The Battle of Bastogne

The Initial Deployment East of Bastogne

The one standing order that General Middleton gave General McAuliffe before leaving
Bastogne on the morning of 19 December was: "Hold Bastogne" * Both generals felt that the
enem! needed Bastogne and the entrance it afforded to a wider com"le# of roads leading
west $Map VI% During the night of the 1&th the two commanders met in the '((( )or"s
command "ost to confer on the uncertain tactical situation and to give )olonel *well+ whose
regiment would first be committed+ his instructions The ma" s"read out before *well showed
a few blue,"enciled mar-s east of Bastogne where the American armored grou"s were
believed to be fighting at their original roadbloc- "ositions General Middleton told *well that
his .ob would be to ma-e contact with these endangered forward "osts *well+ however+ was
interested in the red,"enciled lines and circles which showed the enem! between Bastogne
and the armored roadbloc-s (n view of the uncertain situation+ he suggested that he be given
"mission,t!"e orders" which would "ermit his /01st 1arachute (nfantr! some fle#ibilit! of
action McAuliffe agreed+ as did Middleton+ but the latter still ho"ed that the roadbloc-
defenders at Allerborn+ eight miles to the east on the Bastogne road+ would somehow survive
until the /01st reached them McAuliffe2s order+ then+ was for *well to move out at 0300+
attac- eastward+ and develo" the situation
At the a""ointed hour on 19 December *well2s /01st 1arachute (nfantr! marched out of the
assembl! area in column of battalions *well -new that this was no time to engage in the all,
out+ full,bodied assault tactics to which the "aratroo"ers were accustomed He told
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BA4T5G6*
[446-447]
his officers to "ta-e it eas!+" avoid commitment to an action which would involve their whole
force+ and de"lo! to right and left as soon as the! hit resistance so that the! would not be
easil! cut off and surrounded
1
Hindsight+ of course+ bestows a view of the American and German dis"ositions at 0300+ when
the 101st advance guard marched out+ which was denied *well and the cor"s and division
staffs in Bastogne The battles alread! described were now coming to a close on the roads+ in
the villages+ and through the woods east of the town as the 101st was ta-ing its stance During
the night of 1& December the three small tas- forces of ))7+ 9th Armored Division+ which
Middleton had ordered )olonel Gilbreth to "osition on and overwatching the Allerborn,
Bastogne road $6 18%+ were cut to "ieces 4ome men and vehicles would esca"e to ta-e a "art
in the fight for Bastogne+ although some of )olonel Booth2s command too- si# da!s of
dodging the enem! before the! reached the American lines At 9ongvill!+ ne#t+ and to the
west+ on the Bastogne road+ Gilbreth had gathered what was left of ))7 and its attached
troo"s to fight a rear guard action until the 19th dawned and an orderl! withdrawal might be
effected
Gilbreth started his guns dis"lacing to the rear some time before da!brea-+ but the main force
commenced to defile through the western e#it from 9ongvill! about 0&00+ onl! to be
ambushed and thrown into disorder when a""roaching Mageret+ midwa! between 9ongvill!
and Bastogne Team )herr! $9t )ol Henr! T )herr!% of ))B+ 10th Armored Division+
which had been sent along the road toward 9ongvill! the "revious evening+ found itself
involved in a series of dis.ointed actions as enem! troo"s cut the highwa! Team H!du-e $1st
9t *dward 1 H!du-e% was caught u" in the fight east of Mageret+ subse:uentl! losing all its
vehicles in a shar" and aggressive armored action which the 2d Panzer commander dignified
as an American "counterattac-" $9ate on the afternoon of the 19th 9ieutenant H!du-e led his
men on foot out of the melee under orders to re.oin ))B He was afterward -illed at
Bastogne%
Team 7!erson $)a"t ;illiam < 7!erson%+ the main force belonging to )herr!+ had laagered
during the night between Mageret and 9ongvill!,and thus would fight an action almost
inde"endentl! of the 9ongvill! column,but before da!brea- 7!erson -new that the enem!
was in Mageret and that he would have to "unch his wa! bac- to the west )herr! sent orders
confirming this withdrawal about 0&=0 7!erson found his team outnumbered and outgunned
b! the Germans holding Mageret+ but on the night of the 19th four s:uads of his armored
infantr! held a narrow foothold in a few houses on the eastern edge of the village+ waiting
there for hel" "romised from the west )olonel )herr! had gone bac- to Bastogne to see the
))B commander late on the 1&th+ returning
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thereafter to his own head:uarters outside 6effe $a mile and a :uarter southwest of Mageret%
with word that the 101st would reinforce his command the ne#t da! 5n the road bac-+
however+ he learned that the Germans were in Mageret and his troo"s were cut off About the
time *well2s "aratroo"ers debouched on the Bastogne road+ 6effe was hit b! tan-s and
infantr! from Panzer Lehr> some hours later )herr!2s detachment would "ull bac- to Mont
8
5n the morning of 19 December+ therefore+ the .ob confronting the /01st was that of
develo"ing+ fi#ing+ and fighting the German detachments+ now in strength+ which stood to the
rear of the erstwhile American bloc-ing "ositions and "resaged the coming main effort to
crash the "an?er columns through or around Bastogne
The German High )ommand was aware that the two American airborne divisions had orders
to enter the battle> in the late afternoon of 1& December interce"ted radio messages to this
effect reached OB WEST German intelligence -new that the Americans were moving b!
truc- and so estimated that none of these new troo"s would a""ear in the line before noon on
the 19th The German staffs believed that the two divisions would be de"lo!ed along a front
e#tending from Bastogne to the northeast (n an! case the German attac- "lan was unfolding
about as scheduled and three German divisions were bearing down on Bastogne The 2d
Panzer Division2s successes during the night of 1& December against the out"ost "ositions
east of 9ongvill! had netted fort! American tan-s+ and the a""arent crumbling of the last
defenses east of Bastogne "romised :uic- entr! to that cit! on the 9th
Actuall! the three German divisions moving toward Bastogne were not all maneuvering to
attac- the cit! 9auchert2s 2d Panzer Division had other fish to fr!,its ob.ective was the Meuse
bridges,and when da!light came on the 19th the division advance guard was wor-ing its wa!
to b!"ass Bastogne in the north The 2d Panzer2s end run+ across countr! and on miserable
third,class roads+ collided with Ma. ;illiam 7 Desobr!2s tas- force from ))B at 6oville
$four miles north of Bastogne%+ then blundered into a series of shar" actions reaching bac- to
9ongvill!
5n the left the Panzer Lehr+ having sei?ed Mageret during the night+ began an attac- about
0/00 on the 19th designed to ta-e Bastogne> it was a "art of this forward detachment of
Panzer Lehr which hit )herr!2s head:uarters at 6effe )lose on the heels of Panzer Lehr+ two
regiments of the 26th ol!s "renadier Division had made a right wheel with the intention of
circling through 9ongvill! and 9u?er! so as to enter Bastogne from the north via the 6oville
road @o-ott2s grenadiers+ who had accom"lished a trul! remar-able feat in -ee"ing "ace with
the mechani?ed columns of the Panzer Lehr+ b! now were s"ent The regimental trains were
far to the rear and resu""l! had to be made <urthermore the boundaries and attac- "lans for
the three divisions converging
[449]
on Bastogne were so confused that it would ta-e some time for the 26th ol!s "renadier
Division $,% to orient and coordinate its attac- 5n the morning of the 19th @o-ott2s two
regiments la! :uiescent and e#hausted in the scattered woods southeast of 9ongvill! 5nl! the
advance guard of the Panzer Lehr+ therefore+ was attac-ing directl! toward Bastogne when
the "aratroo"ers of the /01st marched on to the Bastogne,9ongvill! road
=
*well had his 1st Battalion $Ma. 7a!mond ' Bottoml!+ Ar% out as advance guard The road
was curtained at intervals b! swirling fog and from time to time rain s:ualls swe"t in 4ome
8+000 !ards out of the cit! $it now was about 0&80% the battalion ran onto a few howit?ers
from the 9th Armored whose crews were "read!+ willing and able+" as the .ournals re"ort it+ to
su""ort the /01st 9ess than a thousand !ards be!ond+ the advance guard encountered the
enem! near the railroad station at the edge of 6effe> here was the roadbloc- which the Panzer
Lehr had wrested from )herr!2s head:uarters detachment
5n the "revious evening the '((( )or"s commander had sent the 1/&th *ngineer )ombat
Battalion $9t )ol 4am Tabets% to establish a line east of Bastogne between <o! and the 6effe
road 6earl! a thousand antitan- mines had been scra"ed together from other cor"s engineers
to aid the 1/&th+ and at least "art of these were laid in front of the engineer fo#holes during
the night ;hen the 1/&th re"orted about 0800 that its out"ost at Mageret had been overrun+
Middleton sent what hel" he could,five light tan-s ta-en from ordnance re"air sho"s At
da!brea- two enem! rifle com"anies+ led b! a few tan-s+ hit )om"an! B+ whose right flan-
touched the Bastogne highwa! near 6effe The engineers succeeded in halting the advance
along the road+ although at a cost of some thirt! casualties 1vt Bernard Michin seems to have
bloc-ed the "an?ers when he "ut a ba?oo-a round into the leader at ten !ards2 range
Meanwhile Team )herr! had lost its roadbloc- at the 6effe station but momentaril! had
sto""ed the Germans at 6effe village *nem! "ressure then eased somewhat> "erha"s the
German infantr! were waiting for their tan-s to brea- through at Mageret The fight had
slac-ened to a small arms duel when *well2s "aratroo"ers came on the scene
B
<eeling
carefull! to the north and south of the highwa!+ the 1st Battalion found that the Germans were
de"lo!ed in some force and that this was no occasion for a :uic- -noc-out blow to handle a
single roadbloc- About 0900 *well turned the 8d Battalion $Ma. 4ammie 6 Homan% off the
road in a maneuver on the left of the vanguard intended to sei?e the higher ground near the
village of Bi?or! and Hill /10+ a fairl! substantial rise to the east which overloo-ed both
6effe and Bi?or! ;hen the =d Battalion $9t )ol George M Griswold%
[450]
came u"+ *well sent it to the right with orders to ta-e Mont and the ridge south of 6effe B!
