G.R. No.

119991

November 20, 2000

OLIMPIA DIANCIN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NORMA ESTAMPADOR BOSQUE, VEVENCIA ESTAMPADOR BEBIDOR, RAUL ESTAMPADOR, AURORA ESTAMPADOR, LUZ ESTAMPADOR BERAMO and FE ESTAMPADOR DECENA,respondents. PARDO, J.: Petitioner appeals via certiorari from the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification, the decision of the regional trial court declaring the initial deed of sale dated August 7, 1967, and the final deed of sale dated June 28, 1969, null and void with respect to the six-seventh (6/7) share of the one-half (1/2) conjugal share of the late Tiburcio Estampador, and ordering petitioner Olympia Diancin2 to reconvey the six-seventh (6/7) share of the onehalf (1/2) conjugal share to private respondents who are the lawful owners. Tiburcio Estampador, Sr. and Matilde Gulmatico were married on December 30, 1933, in Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. Out of their union, the following children were born, namely, Norma, Vevencia, Raul, Aurora, Luz and Fe, all surnamed Estampador. On April 9, 1940, Matilde was granted Ordinary Fishpond Permit No. F-1777-0 issued pursuant to Fisheries Act No. 4003 covering an area of 10.47 hectares, situated in Barrio Jalaud, Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. This was renewed on November 24, 1945, under Ordinary Fishpond Permit No. F-50-A. The permit was last renewed on February 24, 1972, to expire on December 31, 1972. On March 2, 1957, Tiburcio, Sr. died. Almost one (1) year after, or on August 7, 1967, Matilde initially sold to petitioner Olimpia Diancin the leasehold right on the fishpond. By virtue of a deed of sale executed on June 28, 1969, the leasehold right was fully sold to petitioner Olimpia for the total amount of thirty one thousand pesos (P31,000.00).3 On January 3, 1989, the children (herein private respondents) of deceased Tiburcio, Sr. filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Iloilo City a complaint against petitioner Olimpia and Matilde, for declaration of nullity and recovery of one-half (1/2) conjugal share of deceased Tiburcio Estampador, Sr., in the fishpond leasehold right which Matilde had sold to petitioner.4 On February 27, 1990, the trial court ordered that Matilde be dropped from the case. On March 16, 1989, petitioner Olimpia filed her answer to the complaint, and alleged that the fishpond was actually government owned covered by a fishpond permit exclusively granted to Matilde Estampador.5 On August 13, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which provides: "WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Olympia Diancin. "The initial Deed of Sale, Exh. 'A', dated August 7, 1967, and the final Deed of Sale, Exh. 'A-2', dated June 28, 1969, are hereby declared null and void with respect to the one-half (1/2) conjugal share of the late Tiburcio Estampador. Accordingly, the defendant Olympia Diancin, is ordered to reconvey the same share of the Fishpond Leasehold Right to the plaintiffs who are the lawful owners thereof. "The plaintiffs are ordered to pay attorney's fees to Atty. Raymundo Magat in accordance with their contract, if there is any; otherwise, by quantum meruit. "SO ORDERED."6 Within the reglementary period to perfect its appeal, petitioner Olimpia appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the court a quo erred in finding that: (a) the fishpond permit granted to Matilde G. Estampador was conjugal property pursuant to the provisions of Articles 153 and 160, Civil Code; and (b) Article 1144, Civil Code, on prescription of action did not apply to the sale of leasehold right. On November 28, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming, with modification, the decision of the trial court. The appellate court held that pursuant to Article 160, in relation to Article 153, Civil Code, the fishpond leasehold right is considered real property and is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership having been acquired during the subsistence of the marriage of Matilde and Tiburcio, on April 9, 1940. With the death of Tiburcio on March 2, 1957, the conjugal partnership of gains was dissolved and one-half (1/2) of the fishpond leasehold property right belonged to Matilde as her share in the conjugal partnership, and another one-seventh (1/7) of the one-half (1/2) remainder as her share in the estate of her deceased spouse. Hence, Matilde had no right to dispose of the entire fishpond leasehold right. What she validly disposed of when she executed the deed of sale in favor of petitioner Olimpia was only her one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal partnership and her one-seventh (1/7) share in the estate of her deceased spouse. In deciding the issue of prescription, the Court of Appeals ruled that an action or defense for the declaration of inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. The sale of the six-seventh (6/7) share of private respondents in the estate of their deceased father to petitioner Olimpia was null and void because Matilde had no authority to dispose of it in its entirety. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads as follows: "WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED save for the modification to read as follows: The initial Deed of Sale dated August 7, 1967 and the final Deed of Sale dated June 28, 1969 are hereby declared null and void with respect to the sixthseventh (6/7) of the one-half (1/2) conjugal share of the late Tiburcio Estampador. Accordingly, the defendant Olimpia Diancin, is ordered to

reconvey the same sixth-seventh (6/7) of one-half (1/2) conjugal share of Tiburcio Estampador to the Fishpond Leasehold Right to the plaintiffs who are the lawful owner thereof. "SO ORDERED."7 On December 14, 1994, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the above-cited decision; however, on March 24, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.8 Hence, this petition.9 Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that: (1) the fishpond leasehold right is part of the conjugal partnership of gains, contrary to the "exclusivity of fishpond right" under Section 63, Fishpond Act;10 and (2) acquisitive prescription did not set in favor of petitioner.11 The petition has no merit. As a general rule, all property acquired by the spouses, regardless of in whose name the same is registered, during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.12 In the case at bar, the fishpond lease right is not paraphernal having been acquired during the coverture of the marriage between Matilde and Tiburcio, which was on April 9, 1940. The fact that the grant was solely in the name of Matilde did not make the property paraphernal property. What was material was the time the fishpond lease right was acquired by the grantee, and that was during the lawful existence of Matilde's marriage to Tiburcio.13 As held by the Court of Appeals, this presumption is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing evidence. The burden of proving that the property belongs exclusively to the wife rests upon the party asserting it. Mere assertion of the property's paraphernal nature is not