EN BANC[G.R. No. 112965. January 30, 1997.]PHILIPPINES TODAY, INC., BETTY GO-BELMONTE, MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ARTURO A.

BORJAL, and ISAAC G. BELMONTE, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONSCOMMISSION and FELIX R. ALEGRE, JR., respondents. FACTS Private Respondent Felix R. Alegre, Jr. was employed by PTI as a senior investigative reporterof the Philippine Star. He later became chief investigative writer and then assistant to thepublisher.On October 20, 1988, Respondent Alegre filed a request for a thirty-day leave of absenceeffective on the same date, citing the advice of his personal physician for him to undergofurther medical consultations abroad. Four days later, he wrote a "Memorandum for File"addressed to Petitioner Betty Go-Belmonte with copies furnished to members of the board of directors of PTI, December 6, 1988, Respondent Alegre received from Petitioner Belmonte a letter, informingthe former that the Board has accepted his resignation. The following day, Respondent Alegrewrote Petitioner Belmonte expressing surprise over the acceptance of his "resignation", since hedid not resign. Unheeded, Respondent Alegre filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damagesagainst herein petitioners. ISSUE # 1Whether or not the Memorandum for File constitutes voluntary resignation. HELD IN # 1The SC held that said memorandum juridically constituted a letter of resignation. Alegre's choiceof words and way of expression betray his allegation that the memorandum was simply an"opportunity to open the eyes of Belmonte to the work environment in petitioners' newspaperwith the end in view of persuading her to take a hand at improving said environment." Apprising his employer of his frustrations in his job and differences with his immediate superioris certainly not done in an abrasive, offensive and disrespectful manner. A cordial or, at the veryleast, civil attitude, according due deference to one's superiors, is still observed, especially among high-ranking management officers. The Court takes judicial notice of the Filipino valuesof pakikisama and paggalang which are not only prevalent among members of a family andcommunity but within organizations as well, including work sites. An employee is expected toextend due respect to management, the employer being the "proverbial hen that lays thegolden egg," so to speak. An aggrieved employee who wants to unburden himself of his disappointments and frustrationsin his job or relations with his immediate superior would normally approach said superiordirectly or otherwise ask some other officer possibly to mediate and discuss the problem withthe end in view of settling their differences without causing ferocious conflicts. No matter howthe employee dislikes his employer professionally, and even if he is in a confrontationaldisposition, he cannot afford to be disrespectful and dare to talk with an unguarded tongueand/or with a baleful pen. Here, respondent Alegre was anything but respectful and polite. Hismemorandum is too affrontive, combative and confrontational. It certainly causes resentment,even when read by an objective reader.His incendiary words and sarcastic remarks negate any desire to improve work relations withpetitioners. Such strongly worded letter constituted an act of theofficers of the company.Further, the actions of respondent, such as clearing his work desk of

personal belongings, not reporting back to work after his leave, and his immediate employment with another employer,confirm his intention to terminate his employment with petitioner. ISSUE # 2Whether or not a resignation be unilaterally withdrawn. HELD IN # 2The SC held that resignations, once accepted, may not be withdrawn without the consent of theemployer. If the employer accepts the withdrawal, the employee retains his job. If the employerdoes not, the employee cannot claim illegal dismissal. To say that an employee who hasresigned is illegally dismissed, is to encroach upon the right of employers to hire persons whowill be of service to them.Obviously, this is a recognition of the contractual nature of employment which requiresmutuality of consent between the parties. An employment contract is consensual and voluntary.Hence, if the employee "finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasonscannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, then he has no other choice but todisassociate himself from his employment". If accepted by the employer, the consequent effect of resignation is severance of the contract of employment. A resigned employee who desires to take his job back has to re-apply therefor and he shallhave the status of a stranger who cannot unilaterally demand an appointment. He cannot arrogate unto himself the same position which he earlier decided to leave. To allow him to doso would be to deprive the employer of his basic right to choose whom to employ. Such istantamount to undue oppression of the employer. It has been held that an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment includinghiring. The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, impels neither the oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.Consistent with our ruling in Intertrod, the resignation of respondent Alegre after its acceptanceby petitioners can no longer be withdrawn without the consent of the latter. In fairness to theemployer, an employee cannot backtrack on his resignation at his whim and without theconformity of the former.Petition is granted.

Moreover, it must be emphasized that a contract of employment is impressed with public interest.22 [Article 1700 of the Civil Code provides: "The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressedwith public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. x x x."] Provisions of applicable statutes aredeemed written into the contract, and the "parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships fromthe impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other."23

[Pakistan Airlines Corporation v.Ople, 190 SCRA 90, September 28, 1990, per Feliciano, J. See also Servidad v. NLRC, GR No. 128682, March 18,1999; Villa v. NLRC, 284 SCRA 105, January 14, 1998.] Clearly, the agreement of the parties regarding the period of employment cannot prevail over the provisions of the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, which mandate thatpetitioners must be treated as qualified able-bodied employees.Respondents reason for terminating the employment of petitioners is instructive. Because the Bangko Sentral ngPilipinas (BSP) required that cash in the bank be turned over to the BSP during business hours from 8:00 a.m. to5:00 p.m., respondent resorted to nighttime sorting and counting of money. Thus, it reasons that this task "could notbe done by deaf mutes because of their physical limitations as it is very risky for them to travel at night."24 *Respondents Memorandum, p. 15; rollo, p. 528.] We find no basis for this argument. Travelling at night involvesrisks to handicapped and able-bodied persons alike. This excuse cannot justify the termination of their employment.Other Grounds Cited by Respondent

G.R. No. 128682 March 18, 1999 JOAQUIN T. SERVIDAD, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, INNODATA PHILIPPINES, INC./ INNODATA CORPORATION, TODD SOLOMON, respondents. PURISIMA, J.: Commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet. No one should obtain an advantage from his wrong. Schemes which preclude acquisition of tenurial security should be condemned as contrary to public policy. No member of the work force of this country should be allowed to be taken advantages of by the employer. 1 In this special civil action the Certiorari petitioner seeks to annul the decision 2 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversing the Labor Arbiter's disposition 3 that he was illegally dismissed. The facts of the case are as follows: Petitioner Joaquin T. Servidad was employed on May 9, 1994 by respondent INNODATA as a "Data Control Clerk", under a contract of employment Section 2 of which, reads: Sec. 2. This Contract shall be effective for a period of 1 years commencing on May 10, 1994, untilMay 10, 1995 unless sooner terminated pursuant to the provisions hereof. From May 10, 1994 to November 10, 1994, or for a period of six (6) months, the EMPLOYEE shall be contractual during which the EMPLOYER can terminate the EMPLOYEE's services by serving written notice to that effect. Such termination shall be immediate, or at whatever date within the six-month period, as the EMPLOYER may determine. Should the EMPLOYEE continue his employment beyond November 10, 1994,he shall become a regular employee upon demonstration of sufficient skill in the terms of his ability to meet the standards set by the EMPLOYER. If the EMPLOYEE fails to demonstrate the ability to master his task during the first

six months he can be placed on probation for another six (6) months after which he will be evaluated for promotion as a regular employee. 4 On November 9, 1995, or after working for six (6) months, he was made to sign a three-month probationary employment and later, an extended three-month probationary employment good until May 9, 1995. 5 On July 7, 1994, the petitioner was given an overall rating of 100% and 98% in the work evaluations conducted by the company. In another evaluation, petitioner received a rating of 98.5% given by the private respondent. 6 On May 9, 1995, petitioner was dismissed from the service on the ground of alleged termination of contract of employment. Such happening prompted petitioner to institute a case for illegal dismissal against the private respondent. In ruling for petitioner, the Labor Arbiter disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered finding Respondent guilty of illegal dismissal and concomitantly, Respondent is ordered to pay complainant full backwages from the time of his dismissal till actual or payroll reinstatement, in the amount of P53,826.50 (computed till promulgation only). Respondent is hereby further ordered to reinstate complainant to his former position or equivalent position without loss of seniority rights, privileges and benefits as a regular employee immediately upon receipt of this decision. SO ORDERED. 7 On appeal thereto by INNODATA, the NLRC reversed the aforesaid judgment of the Labor Arbiter. It declared that the contract between petitioner and private respondent was for a fixed term and therefore, the dismissal of petitioner Joaquin T. Servidad, at the end of his one year term agreed upon, was valid. The decretal portion of the decision of NLRC is to the following effect: All said the judgment dated August 20, 1996 is hereby, REVERSED. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. 8 Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition faulting NLRC for acting with grave abuse of discretion in adjudging subject contract of employment of petitioner to be for a definite or fixed period. The petition is impressed with merit. At bar is just another scheme to defeat the constitutionally guaranteed right of employees to security of tenure. The issue posited centers on the validity and enforceability of the contract of employment entered into by the parties. The NLRC found that the contract in question is for a fixed term. It is worthy to note, however, that the said contract provides for two periods. The first period was for six months terminable at the option of private respondent, while the second period was also for six months but probationary in character. In both cases, the private respondent did not specify the criteria for the termination or retention of the services of petitioner. Such a wide leeway for the determination of the tenure of an employee during a one year period of employment is violate of the right of the employee against unwarranted dismissal. Decisively in point is Article 1377 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 1377. The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity. Certainly, favorable interpretation of the contract in the case under scrutiny should be for petitioner and not for the private respondent which caused the preparation of said contract. If the contract was really for a fixed term, the private respondent should not have been given the discretion to dismiss the petitioner during the one year period of employment for reasons other than the just and authorized causes under the Labor Code. Settled is the rule that an employer can terminate the services of an employee only for valid and just causes which must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. 9 According to the private respondent, the one-year period stipulated in subject contract was to enable petitioner to acquire the skill necessary for the job. In effect, what respondent employer theorized upon is that the one-year term of employment is probationary. If the nature of the job did actually necessitate at least one year for the employee to acquire the requisite training and experience, still, the same could not be a valid probationary employment as it falls short of the requirement of Article 281 10 of the Labor Code. It was not brought to light that the petitioner was duly informed at the start of his employment, of the reasonable standards under which he could qualify as a regular employee. The rudiments of due process demand that an employee should be apprised before hand of the conditions of his employment and the basis for his advancement. 11 The language of the contract in dispute is truly a double-bladed scheme to block the acquisition of the employee of tenurial security. Thereunder, private respondent has two options. It can terminate the employee by reason of expiration of contract, or it may use "failure to meet work standards" as the ground for the employee's dismissal. In either case, the tenor of the contract jeopardizes the right of the worker to security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution. 12 In the case of Brent School, Inc. vs. Zamora, et al. 13, the Court upheld the principle that where from the circumstances it is apparent that periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be disregarded for being contrary to public policy. Such circumstance has been indubitably shown here to justify the application of the following conclusion: Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of the legislation culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as already observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure, the clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or oral agreements conflicting with the concept of regular employment as defined therein should be construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure. . . . 14 The agreement in the case under consideration has such an objective and consequently, is a complete nullity. 15 It is abundantly clear that the petitioner was hired as a regular employee, at the outset. He worked as a "Data Control Clerk". His job was directly related to the data processing and data encoding business of Innodata. His work was therefore necessary and important to the business of his employer. Such being the scenario involved, under Article 280 16 of the Labor Code petitioner is considered a regular employee of private respondent. At any rate, even assuming

