Anda di halaman 1dari 136

RPS AFF 1.

0 DDI 2008
1/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Index
Index ........................................................................................................................ ......................1
1AC.................................................................................................................................................. 3
Leadership—Manufacturing Internal.............................................................................................19
Leadership—Competitiveness adv................................................................................................20
Leadership—Innovation key................................................................................. .........................24
Leadership—Renewable k/t Econ..................................................................................................26
Leadership—RPS Solves Competitiveness.....................................................................................27
Leadership—Creates Market.........................................................................................................28
Trade—inherency........................................................................................................................... 47
Trade—20% key........................................................................................................................... ..48
Natural Gas 2AC ............................................................................................................. ..............49
Blackouts 2AC.................................................................................................. .............................50
Blackouts Solvency..................................................................................... .................................52
Solvency—A2 RPS BAD................................................................................................................. .53
Solvency—A2 Inequity.................................................................................................................. .56
Solvency—A2 Inequity.................................................................................................................. .57
Solvency—A2 Increases Gov’t........................................................................................ ...............58
Solvency—2 Tiered Rps Advocate.................................................................................................59
Solvency—20% Best..................................................................................................................... .60
Solvency—A2 Leakage .......................................................................................... .......................61
Solvency—RPS solves foreign fuels imports..................................................................................62
Solvency—A2 Wind cancels out other tech...................................................................................63
Solvency—Wind.......................................................................................................................... ...64
Solvency—A2 Winning & Losing Regions .................................................................................. ....66
States—A2 States solve now ........................................................................................... .............69
States—Race to Bottom.................................................................................... ............................70
States—A2 State Model....................................................................................................... ..........72
States—uniformity ....................................................................................................................... .73
States—uniformity........................................................................................................................ .75
States—Free Riding.................................................................................................. .....................77
States—Legal..................................................................................................... ...........................78
States—Legal..................................................................................................... ...........................80
States—Legal..................................................................................................... ...........................82
States—Industry <3................................................................................................ ......................83
States—ferc key.................................................................................................... ........................84
States—PTC Link........................................................................................... ................................86
States—Inefficient **......................................................................................................... ............87
States—Not Enough.......................................................................................... ............................88
States—POUs................................................................................................. ...............................89
States—Uniformity key.......................................................................................................... ........90
States—Free Riders.................................................................................................. .....................91
A2 REC PIC......................................................................................................... ...........................95
A2 Cap and Trade....................................................................................................... ..................96
A2 Gradual PIC...................................................................................................... ........................97
A2 Demand PIC................................................................................................. ............................99
A2 Don’t Spec Sources CP............................................................................................. ..............100
A2 Resource PICS—Fuel Based Definition Best ...........................................................................101
A2 ptc cp..................................................................................................................... ................115
Politics—Controversy.............................................................................................................. .....117
Politics—GOP hates............................................................................................. ........................118
Politics—Plan unpop.............................................................................................. ......................120
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
2/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Price DA—Electricity/Gas................................................................................................... .....121
A2 Price DA—Must Read.................................................................................................. ............123
A2 Price DA—Ext............................................................................................... ..........................124
A2 Price DA—A2 Michaels...........................................................................................................125
A2 Price DA—A2 Transmission Costs...........................................................................................127
A2 Price DA—A2 Transmission Costs...........................................................................................129
A2 Price DA—At: spending........................................................................................................... 130
A2 Price DA—At: Spending................................................................................... .......................131
A2 Price DA—electricity rates.............................................................................................. ........132
A2 Fism DA................................................................................................................. .................133
A2 T Incentive................................................................................................... ..........................135
A2 T In.............................................................................................................................. ...........136

Alex Gulakov, Ishita Chordia, Sam Page, and Harsh Jhaveri


RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
3/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
1AC
Observation One is the Status Quo

Patchwork of state RPS is a race to the bottom that drives away green investment
Sovacool 8 – Research Fellow in the Energy Governance Program at National University of Singapore; Government and
International Affairs Professor at Virginia Polytechnic Institute; DoE consultant on the Climate Change Technology Program (Benjamin,
June, The Best of Both Worlds, 27 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 397, AG)

state RPS statutes have created a patchwork of inconsistent, often


While their efforts have been laudable,
conflicting mandates that distort the market for renewable energy technologies and
unintentionally inflate electricity prices. By subjecting an increasingly interstate electric utility
market to confusing and sometimes contradictory state regulations, this circus of state-based
RPS programs discourages long-term investments and, in some cases, encourages utilities to
exploit the inconsistencies. The same is true for climate change. State-by-state action, while providing a much-
needed laboratory of experimentation, is now creating an environment prone to manipulation and free
riding by other states and industries. Worse, it appears that even the reduced emissions from
some of the most aggressive states with mandatory greenhouse gas caps will be insufficient to
stabilize, let alone reduce, the growth in national carbon dioxide emissions. Interactive federalism, in
response, can provide a minimum level of distributive justice and uniformity, preventing the states from compromising on issues of
environmental policy. But by refusing to create a "ceiling," interactive federalism would still allow the states to exceed national
standards, experiment, innovate, and craft dynamic and unique approaches.

Observation Two is Climate Change

Status quo federal policy on energy infrastructure guarantees reliance on coal and
natural gas and ensures a massive future increase in emissions and systemic public
health costs
Shoock 7 – JD Fordham Law (Corey, 12 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 1011, AG)
Electricity markets in the United States are dominated by fossil fuels, and under current predictions, that fact is unlikely to change. 43
In February 2007 the Energy Information Administration (the "EIA"), a branch of the Department of Energy, released their Annual
Energy Outlook, a projection of electricity production to 2030. 44Using current trends, the EIA contends that fossil
fuels will continue to account for the bulk of American electricity production for the next two and
half decades. 45 Currently, 50% of domestic electricity production comes from coal, 46 with an
additional 15% from natural gas, 47 and 20% from nuclear sources 48 - making up the overwhelming majority of the
domestic electricity market. 49 Projections bear these trends out for the foreseeable future. 50 Renewable energy, by contrast
- with the exception of hydro power (e.g. Niagara Falls and the Hoover Dam) 51 - has largely failed to catch on because
of the high costs associated with production and transmission, 52 variable output, 53 and the perception that a long-term market
Wind, photovoltaic (solar), geothermal, and biomass are the leading non-
does not exist for these energies. 54
hydro sources of electricity currently available in the United States. 55 [*1018] Combined, however, they
account for only about 2.5% of the nation's electric power sector consumption. 56 Unless the
government changes how energy production costs are reflected, the status quo ought to endure
for fossil fuels and renewables alike. Under current federal pricing measurements, coal is the least expensive source of
electricity 57 (the EIA does not compile comparable production price statistics for renewables, but the International Energy Agency
estimates that utility-scale wind energy costs in the United States are close to that of natural gas in "high quality wind regimes"). 58
According to the EIA, the cost of coal at electric generating plants in 2006 averaged $ 1.70 in nominal dollars per million British
thermal units [*1019] ("Btu"). 59 Petroleum and gas, the other fossil fuels that are used in electricity production, do not compare
with coal's low cost. 60 Furthermore, while the cost of production of coal-based electricity has in fact gone
up considerably in the last ten years, 61 the EIA does not project any rise between now and 2030 to be
more dramatic than 0.1% in real dollars per year. 62 Thus, there is no reason to expect the status quo of
the electricity market to change without outside action . Since coal supplies in the United States are plentiful, 63
limiting coal-burning will not reduce dependence on foreign sources of energy. 64 The casus belli for such outside
action is the fact that the government's pricing figures neglect to factor in the full costs of fossil
fuel production, including environmental and health costs that are not passed onto consumers
directly in their utility bill. 65 For example, utility companies do not have to account for the
consequences of approximately six billion metric tons per year of carbon dioxide emissions, a
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
4/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
total that will increase to nearly eight billion metric tons per year by 2030, a twenty-five-year
increase of about 30%. 66 Nor is a financial charge indexed to other consequences of fossil fuel burning. Increases in
the emission of sulfur, methane, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, ozone, volatile organic compounds, and other particulate
matter [*1020] wreak havoc on human and natural habitats alike by causing things like acid rain,
urban ozone (caused primarily by nitrous oxide emissions, resulting in respiratory problems in
humans), and global climate change . 67 Among fuels used for electricity generation, coal is by far the largest producer
of these emissions, producing far beyond its proportional market share. 68 While coal-based power is seen to be the least expensive
source of electricity on the market today, 69 the market dynamics that favor coal are substantially flawed. 70
The indirect costs associated with the production of electricity from coal are simply staggering. 71 During the mining stage land is
permanently damaged, air and water sources are contaminated, ground subsidence causes surface collapses, and workers can be
injured or killed. 72 During processing and utilization, heavy metal and acid is given off, and particulate matter, carbon dioxide,
sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxides are emitted into the atmosphere, causing seemingly
immeasurable damage and destruction to public and private property, wildlife, and public health.
73 Every year, the more than 600 coal-burning plants in the United States 74 emit more than 98,000 pounds of mercury into the air
75 while creating another 81,000 pounds of mercury pollution from fly ash and scrubber sludge 76, all after 20,000 pounds of
mercury is released in pre-burning "cleaning" procedures - totaling 200,000 pounds. 77 That mercury, along with arsenic, cadmium,
and other heavy metals, seeps out during the coal-burning process and travels either directly through ground water and airborne
particles, or indirectly through the food chain [*1021] (often through fish), to humans. 78 Mercury, even in small doses, is converted
easily through human metabolism into the neurotoxin methylmercury. 79 The result of the contamination is that one
out of every six women of childbearing age may have enough of a concentration of mercury to
permanently damage a developing fetus, meaning 630,000 babies a year born in the United
States (out of 4 million) are at risk for severe neurological consequences as a result of gestational mercury poisoning. 80 Coal also
causes nearly 554,000 asthma attacks, 16,200 cases of chronic bronchitis, and 38,200 non-fatal heart attacks each year. 81 Not
surprisingly, proximity to coal-burning facilities increases the likelihood that a person becomes
one of the 23,600 deaths every year attributed to power plant pollution, 82 each death taking an
average of fourteen years off normal life expectancy. 83 All told, the health care costs caused by
plant emissions total an estimated $ 160 billion annually. 84 Other grisly consequences from living near coal
burning include a high rate of stomach cancer, 85 autism in children (for every 1,000 pounds of mercury released in a Texas county,
autism rates rose 17%), 86 and pneumoconiosis in coal miners (also known as "black lung disease"). 87

Utilities emissions is the key internal link to global warming—only a federal RPS is
large enough to reverse this
Sovacool 7 (Benjamin and Christopher Cooper, Renewing America,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf, AG)

Yet carbon-intensive fuels continue to dominate electricity generation in the United States. By 2005,
almost 90 percent of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions were energy-related, with the electric utility industry
outpacing all other sectors (including transportation) with 38 percent of national carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Fossil-
fueled power plants in the U.S. emitted 2.25 billion metric tons of C02 in 2003, more than 10 times the amount of C02 compared to
the next-largest emitter, iron and steel production.301 Put simply, of all U.S. industries, electricity generation is—by
substantial margins—the single largest contributor of the pollutants responsible for global
warming. In 2004, almost every state in country was home to at least one power plant with significant C02 emissions. Nuclear
energy is not much of an improvement, despite recent claims by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) that nuclear power is “the Clean
Air Energy.” Reprocessing and enriching uranium requires a substantial amount of electricity, often generated from fossil fuel-fired
power plants. Data collected from one uranium enrichment company alone revealed that it takes a 100- megawatt power plant
running for 550 hours to produce the amount of enriched uranium needed to fuel a 1,000 megawatt reactor (of the most efficient
design currently available) for one year.302 According to the Washington Post, two of the nation’s most polluting coal plants (in Ohio
and Indiana) produce electricity exclusively for the enrichment of uranium.303 Because uranium enrichment consumes so much
electricity derived from fossil fuels, many nuclear power plants contribute indirectly, but substantially, to global climate change and
do virtually nothing to end U.S. dependence on foreign oil. The International Atomic Energy Agency estimates that when direct and
indirect carbon emissions are included, coal plants are around 10 times more carbon intensive than solar
and more than 40 times more carbon intensive than wind. Natural gas fares little better, at three times as
carbon intense as solar and 20 times as carbon intensive as wind.304 The Common Purpose Institute estimates that renewable
energy technologies could offset as much as 0.49 tons of carbon dioxide emissions per every
MWh of generation. According to data compiled by the Union of Concerned Scientists, a 20 percent RPS would
reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 434 million metric tons by 2020—a reduction of 15 percent below
“business as usual” levels, or the equivalent to taking nearly 71 million automobiles off the road.305
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
5/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
The impact is extinction
ANI 8 (3/31, New geological age similar to 65 million year old mass extinction event,
http://in.news.yahoo.com/ani/20080331/r_t_ani_sc/tsc-new-geological-age-similar-to-65-mil-f32bc39.html, AG)

A leading environmental scientist has suggested that an unprecedented climatic change is


creating a new geological age, which is similar to the mass extinction event which wiped out the
dinosaurs and other species 65 million years ago. "The planet is already amid a "human-induced mass
extinction event" which is defining a new geological age known as the Anthropocene," said Professor Will Steffen,
director of the Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies at Canberra's Australian National
University. According to the scientist, in 2005, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment published a report on the
changes in species diversity and found the current rate of species loss is higher than the background rate
inferred in the fossil record. "Another 10-30 per cent of birds, mammals and amphibians are currently threatened with
extinction," said Steffen. "This rapid rate in the loss of species diversity is similar in intensity to the
event around 65 million years ago which wiped out the dinosaurs and other species," he added. Another
major reason for concern is the fact that by damning nearly all of the world's major rivers, had left 75 per cent of the world's fisheries
exploited or depleted. "The human impact has been pronounced in Australia, due to the highly variable climate, unique wildlife and
poor soils," news.com.au quoted Steffen as saying. According to Steffen, human history is littered with examples of
civilisations that have collapsed because of their inability to adjust to environmental change -
such as the Mayans in Meso-America, the Norse colonies in southern Greenland and the Akkadian civilisation,
which was located in what is now Syria. "With no one sure what the tipping point was, the best course
of action was to mitigate climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions as soon as
possible," he said.

