''.''':
**5
Note: There is OCR text under the page images, but little faith should be placed in its accuracy, due to the poor quality of the images from which the text was read.
T-
y' \ . .'./*
.".';... Through 'Instruction No.- ,126 -to- Japanese Government,-' 12. -Oct. 45,- entitled* , . "inst^iution-for >mr ^tJcbrds^ihyestVcOti-on'1,.-steps were-Initiated' to. exploit _: ,. ' military historical records ""and. of f ic'ial reports'.'of..the 'Japanese .War ^i.niutr^-1 and.the" "Japanese'sGeneral ^taff; * Upon' ' h ' " ' d s s lu'tXoVr.Q^ te".'l.b arid 'the,v General- ^taf f,' and th'e~tfansf er ', of their" former" functions' W the i>e- ;; mobilisation; Bureau,- the general -research job .:cpnt.inued afid.-resulted, in. the ..' development'of a-\ series 'olf historical-monographs.. detailed instructions . " , ' . covering- the; preparation-^of> thes'fc mohdgrap'hs- were.'included ''i.n'"iwemora-n-da 15-'-- " iJecerhber-1945 and'-21-NoVemb"er' 1946, subject "Japanese Opejratioria.l'riistd 11 ' ' 'The basic materjial contained in this "operational rapord .was- developed by fo>mer of fleers, on duty'in command and staff .units<jiithin major units^ . during the period of;,operations, . it shoulu, be n6te"d:Jat, once,' that" the. erior mous destruction by aerial" bombbtrdment> and fire has practically wiped ouf the Tokyo records;;much of this naterial /.as reconstructed from-memory. ; The paucity of original orders, plans and unit journals-, which are normally essential in the preparation.of this type? of record, most-of which were lost, or'destroyed during field operations - or bombing raids ren-dered the.task of compilation most diTficult; -particularly distressing hasbeen the complete; ],ack of official strength' reports, normal-in AG or G-3 . . records, iiowev'er, while ma-iy oi' the important orders ,< plans'"-and' estimates 'have been,reconstructed i'rom meniory and therefore are "hot textually identical- with the originals, they are believed to' b.e' generally ; accurate'.and reliable., . Further .'data us a result of continuing research and the occasionalrecovery of hitherto unavailable original docui.ients vvill be covered in the'subsequent publication of "supplements" by the teni..'oilization bureau. ' ".
The action under this memorandum and incidental detail-ed i:is-tructions^, wiich followed, 'were inititited by the Assistant Chief oi' Staff, G-2, Gn^, chargea with responsibility for execution of the program under G.O. " * ' : No.;9, SCiiP, 2. October 1945. ' '- . ' . In order to protect the" internst of" the United States, in' the ex- ploitation of Japanese i-.*ilitary lhfor nation,- sub-[>aragruph 4 of G.O. Wo.'9 further provided 'for the" screening of eaemy documents and established in-ventories'in Japanese Uoverrunentul archives. Careful examination of the first records submitted by the Jupunese 'Government in the summer'of 1946 detected a misconception on the purt 0J1 the Japuher>e as tovvhat should be included in co'nparativo iiistories; in a memorandum issued by. assistant Chief of' iJtaff, G-2, on 21 November 1940, the Ij]lperj.al Japanese Gover.nment ;viin directed to record the operations of tne Jupuno:>e I'orcos more . extensively. The li-ii Section thert.-n 1 ter1 ar.Gu:u<id coordination of the entire program, including the ostiibl iulimont of a amull historical research section witiiin the A T I S (nlliod i'ranu'lntor and interpreter Section.)
Do
GBHRAL 8UFH1MK OOMUIBIB TOE TBB ALLIED POVKLS ' * MXUfAHY IITXLLKKMCX 81CTI0I, OEHBAL STATT ALLIED TRANSLATOR AID UTKiPKWKE SKTIOI
lOTlt
ftctioa.
i)crlptlon of Contenit:
Midway Opraiioiia
(TH
/ .
Doc
H O
II. - Outline set Topographical DaU on MD A , IWY III* IT. V. Details of Operational Plart. ^ fc X
Operational Preparation of the Imperial General Headquarters* ' " / * J Operational Preparatldns of the Combined Tleet. A. B. ' f J/~
Operational Plans for the l a s t front of the PACIFIC Ocean..../'. Main Points of the Operational Plans. 1. p ff .
Principles of Operation. ^ /Z
Standards of Actions and Dispositions of Yarious Units Against the Kneagr in the Ml and>L Operations. (' JJ
YI. VII.
-. p at ,
>/ A _^A> -
C. D. K.
Task forces.
(, A' "-j
F.
Other Units. 1. ^.
IH.
im
Results.
Doc
! > '
* HO
A p p e n d i x :
".'-.,
..-:-'
-'
v . > : - :.--.--
'
:r !
'
:
1. 2.
* '
fi ?$'
- "
,-. ....
Command t r i .
W.f'f-
'
r-
DOC
! "
.. '" ' , 'WLdvay Operations ..- . .-:.'..V'.. -. ''.'*..- . : " . .' N ' ' , .. v
l,r iGeneral S i t u a t i o n .
yrom the beginning of the war, our o p e r a t i o n s i n the v a r i o u s areas were carVted out with g r e a t s u c c e s s . Within four months a f t e r
the outbreak p f . t h e war, we had occupied s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n s , i n the > Southern Region and assured o u r s e l v e s , of areas rioh i n natural~ r e - : sources, /rom March 19^2, our t r o o p s , the nucleus of which was our
task f o r c e , extended o p e r a t i o n s to the IMDIAB"Ocean and had. g r e a t success. Simultaneously, p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r o p e r a t i o n s i n the SQLOMOVS .;'" .'' .N-1-v _
;
front.
-They carried out only two small task-force attacks, one agmiiiit
"
the M R H L Is land a on 1 7el> k2 and the other against our homeland AS AL on 18 April, O J and 8 May U2, our occupation units, on their way to n
attack P R H R i E , H V OUIJC^A, encountered air enemy task force in O T O KS Y k the C H L Sea, and damaged the enemy f l e e t considerably; however, our OA strategic, objective was not accomplished. ^ ' "
The f i r s t stage of our operation ended as mentioned above*' After Hay 19^2, we attempted to continue offensive operations and to insure our victory. At thetime, enemy units on land and sea were assumingv
the defensive, that enemy submarines were active near the homeland, . cauting heavy damages to our ships in the early part of May. A total
:
of nine ships (U^,000 tons) was sunk, more than'in any other month. This was equal to almost our entire loss for March and April. II. Outline of Topographical Data on
MIDWAV.
The situation in the U t t e r part of April 19^?, vat as followsi A. General lnformatiom MD A i s an atoll ix * i l e s in diameter. IWY
The two islands, B f D and SASTKR1, consist of oalcareout sand and are Ac generally flat and thinly covered with tropical plants. B. Defense: Before the outbreak of the war, one battalion of It i t
recognlled that sone foroes have been added since the outbreak of
Boo Ho
t
the war.
The Island probably i s protected by many fortresses, antlLand-plnnes, seaplanes, subIt i s assumed
that these establishments and barrier reefs will be of considerable obstacle to our landing. 0. Strategical Taluet The atoll not only Can be ah important
base for patrol when the enemy taek foroe attempts to approach our homeland, but i t Is also the only base for-oarrylng out direct attacks with large aircraft on VAH island which i s now occupied by us. In
the future, when we assume the offensive against the eastern front in the PACUIC Ocean, this island, together with the ALMJT1AI1, w i l l , by i t s location, greatly hamper the a c t i v i t i e s of our fleet* III. Details of the Plans for This Operation. The f i r s t stage of this operation progressed more favorably than we had expected. forced to retreat. As a result, the enemy base's on the f i r s t line wore Therefore, the probability of a direct attack by Any enemy-
attack would probably follow a route from the l a s t , similar to that which the enemy took when i t s task foroe raided our homeland on 18 Apr U2. After the outbreak of the war, patrol lines yore established approximately 600 miles off the homeland, and were composed of an observation unit assigned to the northern troops in order to prepare * for enemy attack from the eastern front of the PACITIC. This t t i t m tlon unit carried out i t s duties in oo-operatlon with patrol flights of base Air Foroe aircraft. However, full reliance could not be placed
on them because of weather conditions and the capacities of the patrol boats. With the complete situation in mind, the plan was drawm up
for capturing MD A and the western ALBUTIAI8 In order to strengthen IWY the patrol for maintaining the Inviolability of our Kernel ami Vy establishing our bases outside of the present patrol limes. At the time,
the Solomons area, the lew Caledonia area, and the Indian Ooean area, in addition to an eastern front in the PAODPIC, were being considered as sites for a main operation, but because of the unyielding opposition
go t
oif the noadquartors of the combined fleet, i t was decided to carry out an eaitirn front operation in tha PAG 171C. XT.
; . ' ' . :
; ; . :
*
'
Operational (Vuldance.
' , . ' ' ' : . ? * ' . -
1'
:
" ' ' " . " "
"
' ' . '
"
Mniloiwsd In th*
lne *cilon, an atrn front operation In th PAOITIC wa docldod. . Thorof or,- on'.5 May U?^ Ia^arlal. Onrml Ha^dqxLartr, Mary Departaont, Ordar M 18 to captvur* MD A and atrataclff Vottorn points in o IWY the AUUTIAHS, in joo^oparation vith tha Amy, u iuad to Cobinad irlaet Cowaandar T K H T . On the aaao day, th acraamnt of tha Aragr A A OO
the AT (MIDWAY) and AO
(AUDTIAM)
Operations was
1.
task: force attacks against our homeland froa tha Hawaii area. At the save time, w- will destroy the enaay float
vfhirh v i l l npar whan our operation "it tmd*Ty , 2. Principles of the Operation 1 The captuco of MD A A<111 IWY be carried out through the co-operation of the Army and Nary.
-
3.
" ..
The Aruy and Hnry, in oo-oporatlon with each Othar, will'capture MD A and will spoodily esUbllah land IWY and sea air bases. To f a c i l i t a t e tho Midway Opera-
tion, the capture of KIYUA will have been carried out by tha Mary unit on tha previous day*. b. The lavy will eupport the occupation foroe with i t s main foroe. Before the landin*, an attack on MD A IWY
will be carried out by mean.of carrier-based airpianos vita the main objoot of destreyiM th air
Doc l o
forces on the island. U. a. * * and 1'orcoi 2taployedi layyi Cowan nd en fleet, forcess b. Arajri U>under: Tproest
"Beginning of Operation! The operation will be begun in the early part of June or the middle of June, almost simultaneously with the Aleutian Operation. Assembly Area and Date! The assembly area for the occupation forces will be 8AUAI. The date will e* '
about 25 may. The layy will take charge of the Army unit froa the port of embarkation to the assembly area'. 7. a. Tollowinc this oooplotlon of tbjt aftioably, the 2 Flt OoBwandor will aarana the eoanand of tha Ary
A
unit in regard to the operation. b. During the landing and landing battle, the Amy unit and the laral landing party will carry out 0"ration at tha tame point, and the enior ooaamnder will aartme the ooamaad of the operation. Defense Quties After the Ooottpatlont The Maral unit
t
will take oharfe of the defense of MD A . The Aragr IWY unit will withdraw froa the island one week after the ' ooapletioft of the capture. CojuHonioationai Coaenmication* will be based on the
Army and Mary agreement regarding 00mtcations in the XL, MI, and T Operations. Motet /J< * ALKUTIAXt M - KIEV/AT} T = MJI. I ,
Doe Vo
supplying the Army and STacuatlng patientfi. Hap* to bs Usodt Tiaa to b Ussds Pacific t i s ) . Jfy&rograpalc- charta. Cantral Standard 1 M (IK Central
S.
Partial Bsorganlftation of ths Combined J l e e t . ' 1. To ttrengthen ths operation for tht captors of " I W Y ' MD A and to prspare for ths adrancst which will bs aads aftsr i t s occupation, on 1 May U2 k spsolal eoablnsd landing.
:.;.,
party WKS organltsd to "bs attachsd to ttxa Coabinsd Tia#tv On 1 April, ths 26 Air 8quadron was organissd to bscojas a part bt the 11 Air f l e e t .
P.
On 30 Apr Hz, ths carrier, HATATAKA, was placsd in conmission, and Joined the H'Air Sqaadrbn.
;
.-.
'
-C.
a l l four carrierg of ths 1 and 2 Air 8qu*drona were l o e t , so ths -difficulty in continuing ths opsration was recognized.
V . "
;
On i l Jal U2.
. . <;
-;
. . . . .
ture MIDVAT, which had been bassd on laperinl 0nsral Headquarters Order Ko 18, was cancaled. T. . ,
Operational Preparations of ths Oonblnsd Tleet. Aftsr the Hawai1 Opsrations was orsr, the hsadquartars of ths
CoMblnod irisst was aboard ths flagship Y M T , which was in A AO anchorage off HASHIBAJIMA, an island in the wsstsrn part of ths IIUUtD Sea, and i t assumed charge of general guidanos of opsratlong. At the saae tlae* ths hsadquartsrs aade preparations for futurs open*tiom. f
In April 19^2, as soon as opsrations in ths IJTDIAH Oosan were ' eoBpls.ted( the strength of ths surfaos units of the Conblnsd Flsst was oonosntrated in the western* part of tho I1LAJBD tsa. At the seaie
tie. the ^re/vler part of the bass air foros was disposed on ths
Dee lo
'eastern front of the PACIFIC, and operational preparations were steadily furthered in co-operation with the A m y . A. Operational Plans for the Pacific Xastern Front. The operational plans for the eastern front in the PACIFIC in May 19^2 wore as "follows I Though the Pacific operation will be carried out in two direction*, one towards, MIDWAY-and the other towards the JIS0TIAV8, they will operate* together in one body, keeping close oontact with each other. The aost important objective of the opera-' tion aay bo said to be the attacking of strategic positions, but it If also the objective of this operation to destroy the caeay; fleet which*lsvexpected to take advantage of this opportunity to counterattack:. Therefore, the plan has been drawn up with considerations of various dispositions in order to face, with the Coablned Fleet, any eneay concentration in the Midway and Aleutian areas. All units will participate in this plan with the exception of 5f (TV Carrier division), 28s (TV Submarine squadron), both of which are under repair, and 88s which are engaged in India-Australia area operations. 1. Operations in the Midway Areat a.' Main participating strength (greater part of the ^ Coablned Fleet) under the direct coaaend of the Commander-in-Chief of OP* (TV Combined Fleet). IS (TV Battleship Div or Cruiser Div), the greater part of 18 and 33d (TV Destroyer ssuadron), the BOSS). * Under the Ooawl of 21 (TV 2 f l e e t ) Midway Occupation Foroo, JJ (W A-sUglaJsl), 58. 71, U
21d(
Party. lldl (TV Task foroe)t 18f, 2tf, 10S, ft, 31s (TV Smbeeuad),
Boo Bo
V* Issantlals of Operation;
occupation fores, air raids will be carried out by , IdB on MD A to destroy enemy forces and defense . IWY ?* equipment on the island. Occupation forces will
capture tha island with one stroke. - At tha seme tima, the destruction of the enemy flaet, which w i l l :, will be oarrlad .out. Sal w i l l .bathe HAWAIIAI Islands and WWAT to prepare .:' ' counterattack of the powerful enemy units whidrwill coma from tha r l c i n i ty of HAWAII.. Kdl and- tha mala, force will wait for tha opportunity to attack the enemy at sea, north or northeast of MD A , IWY while the occupation forces will await tha opportunity to attack the enemy at sea south or southwest of
MIDWAY. . , '. . ', . -. -'
;
; "
- '
.."