noon the regimental attac- had attained most of its ob.ectives $Bi?or! alread! was out"osted
b! troo"s of the 1/&th *ngineer )ombat Battalion% Hill /10+ however+ was no eas! nut to
crac- The enem! held the "osition with automatic wea"ons swee"ing the bare glacis to west
and south,here the "aratroo"ers made no "rogress 5n the right one of Griswold2s "latoons
arrived in time to give )olonel )herr! a hand in the fight at the 6effe chCteau command "ost
and+ when the Americans were burned out+ the subse:uent withdrawal to Mont The =d
Battalion had not been able to get around 6effe+ but )om"an! ( did go as far as ;ardin+
southeast of 6effe+ where it ambushed a 8/,man "atrol
The a""earance of the Americans in this area+ little more than a mile south of Mageret+ was
inter"reted immediatel! as a flan-ing threat to the two grenadier regiments of the Panzer
Lehr which had wheeled to the right and awa! from Bastogne to engage the American
columns transfi#ed on the Mageret,9ongvill! road Ba!erlein detached a "art of his
reconnaissance battalion to meet this threat The Americans made a fight of it inside ;ardin+
retreating from house to house as the long,barreled self,"ro"elled guns blasted in the walls
5ne "aratroo"er wal-ed into the street to confront one of the guns with a ba?oo-a> he got the
gun+ then was cut down <inall! the guns .olted the "aratroo"ers out of ;ardin> the! had
inflicted thirt!,nine casualties on )om"an! (+ all of whose officers were hit+ and -illed )a"t
)laude D ;allace+ Ar+ the com"an! commander
To the west+ near the hamlet of Marvie+ la! the tan-s and armored infantr! of Team 52Hara
$9t )ol Aames 52Hara% holding the right of the three bloc-ing "ositions set u" b! ))B+ 10th
Armored+ the da! before 52Hara thus far had seen no Germans His first warning that the
fight was e#"anding in his direction was the "stragglers of airborne around us" and high
velocit! shellfire directed at his left tan- "latoon <or some reason the enem! failed to close
with 52Hara+ "erha"s because of the low+ clinging fog which had reduced visibilit! to about
sevent!,five feet 5rdered to do so b! )olonel 7oberts+ the ))B commander+ 52Hara sent
tan-s bac- into ;ardin+ but the village was em"t! The tan-s retired to the Marvie "osition as
dar- came on+ and late in the evening Panzer Lehr occu"ied ;ardin
A message from McAuliffe ended this initial da! of battle for the /01st and the regiment dug
in where it stood *well now had a fair "icture of the enem! to his front but no clear idea of
the fate or location of Team )herr!2s main force+ not to mention the ))7 roadbloc-
detachments
Although the /01st had de"lo!ed successfull! astride the main road east of Bastogne and had
develo"ed a s-etch! outline of the most advanced German "ositions+ it had not at an! time
confronted the main German forces These+ the bul- of Panzer Lehr and the two forward
regiments of the 26th ol!s "renadier Division+ s"ent most of the da! cho""ing down the
American column tra""ed between Mageret and 9ongvill! @o-ott a""arentl! had e#"ected to
"ush his two grenadier regiments uno""osed through 9ongvill!+ as soon as the! were rested+
in a circling march to
[451]
enter Bastogne from the north+ but the German cor"s commander+ General 9uettwit?+ himself
too- these regiments out of @o-ott2s hand and thrust them into the battle with the American
rear guard at 9ongvill!,which held there longer than e#"ected,and against the retreating
column en route to Mageret 4uffice it to sa! that the /01st had been effectivel! debarred
from the 9ongvill! arena b! the Panzer Lehr troo"s holding 6effe+ Hill /10+ and the sto""er
"osition at Mageret B! the evening of the 19th the American troo"s east of Mageret were in
var!ing stages of tactical dissolution,all but Team 7!erson+ still clutching its "iece of Mageret
village 9uettwit? was elated b! this victor! over the American armor $which as an old tan-er
he attributed in large "art to the su"eriorit! of the 1anther tan- gun%+ but he reali?ed that a
"recious da! had been lost and with it the chance of an armored #o$p de main at Bastogne
At 6oville+ the left of the three bloc-ing "ositions+ Middleton had assigned )olonel 7oberts
and ))B Here Team Desobr!+ organi?ed around fifteen medium tan-s+ stood athwart the
main "aved highwa! running north from Bastogne to Houffali?e This force had been in
"osition about five hours+ re"orting all :uiet+ when at 080 on the 19th German half,trac-s hit
the American roadbloc-s Americans and Germans "itched grenades at each other in the fog
and one or two "an?ers reached the village itself The enem!,"robabl! a "atrol feeling a wa!
in front of 9auchert2s 2d Panzer,soon "ulled out+ and the noise of battle died awa!
The '((( )or"s commander+ much concerned b! the ga" which he -new e#isted between his
southern troo"s and those of his cor"s somewhere to the north+ ordered Desobr! to investigate
the town of Houffali?e $During the night+ a "atrol Desobr! had sent in that direction re"orted
the road o"en% Before an!thing could be done about the Houffali?e mission+ the Germans
unleashed their artiller! against 6oville 9auchert+ intent on regaining the momentum which
the 2d Panzer had lost in the night fighting around Allerborn and 9ongvill!+ and determined
to get off the miserable side roads which he had chosen as a :uic- wa! around Bastogne+ "ut
all the guns that had -e"t "ace with the forward elements into a shoot to blast a wa! through
to the west At 1000 the fog curtain suddenl! "arted revealing a landsca"e dotted with
German tan-s,at least thirt! of them <ourteen tan-s from the %d Panzer &egiment made a tr!
for 6oville+ coming in from the north 4everal bogged down in a vain attem"t to maneuver off
the road> others were slo""ed b! Desobr!2s com"an! of 4herman tan-s and b! tan- destro!er
fire 5n the east the enem! had started an infantr! assault+ but the fog lifted before the first
waves reached the village and+ suddenl! divested of cover+ most of the attac-ers turned and
ran
Desobr! could not -now that 6oville was the focus of the entire 2d Panzer maneuver+ but he
did as- for "ermission to withdraw 7oberts re"lied that Desobr! should use his own
.udgment+ then added that more tan- destro!ers were on the wa! from Bastogne $Desobr! had
onl! a "latoon from the 309th% and that the 101st was sending a rifle battalion within the half
hour )oincident with 7oberts2 message the last of the German assault force "ulled bac-
9auchert had decided that the ground was too "oor
[452]
for tan- maneuver+ that reinforcements must be brought u" for a headlong "lunge Meanwhile
the German cannoneers continued to "ummel 6oville Desobr! had man! casualties+ but
several ambulances had been wrec-ed b! shellfire and it was difficult to get the wounded out
The reinforcements reaching Desobr! consisted of a "latoon from the D0/th Tan- Destro!er
Battalion $three com"anies of which constituted the onl! cor"s reserve Middleton had to give
the 101st Airborne% and the 1st Battalion $9t )ol Aames 9 9a1rade% of the /03th 1arachute
(nfantr! Although McAuliffe assigned the /03th the mission of covering the northern
a""roaches to Bastogne+ the remaining two battalions had a string attached as the division
reserve+ and the regimental commander+ )olonel 4in-+ was under strict orders not to move
them from their "ositions .ust north of Bastogne As the "aratroo"ers a""roached 6oville+
the! came under heav!+ well,aimed artiller! fire+ twent! to thirt! rounds e#"loding on the
village ever! ten minutes 'ehicles and buildings were aflame,this was indeed a hot corner+
the village itself "racticall! bare of life Desobr!2s detachment was de"lo!ed south and west
of the village> the Germans were firing from the north and east+ a more comfortable "osition
since the higher ground encircling 6oville tilted u" on the enem! side of the dish
B! 1B=0 the 1st Battalion was read! to begin the assault against the enem!,held high ground
The center com"an! wal-ed almost immediatel! into a rain of barrage fire and was sto""ed
with heav! losses The two remaining com"anies were met with intense small arms fire but in
fifteen minutes wor-ed their wa! forward in short s"urts to a "oint where one last dash would
"ut them on the crest As the "aratroo"ers la! here+ a mass of green,clad figures suddenl!
eru"ted over the hill 9ater the 1st Battalion estimated this attac- was carried b! a rifle
battalion bac-ed b! si#teen tan-s The American assault had smac-ed headlong into the attac-
the 2d Panzer had been read!ing since mid,morning As the fight s"read+ nearl! thirt!,two
"an?ers were counted on the field The two antagonists each re"orted subse:uentl! that "the
enem! counterattac- halted" Both "robabl! were correct,although both continued to suffer
heav! casualties The German tan-s might have decided the issue+ but for over half an hour
the! sta!ed well bac- of the rifle line+ "erha"s fearful lest ba?oo-a teams would reach them in
the smo-e and fog billowing u" the hill+ "erha"s fearful of the bite in the few 4hermans left
;hen a few of the enem! tan-s finall! ventured to a""roach+ the American tan- destro!ers
south of the village got on the flan- of the "an?ers and "ut awa! five of them at 1+/00,!ards
range
6ow as the smo-e and fog increased+ onl! small eddies bro-e the "all to give a few minutes
of aimed fire Two of the airborne com"anies fell bac- to the outs-irts of 6oville while the
third+ on the hill to the east+ waited for dar-ness to cover its withdrawal At one .uncture the
1st Battalion was under orders to leave 6oville+ but Brig Gen Gerald A Higgins+ the assistant
division commander who was acting alter ego for McAuliffe+ told the "aratroo"ers to sta! "ut
and "romised assault gun and tan- destro!er su""ort for the morrow
To the 6oville garrison the dar-
[453]
hours were a nightmare *ver! half hour a gust of enem! artiller! fire shoo- the town> one
shell crashed near the American command "ost+ -illing 9a1rade and wounding Desobr! Ma.
7obert < Harwic-+ a "aratroo"er+ assumed overall command+ while Ma. )harles 9 Hustead
re"laced Desobr! as the armored team commander $Desobr!+ with an agoni?ing head wound+
was "laced in an ambulance headed for Bastogne+ but the ambulance was ca"tured en route%
Through the night the "an?ers "rowled on the edge of the village and the German grenadiers
came out of their fo#holes in abortive fora!s to reach the streets But the "aratroo"ers held the
enem! at arm2s length and the enem! tan-ers showed little inclination to engage Hustead2s
remaining eight 4hermans+ which had been brought into the village+ in a blindfold duel
*arlier in the da! the 101st commander had "lanned to establish a defensive line running
northwest to southeast in front of Bastogne from which the /01st+ tied in with Desobr! and
)herr! as flan- guards+ would launch a counterattac- The events of the 19th+ as it turned out+
showed how little room for maneuver was left the Americans )olonel 7oberts+ assessing the
re"orts from ))B in the earl! evening+ advised McAuliffe that "right now the whole front is
flat against this town EBastogneF" 7oberts was right> nonetheless there remained two
indentations in the fast,forming German line: the thumb stic-ing out at 6oville and Team
7!erson2s little enclave on the east edge of Mageret The latter+ however+ disa""eared during
the night hours+ for 7!erson+ on orders+ circled the enem! troo"s in Mageret and brought his
de"leted command into the lines of the /01st at Bi?or! $7!erson later was -illed at
Bastogne%
General 9uettwit? lac-ed the full German cor"s he craved to throw against Bastogne on the
80th The 26th ol!s "renadier Division could count on onl! two of its regiments Panzer
Lehr had a substantial "art of the division immediatel! east of Bastogne+ but at least one
infantr! regiment+ much of its artiller!+ and the bul- of the division trains were still toiling
along the gumm! little roads ,hardl! more than trails,climbing west out of the ;ilt? valle!
<urthermore+ 9uettwit? had ordered Ba!erlein to hold out a reserve for a dash toward 4ibret
The neighboring cor"s might lend 9uettwit? a hand in the north,after all its 2d Panzer either
had to brea- through at 6oville or had to retrace its ste"s,but the 'ifth Panzer (rmy
commander had reiterated in no uncertain manner that 9auchert2s goal was the Meuse+ not
Bastogne
The entire artiller! com"lement of the 2d Panzer was in "lace to su""ort the attac- at 6oville
when the 80th dawned 9auchert2s armor was in "oor re"air after the long and rough march A
goodl! number of tan-s had been shot u" in the first da!2s action at 6oville+ and the
combination of mudd! terrain and American antitan- fire boded no good for a headlong
armored assault 9auchert therefore told his "an?er grenadiers to carr! the battle in com"an!
with small tan- "ac-ets
;hile the German guns "lastered the village the grenadiers moved in about 0/=0 on three
sides 4mo-e and swirling fog veiled the attac-ers but the B80th Armored <ield Artiller!
Battalion+ firing from northwest of Bastogne+ laid down a "rotective curtain which held the
enem!
