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States 2AC
States 2AC...............................................................................................................................................................1
States 2AC – Federal Licensing............................................................................................................................2
States 2AC – Low Yields/Interest Rates...............................................................................................................3
States 1AR – Low Yields/Interest Rates...............................................................................................................4
States 2AC – Perception........................................................................................................................................5
States 1AR – Perception........................................................................................................................................6
States 2AC – Efficiency.........................................................................................................................................7
States 2AC – No Stripping....................................................................................................................................8
States 2AC – Regulations Turn.............................................................................................................................9
States 2AC – Lawsuits Turn................................................................................................................................10
States 2AC – States Already Acting....................................................................................................................11
States 2AC – NMD Turn......................................................................................................................................12
States 1AR – NMD Turn......................................................................................................................................13

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States 2AC – Federal Licensing

Federal licensing overcomes investor doubt
Department Of Energy 1/10/05 ( “MOVING FORWARD WITH NUCLEAR POWER: ISSUES AND KEY FACTORS ,” Final Report of the Secretary of Energy
Advisory Board, Nuclear Energy Task Force http://www.seab.energy.gov/publications/NETF_Final_Draft_0105.pdf)
It is highly unlikely that there will be new nuclear plants constructed in the United States unless there is effective leadership in dealing with our national energy needs
over the next few years. Although there is strong justification for moving forward with nuclear power, and although a streamlined regulatory and legal
framework for such construction is largely in place, nothing constructive will happen without strong leadership in a number of
areas. The information provided to the NETF has confirmed that there is an interest in the private sector in new plant construction, although some additional
government actions must take place before the first plants will be constructed. In this connection, the electricity industry must clarify its needs and prioritize its
requests. In particular, the nuclear industry must also convey information to Federal policy makers in clear, sharply defined terms with specific recommendations for
dealing with both the problems and the opportunities presented. The industry must recognize that the Federal government should not and cannot eliminate all the risks
and vagaries of the energy markets for them. The utilities must develop a reasonable consensus position and present those needs clearly to the Administration and
Congress for action. In this connection, we believe the most critical needs include some assistance to offset the higher capital costs
associated with the first few nuclear plants, and establishment of regulatory and economic conditions that will make the first
few projects viable and attractive to potential investors in both the equity and the debt markets, along with conditions that allow
participants in those markets to finance the plants. These issues are discussed in detail in Chapter 3 and Appendix A. The providers of electrical
energy to the nation’s homes and industry (i.e., the generating companies) are providing some of the critical initiative for moving forward. But their vision and
commitment must be conveyed beyond corporate boardroom and trade association meetings and must also impact the public arena. The nuclear industry must
undertake a vigorous and continuing communications program to make the case to the American public that nuclear power is a safe, reliable, and cost-effective part of
our energy network and must continue to be a significant part of the growth of our energy supply. Of course, any such program must be based on a continued
commitment to safe, reliable, and secure operations. The principal contribution that government can make to the process is to provide,
maintain, and support a regulatory and legal environment that eliminates needless uncertainty and delay from initiation of
construction through plant startup. Much has already been accomplished in this direction over recent years, but it is becoming apparent that some additional action is
required. Leadership from the Administration and Congress is necessary to encourage investment in new construction. Although
there is bipartisan support for nuclear power within the membership of both the House and Senate, there is some conflict within the leadership ranks. Consideration of
energy supply issues should serve as a stimulus to resolve these differences. In this time of concern about energy security, it is imperative that the President, the key
members of the Administration, and Congressional leaders, come together to create an effective national program and a plan for its legislative implementation. We urge
that the President identify this as a critical priority for the nation and that the Congress take the necessary steps to meet this priority. The following key areas must be
addressed by the policy leaders. • A clear commitment to a national energy policy that includes recognition that nuclear power
provides a reliable, stable contribution to energy availability and energy security without adverse environmental consequences. • Resolution of current
issues associated with the disposition of spent fuel. • A reasonable level of Federal involvement to enable private-sector engagement in new
construction. As discussed above, this would involve Federal policies to reduce fears that there might be devastating delays
imposed by the legal process in the completion or startup of new plants, to address the higher costs of first units that are
constructed, and to level the playing field for nuclear power with respect to other non-carbon-dioxide-emitting sources.