[insert more if needed]

Observation Three is Competitiveness

US international credibility is rapidly declining—federal action that reverses the Bush


administration’s precedent is critical to regain legitimacy
Ikenberry 4 – Professor of Global Justice and Geopolitics, Georgetown (John, Liberal Realism, The National Interest, Lexis, AG)

THE BUSH Administration's disregard for legitimacy has had devastating consequences for
America's standing in the world, particularly among Europeans. The country that for decades was seen to be
at the forefront of progressive change is now regarded as a threat to the international system. During the heyday of American
legitimacy amid the Cold War, it would have been unthinkable for a German chancellor to rescue his bid for re-election by insisting
that Berlin stand up to Washington. Not only did Gerhard Schroder do so in 2002, but candidates in other countries--Spain, Brazil
and South Korea--have thrived by distancing themselves from the United States. In a world of
degraded American legitimacy, other countries are more reluctant to cooperate with the United
States. Over the longer term--and in a thousand different ways-countries will take steps to separate
themselves from the United States, to resist its leadership and to organize their regions of the
world in opposition to Washington. From the perspective of liberal realism, legitimacy is an intrinsic aspect
of power. To care about legitimacy is not to cede American power to the UN or any other party. Instead, it is to exercise American
power in a manner that continues to attract the support of others. Successive American presidents have found ways to do so because
they realized that to legitimate American power was to turn coercion and domination into authority and consent. In Jean-Jacques
Rousseau's famous formulation from The Social Contract: "The strongest is never strong enough to be always master, unless he
transforms strength into right and obedience into duty." Given the damage done to American legitimacy, a new
administration needs to undertake urgent steps to repair its social and political capital abroad.
Bold and visible gestures will be required. Washington provoked considerable ill will abroad by
turning its back on the Kyoto Protocol; it should now pursue a follow-up initiative and commit to
its own plan for reducing the emission of greenhouse gases.

Energy sector’s uniquely key to technological and industrial leadership


RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
6/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Kammen 07, Director of Renewable and Appropriate Energy Lab (RAEL),
(Daniel, Testimony before Senate Environment & Public Works Committee, US Fed News September 25) (Jhaveri)

Senator Barrie Sanders, Hearing Chair, and other members of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, I appreciate your
invitation to appear before you today. I am particularly appreciative your inspiring efforts to develop a comprehensive approach to
environmental quality, human health protection, and economic development for the nation. I am grateful for the opportunity today to
speak with you on the energy, climate, and security issues that face our nation and the planet. In this testimony I highlight the key
finding that while a continuation of business as usual energy choices will result in socially, politically,
and environmentally costly and destructive climate change, the motivation to invest in solutions to climate
change can be simply that a green economy can also be exceedingly vibrant. In fact, an economy built around a suite of
low-carbon
technologies can be resistant to price shocks as well as secure against supply disruptions as well
as inclusive of diverse socioeconomic groups. A new wave of job growth - both 'high technology'
and ones that transform 'blue collar labor' into 'green collar' opportunities. The combination of
economic competitiveness and environmental protection is a clear result from a systematic
approach to investing in climate solutions. Clean energy systems and energy efficiency investments also contribute
directly to energy security and to domestic job growth
versus off-shore migration. Renewable energy systems are more often local than imported due to the weight of biomass resources
and the need for operations and maintenance. A growing number of state, regional, and national economies
are assuming leadership positions for a clean, low carbon, energy economy. These 'early actors'
are reaping the economic benefits of their actions. Among the global leaders are Brazil, Denmark, Iceland
Germany, Japan, Spain, all of which have made significant commitments to a green economy, and all are seeing job growth
and rapidly expanding export opportunities. In the United States several states have embarked on significant climate
protection efforts, and half of U. S. states have taken the vital step of adopting minimum levels of renewable energy requirements. On
the vitally important issue of transportation a set of European nations have followed the lead of California, Illinois and other U.S.
states in adopting a Low Carbon Fuel Standard (Kammen, 2007). The goal of a Low Carbon Fuel Standard is to reduce the greenhouse
impact of fossil fuel emissions, and to begin to move toward a diverse set of economically and environmentally sustainable
transportation choices. Job Growth in a Green Economy - Empirical Lessons Expanding the use of renewable energy is
not only good for our energy self-sufficiency and the environment; it also has a significant
positive impact on employment. My students and I have examined the observed job growth in a number of
technology sectors (Kammen, Kapadia and Fripp, 2004).

Leadership solves every impact scenario


Thayer 6 – PolSci Professor, Minnesota (Bradley, Nov/Dec, In Defense of Primacy, The National Interest, AG)
U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics,

allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create
coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in
contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in
dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You
can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for
example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to
consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is
intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United
States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those
strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the
international order U.S. primacy creates. The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is
the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations.
THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and
statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international
free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing
order--

democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained
without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling

things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler
succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as
assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In
addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the
world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
7/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--
between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all
war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood,

particularly war's worst form: great power wars.


Observation Four is Trade

Perception of a lack a national US energy policy is pushing Europe towards trade


sanctions
Cressey 8 – journalist for Nature magazine (Daniel, 1/28,
http://blogs.nature.com/news/thegreatbeyond/2008/01/climate_change_trade_war.html , AG)

Europe and the US could be headed for a trade war over climate change. In a speech yesterday
José Barroso, president of the European Commission, said he would be ready to force companies
outside the EU to buy carbon allowances to ensure that companies inside were not
disadvantaged by Europe’s tougher emissions targets (speech). While this apparently went
down well with the audience (of European businessmen) it hasn’t gone down so well with
America. Reuters highlights that US Trade Representative Susan Schwab said that an earlier
version of the EU plans seemed to be an excuse to close the European market and amounted to
something like protectionism. More worryingly, the notes for speech delivered by Schwab last
week contains the statement, “The unilateral imposition of restrictions can lead to
retaliation, and dramatically impact economic growth and markets worldwide – while
accomplishing nothing or worse when it comes to advancing environmental objectives.” The US
approach has also been backed by the UK, most recently by energy minister Malcolm Wicks
saying today the government was “against any measures which might look like trade barriers”
and warning that some in Europe “could use this as a kind of secret weapon, as it were,
to bring about protectionism” (listen to Wicks on BBC or read his comments on Reuters).
Barroso also appears to be picking a fight with his own trade commissioner, Peter Mandelson.
Mandelson is on record as saying the restrictions are not the way forward (BBC)*. France’s
leader Nicolas Sarkozy has been banging this drum for a while, telling Nature before he was
elected last year last year, “Countries that behave like stowaways hitching a free ride, making no
effort to reduce their emissions, should not continue to benefit from the competitive industrial
advantage this gives them.” However Barroso’s forthright speech – made in the face of British
opposition – represents something of a ratcheting up of the rhetoric level. In the current
economic climate any excuse to shore up their own country’s economy at the expense of
someone else’s is not going to be overlooked by politicians.

National RPS sends a signal against protectionism—this is vital to avoid a


transatlantic trade war
Fontaine 4 – co-chairs the Energy, Environmental & Public Utility Practice Group of the Cozen O'Connor law firm, former EPA
lawyer (Peter, Global Warming: The Gathering Storm, http://www.pur.com/pubs/4419.cfm, AG)

In the vacuum created by the administration's withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, a number of states have stepped forward with
legislative and policy initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.16 Fourteen states have adopted renewable portfolio standards
that require electricity suppliers to derive an increasing percentage of supply from renewable energy generation sources, such as
wind, solar, biomass, and geothermal. State RPS legislation, however, will not create the necessary market
forces to effectuate the large-scale reductions in CO2 necessary for the United States to achieve
a significant reduction in its greenhouse gas emissions. National legislation is essential. In October
2003, the most comprehensive global warming legislation to date was defeated by a surprisingly narrow margin of only seven votes.
The Climate Stewardship Act of 2003 (S. 139), as amended by S.A. 2028, sponsored by Sens. John McCain, R-Ariz., and Joseph
Lieberman, D-Conn., would establish a system of tradable emission allowances and related emissions reporting requirements to
tackle global warming. The bill covers six greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons,
perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. The bill would cover 75 percent of direct greenhouse gas emissions in the United States
and would reduce carbon emissions to year-2000 emission levels by 2015. Appliance rebates, transition assistance, and other transfer
payments that would be made by a newly created Climate Change Credit Corporation-a non-profit organization created to be funded
by emission allowance sales-would significantly mitigate the increase in average household energy expenses. EIA's May 2004
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
8/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
analysis of the bill found that allowance costs will fall largely on the electricity sector and would be passed on to consumers. EIA
predicts average electricity prices will increase under the bill from 6.4 cents per kilowatt-hour to 6.8 in 2010 (about $33 per
household per month), from 6.7 to 8.0 in 2020 (about $108), and from 6.7 to 9.1 in 2025 (about $200). MIT also studied the bill but
assumed-based on experience from the Acid Rain Program-that sources would make substantial early reductions in non-CO2
emissions that would be banked for later sale. By changing this single assumption from EIA's analysis MIT found that monthly costs to
the average household would be only $15 to $20. Also, EIA assumed, unrealistically, no significant fuel-shift to natural gas (despite
this market's historic unpredictability), no market penetration of new low-emission technologies (despite billions of federal R&D
spending), and no continued federal and state emission reduction programs. Obviously, such programs are likely to continue, and will
further reduce the bill's costs by independently contributing toward the bill's modest goal of reducing CO2 emissions to year 2000
levels by 2015. By adopting some form of national legislation that begins to internalize the costs of
global warming, the United States would blunt any effort by the EU to impose trade sanctions on
U.S. goods. The EIA analysis points out one fundamental conclusion. The reduction of global warming gas emissions called for
under the Kyoto Protocol will increase electricity prices and therefore the cost of goods. Even under the relatively modest goals of the
McCain Lieberman bill, electricity prices will increase due to the internalization of the costs of the cap and trade system. The risk
of trade sanctions by America's largest trading partners due to the failure of the United States to
control CO2 emissions should be a real concern to U.S. policy-makers. If the United States
continues to resist global pressure to reduce its CO2 emissions, it will largely cede control over
how the rules implementing Kyoto are written and risk trade sanctions by trading partners
seeking to reduce the disparity in production costs. To avoid this negative outcome, the United States should
pursue a more pragmatic middle path that confronts the problem of global warming by laying out the necessary domestic framework
and economic incentives to create a domestic CO2 emissions market that produces efficient CO2 reductions, much like the Acid Rain
Trading Program. In this way, America can develop new technologies, regain its credibility in the
global deliberations over how to combat global warming, and avoid the risk of a damaging trade
war with the EU.