that his original employment was probationary, petitioner was anyway permitted to work beyond the first six-month period and under Article 281 17 an employee allowed to work beyond the probationary period is deemed a regular employee. Reliance by NLRC on the ruling in Mariwasa Manufacturing, Inc., et al. vs. Hen. Leogardo Jr., et al, 18 is misplaced. Pertinent portion of the disquisition therein was as follows: By voluntary agreeing to an extension of the probationary period, Dequila in effect waived any benefit attaching to the completion of said period if he still failed to make the grade during the period of extension. The Court finds nothing in the law which by any fair interpretation prohibits such waiver. And no public policy protecting the employee and the security of tenure is served by proscribing voluntary agreements which, by reasonably extending the period of probation, actually improve and further a probationary employee's prospects of demonstrating his fitness for regular employment. 19 The above-described situation, however, is not the same as what obtained in this case. In the Mariwasa case, the employment was expressly agreed upon as probationary. Here, no such specific designation is stipulated in the contract. The private respondent sought to alternatively avail of probationary employment and employment for a fixed term so as to preclude the regularization of the status of petitioner. The utter disregard of public policy by the contract in question negates the ruling of NLRC that said contract is the law between the parties. The private agreement of the parties cannot prevail over Article 1700 of the Civil Code, which provides: Art. 1700. The relation between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shops, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects. Similarly telling is the case of Pakistan Airlines Corporation vs. Pole, et al. 20 There, it was said: . . . provisions of applicable law, especially provisions relating to matters affected with public policy, are deemed written into the contract. Put a little differently, the governing principle is that the parties may not contract away applicable provisions of law especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily impressed with public interest. The law relating to labor and employment is clearly such an area and parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other. . . . 21 On the averment that NLRC gravely abused its discretion in finding that petitioner failed to meet the standards of the company, we find for petitioner. The decision at NLRC on the matter simply stated that the petitioner fell short of the expectations of the company without specifying factual basis therefor. 22 The public respondent overlooked the undisputed satisfactory ratings of the performance of petitioner in the two job evaluations conducted by the respondent company. Even granting, therefore, that the contract litigated upon is valid; still, the petitioner, who was permitted to work beyond six months could not be dismissed on the ground of failure to meet the standards of Innodata. By the provisions of the very contract itself, petitioner has become a regular employee of private respondent. Therein, it is stipulated that: ". . . Should the EMPLOYEE continue employment beyond November 10, 1994, he shall become a regular employee upon demonstration of sufficient skill in the terms of his ability to meet the standards set by the EMPLOYER. . . ." 23

Then too, the case at bar is on all fours with the recent case of Villanueva vs. NLRC, et al. 24 where the same standard form of employment contract prepared by INNODATA was at issue. In deciding that the said contract violated the employee's right to security of tenure, the court ratiocinated: The termination of petitioner's employment contract on 21 February 1995, as well as the subsequent issuance on 13 March 1995 of a "new" contract for five months as "data encoder," was a devious, but crude, attempt to circumvent petitioner's right to security of tenure as a regular employee guaranteed by Article 279 of the Labor Code. 25 Hence, the so called "end of contract" on 21 February 1995 amounted to a dismissal without any valid cause. Indeed, the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in construing the contract sued upon as one with a fixed term. To uphold such a finding would be to concede to the private respondent an advantage arising from its own mistake. On the matter of moral damages, however, we rule for the private respondent. Mere allegations of besmirched reputation, embarrassment and sleepless nights are insufficient to warrant an award for moral damages. It must be shown that the proximate cause thereof was the unlawful act or omission of the private respondent. 26 However, the petitioner herein predicated his claim for such damages on mere allegations of sleepless nights, embarrassment, etc., without detailing out what was responsible therefor or the cause thereof. As regards the backwages to be granted to petitioner, the amount thereof should be computed from the time he was illegally dismissed to the time of his actual or payroll reinstatement, without any deduction. 27 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the questioned decision of NLRC is SET ASIDE, and the decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated August 20, 1996, in NLRC-NCR-00-055-03471-95 REINSTATED, with the modification that the award of backwages be computed from the time of the dismissal of petitioner to his actual or payroll reinstatement. Costs against the private respondent. SO ORDERED. http://www.chanrobles.com/PART3.pdf

G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990 PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Minister of Labor; HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister; ETHELYNNE B. FARRALES and MARIA MOONYEEN MAMASIG, respondents. Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for petitioner. Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for private respondents. FELICIANO, J.: On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines Corporation ("PIA"), a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed in Manila two (2) separate contracts of employment, one with private respondent Ethelynne B. Farrales and the other with

private respondent Ma. M.C. Mamasig. 1 The contracts, which became effective on 9 January 1979, provided in pertinent portion as follows: 5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY This agreement is for a period of three (3) years, but can be extended by the mutual consent of the parties. xxx xxx xxx 6. TERMINATION xxx xxx xxx Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves the right to terminate this agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in advance one month before the intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month's salary. xxx xxx xxx 10. APPLICABLE LAW: This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under this agreement. Respondents then commenced training in Pakistan. After their training period, they began discharging their job functions as flight attendants, with base station in Manila and flying assignments to different parts of the Middle East and Europe. On 2 August 1980, roughly one (1) year and four (4) months prior to the expiration of the contracts of employment, PIA through Mr. Oscar Benares, counsel for and official of the local branch of PIA, sent separate letters both dated 1 August 1980 to private respondents Farrales and Mamasig advising both that their services as flight stewardesses would be terminated "effective 1 September 1980, conformably to clause 6 (b) of the employment agreement [they had) executed with [PIA]." 2 On 9 September 1980, private respondents Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint, docketed as NCR-STF-95151-80, for illegal dismissal and non-payment of company benefits and bonuses, against PIA with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment ("MOLE"). After several unfruitful attempts at conciliation, the MOLE hearing officer Atty. Jose M. Pascual ordered the parties to submit their position papers and evidence supporting their respective positions. The PIA submitted its position paper, 3 but no evidence, and there claimed that both private respondents were habitual absentees; that both were in the habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities of "personal effects"; and that PIA personnel at the Manila International Airport had been discreetly warned by customs officials to advise private respondents to discontinue that practice. PIA further claimed that the services of both private respondents were terminated pursuant to the provisions of the employment contract. In his Order dated 22 January 1981, Regional Director Francisco L. Estrella ordered the reinstatement of private respondents with full backwages or, in the alternative, the payment to them of the amounts equivalent to their salaries for the remainder of the fixed three-year period of their employment contracts; the payment to private respondent Mamasig of an amount equivalent to the value of a round trip ticket Manila-USA Manila; and payment of a bonus to each of the private respondents equivalent to their one-month salary. 4 The Order stated that private respondents had attained the status of regular employees after they had

rendered more than a year of continued service; that the stipulation limiting the period of the employment contract to three (3) years was null and void as violative of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations on regular and casual employment; and that the dismissal, having been carried out without the requisite clearance from the MOLE, was illegal and entitled private respondents to reinstatement with full backwages. On appeal, in an Order dated 12 August 1982, Hon. Vicente Leogardo, Jr., Deputy Minister, MOLE, adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of the Regional Director and affirmed the latter's award save for the portion thereof giving PIA the option, in lieu of reinstatement, "to pay each of the complainants [private respondents] their salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract[s] [of employment] . . .". 5 In the instant Petition for Certiorari, petitioner PIA assails the award of the Regional Director and the Order of the Deputy Minister as having been rendered without jurisdiction; for having been rendered without support in the evidence of record since, allegedly, no hearing was conducted by the hearing officer, Atty. Jose M. Pascual; and for having been issued in disregard and in violation of petitioner's rights under the employment contracts with private respondents. 1. Petitioner's first contention is that the Regional Director, MOLE, had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint initiated by private respondents for illegal dismissal, jurisdiction over the same being lodged in the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") It appears to us beyond dispute, however, that both at the time the complaint was initiated in September 1980 and at the time the Orders assailed were rendered on January 1981 (by Regional Director Francisco L. Estrella) and August 1982 (by Deputy Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr.), the Regional Director had jurisdiction over termination cases. Art. 278 of the Labor Code, as it then existed, forbade the termination of the services of employees with at least one (1) year of service without prior clearance from the Department of Labor and Employment: Art. 278. Miscellaneous Provisions . . . (b) With or without a collective agreement, no employer may shut down his establishment or dismiss or terminate the employment of employees with at least one year of service during the last two (2) years, whether such service is continuous or broken, without prior written authority issued in accordance with such rules and regulations as the Secretary may promulgate . . . (emphasis supplied) Rule XIV, Book No. 5 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, made clear that in case of a termination without the necessary clearance, the Regional Director was authorized to order the reinstatement of the employee concerned and the payment of backwages; necessarily, therefore, the Regional Director must have been given jurisdiction over such termination cases: Sec. 2. Shutdown or dismissal without clearance. Any shutdown or dismissal without prior clearance shall be conclusively presumed to be termination of employment without a just cause. The Regional Director shall, in such case order the immediate reinstatement of the employee and the payment of his wages from the time of the shutdown or dismissal until the time of reinstatement. (emphasis supplied)

Policy Instruction No. 14 issued by the Secretary of Labor, dated 23 April 1976, was similarly very explicit about the jurisdiction of the Regional Director over termination of employment cases: Under PD 850, termination cases with or without CBA are now placed under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Director. Preventive suspension cases, now made cognizable for the first time, are also placed under the Regional Director. Before PD 850, termination cases where there was a CBA were under the jurisdiction of the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration, while termination cases where there was no CBA were under the jurisdiction of the Conciliation Section. In more details, the major innovations introduced by PD 850 and its implementing rules and regulations with respect to termination and preventive suspension cases are: 1. The Regional Director is now required to rule on every application for clearance, whether there is opposition or not, within ten days from receipt thereof. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied) 2. The second contention of petitioner PIA is that, even if the Regional Director had jurisdiction, still his order was null and void because it had been issued in violation of petitioner's right to procedural due process . 6 This claim, however, cannot be given serious consideration. Petitioner was ordered by the Regional Director to submit not only its position paper but also such evidence in its favor as it might have. Petitioner opted to rely solely upon its position paper; we must assume it had no evidence to sustain its assertions. Thus, even if no formal or oral hearing was conducted, petitioner had ample opportunity to explain its side. Moreover, petitioner PIA was able to appeal his case to the Ministry of Labor and Employment. 7 There is another reason why petitioner's claim of denial of due process must be rejected. At the time the complaint was filed by private respondents on 21 September 1980 and at the time the Regional Director issued his questioned order on 22 January 1981, applicable regulation, as noted above, specified that a "dismissal without prior clearance shall be conclusively presumed to be termination of employment without a cause", and the Regional Director was required in such case to" order the immediate reinstatement of the employee and the payment of his wages from the time of the shutdown or dismiss until . . . reinstatement." In other words, under the then applicable rule, the Regional Director did not even have to require submission of position papers by the parties in view of the conclusive (juris et de jure) character of the presumption created by such applicable law and regulation. In Cebu Institute of Technology v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 8 the Court pointed out that "under Rule 14, Section 2, of the Implementing Rules and Regulations, the termination of [an employee] which was without previous clearance from the Ministry of Labor is conclusively presumed to be without [just] cause . . . [a presumption which] cannot be overturned by any contrary proof however strong." 3. In its third contention, petitioner PIA invokes paragraphs 5 and 6 of its contract of employment with private respondents Farrales and Mamasig, arguing that its relationship with them was governed by the provisions of its contract rather than by the general provisions of the Labor Code. 9 Paragraph 5 of that contract set a term of three (3) years for that relationship, extendible by agreement between the parties; while paragraph 6 provided that, notwithstanding any other provision in the Contract, PIA had the right to terminate the employment agreement at any

time by giving one-month's notice to the employee or, in lieu of such notice, one-months salary. A contract freely entered into should, of course, be respected, as PIA argues, since a contract is the law between the parties. 10 The principle of party autonomy in contracts is not, however, an absolute principle. The rule in Article 1306, of our Civil Code is that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations as they may deem convenient, "provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy." Thus, counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is the equally general rule that provisions of applicable law, especially provisions relating to matters affected with public policy, are deemed written into the contract. 11 Put a little differently, the governing principle is that parties may not contract away applicable provisions of law especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily impressed with public interest. The law relating to labor and employment is clearly such an area and parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other. It is thus necessary to appraise the contractual provisions invoked by petitioner PIA in terms of their consistency with applicable Philippine law and regulations. As noted earlier, both the Labor Arbiter and the Deputy Minister, MOLE, in effect held that paragraph 5 of that employment contract was inconsistent with Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code as they existed at the time the contract of employment was entered into, and hence refused to give effect to said paragraph 5. These Articles read as follows: Art. 280. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time his reinstatement. Art. 281. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreements of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: provided, that, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered as regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists. (Emphasis supplied) In Brent School, Inc., et al. v. Ronaldo Zamora, etc., et al., 12 the Court had occasion to examine in detail the question of whether employment for a fixed term has been outlawed under the above quoted provisions of the Labor Code. After an extensive examination of the history and development of Articles 280 and 281, the Court reached the conclusion that a contract providing for employment with a fixed period was not necessarily unlawful:

There can of course be no quarrel with the proposition that where from the circumstances it is apparent that periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy, morals, etc. But where no such intent to circumvent the law is shown, or stated otherwise, where the reason for the law does not exist e.g. where it is indeed the employee himself who insists upon a period or where the nature of the engagement is such that, without being seasonal or for a specific project, a definite date of termination is a sine qua non would an agreement fixing a period be essentially evil or illicit, therefore anathema Would such an agreement come within the scope of Article 280 which admittedly was enacted "to prevent the circumvention of the right of the employee to be secured in . . . (his) employment?" As it is evident from even only the three examples already given that Article 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment contracts to which the lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but would also appear to restrict, without reasonable distinctions, the right of an employee to freely stipulate with his employer the duration of his engagement, it logically follows that such a literal interpretation should be eschewed or avoided. The law must be given reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. Outlawing the whole concept of term employment and subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employers" using it as a means to prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping off the head. xxx xxx xxx Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of legislation culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as already observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure, the clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or oral agreements conflicting with the concept of regular employment as defined therein should be construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure. It should have no application to instances where a fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the latter. Unless thus limited in its purview, the law would be made to apply to purposes other than those explicitly stated by its framers; it thus becomes pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to lead to absurd and unintended consequences. (emphasis supplied) It is apparent from Brent School that the critical consideration is the presence or absence of a substantial indication that the period specified in an employment agreement was designed to circumvent the security of tenure of regular employees which is provided for in Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code. This indication must ordinarily rest upon some aspect of the agreement other than the mere specification of a fixed term of the ernployment agreement, or upon evidence aliunde of the intent to evade.

Examining the provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the employment agreement between petitioner PIA and private respondents, we consider that those provisions must be read together and when so read, the fixed period of three (3) years specified in paragraph 5 will be seen to have been effectively neutralized by the provisions of paragraph 6 of that agreement. Paragraph 6 in effect took back from the employee the fixed three (3)-year period ostensibly granted by paragraph 5 by rendering such period in effect a facultative one at the option of the employer PIA. For petitioner PIA claims to be authorized to shorten that term, at any time and for any cause satisfactory to itself, to a one-month period, or even less by simply paying the employee a month's salary. Because the net effect of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the agreement here involved is to render the employment of private respondents Farrales and Mamasig basically employment at the pleasure of petitioner PIA, the Court considers that paragraphs 5 and 6 were intended to prevent any security of tenure from accruing in favor of private respondents even during the limited period of three (3) years, 13 and thus to escape completely the thrust of Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code. Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the agreement "only [in] courts of Karachi Pakistan". The first clause of paragraph 10 cannot be invoked to prevent the application of Philippine labor laws and regulations to the subject matter of this case, i.e., the employer-employee relationship between petitioner PIA and private respondents. We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship. Neither may petitioner invoke the second clause of paragraph 10, specifying the Karachi courts as the sole venue for the settlement of dispute; between the contracting parties. Even a cursory scrutiny of the relevant circumstances of this case will show the multiple and substantive contacts between Philippine law and Philippine courts, on the one hand, and the relationship between the parties, upon the other: the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially; private respondents are Philippine citizens and respondents, while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing business) and hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in between their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All the above contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of contractual disputes between the parties. Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of Philippine law. 14 We conclude that private respondents Farrales and Mamasig were illegally dismissed and that public respondent Deputy Minister, MOLE, had not committed any grave abuse of discretion nor any act without or in excess of jurisdiction in ordering their reinstatement with backwages. Private respondents are entitled to three (3) years backwages without qualification or deduction. Should their reinstatement to their former or other substantially equivalent

positions not be feasible in view of the length of time which has gone by since their services were unlawfully terminated, petitioner should be required to pay separation pay to private respondents amounting to one (1) month's salary for every year of service rendered by them, including the three (3) years service putatively rendered. ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the Order dated 12 August 1982 of public respondent is hereby AFFIRMED, except that (1) private respondents are entitled to three (3) years backwages, without deduction or qualification; and (2) should reinstatement of private respondents to their former positions or to substantially equivalent positions not be feasible, then petitioner shall, in lieu thereof, pay to private respondents separation pay amounting to one (1)-month's salary for every year of service actually rendered by them and for the three (3) years putative service by private respondents. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 13 September 1982 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

P hilippine Telegraph & Telephone Co vs NLRC (1997) G.R. 118978 F acts: S eeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari , petitioner P hilippine Telegraph and TelephoneCompany (hereafter, P T&T) invokes the alleged concealment of civil status and defalcation of company fundsas grounds to terminate the services of an employee. That employee, herein private respondent Grace deGuzman, contrarily argues that what really motivated P T&T to terminate her services was her havingcontracted marriage during her employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in its company policies. S hethus claims that she was discriminated against in gross violation of law, such a proscription by an employerbeing outlawed by A rticle 136 of the Labor Code. Issue: WON the policy of not accepting or considering as dis q ualified from work any woman worker whocontracts marriage is valid?

H eld: P q ualified from work any woman worker whocontracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workersby our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution.The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of socialand political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. A cknowledged as paramount in the due processscheme is the constitutional guarantee of protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer isre q uired, as a condition sine q u a non prior to severance of the employment ties of an individual under hisemploy, to convincingly establish, through substantial evidence, the existence of a valid and just cause indispensing with the as constitutionally protectedproperty. The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted bypetitioner P T&T. The Labor Code states, in no uncertain terms, as follows: A RT. 136. Stip u lation against marriage . I t shall be unlawful for an employer to re q uire as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expresslyor tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or toactually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of I n the case at bar, it can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by the branchsupervisor of the company, with the reminder, that

A gain, in the termination notice sent toher by the same branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her severance from theservice was not only by reason of her concealment of her married you that married women employees arenot applicable [sic] or P provisions of A rticle 136 of the Labor Code on the right of awoman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment, but itlikewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom tochoose her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienableright. Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, andconditions that they may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs,public order, or public policy. Carried to its logical conse q uences, it may even b against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common law relations and subvert the sacramentof marriage.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/59359027/Digest-labor

G.R. No. 144664 March 15, 2004 ASIAN TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. The Hon. COURT OF APPEALS, Thirteenth Division, HON. FROILAN M. BACUNGAN as Voluntary Arbitrator, KISHIN A. LALWANI, Union, Union representative to the Panel Arbitrators; BISIG NG ASIAN TRANSMISSION LABOR UNION (BATLU); HON. BIENVENIDO T. LAGUESMA in his capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment; and DIRECTOR CHITA G. CILINDRO in her capacity as Director of Bureau of Working Conditions, respondents. DECISION CARPIO-MORALES, J.: Petitioner, Asian Transmission Corporation, seeks via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1995 Rules of Civil Procedure the nullification of the March 28, 2000 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals denying its petition to annul 1) the March 11, 1993 "Explanatory Bulletin"2 of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) entitled "Workers Entitlement to Holiday Pay on April 9, 1993, Araw ng Kagitingan and Good Friday", which bulletin the DOLE reproduced on January 23, 1998, 2) the July 31, 1998 Decision3 of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators ruling that the said explanatory bulletin applied as well to April 9, 1998, and 3) the September 18, 19984 Resolution of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitration denying its Motion for Reconsideration. The following facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are undisputed:

The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), through Undersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano, issued an Explanatory Bulletin dated March 11, 1993 wherein it clarified, inter alia, that employees are entitled to 200% of their basic wage on April 9, 1993, whether unworked, which[,] apart from being Good Friday [and, therefore, a legal holiday], is also Araw ng Kagitingan [which is also a legal holiday]. The bulletin reads: "On the correct payment of holiday compensation on April 9, 1993 which apart from being Good Friday is alsoAraw ng Kagitingan, i.e., two regular holidays falling on the same day, this Department is of the view that the covered employees are entitled to at least two hundred percent (200%) of their basic wage even if said holiday is unworked. The first 100% represents the payment of holiday pay on April 9, 1993 as Good Friday and the second 100% is the payment of holiday pay for the same date as Araw ng Kagitingan. Said bulletin was reproduced on January 23, 1998, when April 9, 1998 was both Maundy Thursday and Araw ng Kagitingan x x x x Despite the explanatory bulletin, petitioner [Asian Transmission Corporation] opted to pay its daily paid employees only 100% of their basic pay on April 9, 1998. Respondent Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU) protested. In accordance with Step 6 of the grievance procedure of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) existing between petitioner and BATLU, the controversy was submitted for voluntary arbitration. x x x x On July 31, 1998,the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision directing petitioner to pay its covered employees "200% and not just 100% of their regular daily wages for the unworked April 9, 1998 which covers two regular holidays, namely, Araw ng Kagitignan and Maundy Thursday." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Subject of interpretation in the case at bar is Article 94 of the Labor Code which reads: ART. 94. Right to holiday pay. - (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers; (b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee shall be paid a compensation equivalent to twice his regular rate; and (c) As used in this Article, "holiday" includes: New Years Day, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, the ninth of April, the first of May, the twelfth of June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth of November, the twenty-fifth and thirtieth of December and the day designated by law for holding a general election, which was amended by Executive Order No. 203 issued on June 30, 1987, such that the regular holidays are now: 1. New Years Day January 1 2. Maundy Thursday Movable Date 3. Good Friday Movable Date 4. Araw ng Kagitingan April 9 (Bataan and Corregidor Day) 5. Labor Day May 1 6. Independence Day June 12 7. National Heroes Day Last Sunday of August 8. Bonifacio Day November 30 9. Christmas Day December 25 10. Rizal Day December 30

In deciding in favor of the Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU), the Voluntary Arbitrator held that Article 94 of the Labor Code provides for holiday pay for every regular holiday, the computation of which is determined by a legal formula which is not changed by the fact that there are two holidays falling on one day, like on April 9, 1998 when it was Araw ng Kagitingan and at the same time was Maundy Thursday; and that that the law, as amended, enumerates ten regular holidays for every year should not be interpreted as authorizing a reduction to nine the number of paid regular holidays "just because April 9 (Araw ng Kagitingan) in certain years, like 1993 and 1998, is also Holy Friday or Maundy Thursday." In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator, holding that the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between petitioner and BATLU, the law governing the relations between them, clearly recognizes their intent to consider Araw ng Kagitingan and Maundy Thursday, on whatever date they may fall in any calendar year, as paid legal holidays during the effectivity of the CBA and that "[t]here is no condition, qualification or exception for any variance from the clear intent that all holidays shall be compensated." 5 The Court of Appeals further held that "in the absence of an explicit provision in law which provides for [a] reduction of holiday pay if two holidays happen to fall on the same day, any doubt in the interpretation and implementation of the Labor Code provisions on holiday pay must be resolved in favor of labor." By the present petition, petitioners raise the following issues: I WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETING THE TERMS OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND SUBSTITUTING ITS OWN JUDGMENT IN PLACE OF THE AGREEMENTS MADE BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVES II WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT ANY DOUBTS ABOUT THE VALIDITY OF THE POLICIES ENUNCIATED IN THE EXPLANATORY BULLETIN WAS LAID TO REST BY THE REISSUANCE OF THE SAID EXPLANATORY BULLETIN III WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE EXPLANATORY BULLETIN EVEN WHILE ADMITTING THAT THE SAID BULLEITN WAS NOT AN EXAMPLE OF A JUDICIAL, QUASI-JUDICIAL, OR ONE OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT [Department of Labor and Employment] DOLE MAY PROMULGATE IV WHETHER OR NOT THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE) BY ISSUING EXPLANATORY BULLETIN DATED MARCH 11, 1993, IN THE GUISE OF PROVIDING GUIDELINES ON ART. 94 OF THE LABOR CODE, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AS IT LEGISLATED AND INTERPRETED LEGAL PROVISIONS IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO CREATE OBLIGATIONS WHERE NONE ARE INTENDED BY THE LAW V WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN SUSTAINING THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR IN REITERATING