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States 2AC – Low Yields/Interest Rates

State loans are insured by low yields, prevents lenders from building nuclear power plants – tanks
solvency
EIA 07 (Energy Information Administration, Loan Guarantees and the Economics of Electricity Generating Technologies,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/otheranalysis/eegt.html)
In the electric power sector, the loan guarantee program
could substantially affect the economics of new power plants, for three
reasons. First, Federal loan guarantees would allow lenders to be reimbursed in cases of default, but only for certain electric power
sector technologies. Consequently, they would be willing to provide loans for power plant construction at lower interest rates, which would reduce borrowing costs. For
example, a number of private companies guarantee loans made by State and local governments. Such insured loans typically are
rated AAA (very low risk) and therefore have relatively low yields. Indeed, municipalities purchase such insurance because the
decrease in interest rate is greater than the insurance premiums. Second, firms typically finance construction projects by using a capital structure
that consists of a mix of debt (loans) and equity (funds supplied from the owners of the firm). Debt financing usually is less expensive than equity
financing, and up to some point, the average cost of capital (the weighted average cost of debt and equity financing) can be reduced by substituting debt for equity
financing. (The substitution of debt for equity is called leveraging.) After that point, however, projects financed with large amounts of debt can be very risky, and
additional debt financing can increase the average cost of capital rather than lower it. Thus, there are constraints on the use of leverage. In many industries, capital
structures tend to include 40 to 60 percent debt. With loan guarantees, however, the risks of highly leveraged projects are shifted to the
guarantor, and more leveraging can be used to reduce the average cost of capital for construction projects. Federal loan
guarantees also can allow potential sponsors to participate in one or more major projects while avoiding the risk of possible
failure, which might be caused by factors such as construction cost overruns or lower than expected electricity prices and, potentially, could threaten the financial
viability of the sponsoring firm. To avoid this problem, beginning in the 1990s, many firms used project financing to build electric power plants, including a number of
merchant natural-gas-fired plants that were built in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Under project financing, a power plant under construction is treated as if it were
owned by a separate entity whose sole asset is that new power plant. Thus, the loan is secured only by the new plant. This is also referred to as non-recourse financing.
Because lenders for the plant’s construction have claims only on the power plant in case of default, the project’s risk is quarantined. That is, the lenders have no claims
on the firm’s other assets in case of default, and the project’s failure will have only limited effect on the firm’s creditworthiness and overall financial health. From the
firm’s perspective, there are clear advantages to using project financing. From the lender’s perspective, however, project (non-recourse) financing can be very risky,
especially if the project is highly leveraged. If the project fails and the firm defaults on its loans, the power plant will be sold; but if market electricity prices and thus
the value of the asset are depressed at the time of the sale, the lender may not be able to recover all its costs. In addition, the administrative costs associated with bond
default can be substantial. Consequently, given the inherent risk of large-scale projects, it could be very difficult to obtain project
financing for a multi-billion-dollar power plant at a cost that would allow the project to remain economical. Federal loan
guarantees would thus provide an incentive program for potential lenders.

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States 1AR – Low Yields/Interest Rates

Low interest rates are key to being cost competitive with alternatives
Mark Diesendorf, Senior Lecturer in Environmental Studies at University of New South Wales, and Peter Christoff, co-
ordinator of Environmental Studies at the University of Melbourne, 11/06 “Economics of Nuclear Power fact sheet,” Energy Science
< http://www.energyscience.org.au/FS01%20Economics.pdf>
Because nuclear energy has a high capital cost and low operating cost, choosing an unrealistically low interest or discount rate
can make nuclear energy look much less expensive. This is illustrated by the comparative electricity generating cost study
published jointly by the International Energy Agency and the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, both widely regarded as pro-nuclear.
With a realistic discount rate of 10% real per annum, there were no countries out of 18 studied where nuclear energy was
cheaper than either coal or gas. However, when an unrealistically low 5% real discount rate was chosen, nuclear energy was
claimed to be the cheapest in 5 out of 18 countries. Even the results for a 5% discount rate could be over optimistic, because the data
are supplied to the OECD by the nuclear industry itself and are not open to objective verification.