Interdependence prevents conflict escalation


Griswold 98 – CATO Institute Center for Trade Policy Studies (Daniel, Peace on Earth, Free Trade for Men,
http://www.cato.org/dailys/12-31-98.html, AG)

Free trade also encourages people


Advocates of free trade have long argued that its benefits are not merely economic.
and nations to live in peace with one another. Free trade raises the cost of war by making nations
more economically interdependent. Free trade makes it more profitable for people of one nation
to produce goods and services for people of another nation than to conquer them. By promoting
communication across borders, trade increases understanding and reduces suspicion toward
people in other countries. International trade creates a network of human contacts. Phone calls, emails, faxes and face-to-
face meetings are an integral part of commercial relations between people of different nations. This human interaction encourages
tolerance and respect between people of different cultures (if not toward protectionist politicians). Ancient writers, expounding what
we now call the Universal Economy Doctrine, understood the link between trade and international harmony. The fourth-century writer
Libanius declared in his Orations (III), "God did not bestow all products upon all parts of the earth, but distributed His gifts over
different regions, to the end that men might cultivate a social relationship because one would have need of the help of another. And
so He called commerce into being, that all men might be able to have common enjoyment of the fruits of the earth, no matter where
produced." Open trade makes war a less appealing option for governments by raising its costs. To a nation committed to free trade,
war not only means the destruction of life and property. It is also terrible for business, disrupting international commerce and inflicting
even greater hardship on the mass of citizens. When the door to trade is open, a nation's citizens can gain access to goods and
resources outside their borders by offering in exchange what they themselves can produce relatively well. When the door is closed,
the only way to gain access is through military conquest. As the 19th century Frenchman Frederic Bastiat said, "When goods cannot
cross borders, armies will." History demonstrates the peaceful influence of trade. The century of relative
world peace from 1815 to 1914 was marked by a dramatic expansion of international trade,
investment and human migration, illuminated by the example of Great Britain. In contrast, the rise of protectionism and the
downward spiral of global trade in the 1930s aggravated the underlying hostilities that propelled Germany
and Japan to make war on their neighbors. In the more than half a century since the end of
World War II, no wars have been fought between two nations that were outwardly oriented in
their trade policies. In every one of the two dozen or so wars between nations fought since 1945, at least one side was
dominated by a nation or nations that did not pursue a policy of free trade.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
9/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Plan:
The United States federal government should establish a gradual national Renewable
Portfolio Standard requiring that by 2020 regulated electric utilities in the United
States meet a baseline of twenty percent of their demand through qualifying
alternative energy sources, including solar, wind, biomass, and geothermal. The
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission should administer tradable renewable energy
credits to facilitate this goal.

Observation Six is the Fed is Key

A preemptive federal RPS is inevitable—state action will spur watered-down ceiling


caps that curb progress—our plan serves as floor preemption that sets a minimum but
encourages state-level innovation
Sovacool 7 (Benjamin and Jack Barkenbus, Necessary but Insufficient, Environment 49.6, ebsco, AG)

a strong case can be made for federal governance to preempt state


For all of the reasons just cited,
initiatives that have proliferated on the RPS and climate change fronts. The concern, however, is
that through the process of reaching federal consensus, some of the most aggressive and
meaningful state programs will be preempted, leaving a watered-down, lowest– common
denominator national standard in their place. Such a concern is not merely academic. University of Arizona law
professor Kirsten Engel has noted that in the 1970s, federal preemption was prompted by the desire to impose stronger federal
programs than states themselves would impose. The 1990s, however, saw a turnaround in which industry interest
groups are advocating federal preemption to eliminate aggressive state standards.36 At least
three of these efforts have surfaced in Congress during the past three years. In 2004, a proposal was
advanced that would have overridden the states’ ability to set more stringent zoning authority for the permitting of oil refineries and
utilities. Another bill would have waived all forms of liability for industries involved in the production and sale of antifreeze coolants
containing benzoate. And an amendment to a 2005 appropriations bill prohibited states from attempting to duplicate California’s
efforts to create more protective automobile emissions standards.37 Thankfully, each of these efforts failed, but there has been
talk that a federal RPS might include nuclear power and clean coal as “renewable”
options, a prospect that not only goes against common sense but strains credulity as well. The answer to this
conundrum is to specifically allow for a multi-jurisdictional system of authority over RPS and
climate change. University of Michigan professor of public policy Barry Rabe and his colleagues have noted that the
decision to pursue action at the federal or state level need not be perceived as an either/or
proposition. 38 In other words, jurisdictional overlap is not only possible, but may even be preferable.
This could be accomplished by establishing a federal “floor” without a “ceiling”; that
is, a rule that would impose requirements on each and every state but that would still
allow states to exceed the federal minimum standards imposed. A federal RPS floor, for example,
might be a requirement for retail electricity providers to meet a 15 percent renewable target by 2020 or 2025. States, however,
could be permitted to raise the requirement to 20–25 percent within their own jurisdictions should they wish to do so.
The federal floor might also consist of a standard set of renewables for inclusion. Once the minimum federal requirements are met
through these renewables, states could add their own preferences to meet state-based goals, whether they want to provide special
incentives to promote solar photovoltaics in the Southeast, small-scale hydroelectric in the Pacific Northwest, or offshore wind along
the East Coast. Similarly, greenhouse gas emission reduction targets could consist of a federal minimum as well as an additional state
target. It may be that a federal floor will only set reduction targets out to 2020, while some states will
want to go on record as requiring emission cuts of at least 60 percent by 2050. A multi-jurisdictional
framework can accommodate these differing goals and time frames, and it harkens back to a time in the 1960s and 1970s when
federal preemption meant requiring all states to meet a minimum level of requirements, rather than a more recent preoccupation
with eliminating all the state regulations that overlap. The 1967 amendments to the Clean Air Act of 1963 is an example as it allowed
California to establish vehicle air pollution emission standards that were more stringent than those developed by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, all other states were given the opportunity to
adopt California’s standards in the future or remain subject to the EPA standards. California has requested and been granted more
than 40 exceptions to EPA emission standards, and the system has not been overly burdensome to automakers.39 In areas outside
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
10/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
of environmental regulation, the federal government has a long history of promoting minimum national standards that the states can
exceed. The Fair Labor Standards Act, for instance, establishes a national minimum wage of $5.15 per hour and preempts Kansas’s
miserly rate of $2.65 but is surpassed by 38 other states that have set their own laws higher than the federal statute—with
Connecticut offering $7.65 and Oregon $7.80.40 Other federal “floors,” “savings clauses,” and “safety valves” have been established
in the areas of health care insurance, civil rights, drug safety, and the sentencing of hate crimes.41 Federal environmental law
generally allows states to enact standards stricter than federal laws as reflected in the Clean Water Act, and more recently in the
Toxic Substances Control Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, and in the
area of brownfields regulation.42 Such flexibility in terms of a federal RPS or climate change statute
would ensure that the states can continue to innovate while also mandating that all states move
forward in promoting renewable energy and addressing climate change. Conclusion The RPS and
greenhouse gas caps are excellent policy mechanisms: unlike other policy incentives such as tax
credits and subsidies, these tools minimize government intervention and rely on the efficiency of
the market—instead of continual monetary disbursements or political salience—to dictate how utilities, industries,
and consumers promote renewable energy and fight climate change.43 They also have the tendency to be
self-expiring (or “selfsunsetting”). When utilizing RECs and tradable permits, for example, the value of such commodities will
automatically reach zero once the RPS and greenhouse gas target levels have been met. The impressive growth in state-based RPS
and climate change initiatives utilizing these policy mechanisms is testimony, most of all, to woeful inaction at the federal level.
Perhaps new Democratic control of Congress will overcome objectives at the federal level, but that remains to be seen.44 A multi-
jurisdictional approach to these issues would create a national system for the first time requiring all states to participate in a
harmonized system that would include the trading of RECs and nationally certified carbon offsets. A consensus-based
federal system would produce a meaningful and achievable regime eliminating the “free rider”
phenomenon that now exists. Under a multi-jurisdictional framework, however, states wanting to
do more than what the federal program entails would be permitted to do so. Federal preemption
would not be permitted to snuff out these “laboratories of democracy” that wish to go forward with bold,
aggressive, and experimental programs. If these state programs are successful over time, one would expect
to see their results gradually incorporated into the federal program. Ultimately, however, state experience
will yield profuse results only if it inspires a national standard that motivates the country to truly promote renewable energy and fight
climate change.

Regulation under a uniform accounting system by the FERC is a precondition to a


standardized market that allows innovation and location-specific innovation among
the states
Hempling 1 – Executive Director of the National Regulatory. Research Institute (Scott and Nancy Rader, THE RENEWABLES
PORTFOLIO STANDARD A Practical Guide, http://www.naruc.affiniscape.com/associations/1773/files/rps.pdf, AG)

the integrity of verification systems. The integrity of most states'94 generation attribute policies, including RPS
Ensure
depends on whether all states in the relevant electricity market use a single compliance-
policies,
accounting system, or at least use and coordinate accounting systems that are compatible. Accounting system
uniformity is necessary because most states draw their electricity from a regional market, with
generators and retailers conducting business in more than one state. Without uniformity,
generation attributes could be double counted, both intentionally and unintentionally.95 A national
accounting system would have significant value to states because the lack of regional
authorities makes it difficult for states to work together to establish and fund a
uniform regional verification system. The need to coordinate neighboring regional systems --
assuming regional systems emerge -- adds further complexity. It is particularly important to
coordinate regional verification systems when state RPS eligibility requirements are based on
whether generators provide benefits to the state, and where those benefits can be provided by
generators located outside the physical electricity trading region. In this case, the relevant region for
the generation attribute accounting system to cover would be the physical trading region in
which the state exists as well as the trading region(s) in which eligible generators may be
located. Accommodate state-specific policies. Each state's policies need not be uniform just because
a single credit-accounting system is used. An electronic credit system can (and should) be
designed such that the tradable credits issued to each generator carry whatever identifying
information is required by all states that participate in the system. Two examples: • A generator has been
qualified as eligible by State A for its RPS, but the generator does not qualify for State B's RPS. The generator's credits are "imprinted"
with a code that indicates that the credit will satisfy State A's RPS only. 96 The information that is carried in each credit could be left
up to generators, which would supply the information when they apply for credits. But, if information is lacking, the generator's
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
11/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
credits would not be usable by retailers in states that require the missing information. 97 A "user" could be each state or each retailer
using the system, unless system costs are covered by the federal government. C-3 • State C requires that emissions be disclosed to
consumers in an "electricity facts" label, but State D requires that only fuel sources be disclosed in labels. All credits could carry both
fuel source and emissions information, but, in State D, only the fuel source information is used.96 Note that many
differences between state RPS policies would be of no consequence simply because a single
accounting system is used. For example, no administrative complications would be introduced if one
state's RPS is a product-based requirement and another's is company-based, or if some retailers
are exempt under one state's policy but not under another's. As long as a single credit system is
used, credits will only be used once, and they will be used in accordance with each state's policy.
Each state would need to work with the administrator of the credit system to ensure that its
policies will be accommodated by the system. Each state would then use reports produced by the system
administrator to determine whether retailers operating within their jurisdiction have complied with their generation attribute policies.
Reduce costs to retailers. A national credit accounting system would create benefits beyond the prevention of double-counting of
renewable energy and other generation attributes: it would reduce costs to retailers, and thus promote
competition by establishing a uniform, low-cost accounting system for retailers to use when
complying with state generation attribute policies. Reduce costs through economies of scale. Using a national
credit system would avoid the need to design, build, and operate numerous state- or regional-level
systems. Instead, the fixed costs would be incurred only once. (At least some of these cost savings would also
be achieved if a uniform, coordinated set of regional credit systems were adopted.) The fixed costs associated with the ongoing
operation of the system should also be significantly less the sum of the fixed costs of operating several systems. These costs
would also be spread over all users, reducing each user's individual cost.97 II. Allow States to Add State
RPS Requirements to Any National RPS If Congress adopts a national RPS policy, it should include a "savings clause" specifying that
the federal RPS is a floor upon which states may build. Without such a savings clause, state RPS
policies could be challenged as violating the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, on the grounds that Congress intended to preempt state regimes. Such preemption
could be implied, even where there is no direct conflict between the federal and state systems.98 To ensure that a national
RPS does not end up acting as a ceiling on renewables development, a savings clause is
required. Such a clause would enable states to build upon the federal requirement with their own
RPS requirements, which may contain different eligibility criteria, higher obligations, and/or other variances from
the federal policy.