sufficient. For Olimpia's failure to present evidence that would show that the fishpond lease right was the exclusive property of Matilde, the presumption remained unrebutted. With regard to the disposition of the entire leasehold right made by Matilde after the death of her husband, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Matilde did not have the authority to dispose of it entirely. The death of Tiburcio Estampador on March 2, 1957, dissolved the conjugal partnership of gains, and part of which was the lease right on the fishpond. Only one half (1/2) of the property right pertained to Matilde as her share in the conjugal partnership of gains and another one seventh (1/7) as her share from the estate of her deceased husband, Tiburcio. Their children are entitled to the six seventh (6/7) share in the other half which formed part of the estate of Tiburcio, as his lawful heirs. Be that as it may, the disposition made by Matilde was null and void, not only with regard to the lawful share of her children, but also with regard to her own share because the sale was made without the prior consent and approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.14 The Fisheries Act prohibits the holder of a fishpond permit (the permittee) from transferring or subletting the fishpond granted to him, without the previous consent or approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.15 To the same effect is Condition No. 3 of the fishpond permit, which states that "The permittee shall not transfer or sublet all or any area herein granted or any rights acquired therein without the previous consent and approval of this Office." Moreover, Section 63, Fisheries Act No. 4003 provides: "Permits or leases entitling the holders thereof, for a certain stated period of time not to exceed twenty years, to enter upon definite tracts of a public forest land to be devoted exclusively for fishponds purposes, or to take certain fishery products or to construct fishponds within tidal, mangrove and other swamps, ponds and streams within public forest lands or proclaimed timber lands or established forest reserves may be issued or executed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, subject to the restrictions and limitations imposed by the forest laws and regulations, to such persons, associations or corporations as are qualified to utilize or take forest products under Act Number Thirty-six hundred and seventy four. x x x" [emphasis supplied] The permit was granted solely for the exclusive use of the named grantee, to wit: "This permit is subject to the Laws, Rules and Regulations now existing and to those that may later be promulgated governing utilization, protection, and conservation of fisheries and other aquatic products, and the terms and conditions stated below, on the back of this permit, and on the attached sheet, if any. 1. This permit limits in no way the right of the National Assembly to impose such terms as it may desire upon the use of such area and the collection of charges for such purposes. 2. Nonuse (sic) of the permit within a period of six months after it is granted without a satisfactory explanation or the commission of any violation of its terms by the permittee or his agent may result in the cancellation of the permit and confiscation of the bond. 3. The permittee shall not transfer or sublet all or any portion of the area herein granted or any rights acquired therein."16 [emphasis supplied] The permit grants the permittee the right to enter the area, occupy it, introduce improvements and make production of the area so the government can benefit from it.17 However, he or she can not dispose of it without the prior consent and approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

Considering the void character of the disposition, prescription did not set in, as the action or defense for the declaration of inexistence of a contract is imprescriptible.18 Contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals, we find that the sale of the entire fishpond lease right by Matilde Estampador to Olimpia Diancin was null and void. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for lack of merit. The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 31057 with MODIFICATION. The Initial Deed of Sale dated August 7, 1967 and the Final Deed of Sale dated June 28, 1969 are hereby declared null and void. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990 LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and JESUS YANES, ESTELITA YANES, ANTONIO YANES, ROSARIO YANES, and ILUMINADO YANES, respondents. Francisco G. Banzon for petitioner. Renecio R. Espiritu for private respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of: (a) the decision of the Fourth Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 31, 1983 in AC-G.R. CV No. 56626 entitled "Jesus Yanes et al. v. Dr. Rodolfo Siason et al." affirming the decision dated July 8, 1974 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental insofar as it ordered the petitioners to pay jointly and severally the private respondents the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental and reversing the subject decision insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively and (b) the resolution of said appellate court dated May 30, 1984, denying the motion for reconsideration of its decision. The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B which were originally known as Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental. Lot 773, with an area of 156,549 square meters, was registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes under Original Certificate of Title No. RO-4858 (8804) issued on October 9, 1917 by the Register of Deeds of Occidental Negros (Exh. A). Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. 1 It is not clear why the latter is not included as a party in this case. Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of Lot 823 as she could not attend to the other portions of the two lots which had a total area of around twenty-four hectares. The record does not show whether the children of Felipe also cultivated some portions of the lots but it is established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. 2 It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. RF 2694 (29797) covering Lot 773-A with an area of 37,818 square meters. 3 TCT No. RF 2694 describes Lot 773-A as a portion of Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia and as originally registered under OCT No. 8804. The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831 square meters was also registered in the name of Fortunato D. Santiago on September 6, 1938 Under TCT No. RT-2695 (28192 ). 4 Said transfer certificate of title also contains a certification to the effect that Lot 773-B was originally registered under OCT No. 8804. On May 30, 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. in consideration of the sum of P7,000.00. 5 Consequently, on February 20, 1956, TCT Nos. T-19291 and T-19292 were issued in Fuentebella's name. 6 After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratrix thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special Proceedings No. 4373 in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, a motion requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B. 7 By virtue of a court order granting said motion, 8 on March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. 9 Hence, on April 1, 1958 TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 covering Lots 773-A and 773-B were respectively issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 10 Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed that an accounting of the produce of the land from 1944