Investors prefer federal loans – lower interests

Yuliya Chernova, reporter at Dow Jones & Co. covering alternative energy, 6/3/08, “DOE Seeking Projects For Up To $10 Billion
In Loan Guarantees, Smart Money” <http://www.smartmoney.com/news/ON/index.cfm?story=ON-20080603-000298-1023>
Many start-ups in the renewable energy industry face a conundrum. They are able to raise traditional venture capital to get their
ideas off the ground and to fund pilot projects. But commercialization requires capital beyond the abilities of initial venture investors.
At the same time banks are reluctant to fund experimental technologies like new thin-film solar module production. That's where
the Energy Department's loan guarantee program comes in handy. Under the program, the "full faith and credit of the United
States is pledged to the payment of guaranteed obligations," analysts at Fitch Ratings wrote in a March note about the program.
"The loans will have the same rating as U.S. government obligations 'AAA'," the Fitch analysts continued in their report. Having
the backing of the U.S. government will help these nascent technologies receive commercial loans under reasonable rates. In
addition, it's possible that some loans will come not from commercial lenders but will be funded by the Treasury Department's
Federal Financing Bank. "In many cases, the DOE loan program will likely result in direct funding by the FFB rather than the
issuance of a guaranteed loan," Fitch analysts wrote, adding that in such cases the loan guarantee can support 100% of the debt, as
opposed to up to 80% of a commercial loan. "The FFB's interest rate is expected to result in a lower all-in cost of project
funding," the Fitch wrote continued. The $10 billion in requests for renewable energy and efficiency projects will be the first full
round of solicitations, Karsner said. This came after an earlier, specialized round in October, when 16 pre-applicants were selected.
"Now everything is set up, and there's personnel to process" the applications, Karsner said, adding that about 20 people are taking care
of the program from the Office Of Loan Guarantees, while various laboratories at the DOE help with evaluating technology. While
the looming change of administrations is adding urgency to the processing of this program, said Karsner, the loan guarantee officer's
position isn't political, and the program definitions themselves will stay intact. Still, "we're hoping we can process some applications
before year-end," he said. Of those 16 chosen in the October round, "some have dropped off," Karsner said. Others, like flywheel
technology developer Beacon Power Corp. (BCON) are about to complete the submission of the full application. The test round
allows the department to disburse as much as $4 billion in loan guarantees. Beacon is seeking between $50 million and $60 million in
federal loan guarantees to build a 20-megawatt flywheel frequency regulation plant in Stephentown, N.Y., said spokesman Gene Hunt,
in an interview. So far the process of working with the government, though lengthy, has been well-organized. "They've kept things
moving in a way that's very productive," said Hunt. Beacon approached project finance providers before applying for the federal loan
guarantee. But the potential lenders said, "You've got to show us six months of revenue, then we can talk," Hunt said. For a research-
and-development company it's that first commercialization project that is the most daunting. "In our case (the federal loan guarantee)
makes a huge difference. If we can't get project finance we'd need to further dilute our stock in order to raise the capital," he said. In
addition, the rates on commercial loans for facilities backed by the federal guarantee would be substantially lower than for those that
aren't backed. "The rate would be quite a bit more favorable, if you have the U.S. government cosigning your loan," said Hunt.

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States 2AC – Perception

Private companies will not invest unless matched with federal loans –
perception key
Steve Winn et al, executive vice president of NRG Energy, 7/2/07 (Joe C. Turnage, Senior Vice President of Constellation Energy,
and Theodore Bunting, Senior Vice president of Finance Entergy Corporation, and John F. Young, Executive Vice President and CFO
Exelon Corporation, “Joint Comments of Constellation Energy Group, Inc, Entergy Corporation, Exelon Corporation, and NRG
Energy, Inc. regarding Proposed Rule, Loan Guarantees for Projects that Employ Innovative Technologies” Department of Energy
<http://www.lgprogram.energy.gov/nopr-comments/comment41.pdf>
Simply put, further commitment of capital requires that companies secure confidence that DOE will develop and implement a
workable loan guarantee program to provide the badly needed access to large amounts of capital necessary to finance the
development of the first 3-5 plants of each of the new reactor designs. For some companies, this may require securing loan guarantee
commitments as soon as 2008, shortly after NRC has accepted a COL application as "administratively complete" and "docketed" the
application. At a minimum, however, this requires the clear and unambiguous availability of loan guarantees in the 2009-2012
timeframe for a significant number of capital intensive central power generation facilities (new nuclear and clean coal plants). A
workable loan guarantee program necessary to support new nuclear power development in the U.S. must have the following three
elements: The guarantee itself must be a commercially viable financing instrument, in line with other Federal loan guarantee
instruments; There should be a transparent methodology for calculating the subsidy cost to be paid by sponsors, and such costs should
be reasonable and commercially viable; and There should be certainty as to the future availability of guarantees, and this self-pay
program should be insulated from the uncertainty of the annual appropriations process. The size and scale of nuclear projects,
and the multi-year commitments that need to be made by private industry, make it imperative that DOE create certainty in the
near-term around the future availability of the Title XVII Loan Guarantee Program for nuclear power projects. As part of the
public-private partnership that has been essential to "jump-starting" the development of new, base-load nuclear generation, the multi-
year commitment being made by private parties needs to be matched with a multi-year commitment from the federal
government. The federal government cannot expect private parties to make hundreds of millions of dollars in commitments
premised upon the expectation of they will obtain loan guarantees in 2009-2012 without reasonable progress being made by the
federal government toward establishing a program that can be expected to be available to facilitate the financing of the fitst wave of
new nuclear plants throughout the next five years.

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States 1AR – Perception

* Prefer our Winn ev, its written by the top executives of multiple nuclear
industries – perception of federal government process is essential to get
companies to invest, eliminates uncertainties

Investors will refuse investBanks and Wallstreet will refuse to invest unless
the federal government backs their loans – excessive costs and perception
Edmund L. Andrews, European Economic Correspondent, and Matthew L. Wald, reporter at the New York Times who
specializes in nuclear topics, 7/31/07 “Energy Bill Aids Expansion of Atomic Power” New York Times <
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/31/washington/31nuclear.html>
Lobbyists have told lawmakers and administration officials in recent weeks that the nuclear industry needs as much as $50 billion
in loan guarantees over the next two years to finance a major expansion. The biggest champion of the loan guarantees is Senator
Pete V. Domenici of New Mexico, the ranking Republican on the Senate Energy Committee and one of the nuclear industry’s strongest
supporters in Congress. Senator Jeff Bingaman, Democrat of New Mexico and the energy bill’s author, has long argued that nuclear
power plants do not need federal loan guarantees. Mr. Bingaman said that the industry was over-interpreting the provision and that it
would provide loan guarantees for only the most innovative power plants. But the provision has the potential to considerably expand
the nuclear industry, which plans to build 28 new reactors at an estimated cost of about $4 billion to $5 billion apiece. And while the
nuclear industry would be the biggest beneficiary, the provision could also set the stage for billions of dollars in loan guarantees for
power plants that use “clean coal” technology and renewable fuels. The nuclear industry is enjoying growing political support after
decades of opposition from environmental groups and others concerned about the risks. An increasing number of lawmakers in both
parties, worried about global warming and dependence on foreign oil, support some expansion of nuclear power. But the provision
could go much further than many lawmakers had in mind by giving the Department of Energy the power to approve an unlimited
amount of loan guarantees for “clean” power generation. Under legislation enacted in 2005, nuclear power qualifies as a clean
technology because it does not emit carbon gases that contribute to global warming. Power companies have tentative plans to put the
28 new reactors at 19 sites around the country. Industry executives insist that banks and Wall Street will not provide the money
needed to build new reactors unless the loans are guaranteed in their entirety by the federal government. The federal
government guarantees many billions of loans each year to help farmers, exporters, small businesses and students. The government
does not actually lend the money but agrees to pay it back in case the borrower defaults. While the nuclear industry says it will need
$25 billion in loan guarantees in 2008 and $50 billion over the next two years, President Bush had proposed a far smaller amount —
$4 billion — in new loan guarantees next year for “clean” electric power technologies, which include plants that run on so-called clean
coal technologies and renewable fuels. Many experts fear that the proposed subsidies could leave taxpayers responsible for billions of
dollars in soured loans. “Such projects, by their nature, pose significant technical and market risks,” the nonpartisan
Congressional Budget Office warned last month in an analysis of the provision. “Studies of the accuracy of cost estimates for
pioneering technologies have found that estimates are consistently low.”

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States 2AC – Efficiency

Federal loans are essential to efficiency in the marketplace
Steve Winn et al, executive vice president of NRG Energy, 7/2/07 (Joe C. Turnage, Senior Vice President of Constellation Energy,
and Theodore Bunting, Senior Vice president of Finance Entergy Corporation, and John F. Young, Executive Vice President and CFO
Exelon Corporation, “Joint Comments of Constellation Energy Group, Inc, Entergy Corporation, Exelon Corporation, and NRG
Energy, Inc. regarding Proposed Rule, Loan Guarantees for Projects that Employ Innovative Technologies” Department of Energy
<http://www.lgprogram.energy.gov/nopr-comments/comment41.pdf>
The loan guarantee program is essential to the process of establishing a framework for future private financing once the first wave of
nuclear plants "prove out" the NRC licensing process and a track record has been established for the first 3-5 plants put in operation
for each of the five advanced reactor technologies that are being pursued. Moreover, providing 100% guarantee coverage of the
debt is not only necessary because commercially viable financing is not available on an unguaranteed basis, but also because a
100% U.S. government guarantee will enable lenders and borrowers to maximize the efficiency of the existing marketplace.
There is a deep, well-established market in government-guaranteed debt, and notwithstanding the fact that an underlying project
involves nuclear energy or other advanced technology, this existing market provides a large amount of available capital and
liquidity that can help make this Loan Guarantee Program efficient and successful. However, this will not be possible, if the
DOE'S rules require that there be a tranche of non-guaranteed debt and that each lender hold a pro rata share of this non-guaranteed
debt.
Prefer our evidence, its written by the chief executives of companies wanting
to invest in nuclear power

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States 2AC – No Stripping

States cant overcome no stripping requirement – guts solvency
Steve Winn et al, executive vice president of NRG Energy, 7/2/07 (Joe C. Turnage, Senior Vice President of Constellation Energy,
and Theodore Bunting, Senior Vice president of Finance Entergy Corporation, and John F. Young, Executive Vice President and CFO
Exelon Corporation, “Joint Comments of Constellation Energy Group, Inc, Entergy Corporation, Exelon Corporation, and NRG
Energy, Inc. regarding Proposed Rule, Loan Guarantees for Projects that Employ Innovative Technologies” Department of Energy
<http://www.lgprogram.energy.gov/nopr-comments/comment41.pdf>
The U.S. financial markets are highly efficient at matching the right capital to the right risk profile. Safe investments, such as U.S.
government obligations, go to those who apply a premium to that safety. Risky investments go to those investors willing to accept risk
in exchange for an appropriate reward. Any program that attempts to tie risky, non-guaranteed loans to safe, government-backed loans
fails to recognize the market's preference for self-selection. Such a program has the curse of making every investor unhappy. The risk
averse investor is forced to take risk, and those with an appetite for more risk are forced to buy guaranteed paper. Many of the
investors in the government-guaranteed debt markets actually have charter or regulatory restrictions that prohibit them from
investing in riskier securities. Thus, a "no stripping" requirement and the requirement for a non-guaranteed tranche of debt
would erect a significant barrier to the ability to access this market, because many of these market participants cannot, or will
not want to, take on the risks of non-guaranteed debt. This result is counter to the policy objectives of Title XVII. Moreover, the
"no stripping" requirement combined with the prohibition on pari passu security structures creates a form of "hybrid" debt for which
there is no natural, existing market. At best, market participants would incur significantly higher average cost of financing, as well
as unnecessary transaction costs to achieve project structures that would enable the project's debt to be placed with its
appropriate constituents in the existing marketplace. Such structures would not only be inefficient, but also could amount to a
form of "synthetic" stripping that undercuts the purpose of the requirement. At worst, the barriers to access to the capital markets
could be insurmountable. Either way, the "hybrid" debt structure runs counter to the purposes of Title XVII, does nothing to enhance
the Secretary's ability to issue guarantees based on a reasonable prospect of repayment, and unnecessarily increases costs to electricity
customers. The "no stripping" requirement, along with the requirement for a non-guaranteed tranche of debt appears to have been
proposed with the intent to encourage a rigorous evaluation of the creditworthiness of a project. However, the no stripping provision is
a very poor proxy requirement for determining project creditworthiness, because the feasibility of the "hybnd" credit instrument is
limited by the lack of a market for such instruments, as described abave. The restrictions on achieving a 100% guaranteed instrument,
combined with the prohibitbn on paripassu security structures, render the loan guarantee program unusable for new nuclear power.
Moreover, allowing stripping alone would not lead to a viable loan guarantee prolgram. Rather than such mechanisms, DOE should
focus on assessing the financial strength of the underlying project.

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States 2AC – Regulations Turn

Turn – Regulations

States impose additional regulations – increase risks to investors and delays

reactors up to 10 years
Jack Spencer, Research Fellow in Nuclear Energy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage
Foundation, 11/15/07 “Competitive Nuclear Energy Investment: Avoiding Past Policy Mistakes” Heritage Foundation <
http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/bg2086.cfm>
At the same time, state and local governments expanded their oversight functions. States often claimed jurisdiction over
construction and operations permits as well as environmental regulation. For example, while the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act as amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977, the Clean Air Act, and the Solid Waste Disposal Act mandated that
states enforce minimal federal environmental standards, many states chose to adopt additional regulations.[13] Environmental
standards that varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction imposed additional costs and opened additional avenues for anti-nuclear
activists to exploit. Today, many states exercise significant authority over the location and construction of nuclear reactors.
Some jurisdictions have outright moratoria on new nuclear construction. For example, California prevents further construction of
nuclear power plants until both the California Energy Commission and the federal government approve a method of disposing of
nuclear waste. Most states that limit construction of nuclear plants use some variation of this theme.[14] Public commissions and
referenda can impose additional restrictions. The shifting regulatory environment gave rise to additional reviews from numerous
public institutions. Once permits were obtained, additional design changes were often mandated--even during construction. This
inefficient and time-consuming process increased the time required to build a nuclear power plant by 42 percent (from 86 months to
122 months) between 1966 and 1970. From 1974 to 1984, the average construction delay was nearly 40 months, and between 1956
and 1979, the average construction permit review time increased fourfold. The average time required to bring a plant on line from
the order date increased from three years to 13 years during a similar time period.[15] This significantly increased both the cost
of a plant and the risks to the investors financing these projects. In addition, as the need for electricity increased, lengthy delays
further undermined public confidence in the viability of nuclear power.

Over regulation causes kills the industry

Jack Spencer, Research Fellow in Nuclear Energy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage
Foundation, 11/15/07 “Competitive Nuclear Energy Investment: Avoiding Past Policy Mistakes” Heritage Foundation <
http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/bg2086.cfm>
Private investors have a key role to play in reestablishing America's nuclear industry. The industry is no longer owned or supported by
the government, although the Energy Policy Act of 2005 does provide some incentives to utilities. In general, private investors
provide the capital and take the risks necessary to develop the nuclear industry. The government's role should be to ensure safety
and allow the industry--just like any other--to compete and flourish in open markets. The heavy regulatory burden imposed on the
nuclear industry creates enduring uncertainties about the future of nuclear power in the United States. While a strong public
commitment does provide some near-term certainty, it still is accompanied by regulatory and investment uncertainty. This does
little for the long-term planning inherent in nuclear energy, which results in higher risk assessments for America's energy
companies. Investors are right to be wary. Anti-nuclear activists have already exploited the authority of public institutions to
strangle the industry. Now these same public institutions must be trusted to craft good public policy that reestablishes the confidence
necessary to invite investment back into America's nuclear industry. To be successful, the new policies must create an industry that
does not depend on the government. They must mitigate the risks of overregulation but allow for adequate oversight while
preventing activists from hijacking the regulatory process.

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States 2AC – Lawsuits Turn

Turn – Lawsuits

Federal incentives key to prevent court lawsuits

Mike Wallace, President of the Constellation Generation Group, 4/16/05 “Nuclear Power 2010 Program – Senate Commitee
Hearing” US Senate Committee on Energy and National Resources <
http://energy.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1476&wit_id=4215>
Department of Energy’s Nuclear Power 2010 program is a necessary, but not sufficient, step toward new nuclear plant
construction. We must address other challenges as well. Our industry is not yet at the point where we can announce specific decisions to build. We
are not yet at the point where we can take a $1.5 billion to $2 billion investment decision to our boards of directors. We do yet not have fully certified
designs that are competitive, for example. We do not know the licensing process will work as intended: That is why we are working systematically
through the ESP and COL processes. We must identify and contain the risks to make sure that nothing untoward occurs after we start building. We
cannot make a $1.5 — $2 billion investment decision and end up spending twice that because the licensing process failed us. The industry
believes federal investment is necessary and appropriate to offset some of the risks I’ve mentioned. We recommend that the federal
government’s investment include the incentives identified by the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board’s Nuclear Energy Task Force in its recent report. That investment
stimulus includes: 1. secured loans and loan guarantees; 2. transferable investment tax credits that can be taken as money is expended during construction; 3.
transferable production tax credits; 4. accelerated depreciation. This portfolio of incentives is necessary because it’s clear that no single financial incentive is
appropriate for all companies, because of differences in company-specific business attributes or differences in the marketplace – namely, whether the markets they serve
are open to competition or are in a regulated rate structure. The next nuclear plants might be built as unregulated merchant plants, or as regulated rate-base projects.
The next nuclear plants could be built by single entities, or by consortia of companies. Business environment and project structure have a major impact on which
financial incentives work best. Some companies prefer tax-related incentives. Others expect that construction loans or loan guarantees will enable them to finance the
next nuclear plants. It is important to preserve both approaches. We must maintain as much flexibility as possible. It’s important to understand why federal investment
stimulus and investment protection is necessary and appropriate. Federal investment stimulus is necessary to offset the higher first-time costs associated with the first
few nuclear plants built. Federal investment protection is necessary to manage and contain the one type of risk that we cannot
manage, and that’s the risk of some kind of regulatory failure (including court challenges) that delays construction or
commercial operation.

Court challenges wreck the industry- destroys support for new reactors
San Francisco Chronicle 2/5/06 “The Case for Nuclear Power” http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2006/02/05/INGRBH0HFH1.DTL)
So valuable are nuclear plants that none is for sale today. Indeed, scores of nuclear plants, once thought to be candidates for closure, are pursuing and
receiving licenses to operate for at least an additional 20 years. So far, the NRC has extended the life of about 30 plants. Because these plants are
fully bought and paid for (and even the money required to de-commission them sits safely in bank accounts), utilities are leaning on them, because
they only incur operating expenses, guaranteeing that nuclear-generated electricity is by far the cheapest part of their energy mix. So far, electric
utilities, while happy to harvest existing plants, are reluctant to build new ones. "I'm the biggest nuke operator in the country, but I have
to get the timing exactly right if my company is ever going to build (another) one," says John Rowe, chief executive officer of Exelon. Other
utilities are also biding their time, waiting until they get a clearer signal that new projects won't be delayed into oblivion by
Bleak House-style lawsuits. And even when they resume building nuclear plants, "we will exhaust other opportunities" to generate
electricity through wind and solar, Rowe says. Entergy, Exelon and a few other nuclear specialists are pressing the federal
government for more guarantees against the many risks faced in building a plant, not the least of which are the inevitable legal
challenges. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the chief regulator, has responded by imposing a one-stop approval process, but the process has never been tested
in court. Arguably the biggest economic hurdle for nuclear power is short-term: who will bear the risk of being the first mover? To get past the economic penalties for
being first, a consortium of utilities including Exelon and Entergy, has formed a clever joint venture. The group, called NuStart Energy Development LLC, is filing a
single application for a combined operating and construction license, in effect testing the regulatory and legal environment as a group so that no one utility gets stuck
holding the bag if the process goes awry. NuStart has yet to choose a site, though it hopes to do so by September. If all goes to plan, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission will approve the plant (using either a Westinghouse or a General Electric reactor) by 2007, allowing for construction and operation by about 2015. Utilities
are holding out hope that Uncle Sam will give more help, and Bush's State of the Union speech on Tuesday provided encouragement. They want more money for
development of reactor designs, especially those cooled with gas. Such designs are considered inherently safer than today's light-water reactors and figure to be smaller,
too, reducing costs and allowing more flexibility in deployment. What's more, they may be able to produce hydrogen as well as electricity -- hydrogen for a new
generation of cars powered by fuel cells. A new generation of nuclear reactors -- especially the so-called "pebble bed" technology that
promises far smaller, cheaper and safer reactors -- could help ease what will only be growing pressure on energy supplies, and
rising costs of electricity. The trouble is, without a major push by the public and the U.S. government, improved reactors won't
ever get built. Or by the time they are ready, America will have so gone so heavily into burning coal for electricity that the environmental damage
may be irreversible.

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States 2AC – States Already Acting

CP does nothing – States are already doing there part, federal action is key
Frank L. Bowman, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Nuclear Energy Institute, 6/19/08 (Testimony for the Record,
Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality, U.S. House of Representatives,
http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte_mtgs/110-eaq-hrg.061908.Bowman-testimony.pdf)
In terms of new nuclear plant construction, one of the most significant financing challenges is the cost of these projects relative
to the size, market value and financing capability of the companies that will build them. New nuclear power plants are expected
to cost at least $6 to 7 billion. U.S. electric power companies do not have the size, financing capability or financial strength to finance
new nuclear power projects on balance sheet, on their own–particularly at a time when they are investing heavily in other generating
capacity, transmission and distribution infrastructure, and environmental controls. These first projects must have financing support–
either loan guarantees from the federal government or assurance of investment recovery from state governments, or both. The
states are doing their part. Throughout the South and Southeast, state governments have enacted legislation or implemented new
regulations to encourage new nuclear plant construction. Comparable federal government commitment is essential.

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States 2AC – NMD Turn

Turn – NMD

Federal Spending tradesoff with NMD

Richard Sammon, Senior Associate Editor at the Kiplinger Business Resource Center 6/24/08
http://www.kiplinger.com/businessresource/forecast/archive/No_More_Big_Spending_Hikes_080624.html
While either McCain or Obama will look for savings, their priorities are different. The missile defense program would be trimmed if
Obama wins, less so under McCain, although he, too, would give it more scrutiny than has been the case with the Bush administration.
Roughly $8 billion is allocated each year for research and development. Initial construction and installation of antimissile silos
and radars has started, but the project is rife with engineering complexities and also political considerations about where segments
ultimately will be placed, especially in Europe. The missile defense budget will be a prime target for freeing up some funds for
other purposes. Also on the chopping block, although neither McCain nor Obama has gone into specifics, are nuclear subs, next-
generation Navy surface ships, plus the F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter jet programs. They'll be trimmed in scope and multiyear
acquisition levels. Another area that will come under review is research into potential space-based defense weapons, such as space-
based lasers.

NMD destroys co-operation necessary to prevent Iranian proliferation

Philip Coyle, Senior Adviser to the World Security Institute, and Victoria Swanson, Professor in the graduate International Relations
program at St. Mary's University and analyst at the Center for Defense Information, Spring 2008, “Missile Defense Malfunction: Why
the Proposed U.S. Missile Defenses in Europe Will Not Work,” Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1
There are two serious nuclear proliferation issues facing the world today that require a united response, something that is
unlikely if hostilities are increased between the United States and Russia as a result of the U.S. missile defense plans. The first
is Iran's nuclear program. While the November 2007 NIE acknowledged that as far as the U.S. intelligence community knew, Iran
had stopped work on its nuclear weapons program in 2003, it still indicated that Iran's nuclear intentions are unknown. Furthermore,
no one doubts that Iran continues to enrich uranium, possibly to the point where it will become weapons-grade fissile material.
Iran is a signatory to the NPT, so in theory it admits there are limits to what it can do with its nuclear materials (although Iranian
officials defiantly aver that they are free to do what they wish). This is all to say that the international community can still work
together to lessen the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. In fact, the NIE states that Iran's nuclear weapons work
"probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure."23 Russia in particular has a strong relationship with
Iran and has been one of the holdouts against strengthening international sanctions against Iran. Furthermore, Russia still
indicates that it is holding fast to the option of finishing a nuclear power plant in Bushehr, Iran.24 Clearly, Russia is a key component
to any solution to the Iranian nuclear question. Given how much Iran factors in the justification for extending the U.S. missile
defense system to Europe, this cannot be ignored.

Iranian proliferation results in extinction.

Norman Podhoretz, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, June 2007, Commentary, online:
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/cm/main/viewArticle.html?id=10882,
But there is, it has been reported, another consideration that is driving Bush. According to a recent news story in the New York Times,
for example, Bush has taken to heart what “[o]fficials from 21 governments in and around the Middle East warned at a meeting of
Arab leaders in March”—namely, “that Iran’s drive for atomic technology could result in the beginning of ‘a grave and
destructive nuclear arms race in the region.’” Which is to say that he fears that local resistance to Iran’s bid for hegemony in the
greater Middle East through the acquisition of nuclear weapons could have even more dangerous consequences than a passive
capitulation to that bid by the Arab countries. For resistance would spell the doom of all efforts to stop the spread of nuclear
weapons, and it would vastly increase the chances of their use.

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States 1AR – NMD Turn

Missle defense perceived as unpopular – it will be the first target for cuts
International Herald Tribune 7/11/08 “Reagan's vision for missile defense shield remains just as contentious in post-Cold War
world” http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/07/11/business/NA-US-Missile-Defense-Outlook.php
Washington: The government breathed a sigh of relief in February when the Pentagon used a sea-based missile defense
system to shoot down a dying spy satellite loaded with a tank of toxic fuel hurtling around the globe at 17,000 miles (27,357
kilometers) an hour. The mission was a critical test of the "hit-to-kill" technology at the heart of the U.S. missile defense
program, an idea born at the height of the Cold War when Ronald Reagan outlined his vision for a network of missiles that could
shoot enemy weapons out of the sky or space. Back then, skeptics dismissed the proposal as pure fantasy, nicknaming it Star Wars.
Twenty-five years later, the satellite operation — which used a Navy cruiser equipped with Lockheed Martin Corp. technology and
Raytheon Co. missiles and radar systems — showed the world it could be done. But behind the hoopla, a fierce debate rages
over the ability of the missile defense system to defend the nation from an actual attack and the billions of dollars that
President Bush has devoted to the program — funding levels that could be cut in half under the next administration.

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