Federal action is favored by industry because it allows interstate renewable


development
Sovacool 8 (Benjamin, A Matter of Stability and Equity, Energy & Environment 19.2, IgentaConnect, AG)

The elimination of PUCHA in 2005 removed


A federal RPS better matches the post-PUCHA interstate power landscape.
the geographical restrictions that limited public utility holding companies to single, integrated
systems. [19] More utilities operate across state lines, and many have begun to merge and
consolidate to maximize profits and deal with the perceived challenges of restructuring . While they
are still pending approval, the proposed mergers of MidAmerican Energy Holdings with Pacificorp and Constellation Energy with FLP
serve as prominent examples of this trend. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 also accelerated the regionalization
of the industry by authorizing more interstate compacts and promoting interstate planning and
cooperation. Using individual states as a crucible for innovations in electricity generation and marketing may have made sense
when PUHCA limited the size and geographic scope of utility holding companies, but makes little sense now. Using the states
alone to promote renewable energy technologies endorses action at the improper scale since
electricity flows across state lines.

Only RPS can stimulate market demand—it’s a precondition to other effective


financial incentives
Drabick 3 – Environmental and Energy Study Institute (J.R., State Policies Set Mandates for Renewable Energy, BioCycle 44.10, p
38, ebsco, AG)

An RPS is a market-based policy mechanism that requires utilities to produce a certain percentage of renewable electricity as a
portion of their total output. While tax credits stimulate supply by lowering the cost to producers of
renewable electricity, an RPS operates on the flip side of the market, guaranteeing demand for
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
12/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
renewable electricity. Supply and demand-side policies are intricately linked and of equal
importance for developing renewable energy in the United States. Whereas demand for renewable electricity
will go unfulfilled without adequate supply, renewable electricity suppliers will struggle to grow if demand
remains stagnant.
One of the major advantages of an RPS is its flexibility. An RPS allows a utility to fulfill its renewable electricity
percentage requirement with any of the renewable technologies. This allows the use of the most
cost-effective and appropriate technology in a given region, whether it is photovoltaics in the Southwest or
wind in the Great Plains, and helps develop a diversified portfolio of energy resources.
Well-designed RPS standards also include credit trading provisions that ensure added flexibility
and can provide economic benefits for residential consumers and small businesses. Under credit
trading, a utility that fails to meet its portfolio requirement is allowed to purchase renewable
electricity credits from an alternate utility that has exceeded its portfolio requirement. The price
of the credits is determined by the market, enabling cost-effective decision-making on the part of
utility operators. Moreover, trading provisions that allocate credits for electricity offset
technologies, such as solar water heating, can provide significant economic benefits for
residential consumers and small businesses that invest in those technologies.
RPS requirements also tend to be graduated, increasing incrementally over a given period of
time rather than mandating a single large market transformation. This allows utilities to integrate renewable
electricity into their long-term investment cycle, thereby lowering the cost of acquiring new renewable
energy sources.
Finally, RPS standardsare ideally suited to work in tandem with the other vital renewable electricity
policies, which include production tax credits and interconnection and net metering provisions.
While an RPS stimulates market demand, production tax credits provide incentives for utilities or
individuals to invest in the up-front capital costs of renewable electricity facilities, thereby
stimulating supply. Interconnection and net metering provisions complete the equation, enabling
renewable electricity producers to seamlessly connect to the grid at no extra cost. Together,
these policies enable the entire family of renewable electricity technologies to gain a foothold into the
market for the benefit of consumers and utilities alike.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
13/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Inherency
A patchwork of state-level RPS discourages investment in renewables with non-
uniform interpretations and exemptions—the most authoritative studies project
continued levels of fossil fuels use absent federal action
Sovacool 7 – Research Fellow in the Energy Governance Program at National University of Singapore; Government and
International Affairs Professor at Virginia Polytechnic Institute; DoE consultant on the Climate Change Technology Program (Benjamin
and Christopher Cooper, Big Is Beautiful, Electricity Journal 20.4, ScienceDirect, AG)

With so much state-level action, one might be tempted to agree with the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) that
Because the
“activities on a number of fronts supplant the need for a federal RPS.”3 But looks can be deceiving.
accumulated demand for electricity is expected to accelerate over the next several decades, the
penetration of renewable energy technologies in individual states, while noteworthy, is not likely to
substantially alter the national fuel mix nor materially address the energy risks we all face.
Framing the debate as a choice between a perfectly functioning, undistorted energy market and a clunky, artificial federal
intervention, opponents of a national RPS tend to ignore the unique drawbacks associated with a complex web of state-based
the most compelling argument for federal action is that a national RPS may help
mandates.4 Indeed,
correct many of the market distortions brought about by a patchwork of inconsistent state
actions. Not only does reliance on state-based action make for an uncertain regulatory
environment for potential investors, it creates inherent inequities between ratepayers in some
states that are paying for “free riders” in others. Ultimately, federal legislation can help create a
more just, more diverse and more predictable national market for renewable resources without
significantly increasing aggregate electricity prices. A national RPS may help correct many of the
market distortions brought about by a patchwork of inconsistent state actions. I. The Seven Deadly Sins
of State-Based RPS In Roman Catholic theology, venial sins, which are relatively minor and can be forgiven through any sacrament of
the Church, are distinguished from capital and mortal sins, which destroy the life of grace and create the threat of eternal
damnation.5 The most severe offenses – often called the “Seven Deadly Sins” – became a deeply embedded theme in Christian
culture around the Fourteenth Century, when they were used to educate and instruct followers about immorality.6 We argue that
state-based RPS need redemption from an analogous set of seven deficiencies, in the hope that stakeholders can begin to overcome
them. A. First sin: Failing to diversify fuels Even though some state RPS programs are decades old (Iowa's Alternative Energy
Production law passed in 1985 and Minnesota mandated utilities purchase renewable energy in 1994), state standards have failed to
substantially increase the deployment of renewable energy technologies on a national scale.7 For the past 15 years, non-
hydroelectric renewable energy resources have provided around 2 percent of the country's electricity supply.8 Even with the
contribution of the existing 21 state RPS mandates, projections show that this percentage is unlikely to improve considerably.9 The
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)
uses one of the most rigorous methodological tools to estimate
future renewable energy deployment: the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS). NEMS tracks the
geographical differences in regional energy markets at sub-state levels, including census divisions and North American Electric
Reliability Council (NERC) sub-regions. NEMS also is used as a benchmark for models employed by the Union of Concerned Scientists
the EIA
(UCS) and the Tellus Institute in their own projections of renewable energy production. In its 2006 Annual Energy Outlook,
used NEMS to estimate the contribution of renewable fuels to U.S. electricity supply given
existing state-based RPS mandates. According to NEMS, electricity generation from biomass is expected to increase
from 0.9 percent of total generation in 2004 to 1.7 percent in 2030. Wind is forecast to increase from 0.4 percent to just 1.1 percent
of total generation. Geothermal power is projected to increase from 0.4 percent to 0.9 percent. Grid-connected solar is anticipated to
EIA's projection means that non-hydroelectric
remain at less than 0.1 percent of total generation.10 Nationally,
renewable energy deployment is expected to rise to no more than about 3 percent by 2015 and
4 percent by 2030. Of the capacity stimulated by state RPS programs, more than 93 percent is estimated to result from large
wind farms.11 When broken down by state, the EIA projects that 3.7 GW of central-station renewable energy capacity will be added in
Texas, 3.4 GW in California, 0.9 GW in Nevada, and 0.5 GW in Minnesota. In Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maine,
Montana, New Mexico, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin, small projects are projected to increase the
Why is the outlook so bleak for renewable
production of renewable energy by only 100 to 200 MW in each state.12
energy in the U.S., especially given the rapid expansion of state-based RPS programs? The EIA
notes that poor financing, comparatively higher capital costs for renewable energy, and the need
to build or upgrade transmission capacity from remote resource areas will likely discourage
significant investments in renewable energy. Concomitantly, the EIA assumes that the federal
production tax credit will expire as scheduled on Dec. 31, 2007, significantly deterring large-scale
investments in renewable energy generation. In an early release of its 2007 Annual Energy Outlook, EIA's updated
analysis reflects the same general trend for renewables: Despite the rapid growth projected for biofuels and other non-
hydroelectric renewable energy sources … oil, coal, and natural gas still are projected to provide roughly the same 86-percent share
EIA expects base-load fossil fuel
of the total U.S. primary energy supply in 2030 that they did in 2005.13 Significantly,
generation to continue to have low operating costs compared to current renewable technologies,
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
14/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
making it harder for renewables to compete in state-based electricity markets without some form
of regulatory intervention.14 B. Second sin: Discouraging investment If America's interstate highway system were
structured like our renewable energy market, drivers would be forced to change engines, tire pressure, and fuel mixture every time
they crossed state lines. None of the 21 existing state RPS mandates are alike. Wisconsin, for example, has set its RPS target at 2.2
percent by 2011, while Rhode Island is shooting for 16 percent by 2020. In Maine, fuel cells and high-efficiency cogeneration count as
“renewable,” while the standard in Pennsylvania includes coal gasification and non-renewable distributed generation. Iowa,
Minnesota, and Texas set purchase requirements based on installed capacity, while many other states make it a function of electricity
sales. Minnesota and Iowa have voluntary standards, while Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania all levy
different noncompliance fees.15 States vary in their targets, definitions of eligible resources, purchase
requirements, renewable energy credit (REC) trading schemes, and compliance mechanisms,
among other things. Amid this complex tangle of regulations, stakeholders and investors must
not only grapple with inconsistencies, they are forced to decipher vague and often competing
state statutes.16 In Connecticut, an unclear description of “electric suppliers” enabled the state's
Department of Public Utility Control to exempt two of the state's largest utilities from RPS obligations.
These exemptions created uncertainty over whether the statute would be enforced against any
utilities at all.17 In testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Don Furman, a senior vice
president at PacifiCorp, lamented how “for multi-state utilities, a series of inconsistent requirements and
regulatory frameworks will make planning, building, and acquiring generating capacity on a
multi-state basis confusing and contradictory.”18 The current state-by-state approach to RPS is
also creating unanticipated difficulties to the expansion of distributed generation technologies by
forcing unusually prohibitive operational procedures. Inconsistent tariff structures and
interconnection requirements add complexity (and therefore cost) to distributed generation
projects. In fact, the Clean Energy Group, a coalition of electric generating and electric distribution companies committed to
responsible environmental stewardship, forecasts that fuel cells and community-scale wind energy projects are unlikely to play a
meaningful role in state RPS markets until policymakers adopt a more comprehensive and uniform approach.19

Status quo is a tragedy of the commons in the electricity utilities sector


Sovacool 8 (Benjamin, Renewable Energy: Economically Sound, Politically Difficult, Electricity journal 21.5, AG)

the term “tragedy of the commons” to refer to how people


About five decades later, Garrett Hardin developed
(and firms) rationally externalize as many of the costs associated with their activities that they can.4
Examples of “the commons” for Hardin included agricultural grazing lands, the National Parks, free parking meters, and a thief
robbing a bank. The commons in each instance – grass, land, parking spaces, other people's money – had a tendency to be exploited
because the benefits of abusing them accrued to a small group of individuals, whereas the costs were distributed to everyone. Or, as
Hardin noted, “we are locked into a system of fouling our own nest, so long as we behave only as independent, rational, free-
enterprisers.”5 This may all sound rather dry and theoretical, but it has very real implications for the electric utility sector.
Importers of liquefied natural gas and oil, for instance, have little incentive to change the nature
of their imports to improve energy security (a positive externality, or public good) since the
benefits of doing so are distributed to all companies and importers, including their competitors.6 States
will often require higher smokestacks on fossil-fueled power plants as a way to minimize the
environmental harms of air pollution within their state, shifting the pollution instead to a broader
geographic area encompassing other states.7 Officials will locate trash incinerators, coal mines,
and landfills near state borders (when possible), so that some of the harms from leakage and
waste are transferred to other states, a problem known as “state line syndrome.”8 Indiana recently
authorized British Petroleum to release 1,584 pounds of ammonia and 4,925 pounds of suspended solids into Lake Michigan daily
from its Whiting refinery, primarily because the benefits from increased output (more fuel, jobs, and tax revenue) accrue within the
state while the costs (pollution and waste) are distributed to Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin.9 Federal and state governments
support select energy systems through freakishly large energy subsidies. Such situations demonstrate that existing firms will,
quite cleverly, externalize as many costs as they can to other firms and society at large, even to
the detriment of the public good. As the next three sections will show, the existing regulatory environment especially
hurts renewable power systems by flagrantly subsidizing conventional energy systems, failing to price greenhouse gas emissions, and
refusing to minimize toxic pollution.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
15/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Inherency
State RPS’s are inconsistencies and inefficient- lead to a reliance on non-renewable
energy
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

While most state efforts have been laudable, state RPS statutes have created a patchwork
of inconsistent, often conflicting mandates that distort the market for renewable energy
technologies and unintentionally inflate electricity prices. By subjecting an increasingly
interstate electric utility market to confusing and sometimes contradictory state
regulations, this tangle of state-based RPS programs discourages long-term investments
and, in some cases, encourages utilities to exploit the inconsistencies.