[454]
at ba! for over an hour The eight 4hermans b! this time had run out of armor,"iercing
ammunition and half a do?en "an?ers tried to close in A fresh "latoon of tan- destro!ers from
the D0/th Tan- Destro!er Battalion+ sent u" b! Higgins+ too- a hand and bro-e u" this sortie
(n midmorning+ when a "romised "latoon of :uad mount antiaircraft failed to a""ear+ Harwic-
and Hustead learned that the enem! had cut the road to the rear The two aid stations could
handle no more wounded,most of the medics and aid men were casualties,and the enem! gri"
obviousl! was tightening The word rela!ed through the artiller! net bac- to Bastogne told the
stor!: "All reserves committed 4ituation critical"
McAuliffe and 7oberts consulted+ agreed that the 6oville force should withdraw To free the
troo"s in 6oville would ta-e some doing General Higgins+ in charge of the northern sector+
alread! had acted to meet this crisis b! sending the =d Battalion of the /08d 1arachute
(nfantr! $assembled near 9ongcham"s% into an attac- northeast against the Germans who had
descended on the road lin-ing 6oville and <o! The latter village+ 8+/00 !ards south of
6oville on the Bastogne road+ had been occu"ied b! the =d Battalion of the /03th+ which had
its own fight going <o! lies at the bottom of a "oc-et and during the night elements of the
%)*th Panzer "renadier &egiment had wormed their wa! onto the hills overloo-ing the
village from north+ west+ and east ;ith this vantage the Germans brought their direct fire
wea"ons to bear and forced the =d Battalion bac- onto the high ground south of the hamlet
But b! noon the 101st had a solid base for a counterattac- The 8d Battalion of the /03th
covered the right flan- of the =d and was in contact with the /01st on the east The battalion
sent from the /08d was in "osition west of <o! Beginning the counterattac- at 1B00+
"aratroo"ers "ushed bac- through <o! and dug in some 800 !ards to the north where late in
the afternoon the! met the column fighting its wa! bac- from 6oville
/
The smo-e and fog that run through all re"orts of the 6oville fight did good service as cover
when the Americans formed for the march out The main German barrier force had arra!ed
itself .ust north of <o!+ com"lete with armor and self,"ro"elled guns <our 4hermans+ in the
van with a few half,trac-s+ were "ut out of action before the! could return fire ;hile one
"aratroo" com"an! attac-ed to o"en the road+ Ma.or Harwic- sent for two tan- destro!ers
from the rear of the column 4hells were bursting among the troo"s crouched b! the roadside+
and the clan- of tan- trac-s could be heard a""roaching from 6oville But the tan- destro!ers
and their armor,"iercing shell did the tric-,and an assist must be credited also to the
Americans in <o! who were now on the enem!2s rear B! 1D00 the column was bac- inside
the American lines The fight at 6oville cost the 1st Battalion of the /03th a total of 1=
officers and 199 men -illed+ wounded+ and missing Team Desobr! has no record of its
casualties but the! must have been ver! heav!+ both in men and vehicles The /03th estimates
that the 2d Panzer lost thirt!,one vehicles in the 6oville fight
[455]
and "erha"s half a regiment of foot At least the first "art of this estimate ma! be close to the
fact+ for it is -nown that one battalion of the %d Panzer &egiment was badl! cri""led at
6oville
There is an e"ilogue (n late afternoon+ as his soldiers "o-ed about the ruins of 6oville+
9auchert radioed the LIII Panzer +orps commander for "ermission to wheel the 2d Panzer
into Bastogne @rueger2s answer was "rom"t and astringent: "<orget Bastogne and head for
the MeuseG"
The attac- "lanned for the 19th east of Bastogne and carried out b! the Panzer Lehr and 26th
ol!s "renadier Divisions had signall! failed of success The soft ground had made it
im"ossible for the German tan-s to maneuver easil! off the roads,a factor of great worth to
the defenders The Americans had at least five artiller! battalions on call in this sector+
whereas neither of the two enem! divisions had been able to get an! substantial number of
guns and howit?ers forward Also+ the "ellmell+ "iecemeal de"lo!ment east of Bastogne b!
the advance guard formations was beginning to rea" a harvest of dela! and tactical confusion
There was some savage fighting here during the da!+ but uncoordinated,on the "art of the
enem!,and never "ressed in force to a definite conclusion
5n the 80th 9uettwit? turned the ,-th ol!s "renadier &egiment over to the Panzer Lehr
commander for the close,in northern hoo- at Bastogne "lanned for e#ecution the "revious
da! The immediate goal was 9u?er!+ a suburb of Bastogne on the Houffali?e highwa! The
,-th circled north to "ass the village of Bi?or!+ the left wing "in for the /01st+ but fire from
)om"an! < caught the Germans in the flan- This halted the move and forced the ,-th to
swing wide into the cover given b! the woods north of the village Mas-ed b! the woods the
enem! "roceeded west as far as the Bourc!,Bastogne rail line+ then unaccountabl! sto""ed
;hen the 8d Battalion of the /03th came u" on the left of the /01st+ its dis"osition was such
that it faced this German force+ "lus its sister regiment the ,,th+ at the "oint where the <o!,
Bi?or! road crossed the railroad
Through most of the da!light hours on the 80th the enem! seemed content to "robe the main
line occu"ied b! the /01st During the evening Ba!erlein sent his own .)2d Panzer
"renadier &egiment against 6effe+ but a roving "atrol from Team 52Hara ha""ened to s"ot
the tan- detachment of the regiment as it filed along the 6effe,;ardin road and brought
friendl! artiller! into "la! Between the American gunners and "aratroo"ers the .)2d too- a
formidable beating,ver! severe casualties were re"orted b! the enem! division commander A
tan- destro!er "latoon from the D0/th used ground flares to sight and destro! three of the
"an?ers reinforcing the infantr! assault waves
;hen the /01st went into "osition on the 19th+ its southern flan- had been none too solidl!
anchored b! the thin counter,reconnaissance screen o"erated b! Tas- <orce 52Hara and the
tired+ understrength =/th *ngineer )ombat Battalion $9t )ol 1aul H 4!mbol% *nem!
"ressure around ;ardin+ although subse:uentl! rela#ed+ indicated that here was a ga" which
had better be sealed 5n the morning of the 80th McAuliffe sent the 8d Battalion of the =8Dth
Glider (nfantr! from the division assembl!
[456]
area through Bastogne to relieve )om"an! A of the engineers
3
The engineers had .ust climbed out of their fo#hole line west of Marvie and turned the
"osition over to the 8d Battalion when one of 52Hara2s out"osts saw a German column
streaming into Marvie This was the advance guard of the .)/st &egiment which had finall!
e#tricated itself from the ;ilt? valle! ;ith onl! a single rifle com"an! and four tan-s+ the
Germans never had a chance (n an hour2s time 52Hara2s mediums had accounted for the
"an?ers and the 8d Battalion had beaten the attac-ers bac- in disorder and occu"ied Marvie
The "aratroo"ers waited through the da! for the main attac- to come+ but the onl! evidences
of the enem! were a smo-e screen drifting in from the east and occasional tan-s in the
distance Hn-nown to the Americans a shift in the Panzer Lehr2s stance before Bastogne was
ta-ing "lace
The inchoate American defense forming at Bastogne was conditioned b! a set of o"timistic
"remises The first of these was the "romised arrival of the Bth Armored Division from
1atton2s Third Arm! in the south During the night of December the '((( )or"s commander+
acting on word from 1atton+ told McAuliffe that one combat command from the Bth Armored
was on its wa! to Bastogne and would be attached to the 101st At noon McAuliffe and
7oberts $who had been "romised this initial Bth Armored force% learned that the entire
division was to be added to the Bastogne defense The certaint! of the Bth Armored2s
a""earance e#"lains in "art the routine and rather cavalier treatment accorded )a"t Bert *?ell
and his little team from ))B+ Bth Armored+ when it arrived in Bastogne shortl! after noon
D

Iuite obviousl! McAuliffe and Middleton antici"ated the earl! a""earance of the entire
armored division
A second "remise,acce"ted in most of the 101st "lanning efforts on 80 December,was that the
'((( )or"s still had viable forces in and around Bastogne which could be em"lo!ed in
common with the airborne divisions This idea+ of course+ went hand in hand with the ver!
real ignorance of enem! forces and locations which obtained both in Bastogne and at
Middleton2s new head:uarters in 6eufchCteau *arlier McAuliffe and his staff had counted on
7oberts2 10th Armored combat command to reinforce a counterattac- east b! the 101st,a vain
e#"ectation+ as it turned out There remained the 8&th (nfantr! Division,or at least some "art
thereof (n midafternoon McAuliffe sent a liaison officer to General )ota+ whose head:uarters
was now at 4ibret southwest of Bastogne+ with instructions to find out the German
dis"ositions and to as- the :uestion: ")ould the 8&th attac- towards ;ilt? in con.unction with
the 101st Airborne tomorrowJ"
)ota2s re"l! is not even recorded in the 101st Airborne log After all he could give onl! one
answer: the 8&th (nfantr! Division no longer e#isted as a division $although two of its
regiments would continue in stubborn battle
[457]
under other commands% The fall of ;ilt? on the night of 19 December had written finis to the
stor! of the 110th (nfantr!+ )ota2s single remaining regiment 5n the morning of the 80th
)ota had gone into Bastogne+ finding its streets .ammed with vehicles+ cor"s artiller! tr!ing to
bull a wa! through+ and a host of stragglers+ including man! of the survivors of the 110th
(nfantr! General Middleton gave )ota "ermission to get his "eo"le out of Bastogne and the
latter ordered them out on foot+ abandoning to the traffic .am those vehicles still in their
"ossession $4o im"ressed was General )ota b! the traffic cho-ing the streets and alle!s of
Bastogne+ that he advised the '((( )or"s commander to -ee" all contingents of the Bth
Armored Division out of the town%
Des"ite McAuliffe2s failure to secure the immediate assistance which would ma-e a full,
bodied counterattac- feasible+ it seemed that the tactical "roblem facing the 101st on the
evening of 80 December remained linear+ that is+ the creation of a homogeneous and
defensible line barring entrance to Bastogne from the north and east The cor"s letter of
instructions reaching McAuliffe at noon on the 80th was rather more swee"ing in its
definition of mission "There will be no withdrawal"this was clear enough to all concerned
"The E101st AirborneF Division will stabili?e their front lines on the front 1D9&9B/ Ethat is+
7echtF to 4t 'ith+ south along a general line east of EHighwa!F 61/ to connect with the
Bth (nfantr! Division at Breitweiler" (t ma! be assumed that neither Middleton nor McAuliffe
too- this "art of the order either literall! or seriousl! There had been a few indications+ and
rumors+ of enem! activit! west of Bastogne,indeed the 101st had lost some of its trains in the
division assembl! area during the "revious night,but thus far all this could be charged to
raiding "arties roaming on the loose under cover of night in a fluid and changing battle (n
earl! evening a re"ort reached Bastogne that the road northwest to 9a 7oche and 5rtheuville
$where two "latoons of the D0/th Tan- Destro!er Battalion now attached to the 101st were
o"erating% was free of the enem! The roads south to 6eufchCteau and Arlon were still o"en,
and waiting for traverse b! the Bth Armored 4o the situation loo-ed in McAuliffe2s Bastogne
head:uarters at 1900 on 80 December
Across the lines the German commander+ 9uettwit?+ was none too "leased b! the rather
dilator! o"erations of his cor"s He -new b! this time that the American front east of
Bastogne had stiffened and that his troo"s had been able to find no holes 5n the other hand
the strength of his cor"s was increasing b! the hour as the two divisions hauled their tails u"
on the mudd! roads,it loo-ed as though he had the forces needed for maneuver As a last flic-
of the hand 9uettwit? ordered Ba!erlein to throw the 908d into the night attac- against 6effe
This was at most a diversion+ for 9uettwit? had decided to envelo"e Bastogne from the south
and west He intended to use the bul- of the Panzer Lehr+ leaving onl! one of its grenadier
regiments to flesh out the eastern front with the foot elements of @o-ott2s 26th ol!s
"renadier Division+ but in addition he had in hand the %.th ol!s "renadier &egiment of the
26th which had .ust come u" behind the cor"s2
[458]
south flan- All told there was a si?able motori?ed force for this venture: the reinforced
reconnaissance battalion+ the engineer battalion+ and the .)2d $as soon as it could be
disengaged% from the Panzer Lehr> "lus the reconnaissance battalion and %.th from the 26th
ol!s "renadier Division
The immediate ob.ectives seem to have been clearl! stated The Panzer Lehr s"earheads were
to advance via Hom"rK and 4ibret to 4t Hubert+ while the units of the 26th would start the
attac- from an assembl! "oint at 7emonfosse on the Bastogne,Arlon road with the intention
of stabbing into Bastogne from the southwest (n fact this night o"eration develo"ed into a
mad scramble in which the troo"s from the two divisions .oc-e!ed for the lead as if the! were
in a flat race for high sta-es
Trul! the sta-es were high Throughout this maneuver 9uettwit? and his su"erior+ General
Manteuffel+ had an e!e single to sha-ing the armored columns of the 0LII Panzer +orps free
for the dash to the Meuse bridges Bastogne+ sitting in the center of the web of hard,surfaced
roads+ was im"ortant,but onl! as a means to a geogra"hicall! distant end Bastogne had failed
to fall li-e an overri"e "lum when the bough was sha-en+ but it could be cli""ed off the
branch,or so the German High )ommand still reasoned,and without using Ba!erlein2s armor
The enem! drive across the south face of Bastogne and on to the west during the night of 80
December did not immediatel! .olt McAuliffe2s command> it was rather a dis"arate series of
clashes with scattered and unsus"ecting units of the '((( )or"s )entral to the stor! at this
"oint is the fact that b! da!light on the 81st the German infantr! following the armored troo"s
were ensconced on both the main roads running from Bastogne south+ while light forces were
running u" and down the western reaches of the Bastogne,4t Hubert highwa! (n the north
the circle had been clam"ed shut during the night when the 2d Panzer sei?ed 5rtheuville on
the Marche road
Bastogne Is En#ir#led
4ome of the Bastogne defenders recall in the saga of the 101st Airborne Division that their
lone fight began on 80 December "(t was on this da!+ 80 December+" reads the war diar! of
the =8Dth Glider (nfantr!+ "that all roads were cut b! the enem! and we were com"letel!