up to the filing of the complaint be made by the defendants, that after court approval of said accounting, the share or money equivalent due the plaintiffs be delivered to them, and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the form of attorney's fees. 11 During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13, 1961, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. 12 Accordingly, TCT Nos. 30919 and 30920 were issued to Siason, 13who thereafter, declared the two lots in his name for assessment purposes. 14 Meanwhile, on November 6, 1962, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and in behalf of the other plaintiffs, and assisted by their counsel, filed a manifestation in Civil Case No. 5022 stating that the therein plaintiffs "renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic) any claim, monetary or otherwise, against the defendant Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella in connection with the above-entitled case." 15 On October 11, 1963, a decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 5022, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to the plaintiffs lots Nos. 773 and 823 of the Cadastral Survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 in the name of said defendant, and thereafter to deliver the possession of said lots to the plaintiffs. No special pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. 16 It will be noted that the above-mentioned manifestation of Jesus Yanes was not mentioned in the aforesaid decision. However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773. In his return of service dated October 20, 1965, the sheriff stated that he discovered that Lot 773 had been subdivided into Lots 773-A and 773-B; that they were "in the name" of Rodolfo Siason who had purchased them from Alvarez, and that Lot 773 could not be delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per writ of execution." 17 The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 having met a hindrance, herein private respondents (the Yaneses) filed on July 31, 1965, in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title and for a declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. T-23165 and T23166 issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 18 Thereafter, the court required Rodolfo Siason to produce the certificates of title covering Lots 773 and 823. Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots 773-A, 773-B and 658, not Lots 773 and 823, "in good faith and for a valuable consideration without any knowledge of any lien or encumbrances against said properties"; that the decision in the cadastral proceeding 19 could not be enforced against him as he was not a party thereto; and that the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 could neither be enforced against him not only because he was not a party-litigant therein but also because it had long become final and executory. 20 Finding said manifestation to be well-founded, the cadastral court, in its order of September 4, 1965, nullified its previous order requiring Siason to surrender the certificates of title mentioned therein. 21 In 1968, the Yaneses filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution in Civil Case No. 5022. Siason opposed it. 22 In its order of September 28, 1968 in Civil Case No. 5022, the lower court, noting that the Yaneses had instituted another action for the recovery of the land in question, ruled that at the judgment therein could not be enforced against Siason as he was not a party in the case. 23 The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for recovery of real property with damages. 24 Named defendants therein were Dr. Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez, Flora Alvarez, Raymundo Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. The Yaneses prayed for the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-19291 and 19292 issued to Siason (sic) for being null and void; the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the Yaneses "in accordance with the sheriffs return of service dated October 20, 1965;" Siason's delivery of possession of Lot 773 to the Yaneses; and if, delivery thereof could not be effected, or, if the issuance of a new title could not be made, that the Alvarez and Siason jointly and severally pay the Yaneses the sum of P45,000.00. They also prayed that Siason render an accounting of the fruits of Lot 773 from November 13, 1961 until the filing of the complaint; and that the defendants jointly and severally pay the Yaneses moral damages of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00 plus attorney's fees of P4, 000.00. 25 In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of his titles to Lots 773-A and 773-B, having been passed upon by the court in its order of September 4, 1965, had become res judicata and the Yaneses were estopped from questioning said order. 26 On their part, the Alvarez stated in their answer that the Yaneses' cause of action had been "barred by res judicata, statute of limitation and estoppel." 27 In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that Rodolfo Siason, who purchased the properties in question thru an agent as he was then in Mexico pursuing further medical studies, was a buyer in good faith for a valuable consideration. Although the Yaneses were negligent in their failure to place a notice of lis pendens "before the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order to protect their rights over the property in question" in Civil Case No. 5022, equity demanded that they recover the actual value of the land because the sale thereof executed between Alvarez and Siason was without court approval. 28 The dispositive portion of the decision states: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, judgment is hereby rendered in the following manner: A. The case against the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason and the Register of Deeds are (sic) hereby dismmissed, B. The defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez being the legitimate children of the deceased Rosendo Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre, Negros Occidental; the sum of P2,000.00 as actual damages suffered by the plaintiff; the sum of P5,000.00 representing moral damages and the sum of P2.000 as attorney's fees, all with legal rate of interest from date of the filing of this complaint up to final payment. C. The cross-claim filed by the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason against the defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez is hereby dismissed.

D. Defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay the costs of this suit. SO ORDERED. 29 The Alvarez appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which in its decision of August 31, 1983 30 affirmed the lower court's decision "insofar as it ordered defendants-appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs-appellees the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively." 31 The dispositive portion of said decision reads: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed insofar as it ordered defendants-appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs- appellees the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively. No costs. SO ORDERED. 32 Finding no cogent reason to grant appellants motion for reconsideration, said appellate court denied the same. Hence, the instant petition. ln their memorandum petitioners raised the following issues: 1. Whethere or not the defense of prescription and estoppel had been timely and properly invoked and raised by the petitioners in the lower court. 2. Whether or not the cause and/or causes of action of the private respondents, if ever there are any, as alleged in their complaint dated February 21, 1968 which has been docketed in the trial court as Civil Case No. 8474 supra, are forever barred by statute of limitation and/or prescription of action and estoppel. 3. Whether or not the late Rosendo Alvarez, a defendant in Civil Case No. 5022, supra and father of the petitioners become a privy and/or party to the waiver (Exhibit 4-defendant Siason) in Civil Case No. 8474, supra where the private respondents had unqualifiedly and absolutely waived, renounced and quitclaimed all their alleged rights and interests, if ever there is any, on Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre as appearing in their written manifestation dated November 6, 1962 (Exhibits "4" Siason) which had not been controverted or even impliedly or indirectly denied by them. 4. Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr. Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, could be legally passed or transmitted by operations (sic) of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due process . 33 The petition is devoid of merit. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, it is powerless and for that matter so is the Supreme Court, to review the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 ordering Alvarez to reconvey the lots in dispute to herein private respondents. Said decision had long become final and executory and with the possible exception of Dr. Siason, who was not a party to said case, the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 is the law of the case between the parties thereto. It ended when Alvarez or his heirs failed to appeal the decision against them. 34 Thus, it is axiomatic that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. 35 As consistently ruled by this Court, every litigation must come to an end. Access to the court is guaranteed. But there must be a limit to it. Once a litigant's right has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to return for another try. The prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigation were to be allowed, unscrupulous litigations will multiply in number to the detriment of the administration of justice. 36 There is no dispute that the rights of the Yaneses to the properties in question have been finally adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022. As found by the lower court, from the uncontroverted evidence presented, the Yaneses have been illegally deprived of ownership and possession of the lots in question. 37 In fact, Civil Case No. 8474 now under review, arose from the failure to execute Civil Case No. 5022, as subject lots can no longer be reconveyed to private respondents Yaneses, the same having been sold during the pendency of the case by the petitioners' father to Dr. Siason who did not know about the controversy, there being no lis pendens annotated on the titles. Hence, it was also settled beyond question that Dr. Siason is a purchaser in good faith. Under the circumstances, the trial court did not annul the sale executed by Alvarez in favor of Dr. Siason on November 11, 1961 but in fact sustained it. The trial court ordered the heirs of Rosendo Alvarez who lost in Civil Case No. 5022 to pay the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) the amount of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of the subdivided lots in dispute. It did not order defendant Siason to pay said amount. 38 As to the propriety of the present case, it has long been established that the sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. 39 "It is one thing to protect an innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter and one devoid of justification if deceit would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious decided As clearly revealed by the undeviating line of decisions coming from this Court, such an undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to be guarded against." 40 The issue on the right to the properties in litigation having been finally adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022 in favor of private respondents, it cannot now be reopened in the instant case on the pretext that the defenses of prescription and estoppel have not been properly considered by the lower court. Petitioners

could have appealed in the former case but they did not. They have therefore foreclosed their rights, if any, and they cannot now be heard to complain in another case in order to defeat the enforcement of a judgment which has longing become final and executory. Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death. Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state: Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death. Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property received from the decedent. As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc. 41 The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive. Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco has characterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other. xxx xxx xxx Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate. 42 It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance. With this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there are other properties left by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in favor of private respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987 INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner, vs. FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES,respondents. Jose B. Echaves for petitioner. Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the question raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law. It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix of the said estate. In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4. This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975. These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales. Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The trial court denied her plea. Hence this petition. In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First is a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second are the Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow from getting a share of the estate in question final as against the said widow? Our answer to the first question is in the negative. Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are: Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares. Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation. Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions. Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code. Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that: Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs: (1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants; (2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants; (3) The widow or widower; (4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction; (5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287; Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved. The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code. The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit: We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. ... (Emphasis supplied). By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code. The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil Code, viz Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited. Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.) Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law. Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales. On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner. Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court for further proceedings. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972 CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee. Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellant. D. G. Eufemio for respondent-appellee.