Landing Party (two battalions, approximately 2,800 man) and the Ikkl Datachment of the Army (one battalion, approximately 3,000 men commanded by tha regiment commander) will depart from S X A T on tha aranAPJ lng of 28 May, guarded by 2Sd and 78, and w i l l Carry out the landing on 7 June. lXdB will laara tha ,
western part of tha UL4JS 5aa in tha early morning of 27 May. At 0130 hours on 5 June, i t will attack MD A from tha air. IWY Jj $ 5. ^Sd, and the ZUIHO ' .
will laare tha western part of tha IHAlD Sam at 0500 hours on 29 May. <n route to MD A , thay IWY
will protect the units which will mail from &ADAI. On the day of landing, they will adrmnee to tha south or southwest of MD A to pro tact tha landing IWY
units directly.
Doc Ho
.On the 7th, i t will aupport the landlm* battle directly* The main unit will leare the western part of the IILA1DSea on 23 Nay. It will aid the various unite on
I t s way to kISVAY. At the time of the landing, i t .. will advance to 6o c 1 (TV Presumably 600 milee) northweet of MD A . TBQ will carry out a.compreIWY henaira patrol flight to aaroh for th &/ in conjaaetion.wiXh th aetion of th f l * t . At th
a tim, th Pearl Harbor roomaiano (X Operation) will b iiKttUd vita 14 x 2 (Id larg* f l j r .
. . ; , : . .
tha laadinf, tiia aMpa, athar than i U ( will op*raU in the Yicinity of their atatlona 1*aitia the b^portuna Moment, and will prepare to da a troy the enemy flaat. After tha aqoipant on land have team,
for the Boat part t inatalled,. the akLpa will re torn ': to, the homaland^to prepare for, the next operation. Defense after the Occupation of MI WAT: The 2 CeaMmed liaaty ' . .
four cannona of Tarioua type a, Uo machine cone, aix^type A.Midget aubaariaaa, and fiVe torpedo boate will be prepared. Preparatlona hare been made to send four additional midget auamarinea, two <{uadrupla torpedo
. .
v
j *
'
'
'
tuba , and 12 20 cm gana in the middle of June and afterw a r d a . ' . ..." :... ' ' ' . . , -,. '
Thea <y>uaaaaer-lm-ehief
of 37 will take charce of the direct oommamd, but the ooa*MLnder~lrv-ohif of GT will collaborate in thia O in addition to harinc tha 00atti of the Midway area operationa. ' \^ a. The Main Participating f tremfftht The maim body,
Doc Ib JWM
2MB! U|f, | J
.
:'-:-
.';.;....., ;. :r'::"-:
-C.'
Oywr&tioui of th TarlOtti Unitif* Tie w'bwarltm force Advanced beforehand. A part of I t maMC*A 1B recon-'
naltsance a c t l r l t i e t In,the Seattle area on i t r a t e f l c - points In the JdMJYlJJn, while another pttitt reaalned. oh; the alert, rat utnal. I t J*at planned that tht 2
Hoblle Unit ttart fron OMIIATO on ?6 May, head for the ibtith of D T H HJJLBOB, attack the port-on H Jtme, UC .and attack XISKA and A A on 6 June. DX Xarller, the" Attu Inratlon force will hare
' " > . . ' ^
;
.
. '
'
'
'
"
'
, launched, a traudden attack on ttratecic,pointt on A AC DJ and XAIAOA* on 28 May with Military units, tont fro OMUATO, and Marine corps .personnel aboard rarlout , ships In order to destroy eneay lnttallatlont oopletely. On about th 8th, they vl11 withdraw fro
the islands In order to capture ATW. The Ilska Iarasion Jorce will leare froa O ZA O ' MIT on the ?8th for PA1AMUSBIB0 where sappllet will be picked up. The force will leave there 3 /xrae and Tor the aott part, the
aain force will ooa>lne with the Xitka Inrasion Units and advance to the waters south of AX C and aid In the JU -overall fiaeya1<p
Doc Ho
Trie screening force will, An. c*neralY combine) .. with 7 Squadron to attack fr6 the wstern part of the I?JLAHD 3a on ?9 Hay. f* It the necessity arises,
th*ry will adrance to a point about JjOOrsdles south of KlSKA to support the lorthern forces. ^ v ^
ATTOJ
Within a -.
Measures for i t s station, and tit^^MtT^[}>9':;:imp9xyiimi\ V' ; by the,iavy and A T by the Army. TO The *forces, to be .^-
"stationed on XISXA will consist of 5^0 "special Marine'"'-T troops-, eight guns, and four aachlne guns soon after the< conqueitof the island, and four, Type A Midget submarines'' and one firing tube (four-chabered) will be dispatched o n 'o r n f t e r t h e j t h . . ' ' - '' " .- .'. ll<".'-.'-;' ' . ' /.;'.
j^neay Ihtellicncer
\ ,
in 'the Hftvallan area consists of the flat t made up of two dwpot-ihips a it naln force. This was
organiirod soon after'the Coral Sea Battle and was re>aoyed to thn east of the OLOMOS, although they are supposedly remaining in the South 3*as area. ..\
Our forces
carried out .submarine reconnaissance in the r i c i n i t y of strategic eneay locations, but the enemy was not sighted. Testeirdax's "cable reports that their Mobile units presumably arriY*i at a point south of the 80LDN0VS. Towards tho < d of Mayr. ooe or two of their planes attacked, m T X L Z These two items indicate that some of their UJO. depot-ships are s t i l l in the twx%h Seas area, Vmt others
'
Jog i s a gre,t nuisance in the Aleutian oampaiga. Ve are now la the midst of the year's me>t fsnrerable
10
Doc yo
'V
:
.t
period for var activities, but the possibility of fog Bust be* takan into consideration* The Midway art a, on
the other hand, it an area of favorable weather oondiDue to bad weather, operations In the Aleutian area aay be delayed sosjowhat, but the attacks In the .Midway area wi 11 be earrl ed out' as planned.
& .
'. -.
- ;
'-'.''I,,-
subaarine forces, will assemble in i, on or about 20 June, to prepare for the next
f
' campaign which will be carried out in early July. '.The aaln force will return to the-homeland about
.'<& June, or Bay proceed to TKJI in order to support .: ' in the next caapaign. The subaarine force will con-
tinue i t s Hawaiian operation for the tiae being froa the air base at KIDVAT. ^ > . b. -. .
The majority of the forces participating in the -.' Aleutians Operation will, return to OMIIATO, and the \ screening force will return, either to 0W1AT0 or. to Tokyo Bay, in order to protect transportation units within the Midway and the Aleutians areas,
- ' ;
. '..'-,.' '
and prepare for eneagr a c t i v i t i e s in the waters east . of the homeland during the next phase of the-war. -The gubaarine force will continue the,Aleutians
Operation. ' :*. :. / . . . ' -/ _ . ' . . ' .
\ -
B.
Main Points of Progress in Midway Operations. 1. Xstiioation of Snaay Position in the Midway Area. a. Xnemy air etrengthi Pntrol seaplanes ' Aray boabersi Air fighterst two coapanles (about ?U plaaes). . ,
>_ '
- "
.
' . . . . .
Doc Ho -3W18S-
,X.uawy air patrols in the western aque are carried out continually day and night at a distance of as auch as 6bo miles.
i
two or three fighters are on constant patrol duty. Several petrol seaplanes are active dn nearby waters;
Ai
d. ': The aircraft carrier B D E i s said to be;;activa in , ; ^ ^ j: AGR the JOLAWTIC. '
LEXIIOTOI
'.
has been sunk, but others say that she i s '' "
! '
"-: nov-under repair on the vest coast. e. In the PACIFIC, tha * JTEEBPRISI ahd#the BOfittT are- . s t i l l aotlve, while the otatus of theJtfUP; i s not
.'" c e r t a i n . ' . - . . ' . . '_-_. .,' . - >~ ..' ;'_ -" '.-
f.
Special aircraft carriars which have already been coiplstcd are calculated to number about six, half of vhlch /trfl1 nresuaed. to be active"in \1id PiJSIfIC, rrejn"""T" though their Strength has boon weakened'.} They are unfit for active duty. . . , '.;. -
g.
inaay air forces in4 llAViil are able to provide rapid roinforceiaonts to the Midway area. . They are as
;
; . J
",
follows:';/
,"...
_'
''
."''
'.
.-.
'/
'
';". -
"
' , ,, .
Knwy f l e e t units in the Hawaiian area are scheduled to advance if MD A i s attacked. IWY tip as follows: , two or three. two' or three. . . . The"units are made
four. '
".'.
about 30.
2 5 . ' ' .
"
. ; . . , . . '
1. .
Tarious cannons,
.dual-purpose funs, and machine guns are in humbars, and Marine Corps troops (about 750)
2. \
Is to capture MD A , to adTance our'positions In order, IWY to check enemy actiTitles from that direction, and to destroy the enemy f l e e t which night launch an attack
If
'
otherwise.
."''
'
" - '",{--'.'
';.' , < .
3.
The Main Points of the Operation. a. The Main Force. (1) i ,.'
The main force will reach a point approximately 600 n i l e s northwest 'of MIDVAI fn ordar to support attacking units most conTeniently. -
(2)
The security detachment will^ be stparaied from: the midn force by a special order, and will
~ ."':':[.'
adTance to a point about ^00 miles south of, KISKA to aid the northern unitn.*,
,\.jjj.. The main force will execute an enreloping b. attack when the nemyfleet admnoas. Task fbroei '
'* ;
approximately 250 miles northwest of MD A at dayIWY brek, two days before the attack, and will support the attacking units by carrying out air raids against the island, destroying enamy air units, f l e e t , and base installations. Afterwards, they will eafafe in
nopplnc up operations acninst the eaamgr flaot aa opportunities arise. Whan an air ease on MD A i s IWY
> ^
.
' ' ' ' ' .'
HO
(l)
The aain forco will reach a point approximately ^00 alias wait of kD A at daybreak of the day IWY preceding the attack, from then on, aaiatalning
close liaison with the main foroe and aobile units, they v i l l turn their Attack toward the U>uth iJeaa to brine about an enveloping attack on the eaeagr and support the operations of the other forces. {_) -
Other onits will co-operate with t&e aerial campaign of the uwbile units in order to adranoe rapidly to KlYUA*. and, with a foroe consisting
A?
of seaplanes as i t s naln factor, v i l l have subjugated the island on the previous day to f a c i l i t a t e the uovosant of the seaplane units. They, buccebslvely, v i l l .occupy SAiTD and LASTiEJJ Islands at daybreak of the appointed day vith harluti lorcea, escorting parties, and their own strength in order to complete defense and base installations. d. Uaao Air Units. (1; Tht main force will b deployed on the eastern tront. While current operations are being continued., a portion of the forces vill oojaplete oase installations on MIDWAY. () Al'ter the fall of KIDWAY, one tinlt of fighters, lautUbased attack planet, and seaplanes vill be dispatched lwaediately towards this area to engage in patrol operations against the eneay in the eastern soctor over a wide area, and vill aid in thu dufonsa of the island. * < - ' .
e.
Advance Troops. (1) Tivi days before the appointed day, one subaarine - squadron will advance along ttye oeaat ef KUTH
Doc H O
AMX&ICA or s t r a t e g i c potntt i n th JtfJTOTUIS, end another, together v i t h Srtbaarin* l o 59, v l l l adrance to a point botvoon HAWAII and *r MIDYAY to co-operat with both tho attaokinc tuvltcjand northern troops. < ' . (?) ,
Some of the mibaarinec Will okicac* in nurpria* attacke on th# #nMQr f l t and i n dtructiY operation! against lee. t r a f f i c i n the areeif of the IKBZAI Ocean, South ATTUCA, AUSTRALIA^ and IXV HALAID. ' ~ ^
f.
Northern Troop*.
Troope i n the Worth v l l l capture K 2 U and ATTO on ZU L the RjTpolnted day, and, oaptor* the ene^jr f l e t . H. Diapoeitlon of Strength of laoh Force.
Doc *o 3HU6S
SI
Main Fore*
^-'Irtrwigth
3 Destroyer Sqn. _Ona destroyer f l o t i l l a and a half of ths 1 Destroyer 5qn. HOSfiO. On* destroyer of the 1 Destroyer Sqn.
CHIYODA. U8SHIH. HJDJTO. TOlI Maru. YDKiJC*.
Captain of HOSHO.
2 Swpply Unit
Doc W o
Screening force ( i n case of maneuvering away from the aaln f o r c e ) . Commander Commander- i n-chi ef of 1 T l e e t . Cotamander of 9 Cruiter Div. Strength ? Battleship 1. 2. Cruiser Div. Deatroyar F l o t l l l n -r d e s t r o y e r ) . 27 Destroywr y - (excluding one :. destfoyer). : ?0 Destroyar F l o t i l l a : . Maru.. Kara. One destroyer of the 1 Destroyer Duty Oopport northern Force. Sxternlnate enemy f l e e t .
facreenlng unit
unit
Doc M o
Task Tore*.
Comaipjider
Strength 1 l i r Fleet (excluding U and 5 Aircraft Carrier ^ LiTiion8 and 10 Cruiser Diy)._
->'
Duty
upport force. .
Coaaaxxdor o f 8 Crair E i v .
. , . . ' _
S Cruiser Dir. , Two sections of the , 3 Battleship Dir. 10 Cruisar Dir (excltullng the 7 . Destroyer r i o t i l l a ) . . H Destroyor Tlotilla* ETOrnrO Maru S I E K Maru : HB O U T0B5 Kara HPP0I Maru ; K0KUY5 Maru '; '
KCHHO Maru 2 l Y f a l Martt
3 5 B 5 Maru.
lxterainate enemy fleet. Protect air attack force. Take precautions. Exterminate eneay fleet.
Screaking ualt.
1 Supply Unit.
-
force 2 Sopply/Unit.
Under direct control of . Coandar-in-chief o f / : r 1 l i r net
' .'
S u p p l y .
' - "
.'.*'.'.
. -
y 4L -
Doc to
. : /
-. 8teath;
-- ; : 7
; .
: '
- -
U Cruiter Dir, 3 Battl#hip - Support the whole operation. Dir (excluding Mm Wo IH0TA1), U Dettro7r 8<|n (czelodix^ tvo d#itroyr f l o t i l l a * ) , HrtHB, MUCAZUri^ thrSr tarazwporti. 2 D*troyer 5<pi (excluding on* destroyer), one Bixiesveeper f l o t i l l a , one tabchaser d i r , one BO tor torpedo boat, "one patrol boat, 16 transport*. 2 Coabined 8EL7, one construotion battalloa, oae orTy unit, on* Army detacfaaent.
1) I s c o r t occupation u n i t .
': I-.