surrounded" This is onl! hindsight The "icture of com"lete encirclement was built u" in
McAuliffe2s head:uarters onl! slowl! on the 81st+ nor did the ring at first seem to be hermetic
and contracting Doubtless the word "assed among the regiments ver! ra"idl!,the /01st
.ournal notes at 10=0 that the last road is cut,but it was late afternoon before an armored
"atrol sent out b! ))B affirmed that the wa! south certainl! was closed
;hat were the means available for defense of the Bastogne "erimeterJ The 101st Airborne
was an elite+ veteran outfit at nearl! full strength+ and well ac:uainted with isolation as a
combat formation 5nl! five battalions from McAuliffe2s four regiments had been seriousl!
engaged in the fight thus far (ts four artiller! battalions were reinforced b! the 939th and
D//th <ield Artiller! Battalions+ armed with 1//,mm howit?ers whose range was nearl!
[459]
three times that of the airborne artiller!+ a ver! im"ortant ma-e,weight for the 101st (n
addition the 10th Armored Troo"s were su""orted b! the B80th Armored <ield Artiller!
Battalion+ whose mobilit! and tactics made it es"eciall! useful in a "erimeter situation Also
available were stra! gun sections and "ieces from artiller! units which had been decimated
during the '((( )or"s2 withdrawal
1robabl! ))B+ 10th Armored+ and ))7+ 9th Armored+ had between them some fort!
o"erable medium tan-s b! the 81st
&
To this number of fighting vehicles should be added the
light tan-s+ cavalr! assault guns+ and antiaircraft artiller! automatic wea"ons carriers,
"robabl! no more than two "latoons in each categor! A ver! heartening addition to the
Bastogne force+ of course+ was "rovided b! the D0/th Tan- Destro!er Battalion
The highwa! nodal "osition which made Bastogne so necessar! to the Germans also set u" a
magnetic field for the heterogeneous stragglers+ bro-en infantr!+ and dismounted tan-ers
heading west 7eali?ing this fact+ )olonel 7obert2s got "ermission to gather all stragglers into
his command 7oberts2 force came to be -nown as Team 46A<H
9
and served mainl! as a
reservoir from which regular units drew re"lacements or from which commanders organi?ed
tas- forces for s"ecial assignments
(t is im"ossible to rec-on accuratel! the number and the fighting worth of those stragglers
who reached Bastogne and sta!ed there ))7 contributed about two hundred riflemen> ))B
ma! have had an e:ual number> General )ota culled two or three hundred men from Team
46A<H to return to his 8&th Division> and one ma! guess there were another two or three
hundred stragglers whose identit! has been lost Man! of these men+ given a hot meal and
fort!,eight hours2 rest+ could be used and were used+ but the! a""ear as anon!mous figures in
the combat record $thus: "100 infantr! left for Team Browne"%
McAuliffe now had the advantage of a clearl! defined command structure Before the 80th he
and )olonel 7oberts had commanded inde"endentl!+ but on that date Middleton gave
McAuliffe the "sa!" $as General )ota had advised after his visit% over all the troo"s in the
Bastogne sector
10
The "resence of 7oberts would "rove "articularl! valuable *arl! in the
war he had been the armored instructor at the Arm! )ommand and General 4taff 4chool+
where his humorousl! illustrated "Do2s" and "Don2ts" of tan- warfare showed a -een
a""reciation of the "roblems "osed b! armor and infantr! coo"eration The "aratroo"ers were
in "articular need of this advice for the! seldom wor-ed with armor+ -new little of its
ca"abilit!+ and even less of its limitations+ and,as befitted troo"s who .um"ed into thin air,
were a little contem"tuous of men who fought behind "late steel $During the Bastogne battle
7oberts develo"ed a formal memorandum on the "ro"er em"lo!ment of armor+ but this was
not
[460]
distributed to the 101st until 8& December% 5n the other hand the tan-ers had much to learn
from commanders and troo"s who were used to fighting "surrounded"
McAuliffe2s logistic means were less substantial than the tactical The airborne division
normall! carried less su""l! than conventional divisions and the 101st had been hurried into
Belgium with ammunition and grenade "ouches not :uite full+ much individual e:ui"ment
missing $overshoes+ helmets+ slee"ing bags+ and the li-e%+ and onl! a few truc-loads of 10/,
mm howit?er shells (n fact some of the first "aratroo"ers into line had to be su""lied with
ammunition from the ))B trains <ortunatel! 7oberts2 trains were full+ and in some ma.or
su""l! items even had overages+ when the! arrived at Bastogne
The abilit! of the 101st to sustain itself had been severel! diminished on the night of 19
December when German raiding "arties $some re"orted in civilian garb% sur"rised and
overran the division service area around Mande,4t *tienne Most of the :uartermaster and
ordnance troo"s made their wa! to the '((( )or"s+ but the raiders ca"tured or -illed most of
the division medical com"an! 5nl! eight officers and fort!,four men esca"ed This loss of
doctors+ aid men+ and medical su""lies was one of the most severe blows dealt the 101st A
number of trans"ort vehicles also were lost in this affra!+ but about a hundred truc-s had been
sent to the rear for resu""l! and so esca"ed 'er! few of these got bac- to the 101st before the
ring closed
(n addition+ 7oberts had sent the ))B truc-s bac- for resu""l! .ust before the roads were
closed There was+ of course+ a considerable :uantit! of ammunition+ food+ and other su""lies
inside Bastogne which the '((( )or"s had been unable to evacuate $5fficers of Middleton2s
staff bitterl! regretted the loss of the wine and li:uors which had been carefull! husbanded for
consum"tion at )hristmas and 6ew Lear% Bastogne was si?able enough to have some reserve
civilian stoc-s+ and the melange of armor+ engineers+ and artiller! units around the cit! had,
su""lies and ammunition in their own vehicles $1anca-es would a""ear regularl! in the
rations served during the siege+ these concocted from the doughnut flour left in a huge
American 7ed )ross dum"%
Through assiduous scrounging+ re:uisitioning+ and an enforced "ooling of unit resources+ the
G,B of the 101st would be able to wor- minor logistic miracles,but these alone would not
have insured the survival of the Bastogne garrison The airborne division had been su""lied
b! air during the Holland o"eration+ and when+ on the 81st+ McAuliffe -new that his
command was isolated he as-ed for aerial resu""l! Hnfortunatel! no "lans had been wor-ed
out in advance for airlift su""ort and the su""l! records of the Holland cam"aign,which
would have made logistic calculation and "rocedure easier,were bac- in <rance (n the first
instance+ therefore+ the troo"s in Bastogne would have to ta-e what the! got whenever the!
could get it
)ommunications would "resent no ma.or "roblem A cor"s radio,lin- vehicle arrived in
Bastogne .ust before the road to 6eufchCteau was severed> so Middleton and McAuliffe had
two,wa! "hone and telet!"e at their dis"osal throughout the siege (nside Bastogne
[461]
there were enough armored and artiller! units,com"arativel! rich in signal e:ui"ment,to flesh
out a s"eed! and fairl! reliable command and artiller! net Tactical communication be!ond
the Bastogne "erimeter+ however+ as for e#am"le with the Bth Armored+ had to be couched in
ambiguous,sometimes :uite meaningless,terms
Mobile forces racing cross,countr!+ shooting u" isolated "osts and convo!s+ do not
necessaril! ma-e a battle The German dash around Bastogne was "reeminentl! designed to
encircle+ not constrict The German commanders+ well aware of the fragmenti?ation of their
envelo"ing forces+ did not consider that Bastogne had been surrounded until the evening of
the 81st The ma.or enem! im"act on this date+ therefore+ came as in "revious da!s against the
east face of Bastogne The American "erimeter+ then ta-ing form+ re"resents basicall! a
reaction to the original German intentions with onl! slight concessions to the a""earance of
the enem! in the south and west The /08d held the northern sector of the American line in
the 9ongcham"s and 4onne,<ontaine area 6ortheast of Bastogne the /03th was de"lo!ed
with one foot in <o! and the other ne#t to the Bourc!,Bastogne rail line To the right of this
regiment the /01st faced east,one flan- at the rail line and the other south of 6effe The 8d
Battalion+ =8Dth+ held the Marvie "osition with an o"en flan- abutting on the Bastogne,Arlon
highwa!
The American de"lo!ment on through the south and west :uadrants could not !et be called a
line (n the earl! afternoon McAuliffe too- the 1st Battalion of the =8Dth $then attached to the
/01st% and sent it due south of Bastogne> here tenuous contact was established with the
division engineer battalion,the =83th,strung thinl! across the 6eufchCteau road and on to the
west $The airborne engineers were not well e:ui""ed with demolition matKriel and this road
had to be bloc-ed> McAuliffe "honed the '((( )or"s for assistance and in the earl! dar- a
detachment from the =/th *ngineer )ombat Battalion came north and did the .ob%
Directl! west of Bastogne la! the remnants of the division trains and service com"anies
Defense here would devolve initiall! on the B80th Armored <ield Artiller! Battalion $9t )ol
Barr! D Browne%+ which was gathering infantr! and tan- destro!ers and finall! would be
-nown as Tas- <orce Browne The last lin- in the "erimeter was the =d Battalion of the =8Dth+
holding on a front northwest of Bastogne which e#tended from the Marche,Bastogne highwa!
to )ham"s
The dis"ositions .ust described re"resent the more or less static formations in the Bastogne
force+ the beef for sustained holding o"erations *:uall! im"ortant were the mobile+ counter,
"unching elements "rovided b! the armor+ assault guns+ and tan- destro!ers These units+ with
constantl! changing tas- force names and com"osition+ would have a ubi:uitous+ fluid+ and
highl! im"ortant role in maintaining the Bastogne "erimeter against the German concentric
attac- Their tactical agilit! on the interior line would be greatl! enhanced b! the big free?e
which set in on the 81st
All through the night of 80 December the troo"s of the /03th in <o! had been
[462]
buffeted b! German artiller! At dawn the enem! advanced on the village+ and the Americans+
as the! had done earlier+ retired to the better ground south of <o! and 7ecogne This earl!