REYES J.B.L., J.:p Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, for review by certiorari of an order, dated 29 July 1969, of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 20387, dismissing said case for legal separation on the ground that the death of the therein plaintiff, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred during the pendency of the case, abated the cause of action as well as the action itself. The dismissal order was issued over the objection of Macario Lapuz, the heir of the deceased plaintiff (and petitioner herein) who sought to substitute the deceased and to have the case prosecuted to final judgment.

On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. In his second amended answer to the petition, herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses, and, along with several other claims involving money and other properties, counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok. Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. But before the trial could be completed (the respondent was already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence on 9 and 18 June 1969), petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her death. On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation" 1 on two (2) grounds, namely: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion. On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order under review, dismissing the case. 2 In the body of the order, the court stated that the motion to dismiss and the motion for substitution had to be resolved on the question of whether or not the plaintiff's cause of action has survived, which the court resolved in the negative. Petitioner's moved to reconsider but the motion was denied on 15 September 1969. After first securing an extension of time to file a petition for review of the order of dismissal issued by the juvenile and domestic relations court, the petitioner filed the present petition on 14 October 1969. The same was given due course and answer thereto was filed by respondent, who prayed for the affirmance of the said order. 3 Although the defendant below, the herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio, filed counterclaims, he did not pursue them after the court below dismissed the case. He acquiesced in the dismissal of said counterclaims by praying for the affirmance of the order that dismissed not only the petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and void ab initio. But petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy (through her self-assumed substitute for the lower court did not act on the motion for substitution) stated the principal issue to be as follows: When an action for legal separation is converted by the counterclaim into one for a declaration of nullity of a marriage, does the death of a party abate the proceedings? The issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a supposed conversion of a legal separation suit to one for declaration of nullity of a marriage, which is without basis, for even petitioner asserted that "the respondent has acquiesced to the dismissal of his counterclaim" (Petitioner's Brief, page 22). Not only this. The petition for legal separation and the counterclaim to declare the nullity of the self same marriage can stand independent and separate adjudication. They are not inseparable nor was the action for legal separation converted into one for a declaration of nullity by the counterclaim, for legal separation presupposes a valid marriage, while the petition for nullity has a voidable marriage as a pre-condition. The first real issue in this case is: Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights? . An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona. ... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place during the course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3). The action is absolutely dead (Cass., July 27, 1871, D. 71. 1. 81; Cass. req., May 8, 1933, D. H. 1933, 332.") 4 . Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an action for divorce is a proceeding brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that relation. The action is one of a personal nature. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death has settled the question of separation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the action and of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts are almost unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a divorce proceeding, before final decree, abates the action. 1 Corpus Juris, 208; Wren v. Moss, 2 Gilman, 72; Danforth v. Danforth, 111 Ill. 236; Matter of Grandall, 196 N.Y. 127, 89 N.E. 578; 134 Am St. Rep. 830; 17 Ann. Cas. 874; Wilcon v. Wilson, 73 Mich, 620, 41 N.W. 817; Strickland v. Strickland, 80 Ark. 452, 97 S. W. 659; McCurley v. McCurley, 60 Md. 185, 45 Am. Rep. 717; Begbie v. Begbie, 128 Cal. 155, 60 Pac. 667, 49 L.R.A. 141. 5 The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and maintenance (Johnson vs. Bates, Ark. 101 SW 412; 1 Corpus Juris 208).