Ambiguous State RPS encourages noncompliance and a dependence on non-


renewables
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

Amid this complex morass of regulations, stakeholders and investors must not only grapple with
inconsistencies, they are forced to decipher vague and often contradictory state statutes.26 In
Connecticut, for example, the state’s Department of Public Utility Control originally exempted
two of the state’s largest utilities from RPS obligations because the description of “electric
suppliers” in the statute was unclear. These exemptions created uncertainty over whether the
statute would be enforced against any utilities at all.27 Hawaii’s standard contained so much
“wiggle room” that it was unclear even to its own advocates whether it applied to most of the
state’s utilities.28 Such ambiguity has lead to “wide disagreements among parties in regulatory
proceedings” about how to enforce some state RPS mandates. 29 In testimony before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Don Furman, a senior VP at PacifiCorp,
lamented how “for multi-state utilities, a series of inconsistent requirements and regulatory
frameworks will make planning, building and acquiring generating capacity on a multi-state basis
confusing and contradictory.”
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
16/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Inherency
No national RPS- has already been rejected 17 times
Solve Climate (“Renewable Portfolio Standards: America’s clean energy standard,” 4/24/2008,
http://solveclimate.com/blog/20080424/renewable-portfolio-standards-america-s-clean-energy-
savior).

So, if the RPS works so well, why not ditch the patchwork of 25 different standards and
institute a consistent, single RPS for the whole nation? Seems obvious, especially when you
throw this into the mix: The Network for New Energy Choices found in its 2007 report that a
national RPS would create 80% more jobs than comparable investment in fossil fuels and
would save electricity consumers in every region money -- $49.1 billion nationwide, in fact.
The problem? A national RPS requires coordinated and coherent federal leadership on
climate change and energy. Over the past ten years, a federal RPS has been considered by
Congress -- and rejected -- 17 times. The US Senate has passed some form of it three times
since 2002. The House passed one in 2007.

No national RPS- rejected again and again


Joshua Fershee 08 – assistant professor of law at the University of North Dakota (Energy Law
Journal, “Changing resources, changing market: The impact of a national renewable portfolio
standard on the U.S. energy industry”, lexis)

The U.S. Congress recently passed a new energy bill that, until that last minute, included
provisions that would have established a national renewable portfolio standard (RPS). The
RPS would have required electric utilities to procure a certain percentage of their electricity
from renewable resources or purchase renewable energy credits from other sources to meet
the standard. The recent energy bill is just the latest of repeated, and thus far failed, efforts
to impose a national RPS. As such, there has been much debate about the potential merits
and hazards of a national RPS, and more is sure to follow

We’re still dependent on non-renewables- alternatives are key


Ethan Goffman (writer for Proquest, published hundreds of articles, June 2005, “Global Oil
supply and US energy policy.” http://www.csa.com/discoveryguides/ern/05jun/overview.php).

In the long run, alternative energy is the only answer to the eventual diminution of oil
supplies. Currently there is no panacea, however; each source has its disadvantages.
Regarding transportation, oil remains the indisputably cheapest source of fuel. Many
alternative fuels are also nonrenewable and will eventually run out. With the exception of
nuclear, nonrenewable sources represent sequestration of millions of years of energy from
the sun. In the extremely long run, the human race is dependent upon renewable energy
sources.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
17/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Inherency
US is too dependent on oil- transition is necessary
Bill Brubaker (10/12/2006, “Bush: ‘We’re too dependent on oil’,”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/12/AR2006101200939.html).

President Bush today said he worries that declining gasoline prices will make Americans less
concerned about the nation's future energy needs. "Energy is -- look, let me just put it bluntly:
We're too dependent on oil," he said at the Renewable Fuels Conference in St. Louis, sponsored
by the departments of energy and agriculture. "Now, see, low gasoline prices may mask that
concern." Bush said he frets that the "low price of gasoline will make . . . us complacent about
our future when it comes to energy." Gasoline prices have dropped sharply in recent weeks, in
part because of a slowdown in U.S. demand and a buildup in crude oil and gasoline inventories.
Today, the average price in the United States for a gallon of regular unleaded is $2.25, compared
with $2.61 a month ago, according to the AAA motor club. In the Washington region, regular
unleaded has dropped from $2.80 to $2.36 over the same period. "I want to tell you that I
welcome the low gasoline prices," Bush said. "However, it's not going to dim my enthusiasm for
making sure we diversify away from oil. We need to diversify away from oil for economic
reasons." Bush offered his audience a dose of Energy 101, asserting early in his speech: "We live
in a global world. When the demand for oil goes up in China or in India, it causes the price of
crude oil to rise. And since we import about 60 percent of the crude oil we use, it causes our
price to go up as well, which means the economy becomes less competitive
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
18/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Leadership—inherency
US is losing leadership in global renewable energy markets—only federal action can
reverse this
Sawin 02, Senior Researcher & Director, Energy and Climate Change Program (Janet, “Losing the Clean Energy Race”, 26 March
2002, http://www.greenbiz.com/column/2002/03/26/losing-clean-energy-race accessed 24 June 2008) (Jhaveri)

The United States once led - actually, began - the clean energy revolution. As recently as 1990, U.S. industries
played the dominant global role in wind and solar PV development and deployment. But, due to a lack of appropriate and
consistent government support for clean energy technologies, and government subsidies that continue to favor dirty,
conventional fuels and technologies, we are losing our role as technological leaders. We are now falling
farther and farther behind as Japan and Europe surpass us with regard to total installed clean
energy generating capacity, share of the global market, and ownership of manufacturers. U.S.
companies must compete in the global marketplace. If this trend is not reversed, America will
lose millions of potential high-wage, high-tech jobs, billions of dollars in potential investment and
revenue. The US will also fail to glean multiple benefits not traditionally measured in economic terms that come with clean, safe,
domestic and renewable energy technologies - including cleaner environment, reduced risk of global warming, improved human
health, better quality of life, and a more secure future. With only 4.5 percent of the United States land area and a fraction of its wind
resource potential, Germany has more than double the U.S. installed wind energy capacity. Denmark, a small nation of about five
million people, is the world's leading manufacturer of wind turbines, with several turbine companies that consistently rank in the
global top ten. The U.S. share of global PV shipments reached a peak in 1996, declining from 44 percent that year to 27 percent in
2001. Total grid-connected PV in the United States is now estimated to be only 15 percent of nthatin Japan, and 31 percent of that in
Germany.The rising demand for Japanese and European made technology is due primarily to the
dramatic increases in demand for renewable energy capacity in these countries, sparked by
successful government policies aimed to develop markets for renewable energy. Meanwhile, the
U.S. government continues to subsidize fossil fuels and nuclear power, at levels many times that
for renewable energy technologies. Around the world, leaders in business and government are
calling for a transition to a clean energy economy to address global climate change, increase national
security and meet rising demand for energy worldwide. Perhaps most importantly, the American public wants clean energy.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
19/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Leadership—Manufacturing Internal

National RPS spurs investment and the manufacturing sector


Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

A National RPS will jump-start U.S. materials and manufacturing sectors • American
companies have enough materials for major expansions in wind energy. American
composite manufacturers say they can provide enough fiberglass at competitive prices in
the next three years to power 100,000 MW of new wind energy (nearly 6 percent of the
country’s entire electricity supply). • Increased demand for wind components creates new
American industries. Increased demand for wind turbine materials and components will
allow more than 16,000 companies (with over 1 million employees) to enter the turbine
manufacturing market. • A national RPS will improve manufacturing efficiency. More
domestic renewable energy manufacturing facilities will save utilities money by decreasing
reliance on overseas shipments of materials, which suffer from unfavorable exchange rates.
Transmission – A National RPS Speeds Investment in Critical Infrastructure • Utilities benefit
from congestion pricing. When transmission is saturated, prices increase because there is
not enough electricity to meet demand. Market forces create perverse incentives for some
utilities to profit from congestion prices, delaying new transmission until the system is at
risk of catastrophic failure. • A national RPS forces critical transmission system upgrades
Maintaining adequate transmission will require the construction of 26,600 miles of new
transmission in the next decade, quadrupling planned expenditures to $56 billion by 2011. •
Renewable energy overcomes public objection to new transmission lines Case studies show
that public opposition to transmission lines turns into widespread support when utilities
justify the infrastructure with the need to interconnect new renewable generation. • A
national RPS speeds recovery of transmission investments Because of their quicker lead-
times, renewable energy systems can start providing revenue to help pay down debt on
transmission investments while conventional plants are waiting to come online. Expedited
debt repayment decreases capital costs and lowers electricity rates. • Increased
deployment of renewables improves system reliability The variability of renewable
resources becomes easier to manage the more they are deployed. When energy is not
available in one area, it is made up by larger outputs of renewable energy in other areas. •
More renewable energy decreases the need for reserve capacity Modern wind turbines have
a technical reliability of 97.5 percent, compared to coal and natural gas plants with a
reliability of 85 to 90 percent. Higher technical reliability lowers the probability of
unexpected outages and requires less short-term operating reserve.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
20/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Leadership—Competitiveness adv

RPS spurs competition and economic growth


Ryan Wiser (scientist in the Electricity Markets and Policy Group at Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory, PhD in energy and resources, “Renewable Energy Policy Options for China: A
comparison of Renewable Portfolio Standards, Feed-in Tariffs, and Tendering Policies,”
http://www.resource-solutions.org/lib/librarypdfs/IntPolicy-Feed-in_LawsandRPS.pdf,
June 2002).

RPS and tendering policies can create wholesale price competition among renewable
energy suppliers, provided that there are several suppliers bidding on any particular
contract. Though these policies do not inherently lower costs of production, they can create
the volume that allows renewable energy generators to lower costs through economies of
scale, and they can help local renewable developers gain project development experience
that helps to lower costs. However, the volume of projects and speed of infrastructure
development/cost reductions will be dependent upon the initial level of industry
development at the time the policy is implemented and a program design (for tendering
strategies) that includes effective penalties for speculative and non-cost based bids.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
21/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Leadership—Modeled
US leadership is key to spurring other countries to cut emissions
David Doniger et al (Antonia Herzog, Daniel Lashof, all are in the Natural Resource Defense
Council in Washington, “An ambitious, centrist approach to global warming legislation,”
12/22/2006, http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/314/5800/764.pdf).