effort was not followed u" because the 2d Panzer was on its wa! west and had no further
concern in this sector save to neutrali?e a "ossible American fora! against its rear
The "rimar! attac- of the da! came along the Bourc!,Bastogne rail line+ right at the seam
between the /03th and /01st During the "revious night @o-ott had built u" the concentration
of his 26th ol!s "renadier Division in the woods east of the railroad to include much of the
rifle strength of the ,,th and ,-th &egiments The two American regiments had failed to ma-e
a firm commitment as to tactical res"onsibilit! and+ indeed+ the left flan- of the /01st was
nearl! a thousand !ards to the rear of the /03th At 0&=0 a /03th "atrol chanced u"on some
Germans in the woods behind the regiment2s right flan- )om"anies D and < attac-ed
"rom"tl! to seal the ga" at the rail line while the /01st turned its wea"ons to den! an!
movement on its side
*nough of the enem! had infiltrated for McAuliffe to as- )olonel 4in- to send in his 1st
Battalion+ which had been badl! hurt at 6oville+ as a cauteri?ing force (t too- three hours of
mus-etr! and+ at several "oints+ ba!onet wor- to li:uidate the Germans in the "oc-et> the
battalion -illed about so+ too- "risoner &/+ and drove a large number into the hands of the
/01st This hot sector of the front cooled off during the afternoon The 26th ol!s "renadier
Division was realigning and e#tending to ta-e over the ground vacated b! Panzer Lehr+ and
@o-ott could not afford two regiments in attac- at the rail line
Through most of 81 December the Germans lashed out at the /01st with artiller! and s"oradic
infantr! assaults 5n the American left flan- @o-ott2s ,,th carried the ball but the main effort
was made b! the .)2d+ attac-ing from an assembl! area at 6effe against the =d Battalion The
records of this battalion were lost in later fighting+ but "artici"ants in the action s"ea- of a
"determined" attac- b! two German rifle battalions and "vicious close,in fighting" Although
)olonel *well e#"ected a second all,out assault when da!light ended+ this never came The
.)2d had its orders to catch u" with the Panzer Lehr van in the west and during the night
assembled for the march to re.oin General Ba!erlein
4outh of the /01st "ositions the enem! seemed content to sit bac- and shell the head:uarters
of the 8d Battalion+ =8Dth+ at Marvie The 8d Battalion records no other action than the
a""earance of some tan-s and infantr! along the Arlon road forcing a flan- e#tension across
the road German evidence+ however+ s"ea-s of attac-s b! the .)/st in this sector which
"miscarried"
11
(f discretion in this "articular instance "roved the better "art of valor+ it
"robabl! was induced b! the ))B tan-s which had ta-en "osition on the Arlon road
<arther west the enem! was more aggressive Having "la!ed havoc with the
[463]
'((( )or"s2 artiller! and trains assembled outside 4ibret+ 1ampfgr$ppe 1$n!el turned north in
the late morning toward 4enoncham"s+ a village of some im"ortance since it controlled the
secondar! road leading onto the Marche,Bastogne highwa! The immediate "ri?e before
@un-el+ but "robabl! un-nown to him+ was the American artiller! grou"ment consisting of
the D//th and 939th <ield Artiller! Battalions+ em"laced with their 1//,mm howit?ers near
'illerou#+ a crossroads some 8+/00 !ards south of 4enoncham"s
At 4enoncham"s the B80th Armored <ield Artiller! Battalion under )olonel Browne was
busil! engaged in firing against the enem! east and north of Bastogne+ but Browne had been
able to ta-e some ste"s to secure his gun "ositions with a scratch force of infantr! and light
tan-s raised b! ))B Around 'illerou#+ however+ all was confusion and no single officer
seemed to be res"onsible for defense of this sector As @un-el s"ed north from 4ibret toward
'illerou# he met the DD1st <ield Artiller! Battalion+ which abandoned its guns and fled
About this time Team 1!le $a detachment formed from the remnants of ))7 and numbering
fourteen tan-s and a cou"le of hundred stra! riflemen% came south on the 6eufchCteau road
@un-el hit the "oint of this force east of 'illerou# and drove the Americans bac- in the
direction of 4enoncham"s
The brief res"ite given the 'illerou# defenders b! this encounter enabled the two medium
howit?er battalions to "march order" their batteries and head for 4enoncham"s German
infantr! in half,trac-s closed on 'illerou# before the last howit?ers could dis"lace+ but
visibilit! b! this time had dwindled to a cou"le of hundred !ards and Batter! A of the D//th
alongside the head:uarters batter! of the 939th laid down a hail of machine gun fire which
momentaril! halted the enem! This small rear guard force itself was saved b! the a""earance
of two American tan-s that casuall! wandered into the fight and out again 5nl! one howit?er
was lost during the dis"lacement to 4enoncham"s+ and it was disabled b! a mortar shell
At the edge of 4enoncham"s Team 1!le made a stand+ for the German drive threatened to
stri-e the B80th Armored <ield Artiller! Battalion $Team Browne% and the two battalions of
1//24 from the rear ;hen the enem! infantr! formed to .oin their tan-s in an assault on the
village the! came directl! under the e!es of Batter! B of the D93th Antiaircraft Artiller!
Battalion+ whose /0,caliber "meat cho""ers" :uic-l! ended this threat @un-el decided to
dela! an attem"t for conclusion until the morrow
6orth and northwest of Bastogne the da! "assed :uietl!+ although small German detachments
did ma-e a few sorties on the Marche road The com"an! of the =d Battalion+ =8Dth+ which
had been sent on a lone mission to aid the survivors of the division medical com"an!+ was
attac-ed and momentaril! cut off but succeeded in re.oining the battalion
The Enemy Begins a +on#entri# (tta#!
The evening situation re"ort that reached OB WEST on the 81st made good reading
7undstedt was convinced that the time was ri"e for a concentric attac- to crush Bastogne and
ma-e this road center available for the build,u" re:uired
[464]
to su""ort the 'ifth Panzer (rmy at or over the Meuse His order to Manteuffel made the
sei?ure of Bastogne a must+ but at the same time stressed the "aramount necessit! of retaining
momentum in the drive west Manteuffel had antici"ated the OB WEST command and during
the evening visited the 0LII Panzer +orps2 command "ost to ma-e certain that 9uettwit?
would start the s:uee?e on Bastogne the ne#t da!,but without involving the mobile armored
columns of the Panzer Lehr
Manteuffel+ 9uettwit?+ and @o-ott+ who was now made directl! res"onsible for the conduct of
the Bastogne o"eration+ were o"timistic <or one thing the fight could be made without
loo-ing over the shoulder toward the south $where the 9uftwaffe had re"orted heav!
American traffic moving from Met? through 9u#embourg )it!%+ because the right wing of the
Seventh (rmy finall! had shouldered its wa! west and seemed read! to ta-e over the
"rearranged bloc-ing line facing 6eufchCteau+ Arlon+ and the American reinforcements
"redicted from 1atton2s Third Arm! The advance guard of the 2th Para#h$te Division alread!
had crossed the Arlon road north of Martelange General Brandenberger+ the Seventh (rmy
commander+ himself came to 9uettwit?2 command "ost during the evening to "romise that all
three regiments of the division would ta-e their allotted "ositions
@o-ott a""arentl! was "romised reinforcement for the attac- 3 o$tran#e on Bastogne but he
had to begin the battle with those troo"s on the s"ot: his own 26th ol!s "renadier Division+
the .)/st 1ampfgr$ppe $which had been detached from Panzer Lehr%+ an e#tra fifteen 1anther
tan-s+ and some artiller! battalions ;hat the 2th Para#h$te Division could "ut into the "ot
de"ended+ of course+ on the Americans to the south
(t would ta-e some time to relieve those troo"s "ulling out and redress the alignment of the
26th ol!s "renadier Division2s battalions There was little "oint to attac-ing the 101st
Airborne in the eastern sector where its strength had been demonstrated+ but west of Bastogne
the Panzer Lehr and @o-ott2s own reconnaissance troo"s had encountered onl! wea- and
disorgani?ed o""osition The first blow of the new series designed to bore into Bastogne
would be delivered here in the western sector+ accom"anied b! s!stematic shelling to bring
that town down around the defender2s ears
The battle on the 88d+ therefore+ largel! centered along an arc rather roughl! delimited b!
'illerou# and the 6eufchCteau highwa! at one end and Mande,4t *tienne+ .ust north of the
Marche highwa!+ at the other 5ne cannot s"ea- of battle lines in this sector: the two
antagonists were mi#ed higgled!,"iggled! and for much of the time with no certain
-nowledge of who was in what village or at what crossroads (t is indicative of the confusion
"revailing that the /01st tried to evacuate its regimental baggage train,which had suffered
from enem! shelling,through 4ibret after 1ampfgr$ppe 1$n!el had cut the road north of the
town b! the dash into 'illerou# $The /01st lost fifteen truc-s and nearl! all its bed rolls%
The arena in :uestion earlier had been the 101st service area and contained in addition a good
deal of the
[465]
'((( )or"s2 artiller! and trains Much of the fighting on the 88d revolved around two
battalions of armored field artiller!: )olonel 1aton2s /&th Armored <ield Artiller! Battalion+
which had em"laced near Tillet,after the 9ongvill! battle,to su""ort the 101st Airborne> and
Browne2s B80th+ now o"erating as a combined arms team on a B+000,!ard "erimeter in the
neighborhood of 4enoncham"s Tillet la! about si# miles west of 4enoncham"s Much of the
intervening countr!side was in the hands of roving "atrols from Panzer Lehr+ one of which
had erected a strong roadbloc- midwa! between the two villages
5n the night of the 81st the Germans encircled Tillet+ where 1aton+ hard "ressed+ radioed the
'((( )or"s for hel" Middleton rela!ed this 454 to Bastogne but Browne+ himself under
attac- b! @un-el2s 26th ol!s "renadier Division reconnaissance battalion+ was forced to sa!
that the /&th would have to get bac- to 4enoncham"s under its own "ower 6evertheless+
Team Lantis $one medium tan-+ two light tan-s+ and a cou"le of rifle s:uads% moved forward
to the German roadbloc-+ e#"ecting to give the /&th a hand when da! bro-e
18
1aton and his gunners never reached Team Browne+
1=
which had had its hands full Browne2s
force not onl! had to defend a section of the Bastogne "erimeter and bar the 4enoncham"s
entr!+ but also had to serve the eighteen 10/,mm howit?ers which+ from batter! "ositions east
and south of 4enoncham"s+ "rovided round,the,cloc- fire su""ort for friendl! infantr! five to
eight miles distant )lose,in defense was "rovided b! a "latoon of thirt! stragglers who had
been rounded u" b! an airborne officer and de"lo!ed three hundred !ards south of the gun
"ositions $This "latoon held for two da!s until all were -illed or ca"tured% Browne2s main
wea"on against the German tan-s and self,"ro"elled guns was not his howit?ers but the
seventeen 4herman tan-s brought u" b! Team 1!le and Team 'an @leef the da! before
These were dis"osed with nine tan-s facing a series of wood lots west of the batter! "ositions+
four firing south+ and the remaining four "laced on the road to 'illerou#
At da!brea- the first tas- was to clear the enem! from the woods which la! uncomfortabl!
near the firing batteries 1!le2s scratch force of riflemen entered the woods but found onl! a
few Germans 5ff to the northwest came the sound of firing from the area -nown to be
occu"ied b! a battalion of the =8Dth Glider (nfantr!> so Browne re"orted to )olonel 7oberts
that his team would .oin this fight as soon as the woods were clear Before the sortie could be
organi?ed+ a detachment from 1ampfgr$ppe 1$n!el struc- out from 'illerou# against the
American flan- Direct tan- fire chased the enem! awa!+ but this was onl! the o"ener During
the afternoon the enem! made three se"arate assaults from the woods that earlier had been
re"orted cleared+ and again the tan-s made short wor- of the Germans $'an @leef re"orted
eighteen enem! tan-s destro!ed during the da!%
As the afternoon wore on fog and snow
[466]
)A4HA9T(*4 (6 A6 (M175'(4*D *M*7G*6)L ;A7D d$ring the siege of Bastogne4
clouded the scene and the tan- gunners began to lose their targets The American howit?er
batteries+ however+ "rovided a static and b! this time a well,defined target for enem!
counterbatter! fire At twilight )olonel Browne radioed ))B that his heterogeneous team was
ta-ing "terrible casualties" *arlier he had as-ed for more troo"s+ and McAuliffe had sent
)om"an! ) of the =8Dth and Team ;atts $about a hundred men+ under Ma. *ugene A
;atts% from Team 46A<H At dar- the howit?er "ositions had a fairl! substantial screen of
infantr! around them+ although the enem! guns continued to "ound awa! through the night
The airdro" laid on for the 88d never reached Bastogne,bad fl!ing weather continued as in the
da!s "ast All that the Third Arm! air liaison staff could do was to send a message that "the
101st Airborne situation is -nown and a""reciated" Artiller! ammunition was running ver!
low The large number of wounded congregated inside Bastogne "resented a s"ecial "roblem:
there were too few medics+ not enough surgical e:ui"ment+ and blan-ets had to be gathered u"
from front,line troo"s to wra" the men suffering from wounds and shoc- 6onetheless+ morale
was high 9ate in the afternoon word was circulated to all the regiments that the Bth
[467]
Armored and the Dth Armored $so vague was information inside the "erimeter% were on their
wa! to Bastogne> to the men in the line this was heartening news
;hat ma! have been the biggest morale booster came with a reverse twist,the enem!