ITS EXPLANATORY BULLETIN DATED MARCH 11, 1993 AND IN ORDERING THAT THE SAME POLICY OBTAINED FOR APRIL 9, 1998 DESPITE THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT TO THE CONTRARY VI WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ACTS WILL DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS BY THE "EXPLANATORY BULLETIN" AS WELL AS EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS The petition is devoid of merit. At the outset, it bears noting that instead of assailing the Court of Appeals Decision by petition for review oncertiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner lodged the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65. [S]ince the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the petition under Rule 65, any alleged errors committed by it in the exercise of its jurisdiction would be errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civil action of certiorari. If the aggrieved party fails to do so within the reglementary period, and the decision accordingly becomes final and executory, he cannot avail himself of the writ of certiorari, his predicament being the effect of his deliberate inaction. The appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, now Rule 45 and Rule 65, respectively, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 45 is clear that the decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceeding involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. Under Rule 45 the reglementary period to appeal is fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or denial of motion for reconsideration. xxx For the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to issue, a petitioner must show that he has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against its perceived grievance. A remedy is considered "plain, speedy and adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency. In this case, appeal was not only available but also a speedy and adequate remedy.6 The records of the case show that following petitioners receipt on August 18, 2000 of a copy of the August 10, 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying its Motion for Reconsideration, it filed the present petition for certiorari on September 15, 2000, at which time the Court of Appeals decision had become final and executory, the 15-day period to appeal it under Rule 45 having expired. Technicality aside, this Court finds no ground to disturb the assailed decision. Holiday pay is a legislated benefit enacted as part of the Constitutional imperative that the State shall afford protection to labor.7 Its purpose is not merely "to prevent diminution of the monthly income of the workers on account of work interruptions. In other words, although the worker is forced to take a rest, he earns what he should earn, that is, his holiday pay." 8 It is also intended to enable the worker to participate in the national celebrations held during the days identified as with great historical and cultural significance. Independence Day (June 12), Araw ng Kagitingan (April 9), National Heroes Day (last Sunday of August), Bonifacio Day (November 30) and Rizal Day (December 30) were declared national

holidays to afford Filipinos with a recurring opportunity to commemorate the heroism of the Filipino people, promote national identity, and deepen the spirit of patriotism. Labor Day (May 1) is a day traditionally reserved to celebrate the contributions of the working class to the development of the nation, while the religious holidays designated in Executive Order No. 203 allow the worker to celebrate his faith with his family. As reflected above, Art. 94 of the Labor Code, as amended, affords a worker the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays.9 The provision is mandatory,10 regardless of whether an employee is paid on a monthly or daily basis.11Unlike a bonus, which is a management prerogative,12 holiday pay is a statutory benefit demandable under the law. Since a worker is entitled to the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays, the fact that two holidays fall on the same date should not operate to reduce to nine the ten holiday pay benefits a worker is entitled to receive. It is elementary, under the rules of statutory construction, that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says.13 In the case at bar, there is nothing in the law which provides or indicates that the entitlement to ten days of holiday pay shall be reduced to nine when two holidays fall on the same day. Petitioners assertion that Wellington v. Trajano14 has "overruled" the DOLE March 11, 1993 Explanatory Bulletin does not lie. In Wellington, the issue was whether monthly-paid employees are entitled to an additional days pay if a holiday falls on a Sunday. This Court, in answering the issue in the negative, observed that in fixing the monthly salary of its employees, Wellington took into account "every working day of the year including the holidays specified by law and excluding only Sunday." In the instant case, the issue is whether daily-paid employees are entitled to be paid for two regular holidays which fall on the same day.15 In any event, Art. 4 of the Labor Code provides that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of its provisions, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor. For the working mans welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.16 Moreover, Sec. 11, Rule IV, Book III of the Omnibus Rules to Implement the Labor Code provides that "Nothing in the law or the rules shall justify an employer in withdrawing or reducing any benefits, supplements or payments for unworked regular holidays as provided in existing individual or collective agreement or employer practice or policy."17 From the pertinent provisions of the CBA entered into by the parties, petitioner had obligated itself to pay for the legal holidays as required by law. Thus, the 1997-1998 CBA incorporates the following provision: ARTICLE XIV PAID LEGAL HOLIDAYS The following legal holidays shall be paid by the COMPANY as required by law: 1. New Years Day (January 1st) 2. Holy Thursday (moveable) 3. Good Friday (moveable) 4. Araw ng Kagitingan (April 9th) 5. Labor Day (May 1st) 6. Independence Day (June 12th) 7. Bonifacio Day [November 30] 8. Christmas Day (December 25th)

9. Rizal Day (December 30th) 10. General Election designated by law, if declared public non-working holiday 11. National Heroes Day (Last Sunday of August) Only an employee who works on the day immediately preceding or after a regular holiday shall be entitled to the holiday pay. A paid legal holiday occurring during the scheduled vacation leave will result in holiday payment in addition to normal vacation pay but will not entitle the employee to another vacation leave. Under similar circumstances, the COMPANY will give a days wage for November 1st and December 31st whenever declared a holiday. When required to work on said days, the employee will be paid according to Art. VI, Sec. 3B hereof.18 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Double Holiday Pay Art. 94 of the Labor Code, as amended, affords a worker the enjoyment of ten paid regularholidays. The provision is mandatory, regardless of whether an employee is paid on a monthly ordaily basis. Unlike a bonus, which is a management prerogative, holiday pay is a statutory benefitd e m a n d a b l e u n d e r t h e l a w . S i n c e a w o r k e r i s e n t i t l e d t o t h e e n j o y m e n t o f t e n p a i d r e g u l a r holidays, the fact that two holidays fall on the same date should not operate to reduce to nine theten holiday pay benefits a worker is entitled to receive. [ASIAN TRANSMISSION CORPORATION vs.COURT OF APPEALS] DOUBLE HOLIDAY PAY ASIAN TRANSMISSION CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS[G. R. No. 144664. March 15, 2004] CARPIO-MORALES, J.: FACTS: The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), issued an Explanatory Bulletin whereinit clarified, inter alia, that employees are entitled to 200% of their basic wage on April 9, 1993,whether unworked, which apart from being Good Friday [and, therefore, a legal holiday], is also Araw ng Kagitingan [which is also a legal holiday].Despite the explanatory bulletin, petitioner [Asian Transmission Corporation] opted to payits daily paid employees only 100% of their basic pay on April 9, 1998. Respondent Bisig ng Asian

Transmission Labor Union (BATLU) protested. In accordance with Step 6 of the grievance procedureo f t h e C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g A g r e e m e n t ( C B A ) e x i s t i n g b e t w e e n p etitioner and BATLU, thecontroversy was submitted for voluntary arbitrat i o n . T h e O f f i c e o f t h e V o l u n t a r y A r b i t r a t o r rendered a decision directing petitioner to pay its covered employees 200% and not just 100% oftheir regular daily

wages for the unworked April 9, 1998 which covers two regular holidays, namely,Araw ng Kagitingan and Maundy Thursday.The Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator.further adding that theCollective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between petitioner and BATLU, the law governing therelations between them, clearly recognizes their intent to consider Araw ng Kagitingan and MaundyThursday, on whatever date they may fall in any calendar year, as paid legal holidays during the effectivity of the CBA and that there is no condition, qualification or exception for any variancefrom the clear intent that all holidays shall be compensated. ISSUE: Whether or not, Relief under Rule 65 is the proper remedy of the petitioner; 2. Whether ornot, the Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing an explanatory bulletininterpreting Art. 94 of the Labor Code. HELD: The petition is devoid of merit. Since the Court of Appeals had j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e petition under Rule 65, any alleged errors committed by it in the exercise of its jurisdiction wouldbe errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civil action of certiorari. The appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review underRule 45 and not a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, now Rule 45 and Rule 65,respectively, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. For the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of theRules of Court to issue, a petitioner must show that he has no plain, speedy and adequate remedyin the ordinary course of law against its perceived grievance. A remedy is considered plain, speedyand adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgmentand the acts of the lower court or agency. In this case, appeal was not only available but also a speedy and adequate remedy.Technicality aside, this Court finds no ground to disturb the assailed decision. Holiday payis a legislated benefit enacted as part of the Constitutional imperative that the State shall affordprotection to labor. Art. 94 of the Labor Code, as amended, affords a worker the enjoyment of tenpaid regular holidays. The provision is mandatory, regardless of whether an employee is paid on am o n t h l y o r d a i l y basis. Unlike a bonus, which is a management prerogative, holiday pay is a statutory benefit demandable under the law. Since a worker is entitled to the enjoyment of tenpaid regular holidays, the fact that two holidays fall on the same date should not operate to reduceto nine the ten holiday pay benefits a worker is entitled to receive.In any event, Art. 4 of the Labor Code provides that all doubts in the implementation andinterpretation of its provisions, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolvedin favor of labor. Moreover, Sec. 11, Rule IV, Book III of the Omnibus Rules to Implement the LaborCode provides that Nothing in the law or the rules s hall justify an employer in withdrawing orreducing any benefits, supplements or payments for unworked regular holidays as provided inexisting individual or collective agreement or employer practice or policy. The provision of theCBA entered into by the parties, petitioner had obligated itself to pay for the legal holidays asrequired by law