For too long, the United States has excused its own inaction by saying that it cannot solve this
problem alone. But other countries cannot be expected to play their full part if the world’s largest
emitter continues to do nothing. Global progress requires that we begin to act at home and rejoin
international negotiations with a new attitude. As the Senate resolution states, by beginning to
curb our own emissions we will encourage others to act (4). At the same time, it is reasonable to
take stock periodically to ensure that others are taking reciprocal action. Several current
legislative proposals usefully provide for a regular review every 5 or 10 years based on input
from the Administration and the National Academy of Sciences on the current science,
economics, and state of international cooperation (6–8). Congress would then decide whether or
not to fine-tune the declining cap.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
22/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Leadership—Competitiveness Internal

The renewable energy market is ciritcal to American economic and technological leadership –federal
investments are key
Romm 96, acting principal deputy assistant secretary office of energy efficiency and renewable energy,
(Joesph, Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony FDCH, March 14th) [Fay = Chris Fay, chairman and ceo Shell UK]

Fay notes that "new technologies cannot leap from laboratory to mass market over night. They must first
be tested in niche markets, where some succeed but many fail. Costs fall as they progress down the
'learning curve with increasing applications The long term nature of the research, and the real potential for
failure, is why many options must be pursued at once and why private sector companies are reluctant to
invest. Fay observes that "renewables will have to progress quickly if they are to supply a major proportion
of the world's energy in the first half of the next century. They can only emerge through the process of
widespread commercial experimentation and competitive optimization." Federal investments clearly make
a difference in technology development and global market share. Consider the case of photovoltaics. In
1955, Bell Laboratories invented the first practical PV cell. Through the 1960s and 1970s, investments and
purchases by NASA for space use helped sustain the PV industry and gave America leadership in world
sales. In 1982, federal support for renewable energy was cut deeply, and within three years Japan became
the world leader in PV sales. The Bush Administration began to increase funding for solar energy and, in
1990, launched a voluntary collaborative with the American PV industry to improve manufacturing
technology; three years later, the United States regained the lead in PV sales in this rapidly growing
industry. The Clinton Administration has further accelerated funding for PVs. Sadly, however, the deep cuts
of the 1980s have taken their toll: in the past decade, German and Japanese companies snapped up
several major American PV companies that accounted for 63% of the PVs manufactured in the United
States. Such purchases represent a huge savings for our foreign competition. They don't have to spend
hundreds of millions of dollars to see which technologies succeed. They need- only let the United States do
the basic research and early development and then spend a few tens of millions of dollars plucking the
winners when the federal government abandons funding for applied research. demonstration, and
deployment. While some argue that the cuts in federal R&D will be made up for by the private sector,
historically this hasn't happened. When the government pulls out of a promising long-term technology
area, it sends a signal to the industrial and financial community that the area has no long-term promise
and that the federal government is not a reliable- partner. Finally, while low U.S. electricity prices are a
boost to us economically, they create one disadvantage. Renewable energy will be cost-effective in foreign
countries before it is in America. Countries like Germany and Japan not only have far larger government
financial incentives for the use and export of renewable energy, they typically pay far more for electricity:
In 1991, the price for electricity in Germany's industrial sector was 8.8 cents per kilowatt- hour, whereas in
the United States it was 4.8 cents per kilowatt-hour. The primary competitive advantage the United States
has had in renewables is technological leadership driven by federal research and development support.
That advantage is being taken away by current and proposed Congressional budget cuts. These cuts will
have two effects. First, the transition to low-cost renewables that Shell envisions will likely be slowed, since
America remains the leader in most relevant renewable technologies, and U.S. government funding
remains a sizable fraction of total world R&D funding. The transition, however, even if slowed, seems
inevitable at some point in the middle of the next century. Second, when the transition occurs, the United
States will miss what could be a very large new source of jobs in the next century. Using Shell's numbers,
annual sales in renewable-energy technologies may hit $50 billion in 2020, and almost $400 billion in
2040. In the later year such an industry would support several million jobs. Moreover, as noted above, the
United States will be importing $100 billion worth of Oil annually 10 to 15 from now. With prudent the
peak, followed by a gradual decline as U.S made technology and domestic fuels, including home-grown
biomass with its implications for rural economic development, substitute for imported oil. With proposed
Congressional cuts, however, we could end up only augmenting our debilitating trade deficit in oil with a
dollop of oil-replacing technologies. We cannot know today which technologies will deliver the lowest cost
energy in the future, which is why the DOE pursues a variety of approaches. Indeed, a widely held view,
which I share, is that diversity of supply itself minimizes overall cost. That way, the nation is protected
from global shocks that only affect some of its sources of energy, such as an oil crisis, or an unanticipated
national or global environmental crisis.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
23/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Leadership—Renewable k/t Econ
RPS makes the US renewable globally competitive
Sierra Club, No Date Given (http://www.sierraclub.org/energy/cleanenergy/renewables.asp)
[S. Page]
The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) recently completed a study, Renewing Where We
Live, which shows that the U.S. has more than sufficient potential to produce 20% of our
electricity from renewable sources. Adopting a 20% standard will put the U.S. on track to be
competitive with other countries-many of which have poorer resources and less land area-that
have adopted similar or more aggressive standards. The United Kingdom plans to increase
renewable energy from 2.8% of electricity use today to 10% by 2010, and a recent
government report proposed increasing to 20% renewable energy by 2020.2 Denmark and
Finland are planning for 30% renewable energy by 2010. The European Union goal is 22% by
2010. Regions in Denmark, Spain, and Germany already get nearly 20% of their electricity just
from wind turbines.(3)

RPS is based on domestic competition


American Wind Energy Association October 1997
(http://www.awea.org/policy/rpsbrief.html) [S. Page]
The Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS) is a flexible, market-driven policy that can ensure
that the public benefits of wind, solar, biomass, and geothermal energy continue to be
recognized as electricity markets become more competitive. The policy ensures that a
minimum amount of renewable energy is included in the portfolio of electricity resources
serving a state or country, and -- by increasing the required amount over time -- the RPS can
put the electricity industry on a path toward increasing sustainability. Because it is a market
standard, the RPS relies almost entirely on the private market for its implementation. Market
implementation will result in competition, efficiency and innovation that will deliver renewable
energy at the lowest possible cost.

RPS makes the US economy and renewables market globally competitive.


Sierra Club, No Date Given (http://www.sierraclub.org/energy/cleanenergy/renewables.asp)
[S. Page]
A national RES would have substantial economic benefits. Both EIA and UCS analyses found
that under a 20% RES, total consumer energy bills would be lower in 2020 than business-as-
usual because the RES would reduce natural gas prices. Lower energy bills will make the
American economy more competitive and increase economic growth and employment. A 20%
RES would create 80,000 new, high quality jobs in the wind industry alone; spur $80 billion in
new capital investment; and provide $1.2 billion in new income for farmers, ranchers and rural
landowners and $5 billion in property tax revenues for communities. Furthermore, creating a
healthy renewable electricity industry would position U.S. renewable energy firms to compete
successfully with European and Japanese companies for a multi-billion international market in
renewable energy.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
24/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Leadership—Innovation key
New innovation will cut the trade deficit
Joseph Romm, principle deputy assistant secretary at the department of energy, 3/14/96[FDCH]

Considering that the last war America fought was in the Persian Gulf a little over five years ago,
and that there are a number of experts warning us of the dangers, as responsible holders of the
public trust who among us is prepared to answer the following question sometime in the next
decade: Why did you fail to take reasonable and prudent actions when you heard the warnings
and should have understood the dangers? This is especially true since the energy R&D needed to
respond to growing dependence on Persian Gulf oil achieves many other national benefits, each
justification enough for the investment, including makin5, more efficient use of energy, a
reduced trade deficit, more American jobs, and an improved national and global environment.

The trade deficit will destroy the global economy


New Republic – 1/24/2004

That's what the current tax debate is all about. Thanks to the Bush tax cuts, an already huge
federal debt is getting even bigger. The government pays interest on its loans, just like a
household paying down a mortgage or carrying a large credit card debt. The bigger the interest
payments, the less money is left for other purposes. And, when the government doesn't have
extra money, it's not vacations or luxury cars that get eliminated from the budgets: It's school
lunches, health insurance for pregnant women, homeland security, or, eventually, Medicare and
Social Security benefits. You can already see this taking place. According to an article in The New
York Times last week, Bush's proposed budget for fiscal 2005 includes cuts in spending on
medical benefits for veterans, housing subsidies for the poor, and job training for the
unemployed--naturally, while proposing further new tax cuts. True, the government could just
keep borrowing more money to pay its bills. But, eventually, the lenders would get sick of
lending. At best, they would demand more money (i.e., higher interest rates) to keep
underwriting American profligacy, which would slow down the U.S. economy. At worst, they
would stop lending the money altogether, producing an Argentina-style financial calamity. It
sounds insane, yes. But, just last week, the International Monetary Fund, which knows a thing or
two about Latin American financial crises, issued a 60-page report warning that the United States
had run up an "unprecedented level of external debt for a large industrial country," posing
"significant risks" not only to the United States but to the entire world economy

Innovation is critical to the U.S. economy


Nina Hachigian and Mona Stuphen, Stanford Graduate School and former Service Officer in the
Clinton administration, 2008, The Next American Century
There are myriad factors influencing the U.S. economy, but innova tion ultimately drives the U.S.
standard of living. Here is why: economists agree that economic growth is the key ingredient to
improving standards of living. Even slight improvements in economic growth, when compounded
over time, can make enormous differences in per capita income. The linchpin to U.S. economic
growth is productivity growth. Productivity growth allows companies to make more with less—
less money, fewer workers, fewer machines. The money left over can be passed to consumers,
workers, or leveraged and reinvested. Each of these uses ultimately translates into better jobs
and greater wealth for Americans. (Of course, there is no guarantee that wealth will be
distributed evenly.) What spurs productivity growth? As the McKinsey Global Institute's Diana
Farrell says, "[T]he key to productivity growth is innovation," and many have argued it will be the
most important factor driving American economic success this century. Technological
improvements have accounted for up to 50 percent of U.S. GDP growth, and some 65 percent of
productivity growth since World War II.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
25/136 Strange & Serrano Lab

Collapse of innovation ensures economic collapse


Nina Hachigian & Mona Stuphen 08, Stanford Graduate School and former Service Officer in
the Clinton administration, 2008, The Next American Century

There are several reasons for the U.S. to ensure the continued health of its innovation system.
First, America is counting on innovation in a very high-stakes game. Given its national debt,
America's productivity growth stands between it and financial ruin. If American innovation slips and
economic growth slows, America's fiscal situation would deteriorate further, rendering some
otherwise pressing budget problems like Medicare and Social Security financially catastrophic.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
26/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Leadership—Renewable k/t Econ

RPS saves money and promotes economic growth


Union of Concerned Scientists 6/19/08
(http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/clean_energy_policies/lbl_RES_cost_analysis.html)
State renewable electricity standards (also known as a renewable portfolio standard, or RPS) are
generally expected to have minimal rate impacts, according to a recent study by the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE).[1] A renewable electricity standard—currently found in twenty-one
states and the District of Columbia—requires electric utilities to gradually increase the amount of
renewable energy sources, such as wind, solar, and bioenergy, in their power supplies. The DOE
study finds that, on average, state standards will result in a monthly electricity bill increase of
just 38 cents for a typical residential household. Since the study does not analyze the effect of
increased renewable energy use on natural gas markets, which several studies have found would
lower demand and prices by increasing competition,[2] the overall energy bill impacts from state
renewable electricity standards would likely be even lower. The analysis—conducted by the
DOE's Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory—compares the results from 28 state or utility-level
renewable electricity standard cost studies completed since 1998. It finds that 70 percent of the
studies reviewed project retail electricity rate increases of no greater than one percent. Six of the
studies result in cost savings for electricity consumers (Figure 1). Two of the studies surveyed
found rate increases of greater than five percent. However, one uses cost assumptions for
renewable energy that are higher than most analysts project. The other assumes that the state
standard it analyzes would result in large amounts of solar energy, which is currently more costly
than other renewable technologies.The conclusion that state standards are expected to result in
modest electricity rate impacts is consistent with findings of previous analyses of a national
renewable electricity standard by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) and Union of
Concerned Scientists (UCS). A 2005 EIA study found that a 10 percent by 2020 national standard
would lower electricity and natural gas prices, saving consumers $22.6 billion by 2025.[3] In
addition, a 2004 UCS analysis found that increasing a national standard to 20 percent by 2020
would save electricity and gas consumers $49.1 billion.[4] The DOE report also reviews the
projected public benefits found in the cost studies. All of the studies that consider the larger
economic effects of state renewable electricity standards found that they will result in job
creation and economic growth. Many of the studies also quantify the expected reductions in
carbon dioxide emissions resulting from RPS policies, demonstrating that renewable energy is a
cost-effective strategy for reducing the heat-trapping gases that contribute to global warming.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
27/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Leadership—RPS Solves Competitiveness

RPS and RECs create competition


Cliff Chen, Ryan Wiser, and Mark Bolinger 2007 (Weighing the Costs and Benefits of State
Renewables Portfolio Standards: A Comparative Analysis of State-Level Policy Impact Projections
http://www.lbl.gov/today/2007/Mar/16-Fri/energy-report.pdf)
A well-designed RPS should generally encourage competition among renewable developers and
provide incentives to electricity suppliers to meet their renewable purchase obligations in a least-
cost fashion. In part to accommodate diverse goals and regional differences, however, state RPS
policies differ in their design. The definition of eligible renewable projects and the amount of
renewable energy that is required varies. In many – but not all – jurisdictions, electricity suppliers
can meet their RPS obligations through the use of tradable renewable energy certificates (RECs);
in theory, the use of RECs increases compliance flexibility and may therefore reduce overall
compliance costs. RPS policies in some states provide for resource tiers or credit multipliers,
which are designed to promote diversity among renewable technologies. 9 State RPS policies
also vary in their scope of application (e.g., whether publicly owned utilities are required to
comply), and in their use of compliance flexibility and non-compliance penalties.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
28/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Leadership—Creates Market
US leadership in renewable incentives is key for global renewable development
Center for American Progress 2005
(http://www.americanprogress.org/projects/progressivepriorities/files/Ch12-Energy.pdf)
United States leadership is necessary to engage developing countries—particularly China and
India—which already face major pollution challenges and will eventually produce emissions well
in excess of the United States and other industrialized countries. Many parts of the developing
world have the opportunity to implement clean-energy strategies as they establish and expand
their energy systems, which is much easier and less expensive than overhauling existing
systems. Developed nations are doing little to encourage this, however, even though it is
overwhelmingly in their interest to do so. Clean-energy incentives for the developing world are
woefully inadequate (to the extent they exist at all) and poorly coordinated by developed
nations. Without U.S. leadership, this is unlikely to change. And the consequences are significant.
Not only will CO2 emissions from the developing world continue to skyrocket, accelerating the
pace of global climate change, but our economic and national security will be further
destabilized. Roughly two billion people still lack even basic energy services. Unless we help
change the global energy path, the ranks of competition for increasingly scarce energy supplies
will swell dramatically

RES creates a market for renewables, driving down prices


Union of Concerned Scientists No Date Given
(http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/clean_energy_policies/real-energy-solutions-the-renewable-
energy-standard.html)
By using tradable "renewable energy credits" to achieve compliance at the lowest cost, the RES
would function much like the Clean Air Act credit-trading system, which permits lower-cost,
market-based compliance with air pollution regulations. This market-based approach creates
competition among renewable generators, providing the greatest amount of clean power for the
lowest price, and creates an ongoing incentive to drive down costs. Consumers and Businesses
Money: Diversifying the power supply by developing America’s homegrown renewable energy
resources creates a more competitive market, which can reduce natural gas prices and save
consumers money on their energy bills. Renewable energy is not subject to the price volatility
that plagues natural gas power plants. EIA 10 RPS NS total energy bills. Two recent studies by
the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)1, using high renewable energy cost estimates,
found that a national RES to provide 10 percent of U.S. electricity from renewables by 2020
would lower natural gas prices, have virtually no impact on electricity prices, and could save
energy consumers as much as $13.2 billion. A 2002 UCS report, Renewing Where We Live, also
found that a 10 percent by 2020 national RES could significantly reduce consumer energy bills. In
addition, the UCS report looked at what would happen if the national RES were doubled to 20
percent by 2020. In this case, the RES would achieve greater diversity, economic development,
and environmental benefits, while still saving consumers $4.5 billion on their energy bills
between 2002 and 2020.3,4
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
29/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Leadership—Competitiveness Solvency
Overwhelming non-renewable energy subsidies ensures renewables won’t compete in the
status quo.
Union of Concerned Scientists 8/27/07
(http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/clean_energy_policies/the-renewable-electricity-
standard.html#5) [S. Page]
As discussed above, DOE investments in R&D and state and federal incentives have reduced
the cost of renewable energy generation as much as 80-90 percent. But renewable energy
technologies still do not compete on a level playing field with conventional energy sources.
Federal subsidies for renewable energy have been and continue to be much less than
government subsidies for the fossil fuel and nuclear power industries.10 A study by the
Renewable Energy Policy Project showed that between 1943 and 1999, the nuclear industry
received over $145 billion in federal subsidies, versus $4.4 billion for solar energy and $1.3
billion for wind energy.11 Another study by the nonpartisan Congressional Joint Committee on
Taxation projected that the oil and gas industries would receive an estimated $11 billion in tax
breaks and loopholes that subsidize exploration and production activities between 1999 and
2003.12 National energy legislation passed by a House and Senate conference committee in
November 2003 (H.R. 6) would authorize more than $13 billion over 10 years in new and
expanded tax incentives for the oil, coal, gas, and nuclear power industries.13

RPS creates competition over renewable energy


Energy Information Administration May 2003, (Analysis of a 10-percent Renewable
Portfolio Standard) [S. Page]
To stimulate an increase in the use of renewable resources to generate electricity, several bills
or amendments in Congress call for the establishment of a renewable portfolio standard (RPS)
for all electricity retail suppliers. A typical RPS requires that a share of the power sold in the
United States must come from qualifying renewable facilities. Companies who generate power
from qualifying renewable facilities will be issued credits that they can hold for their own use
or sell to others. To meet the RPS requirement, each individual electricity seller must hold
credits - issued to their own qualifying renewable facilities or purchased from others - equal to
the share required in each year. For example, a supplier with 100 billion kilowatt-hours of retail
electricity sales in a year with a 5-percent RPS requirement would have to hold 5 billion
kilowatt- hours of credits. In a competitive market, the price of renewable credits should rise to
the level needed to stimulate power plant developers to bring on the amount of qualifying
renewable capacity needed to meet the RPS requirement. Thus, the RPS provides a subsidy to
renewables to make them competitive with other resource options. However, it allows the
market to determine the most economical renewable options to develop to comply.

RPS stimulates renewable market


Alan Nogee, Jeff Deyette and Steve Clemmer 4/23/07 (“The Projected Impacts of a National
Renewable Portfolio Standard,” The Electricity Journal Volume 20, Issue 4, May 2007, Pages 33-
47) [S. Page]
Table 2 illustrates that the mix of renewable energy generation under various national RPS
scenarios is much more sensitive to the difference in assumptions between UCS and EIA than
the projected consumer benefits. Using UCS assumptions, wind power provides the majority of
renewable energy generation under the 20 percent RPS, with significant contributions also
coming from biomass and geothermal resources. Under this scenario, total U.S. non-hydro
renewable power capacity increases from about 20,000 MW in 2005 to 180,000 MW by 2020.
Using EIA assumptions, however, results in significantly more generation from biomass energy.
This is primarily due to the more pessimistic cost and performance assumptions that EIA uses
for wind power. Because wind power is more expensive under EIA's assumptions, generation
from biomass integrated gasification combined cycle plants becomes cost-competitive more
quickly, and is deployed by the model to meet a larger portion of the annual targets. Greater
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
30/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
generation from biomass, which has a higher capacity factor than wind power, also results in
less total renewable energy capacity being developed. Under EIA assumptions, total non-hydro
renewable power capacity increases to 150,000 MW by 2020. The difference in renewable
energy generation mix between scenarios that use UCS and EIA assumptions also holds true
under a 10 percent national RPS. The UCS scenario found that wind power would account for
the majority of the generation resulting from the 109,000 MW of renewable eneergy capacity
developed by 2020. Biomass, geothermal, landfill gas, and solar resources continue to play
important, but lesser roles. Under EIA's 10 percent RPS analysis, biomass actually accounts for
a majority of the renewable energy mix by 2020. Ultimately, the competition between
renewable energy resources that is stimulated by a national RPS will pressure developers to
reduce costs and determine the technology winners.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
31/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Leadership—Competitiveness Jobs Solvency
RPS creates jobs, saves homeowners money, and saves consumers 49.1 billion
Alan Nogee, Jeff Deyette and Steve Clemmer 4/23/07 (“The Projected Impacts of a National
Renewable Portfolio Standard,” The Electricity Journal Volume 20, Issue 4, May 2007, Pages 33-
47) [S. Page]
Both the UCS and EIA analyses show that a national RPS can save consumers money in
several ways. First, by reducing the demand for fossil fuels, and creating new competitors for
the dominant fuel sources, renewable energy helps reduce the price of fossil fuels and restrain
the ability of fossil fuel prices to increase in the future. Natural gas therefore costs less for
electricity generation, as well as for other purposes, benefiting both electricity consumers and
other natural gas consumers. Second, some renewable resources, especially wind energy at
good sites, are now less expensive than building new natural gas- or coal-fired power plants
over the expected lifetimes of the plants, and reduce projected generation costs. And third, a
national RPS reduces the cost of renewable energy technologies, by creating competition
among renewable sources and projects to meet the requirements, and by creating economies
of scale in manufacturing, installation, operations, and maintenance. Most importantly,
projected savings are robust enough to be found in all of the recent RPS scenarios, at both the
10 percent and 20 percent levels, and despite large differences in projected renewable energy
costs and performance in the EIA and UCS assumptions. Using UCS assumptions for renewable
energy technologies, average consumer natural gas prices would be lower than business as
usual in nearly every year of the forecast under the 20 percent RPS, with an average annual
reduction of 1.5 percent. In addition, average consumer electricity prices would be lower than
business as usual in every year of the forecast, with an average annual reduction of 1.8
percent. As a result, the 20 percent RPS would save consumers $49.1 billion on their
electricity and natural gas bills by 2020 . All sectors of the economy would benefit, with
commercial, industrial, and residential customers’ total savings reaching $19.1 billion, $17.4
billion, and $12.6 billion, respectively. With UCS running NEMS using EIA's assumptions
unmodified, the results showed that a 20 percent RPS would still reduce gas and electricity
prices. Cumulative savings to electricity customers under a 20 percent RPS totaled $15.4
billion by 2020, with cumulative savings to gas consumers of an additional $11.6 billion, for a
total savings of more than $27 billion. A 10 percent renewable standard would save less
money than the 20 percent scenario. In the UCS scenario, consumers would save almost $28.2
billion on their electricity and natural gas bills by 2020, with the savings continuing to grow to
$37.7 billion by 2025. EIA's own analysis found that the 10 percent RPS would save consumers
$22.6 billion by 2025.20 National RPS scenarios using either UCS or EIA assumptions also
show that energy bills would be reduced in every region of the country, including the
Southeast, where some people have suggested there is limited low-cost renewable energy
potential (Table 1). This is primarily due to the lower natural gas prices for electricity
generation and other direct gas consumers that all regions would see. In addition, all regions
do have some renewable energy resources, and would likely see an increase in using local
resources for generation that would often displace the need for importing fossil fuel.
Furthermore, the national credit trading market created by a national RPS would allow utilities
in all regions to purchase RECs for the same price, providing utilities with negotiating leverage
over local renewable generators.

RPS creates new job and export opportunities–booting the domestic economy
Alan Nogee, Jeff Deyette and Steve Clemmer 4/23/07 (“The Projected Impacts of a National
Renewable Portfolio Standard,” The Electricity Journal Volume 20, Issue 4, May 2007, Pages 33-
47) [S. Page]
Investment in renewable energy can create high-paying jobs in the U.S. For example, direct
jobs are created in manufacturing renewable energy technologies, as well as in installing and
operating them. Jobs are also created when renewable energy workers spend their additional
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
32/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
income on other goods and services and when consumer energy bill savings are spent in the
economy. Using UCS assumptions, we project that by 2020 the 20 percent RPS would generate
more than 355,000 jobs in manufacturing, construction, operation, maintenance, and other
industries—nearly twice as many as fossil fuels, representing a net increase of 157,480 jobs
(Figure 4). Renewable energy would also provide an additional $8.2 billion in income and $10.2
billion in gross domestic product in the U.S. economy in 2020. A 10 percent national RPS would
create significant, but fewer jobs. Under the 10 percent scenario using UCS assumptions, more
than 190,000 jobs would be created by 2020—a net increase of 91,220 jobs when compared
with fossil fuels. In addition, $5.1 billion in income and $5.9 billion in gross domestic product
would be pumped into the U.S. economy in 2020. Renewable energy technologies tend to
create more jobs than fossil fuel technologies because they are more labor-intensive. A large
share of the expenditures for renewable energy is spent on manufacturing equipment, and
installing and maintaining it. With biomass, money is also spent on fuel, but usually from
sources that are within 50 miles of a biomass plant, because it is too expensive to transport it
for long distances. Therefore, renewable energy facilities avoid the need to export cash to
import fuel from other states, regions, or countries—keeping money circulating in the local
economy, and creating more local jobs. Many of the new jobs would be located in rural areas
where the renewable energy generating facilities would be sited. However, a national RPS can
also benefit manufacturing states, even those with less abundant renewable resources, by
providing them the opportunity to manufacture and assemble components for renewable
energy facilities. Developing a strong manufacturing base can also create enormous export
opportunities, given the rapidly growing commitment of the rest of the world to expand use of
renewable energy.