"ultimatum" About noon four Germans under a white flag entered the lines of the 8d
Battalion+ =8Dth The terms of the announcement the! carried were sim"le: "the honorable
surrender of the encircled town+" this to be accom"lished in two hours on threat of
"annihilation" b! the massed fires of the German artiller! The rest of the stor! has become
legend: how General McAuliffe disdainfull! answered "6utsG"> and how )olonel Har"er+
commander of the =8Dth+ hard "ressed to translate the idiom+ com"romised on "Go to HellG"
The ultimatum had been signed rather ambiguousl! b! "The German )ommander+" and none
of the German generals then in the Bastogne sector seem to have been an#ious to claim
authorshi"
1B
9t )ol 1aul A Danah!+ G,8 of the 101st+ saw to it that the stor! was circulated,
and a""ro"riatel! embellished,in the dail! "eriodic re"ort: "The )ommanding General2s
answer was+ with a sarcastic air of humorous tolerance+ em"haticall! negative" 6onetheless
the 101st e#"ected that the coming da!,the 8=d,would be rough
The morning of 8= December bro-e clear and cold "'isibilit! unlimited+" the air,control
"osts ha""il! re"orted all the wa! from the Hnited @ingdom to the fo#holes on the Ardennes
front To most of the American soldier! this would be a red,letter da!,long remembered,
because of the bombers and fighter,bombers once more streaming overhead li-e shoals of
silver minnows in the bright winter sun+ their shar"l! etched contrails ma-ing a wa-e behind
them in the cold air
(n Bastogne+ however+ all e!es loo-ed for the s:uat "lanes of the Troo" )arrier )ommand
About 0900 a 1athfinder team dro""ed inside the "erimeter and set u" the a""aratus to guide
the ),BD2s over a dro" ?one between 4enoncham"s and Bastogne The first of the carriers
dro""ed its si# "ara"ac-s at 11/0+ and in little more than four hours 8B1 "lanes had been
vectored to Bastogne *ach "lane carried some twelve hundred "ounds+ but not all reached the
dro" ?one nor did all the "ara"ac-s fall where the Americans could recover them
6evertheless this da!2s dro" lessened the "inch,as the records of the 101st gratefull!
ac-nowledge 5n 8B December a total of 130 "lanes would ta-e "art in the dro"> "oor fl!ing
weather on )hristmas Da! virtuall! scrubbed all cargo missions,although eleven gliders did
bring in a team of four surgeons and some 159 badl! needed b! 7oberts2 tan-s The biggest
airlift da! of the siege would come on the 83th with 8&9 "lanes fl!ing the Bastogne run1/
The bul- of the air cargo brought to Bastogne during the siege was artiller! ammunition B!
the 8Bth the airborne batteries were down to ten rounds "er tube and the wor- horse B80th
Armored <ield Artiller! was e#"ending no more than five rounds "er mission+ even on
[468]
4H119L BL A(7 Pathfinder $nit 5a6ove7 sets $p radar e8$ipment4 9edi#al s$pplies 56elo:7
are
dragged 6y hand from drop zone4
[469]
ver! lucrative targets This battalion+ covering a =30,degree front+ would in fact be forced to
ma-e its original 1+B00 rounds last for five da!s The two 1//,mm howit?er battalions were
reall! "awing at the bottom of the barrel The 939th fired thirt!,nine rounds on 8B December
and two da!s later could allow its gunners onl! twent!,seven rounds+ one,si#th the number of
rounds e#"ended "er da! when the battle began
The airdro" on the 8=d brought a dividend for the troo"s defending Bastogne The cargo
"lanes were all overwatched b! fighters who+ their "rotective mission accom"lished+ turned to
hammer the Germans in the Bastogne ring During the da! eight!,two 1,BD2s lashed out at this
enem! with general,"ur"ose and fragmentation bombs+ na"alm+ and machine gun fire The
101st re"orted to Middleton+ whose staff was handling these air stri-es for the division+ that
"air and artiller! is having a field da! around Bastogne"
The German attac- on the 8=d was mounted b! the 26th ol!s "renadier Division and the
attached regiment left behind b! Panzer Lehr 9ac-ing the men and tan-s for an assault
around the entire "erimeter+ General @o-ott elected to continue the fight at 4enoncham"s
while attac-ing in two sectors diametricall! o""osite each other+ the Marvie area in the
southeast and the <lamierge area in the northwest B! the ha""enstance of its late and
"iecemeal de"lo!ment the =8Dth Glider (nfantr! stood in front of the enem! at both these
critical "oints
The 2th Para#h$te Division+ now badl! fought out and with ga"ing ran-s+ could be of little
hel" at Bastogne Actuall! this division was scattered on a front of eighteen miles+ reaching
from 6eufchCteau clear bac- to the 4auer crossings (ndeed+ during the da! the 26th ol!s
"renadier Division had to ta-e over the "ortion of the 2th Para#h$te line between
)lochimont and Hom"rK because the American forces from the south threatened to "ierce this
ver! thinl! occu"ied segment of the bloc-ing line @o-ott+ then+ could em"lo! onl! two
regiments and his reconnaissance battalion in the assault+ while maintaining what "ressure the
remaining two regiments might have along the balance of the American "erimeter
The enem! tactics on this and the following da!s reflect the manner in which @o-ott had to
husband his resources *#tensive "re"arator! fires b! artiller! and Werfers o"ened the show
while the infantr! wormed in as close to the American fo#hole line as "ossible B! this time
the newfallen snow had "ut ever! dar- ob.ect in full relief> the grenadiers now donned white
snow ca"es and the "an?ers were "ainted white $The Americans re"lied in -ind with
wholesale raids on Belgian bed linen and with whitewash for their armored vehicles% The
assault would be led b! a tan- "latoon,normall! four or five "an?ers,followed b! fift! to a
hundred infantr! (f this first wave failed+ a second or third,seldom larger than the initial
wave,would be thrown in (t is clear+ however+ that the German commander and his troo"s
were char! of massed tactics at this stage of the game
The %.th ol!s "renadier &egiment+ freshest in @o-ott2s division+ was assembled to the west
and northwest o""osite Team Browne and the =d Battalion of the =8Dth The latter had
maintained
[470]
an observation "ost at <lamierge and a string of roadbloc-s along the <lamierge road well in
front of the battalion "osition Here the enem! dealt the first blow of the da! and got into
<lamierge+ onl! to be chased out b! a counterattac- 6e#t+ the enem! gathered south of
)om"an! ),"ositioned astride the Marche highwa!,and tried to shoot the Americans out with
tan- fire (n earl! evening the Germans moved in for the assault and at one "oint it was
re"orted that )om"an! ) had been lost This was far from fact for the American artiller! beat
off the attac-ers> the =d Battalion+ however+ "ulled bac- closer to Bastogne This enem! effort
also e#tended to embrace Team Browne More infantr! were hurried to 4enoncham"s on light
tan-s+ and at 1&=0 McAuliffe sent one half of his mobile reserve $Team )herr!% to give a
hand against the German tan-s But the American tan-s+ tan- destro!ers+ and artiller! alread!
on the scene were able to handle the "an?ers without additional hel",and even while this fight
was on the cannoneers around 4enoncham"s turned their "ieces to lob shells across the
"erimeter in su""ort of the hard,driven "aratroo"ers and tan-ers at Marvie
During the hours of light the .)/st made no move to carr! out its scheduled attac- between
Marvie and the Arlon road Iuite "ossibl! the activit! of the American fighter,bombers+ once
more in the s-ies+ made it necessar! to wait for nightfall Through the afternoon the enem!
shelled the 8d Battalion+ =8Dth+ and its command "ost in Marvie As night came on the
barrage increased in intensit!+ swee"ing along the battalion front and onto its northern flan-,
be!ond Marvie,where Team 52Hara stood with its tan-s
At 1&B/ the .)/st $with at least two tan- com"anies in su""ort% commenced a co,ordinated
attac- delivered b! "latoons and com"anies against the front manned b! the 8d Battalion and
Team 52Hara
13
5ne :uic- rush "ut an enem! detachment on a hill south of Marvie which
overloo-ed this village The "latoon of "aratroo"ers on the hill was surrounded and destro!ed+
but when a half,trac- and a brace of tan-s tried to move down the hill into Marvie a luc-!
shot or a mine disabled the half,trac-+ leaving no wa! "ast for the tan-s 5n the Bastogne,
Arlon road a grou" of tan-s $twelve were counted% started north toward the right flan- of the
8d Battalion Here )om"an! < later re"orted that the tan-s "made re"eated attem"ts to
overrun our "ositions but were halted" (t is "robable that the three medium tan-s from Team
52Hara and the three tan- destro!ers from the 309th Tan- Destro!er Battalion which stood
astride the road $not to mention the dar-ness and artiller! fire% had a more chastening effect
on the "an?ers than the small arms fire of the "aratroo"ers
The Germans seem to have had the village of Marvie as their main ob.ective for b! midnight
the fight had died down all along the line e#ce"t at Marvie+ where it burst out with fresh
virulence (t is estimated that at least one rifle battalion and some fifteen tan-s were thrown
against )om"an! * $now reinforced b! an understrength com"an! of airborne engineers% and
Team 52Hara
[471]
Hsing the hill which earlier had been wrested from )om"an! G as a mounting bloc-+ three
German tan-s made their wa! into the south edge of Marvie+ but 52Hara2s tan-s and assault
guns sto""ed a ma.or "enetration from the east b! gunning down the "an?ers silhouetted in
the glare of burning buildings+ thus enabling the Americans to hold on in the north half of the
village The threat of a breach here im"elled McAuliffe to send the remaining half of Team
)herr! to Marvie Because this switch stri""ed Bastogne of its last counterattac- force+
)herr!2s detachment+ which had gone west to assist Team Browne+ was recalled to Bastogne
An hour before dawn on the 8Bth the battle ended and :uiet came to Marvie 52Hara2s troo"s
had accounted for eight "an?ers in this fight+ but the village was still clutched b! both
antagonists
The battle on the 8=d had been viewed in a somewhat somber light inside Bastogne That
evening+ onl! a few minutes after the German attac- began in the Marvie sector+ 9t )ol
Harr! ; 5 @innard $the 101st Airborne Division G,=% tele"honed his o""osite number at
the '((( )or"s command "ost The gist of his re"ort+ as recorded in the cor"s G,= .ournal+ was
this: "(n regard to our situation it is getting "rett! stic-! around here The! Ethe Bth Armored
DivisionF must -ee" coming The enem! has attac-ed all along the south and some tan-s are
through and running around in our area 7e:uest !ou inform Bth Armored Division of our
situation and as- them to "ut on all "ossible "ressure"
The events of the "ast hours had shown that the force under McAuliffe2s command was
overe#tended at a number of "oints The artiller! grou"ment west of Bastogne was
"articularl! e#"osed+ and the =8Dth Glider (nfantr! had alread! been forced to shorten its
lines Then too the segments of the "erimeter defense were not as well coordinated as the!