Hiring extend period HANJIN HEAVY INDUSTRIES vs. IBANEZ| GR 170181 | June 26 2008FACTS : Felicito Ibanez (tireman), Elmer Gacula (Crane Operator), ElmerDagotdot (Welder), Aligwas Carolino (Welder), Ruel Calda (Warehouseman)filed a complaint at the NLRC for illegal dismissal with prayer forreinstatement and payment of backwages. The group alleged that thecontract they have is good for three months, subject to automatic renewalif there is no notice of termination from Hanjin, and that the contract wouldautomatically terminate upon the completion of the project. They furtheraverred that during the time they were dismissed, the project was stillongoing and Hanjin hired people for the positions that they had vacated.Lastly, they also allege that they are entitled to a completion bonus as partof the industry practice and this was substantiated by past payrollpayments. Hanjin failed to furnish a copy of the contract agreements withthe dismissed group. Instead it showed the quitclaims that had beenexecuted by the group that released Hanjin and its representatives fromany claims with their employment. It contained clearance certificates thatshow that respondents are free from accountability. ISSUE : WON the members of the dismissed group are project employees? HELD : No, Hanjin was unable to prove they were not regular employees The rehiring of construction workers on a project to project basis does notconfer upon them regular employment status, since their re-hiring is only anatural consequence of the fact that experienced construction workers arepreferred. Employees who are hired for carrying out a separate job, distinctfrom the other undertakings of the company, the scope and duration of which has been determined and made known to the employees at the timeof the employment , are properly treated as project employees and theirservices may be lawfully terminated upon the completion of a project.Should the terms of their employment fail to comply with this standard,they cannot be considered project employees. Hanjin was unable to showthe written contracts it had with the workers. White the absence of thecontract does not grant permanent status it is the burden of the employerto prove that the employees were aware that their contract with thecompany is for per project only. While Hanjin submitted a terminationreport including the workers names to prove that the services of theirservices were only contracted for a per project basis, Hanjin only submittedone report. It was unable to disprove the allegation of the workers thatthey were part of a pool that Hanjin contacts once a project is to becompleted. Employers cannot mislead their employees, whose work isnecessary and desirable in the former's line of business, by treating themas though they are part of a work pool from which workers could becontinually drawn and then assigned to various projects and thereafterdenied regular status at any time by the expedient act of filing a Termination Report. This would constitute a practice in which an employeeis unjustly precluded from acquiring security of tenure, contrary to publicpolicy, morals, good customs and public order.Hanjin alleged that per Department Order 19, Series of 1993 of DOLE, thepayment of completion bonus is further proof that the workers were onlyproject employees as Hanjin is mandated by

law to pay it to the temporaryworkers whose contracts are about to end upon the completion of theproject. SC views the completion bonus terminology here reflects the factthat the project has already been completed and that is the premium theywished to pay. Quitclaims are viewed with disfavor, especially when a. There is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspectingor gullible personb. Where the terms are unconscionable in its face. For quitclaims to bevalid, it must constitute a reasonable settlement commensurate to theirlegal rights. It does not preclude them from seeking benefits they wereentitled to such as back wages. The respondents were also not granted thetwin requirements of notice and hearing

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[G.R. No. 163210, August 13, 2008] LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. MORENO DUMAPIS, ELMO TUNDAGUI AND FRANCIS LIAGAO, RESPONDENTS. DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the November 7, 2003 Decision[1] and April 15, 2004 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75860. The antecedents of the case are as follows: Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corporation (petitioner), a domestic juridical entity engaged in mining, employed Moreno Dumapis and Elmo Tundagui as lead miners; and Francis Liagao, as load, haul and dump (LHD) machine operator (respondents).[3]All three were assigned at the 850 level, underground, Victoria Area in Lepanto, Mankayan, Benguet. This is a known "highgrade" area where most of the ores mined are considered of high grade content.[4] In the afternoon of September 15, 2000, at 2:00 p.m., Dwayne Chambers (Chambers), one of its foreign consultants who was then acting as Assistant Resident Manager of the Mine, went underground at the 850 level to conduct a routinary inspection of the workers and the working conditions therein. When he went to the various stopes of the said level, he was surprised to see that nobody was there. However, when he went to the 8k stope, he noticed a group of workers sitting, sorting, and washing ores believed to be "highgrade." Realizing that

"highgrading"[5] was being committed, Chambers shouted. Upon hearing his angry voice, the workers scampered in different directions of the stope.[6] Chambers then reported the incident to the security investigation office.[7] After investigating, Security Investigators Paul Pespes, Jr. and Felimon Ringor (Security Investigators) executed a Joint Affidavit, which reads as follows: xxxx At about 3:40 PM of September 15, 2000, while we were at the Lepanto Security Investigation office, we received a report that the LMD Asst. Resident Manager, Mr. Dwayne Chambers saw and surprised several unidentified miners at 8K Stope, 850 level committing Highgrading activities therein; Consequently, all miners assigned to work therein including their supervisor and SG Ceasarion Damoslog, an element of the Mine Security Patrol posted therein as stationary guard were called to this office for interrogation regarding this effect; In the course of the investigation, we eventually learned that the highgrading event really transpired somewhere at the roadway of 8K Stope, 850 level at about 2:00 o'clock PM of September 15, 2000. That the involved participants were all miners assigned to work at 7K Stope, 8K Stope, 240 E, Cross Cut South level drive, all located at 850 mine level. Likewise, the detailed stationary guard assigned thereat and some mine supervisors were also directly involved in this activity; Security Guard Ceasarion Damoslog honestly confessed his direct participation then claimed that he was allegedly convinced by Mr. Joel Gumatin, one of the miners assigned at Panel No.1est-North, 8K Stope, 850 level to cooperate with them to commit Highgrading. He revealed his companions to be all the miners assigned at 8K stope, namely, Joel Gumatin, Brent Suyam, Maximo Madao, Elmo Tundagui and Daniel Fegsar. He also included those who were assigned to work at 240 E, XCS, namely: Thomas Garcia (immediate supervisor), John Kitoyan, Moreno Dumapis, and Marolito Cativo. He enumerated also messrs. Benedict Arocod, Samson Damian, and Dionisio Bandoc, 7K Stope, 850 level assigned miners and shiftboss, respectively; Mr. Pablo Daguio, the shiftboss of 240 E, XCS, 850 level alsopositively confirmed the Highgrading activity. He added that actually he came upon the group and even dispersed them when he went therein prior to the arrival of Mr. Chambers; Furthermore, we also learned from the confession of Mr. Maximo Madao that its was messrs. Joel Gumatin and Brent Suyam who took their issued rock drilling machine then drilled holes and blasted the same at the 8K Stope roadway with the assistance of Thomas Garcia, John Kitoyan, Benedict Arocod, Samsom Damian, Daniel Fegsar andFrancisco Liagao. That SG Ceasarion Damoslog was present on the area standing and watching the group during the incident;

That we are executing this joint affidavit to establish the foregoing facts and to support any complaint that may be filed against respondents; IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands and affix our signature this 28th day of September 2000, at Lepanto, Mankayan, Benguet.[8](Emphasis supplied) On October 24, 2000, petitioner issued a resolution finding respondents and their co-accused guilty of the offense of highgrading and dismissing them from their employment.[9] On November 14, 2000, respondents together with the nine other miners, filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter (LA), docketed as NLRC Case No. 11-0607-00 against petitioner.[10] On August 21, 2001, the LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On September 22, 2001, the miners appealed the decision of the LA to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On August 30, 2002, the NLRC rendered a Decision, declaring the dismissal of herein respondents as illegal, but affirming the dismissal of the nine other complainant miners. The dispositive portion of the NLRC Decision insofar as respondents are concerned, reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DECISION dated August 21, 2001 is hereby MODIFIED declaring the dismissal of complainants [herein respondents] Moreno Dumapis, Elmo Tundagui and Francis Liagao illegal and ordering respondent to pay them backwages in the total amount of four hundred eighty thousand one hundred eighty two pesos and 63/100 (P480, 182.63) and separation pay in the total amount of four hundred seventeen thousand two hundred thirty pesos and 32/100 (P417,230.32) as computed in the body of the decision. xxxx SO ORDERED.[11] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit by the NLRC in its Resolution dated on November 22, 2002.[12] Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA assailing the aforementioned decision and resolution of the NLRC. The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC[13] and denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, herein petition on the following grounds: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION'S DECISION DATED AUGUST 30, 2002 WHICH DECLARED AS ILLEGAL THE DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE OF HEREIN RESPONDENTS.[14] A. The Court of Appeal's strict application of the hearsay rule under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to the present case is uncalled for. B. In cases of dismissal for breach of trust and confidence, proof beyond doubt is not required, it being sufficient that the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the

employees are responsible for the misconduct which renders them unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by their position.[15] The petition is devoid of merit. In finding the dismissal of respondents illegal, the CA upheld the NLRC in considering the Joint Affidavit of the Security Investigators (Joint Affidavit) as hearsay and therefore inadmissible, to wit: We subscribed to the conclusion of the NLRC that the Joint Affidavit of Security Investigators Paul D. Pespes, Jr. and Felimon Ringor is hearsay and thus, inadmissible. Their narration of factual events was not based on their personal knowledge but on disclosures made by Chambers and Daguio. Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court defined the nature of hearsay: Witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. [16] Arguing for the admissibility of the Joint Affidavit, petitioner cites Article 221 of the Labor Code, as amended, which provides: Article 221. Technical rules not binding and prior resort to amicable settlement. In any proceeding before the Commission or any Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of the Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to the technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. x x x (Emphasis supplied) We agree with the petitioner. Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.[17] In a number of cases,[18] this Court has construed Article 221 of the Labor Code as permitting the NLRC or the LA to decide a case on the basis of position papers and other documents submitted without necessarily resorting to technical rules of evidence as observed in the regular courts of justice. Rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC.[19] In Bantolino v. Coca-Coca Bottlers Phils., Inc.[20] the Court ruled that although the affiants had not been presented to affirm the contents of their affidavits and be cross-examined, their affidavits may be given evidentiary value; the argument that such affidavits were hearsay was not persuasive. Likewise, in Rase v. National Labor Relations Commission,[21] this Court ruled that it was not necessary for the affiants to appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the adverse party. To require otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence.

Thus, the CA and the NLRC erred in ruling that the Joint Affidavit is inadmissible for being hearsay. The Joint Affidavit of the Security Investigators is admissible for what it is, an investigation report. However, the admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue.[22] Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. [23] The distinction is clearly laid out inSkippers United Pacific, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission.[24] In finding that the Report of the Chief Engineer did not constitute substantial evidence to warrant the dismissal of Rosaroso, this Court ruled: According to petitioner, the foregoing Report established that respondent was dismissed for just cause. The CA, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, however, refused to give credence to the Report. They are one in ruling that the Report cannot be given any probative value as it is uncorroborated by other evidence and that it is merely hearsay, having come from a source, the Chief Engineer, who did not have any personal knowledge of the events reported therein. xxxx The CA upheld these findings, succinctly stating as follows: Verily, the report of Chief Engineer Retardo is utterly bereft of probative value. It is not verified by an oath and, therefore, lacks any guarantee of trusthworthiness. It is furthermore, and this is crucial, not sourced from the personal knowledge of Chief Engineer Retardo. It is rather based on the perception of "ATTENDING SUPT. ENGINEERS CONSTANTLY OBSERVING ALL PERSONNELS ABILITY AND ATTITUDE WITH REGARDS TO OUR TECHNICAL CAPABILITY AND BEHAVIOURS WITH EMPHASY [sic] ON DISCIPLINE" who " NOTICED 3/E ROSAROSO AS BEING SLACK AND NOT CARING OF HIS JOB AND DUTIES x x x." Accordingly, the report is plain hearsay. It is not backed up by the affidavit of any of the "Supt." Engineers who purportedly had first-hand knowledge of private respondents supposed "lack of discipline," "irresponsibility" and "lack of diligence" which caused him to lose his job. x x x The Courts finds no reason to reverse the foregoing findings.[25](Emphasis supplied) While it is true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases, this procedural rule should not be construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules. The evidence presented must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to have probative value. [26] Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla.[27] It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [28] Thus, even though technical rules of evidence are not strictly complied with before the LA and the NLRC, their decision must be based on evidence that must, at the very least, be substantial.[29]

Pursuant to the aforementioned doctrines, we now look into the probative weight of the Joint Affidavit. An examination of the Joint Affidavit reveals that the facts alleged therein by the Security Investigators are not of their own personal knowledge. They simply referred to the facts allegedly relayed to them by Chambers, Damoslog, Daguio, and Madao. Thus, there is a need to individually scrutinize the statements and testimonies of the four sources of the Joint Affidavit in order to determine the latter's probative weight. The Joint Affidavit states that, "Mr. Dwayne Chambers saw and surprised severalunidentified miners x x x."[30] Chambers simply narrated to the Security Investigators what he saw but did not indicate herein respondents. Also stated in the Joint Affidavit is the alleged confession of Damoslog wherein he named respondents Tundagui and Dumapis as his companions in the act of highgrading .[31] Records show that Damoslog submitted two sworn statements. In his first statement,[32] Damoslog claimed that he was unaware of the act of highrading, and denied any involvement therein. However, in his second statement,[33] Damoslog claimed to have personally witnessed the act of highgrading and named the miners involved to wit: 07. Ques - Could you narrate briefly how it transpired then? Ans - On the first hour of this specific dated and shift at about 0800hrs, while we were at the 8K stope, 850 level, Mr. Joel Gumatin approached me that he could not procure some needed amount of money and if possible we will commit highgrading for that effect to settle his problem. That because I pity him, I just answered that if they could manage to do it then they could do it. 08. Ques - Who was the companion of Mr. Gumatin when he approached you? Ans - He was alone. 09. Ques Did Gumatin specifically informed [sic] you his problem? Ans I did not asked him honestly but he only insisted that he needed an amount of money badly as I earlier said. 10. Ques So just after telling his purpose did he started [sic] the highgrading activity? Ans No, the highgrading scheme started at past 1300 Hrs. 11. Ques - How did it started [sic]? Ans - They started after they all finished their respective drilling assignment. That while I was near the panel 2-West located at the inner portion of 8K Stope, I observed the LHD unit coming from the roadway near the 8K Eating station which was previously parked thereat proceeded to the roadway of panel 1West then started cleaning and scraping said roadway. That after cleaning he parked it at the inner portion of the roadway. Then afterwhich one among the miner who was not assigned therein and I failed to identify his name shove two shovels on the roadway recently cleaned by the LHD then handed it to us with another man whom I don't know his name but could recognize and identify him if I will meet him again then we washed the same

in the inner area of panel 2-West which is adjacent. That after washing and sorting the same, we placed it atop of an spread cartoon [sic] sheet. That while we were busy washing and sorting, Mr. Gumatin also was fixing and spreading the airhose for rockdrilling machine. That few moments thereafter, I heard the running engine of the drilling machine but I can not identify the operator as my line of view was obstructed by the curbed angle of the panel where we are washing the ores. That afterwhich I heard somebody that they are now going to blast the drilled holes but we remained in our place continuing washing the stones. That after the blast Mr. Garcia and one other companion whom I failed to identify due to foggy condition caused by the explosive blasting then handed us the additional newly unearth ores for washing. That while were still busy washing, Gumatin approached us then told us that he will collect what was already washed and sorted and start to process the same. That Gumatin took the items then started to pound the ores atop of an LHD unit parked near the entrance of panel 2-East which was not used during the shift. That after that, I stood up then subsequently proceeded to panel 2-West then observed messrs. Maximo Madao, Benedict Arocod, Brent Suyam, Daniel Fegsar, Thomas Garcia, Mariolito Cativo, John Kitoyna and Samson Damian who acted as the look out at the junction of 240 E, XCS and 8K Stope. The enumerated miners except Damian were in squatting position in scattered adjacent places busy sorting ores. Moments later Shift boss Dionisio Bandoc arrived then went to the place of Gumatin then told us that he will get a portion of the already proceeded ores for the operator to handcarry so that he will not need to come to 8K Stope, 850 level then after taking some of the loot he proceeded out simultaneously uttering that he will check the look out at the outer area of the mainline posted away from the 7K Stope.[34] (Emphasis supplied) Evidently, Damoslog does not name respondents Dumapis and Tundagui as among the miners involved in the act of highgrading; neither does he mention respondent Liagao. The Joint Affidavit also states that Daguio positively confirmed the act of highgrading. However, in his sworn statement,[35] Daguio claims that he did not recognize nor did he identify any of the miners, to wit: 11. Ques - In your own honest observation, what could be the estimate [sic] number of this group of miners doing highgrading activities? Ans - I don't know but obviously they were several as manifested by their number of cap lamplights. I also speculated that some of them were hidden at the curved inner access of the roadway enroute to the inner area. 12. Ques - Did you recognize nor [sic] identify any of them? Ans - Honestly, no.[36] (Emphasis supplied) Lastly, the Joint Affidavit also points to the confession of Madao wherein he particularly named respondent Liagao as one of the miners involved in the act of highgrading.

Madao submitted two sworn statements. In his first sworn statement[37] dated September 16, 2000, Madao claimed his innocence. He did not incriminate any of the respondents. However, in his second sworn statement[38] dated September 20, 2000, Madao claimed to have knowledge of the act of highgrading and specifically named respondent Liagao as one of the miners involved, to wit: 09. Ques - Do I understand that Mr. Suyam has companions and had drilled first the flooring of that roadway before blasting it? Ans - Yes, that is true I saw Suyam and Gumatin transferred [sic] their assigned drilling machine at the said roadway and drilled the area with the company of Garcia, Kitoyan, Arocod, Damian, Fegsar and Liagao.[39] (Emphasis supplied) Nonetheless, the second sworn statement of Madao is not sufficient to find Liagao guilty of highgrading. In a Joint Affidavit[40] which he executed with respondent Tundagui, Madao made the following declarations: When I, MAXIMO MADAO reported for work on September 16, 2000, I am being required to appear at the security investigation office. After quitting time I went to the security office and was surprised to learn that my name is among those listed persons who were seen by Mr. Chambers committing acts of highgrading on September 15, 2000. However, when I quit work on September 20, 2000 I was again called through telephone to appear at the security office. Investigator Felimon Ringor told me that I will give another statement and convinced to tell me all the names of the persons assigned thereat with the promise that I will report for work. With my limited education having not finished grade 1, I was made to give my statement on questions and answers which are self-incriminating and knowingly mentioned names of persons who are innocent. Worst, when I got my copy and the contents were fully explained to me by our legal counsel I was surprised that it was duly notarized when in fact and in truth after I gave my statement I did not appear before Atty. Nina Fe Lazaga-Raffols for swearing. With this circumstances, I hereby RETRACT my statement dated September 20, 2000 for being self incriminatory unassisted by my counsel or union representative and hereby ADAPTS [sic] and RETAINS my sworn statement dated September 16, 2000.[41](Emphasis supplied) In labor cases, in which technical rules of procedure are not to be strictly applied if the result would be detrimental to the workingman, an affidavit of desistance gains added importance in the absence of any evidence on record explicitly showing that the dismissed employee committed the act which caused the dismissal.[42] Accordingly, the Court cannot turn a blind eye and disregard Madao's recantation, as it serves to cast doubt as to the guilt of respondent Liagao. Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the Joint Affidavit, being sourced from Chambers, Damoslog, Daguio and Madao, has no probative value to support evidence to warrant the dismissal of the respondents. Chambers and Daguio did not identify the miners involved in the act of highgrading. In addition, Damoslog's first and second sworn statements did not implicate respondents, and Madao recanted his statement implicating respondent Liagao. As earlier discussed, the sworn statements and joint affidavits of the sources do not corroborate but actually cast doubt as to the veracity of the statements in the Joint Affidavit.

The second ground is not plausible. While the Court agrees that the job of the respondents, as miners, although generally described as menial, is nevertheless of such nature as to require a substantial amount of trust and confidence on the part of petitioner,[43] the rule that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required to terminate an employee on the charge of loss of confidence, and that it is sufficient that there be some basis for such loss of confidence, is not absolute.[44] The right of an employer to dismiss an employee on the ground that it has lost its trust and confidence in him must not be exercised arbitrarily and without just cause.[45] In order that loss of trust and confidence may be considered as a valid ground for an employee's dismissal, it must be substantial and not arbitrary, and must be founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant the employee's separation from work.[46] In the present case, the Court reiterates that the evidence is not substantial to hold respondents guilty of highgrading so as to warrant the dismissal of respondents. Moreover, it is a well-settled doctrine that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing, should be resolved in the former's favor. The policy is to extend the doctrine to a greater number of employees who can avail themselves of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor.[47] Lastly, respondents' prayer in their Comment[48] and Memorandum,[49] that the CA Decision be modified by ordering their reinstatement to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and with payment of full backwages from their alleged dismissal up to date of reinstatement, deserves scant consideration. Respondents are estopped from claiming their right to reinstatement. Records show that respondents along with their co-accused, filed an appeal with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75457 questioning the decision of the NLRC. The said appeal was denied by the CA. The case was then elevated to this Court through a petition for review, entitledThomas Garcia v. Court of Appeals, docketed as G.R. No. 162554. However, the same was denied with finality for having been filed out of time. [50] In effect, it serves to estop the respondents from praying for their reinstatement in the present case. Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, which is also known as "reclusion of issues" or "collateral estoppel," issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.[51] Applied to the present case, the "former suit" refers to CA-G.R. SP No. 75457 wherein the CA ordered separation pay instead of reinstatement and G.R. No. 162554 wherein this Court denied the petition for review filed by respondents together with other dismissed workers. The "future case" is the present case in which the petitioner is Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company assailing the validity of the CA Decision declaring the dismissal of respondents to be illegal. Reinstatement was not an issue raised by herein petitioner. Respondents cannot

now be allowed to raise the same in the petition filed by petitioner, for that would circumvent the finality of judgment as to separation pay insofar as respondents are concerned. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 7, 2003 and its Resolution dated April 15, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 75860 are AFFIRMED. Double costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

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[G.R. No. 148241. September 27, 2002] HANTEX TRADING CO., INC., and/or MARIANO CHUA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Special Former Tenth Division, and BERNARDO SINGSON, respondents. DECISION BELLOSILLO, J.: This petition seeks to review the Decision of the Court of Appeals [1] affirming in toto the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which in turn sustained the Labor Arbiter's finding that respondent was illegally dismissed and therefore entitled to reinstatement, backwages and 13th month pay. Private respondent Bernardo Singson was employed by petitioner Hantex Trading Co., Inc. (HANTEX) on 8 November 1994 as sales representative. HANTEX was engaged in selling laminating machines and ID supplies. He was paid a regular salary of P165.00/day in addition to P500.00 travelling allowance and a 3% - 5% commission from his sales. Sometime in February 1996 the management of HANTEX called the attention of Singson regarding his deteriorating sales performance. Despite thereof, Singson's performance showed no sign of improvement as it remained inadequate and unsatisfactory. Thus, HANTEX, through its president, petitioner Mariano Chua, held a "one-on-one" conference with him on 5 August 1996. The parties presented conflicting versions of what actually transpired during the conference. Singson alleged that petitioner Mariano Chua asked for his resignation from the company, and required him to submit a resignation letter otherwise his separation pay, 13th month pay and other monetary benefits would not be paid. When he refused, petitioner

Mariano Chua ejected him from the premises of HANTEX and left instructions to the guards onduty to refuse him admittance. On the other hand, petitioners denied that they dismissed Singson and maintained that the conference was merely intended to motivate him "to exert more effort in his job and mend his work attitude;" and that Singson apparently resented petitioner Chua for it that he never reported back for work after the conference. On 8 August 1996 Singson filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement asserting that he was dismissed from his employment without prior notice and hearing.[2] On the contrary, HANTEX averred that Singson was not dismissed but abandoned his job after he was reprimanded. On 5 May 1998 the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding private respondent Singson to have been illegally dismissed and ordering HANTEX to reinstate him to his former or substantially equivalent position, as well as to pay him P234,848.38 as backwages and P8,992.60 as 13th month pay.[3] HANTEX appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which affirmed the Labor Arbiter's finding of illegal dismissal but ordered the reduction of backwages, holding that the computation thereof should start not from the date complainant was hired in 1994 as held by the Labor Arbiter, but from the date he was illegally dismissed in 1996. The NLRC observed The respondents would want us to believe that on August 5, 1996, they merely reprimanded complainant for his poor performance (p. 10, Appeal, p. 109, Record). However, they have not submitted any proof thereon, unlike on November 21, 1995 when they sent him a memorandum, which he duly received, calling attention to his work deportment x x x x Just because respondent asked him to assume duties during the hearing before the Labor Arbiter on September 30, 1996 (p. 7, Record) does not necessarily prove that they in fact did not dismiss him in the first place. On the contrary, that offer could be a tacit admission of respondents that they erred in dismissing him verbally and without observance of both substantive and procedural due process x x x x On the matter of complainants alleged abandonment x x x x suffice it to say that his mere filing of a case for illegal dismissal already negates the theory of abandonment x x x x However, we find merit in respondents argument regarding the award of backwages. Indeed, it was glaring error to base the computation thereof from the date complainant was hired in 1994. Rather, the computation should start from the date he was found to have been illegally dismissed x x x x [4] On 8 June 2000 HANTEX and/or Mariano Chua, undaunted by reverses, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari [5] arguing that: (a) the complaint for illegal dismissal was a mere ploy of private respondent to get back at them; (b) there was no termination letter which is the best evidence of the alleged illegal dismissal, consequently, the NLRC should have adjudged that private respondent was not dismissed but had voluntarily abandoned his employment; and, (c) private respondent's rejection of petitioners' offer for him to resume his employment during the preliminary conference before the Labor Arbiter was an overt act of abandonment. The appellate court, however, likewise ruled against petitioners -