A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. On the point, Article 106 of the Civil Code provides: . Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: (1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed; . (2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal community of property shall be dissolved and liquidated, but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, without prejudice to the provisions of article 176; (3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, unless otherwise directed by the court in the interest of said minors, for whom said court may appoint a guardian; (4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent one shall be revoked by operation of law. From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute community of property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of the deceased party. Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted... The same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the actions that survive for or against administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court: SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him. Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can be deemed fairly included in the enumeration.. A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn. As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant. In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse", as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding. ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations is hereby affirmed. No special pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 82233 March 22, 1990 JOSE BARITUA and EDGAR BITANCOR, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NICOLAS NACARIO and VICTORIA RONDA NACARIO, respondents. Domingo Lucenario for petitioners. Ernesto A. Atienza for private respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.: This petition for review on certiorari assails as erroneous and contrary to existing relevant laws and applicable jurisprudence the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated December 11, 1987 which reversed and set aside that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXII, at Pili, Camarines Sur. 2 The challenged decision adjudged the petitioners liable to the private respondents in the total amount of P20,505.00 and for costs. The facts are as follows: In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle then being driven by Bienvenido Nacario along the national highway at Barangay San Cayetano, in Baao, Camarines Sur, figured in an accident with JB Bus No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor and owned and operated by petitioner Jose Baritua. 3 As a result of that accident Bienvenido and his passenger died 4 and the tricycle was damaged. 5 No criminal case arising from the incident was ever instituted. 6 Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-judicial settlement of the matter negotiated by the petitioners and the bus insurer Philippine First Insurance Company, Incorporated (PFICI for brevity) Bienvenido Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, received P18,500.00. In consideration of the amount she received, Alicia executed on March 27, 1980 a "Release of Claim" in favor of the petitioners and PFICI, releasing and forever discharging them from all actions, claims, and demands arising from the accident which resulted in her husband's death and the damage to the tricycle which the deceased was then driving. Alicia likewise executed an affidavit of desistance in which she formally manifested her lack of interest in instituting any case, either civil or criminal, against the petitioners. 7 On September 2, 1981, or about one year and ten months from the date of the accident on November 7, 1979, the private respondents, who are the parents of Bienvenido Nacario, filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. 8 In their complaint, the private respondents alleged that during the vigil for their deceased son, the petitioners through their representatives promised them (the private respondents) that as extra-judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for the death of their son, for the funeral expenses incurred by reason thereof, and for the damage for the tricycle the purchase price of which they (the private respondents) only loaned to the victim. The petitioners, however, reneged on their promise and instead negotiated and settled their obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late son. The Nacario spouses prayed that the defendants, petitioners herein, be ordered to indemnify them in the amount of P25,000.00 for the death of their son Bienvenido, P10,000.00 for the damaged tricycle, P25,000.00 for compensatory and exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and for moral damages. 9 After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, holding that the payment by the defendants (herein petitioners) to the widow and her child, who are the preferred heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased Bienvenido to the exclusion of his parents, the plaintiffs (herein private respondents), extinguished any claim against the defendants (petitioners). 10 The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the judgment of the trial court. The appellate court ruled that the release executed by Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario did not discharge the liability of the petitioners because the case was instituted by the private respondents in their own capacity and not as "heirs, representatives, successors, and assigns" of Alicia; and Alicia could not have validly waived the damages being prayed for (by the private respondents) since she was not the one who suffered these damages arising from the death of their son. Furthermore, the appellate court said that the petitioners "failed to rebut the testimony of the appellants (private respondents) that they were the ones who bought the tricycle that was damaged in the incident. Appellants had the burden of proof of such fact, and they did establish such fact in their testimony . . . 11Anent the funeral expenses, "(T)he expenses for the funeral were likewise shouldered by the appellants (the private respondents). This was never contradicted by the appellees (petitioners). . . . Payment (for these) were made by the appellants, therefore, the reimbursement must accrue in their favor. 12 Consequently, the respondent appellate court ordered the petitioners to pay the private respondents P10,000.00 for the damage of the tricycle, P5,000.00 for "complete" funeral services, P450.00 for cemetery lot, P55.00 fororacion adulto, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees. 13 The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the appellate court's decision 14 but their motion was denied. 15 Hence, this petition. The issue here is whether or not the respondent appellate court erred in holding that the petitioners are still liable to pay the private respondents the aggregate amount of P20,505.00 despite the agreement of extrajudicial settlement between the petitioners and the victim's compulsory heirs. The petition is meritorious. Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them being by payment. Article 1231 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides: Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished: (1) By payment or performance; (2) By the loss of the thing due; (3) By the condonation or remission of the debt; (4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor; (5) By compensation; (6) By novation. (Emphasis ours.)