Itcort Ttait
2) Cap tore MIDV1I and a s s i s t arranfenents for csaplns.l ;-.'.v ' %> 1) Captura & I 1 and JULWMQf I . l a n d . . AX 2) aake; arrawcssitnts for caapinc a t the b a s e ; - - ..-_-.
v> x
Occupation unit ^ -
Cnmndw of 2 Coafolntd 8XLF (ftpial laral Landing 7oree). Coaatander of 7 Craistr Dir.
Ol'MliflT Of
7 Cralser DiT, S Destroyer : ',<} "\ Support atcort xmit. '-.:- V-.;'r:-:s:-?-':^^- .'";). ' F l o t i l l a , one transport. U Aircraft Carrier DiT,
UMIXAMX H a m .
' : ' . ' < . :
-..
*
' , . " :
:
\ : -
: :
Distribution
Strength
22 Air Via Dir,.
.^
1.
ftity Patrol each area and destroy eney air strength. 2. Contact and exterminate eneay task (eccrapatioa) force. 3* Assail and exterminate eaesgr _ ^ float aoving in the sain operational area. h. U and 6 Air Attack lorces cooperate vith each other in the \ MDC T operation. I1A After the f a l l of MI9KAT, a greater" part of the large flying seats of the 4 Air Attack Tore*, a greater part of the fighter planes of the 6 Air Attack Joroe, and a part of i t s lead attack planes shall advance.
T X O Bay Areas about half OT of the division. k Air Attack Fore*. Cojooander of the 2H Air Vine Bir. 2k Air Vin* Div. Marihall Area: a greater part of the, diTieionVake-Oirbert Area: of the dirieloxi. 5 Air Attack Tore* 25 Air-Vin Dir. 2^ Air Vine Div. a part
labaal Areat a greater part of the division. Soloaoxu Area: a part of the dirialon.
Kitarasu Area: a greater part of the division. Minajdtori lalamd Area: part of the division. a -
* '
1
Counder ef the
3 * Deetroyer Tlotill*
19 trejELiporte
1. 2. 3.
>
(2) BUtriHtttion
3 fore*. -
Tighter plan*
force. ."- - - --.
. 36 "fighter, planes. ;
i- SitermijteU attaekUf eaeay plaa. *."' 4 s . Altailiac and eitermiatl tin , r 7 ney warhipf which coae to the attack.
Commander of the aediua attack . plane unit dispatched by the Mlsava Air Group. CouBandor of the flying fco&t uuit dispatched "by, the Ik Air Group.
1. Aeaail and exterminate attacking '- ' eneay warhip. i ' - - .-. :'~'.V \? 2. ^PaJ^rol-aaA March for the memy..;.:
^ -
Patrol and search for the eaeay. ixtermiMtte and reooamelter military establihets and strength n OAW Itland. -^ : ; 3. Assail and exterminate attacking ~ :' : '. _ enemy varshlpi. ; '. . \'-.-...-. - . _': ' " .'! ' . ,
1. 2.
DOC
Northern Force. Distribution Malauaii. 2 Task Force. Conaaader -in-chief of tha 5 Flaat. Coaauuisr of tha U Carriar DIT. Stran^th Ml CHI, d Sect ion a of tha 21 Destroyar f l o t i l l a . U Carrier Dlv* * 2 Sections of the U Cruiser Div. 7 Destroyer Flotilla. One traneport. 1 Destroyer cluding 3 flotilla*). . Other* omitted.
2 1 D i v . .-
v
* Duty i
'
Support the whole operation. M k air raids on1 D T H H B O and &a UC AB R othar is^portant areas. Capture and axtenslnate the enaay fleet. I *Capture ATTO.
(ex-
Kieka Occupa-tion Fore*. Sabsjarine Seaplane force. laae air force. Patrol force* Tore*, Attached force.
Others onittad. 1 Subsarine Sqn. KW A A karo. I KW One destroyar Six flying boats* Four ; transports.
Capture KISCA. Kaap Vatch on laportant eaasgr areas. Search for enasqr fleet and attack i t Co-operate in the l&hdin operation, fteareh for the eney.; > , * Search for the anaay and att*ok i t . Patrol.
(Oaitted) Supply.
Tha -atandard oparatlnc prooadura for^taoh unit for tha Midway and AlWtiana oparatlona waa praarrancad
I, U -
Dlapoaltlon in raadinaaa for tha Midway and Alautiana operational Tha dlapoaltlon in raadinaaa fro tha
of tha oaapalcA of oocrxpntl^n of atrata^lo ko MVin daya aftor tha appointad data waa ' ' daoidad aa followai (1) Dlapoaltlon plan M it a \t . ^ When any powerful .
anaagr foroaa appaar, adyanoa and attack tha*. If no apaoial ordar la laauad thla dlapoaltlon will a followad. (?) Dlapoaltlon plan M 2t o Lttra powarful aaaagr
foroaa to a faalllar atrata&de paint In an ooouplad ara* and annllillnta than. .-.-. of foroaa.) (Daploymant
"
.'*
' ; : - - - ;
1 Task Torce
Three hundred Biles ea.it of the s a i n -
u n i t . . -';-' "";.
2 Task Force:
rJyr~T
Mr rieet.
r- deplojr to 1 l i n e .
ne H(lron
1 Sotesmrine. Squadron --deploy to 1) line. Plan l e 2. laoh irtmp will >e located at a point J O ndles west of the respectiTo points O Indicated in plan l o 1. Saae as Plan lo 1 The line aay be used by special' order. ,Remarkst (2) (3) lach roup will operate vi thin a raiige of 100 mile. fro the re spec tire points designated; If i t becomes i^>ortant to observe the eneay1 a situation in the Ssattle area, a part of 1 8ubaarine Squadron will continae this duty; ~ . , The Coswander of the Assault Group will decide the group's entire operation*
' Doc Bo
t
If powerful cneeiy forces appear and operate in the Area west of l6o degrees, west longitude, apprehend and attack them according to the following operational i net motions! ft. Tactics A (for attack on enemy fleet) t (1)
\
The Task forces and Submarine Squadrons will adrance to search for the enemy. " If necessary, the reaaining units will a s s i s t the forces.
, (2)
b.
Taotitfe Bf (1) lach unit deployed aeoording to disposition plan Ho 1 or lo 2 will await the enemy at its station. Submarine squadrons will carry out
tracking tactic repeatedly against the enemy forces. (2) The task forces will advance to search for and annihilate th* enemy at the opportune time. The remaining units will assist the taak forces. c. Tactics t\ (1) ^ V
When a powerful concentration of enemy ships adrances westward, a l l our forces will carry Out a dec!sire battle against this enemy group as decided in the operational plan.
(2)
The Ooomaader of the 1 Taak force will oommand both the 1 and 2 Task forces. The oommmndeor
of the adrance unit will focimnfl the 1, 2, and 3 Submarine Squadrons. (3) The 1.fleet, which operates l a the northern area will Join the main group.
lotet
north latitude will be the boundary lime which * separate the re spec tire operational areas for the
Doc ITo
t
JoVca .(3. w^ -5 8trtuurin* Siuadront) end the 2 Taek Torce (1 Submarine Squadron). _Howererk If the envsyj should operate in the i n t e r ^ i i ^ e rone, l o t a talk forces ahall co-operate i a attacking the
.a
TI.
, '
- ,
' , . . ' /
At the outbreak of the war, the lavy dirt not hare ship radar/ As. result of earnest study and progress in preparations, the Xary f i n a l l y c o l l a t e d the i n s t a l l a t i o n of radar equlpent on the b a t t l e hip, I SI and'HTUOA, on ?J .May, Just prior to *he Beginning of t h i t operation. B.
Carriere.'
- , ' -
'
carriern werei recognited../is having great iapp'riaacav, Contidering the inportance of this operation, two Tj^e. 13 CArrier-based boabers' , (water-cooled engines, tvin cockpit), vhlch had be^n:ttnder experimentation, were placed aboard the SOHTU, a carrier attached to the 2 Air " Squadron, as recpr;h'>.i<^>jic5 plen^B. (At. tha.t^tiaiB", V.IQ 5Jypel3 plane
was superior i n , i t s characteristics to 'any of. the enejay earrier-based planec. in actaal serrice and wae able to carry out i t s dutie's satis-' /rA
faotorily.)''' ' . .:.,.'.' :'; _ - /. ' \ ~ "1 . ,_.. .*'' ''.'
Til.
\* . . ' . '
The greater part of the Co nib 1 nod Fleet, which was to parti- :, oipate in this operation, had been engaged in aaneuYer in the IHDIAH Ocean in March and April 19^?, nnd the remaining part of the Combined 71eet had engaged i n the Battle of the Ooral Sea i n early Nay. More-
orer, these ships had been ordered to attack the ensy task forces which boabed the honeland in on air raid, on 18 Apr ^2,
. . . . . . . . > . . . . . . .
For these
_ .
reasons, these Baral forces could not return to the homeland to prepare for this operation before late April.
' :. -. ' ' . ' " " 2 6 " '" ' :
'. . . ' . -
'
.
: V
'
' .
As a result of a series of major operations during the half year following tho outbreak of the war, the Navy had been'forced.to carry out large-scale replenishments and replacements of tsrevs, *md to maintain it .ships and planes, and wasjeept very buny. our forces'still could not assembly by mld~May. Therefore,
Such oircumstmncer
interfered extremely with the training of not only the fleet i t s e l f , but with the individual ships, ncd, especially, the plane unit of the task force.
i
Further-lore, units which were to partlcipute in thitr-operation did not have sufficient tine for a thorough study of the operation. Finally, tho task force was forced to set out for the operation "~ " ~
In late May, when the Combined Fleet rehearsed the operation through use of a man, the various units suggested postponing the date on which to comraenco the operation and change the assembling point of the assault groune. However, the cotntander of the Combined Fleet
decided to carry out the operation according to the scheduled plan. The 1 Task Force l e f t the IMLkttD Sea on 2J May, and the main group and the assault group l e f t the IHLAJJD 8ea on 2$ Nay. The convoy attached to the assault group, which had changed the originallyplanned assembly point from TiUJK. to SAIPAH, departed from 8AXPAY on "26 Kay. 7or information concerning the remaining units, refer to the daily report of the Midway Operations. At the beginning of this operation,<a number of enemy submarines appeared in the vicinity of the home islands. On 29 Nay,
when our main group set out for the operation, two eneaqr cub marines were sighted off Bungo Straits. On 30 May, a patrol plane from WAD
Island sighted two other enemy submarines in the are* north of VAO Island. According to the report on enemy submarine a c t i v i t i e s of
2 June, at least 16 enemy submarines wore sighted after 29 May, i n eluding six in the vicinity of the homeland, four In the area northeast of W J f Island, mad four i n the area around SRUK. AC c On k June, a day before the taafc force attacked MIDWAY, our convoy was attacked by enemy patrol planot. Moanwhile, our X Operation,
DOC JI6*
which called for reconnaissance and attack on-the Hawaiian Itlands, vat finally suspended because of the strict guard Maintained by the eneeqr and because no curate information could not be obtained. pn 5 June, our task force, en route, carried out an attack on MD A Island. IWT On the U M day,-a::Wlt^force*en>f^:'wi\h;;'.a
task-force^jiM^>tt^ assaultonMIDWAY Island had to be sailed off. On the other hand, '; .
:m
u*
ihe 7 Squadron, which vas dispatched in order to bombard MD A I land, IWY had an accident which was followed by ecaey attack and the WIUXA (hsarr cruiser) was lost and the NOOiMI (heavy cruiser) was sererely
"v\
ift
damaged.
. -
..
V ; ' -
/:
> V
' , , - - - - - 'v
.'"..
. ' ; ,
- . . . ,
.-..,. ' # " > . '
.
'.
"
.."
:.;
V \
i . ';." ^ -.
' " " ; ; .
:
" . '
The details of the.actirities Of each of our units will be > ,' . ^ .."'' ' " , . . ,'.,'.
Recomaiilnsance Prior to 1.
Operations.
(The'second X Operation.j
that Type 2 seaplanes fro Wodje Base in the MUSHALL Islands would get fuel supply fro* otur sn^aarlar sUtioned at 7BWK3H' niOaff Atoll and reconnoiUr PSAHL HlEBOfi. Preparations were being mde tqt
' " > , .
this operation.
tioned at HQIVCH TRI0A5S Atoll, reported that ensy ' seaplanes were keeping on close watch orer TaUCH yfilOATK Atoll, the operation was temporarily suspended. As the enesqr oontinue to keep d o s e obserra~
tibn, the Qosnander of the Base Air Obit ordered the operation dropped. As a result of this suspension,
the only chance of reconnaissance against enesgr task forces was l o s t . b. Plans! .
fleet to co^plate obserration of the strength of the _ enesV sea fbroe at PAABL KARB01 by late Nay or early ' June (by about 3 June), the Onunflor of the Sase Air
28
Doe l o
t
Unit ordered the Commander of the Z Air Squadron to f U end several Type 2 heavy seaplanes, together with some submarines, at. an opportune tlnn to.carry out ' tfic abore-aenUoned Million. In compliance with
!th# above order, arrangement! between the headquarters of the 6 Tleet and the 2k Air Squadron Were Bade aboard the KAfQRI, anchored at XKAJAUXV, on 19 Nay* The acreeeMAt regardiac the teoond K Operation was as follows! (1) , _ * This If
The appointed date for raoonnaissaneet will be carried out on *P Day* (31 Mqr).
the situation i s unfavorable, i t will be postponed, and i f i t i s impossible by 3 June, this / (?)
. ' " . ' ,
. ^,
. " *
* * " '
(b)
Three subaarines of the 1} Babmarine Oroup and three subaarines of the 3 Snbaarine
'"
Group.
'
..
'
'--"'
' : :
(;)' Operation of seaplaneer At 0000 hours on "W. Day leave Wodje Base.' At IU30 hours, arriveK at FBZVOH TRIQ1T1 (sunset tima on this day i s *
1
'1UU7;hours).
Bat'ely 10 tons of fuel fron.the subaarines at 1600 hours and leave 7 X C TRIOATX. RHH trtm
20H5 hours to 211$ hours, carry Out reconnaissance on PXASL H R O (attack the enasgr i f ABR possible). At 09P0 hours on *Ut* Day, flying "
Duty and disposition of the subaarlnesi (a) ftupply for seaplane si Supply ships, "I* (W
pointer .^A point 33 degrees and 1.7 miles from the f i r s t PMiOS'Isl&wl. A point 170 degrees and 2.5 miles from the seeond PKLOS ^Island. .,\ (b) : A point 260 degrees
and 6.5 miles from tiWvtMrdPlWS Island, Radio guide beamt- The submarine; "I" Id ; 71^ deployed at appointed point "H* (19 degrees' north, I7U degrees and. ?6 minute*irV west) will transmit a radio guide Vessi. . <
-1(J4Srsah boats (to rescue crews of planes. which hare made forcedl*ading*)i :, .
'
Submarine
s
"I* Bo 7U will be positioned at appointed P<>int V (200 degrees and 20 minutes ff C F K A Q S in the Hawaiian Islands as; AE XH L
- nn emergency boat.
.;.-.