An ordinary member of the working class will not put at stake his primary source of income just to satisfy his egoistic feeling of revenge. The expense of a protracted legal battle against a wellequipped employer coupled with the uncertainty of winning and the prospect of a prolonged unemployment are factors that negate petitioners supposition. Furthermore, a letter of dismissal is not the only material evidence to establish the fact of termination. For in cases of constructive dismissal, as when the employee was compelled to resign because continued employment has become impossible, unreasonable and unlikely, his quitting his job amounts to constructive discharge or illegal dismissal. Likewise, we find petitioners argument in support of their abandonment theory as misplaced x x x that offer could be a tacit admission of petitioners that they erred in dismissing him verbally and without observance of both substantive and procedural due process x x x x Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals on 10 May 2001, petitioners now hope to secure relief from this Court. Relying once more on their defense of abandonment, petitioners insist that other than the bare allegations of private respondent that he was illegally dismissed, the records are bereft of any evidence to prove that petitioners indeed terminated his services; that moreover, no notice or letter of dismissal was ever issued by petitioners to private respondent, as there was no intent to dismiss him when he was called to a conference on 5 August 1996; and, that he was not prevented from returning to work as in fact he was asked repeatedly to return to work, but he defiantly refused to do so. To avoid delay in the disposition of the case, it appearing from the records that the parties had already fully ventilated and exhaustively argued their respective positions before the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, and even before this Court, through their respective petition, comment and reply, we dispensed with the usual practice of requiring the parties to submit their memoranda and would now proceed to decide the case. The pivotal issue in the present recourse is whether private respondent Bernardo Singson deliberately abandoned his employment, or was illegally dismissed by the management of petitioner HANTEX. We deny the petition. Plainly, the petition raises a fundamentally factual issue, which we are not at liberty to review because our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. The resolution of factual questions is the primary and often the final task of lower courts. This Court is not a trier of facts and it is not our function to examine and evaluate all over again the probative value of all evidence presented to the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or order.[6] We reiterate time and again the much-repeated but not so well-heeded rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, particularly where it is in absolute agreement with that of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, as in this case, are accorded not only respect but even finality and are deemed binding upon this Court so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. [7] In any event, we waded into the records of this case and found no compelling reason to disturb the unanimous findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals, NLRC and the Labor

Arbiter. Indeed, petitioners' persistent refrain, ad nauseam, that private respondent Singson was not dismissed but voluntarily abandoned his employment, fails to persuade. Considering the hard times in which we are in, it is incongruous for respondent to simply give up his work after receiving a mere reprimand from his employer. No employee would recklessly abandon his job knowing fully well the acute unemployment problem and the difficulty of looking for a means of livelihood nowadays. With a family to support, we doubt very much that respondent would so easily sacrifice his only source of income and unduly expose his family to hunger and untold hardships. Certainly, no man in his right mind would do such thing. What is more telling is that on 8 June 1996, or three (3) days after his employment was terminated, respondent immediately instituted the instant case for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement against his employer. An employee who loses no time in protesting his layoff cannot by any reasoning be said to have abandoned his work, for it is already a wellsettled doctrine that the filing by an employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement is proof enough of his desire to return to work, thus negating the employer's charge of abandonment. Verily, it would be illogical for respondent Singson to have left his job and thereafter file the complaint against his employer. As we held in Villar v. National Labor Relations Commission[8] x x x x It is clear from the records that sometime in August 1994, immediately after petitioners supposedly refused to work having lost earlier in the certification election, several complaints for illegal dismissal against HI-TECH were filed by petitioners. These are sufficient proofs that they were never guilty of leaving their jobs. The concept of abandonment of work is inconsistent with the immediate filing of complaints for illegal dismissal. An employee who took steps to protest his layoff could not by any logic be said to have abandoned his work. Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be presumed from certain equivocal acts. For abandonment to exist, it is essential (a) that the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and, (b) that there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts - the second element is the more determinative factor. Mere absence of the employee is not sufficient. The burden of proof is on the employer to show a clear and deliberate intent on the part of the employee to discontinue employment without any intention of returning. Petitioners dismally failed to discharge their burden. Their evidence, consisting entirely of cash vouchers of respondent SINGSON and his co-salesman Raul Hista, for the months of May, June and July 1996,[9] is grossly anemic - if not totally irrelevant - to establish that respondent Singson indeed deliberately and unjustifiably abandoned his job. At best, these cash vouchers merely show respondent's lackluster performance during those months, and that he paled in comparison with his co-salesman Raul Hista in terms of sales output. As astutely observed by the Court of Appeals x x x x Neither can we see any evidentiary relevance of the vouchers of Raul Hista in comparison with that of private respondent. They do not in any way vouch petitioners claim of

abandonment nor do they refute the fact that private respondent was illegally dismissed because of petitioners failure to observe the substantive as well as the procedural requirements of the law. If at all, they merely show the unsatisfactory performance of private respondent which does not in any way authorizes the abrupt dismissal of private respondent sans observance of due process. At any rate, petitioners undoubtedly could have presented better evidence to buttress their claim of abandonment. After all, being the employers, they are in possession of documents relevant to this case. For instance, they could have at least presented in evidence copies of respondent's daily time records, which are on-file in its office, to prove the dates respondent was on AWOL (absence without leave); or any letter wherein they required respondent to report for work and explain his unauthorized absences. But, as it is, petitioners' defense of abandonment cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary support. Petitioners maintain that during the initial hearing before Labor Arbiter Bugarin on 30 September 1996 they made an offer to reinstate private respondent to his former position, but he "defiantly" refused the offer despite the fact that in his complaint he was asking for reinstatement. Again, petitioners extended the offer in their position paper filed with the Labor Arbiter but was likewise rejected by respondent. They assert that these circumstances are clear indications of respondent's lack of further interest to work and effectively negate respondent's claim of illegal dismissal. We hold otherwise. As we see it, respondent's refusal to be reinstated is more of a symptom of strained relations between the parties, rather than an indicium of abandonment of work as obstinately insisted by petitioners. While respondent desires to have his job back, it must have later dawned on him that the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal and the bitter incidents that followed have sundered the erstwhile harmonious relationship between the parties. Respondent must have surely realized that even if reinstated, he will find it uncomfortable to continue working under the hostile eyes of the employer who had been forced to reinstate him. He had every reason to fear that if he accepted petitioners' offer, their watchful eyes would thereafter be focused on him, to detect every small shortcoming of his as a ground for vindictive disciplinary action.[10] In such instance, reinstatement would no longer be beneficial to him. Neither does the fact that petitioners made offers to reinstate respondent legally disproves illegal dismissal. We agree with the observation of the Court of Appeals that the offer may very well be "a tacit admission of petitioners that they erred in dismissing him verbally and without observance of both substantive and procedural due process." Curiously, petitioners' offer of reinstatement was made only after more than one (1) month from the date of the filing of the illegal dismissal case. Their belated gesture of goodwill is highly suspect. If petitioners were indeed sincere in inviting respondent back to work in the company, they could have made the offer much sooner. In any case, their intentions in making the offer are immaterial, for the offer to re-employ respondent could not have the effect of validating an otherwise arbitrary dismissal. In sum, we are convinced that respondent did not quit his job as insisted by petitioners, but was unceremoniously dismissed therefrom without observing the twin requirements of due

process, i.e., due notice and hearing. While we recognize the right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee for a just or authorized cause, nevertheless, the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of law and pursuant to the tenets of equity and fair play. Truly, the employer's power to discipline its workers may not be exercised in an arbitrary manner as to erode the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. Whatever doubts, uncertainties or ambiguities remain in this case should ultimately be resolved in favor of the worker in line with the social justice policy of our labor laws and the Constitution. The consistent rule is that the employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause, failing in which makes the termination illegal. Upon the foregoing considerations, the normal consequences of respondent's illegal dismissal are reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, and payment of back wages computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him, that is, 5 August 1996, up to the date of his actual reinstatement. These remedies give life to the workers' constitutional right to security of tenure. However, under the circumstances, reinstatement would be impractical and would hardly promote the best interest of the parties. As heretofore discussed, the resentment and enmity between HANTEX and Singson which culminated in and was compounded by the illegal dismissal suit necessarily strained the relationship between them or even provoked antipathy and antagonism. Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service should be awarded as an alternative. This has been our consistent ruling in the award of separation pay to illegally dismissed employees in lieu of reinstatement.[11] WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision dated 23 October 2000 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Petitioners Hantex Trading Co., Inc., and Mariano Chua are directed jointly and severally to pay respondent Bernardo Singson separation pay in lieu of reinstatement in the amount equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, backwages computed from 5 August 2002, the time his compensation was withheld from him, up to the finality of this decision, plus the accrued 13th month pay. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 146621. July 30, 2004] RENE P. VALIAO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION-FOURTH DIVISION (Cebu City), WEST NEGROS COLLEGE, respondents. DECISION QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari is the Decision[1] dated August 22, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55133, and its Resolution[2]dated November 22, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner and affirmed the Resolution dated July 7, 1999 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)-Fourth Division in NLRC Case No. V-000134-98 (RAB Case No. 06-01-10026-95), which sustained the Decision of Labor Arbiter Benjamin E. Pelaez, directing private respondent West Negros College (WNC) to pay petitioner Rene P. Valiaos salary during the period of his preventive suspension and attorneys fees, while dismissing all other claims. The facts, as culled from records, are as follows: On February 5, 1990, petitioner Rene Valiao was appointed by private respondent West Negros College (WNC) as Student Affairs Office (SAO) Director, with a starting salary of P2,800 per month. On May 14, 1990, he was assigned as Acting Director, Alumni Affairs Office. On July 29, 1990, petitioner was transferred to a staff position and designated as Records Chief at the Registrars Office but was again re-assigned as a typist on June 24, 1991. The latest re-assignment was due to his tardiness and absences, as reflected in the summary of tardiness and absences report, which showed him to have been absent or late for work from a minimum of seven (7) to a maximum of seventy-five (75) minutes for the period March to October 31, 1991, and to have reported late almost every day for the period November to December 1991. Copies of his tardiness/absences reports were furnished petitioner, along with memoranda requiring him to explain but his explanations were either unacceptable or unsatisfactory. Subsequent reports also showed that he did not change his habits resulting in tardiness and absences. He was even caught one time manipulating the bundy clock, thus necessitating another memorandum to him asking him to explain his dishonest actuations in accomplishing the daily attendance logbook and in using the bundy clock. On December 10, 1991, petitioner received a suspension order without pay for fifteen (15) days effective January 1, 1992, because of dishonesty in reporting his actual attendance. After serving the suspension, the petitioner reported back to office on January 16, 1992. On June 15, 1992, another adverse report on tardiness and absences from the Registrar was made against the petitioner prompting WNC to send him another memorandum with an attached tardiness and absences report, calling his attention on his tardiness and absences for the period February to April 1992. On June 20, 1992, petitioner sent a letter of appeal and explained his side to the new college president, Suzette Arbolario-Agustin, who gave petitioner another chance. The petitioner was then appointed as Information Assistant effective immediately. However, the petitioner did not immediately assume the post of Information Assistant prompting the President of private respondent WNC to call his attention. When the petitioner finally assumed his post, he was allowed a part-time teaching job in the same school to augment his income.

Sometime in December 1992, WNC won a case against the officials of the union before the NLRC. Petitioner was ordered to prepare a media blitz of this victory but the petitioner did not comply with the order on the ground that such a press release would only worsen the already aggravated situation and strained relations between WNC management and the union officials. When petitioner reported for work on the first day of January 1993, he was relieved from his post and transferred to the College of Liberal Arts as Records Evaluator. Not for long, the Dean of the Liberal Arts sent a letter to the Human Resources Manager complaining about the petitioners poor performance and habitual absenteeism, as shown in the daily absence reports. On January 18, 1993, petitioner was again absent from work without permission or notice to his immediate superior. It turned out that he went to Bacolod City and on January 28, 1993, the petitioner was one of those arrested during a raid in the house of one Toto Ruiz, a suspected drug pusher and was brought to the Bacolod Police Station along with four (4) other suspects. Upon further search and investigation by the Narcotics Control Division, the petitioner was found possessing two (2) suspected marijuana roaches (butts) which were placed inside his left shoe. The event was widely publicized, focusing on petitioners position as an Economics teacher of WNC, and considering further that one of his fellow suspects was a member of the Philippine Army, who was caught with an unlicensed firearm, a tooter and other shabu paraphernalia. The petitioner and other suspects were then charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425, as amended). Petitioner was asked to explain within 24 hours why he should not be terminated as a result of the raid and the charges against him for violation of Rep. Act No. 6425 as amended. Petitioner allegedly was not able to answer immediately since he was in jail and received said memorandum only on January 30, 1993, although his wife had earlier received the memorandum on January 28, 1993. On January 29, 1993, the petitioner was dismissed for failure to answer said memorandum. On February 1, 1993, the petitioner wrote to the President of WNC explaining his side and asking for due process. WNC cancelled its Notice of Termination dated January 29, 1993, and granted the petitioners request. The petitioner was notified through a memorandum about the grant of his request and that a hearing would be conducted. He was then placed under preventive suspension and an investigation committee was organized to conduct the probe. On March 6, 1993, a notice of hearing/investigation was sent to the petitioner. After the investigation attended by the petitioner and his counsel, with proceedings duly recorded, the investigation committee recommended the dismissal of petitioner. A notice of termination was then sent to petitioner informing him of his termination from the service for serious misconduct and gross and habitual neglect of duty. The petitioner received the notice on March 25, 1993, but did not file a grievance concerning the notice of termination. On January 19, 1995, petitioner filed a Complaint against WNC for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, backwages, salary differential for salary increases and other benefits granted after his dismissal as well as for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

In its Answer, WNC alleged that petitioner was dismissed on charges of serious misconduct, and gross and willful neglect of duty. WNC said his dismissal was effected after due notice and prior hearing. It claimed also that since petitioner was terminated for a valid cause after a due hearing, the latters claim for moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees had no basis in fact and in law. After due proceedings, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the decretal portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DIRECTING respondent West Negros College to pay complainant Rene P. Valiao (a) P3,300.00 as salary for the period of his preventive suspension, and (b) P330.00 as attorneys fees, or the total amount of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS (P3,630.00). Further, all other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.[3] The Labor Arbiter found no justifiable reason to place the petitioner under preventive suspension as there was no serious or imminent threat to the life or property of his employer or co-workers. However, the Labor Arbiter found the dismissal of the petitioner from WNC to be valid due to absenteeism and tardiness and after he was accorded the procedural due process aspect of the law as reflected in the records showing that the petitioner was formally investigated and given the opportunity to refute the alleged findings by the management of WNC. The Labor Arbiter held that frequent absenteeism and tardiness of the petitioner constituted not only willful disobedience but also gross and habitual neglect of duties, which are valid grounds for termination of employment. He stressed that the petitioners frequent absences without proper leave of absence was not only unfair to WNC and the petitioners co-employees but also set an undesirable example to the employees under his supervision, considering that the petitioner was not a mere rank-and-file employee but one who owed more than the usual fealty to the organization. On appeal to the NLRC, the latter affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, sustained the latters findings of facts, and made its own findings on the apprehension of the petitioner for possession of prohibited drugs. The decretal portion of the decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED and the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter is AFFIRMED in its entirety. SO ORDERED.[4] Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals but this was dismissed for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision and Resolution dated December 11, 1998 and July 7, 1999, respectively, of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.[5] The Court of Appeals held that the petitioner was validly dismissed for serious misconduct and gross habitual neglect of duties, which was aggravated by his arrest for violation of Rep. Act

No. 6425, as amended [the January 28, 1993 incident] and that he was afforded the twin requirements of notice and hearing and the opportunity to defend himself by the investigating committee. The appellate court noted that WNC had presented sufficient evidence to support petitioners termination from employment after taking into consideration the totality of the infractions or the number of violations committed by petitioner during the period of employment and stressed that it properly exercised its management prerogative by observing due process. Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that the NLRC correctly denied the claim for damages and attorneys fees for lack of evidentiary support. Petitioner duly filed a Motion of Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition alleging that: A. THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER WAS VALID, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE IS CLEAR AND BLATANT VIOLATION OF THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. B. THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN (SIC) DISMISSING THE RELIEFS FOR MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES.[6] In our view, the only relevant issue for our resolution is whether or not the petitioner was validly dismissed from employment on the ground of serious misconduct and gross habitual neglect of duties, including habitual tardiness and absenteeism. Petitioner claims that his outright dismissal from employment was not valid and too harsh and that he was not dismissed from employment because of tardiness or absences but because he was among those apprehended in a raid. Also, he was not accorded due process because although his wife received the show cause notice, he did not have the proper mind to reply as he was in jail and was psychologically disturbed. Considering the submissions of the parties as well as the records before us, we find the petition without merit. Petitioners dismissal from employment is valid and justified. For an employees dismissal to be valid, (a) the dismissal must be for a valid cause and (b) the employee must be afforded due process.[7] Serious misconduct and habitual neglect of duties are among the just causes for terminating an employee under the Labor Code of the Philippines. Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of ones duties. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances. [8] The Labor Arbiters findings that petitioners habitual absenteeism and tardiness constitute gross and habitual neglect of duties that justified his termination of employment are sufficiently supported by evidence on record. Petitioners repeated acts of absences without leave and his frequent tardiness reflect his indifferent attitude to and lack of motivation in his work. More importantly, his repeated and habitual infractions, committed despite several warnings, constitute gross misconduct unexpected from an employee of petitioners stature. This Court

has held that habitual absenteeism without leave constitute gross negligence and is sufficient to justify termination of an employee.[9] However, petitioner claims that he was dismissed not for his tardiness or absences but for his arrest as a suspected drug user. His claim, however, is merely speculative. We find such contention devoid of basis. First, the decisions of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals are indubitable. They show that indeed petitioner had incurred numerous and repeated absences without any leave. Moreover, he was not punctual in reporting for work. These unexplained absences and tardiness were reflected on the summary reports submitted by WNC before the labor arbiter, but petitioner failed to controvert said reports. Second, contrary to petitioners assertion, the NLRC did not base its conclusions on the fact of the arrest of petitioner for violation of Rep. Act No. 6425 but on the totality of the number of infractions incurred by the petitioner during the period of his employment in different positions he occupied at WNC. Thus: In the case of petitioner Valiao, his services were terminated by private respondent after having been found guilty of serious misconduct and gross habitual neglect of duty which was aggravated by the January 28, 1993 incident. In exercising such management prerogative, due process was properly observed. Private respondent presented sufficient evidence to support its act in terminating the services of petitioner. Private respondent took into consideration the totality of the infractions or the number of violations committed by petitioner during the period of employment. Furthermore, it hardly needs reminding that, in view of petitioners position and responsibilities, he must demonstrate a scrupulous regard for rules and policies befitting those who would be role models for their young charges.[10] (Emphasis and italics supplied) Indeed, even without the arrest incident, WNC had more than enough basis for terminating petitioner from employment. It bears stressing that petitioners absences and tardiness were not isolated incidents but manifested a pattern of habituality. In one case, we held that where the records clearly show that the employee has not only been charged with the offense of highgrading but also has been warned 21 times for absences without official leave, these repeated acts of misconduct and willful breach of trust by an employee justify his dismissal and forfeiture of his right to security of tenure.[11] The totality of infractions or the number of violations committed during the period of employment shall be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed upon an erring employee. The offenses committed by him should not be taken singly and separately but in their totality. Fitness for continued employment cannot be compartmentalized into tight little cubicles of aspects of character, conduct, and ability separate and independent of each other.[12] Needless to say, so irresponsible an employee like petitioner does not deserve a place in the workplace, and it is within the managements prerogative of WNC to terminate his employment. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the rights of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. As long as the companys exercise of those rights and prerogative is in good faith to advance its interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under the laws or valid agreements, such exercise will be upheld.[13]

Still, petitioner claims that he was not afforded due process so that his dismissal from employment should be declared invalid. This contention deserves scant consideration. The Court of Appeals held that the records reveal that petitioner was afforded the twin requirements of notice and hearing and was likewise given the opportunity to defend himself before the investigating committee. We find no reason to set aside these factual findings of the Court of Appeals as they are supported by evidence on record. Besides, we may not review the appellate courts findings of fact in an appeal via certiorari,[14] since as a rule, the Supreme Courts review is limited to errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. [15] Judicial review of labor cases does not go as far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and National Labor Relations Commission based their determinations.[16] In this case, petitioner was asked to explain his several absences and tardiness on many occasions. A notice to explain was sent to him regarding the arrest incident wherein he was able to reply. An investigation committee was formed by WNC to investigate the arrest incident and the absences and tardiness of petitioner. It must be emphasized that proceedings of the committee were duly recorded, and petitioner actively participated therein by answering the various questions interposed by the panel members. Finally, a notice of his termination was sent to petitioner, although he claims to have received it late as he was in jail. It is an undeniable fact, however, that his wife had actually received the notice in his house earlier, even before petitioners termination and this matter was later communicated to him. At any rate, petitioner was given enough opportunity to be heard, and his dismissal was based on valid grounds. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential, as the due process requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice and hearing.[17] Finally, the Labor Arbiter found that petitioner is entitled to salary differentials for the period of his preventive suspension, as there is no sufficient basis shown to justify his preventive suspension. During the pendency of the investigation, the employer may place the worker concerned under preventive suspension if his continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to life or property of the employer or of his co-workers.[18] But in this case, there is no indication that petitioner posed a serious threat to the life and property of the employer or his co-employees. Neither was it shown that he was in such a position to unduly influence the outcome of the investigation. Hence, his preventive suspension could not be justified, and the payment of his salary differentials is in order. However, the award of attorneys fees to him cannot be sustained, in view of our findings that petitioner was validly dismissed from employment. Said award lacks legal basis and could not be granted properly in this case. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated August 22, 2000 and Resolution dated November 22, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55133 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of attorneys fees is deleted. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Labor Rel cases: Phil Today Inc V NLRC, GR No. 112965 Servidad V NLRC, GR No. 128682 Pakistan Airlines Corp V Ople, GR No. 61594 Phil Telegraph and Telephone Co V NLRC, GR No. 118978 Asia Transmission Corp V CA, GR. No. 144664 Hanjin Heavy Industries Corp V Ibanez, GR. No. 170181 Valiao V CA, GR No. 146621