There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation petition arising from the accident that occurred on November 7, 1979. The only question now is whether or not Alicia, the spouse and the one who received the petitioners' payment, is entitled to it. Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates the persons to whom payment to extinguish an obligation should be made. Art 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it. Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased are the successors in interest referred to in law as the persons authorized to receive payment. The Civil Code states: Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs: 1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants; 2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants with respect to their legitimate children and decendants; 3. The widow or widower; 4. Acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction; 5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287. Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2. Neither do they exclude one another. (Emphasis ours.) Article 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his parents and ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collateral relatives. (Emphasis ours.) It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As it has been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the private respondents are not successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia had been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse. Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief and compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that the private respondents loaned to Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered the expenses for his funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are but money claims against the estate of their deceased son. 16 These money claims are not the liabilities of the petitioners who, as we have said, had been released by the agreement of the extra-judicial settlement they concluded with Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, the victim's widow and heir, as well as the natural guardian of their child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she executed a "Release Of Claim" in favor of the petitioners. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 106314-15 October 8, 1999 HEIRS OF PEDRO CABAIS, NAMELY: MAGDALENA BONTO CABAIS, ANTONIO CABAIS, PABLO CABAIS, ANDREA CABAIS, EFREN CABAIS, AGAPITA CABAIS, and ANDRES CABAIS, represented by AVELINA CABAIS, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CONSTANCIA PAGLINAWAN, PAULINO LORIA, AUREA NICOLAS, ANTONIO LO, SANTOS WANTON, ZENAIDA BATALLER, ISABEL LORIA, ADELAIDA DAUS AND EMMA CARALI,respondents, HEIRS OF PEDRO CABAIS, NAMELY: MAGDALENA. BONTO CABAIS, CHILDREN: ANTONIO, ANDREA, PABLO, AVELINA, EFREN, AGAPITA and ANDRES all surnamed CABAIS, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF VICTORIA CAETA, NAMELY: CELSO represented by his HEIRS, ISABEL, ARMANDO, ROGER, SURNAMED LORIA, HEIRS OF MELECIO LORIA, NAMELY: NIMFA and JOEL, PAULINA LORIA VDA. DE PAGLINAWAN, EMERITA LORIA and SPS. RUFINO NICOLAS and AUREA GOYAL, respondents. PURISIMA, J.:

At bar are Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking a review of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated November 13, 1991, and its Resolution 2 of July 9, 1992, denying the motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 28109 and 28110. The two cases were tried jointly and decided by Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court in Tabaco, Albay. Petitioners are legal heirs of Pedro Cabais, who died on April 16, 1982, leaving a parcel of land situated 3 in Basud, Tabaco, Albay, with an area of 1,638 square meters, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-55640 in the name of Pedro Cabais. The said property was inherited by Pedro Cabais from his grandmother Eustaquia Caeta by right of representation. His mother, Felipa Caeta Buesa, who was the only daughter of Eustaquia Caeta, 4 predeceased the latter, leaving him as the only legal heir of Eustaquia. Thus, Pedro Cabais executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication, 5 adjudicating in his favor subject property. By virtue thereof, Original Certificate of Title No. RO-3433 (23899) was cancelled and in lieu thereof, the aforementioned transfer certificate of title issued in his name. On October 15, 1979, shortly after Pedro Cabais had adjudicated to himself the property in question, a complaint for partition and accounting was brought by Simon Bonaobra, Heirs of Victoria Caeta and Heirs of Anastacio Caeta against Pedro Cabais, docketed as Civil Case No. T-567 before the Regional Trial Court but the plaintiffs were declared non-suited, resulting to the dismissal of the case.1wphi1.nt During the pendency of Civil Case No. T-567, Pedro Cabais died. Whereupon, the respondents herein entered the property in dispute and constructed houses thereon, depriving petitioners of possession thereof. On April 15, 1987, petitioners filed with the lower court, 6 Civil Case No. T-1283, for quieting of title, recovery of possession and ownership with a prayer for preliminary injunction, against the herein respondents, alleging that the acts of the latter with regard to the disputed property cast a cloud on their title thereto. In their Answer, respondents theorized that the petitioners have no cause of action and were in estoppel, and that the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 55640 was in derogation of respondents' successional rights. On April 21, 1987, the respondents, Heirs of Victoria Caeta, Paulino Loria, Jose Loria, Constancia Loria Vda. de Paglinawan, Emeterio Loria, and spouses Rufino Nicolas and Aurea Goyal, instituted before the same lower court Civil Case No. T-1284, for annulment of title and damages, claiming to be coowners of subject property. The respondent spouses, Rufino Nicolas and Aurea Goyal, asserted that they bought 806.5 square meters of Lot No. 2119 from Simplicia Casaul. The latter was said to have acquired the said portion of the lot from Benigno Bonaobra, who, in turn, acquired the same from Victoria Caeta and Ciriaca Vda. de Gawan. The respondent heirs of Victoria Caeta averred that they purchased the remaining portion of Lot No. 2119 from their deceased grandmother, Ciriaca Vda. de Gawan, the first wife of Antonio Buesa. According to them, the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. RO-3433 (23899) and issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 55640 were tainted by fraud. Petitioners denied the allegations of respondents' Answer in Civil Case No. T-1284. It was their submission that the truth of the matter were those alleged in their Complaint in Civil Case No. T-1283, and that Civil Case No. T-1284 is barred by Civil Case No. 567, which had been previously dismissed. In due time, the two cases were jointly tried and on September 28, 1989, the lower court came out with a Joint Decision upholding the view of petitioners, quieting their title over the contested lot; ordering the respondents to vacate the same, to pay the rents thereon to petitioners until they leave the place, apart from litigation expenses. The trial court ruled that res judicata barred the institution of Civil Case No. T-1284 by reason of the prior dismissal of Civil Case No. T-567. Respondents seasonably presented a motion for reconsideration of the said disposition, which the trial court granted 7 on November 26, 1989, upon the reasoning that res judicata as alluded to in the decision did not apply and that the baptismal certificate of Felipa C. Buesa does not show her to be the daughter of Eustaquia Caeta. From such adverse action against them, petitioners went to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision on November 13, 1991, affirming the decision of the lower court. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in the Resolution dated July 9, 1992. Undaunted, petitioners have come to this Court for relief. The main issue for resolution here is whether or not the Order of the lower court reconsidering its Joint Decision was proper. Firstly, petitioners maintain that the lower court erred in relying on the Baptismal Certificate 8 of Felipa C. Buesa to establish the parentage and filiation of Pedro Cabais. They contend that the grant of the motion for reconsideration and reversal of its own decision were without legal basis. It is also petitioner's submission that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 567 constituted a bar to Civil Case No. T-1284 on the ground of res judicata. The petition is impressed with merit. The Order under attack disregarded the limited evidentiary value of a baptismal certificate in this jurisdiction vis--vis a birth certificate. A birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima facie evidence of filiation 9 and a high degree of proof is needed to overthrow the presumption of truth contained in such public document. 10 This is pursuant to the rule that entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. 11 The evidentiary nature of such document must, therefore, be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. 12 On the contrary, a baptismal certificate, a private document, which, being hearsay, is not a conclusive proof of filiation. 13 It does not have the same probative value as a record of birth, an official or public document. 14 In US vs. Evangelista, this Court held that church registers of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 15 and the passage of Act No. 190, 16 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. 17 Thus, in this jurisdiction, a certificate of baptism such as the one herein under controversy is no longer regarded with

the same evidentiary value as official records of birth. Moreover, on this score, jurisprudence is consistent and uniform in ruling that the canonical certificate of baptism is not sufficient to prove recognition. 18 The unjustified failure to present the birth certificate instead of the baptismal certificate now under consideration or to otherwise prove filiation by any of the means recognized by law weigh heavily against respondents. InMacadangdang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 19 this Court declared that a baptismal certificate is evidence only to prove the administration of the sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the declarations therein stated with respect to his kinsfolk. The same is conclusive only of the baptism administered, according to the rites of the Catholic Church, by the priest who baptized subject child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate concerning the relationship of the person baptized. 20 It is indispensable that such declarations and statements are shown by proof recognized by law. 21 There is thus no reason to further sustain respondents stance in the face of the aforecited rulings explaining the significance of baptismal certificates. The lower court erred in giving too much credence on the baptismal certificate of Felipa Caeta Buesa to prove that Felipa was the daughter of one Gregoria Caeta and not of Eustaquia Caeta, the original registered owner of the property under controversy. The grant by the lower court of the motion for reconsideration from its own decision, quieting the title of Pedro Cabais (and consequently of herein petitioners-successors in interest) to the said property, on the basis mainly of such proof was unwarranted. To repeat, a baptismal certificate, like all documents in general, attests the fact leading to its execution and the date thereof, the administration of the sacrament on the day therein specified, but not to the veracity of the statements therein contained regarding the kinsfolk of the person baptized. 22 Furthermore, the above findings of the courts below relying on the baptismal certificate in question to establish the filiation of Pedro Cabais' mother must of necessity yield to the inherent inconsistency and unbelievable nature of the baptismal certificate in question. It appears that said baptismal certificate of Felipa C. Buesa states that she was born on September 13, 1899, while the baptismal certificate of Gregoria Caeta, the supposed mother of Felipa, indicated that Gregoria was born on May 9, 1898, or only a little more than one year ahead of her alleged daughter. This Court need not overstress the point that it is simply improbable under the above circumstances for Gregoria to have been the mother of Felipa, and thus, to have been the real grandmother of Pedro. The lower court should have readily taken judicial notice of this fact, being one of those matters which come to the ordinary experiences of life and which is generally accepted as true and is capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. 23 However, as regards the contention that Civil Case No. 567 barred the filing of Civil Case No. T-1284, the Court holds that the Court of Appeals erred not. Thus, in ruling on the inapplicability of res judicata, it ratiocinated: Nor would the defense of res judicata prosper. For the doctrine of res Judicata to apply, (1) the judgment or order must be final; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and of the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. While We agree with appellants that the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-567 for non-suit is an adjudication on the merits, the fourth element, particularly the identity of causes of action, is absent in the case at bar. Civil Case No. T-567 was an action for partition and accounting, while the instant case is an action for the annulment of T.C.T. No. 55640. The evidence needed to sustain both the former and the present causes of action are not the same. 24 Be that as it may, the said pronouncement by the Court of Appeals is rendered moot and academic by the finding here that there was no basis for the grant by the trial court of the motion for reconsideration of its Joint Decision of September 20, 1989. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 28109 and 28110 is SET ASIDE, and the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of origin in Civil Case Nos. T-1283 and T-1284, dated September 20, 1989, REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED.