided missile
sup supply TPFDD time-phased force deployment
surg surgeon data
Svc service TPFDL time-phased force deployment list
SWO staff weather officer TPU troop program unit
sys systems TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command
(T) towed trans transportation
TA Theater Army TRANSCOM U.S. Army Transportation
TAA tactical assembly area Command
TAC tactical trn terrain
trp troop
TACC tactical air control center
TSS topographic support systems
TACFIRE tactical fire
TTP tactics, techniques, and
TACOM tactical command procedures
TACON tactical control
TACP tactical air control party UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
TACSAT tactical satellite UAV-SR unmanned aerial vehicle-short
TAI target areas of interest range
TALO tactical airlift liaison ofllcer UCP Unified Command Plan
TAR tactical air reconnaissance UH utility helicopter
Glossary-9
FM 100-15
Glossary-10
REFERENCES
SOURCES USED
References-1
FM 100-15
Army Publications
Field Manual 3-100 NBC Defense, Chemical Warfare, Smoke and Flare Operations. May 1991.
Field Manual 5-100-15 Corps Engineer Combat Operations (D). March 1994.
Field Manual 5-102 Countermobility. March 1985.
Field Manual 5-114 Engineers in Operations Other Than War (D).
Field Manual 6-20-30 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Corps and Division
Operations. October 1989.
Field Manual 7-30 The Infantry Brigade (D). September 1994.
Field Manual 17-95 Cavalry Operations. September 1991.
Field Manual 19-1 Military Police Support for Airland Battle. May 1988.
Field Manual 22-103 Leadership and Command at Senior Levels. June 1987.
Field Manual 33-1 Psychological Operations. February 1993.
Field Manual 34-7 Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low-Intensity Conflict Operations. May
1993.
Field Manual 34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. May 1989.
Field Manual 44-100 US Army Air Defense Operations. December 1994.
Field Manual 55-1 Army Transportation Services in a Theater of Operations. November 1984.
Field Manual 55-12 Movement of Army Units in Air Force Aircraft. November 1989.
Field Manual 55-20 Army Rail Transport Operations. October 1986.
Field Manual 55-65 Strategic Deployment by Surface Transportation. May 1989.
Field Manual 71-3 Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade Operations.June 1993.
Field Manual 71-100 Division Operations. November 1988.
Field Manual 71-100-3 Corps Operations. January 1996.
Field Manual 90-2 Battlefield Deception. October 1988.
Field Manual 90-13 River Crossing Operations. September 1992.
Field Manual 90-26 Airborne Operations. December 1990.
Field Manual 90-29 Noncombatant Evacuation Operation. October 1994.
Field Manual 90-30 Army-Air Force Air Base Ground Defense Operations.
Field Manual 100-5 Operations. June 1993.
Field Manual 100-6 Information Operations (D). May 1994.
Field Manual 100-7 Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations. April 1994.
Field Manual 100-8 Multinational Operations (D).
Field Manual 100-9 Reconstitution. January 1992.
Field Manual 100-10 Logistics. May 1994.
Field Manual 100-16 Support Operations: Echlons Above Corps. April 1985.
References-2
FM 100-15
DOCUMENTS NEEDED
READINGS RECOMMENDED
References-3
FM 100-15
OTHER DOCUMENTS
Standardization Agreements
STANAG 2070 Emergency War Burial Procedures. December 1988.
STANAG 2077 Order to Battle. October 1981
STANAG 2079 Rear Area Security and Rear Area Damage Control. September 1985.
STANAG 2104 Friendly Nuclear Strike Warning. December 1989.
STANAG 2868 Land Force Tactical Doctrine. (ATP-35(A)). April 1992.
References-4
INDEX
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Index-8
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Index-9
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Index-12
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Index-13
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Index-14
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Index-15
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Index-17
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Index-24
FM 100-15
29 OCTOBER 1996
DENNIS J. REIMER
General, United States Army
Official: Chief of Staff
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in
accordance with the initial distribution number 110407, requirements for FM 100-15.