might be The tan-ers of ))B com"lained that the! had no idea of the airborne "ositions+ and
:uite "robabl! the regiments of the 101st were ha?! as to the location of the small tan- and
tan- destro!er detachments on their flan-s
)olonel @innard+ whose shar" tactical sense was rated highl! b! all the commanders who
wor-ed with him during the siege+ drew u" on 8B December a "lan to regrou" the Bastogne
forces The "lan was "ut into o"eration that same evening @innard2s scheme "laced all four
regiments of the 101st Airborne on the line as combined arms teams Team 52Hara and a
"latoon of the D0/th Tan- Destro!er Battalion were attached to the /01st The /03th+ whose
sector had been :uiet+ got two "latoons of the D0/th but no tan-s The /08d was given two
"latoons from the D0/th and Team Anderson $it is s!m"tomatic of the shoestring defense
which "erforce had evolved at the "erimeter that )a"tain Anderson2s "team" consisted of two
cavalr! assault guns+ one tan- destro!er+ and two .ee"s% The =8Dth too- over the =83th
Airborne *ngineer Battalion+ two "latoons of the 9th Armored *ngineer Battalion $which had
won distinction in the 6oville fight%+ and four "latoons of the D0/th Also attached to the
=8Dth was the amalgam of infantr!+ tan- destro!ers+ and tan-s which had grown u" around
Browne2s B80th Armored <ield Artiller! Battalion and which+ on the 8=d+ had been
reorgani?ed as Team
[472]
MA1 B
7oberts $)olonel Browne was wounded b! a shell fragment on the 8Bth and died the ne#t
da!%
1D
This read.ustment of the 101st "ositions resulted in a taut and tenuous line a""ro#imatel!
si#teen miles $Map 4% That it could not be defended in e:ual strength at all "oints was not
onl! a militar! a"horism but a sim"le fact dictated b! the troo"s available and the accidents of
the ground )reation of a tactical reserve was therefore mandator!+ albeit difficult of
accom"lishment with the limited mechani?ed force at McAuliffe2s dis"osal The 101st
reserve+ as now organi?ed+ consisted of 7oberts2 ))B> that is Teams )herr! and Arnsdorf
$with "erha"s nine medium and five light tan-s o"erational at an! given time% "lus a "art of
the original Team 46A<H+ "ut together b! )olonel 7oberts from the remnants of ))7+ 9th
Armored+ and various waifs and stra!s $)olonel Gilbreth+
[473]
the commander of 46A<H+ was wounded on the 88d and then hos"itali?ed%
This reshuffle stri""ed ))B of its own reserve> so 7oberts organi?ed a new formation $Team
1almaccio+ commanded b! 1st 9t )harles 1 1almaccio% e:ui""ed with four antiaircraft half,
trac-s+ one tan- destro!er+ and two light tan-s 7oadbloc-s at the entrances to Bastogne were
established+ each manned b! two guns from )om"an! )+ 309th Tan- Destro!er Battalion
(nside Bastogne itself+ McAuliffe had a "art of Team 46A<H as a -ind of "interior guard+"
bac-ed u" b! four self,"ro"elled tan- destro!ers and fort! men from the D0/th All this
regrou"ing tightened and strengthened the rifle line surrounding Bastogne+ but the resources
at hand for fire fighting enem! armored incursions or for :uic-+ local counterattac-s were
woefull! limited,as shown b! the commitment of Team )herr! on o""osite sides of the
"erimeter during 8=,8B December
General 9uettwit?+ with onl! a reinforced division to use against Bastogne+ was worse off
than McAuliffe He had been given rather vague "romises of reinforcement+ but no decision
was rendered b! the High )ommand until the 8=d when Hitler agreed to release two fresh
divisions $the .th Panzer and /2th Panzer "renadier% from the O1W reserve 5nce these
troo"s were handed over to (rmy "ro$p B+ <ield Marshal Model decided that the! were more
sorel! needed to shore u" the left flan- of the 'ifth Panzer and Seventh (rmies than at
Bastogne 5ne regimental combat team from the /2th Panzer "renadier Division was all he
would give 9uettwit? for the Bastogne o"eration
5n both sides of the line+ then+ the da!light hours of the 8Bth were s"ent in regrou"ing+ this
"unctuated with heav! gusts of artiller! and mortar fire whenever the o""onent showed signs
of movement 5nce again+ however+ a beautiful fl!ing da! gave the Americans an edge 1,BD
2s belonging to the /18th+ /1=th+ and /1Bth 4:uadrons of the M(M Tactical Air )ommand
wor-ed around the Bastogne "erimeter+ at one "oint+ in the 6oville sector+ bombing so close
to the airborne lines that the 101st sent frantic word to the '((( )or"s as-ing that the flight
leader be told to call off the mission The //2th 1ampfgr$ppe from the /2th Panzer
"renadier Division dul! arrived for attachment to @o-ott2s division and too- over a sector in
the northwest between <lamierge and Givr! The B80th Armored <ield Artiller! Battalion and
the medium howit?er battalions dis"laced to new firing "ositions .ust north of the Marche
road and not more than a mile and a half from Bastogne The Americans abandoned their last
roadbloc- at Mande,4t *tienne,now it was too far out,and drew in the western line held b!
Team 7oberts and the =d Battalion of the =8Dth Germans and Americans both claimed
Marvie+ a circumstance which ma! have accounted for an American air stri-e on Marvie b!
1,BD2s during the afternoon
(n the head:uarters at Bastogne McAuliffe2s staff had been -e"t "rett! well abreast of the
enem! movements indicative of incoming reinforcement Team Anderson+ scouting around
)ham"s+ re"orted armor and trac-ed vehicles moving into Givr! $this was the new //2th
1ampfgr$ppe%> other re"orts noted the movement of German traffic coming from the
northeast and moving southward across the American front All this must have been a
headache for the 101st
[474]
G,8+ but aside from shortening the lines and tightening u" tactical control there was little the
Americans could do but wait for the blow to fall
*arl! in the afternoon the '((( )or"s rela!ed a message from General 1atton and the Third
Arm!: "Mmas *ve "resent coming u" Hold on" But there were more tangible items to lessen
the nostalgia and de"ression of the surrounded garrison on )hristmas *ve The second da! of
air resu""l! had been "a tremendous morale booster",so re"orted ))B and most of the
regiments Allied air activit! on the 8Bth had heartened the men on the ground ;hen night
fell the! could see the fires left as aftermath of the fighter,bomber stri-es bla?ing all the wa!
round the "erimeter $Twice during the night of 8B December+ however+ the 9uftwaffe
retaliated with ver! damaging and lethal bombing sorties on Bastogne and the surrounding
area% 9ess obtrusive but of considerable im"act was the confidence that the commanders and
the troo"s had in each other> a lesson for future commanders ma! be read in the considerable
effort "ut forth b! McAuliffe+ 7oberts+ and the regimental commanders to a""rise all the
troo"s of the "situation"
)hristmas *ve in the German head:uarters brought forth some cognac and a few "Prosits" but
in the main was devoted to "re"arations for a ma.or attac- on )hristmas Da! As late as the
evening of the 8Bth 9uettwit? ho"ed to obtain more troo"s from the /2th Panzer "renadier
Division+ but the <uehrer had other ideas *arlier in the da! the 'ifth Panzer (rmy
commander "osed a :uestion which finall! reached Aodl and Hitler: should he turn to finish
off Bastogne or continue+ with the bul- of his divisions+ toward the Meuse and sei?e the
Marche "lateau in an attem"t to widen the German thrustJ Hitler2s answer+ finall! rela!ed b!
Model+ was that the attac- to sei?e the Marche "lateau should be continued with all available
forces This answer did nothing to relieve Manteuffel2s worries about his thin and endangered
southern flan-
1&
To leave Bastogne as a sall! "ort onto his left rear made no militar! sense to
this e#"erienced soldier,so Manteuffel ordered that Bastogne be ta-en on 8/ December
$The attac- order read: "Dis"lacement Ein this conte#t a -ind of eu"hemism for "destruction"F
of the enem! at Bastogne"%
The German order of battle on )hristmas *ve was this $read from the north cloc-wise% The
26th ol!s "renadier engineer battalion and a few antitan- guns maintained a securit! screen
in the <o!,7ecogne sector The ,-th '$esiliers+ brought bac- to strength b! a large draft of
re"lacements+ held on a front e#tending from <o! to 6effe The .)/st+ its ran-s much
de"leted b! the fighting .ust ended+ continued the circle "ast Marvie and to a "oint west of the
Arlon road The %.th was de"lo!ed on both sides of the 6eufchCteau road ;hat earlier had
been the "western front",that is+ from 4enoncham"s north to the Marche road
[475]
A BA4T5G6* 4T7**T A<T*7 9H<T;A<<* B5MBA7DM*6T
,was occu"ied b! the reconnaissance battalion of the 26th ol!s "renadier Division+ which
had moved onto the ground left free b! the American withdrawal on the 8Bth The regiment
from the incoming 2th Panzer "renadier Division $)olonel Dec-ert% was bivouac-ed west of
<lami?oulle The ,,th '$esilier &egiment com"leted the circle+ the bul- of its troo"s
concentrated west of )ham"s Hneas! about the abilit! of the 2th Para#h$te Division to cover
his bac-+ @o-ott was forced to stri" a few com"anies from his own division and the .)/st to
form a subsidiar! front facing south
The attac- "lan for the 8/th turned on the fresh strength "rovided b! the /2th Panzer
"renadier $,% The main effort would be made in the northwest between the Marche road and
)ham"s+ the latter "oint included as an initial ob.ective (t was -nown that the American hold
in this sector was wea-+ the fro?en ground gave good tan- going and observation for the
artiller!+ and there were no large villages or woods to hold u" the assault To o"en a wa! for
the main effort @o-ott :uietl! assembled the ma.or "art of his division artiller! around
<lamierge and Givr! The "lan included a heav! blow b! the 9uftwaffe against Bastogne
itself $this eventuated in the two bombing attac-s during the
[476]
night of 8B December which -illed a Belgian nurse and a score of wounded "aratroo"ers%
The original time schedule was e#ceedingl! o"timistic: to "ut in the infantr! assault at 0B00>
to brea- through the American rifle line b! 0300+ at which time the artiller! could see to fire
on targets of o""ortunit! and the tan-s would be able to move with s"eed> and to rush an
armored grou" from the /2th Panzer "renadier into Bastogne between 0&00 and 0900 hours
before the American fighter,bombers too- to the air
The o"timism breathed b! this schedule must have e#"ired shortl! after it was "ut on "a"er
although the "lan remained @o-ott has recorded his shoc- and sur"rise at the wea- state of
the reinforcements brought in b! Dec-ert: the //2th &egiment $three battalions of fusiliers%+
the reconnaissance battalion and two armored field artiller! battalions of the /2th Panzer
"renadier Division+ a com"an! of tan- destro!ers+ and seventeen tan-s belonging to the
//2th Panzer Battalion Hitler2s failure to name Bastogne as the "rimar! ob.ective had been
reflected in the dilator! and contradictor! orders issued b! the higher commanders for the
em"lo!ment of Dec-ert2s division True+ the second of Dec-ert2s regiments $the /)*th% finall!
had been given to the 0LII Panzer +orps+ but on )hristmas *ve it was toiling slowl! toward
the east side of Bastogne and would not arrive in time to .oin the battle )ol ;olfgang
Mauc-e+ commander of the //2th+ ob.ected,as strongl! as a colonel would dare,when he
received his orders toward dus- on the 8Bth He had been given no time for reconnaissance>
no coordination had been arranged with the tan-s su""osed to su""ort the //2th Mauc-e2s
su"eriors sim"l! "ointed out the tremendous advantage that would accrue to a sur"rise attac-
on )hristmas Da!,he had his orders
19
The main assault+ handed the elements of the /2th Panzer "renadier+ was to be a straight
thrust over <lami?oulle into Bastogne with the right wing guiding on the Marche highwa!+ a
distance of about four miles <or this Mauc-e "ut two battalions in line and one in reserve
The /st Battalion+ with tan-s carr!ing some of the infantr!+ was to "ass through <lami?oulle>
the 2d Battalion+ su""orted b! the tan- destro!er com"an!+ would circle <lami?oulle to the
north and stri-e for the northern edge of Bastogne To the left of Mauc-e2s -am"fgru""e the
,,th "renadier &egiment was ordered to attac- along the secondar! road running through
)ham"s and Hemroulle into Bastogne Here the /st Battalion had the .ob of sei?ing )ham"s
and o"ening the wa! while the 2d Battalion+ following to the left and rear+ would be "re"ared
to lea"frog forward as )ham"s fell+ the two ma-ing the final "ush into Bastogne abreast The
reconnaissance battalion of the 26th ol!s "renadier Division+ south of Mauc-e2s force+ had a
s"ecial mission: to attac- from 4enoncham"s and "ierce the new American "osition b!
sei?ing (sle,la,Hesse+ a hamlet standing where the 4enoncham"s road fed into the Marche
highwa! Although nearl! all the German units surrounding
[477]
Bastogne had some diversionar! mission during the )hristmas Da! assault+ onl! the %.th
"renadier &egiment had a ma.or attac- assigned in su""ort of the effort in the northwest+ this
to be an advance astride the 6eufchCteau,Bastogne highwa! $which was never carried out%
The Battle on +hristmas Day
About 0=00 a few German "lanes droned over the /08d lines and dro""ed bombs
indiscriminatel! around 7olle+ the regimental command "ost This seems to have been the
9uftwaffe su""ort "romised @o-ott A few minutes later the German gunners and mortar
crews started to wor-+ their target the American "ositions at )ham"s Here )om"an! A of the
/08d was de"lo!ed on the northwest edge of the village+ its right flan- .oining the 8d
Battalion in a large wood lot midwa! between )ham"s and 9ongcham"s )lad in white snow
suits the first German assault "art!+ some fift! grenadiers from the ,,th+ cre"t forward under
the waning moon toward )ham"s At 0B00 this grou" dashed into the village and the German
attac- began More of the enem! moved through the woods against the left flan- of the 8d
Battalion+ and within the hour a full German battalion had .oined the fight )om"an! B
moved u" as a bac-sto" if its sister com"an! should be engulfed or "ushed aside+ but the
confused melee around )ham"s in the "redawn dar-ness "inned the Germans down
Meanwhile the two assault battalions of the /2th Panzer "renadier Division were moving
against the =d Battalion of the =8Dth The tan- grou" on the right of the German line drew
ahead of its marching "artner and an hour and a :uarter after the advance began re"orted to
@o-ott that the onl! evidence of American reaction was some tan- or tan- destro!er fire
coming in from the south Thirt! minutes later a brief and o"timistic radio message flashed to
the rear: the tan-s and the infantr! battalion festooned thereon had reached the western edge
of Bastogne But elation at the German command "ost was short lived> word that the German
tan-s were in the streets of Bastogne never came The commander of the //2th sent a liaison
officer forward to find the battalion or its tan-s+ but without success German forward
observers were alerted to listen for the sound of German tan- fire,but all the! could hear was
the crash of artiller! fire and the crum" of e#"loding mortar shells
The stor! of the lost tan- grou" is soon told The eighteen Mar- ('2s and the riding grenadiers
had bro-en through the "ositions held b! )om"anies A and B of the =8Dth Glider (nfantr!
before dawn and got as far as the battalion command "ost 4everal of the enem! tan-s "assed
straight through batter! "ositions of the D//th <ield Artiller! Battalion+ whose gunners
o"ened u" with machine guns as soon as the! discerned the distinctive German mu??le,
bra-es But the 1//,mm howit?ers could not be brought to bear at such close range and the
Germans rolled on unscathed Aust west of Hemroulle about half the German tan-s wheeled
left+ defiling along a cart "ath which led to the road between )ham"s and Bastogne As the!
a""roached the road the "an?ers formed in line abreast+ now bearing straight toward
)om"anies B and ) of the /08d+ which were on the march to
[478]
hel" the "aratroo"ers in )ham"s
)olonel )ha""uis had a few minutes to face his com"anies toward the oncoming tan-s+ but
the initial shoc- was absorbed b! two tan- destro!ers from )om"an! B of the D0/th Tan-
Destro!er Battalion which were -noc-ed out as the! fell bac- toward the )ham"s road
80
As
the "an?ers rolled forward+ )om"an! ) made an orderl! withdrawal to the edge of a large
wood lot midwa! between )ham"s and Hemroulle 6ow it was the "aratroo"ers2 turn The!
showered the tan-s with lead+ and the German infantr! clinging to the dec-s and sides fell to
the snow The tan- detachment again wheeled into column+ this time turning toward )ham"s
Two of the D0/th tan- destro!ers+ which were bac-ing u" )om"an! )+ caught the column in
"rocess of turning and "ut awa! three of the "an?ers> the "aratroo"ers2 ba?oo-as accounted for
two more
The half of the enem! tan-,infantr! formation which had -e"t on toward Hemroulle after
-nifing through the =8Dth fo#hole line received its #o$p de gr;#e in a fur! of cross fire laid
down b! four of the D0/th tan- destro!ers+ tan-s from Team 7oberts+ the B3=d 1arachute
<ield Artiller! Battalion+ and ba?oo-as handled b! the glider infantr! As recounted b! )ol 4
9 A Marshall after the battle: "The German tan-s were fired at from so man! directions and
with such a mi#ture of fire that it was not "ossible to see or sa! how each tan- met its doom"
The survivors of those "an?er grenadiers of the /st Battalion who had ridden into battle on the
tan-s found themselves surrounded and alone+ for the American rifle line had sealed itself
after the initial armored "unctures About fift! German riflemen who had hidden in a stream
bed were ca"tured b! cannoneers from the D//th At noon General @o-ott wrote the tan-s and
the accom"an!ing infantr! from the /st Battalion of the //2th off as lost,wh! and where
remained a m!ster! to the German head:uarters
The 2d Battalion of the //2th seems to have made good use of the ru"ture created in the
=8Dth "ositions west of Hemroulle+ advancing almost un"erceived and uno""osed until
da!brea- when it was brought under fire b! )om"an! )+ the =d Battalion reserve At first
light the American artiller! and mortars too- on the German infantr! star-l! outlined against
the snow,covered slo"es west of Hemroulle The "an?er grenadiers tried digging in but the
ground was too hard fro?en> so the! la! in the snow and too- their losses The regimental
commander+ )olonel Mauc-e+ began in midmorning to re,form his remaining troo"s+ "ulling
what was left of the /st Battalion bac- to a hill southeast of <lami?oulle $where it too- a
merciless "ounding from Allied fighter,bombers% and sending his reserve battalion into the
woods north of the /st to cover its flan- ;hen night fell Mauc-e ordered the remnants of the
/st Battalion to sidesli" south across the ga" left b! the disa""earance of the tan- grou" 5f
the battalion staff all were dead or wounded and the battalion commander was a !oung
lieutenant from one of the rifle com"anies Mauc-e himself went forward to find his lost tan-s
but was sto""ed b! machine gun fire
At )ham"s+ where the battle had begun+ most of the Germans left the village in the middle of
the morning to let their
[479]
gunners blast the "aratroo"ers out of the houses and surrounding woods The commander of
the ,,th+ a""rehensive of a continued house,to,house battle+ as-ed for and received
"ermission to circle around the village+ but the new attac- u" the slo"es toward Hemroulle
was shot to "ieces (n the earl! afternoon General @o-ott called the German attac- to a halt+
"lanning to resume the battle under cover of the night
This last "des"erate effort+" as @o-ott himself termed it+ too- long to organi?e and did not get
under wa! until the morning hours of the 83th Hsing the German salient at the (sle,la,Hesse
road for- as his base+ @o-ott sent a small assault grou" from his own division and ten mobile
tan- destro!ers northeast in the direction of Hemroulle with the intention of circling through
4av! into Bastogne This force wedged its wa! between the two right flan- com"anies of the
=8Dth but was caught in the o"en b! the howit?ers massed west of Bastogne which literall!
blew the infantr! assault a"art <our armored tan- destro!ers continued toward Hemroulle but
were finall! brought to a halt b! a large ditch Here+ while maneuvering+ all were "ut out of
action b! artiller! and tan- destro!er fire at close range
(n midafternoon more bad news reached @o-ott2s command "ost He had counted on the 2th
Para#h$te Division to -ee" 1atton2s armor at ba! in the south+ and to ma-e doubl! certain had
faced "arts of the .)/st and %.th awa! from Bastogne in su""ort of the "aratroo"ers 6ow
word came that the 2th Para#h$te Division had bro-en and that the %.th &egiment was under
attac- @o-ott had little to give the %.th+ onl! five or si# tan-s which had .ust been re"aired+
and he did not dare "ut these on the road until dar-ness sent the American fighter,bombers
home Both @o-ott and the cor"s commander+ 9uettwit?+ still e#"ected the main battle to be
fought on the Arlon or 6eufchCteau road+ but in the late afternoon the commander of the %.th
radioed that American tan-s had bro-en through farther to the west at Assenois @o-ott as-ed
9uettwit? for hel"+ but the latter had em"t! hands 9ate that night new orders came from <ield
Marshall Model: the 26th ol!s "renadier Division would hold the defenders inside the
Bastogne "erimeter until the tan-s of the '$ehrer Begleit Brigade could arrive to sever the
narrow corridor o"ened to the defenders that afternoon b! the American armor
The siege of Bastogne+ for "ur"oses of historic record+ ma! be considered ended at 13B/ on
83 December when the =83th Airborne engineers re"orted contact with "three light tan-s
believed friendl!" True+ the breach in the German,held ring o"ened b! the Bth Armored
Division was narrow and "recarious+ but it would not be closed des"ite the most strenuous
enem! efforts in coming da!s The staunch defense of Bastogne had im"eded the 'ifth
Panzer (rmy drive to the west+ .ust as the des"erate rear guard battle b! the Dth Armored at
4t 'ith had slowed the advance of the Si<th+ demonstrating the a#iom of ;orld ;ar ( that no
salient thrust into the defender2s "osition can be e#"anded ra"idl! and successfull! if the
shoulders of the salient are firml! held b! the defender The human cost of the Bastogne
battle+ therefore+ "robabl! was not out of "ro"ortion to the militar! gains achieved The 101st
Airborne
[480]
Division suffered battle casualties numbering 10/ officers and 1+/=3 men ))B of the 10th
Armored Division had a""ro#imatel! 8/ officers and BD& men as battle casualties There is no
means of numbering the -illed+ wounded+ and missing in the miscellan! of unrecorded
tan-ers+ gunners+ infantr!+ and others who shared in the defense of Bastogne 6or can an!
casualt! roster now be com"iled of those units which fought east of Bastogne "rior to 19
December and gave the 101st Airborne Division the time and the tactical o""ortunit! to arra!
itself in the defense of that town