OboerYatlon of P B R H fB H (also^reports J A 1 Ai O on weather conditions in> thet vicinity qt , PBAHL;RARBOH)j Submarine I" W 75 ( a t , ^
a point 80 miles southwest of Oahu Island). (5) Bttbmaflnes Ro^le In Operations. -1 (a) Radio guide beamt * V
- , -, transmitted, covering th* designated area*' from 30 alnuten before to 30 minutes after
. . . . . . . . . 1 ' .
the seaplanes fly.past appointed point M, v . (The seaplanes will pass roint U at O33O -" hours.) (b) If fuel supply i s difficult to obtain from ntXVCH I1IQATE as scheduled, due to enemy Interference, the commander of the seaplanes will follow the following three plans, talcing
the amount of reserve fuel into consideration. The oomrnandor will inform of his
Doc 50 t
t, the seaplanos v i l l atop at IRJMCH for refueling and will return to * Wodje Base. " , ,
The Second Plant- After the attack on P A L HARB01, the crash boats will collect KH - the crews of crashed seaplanes.* The Third Plant -If, at HUBIGH raiQAtt, i t i s difficult to obtain fuel supply due to enemy interference and i f It"seems impo*-* t i t l e to reoonnolter PKJUL 4 & Q with the ABR x fuel on hand, request the submarine at point k, either the same night or the next morning, to transmit a radio guide beam sod to pick up crew members. (c) Weather reportsi \_ > ,
each submarine will^ report to the 2k Carrier Division regarding weather conditions in i t s own area (point M, point V,
If i t seems impossible to secure fuel supply at raVGH TRI0AT1 because of strict enemy patrol, t Operation will be canceled.
(7)
Any change in the date of "P* Day v i l l be decided by the commander of the 2 Carrier M
Dirlsion.
Doc ffo
Outline of operational progress: 29 Kayi The commander of the lU Air Unit advanced
to V D E Island in order to assume command of the .. _ OJ -' second I: Operation. 30 Mayt * " ' ^
received from Submarine "I" l o I23 (stationed at . F J I H FRIQATS Atoll) 1 B QC Ho p o s s i b i l i t y seen. Ikkk hours." "Strictly watched by enemy.
"'
-ji Kayi
frbm F K C FRIOATS at 1655 hours and 16^6 hours, RHH respectively. Frigate Bay. Sighted. "One enemy seaplane sighted off French \&\k hours;" "One enemy seaplane ,'
l6lO hours."
Squadron jointly issued, at ?123 houtrs,, m order to; cancel K Operation. 2. : .> . v - i>'<
Reconnaissance by submarinet
. , ' . '
reconnaissance In the vicinity of MD A Island from IWY midnight, 1 June, to noon, 2 June, and made the following reportj a. During the whole day and night, patrol f l i g h t s over the French Frigate area,' by at least l*t heavy and l i g h t enemy planes have already been observed. t>. What appeared to b a patrol boat was sighted In the area south of S K Island, AD c. A number of oranes were sighted en French Frigate atoll. I t seems that the enemy i s constructing war
Doc Ho
equipment there.
rwwqr air unit hat been closely ^ t r o l l i n g the area o O o i l * t southwest of MD A Island. O IWY C. Task Forces. 1. ^ ~" ~"T~~<_ .
A task force l e f t KATSUfiAfiHlXA (located in Hiroshima Jiay in the IHAID Sea) at 0600 hours on 27 Hay, and. adraaced to the waters northwett of MD A via the f i r t t linr**"~~^ IWY (See sketch Map of action). '
i?.
T)ie task force tent a radio signal at 1030 hours oh 3 June. Supplies were assembled on 1 and P Junet t u t the Troa about 1000
f i e l d of r i s i o n gradxially diminished.
hours on 2 June, a denee fog prevailed, so navigation was continued through the fog u n t i l about 2J0Q hours oa I June. During this period, i t was impotsible to use Consequently, the task force
headed for MD A at 1030 hours,*3 June, and was obliged IWY to send a long-vave radio signal concerning i t s course. This took; place at the chrtnge of coure5 /hen the task fore < .<*.& to contact the eneuy. (The i lrcuustances at
the time were such that i</ the task force were to advance along a predetermined course and wait for veatther conditions to improve, I t would hkve been late" fflr If Operation.) 3. '
1
.-
The Task force was probably discovered by the eaeay on the Hth. a. The task force Intercepted a radio signal (presumably that of an enemy patrol plane) at close range, at 1510 hours on the Uth. It was reported by TOKI that
about 10 enemy planes were reoocnised at a bearing of 260 degrees. f Three planes from the AXA0I were
dispatched Immediately to attack the eaemy, but they could not locate'the planes, so it was assumed that the report was a mistake.
33
b.
-The AJO01, on the Uth at about 233O hours discovered an object believed to be a contact plane of the eneay, which was glimpsed twice through the clouds and which prompted the warship to prepare for 1 Mediate action. However, "the eneaj could not be sighted, so i t was
assumed that the AIA0I had been sritn>"<sn, U. Evaluation of the situation as Made by-the """n-sm^lng ' officer of the task force before the air raid on MD A . - IWY a. ,Although the ne*y appeared to lack fighting spirit, -
s
i t vould be prepared to ak* counterattacks against us when our offensive operation ^begins. .
b.
The a c t i v i t i e s of the exuray were concentrated MainlyIn the southern and western regions, and not so Much in the northwest and northern regions. *,
c.
W estimated the lookout range of the eneay to be e approximately t>00 nautical miles.r
' ,\ .,.''/
d.
W a8Eiuwd that the enejuy did not know of our attejspt, e at least hot until the early morning of Vhi* 5th. The
gL.
W did not pre.wsm an enemy aircraft carrier to be in e ; the vicinity of our torces. , * *
v
*. f. .
\'r. aaBUiaed that * after we. had attiid-'od vUDiAY, had daaogod the air base, and had co-operated with the
<= .
Army in the landing operations, i t would be possible for* us to win even if the mummy launched a counteroff enslv* against us. . >, . ' '
It would be possible for us to repel counterattacks by enesy air-basAd aircraft with escort fighters, flying at high eltltuAs, and with defensive gun
5.
Air raid against' MD A on the 5th. IWY At 0130 hours on the Jjth, 36 ship-baaed fighters, 36 ship-
HOC MO
bosibers, and 36 ship-based torpedo-carryinc assault planet were dispatch**** under th< direct fonusand of Capt TKIG ( G OA A rf? /jf^_ ), the coasnanding of f l o w of the
Hlryu air unit, to attack HIDVAY/ shortly after, eonvteiCt was Jaauae with eneay flying boats by our*unit,' and when th assault unit was within 30 nun.tleal miles of itt~ r objective, the above-aentioaed flying boats dropped pprpcttut* flares to guide, i t i s presumed,,' eney fighters ~ecortin th flying boats in the tt^fer altltudei, ftftor, Hriftl coB^b^t b^cune prver. Thar#-
hourt,' v shot down f) fi^itr (this incltarit niml planat aWut '/hich we are onccrtaln), two liclit uojttert, one heavy boaber, and one reconnaissance plane. W did not e ^*
so** nrty wore pianos on the ground, 00 we concentrated on boabing Kllttary installations and destroyed a part of then by f i r e . ' After this, we returned bone vith t % ship-based fighters, one ship-bad bomber and three ship-based torpedo-carrying assault plaaep, at about '
0 6 0 0 h o u r
v
>
" /
. .";
' . ^ - - ^ ' M , ^
'
" ; '
.-"''.'.",'
;, . -; . *esjrtrs
. ^ ; . .
Coaioanding ; oV"Officer
*
' . )
Military power
. ' . / ' ' . " " ''.<' '
.'
1 1
5 Attacking Party. .
. ' / . ^
f;'
1 8 ' ' ^ - ;
1 ' Oroup
m
i
U Attacking Party
. ' _ .
.;-:; f -
f a 36,.
r
c &
V*
Leader
of AknL .'
. ' ' ' ; .
Oroup
" f*. X . 3 6
Leader of
Lna iiquad
b
. > * . . . , : . . . , ,
o
c
a
'
f
9
- . 9 "'
'
f x 36
. " ,
' f.
I
Oroup
-.
c '
'
'
Boo lo
lotei
f . . . . . . . . Ship-bated (or carrier-bated) fighter. fb . . . 1 , . . . Ship-bated boaber. * 6. Ship-bated torpedo-carrying at ami t plane.
Actual tltuatlon of neay foroet on MD A on that day. " IWY It i t pretuaed that the eneay anticipated our attault, for enoay torpedo-carrying attault planet and flying boatt and about 50 fightert ( a l l of. the* OBDMUI't) vero tent againtt ut. Before our f l r t t attault unit '-"
"
reached tha target, our unit vat attacked about 30 At toon at ve attoned
a serious oottnterof fen t i r e , the neay began to erado ut. Thereafter, our carrler-ttated torpedo-carrying attault planet and boabert did not recolre any daaage through aerial ooabat, a**4 * aajorltjr of the oneay air defeat* / . fightert vere dettroyed by our'fordet* Antiaircraft .;
fire froa the ground vat to intente that~ve l o t t four planet. '~ ' \ . W dropped 12 lo 80 land boabt (lotet e boabt ,
prlaarily utod againtt land target) at tvo placet on the alrtrip, but' they did l i t t l e daaage. The actiont
:'
of the large land-plane* becaae quite fequeat laterVon(Annotation) Data cbnoeirnlng MD A according to IWY ^ . . .-... . *
<
'
; b*
" i
Tighter 1 (w/tWkliO*t at veil at (HttnOtAM't)! 155* loabert (fiOUQLAJ B-17)i 50. y).
d. f e.
7iTt torpedo boatt vere in the harbor. The Battern Island airport vat located at the northern end of the island and vat oonttructed In a triangular thape. The runvay vat 200 feet vide and 3,000 feet
Soo So 3*4*8
l o n g .
'":
''
'':;'"''.'".[
'
-'..
<
'"
f.
Irery morning, flying boats were sent out on patrol- f which lasted lU hours and oorered an area within 700 nautical-mile radius of'-the f i e l d . ' v y
Air reoomxaissanoe in the south and-east areas*' During the time from OI36 to 0200 heurs; on* carrierbased torpedo-earry-ing assault plane each from the AXAOI
r .
and the XAOA, two Zero*type flea? reconnaissance planes!-' ' each from the TOU and the G I U A (range of adTanc*, V HZ M 300 nautical ail*, and lateral distanc*, |6 nautical a i l e s to port), and one type 95 float reconnaissance plane from the HABJ1A (adranc* rang* I56 nautical a i l e s , lateral range Uo nautical a i l e s to port) were dispatched to search for the enemy to the south and east of the task . force. Howerer, the departure of the 90X1, as well as ./ .
the C I 0 M was.greatly delayed,- and the sixth search V H1 J A plane returned at .0235 hours because of poor weather . . . .
c o n d i t i o n s . .. '
:
_ '/ - ;..-.
'--.- - '-'-"-*
. >,. ' .
"' ..
g.
>
Tron about 0230 hours, two or three flying boats of the eneay came into con tact, with our task force.
r
..
'
torpedo-carrying assault planes were equipped with torpedo armaments as a precautionary measure against the surface naral firnfX of the eneay. At CM5 hours, according to *
the eoBBending officer of tha Midway assault unit, i t was reported that 1t had been necessary to resume the Moond attack at OhOO hours.
attack, eneay planes had already departed from their base. Therefore, the attack was not as effectire as i t
should hare been.)' It was decided to direct the seoond attack towards MISVAT, and the torpedo t s of the
3T
Doc Io
'
the ni^ contlnuoumly atvd persistently, but th majority of the ensmypl^es. were shot down by our dfn< fire J ' '
>
'
'
'
"
1%
. . .
; , .
"
'
>
'
'
" -
-.
'
' - 7 - r ; . -
'
"
'
"
. " -
"
" ' -
. " .
~ . "
-.
- 1
'
"
' -
'
'
"
"
"
'
'
tho eneay raid and of our counterattack are as followsi a. Our reconnaissance planes discovers naral surface crafts.of the Vneagr: At about 0500 hours, the f i r s t message in respect to the discovery of the enesqr, dispatched by the Tone plane of tho fourth search. , l i n e , which was reported to be greatly delayed,"was receivedt .r'.
f"Ten
sighted .at 0^28 hours at a compass,point 10 degrees and ?Uo nautical miles off MIDW1T, on. a compass course , of 150 degrees, and proceeding at a speed of 20 knots."
_':
Vo received reports twice, at'ti^SO Iwars in respect to the wo A ther and at 0U55 hours regarding the conpass course and speed of the enemy, "but we did not receive any other information. Therefore, at . 0500 hours, we requested information on the type of
i ' '
TV. ;..
naval ship. b.
..
"
It was ascertained that enemy aircraft oarrlecrs had begun operation. At 0509 hours, the Tone plane re-
ported that "the enemy power was composed of five cruiserii and five destroyers." At 0530 hovers, I t
was reported that the enesty was acoompanied by something resembling an aircraft carrier and t M i was reported again at about 05*10 hours. Tiro cruiser-
like craft at a point 8 degrees and 2^0 nautical miles off MISVAT, on a compass course of.
ao
degrees and cruising at a speed of 20 knots, were reported at 0530 hours. The following report was
Hade by the commanding officer of the task force to the command er-ln-ehlef of the Combined Tleet, when I t vaa ascertained that the enemy aircraft carrier had commenced operations 1 "At 0500 hours, one aircraft carrier, fire cruisers, nrt five) dee: N 4
vroyers were sighted; at a point 10 degrees and 2 H *"" ?o nautical miles off MIDWAY." , -^
K -__
c.
I t was decided to launch ari all-out attack on the enemy aircraft carriers after uniting with the Midway assault unit.
'
the-aecond force which was to make an attack oh the enemy aircraft carriers as soon as they had been ' A sighted because, according o the prerious order transmitted at 0U15 hours,,the torpedo armaments of the carrier-based torpedo-carrying assault planes were being installed in Ho 80 land bombers,.and,
1
in addition, the carrier-based fighters were already in action, battling enemy planes which had come to raid us. There were only n. few carrier-based bomb-
ing planes which were not attached to the air command^ group. W were determined to make an'all-out attack e
-\
on thfl enemy after uniting with the us&ult-unit which had Just returned from MD A at that time. IWY W transmitted the following order to the f l e e t at e O0O5 hours, "After the uniting operation has been completed, we will adranee north for the time being and assault and destroy the enemy task force." In accordance with this order, i t was reported
that the carrier-based torpedo-carrying assault planes of 18f (the 1 Air Squadron, equipped with torpedo armaments) would be able to set out at 0730
Doc Ho
hours artd the carrier-based torpado-bworrying assault plants of 2Sf (the 2 Air Squadron, e<rttlpped with torpedo. anmaanis following i ts return froa the f I n t assault) would b e a b l e t o set out between 0730 and
' 0 5 0 0 ; - h o u r . -'''' ; ^ : ' / ' : -' ' ^ " J V . " '."'"" ' " V-1-"'^1 -':'-' "'''":' -''c"i7^ "'
ln)ra/t:.caWl
naay carrip-baid boabora^ raided us. V coipXtd; our union vlth th Midvay aieault unit, and ^tipht were mada jfor,dltpa%chiB th a i t e u l t u n i t , vhio^ vas organ!x#d into four crxxupg; (iXAOI and f.c i--3,:f** x;27, retpeotiTely, *ind tV iOXrw, t x 3 , fy x 16, rp6c tiv^ly), for th.cond
aslault."
v
.,
, ..,
..... '
.,'
baaed bombers raided our force and th XKiXJI, XAOA, and SQHYU.were dawagad " y fir*, b fhaao ahipg wr i n
tht midt't of prtparationt for getting underway ond , ver forced to abandon, atationa.
l e f t . . ; ' " " " ' ; . ' . : ' . " ' .
e.
The flagship vas 'changed to the HA0ARA. All e damaged ehlpi were unable to conwunicate with other, and, for the time being, the fire could not * * be extinguished. Consequeritly, the commanding offleenr
of the task force was.forced, to conduct operations 1 on board the EA0ARA. At 0830 hours, he changed oonoands from the AXAGI to the XAGARA. f. The desperate battle of the Hiryu unit 1
v
(1) After the AXACI, XAOA and the SOETU were damaged, the colanding officer of 26f (the 2 Air t^umaron) was determined to make an attack on the aircraft
r-
carrier which had been discorered by a plan* ' from the. TOW, At O75< hours, he ordered six
m x based bomber* or tbt Hlryu Attacking part? vndir tho direct eup*Tvi*lon of Capt KO1ATAIHI, loader of the Hiryu tqaad, to attack tho aircraft carrir. Th attack 4T*P Bt with various
obstaol**, but or worn* the*, aad **aa4r*d to < shoot doviL 10 &i]r r i f h U n (tfcl* maAcr 1- eludi thr planft which i t not o*rtain), and hit tha aircraft oarrlar MMTBniBM directly and badly djuaa^ad har. Thraa of our oarri rbasd <
fihtin plaaai and* 13 oarrlaiwftasad bobari (including tha laad plan*) did not r*+*m* (Votl Aoeordi&c to tha official report of
y
AdMral QM> at tho VI Foroot, at 0907 fcovrt, tha YOIITOW vaa hit b/ throo bob. 2) Before tho battle, tho rperiaoatal fiarrior-baeod bober, Typo 13, which eot out fro* tho.lQftTU at 0330 houri to eontaot tho oaaagr aircraft carrier but which had boon unable to ooawaioate with our force* duo to defect* l a radio equipment, reported after i t * return to the HUTU that in addition to that which vma dloooTOrod by tha Tone piano, there was an eaeay taak force, con*istln principally of tho. aircraft carrier* ^ TOnmmn and aoUBf, MOTIM* In a northorly
plane* wader the diroct ooaavmA nt Oapt IGMOKIOA, the ooamander of tho Jttryu *^uadron, % omt to attack tho force. About 11^5 howro, tho
plane* launched a desperate attack and ahot down 13 enaagr fi^htlivj; plane* (this lmoltole*
fly* plane* presumed to hare boon shot dOMl), hit one lmtrpri*-type oarrler with throo
' DOC
torpedoes and badly daaaged i t , and badly damaged one fan Treacltee-type heavy cruiser. In thit
attack, we lost three carrier-bated fighter* nnd fire oarrler-baaed torpedo-carrying assault plaaae (laolmding the- lead plane) which'ex<*/.
ploded.
(Iotai
pert of Adalral Xtf of tha US Vary, during , the tiaa froa 1H33' to lW*5 hour a, the YQKTOMr vaj hit by two torpedoes. (3) The organisation of the group which attacked the enaay aircraft oarrieri () Dlrliion lk Attack: Oroup U Air
OoJHaand Oroup
Stran^th
GoaaaAdart of the Hiryu Squad.
lotatlan
Two plaaea of the Air Hoaaaiwi group diaeevered an eneay torpedo plane on the way, drore i t r away, and did not eater into the b a t t l e .
x 18 fc x 6
(b)
U Attack Leader of Hlryu Air Squadron (Air 8gt/ Kajor) Leader of the Hlryu Squad
f
9 f
1 x 10
k Air
Cowhand Oroup
f U
2
fc x 6
TAMAJOro
Sqnad - let Air Sgt .
g.
.,
The actual fact of the reeoaaalseance aade by tha Ohlknaa ao 2 plane (which was assigned to contact the enaay) en tha 5th.
(a)
At 1U13 hoars, tha contact plaae spotted oaa aaterprlsc-type aircraft at a position 3 0 n s 1 Bortfc aad 1765O* Vest. The ship
BOO, 50
not on fire, and no deck damages vere risible. lear the oarrier, three and fire destroyers were risible. At hours, learlnc the aircraft oarrier, the - ether oraft adranoed eastward on a compass oourse of 80 decrees at a speed of 20
(b) At 1510 hoursk two enemy earriers Torktovn and Hornet eln9*9, 1 sighted at 30o23* Worth and . They were accompanied by esoort ships consisting of tub cruisers and four ' destroyers traveling while Minted sing '
stations three nautical allot apart oa a compass oourse of 270 decrees at a speed of 12 knots. . (c) Furthermore, at I516 hours, tvo carriers (type not ascertained) were sighted. They were accompanied by fire cruisers and six destroyers, and were about four nautical lies south of the carriers proceed!! a compass eoursi of ?6o degrees at a of 12 knots. According to reports, fire aircraft earriers were slghied by the* CHlH/KA't lo 2 plane. In Addition, while the reconnaissance plane adranoed south, on a compass oourse of 180 degrees, after 1^00 hours, It sighted the carriers aem-> tloned in paragraphs (b) and (e) at the bottom edge of a cloud bank while flying
on
at an altitude of 300 si. Oeaseeueutly, it ,1s eertain that a repetition of previous reconnaissance had not occurred.
Doc I?o
. ' "
t
(d)
An aircraft carrier wa badly damaged and seen burning as a result of five hits by" eneay carrier-borne planes and one additional hit by enaay laadwbaeed plane In
the i n i t i a l attack unit* 'x^in'^^^\i^T-^9r'iinS9f'J-
(e) - It seeaed that the aircraft carrier which" had stopped and was listing due to three torpido hlta it"haU recairid during;the econd attack, drifted, badly daaaj^d, until
' V ; . ' : : . . . : . ' ^ . ' # : . : : '
carrier vaa di too rered by theCHIIUXi1! Ho U plane at O352^hour on the 6th, and vaa rank, deck unrfawaged, in "an at tadclby 7 , our eubMarlnet. Because of thi fact, ve
judged that i t had been damaged by a tor^> pdo during our second attack. (This i s After
the YORrrqwi announced by th# eneay.) cataloguing and sifting the prerioely
mentioned data, i t would appear, i f there :. * was no error in the discoreries and reports ade by the* reconnaissance plane, that there were, in addition, one craft badly damaged by a bomb hit and one ressel damaged in the torpedo attack (thi ship was sunk' during the subaarino attack tho next day) Moreorer, i t seeaed that four eneay craft were aotire on this oooasion, but, froa the nuaber of eneay planes which to rai'd us, the action of the eneay after this and testiaonies of the ?, i t eeeas
-/ -
Doc No
pottible that an error juay itave been made ragardiag the type of thipt inYoVred in thete aotiont. (f) fttatomant of a W (a leserve eaalgn from the T E T W i OKO O 1Three aircraft carriert, Y R T W, OKO f BJTllPUtai, and WOOER, accompanied by; six crultert and 10 dettroyert^ took part in the action* . s "
y
The Y & T W with two cruisers and O KO threo destroy art formed into one group ^&nd became a detached force*
2..
Tho YOMTOWI Carried 27 f i g h t e r ^ IS bombert, 12 torpedo-carrying assault planet, and -Itf reconnaiatasce planet*
h.
Tha H1HY0 atteznptt to makis a fourth attack on"tlia ennyt, Thft HIJXU l o t t nost of I t s cttaok planet during The R L U l e f t , carrying t l x UT
fighters, five bombert, and four torpedo-carrying aasanlt planet, but i t v&t decided to make an attack on tha Hornet-type carrier by making ute of,the floryu Ho 13 experimental carrier-baaed bombert, whieh joined the HIBTU after a reconnalttanoe f l i g h t , becauae the S U H had been damaged, and preparations OT were made for a night attack. During this time, tha
H & U exercised aerial precautions by using the XY combat planet of the various carriert. 1. The HIBTU vat damaged during the tecond raid by 13 enemy planet. The contact plane (the experimental *
when the aeoond enemy raid began* J. The oonomot of the operation after tha task farce commandant ohanged ttatlont to tha
TTBbc.Ho
^(1)
It was intended to harass tha eneay with daylight attacks. After the coaamnding officer
boarded the IAOAHJL, the GHHWA raportad at 082S hours that the eneay was located at 70 ' decrees and <)0ikautiealailet~}iro tha /apaaase Accordingly, with:-* tiav toward
ing the eneay with a daylight attack, the Ing officer ordered an asstably of forces at
.*- -
0900 hours on a coapaas coursa of' 60. dagraas ;'.'", at a speed of 16 knots to carry out such an attack. At O9U5 hours, the ooapass course was
to be' 0 degrees at a spaad ox 20 knots, and, at 1000 hours, at a speed of 2U knots. aWevor,
a Tone plane reported later that at I230 hours the eneay.was 110 nautical alias away and was proceeding, on a coapass course of 11U dagroai, so i t becatte apparent that the eneay ships ware rapidly putting space between our foroe and
" t h e i r s . ' " ' ' . : ''
;
,
"
:
'
'
'''
~>
"
'
(2)
W a t t e s t to harass e
"V
attacks!
proYlding the above-mentioned relatire petltiona^ ware asalntainad, any daoisira battle against tha eneay would be hopeless and we would,ba subjact -
to the ehaagr's skillful taxjtics with no adrantac** on our side, resulting in sariaus daaaga to u* Consequently, the oojsaandant wanted to tarn back for the tlae being and to wait for darkmasW, so that the eneay sdght ba harassed by night attacks. Preparations for carrying out night operations ware begun, but, at about 1^00 hours, tha KHYu wa>s badly daaagad in tha eneay1 s seooad raid against us. All the aircraft carriers in our /
had at least out aircraft earrler whloh was not damaged. In addition, crar forces wers located -
4
'm
within striking range of enemy air base which w could not attack at a l l . Coniequamtly,- th
situation'was unfavorable for tia. At IU33 hours, we were informal that the enemy float had coamenoed withdrawal towardi - thr aal on a bowrio of 70 dagraai and at a . tpood of 20 knots. .Although th# ohancos of night operation ad f u t i l t , tho thlp-*a#d piano of tho 110*1* (haaTy orttiior) was ardarod , to propairo for nifht oontaot, and a l l ships war* ordorod to assnbl. . ; In accordance VIth raport raeairod at 1530 .;
hours froa the QHtDDU (ornlsar), tha of tha anoagr flot was found contrary to t i o m , to b vmxj formidable. Tbjs raport statad
that our ship--)asad p l a n e l o 2 had sigh tad an nasty flt consisting of for airoraft carriors, six oruisors, and 15 dstroyrs at a n o i n t 30 nautical xailas east of th badly>dbagd and4 ^ burning asapr airoraft .carrier. Sinc oxor pianos
could not astablish oontact by dusk, tha situation of tho nasgr float was unknown and our night attack was not carriad out* l a a l l t i n g tha d i f f i ctdtios of a daylight withdrawal* w aaployad a scrota for tha aircraft oarrior, HUTV, and withdraw towards tha aorthwast. Maral >wgagsswnts aftor Juas. (1) On 6 /una, our taak foraa, whiah MM prosdlag towards' tha northwast i s ordar to Jain tho nain foroo and which had not yot oo^plotod i t s ooncomtration, vat soabardad oa tkrao oocasioaa by
v
enemv ohip-tmaod nnd land-baaed pianos fron Oj O to l0O hours, 'O fortunately, none of the
ships vnn hit directly and only slight danage vne suntnined froa near misses. {?) O th 6th, a reconnai^snrtce plane froa the n aircraft carrier HDSlC'of the ilrf f l e e t ..sighted. t*i aircraft carrier HI R U t^ndug and driftY ing. The oowandT of the Task foroe dispatched
the destroyer T MK Z and p ship-based plane A I AB (which departed fron the cruiser JfAGARA), and ontrueted to them the responsibility for rescuing the HIRYU's crew. During the action, the
\,
T NK Z was attacked by a large group of eneay AI AK ship-baced j>] ine3. Through skillful Maneuvering,
the T HK Z successfully evaded the attacking A I AK planes and continued on her odssion. The des-
troy er, however, failed to locate the HIRYU. (j) In tne afternoon of the 6th, the task force succeeded in joining the juqln f l e e t and the attack unit. In compliance with the orders of
the coamauder-in-chiti" of the Combined f l e e t , all casualties from the task force were transfrrred to the battleahina W G W and MUTCU. AA \\\ chief of stnrf and hie subordinates were liibpatched to the YAHATO, the flagship of the Combined Fleet, to make a report on the situation at that tine, koveaents of the task foroe ^ . ,
uo to 10 Juno werw oo-ordinated with those of the aain f l e e t . On the 10th, the XA0A1A was
Doc Ho
"9
(Betet)t
Fei^at of laps**
x 12 f x 13 f x 9
V13
Main foroe (inclvtdlac the Serreenixif UAitt). 1. The Main force under the'coMmand of the commander-irvohief of the Cioabined f l e e t departed fro* anchorage at 0600 hours on 29 May, and followed the prearranged course. At 0300 hours on 25 May, the 3
2>.
Destroyer Squadron, which had been engaged in the frontal area of the main force, sighted an en cay subjsarine at a point 220 degrees and ko nautical niles from OEWOaiUHA. They again detected an envoy subaarine>
at the sauo point at 1300 hours. 2. On k June, tho screening force was dispatched towards the north as prearranged. northern forces. This was done to support the . ^
-M
3> Outline of operational conduct after discovery of the eneoyi a. The following i s a sequence of orders Issued by aach ooasanding officer. (l) 0920 hours, 5 Junet the Combined Fleet.
r
Goaawaderlak-ehlef ef
Ooablnad Tleet Dispatch Operational Order l o J 155i Omits will Maneuver depending on the following orders and will attack the eneagr in
1 1
Doc yo
t
(a)
The position of the main body at 0900 hoars van "Fa To Mt* 15 (TI Japanese Haral nap
^ t o w a r d , : t h e ' - - -.
(c)
i . , * - { . '
;':"
.
. -"''.':';'.
1 ' - -
'
(d)
/ . , -
-,
OosMandeivlm-ohief of the .. .. v
Ooubined Tleet Dispatch Operational Order 5o (a) ; (b) The *C" method will be eaployed i n attackln^ the aey flaeto. *'
A part of the Attack Unit y l l l attack the air base on MD A tonight. IWY v
(c)
The inrasion of MD A and the. IWY will be prolonged for the tle belnf'. ':
(3)
,
' F o r c e s ; . ; , :
"(
. : " . . ,
..*"]'..-'
.'....,-.
1 Task Foree Military Secret Telecraa l o 5511 The position of the 1 Task force at 1100 hours on 5 Jtate was "To 1 Fu" 33 ( " Japanese laral ' aiap reading). I t i t our Intention to proceed
'
north and annihilate the mnamj task force vhloh 1* nazxeurerinc to the east of our units. The 2 Task Force will Join us as soe* as possible. (U) 1230 hours, 3'Juast On wander of the 2 Taek Foroe.
Doc * o 3UIMSS
t
Tha 2 Task fores v i l l prooaad south l n e d l a t e l y aftar ha Yin* usssaiblad tha Attack Units vhlch
* , . ' ' ' . . '
of tha 7th, tha 2 -Task Jorea v i l l endaaror to join tha 1 Task Tores. Our position
hours, 5 Junet
C o a b i n e d T l e e t .
: '
''.-..
" - : . ' ,
(a)
Tha anaagr* s task for cat hava wi thdrawn to tha aast, and thair aircraft carriars^for
;, (b)
It i s tha intention of tha Combined 11 eat to pursue and annihilate the anaay forces . and, at tha same tlaa, occupy AT (TI Presuaably place naaa unknown). . '..
x
(c)
Japanese naral nap_ reading) at 2UO0 hours, 5 June. It i s proceeding *t a spa#d Of '
20 knots par hour on a course of 90 (d) The task foreas, Attack Unit (azolodUc tha 7 8(juadron) and the adranoa units v i l l locate and attack the eneagr as quickly as possible. (6) 1630 hours, 3 Junes Oosusandar of tha Task Torce.
Task Toroe Military leoret Telecra* l o 56O1 An enaaqr feroe, oonslstine of fire airoraft oarrlers,
r-
six cruisers, and 15 destroyers, i s at present prooaadinc westward. Our present position Is
Doo
(7)
Commander-in-chief of the
_ _
(may include conrerted aircraft carriers) which, ---y.:. ^together Vith:tlx cruisers and 15 dettroyer*, are proceeding westward. All our aircraft carrier* - " -;
-
'
"
'
'
'
The main body of the Attack Unit will reach To X Va 12 (TV 'Japanese naval map reading) at O O hour* bn 6 June, and, thereafter, OO will .conduct a reconnaissance of the eastern area. This unit will launch a night attack ,
against the enemy which was mentioned in Task Force Military Secret Telegram Vo 560^ (b) .. "
The Task Force (excluding the HUCTU, AKAOI, and esoortlng, strength) will rererse i t s * course at once and participate in the night attack of the Attack Unit.. -. :- (Vote) Prior to this, the task force had been ' \
placed under the command of the Attack Unit oommander in accordance vitlx a Combined Fleet dispatch order. .(9) 2115 hours, 5 June1 Combined Fleet. -
Commander-in-chief of the
Combined Fleet Military Secret Telegram So 303. (a) The-Attack Unit (excluding a part of i t s unit, but including the 7 Seuadrom) and the Tatk Foroe (exoluding the AXA0I, VOTU,
, Doc lo 3^88 t and escorting strength) vill Join the main force. * /
(b) The position of the main foroe at 0600 hours tomorrow morning vill be fOKUHI 31 (TH Japanese oaral map reading). It is travel-
course of 90 decrees. (10)" 2355 hours, 5 Junes Combined f l e e t . Combined fleet Dispatch Operational Order Ho l 6 l . (a) (b) The attack on M W T will be suspended. H A The Bain force, Attack Unit, and the 1 Task Foroe (excluding the HIRTU and her escort vessel) v i l l assemble, and receive supplies at a point 33*-17O1> on tae morninc of 7 June. (c) * " i_ \ O inderln- chief of the
The Screening Unit, thoHIEYU and her escort vessel, and the HXSSHIS v i l l t a i l to that point.
(d)
The Attack Unit will proceed.vestvard, out of range of enemy planes based*on MIDVJX.
(11)
Commander-in-chief of the)
Combined f l e e t Dispatoh Operational Order lo l62t The 2 Task force v i l l return to the lor them foroe. (12) 1200 hours, 7 Junet Combined f l e e t . Combined f l e e t Military Secret Telegram lo 331. (a) The Combined f l e e t intends to looate and annihilate the enemy tail: foroes vlthln the range 6f enemy planes based on WAD Island* Oosaaander-in-chief of the
53
fioojlo
<b)
Coaneaclng at I230 hours from a point (coordinatest 332U | I-i69 9 l) f 1 th aln fore*;
task forces, and the 1 Division, of the 3 Squadron will gall southward at a rat* of 18 knots per hoar on B OOUTM of 180 degrees, (c)- fh Screening Unit will be responsible for " * (d) supporting the lor them Joroe. " ,
The Sase Air Forces will attack this enefty as iuoh as possible. , / " f -^ " .- ,_-, ..
(e) k.
Otaitted.
JJthough oar aircraft carriers had been sank, we were s t i l l planning a night attack aalmt the cnaay f l e e t as \ Mentioned abore. This plan, howerer, was finally suspended
After
.. that, we endearored to assemble the 1 task Toroe and the > M O M. Turthmrwov, we planned to direct a concentrated OA I attack on VAO Island and "the
" ' ' ' ' ' . ' ' " " ' , . ' . ' -
task-force by u t i l l s * : _ ;
ing, the attack planes of our Base Air Forces, but this
' ' ( ,
As a rssult of the Midway Operations, we can anticipate the eneay task.force to adVance in- the direction of the. --, .ALBUTIAW. Powerful units were, therefore, sent to reinforce the Aleutians area, and a unit*with the 5 8foadron as a nucleus had aaneurered-so as to check the enesQr's
' T
' .
-
adrance.
..
. . .
,".
.. ^
.J . ' .
jl.
'
After the Attack Unit Va divided into three croups, each " tcroxrp eejuiumn separately. he thre croups weret the aain force
(including the air unit), the soreeninc unit (inoludin* ooct^patioa forces), and the support unit. Main force of the Attack Unit. a. The aain foroe of the Attack Unit l f t the lashlrajijaa anchorage in the HUUTD ga at 0500 hours on 29 May
and placed Itself at the head of the Mala f l e e t ' s formation. Having l e f t the main f l e e t on the nomine
of 31 May, i t followed a prearranged course in an ^ b. effort to Join the screening unit. O J June, a report from the screening unit stated that n ,an enemy patrol plane had berfn sighted. The main force
of'the Attack Unit was Righted by an enemy patrol """ "" _ T T* e on 4 June. > ,n c. _ ** * <*',
On 5 June, i t became apparent t h a t our t a s k force^___ had suffered severe losses in the engagement vith eneagr task forces. In eosqjliance vith the Coabined/
yieet*s Operational Order So I55, afpmrt of our force covered the-withdrawal of the convoy towards the northwest. The remainder of our force vat rushed
to the battle area. d. I e ordered the 7 Squadron, which was the support unit, T to attack \he air bases on MD A as stated in the IWY Coabined f l e e t 1 s Operational Order lo I56. e. Since the task force had been placed under our iyrraivfl' as set forth in Operational Order Bo I60, we issued \ a telegraa containing the outline of the night operation I? Tleet Military Secret Telegraa lo 761). W e alto ordered the task force, which had" retreated towards the northwest, to reverse i t s course and participate in the -night operation.' f." Observing one of our aircraft carriers burning in the distant, we advanced to the prearranged point for our night engagement at aidnight on 5 June, but the eneay's situation could not be confirmed. W were e
Order Xo l6l) and aanaged to rejoin the aaia fleet on the morning of 6 June.
55
' Doe
4 On 7 June, after replenishing our supply, we sailed % southward in order to oontafit the M O M . W then OA Z e escorted her to TBDI Island. h. 'thi our way to the hnmi BTVI , v plaetd th 3 Squadron (xaludiac tht 2 Dlrltlon) and th* ZUIBO (aircraft
l*
carrier) uadr Xhm cnanfi of %h* Xorthra Foreo. i. Thmr* vr no oaaaj attacJct oa tha Bain foroo during Xbm cotura* of Xhm mhorm action. 2. iBcortin* Unit (lncludinc the occupation forc)t, a. The trnth of th Attack Unit van at follovtt 2 Sestro7r Squadron (oxolxidiiig the 3 and 15 Dtroyr >r Groupi): TlafiMpt JI1T8U - > ' *; ,
^__-
One. / .
at UUPAIt
Fleet Hedqttartera in the western UTAH) Sea, dartn* the Middle part of Magr, oar aoresMttts vere as follovst
Doc 1o
f
The 13 Destroyer droop departed fro* TOKOSHUL, escorting the Yokosuka 1 Special laral T-tTtMwc 7oroo oa 20 May. (2) The lb" Destroyer Oroop departed froa EOT, esoortiac tho Euro 2 Special laval Laadlaf 7oroo on 19 May* (3) , - -
One to delay l a repair vorks, the JHTHJ aad a destroyer under the IS Destroyer Group departed froa 1011 on 21 May. . A
(U)
Aaxiliary patrol boats and patrol boats frost TJBJI aad YA1DT0*, and subehasart froa the Land were asseakled.
(5)
The concentration of escort squadron va* vith the arriral of the JIITSC at U&AK oa 2k May.
C4 Departure froa 8AIPAI. (1) Training and negotiations such as those aentlaaad oolov vere carried on erery day at oAIFAIt nat>o-> tlations concerning operations of tho Attack Unit, landing aaueuvert for tho Landlnjf 7orces t oporational necotlatlon vith the Support Unit/ end training in fueling for patrol boats. Oa the eroninc of 2t May, tho aala body of the eseortlac s<pxedron departed frost HI71I under the direct nnastind of tho t Destroyer Souadroa.
r
(2)
Because of their spaed aad oroislaf raaet tho subchasers and patrol boats vere ordered to dapart In advance, and, after reoelvlnc supplies at W C I aland, vero to rejoin the aala tw*m l a j B U
r
the area eoutavost of M D A oa the day prior to ZK7 oar invasion of the Island. The above-asmtloaed
57
Doe l o
d.
(1)
At that tine, thart vart may enemy tubmarinet in the ricinity of 1AIPAK. We, therefore,-de-
" " ~
parted during the ertnlng and executed a flanki ing movement at a meant of deception. Patting
on both the west and south tidss of Till AH, ve _ proceeded towards the area north of WADE. Ships vert refueled erery third day. (2) Ve deviated our courte approximately 50 nautical Biles north of the prearranged route after being informed through an intelligence report that enemy submarines were present in the vatert northvett of WAO. (3) *~ ' .
4%
W enforced t t r i c t lookout against eneaiy patrol e planet after patting north Of VAO. The Btoort-
ing Squadron vat lighted by a B-OJ at a point 600 nautical idles touthvott of WDVAT at 0600 hours on h June. The plane vat i n e d i a t e l y
fired upon by the ainetveeper group* (U) In the afternoon of H July, ve vere attacked by
'kL nine 1-17*8, but none of our ressels vat dettroyed. At Bid night, we vere again attacked *
Vat the Benaged to continue her royage. On 5 June (two days prior to th lnration), ve had l i t t l e knowledge of the situation of our tatk forcet. W vere, htverer, ordered to withdraw the oetrroy to e the northvett under the protection of the 15 Dtttroyer Group. The tubchaaert and auxiliary thipt, adTaaciag
drtwal.
gqvadron rushed hit unit, which had Veen strengthened ly the edditioa of the J1WTSQ and the 16 Dettreyer Oroup, to the battle area north of MIOKAT. loverer,
] Doc lo
Y*
;
:'; ':-'
- ^ ( f h e X0MAXO, BOroTA^MinmA, and MOOAXX), tha .uestrbyer f l o t i l l a (the AfABHIO, MJLICHD, OEHIO, and
AHJLSHIO),
and a tanker.
> . /
'
to in^
OUAMV
otcorW . "
c. .
In the afternoon of .25 Kay'-, the 7 Squadron l e f t O A OM according to prearranged plan,, and lad the southern part of the invasion force. On the way, i t oaabined :' >v -..';'. \
On 5 June, after the task force had opened fire, the 7 Squadron eaerged onto tha deoltlve sea frontier by. order of the Coabined f l e e t . In the afternoon, the
7 oquadron was ordered by the contender of the invasion .forces to attack MD A , and I t iModimtoly haaAed IWY toward MD A . IWY t. Doe to l t t distance, the 7 Somadron advstioed at f a l l tpeed to attack MD A Wfora dawn of 7 / a a e . IWY there-
fore, the 8 Dtttroyer F l o t i l l a was forced to withdraw. While the 7 Squadron wat adraajBlnc eeparately, an order froa tha Ceaslaat / l o o t to smeyead Midway
59
Doc l o
f
Operation vat received, and, at 2330 hours on 5 Jane, the 7 Squadron rerersed l i t eourtt At & point about -" 90 nautical mile, from MIDVOX. Immediately after this, the leading thip, the K K P sighted an enemy U UO submarine. Therefore, tut entire 7 Squadron executed
a simultaneous Uy-degree %**t/*dWtique> OYnt. f. Sinoa the ticnal for th N>YMnt &i not olar t th , third ghip, MirUiU. collidod vith tht M O M, ih OA I fourth thip. Th M QL I vat daaafcd in th bov from O JK
tht f l r i t torrtt forward, 'and vat difficult to navl(th riana tpted vaa 12 kxtott an hour). Tho
$$
^
vat daaafftd lihUy, but could b narigatod. Sinet tha M0Q1MI tuffrd haavily and vat forood to halt* the thra* othar thipt kept ttriot cuard. AfXmr, confirming the condition of the M G K , the mieniitr OAX of the 7 SquAdron ordered the KUUkJL to ttand vatch orer the HGQAMI, and alto ordered the 8 Dettrojrer TloUlla to combine with the 2 DlTitiott of the 7 Squadron. After that, he led the 1 Dlvitlon of the
7 Squadron to the rendetvout deticnated by order o ^ the Combined Fleet, and joined the Main f l e e t on 7 June. g. The KIKUKJL, together vith the' 8 Dettrojrer T i e t i l i a , toorted the M O K and vithdrev tovardt the vett. OAI While vithdravinc, eneagr carrier-baed planet attacked then on 6 June, but they tuffered no daaac. h*. On 7 June, a l i t t l e after 0&b hourt, the MIKD1U, the K00AK1, and.the 8 Destroyer F l o t i l l a vere attacked by enaiqr carrier planet about 500 mile* vett of KIDVJLT.
The MIXURi suffered direct hits and vat sunk. The R Q H suffered six hits and became d i f f i c u l t to OAI navigate. Xvry ship of the 8 Beitru/e* f l o t i l l a vat hit, but they could be nayifateft in battle formation.
Doc Ho 3
i . / f ha M G J suffered heavy d/wmgi, "but escaped "by O AU taking proper eumrgencywaatureB., On 8 June, at O O HO .
'
'
. .
'
'
. .
'
'
'
a.
R e t r i b u t i o n of trcopni
of the Baee Air Force i n the eecond operation wms a s follows (Operational Order Ho 2 of the s e c r e t o r d e r s " ' for the Base Air Force issued on l J M a y ) ! ^1;
'J..W*
*v
"
\ ? ~
*, <: _
y
Strength
Di ritlon
Ofcittad 1. lacoaw of K^. If tW; aitaaon raqmlras rannawiitar ad prapara paiMwrars inra-
areas, bulk of
1-%
To taareh and dattroy tha anasy task forea (tha oceopatloa forc). To intarcapt and dastroy tha anaagr flaat. GoaawaAw pt 2k Carrier Dlritlo ; 2 Carrier H 1 Diritlon To dattroy AI i l i t a r y inatallatioaa aad ttrnthv to f l W t tha part of accordtiUaUon. 5. To co-operate ' with the Midway . Operation.
appaara, dot troy i t with tha whaU forea. (If aacottary, oo oparata / with tha 5 Attack f area ad tha 2 Attack orca.)
t i o n *
-
'--.;
* . '
_ . , . '
" " ^ *
k. At opportune t l a s , carry omt surprise attaak AZf with typa^ 2 larc* f i x in >oat in co-opratie* vith tiVsiariaea, and doatr*r sdlitary inatallationa and trencth. At tha M M
_ i
- :
"'
'
tlae, rocnAoitor eaoeqr iUaUon. 3 t Co-operate with tho forco to proceed with Midway operation and koop rtrlct guard against tho oporsvtioa area.
-:-;
- -
i r ^ : :
AN.
_
v
-
The Large flying boat after the oapturo. AdTanee of half of strength.
'
'
'
' .
u
'~ , ' kl^ ore*
' ' . ' ' '
:
' . . ' .
. 7
..-''<'.
--
bulk of
-.
ltt&k
v o .
d
25 Oarrier
illTiBiOll
12S^(
6 J Ue^dlately after tho occttpation of jJti, la\ half of lU Air ?l.*t- x ' 7 V;- . strength adranco ail ftoon as possible. After arriv':" ing at the * Ik Air Jloot " ' . baaot receire ikstrastioa*
. ' .
;
'
o o
Air Attack Toreo and participate i n tho operation ' ' o f A w a r e a . "? '"7777TT"-v. v
' ' . ' " 7 ' ' ' ' ' ' . . :
26 Carrier Sirition
..
,.
7 '7
._..'
Osdtted
' ' ' ' . - * ' ' ' ' .
; ;V-.7.7
'.' ' :
' 7 '
. "
'
South ToriJlaa* part of strangth according to tho situation. . Mrance the bulk of carrier fighters aad v part of long range / bes^ert af tor tho capture of A*>. \
. " '
7'
A V , ' . . .
"'''
''
,
" 7
* . ' ? ' .
* 7 '
'
.' '
" t
.
.
, ^ .
. . . '
'
7 ; - '
'-
'*' ' 7
7"." * *
'
"
~
^
'
.
?
'
*
'
'
'
'
*
. '
7
' "
"
. .- . " . .
" '
f
;.- ; ,y
' . ' ' ' , ' '
'
<
'
'
'
' '
" . *
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
"
'
'
b.
Frotpreanj
Yore* vat ongafed i n taarchlng out tho enaar and i n eonyoy patrol for\tho t u r f a c o f o r o o . tliivi, a port of i t i itrwa^th vat .. . At tb* taao an th
<UY14*4
Tarlout a i r c r a f t o a r r i T of h. task f o r . T i t t f a t a l y : af tor tho oocupaUon of klDtAJ, proparationt voro to 00 Eaado for an aftYanco to that itlannl. Af tor tho occtpa-
.-...'
t i o n operation* had Voon- omopo^dod, 'tao1-ia"ii0':AlJr.Torca-'^'--" plaaaod to pturtue tbo onovgr itmiik foroo and to intorcopt it. Tbo a a j o r l t j of land-oaaad attack piano* i n t h i s ; i\,:'.:.\. .',:,.%'. '--.. '..
' ' ' ' '':
".
'
'
>
>
(1)
t Oporation (proriouoly ditcuaood). . Soaroh for the.enooQr aid oonToj patrol* '
On 31 May at 66pO hour., land^ftatod attack - ' planot firoa tho Chitooo Air laoo, whiah varo ttationod on V K Itlaad tlfhiod a CKUIOWO* AB
c l a t t oubMarino, ?8 dagrt and
namtioal
a l l o t fV VAX*. At 07*>0 hourt, two noro froa .onooqr oubaarinot voro tihtod, U dajproot and 5U0 nautical a l l o t froa On 1 Jun*. a Typo 2 flyin* Wat, wnieh had takan off fro* VOJtfl, *U*itod an flrinc oat about 300 nautical a l l o t northno rthoatt of W)DJ1. , ' " . ' to,
On 2 Juno, UnJ >ttai attack planot AH onoountorod an omoaqr fljrlac boat aaa oacacod in aortal ooafeat, 73 dafraot and 5*40 nomtital ailoo fro VAD.
At that tiao,
Doo So
plan* patroled H V A L Island and B X R OLH AK Island, but no changes wero t>serreA. On and after 3 Juno* patrol* continued day and night. (o) .. Preparations for interception! fiftp-one
land-based attackers and 18 fighters vere concentrated on V X "by 8 Juno. AX Th*y carrlod
out extensive arch for t^ onoay and MUIO proparationi for intarceptioa. On 8 Juno,
a rooonnaiitanoo piano tifhiod olght onovy u^amrinoi. Two of thoa voro ooabod and
Tho 6 Air MUdt force (Tho 26 Air Tl^htin* Unit)t (a) Soar eh for onoagr and patrol i Tho aajoritar
of tho unit vaa dipotd in KI1A1AXD and a part In south TO9ELUIHA. ~ Both too U on* voro on (uard afaintt tho ooaay. On 8 Junot a
land-oatod attackor itatio&ftd in south* T01IJINA sl^htod an naagr sutiaarina. (b) Tho Air Forco* dispatchod to HIDWATi In tho x lattor part of May, tho fight or units (tho 6 Air Corps) of tho dispatchod Air foroo voro loadod on tho aircraft oarrlor of tho task force in tho wot torn part of tho IILAlD 3oa. Six pianos voro plaixod on tho AtAOI,
bORTU, IOCA, and KUtTU, rp*otlToly, and 12 on tho JUITO, a total of 36 pianos* Pianos,
sttppllos, oad a part of tho personnel voro lost vhnn Ui oorriors voro sunk. 2. Tho advance forces.
r The cowsonier of tho Hdvaiioa foroos proceeded to KVAJAUII i n the KAESHJU.Lfl and (%*umed ootaaad of tho e n t i r e operation. He dispatchod 15 ntmarines of tho 3 and 5 ScCbaarlae
65
Doe
t
Squadrons and the 13 Submarine Division to MD A , Trench IWY frigate Atoll, and the Hawaiian area to reconnoiter and to guard strategic points. with I Operation. At the taM time, he co-operated
our arrival at the scouting lime Mat appointed by the Combined f l e e t order as "1-1 Day," tat i t appeared that the eneagr force* had patted through the line "by the time oto*' ubaarlnet atemod a tcoutin position Vetveen KAValX and. MIDtCAT. In tMt operation, the "I" 168 (tutafcnrlae) mat be peelally noted. Outline of "I" 1&. A c U r i t U t i 1 Junt! previously)
/
5 Junet
. '
.V
y
carrier and several destroyers at a point 3O56* morth, 1772O West (l50%miles north of MIDWAY). Attacked
. . ' . \
v
the shipt from a dlttanoe of 1700 a and ditcharged four torpedoet which found their targets (eacplesions were heard five minutes after they were released). Wo were attacked by a destroyer and sustained heavy . damagos from a near mitt by a depth bomb (30 m ) . further submerged eruislng booame difficult, and we were pursued by two destroyers, barely managing to escape from the combat seme.
Till. Operational losults. i !' . f: A. Task Toroe and Submarine "I" 1 & . 1. Operational results 1 a. Ihiptt
'
'
Don
th.
th
UIS
f--
D o d o 3^*88
s
~^<^ i \ Ola* sif i cation of' . ^^^^-<_ airplanes Olassm e a r ^ ^ ^ ^ tionof, attack ^ ^ ^ ^ Attack en MD U IW Attack on air- . The 1st' The 2nd craft carrier. Direct air escort. Defensive fire.
The 1st Tha 2nd Tha 1 s t
\
Boaibare ;
Uncertain
Attack planes
./ Lone .
rane hoaiMara
/ ! e C B T v _ : ' ,~;
naissanoa saaplanaa
" : " r ' " I - ' .' 7
;.;^;^;iou;^;;-r
1 #
: Mm .
7
8
/
5
' '
. ^ _
' .
' . '
- 18
i m - -;
13
'
"
6
;
'
Tha 2nd
'
'
"
'
ia this
178*(27)
Total xa total
17
V 32
60
15-
' statistics.
/ D o e jo
' 2 .
J^
.V.." Alrplanst (only theia which wro l o t t In -: .' - l16iu or which falld to rtaurn)i
v
'^
Carrier \ Carrier
-attack ,': plane-,
- ,^z"~^ .
The f i r s t The second
;; Z'[''
' ; - 1 - . : . : v .
. '
'
Aerial escort
-
13
3
20* .
;; I k > ' '
5
g
'
_ . . . "total..
U2
-, ,
Operational reeultit
" * ,
'
'-.,
.;",
: "
"'
"
'
^ ^ . i
.) 2.
. Dettroyed by e x p l o s i o n - \ Damaged t
..
s i x h i t t j but returned, to TRUK under i t s OVA power. .Slightly, damagedj The AIASHlO and A1A8H0 (both by
Doe to
t
Date
Dotoriptioa 10 IS.of tha Department of the Imperial '/ \ " Oaneral HeadiptertereV "CoW,","?/. aadar-inrOhiaf. of the Ooaw ; -; Mned Tleat T K M T ia to A A OO oo-operata vlth the Any in the ooowpation of ttratafia points in WDtAI and the
v
5 May U2.
^;
7T
Iaperial Oaaeral laaifnarterot "Any and layy Joint Airaaaamt on AT (WDV1T) and A (AUUTIAl) O oparationa." ...
v
B a t U e of the
8 e a . : \. r ' ' :
Baaa airplane and tubaariaei made erary effort to raobnmoltar tha am oman t of tha urrlrlnc onaay f l e e t l a the area of tha Ooral Sea. Hoverer, until tha .
11th, the anaay flaat did not operate in tha araaa off TOMUYILLB, IMHAll,
DOC 1 0
:
:.-|
Date
15 May
Description
Main Orders
" .
force (two aircraft carrier!, foui .cruisers, five tro yer ) at 9* t i e s off WLAOI.
17 May
At 015 hour*, a f l y boat frosi the Tokohaae Air lane sighted an eneay task force to the east of the S L M O . According OQ O T to reports from the flying boat, which kept in contact with the enoBy task f oroe until 1200 hours, the eneay was operating in the, Ticdnity of the S0LOMOI8. At 1200 hours, the enesqr
i ' '
m.
was located 9^ decrees ties off TOLAOI and wat proceeding on a oourse of i]}0 degrees* Acoordlng 'to the information reeel red, our flyboat wa able to dethe position of the eness/ task force, at
f:
Doc w
Data
Main Ordert
IS May
In,tha aarly mornlnf, tha baaa air foroa searched for tha enemy 'between, the 0IU9ULT8 and tha 5QL0N0JT8 with flying boat* txouL >aaaa on TULAOI and MAKIV, \m% no
/
) , tha laadar
of tha Army unit (OOAmander of tha oampalm to occupy M X A ) called on XWT the oommondar-ixwohlaf of the Oomblnad Fleet.
-
20 ttay
Ordars lssuad >y tha COJmandar-lA-ehiaf of tha Ooabinad Tleat.statest Oarry out saooad
1
4
deployment.
Thn f i r s t and taoond maneuvem of tha OomHnad llaat (tha air foroa, tha acraaninf foroa, tha ocoupatlon foroa, and tha task force) vara oondaotad off Bonc Ohanaal.
-Date 2U May
/ Description
'
'."'
Kain Orders
The second X Opera- . tion (the recommit twice t and attack on the Hawaii area " y airplane*) was tti*_ b be' executed vithln a v^k:.
25
' . " ' Air force nanrnxrert ~..and plottine unit operation* on chart vera ached. uled to be held frou 0S00 " hour* on the flagship T K L O anohbred at A JT , HA8HISAJI1U. irrancemente
An enepgr task force appeared In the I L 1 D H AT Sea. Radar eqpxipttent was installed on the 111 and ., H U A ("battleships)>;.. YO Transport ships of the Attaok Unit departed for 8AIPAI.
0600 hours,
r
28 May
Hay
The Attack Unit l e f t HASHUUJZMA at O O hoars. $O The main force followed at 0600 tears. At 0200 hoars, the 3 Destroyer Iqaadron, which had been olearlnc the front of the CoTdblnoA Tleet, sighted five enesqr submarines 220
73
' * '
"
' ~
'
' \
'
'
* *
' ,
'
' '
'
'
. peecription
"
'
'
'
Main" Orders
'
"
'
'
' o f f
;' - . ' S ; - -
' . / - . . '
'
# '
OKIBOSHIKA ( ^ , '.'1n
'
ver
thearea .o..t'
.
->-
... 1 . J . .
.:ii-4l -attack B q Ju VATii observed moycmontt of aadcy tubnarines as folloyc (oneray Idsaec >re -qiideter-
. ; l ) At 0620 houro, an ;
1) JLl I9H0 hcurB, a X>AtroX pluie wai o"b*rrd at a'poiat UlO l l t vtt-
Boo
Sato
Do script ion touthvott of WIWAT. 2) At 1000 hours, a patror piano was sighted at a point 33O allot southwest of kIWAT. 3) *t of approad,aatly 180 ontogr* aotoafot ont froa HAWAII, 72 w o of
4tifc TLPCsUa^ Aft wLU^t 0 TlMI GStVflflDT
Main OrdoTt
that thoir day and night roconnaitsanoo to locato oar positions cororod a
radius of 600 a i l o s . Ono of our subaarinos,tho "I" 1^8 of tho 3 8 L K k aarlno Squadron rooonnoitor. od M2 A froa aldnicht of IW T tho 1st to noon of tho 2nd. A typo-2 ooaplano froa - W0DJ1 tl^htod an onoay soaplano 560 a l l o t northnortheast of tho Island. OviAf to tho bsvtUo situation in tho r l o U l t r of Tronch Trifato Atoll, tho coaaandor of tho 2U Air tujpondod tho tooond X /^Oporation. (Tho ^oarl
75
Doc So
Main Ordert
AfUiy2S May.
1
9abnarl.net -present in .- \
Truk are* ll l a t h e i r k north Of lOO-H, U th _ JpnT++-6. ,,th total can b #itiaatd at a of lU. fro 8utarin
"I" l6S which rconnoitrd NIPKIX (from aldaifht of the l i t to noon of the 2nd). 1) i n all-day reconnaissaAea Of tha MDKAY . Area Vat made. 7ourtn lighted.
2) k patrol Ttal was ighted vast of 8ATD Itland.- 3) I t can be atstuaed that anaaj heary boaberBware actir* on MIDWAY. Tha anaay attabllthad elote air patrol of tha area outhvaat of WDWAT,xtidln to approximately 600 a i l a i . Land attack planet tartine from W J aooutad JV tha eaatarn aea area ml l e t from W X on a coarse A! of 73 decreet. Daring l } t
Doe So Date Deecription encountered one enejqr flying boat and sighted
; . .. another. : : . , _ . ,' ' ^ > " ' ; ; ; ; ; r . 7 :'' '';'. ' ' , A l a n d ' a t t a c k p l a n e ,.: " ,
Main Qrdart
"\/ ,\ -V " -:K?^;; reportd that .'the alar: ' ; ' h ' . \ . ' > ' . . . . " ' . . . ' . '
!>'
""'...
fielde
o n SAXKE a n d BOW-
|; > 4 v.x
' .
'"
\
(
'
a p p e a r t o b e i n ui"." '...' .
. . . . ;
'
; ;
'
" . . > > " ' .
^ ;
. .
enemy patrol plane at a point 600 idlei eouthveet ofKIDWAT. The l6 Mina-
'-'-
... .
w e e p e r Group i n a e d i a t e l y
'
: v
' .
. .
' . . , * ..'.
Kre suitained. j . At 225^ hovri, tha tanker, AUBOIO, vat , . attacked by eneey planes. (Location of attackt Co * xi
ordinatat 2ff*&**, 17* lU'l.) A direct hit by a r . torpedo eauaad tha ship1a M*aiine to explode11 k i l l 1
i
;. ; ., : " . ' ' ; '" . 7 7
so
Description Tlr sen vtrc ttissin*. . Although its bull vat
Main Orders
On the sane day, planes f r o * our 2 Task l"orce twice attacked DUTCH ' HAHBGE. Vhilo the Transport Convoy of our Attack Unit vas steaadn^ through the waters within a i r range of VAXX, i t WES sighted "by an enemy "flying boat. The
inisftdiataly sent up f i g h t e r planes to insure a i r prot e c t i o n for the convoy. At 0 # 0 hours, the 1 Task Force reported that i t s p o s i t i o n had been d i s covered by an eneagr f l y i n g boat. Plan*s from the 1 Task Toroe attackd MD A IWY a t 0}h& h0urs. At O O hours, a patrol ^O plane, r*oonnolterin the area east of the 1 Task 7oroe, reported 'that a powerful enesgr u n i t c o n s l s t of osM a i r c r a f t carrier,
Doe K b
Description fire cruisers, and fire destroyers were proceeding 220 mil at eat t of the task: force. , An attack unii l e f t at-OcOO hours to engage this eneny formation; ;
;
Main Ordert
i ^ . - - \ ' - ';J< -
;-
Order i
CoMbined Heeti An intercepted, inaigr . oontained a report of attack! on our taak force and deitroyert at 0900 hours and 1000 hour*. The finwrtftTiiitr In ehlf of the Coabiaod . Tleet UBpoaded MidwayOperation. . _..l ."The Attack on MIDVJlY will be postponed. "(a) The transport oonroyv will be strengthened with, a portion of the nmits withdrawing i o the northwest. A portion of the A t t a * Unit w i l l attack the airfields ea M D A XKT tonight.
M
After the NIOVAT attack, th 7 BattUihip Dirlaion tvurned and withdrew. Darin* the with-
Join the 1 task foree as soon as possible. "(0) The 5 and 3 obaarine Squadrons will be oeaeentrated at the line of depleyaeat i n the waters north of the Hawaiian
drawal, the NIXnMA oollided with the MOOAHI. ' The 1 Section of the
79
Bee Be
f /
Bate y.
j
Mala Orders
".
--.-.<.
f l e e t X0706 hours) 1
:':::;-,-:-/-\
6 June
;"
, k Destro/er D i r i s l o a sank
th daaaied AIA0I.
..'
v-^for^'vrSJ::\'"
Order; it
s'&?
the Ooabined
:
attacked ibj onesqr planes three tines between 0500 -' and lU00 hours* ' '/ '
sion of the T Destroyer Squadron, the ZUIBD, tha KAMIO M Maru, and the H Destroyer AA DiYislon will be added to the Borthern Ydrpe. . \
"
r *
''
to tink tha KDITU. Tha TAMXKiZl v u t t U o k t d V p l t t f i while en fke aala forc, the Attack Unit; and th Uak foroet wr attaaklad. i f tar maeet, a l l o a a l - 1 t l t of tha taak faroaa ar tre*ferrea to tha lAOiTO aad MUTSU. Tha MUOMi, M O M , Ok X and eight destroyer* were
13 atearlne Dirision will also be added to the aertham force. The Midway Opermtien
wiU be emapeaded." The Adrsnoe f eree reported that I l 6 i had saooaeded in sink* in* the eneay ship, TOUL10W, at a point 1*0 adles northwest ef
Doc *>
Sato
Doscription attackod by enony plants, but no l o t tot woro tuttalnod. * Aftor 00*5 hours, tho
Joroo roportod that tho 5 8obaarino Squadron wat thon oparatin* In tho* watort northoaat Of HAWAII. Attacks will bo ado on tho T U T M and QLO othor aa&? units TOlnth in tho aroa north of MD A . IWY Qtdoar of tho Ooofrinod
7 Juno
M O M , M K M and tight 0 A X XB A dottroyart woro attackod by onttqr oarrior planot. Tho Umnik vat badly daaacod at a point $00 a l l o t watt of N I C T H1 A * ^6i. althooih ho^porod V f l / i n * Doati, maamcfiA to ink tho T B T W at a QKO point 19} a i l o t oast of M 2 U Y at lOMo hourt. XN L Tho aain foreo, task foroat, and tho Attack Unit voro oxpootod to ooivoontrata and bo mppllod in tho aroa 1000 a i l o i voiV-northwoot of MIDKAI. 8 Juno At 0^00 hoturt, tho M O M joined tho 2 TL\. OA X It vat d i f f i c u l t for tho N O M to trarol faator OA X than 12 knott par homr. fioo to barrtpjaafoftoondltlon, tho took in at aoa at 1500 toma of vator ttona/ voathor.
t
flooti
_~
l ) T M i t , with tho 5 - \ lattlothip WLritiom at i t s nuolaut, will bo eonttitutod at a dirortion forco. . * Thit unit will oo-oporato
for a wook with tho lato Air Toroo and tho tubaarina Toreo in a 300 nilo aroa ttrotchin* oatt to oouth from OTOaiJIMA and will andoaror to jkoutraliio tho onony tatk foreot. .H2) Tho torooniBC Unit * *
with tho 1 Tloot as l t t naelous, plus tho 1 footlon of tho 3 Battlothip Difition and tho SKID, wiU bo trantforrod to tho Korthorn Toroo.
N
Attaok Unit, aad tho tatk forooo will bo dirootly ooaaandod by tho notMrftr-la-ohlaf of tho Qoa*iaod Floot aad will aavomoo to tho vottom part of tho
Doe Do
Date
r
Description were s t i l l unknown. The MIKJBU vat expected to uaderC repairs at fBJX. O The Bat* Air Tore* ooncontrated"*UTjrtd attaok planes (the fthftese Air Unit) on 1 0 0 tbr th j*trpoie of lonff-range patrols. Thi uni t wit to 'be aided by land attack planet (the Kitaram Air Unit) *t| tionad on The land attack planet on VAX* tUhted ei^ht enaagr tubmarinai and inflicted considerable daaage to,one of them. The land attack
Main Orders
ULAID Sea.
(This i s ezpacted
to be completed en the 15th.) The plan to dispatch the 2 Section *t. the 3 Battleship Division and the 8 and 10 Battleship Division* io'the north was suspended. The Screeninc Torce .
arrived at a point 506 a i l e s south-southwest of HWUL Island at 1CG0 JSmrs OSL 9 June. It i s expected to
planes on MIIAMI T0U8HUU sighted one eneagr su'bBarlne. The aain bod/ of the Ooablned f l e e t arrlred at a point 600 Miles north of VAXB. The Bain nod/ of the 2 Fleet Moved into the area between the enesqr and the 1 Battleship Dlritioa* The 1
Boetioa of the 7 Battleship Division assembled in front of the 1 Battleship Division. Bue to the situation of the 2 Section of the 7 Battleship
82
DOC
DaU
Inscription
"
". -
Orders
Division, the 2 f l e e t pro- . ceeded southward in an effort to annihilate the ny UfV force within.th edr rnn^* of
*h airplanes of the 5
rported four subaarlnas two unknown type ships which ware eighUd vest of MIEVAY. . At 0550 hours. Submarine Jy
. .
ZC (VSdbBarlBt) Dlvision
'
_
J.
"
'
'
attacked and-sank ao any transport-($000, tone) off SSAJTU'. i e t i v l t l e s naar 8ATTLX have been under 0*0- ' ervaiion since 2 June, Xneny
"A
prcautions have not been us . fltrlct as expected. 9 June There have "been no reports on the enemy task foroe slnoe the 7th. (it
ift as aimed that i t i t either replettl'shlBsT soppllee or has reversed Its course.) A radio signal, pre~ waamXlj trim a powerful eneaay warship looated 500
" ; / ' V
y
Datr
Main Ordori
t
>4|
Th aala stroafth of
180
slghtod 10,000 a wost of OTOttJDU at 1200 hours. . Attack upon thoso subaarlnos by our 65 Guard Uai t, * k
r -, - ^ - -
and' Ho -j Zorpado Boats, and unit vat sttccossful, ho Xohlkl Botaehaoat , which had ooon rotpout 1 s i a for tho iarasion of M WAT, uador tho doaiiaad of I tho 2 Tloot, was oxpootod to arriro at WAN oa tho 13th or lUth, and was to bo stationed thoro. This uait will *' V ' i i
Doc So
t
Da to
Mala Oritri
patrol shlpa. *fho 11 aad 12 laral .Ooat^ructloa J a t t a l l o a j , " 9ooortod py tho 2 Dootroyov Squadron ( l o i t two d l r l i
l s m d at 1500 borxrij k fore* ooaalttlac of tho 5 Carrior Dlrltloa (lo* tho MOKJjnj), oao dtre7r, aad tho 5 lattloahlp DlrltUa, which l i at proooat oapl#yod ' as a dlrormloa forco la tho aroa oouthoait of Win, wlU bo traasfarrod to tho lorthara
iTorco."
x
hours. Harlaf b^oa rollorod of I t s dutlot with tho lorthora 7oreo t tho 8eralac Ualt (2 Sqaadroii ai auoloui) %rlll arrlTo at T J O J L oa tho af toraooa \ OC HU of 17 ^ua( and, aftor ro->
It, Jxne
Tito tpfkUae part* of tho norooniaj 7oroo( whloh opratod la tho Mlavay aroa, arrlT#A at Fftlfirf1*PiJTMA laaqr looo l a tho
i Data
Description faak (vnoonf lraed) t One baavy oral tar (San franc lie 0 typt). B&aagr pleat 1 shot dovnt Large - 50j aaaJLl - 100; total - 150.
i
Main Ordart
tha oLaaaTl&a 7orea, which oparaUd 1A tha Mldvay Oparation, 1 la axpaotad to laara lta opara--
i
i tloaal b&aaa today and r%a.ni I
{
' ~
16 Jtint
. 818B0.
tha offanaIra taaroh fore* (ubaarlna a^oadron, a i m i the IACHI, at it1 miclaut), which had boa a amnauTtrinf; 1B ta vat art oatt of W X , Joiaad tha ropply AX tuiit on tha 15th and prooaaded northward. Aftar ropIanlthlBc .-v -
17
Torce at -djarm on 20 J I M . Tha Soraaaiac 'oroa (craatar part of tha 1 Tie at) arrived at TOTOSJXA thit afWraooa. Tha aala tody of tha 7 Battlothlp DirltLoa and tha 2 Dattraxar Bamadraa atartad for
DOQ aro
Description
*-^~^~J
Main Orders
t h e C o m b i n e d 7 1 e e t , > ; - *..'
' * , ' . . '
8MI about 21 Jun.~ ^ E^palr work by the AXASRI and th Ul2wir Unit at SOK
" " . . ' . . . .
on tha VOOJMl, ASASHIO, and th ASASRIO, Vhioh wr damac*dl& th Midway Operation, has b^in facilitated, to insure a tpdy rtum of these thlpa to the homeland. ittLnatad time of comple-
ASASHIOi AEASHIOt
July. June
The AJU8HI0 (of the 8 ,_..;,. Destroyer Division) has been temporarily repaired at O0&V < It Xn expected to aTTlre at S J Z O on 21 June. AS B
17 June
Temporary repairs on the H O K are exoected to be comOAI pleted on 22 June. She Is ex-
.'-.'
. ,
A p p e n d i x
o2 '.'".''
'
:'
Organisational Strength of Unit* Which Participated i n t h e Hidvay Operation, ' and l e j i i t of I ^ o r t a n t Oeaemnders^ ~ , '
r 'A. : {Organisation
lorihnrn Torce
(5T) (ALSUTIAI .
QBXXJP)
IACHI and tvo destroyers. ' - l l s f - CHI1O81 and XUIHO. 73 - SUZOYA, IUXAIO, HOOAMI, and MHUMA. Attack Unit ^(27) (TransportConvoy) :'::; r The 2 8pecial Landing Unit. - S i x t e e n transports. ^ --2sd - JI1TSU and 12 destroyers. Ud - IAIA and 16 d e s t r o y e r s . 07 33 - X H O and K i l l . OG US - A A O and CHQKAI. TG -3d - IAWACHI and 12 Main Group 9 1 - KHAXAKX and 5 l . ' ' ''/'' ' : ';
2% - I O , HTTJOA, T U 1 0 / a n d YAJU8HX10. I S - TAkATO, MOTga, and IAOAT0. Supply Unit. Carrier Group (UI) ".."'
103 - HA0A1A and l 6 dattroyr. - H JU A and II1IJIMA. At M ) 88 - T M and CUnWA. O B - K i m and KXXU. l t f - AXAftl and 1A0A. US
Doe go
t
4? -
8 D d
d T -
(Reference:
r
9
>
4*
i
13
r '
l I 1:
8
P il
a
5
3Q
i
o
as
K\
'
'
Doc :
"
'
, ' ' . --
"
Raar-Admiral " s JOIAWA, OunicM Raar Admiral ' ~ HI8HIMUBA, Shoji Rear Admiral IAIAKA, Raisp Captain OTA, Kinoru Rear Admiral EflLITA, Tako Rear Admiral ' TUJITA. S o i t a r o ;
'
'
"
"
'
'
<
'
'
s : ' *
q^MipiMi fff'
" ! ' . ' -
'
_ .
. * K.
**-
' .;'..-
-"--.T
'.'
".; . "
.-1
'
'
'
"
.Mi
I
. , .
llrf
(21)
,5*
'
'
'
'
Captain. <
11
.. .
- *3
t.
Coawandar
'
ARICHUA, B o k o j l
- - ' : , ' ' V ..'.' -":: " : . - :
<
~ ~ '
MIT NO I - O 9 J O -
OMWCT NIT JUtT KMNK) THI MlOfC. THI tt*CTWCAL CmCWT FO* TMI OONTNOL f C T I M MM OAMAMD. ILfCTMCITV m t OUT OFF TO M M I
rowne omen m*
HIT NO. t - 0 M 0 ~ JtT OAMMI TO M4MMMT fTWUCTUW. NTT NO. * - 0 M I - OATAWCT A D OHTfH D QMUKD A O M O TO K. NVLABtD. W N A m NO. 4 - O M i -
DMfCT Mff ON M TttK, U . OK) NOT OETONATI. HOMCV0I, TUHUfT U CMMMtt ANO O M A NOT M UHD TMCTtAFTCT, - THJ MMBMS TMC ACTW OL M PUMMT. I OLLfD, I WOUNMD. MIT NO. f - T T T T - FINCTNJVU TMI MO OF A tTAFF OFFlOtM OiNfCTtY KtNNO FUM) A TOTAL O A l l A i T t : N) 0149, t7
TAMA