RPS economically benefits small communities


Alan Nogee, Jeff Deyette and Steve Clemmer 4/23/07 (“The Projected Impacts of a National
Renewable Portfolio Standard,” The Electricity Journal Volume 20, Issue 4, May 2007, Pages 33-
47) [S. Page]
A national RPS can help improve the U.S. economy in other ways. Renewable energy can
greatly benefit struggling rural economies, by providing new income for farmers, ranchers,
and landowners from biomass energy production, wind power lease payments, and local
ownership. Property tax revenues from renewable energy facilities can also help local
communities pay for schools and vital public services. Table 3 compares the economic
development benefits of the 20 percent by 2020 and 10 percent by 2020 national RPS
scenarios analyzed using UCS assumptions.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
33/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Climate—Pollution Solvency
Displaces non renewable
Alan Nogee, Jeff Deyette and Steve Clemmer 4/23/07 (“The Projected Impacts of a National
Renewable Portfolio Standard,” The Electricity Journal Volume 20, Issue 4, May 2007, Pages 33-
47) [S. Page]
Renewable energy diversifies the energy portfolio by meeting a much larger portion of U.S.
electricity demand under a 20 percent national RPS (UCS assumptions). By 2020, non-hydro
renewable energy accounts for 15.5 percent of total electric power generation (Figure 3).25 In
the earlier years of the forecast, the increased renewable energy generation displaces more
natural gas. In the latter years, as coal generation begins to compete with more expensive
natural gas, renewable energy generation displaces more coal. However, new growth in both
coal and natural gas are still needed under the RPS to meet the projected increase in energy
demand by consumers. By 2020, nearly two-thirds of the increase in coal generation projected
under business as usual is displaced as a result of the new renewable energy generation.

RPS would reduces emissions by 59 percent


Alan Nogee, Jeff Deyette and Steve Clemmer 4/23/07 (“The Projected Impacts of a National
Renewable Portfolio Standard,” The Electricity Journal Volume 20, Issue 4, May 2007, Pages 33-
47) [S. Page]
Increased renewable energy use would reduce CO2 emissions from power plants. Using UCS
assumptions, the 20 percent national RPS is projected to reduce CO2 emissions by 434 million
metric tons (MMT) per year by 2020—15 percent below business as usual levels or a 59
percent reduction in the projected growth in emissions. This reduction is equivalent to taking
nearly 71 million cars off the road. Using EIA assumptions, a 20 percent RPS would produce
slightly greater CO2 reductions of 468 MMT by 2020, as the increased use of biomass sources
displaces higher amounts of coal generation.

RPS reduces dependence of foreign energy and dangerous LNG


Alan Nogee, Jeff Deyette and Steve Clemmer 4/23/07 (“The Projected Impacts of a National
Renewable Portfolio Standard,” The Electricity Journal Volume 20, Issue 4, May 2007, Pages 33-
47) [S. Page]
In response to high gas prices, and the declining productivity of North American gas wells, EIA
projects imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to increase more than seven-fold over the next
20 years. This trend threatens to push the U.S. down the same troubled road of rising
dependence on imported gas that has been followed for oil. By reducing the demand for
natural gas, renewable energy can reduce imports. Lacking long fuel supply chains, renewable
energy facilities are also not vulnerable to supply shortages or disruptions, price spikes, price
increases, or price manipulation. And because they do not use volatile fuel or produce
dangerous wastes, renewable energy facilities (except large hydropower dams) do not present
inviting targets for sabotage or attack.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
34/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Climate—Pollution Solvency
RPS is a cost-effective way to promote transition to renewables
Mark Jaccard, Professor, School of Resource and Environmental Management-Simon Fraser
University, 2005, Sustainable Fossil Fuels: the unusual suspect in the quest for clean and
enduring energy

Four characteristics help explain the emerging interest in the RPS. First, ongoing competition for
the renewable market share maintains an incentive for renewables producers to reduce costs,
thereby enhancing economic efficiency. Second, because the supply portfolio blends a small
share of high-cost renewables with a large share of low-cost conventional electricity, the policy's
impact on consumer prices is small (as long as bidding and price setting in the two markets are
segmented), which helps with political feasibility. Third, the policy can be directly linked to
environmental targets given that renewable: have zero emissions (except for local air emissions
from combusting biomass). Fourth, the policy minimizes government budgetary involvement
because customers pay producers directly for the extra financial cost of renewables, and the
selection of renewables can be left to market forces through a competitive bidding process. In
contrast, the Danish government paid over 100 million Euros in 1998 alone in annual subsidies to
wind generators.

Quota system like the RPS is a mechanism to promote renewables


Janet L. Sawin, Worldwatch Institute, 2004, Mainstreaming Renewable Energy in the 21st
Century, Worldwatch Paper # 169, May, p. 35

The second type of regulatory access policy, the quota system, works in reverse of pricing laws:
governments set targets and let the market determine prices. Typically, governments mandate a
minimum share of capacity or generation to come from renewable sources. As with pricing
systems, the additional costs of renewable energy are borne by taxpayers or electricity
consumers.With the most common form of quota system (such as the Renewables Portfolio
Standard, or RPS, used in several US states), investors and generators comply with the quota by
installing capacity, purchasing renewable electricity through a bidding process, or buying “green
certificates” or “renewable energy credits.” Generally certificates are awarded to producers for
the renewable electricity they generate, and add flexibility by enabling utilities and customers to
trade, sell, or buy credits to meet obligations. They can add value to renewable sales, and can
allow for trading and expanding renewable energy markets between states or countries.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
35/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Climate—Pollution Impacts
National RPS significantly reduces air pollution
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

A national RPS reduces air pollution. Air pollution from conventional power plants kills between
50,000 and 70,000 Americans each year. A single 1 MW wind turbine (operating at only 30%
capacity) displaces 96 tons of nitrous oxides, 69 tons of sulfur dioxide and 1800 pounds of
toxic mercury during its 30-year lifespan.

Conventional Utilities lead to thousands of deaths every year because of pollution


Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

C. Air Quality Conventional electricity generation is by far the largest source of air pollutants that harm
human health and contribute to global warming. In 2003, for example, fossil fuel use (for all energy
sectors, not just electricity) was responsible for 99 percent of the country’s carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions, 93 percent of its sulfur dioxide (SOx) emissions, and 96 percent of its nitrous oxides emissions
(NOx).269 Researchers at the Harvard School of Public Health estimated that the air pollution from
conventional energy sources kills between 50,000 and 70,000 Americans every year. These researchers
found that the emissions from just 9 power plants in Illinois directly contributed to an annual risk of 300
premature deaths, 14,000 asthma attacks, and more than 400,000 daily incidents of upper respiratory
symptoms among the 33 million people living within 250 miles of the plants.271 Compiling data from the
American Cancer Society, Harvard School of Public Health, and Environmental Protection Agency, the Clean
the Air Grassroots Network estimated that residents in every single U.S. state were at risk to premature
death from air pollution. 272 Children are particularly vulnerable to the pollution from fossil fuels. Because
children spend more time outside and have smaller airways that necessitate more rapid breathing, they
are much more vulnerable to develop illnesses associated with air pollution.273 By promoting technologies
that displace conventional forms of electricity generation, a national RPS would substantially decrease air
pollution in the U.S. A single 1 MW wind turbine running at only 30 percent of capacity for one year
displaces more than 1,500 tons of carbon dioxide, 2.5 tons of sulfur dioxide 3.2 tons of nitrous oxides, and
60 pounds of toxic mercury (Hg) emissions.274 One study assessing the environmental potential of a 580
MW wind farm located on the Altamont Pass near San Francisco, California, concluded that the turbines
displaced hundreds of thousands of tons of air pollutants each year that would have otherwise resulted
from fossil fuel combustion. 275 The study estimated that the wind farm would displace more than 24
billion pounds of nitrous oxides, sulfur dioxides, particulate matter and carbon dioxide over the course of
its 20-year lifetime — enough to cover the entire city of Oakland in a pile of toxic pollution 40 stories
high.276
Power plants release toxic amounts of pollution like mercury
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
36/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A comprehensive EPA study on mercury noted that epidemics of mercury poisoning following
high-doses in Japan and Iraq have demonstrated that neurotoxicity is of greatest concern when
mercury exposure occurs to the developing fetus. Dietary mercury is almost completely
absorbed into the blood and distributed to all tissues including the brain; it also readily passes
through the placenta to the fetus and fetal brain.285 Most Americans do not ingest mercury
directly, but accumulate small amounts of the poisonous metal through the consumption of fish.
In 2003, 43 states had to issue mercury advisories to warn the public to avoid consuming
contaminated fish from in-state water sources. The EPA estimates that as many as 3 percent of
women of child-bearing age eat sufficient amounts of fish to be at risk from mercury exposure.
Conventional power plants are responsible for nearly one third of all U.S. emissions of
mercury.287 In 2004, for example, U.S. coal-fired power plants alone released about 100,000 lbs.
of mercury into the nation’s air.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
37/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Climate—Pollution Impacts

Pollution causes millions of deaths and severely hurts all aspects of the environment
Alex Kirby (British journalist, specializing in environmental issues., staff writer for BBC,
12/13/2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4086809.stm).

One of the main themes of Planet Under Pressure is the way many of the Earth's environmental
crises reinforce one another. Pollution is an obvious example - we do not have the option of
growing food, or finding enough water, on a squeaky-clean planet, but on one increasingly
tarnished and trashed by the way we have used it so far. Cutting waste and clearing up pollution
costs money. Yet time and again it is the quest for wealth that generates much of the mess in the
first place. Living in a way that is less damaging to the Earth is not easy, but it is vital, because
pollution is pervasive and often life-threatening. Air: The World Health Organization (WHO)
says 3 million people are killed worldwide by outdoor air pollution annually from vehicles and
industrial emissions, and 1.6 million indoors through using solid fuel. Most are in poor countries.
Water: Diseases carried in water are responsible for 80% of illnesses and deaths in developing
countries, killing a child every eight seconds. Each year 2.1 million people die from diarrhoeal
diseases associated with poor water. Soil: Contaminated land is a problem in industrialised
countries, where former factories and power stations can leave waste like heavy metals in the
soil. It can also occur in developing countries, sometimes used for dumping pesticides.
Agriculture can pollute land with pesticides, nitrate-rich fertilisers and slurry from livestock. And
when the contamination reaches rivers it damages life there, and can even create dead zones off
the coast, as in the Gulf of Mexico. Chronic problem Chemicals are a frequent pollutant. When
we think of chemical contamination it is often images of events like Bhopal that come to mind.
But the problem is widespread. One study says 7-20% of cancers are attributable to poor air and
pollution in homes and workplaces. The WHO, concerned about chemicals that persist and build
up in the body, especially in the young, says we may "be conducting a large-scale experiment
with children's health". Some man-made chemicals, endocrine disruptors like phthalates and
nonylphenol - a breakdown product of spermicides, cosmetics and detergents - are blamed for
causing changes in the genitals of some animals. Affected species include polar bears - so not
even the Arctic is immune. And the chemicals climb the food chain, from fish to mammals - and
to us. About 70,000 chemicals are on the market, with around 1,500 new ones appearing
annually. At least 30,000 are thought never to have been comprehensively tested for their
possible risks to people.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
38/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Climate—uniqueness
CO2 emissions are the largest cause of climate change
EIA (official energy statistics from the US gov, May 2008,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/bookshelf/brochures/greenhouse/Chapter1.htm).

What Effect Do Greenhouse Gases Have on Climate Change? In computer-based models, rising
concentrations of greenhouse gases produce an increase in the average surface temperature of
the Earth over time. Rising temperatures may, in turn, produce changes in precipitation patterns,
storm severity, and sea level commonly referred to as “climate change.” Assessments by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) suggest that the Earth’s climate has warmed
between 0.6 and 0.9 degrees Celsius over the past century and that human activity affecting the
atmosphere is “very likely” an important driving factor.1 The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report
(Summary for Policymakers) states, “Most of the observed increase in globally averaged
temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in
anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.” It goes on to state, “The observed widespread
warming of the atmosphere and ocean, together with ice mass loss, support the conclusion that
it is extremely unlikely that global climate change of the past 50 years can be explained without
external forcing, and very likely that it is not due to known natural causes alone.” 1According to
the IPCC “very likely” indicates that there is a 90 percent chance that this is the case. What Are
the Sources of Greenhouse Gases? In the United States, greenhouse gas emissions come
primarily from the combustion of fossil fuels in energy use. Energy use is largely driven by
economic growth with short-term fluctuations in its growth rate created by weather patterns
affecting heating and cooling needs, as well as changes in the fuel used in electricity generation.
Energy-related carbon dioxide emissions, resulting from the combustion of petroleum, coal, and
natural gas, represented 82 percent of total U.S. anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions in
2006 (Figure 32). The connection between energy use and carbon dioxide emissions is explored
in the box on the reverse side (Figure 4).

CO2 emissions keep rising and are the largest factor in climate change
EIP (“U.S. Power plan Carbon Dioxide Emissions rose 3 percent in 2007, Biggest one-year jump
in nearly a decade,” 2007,
http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:Uir72jkHYoYJ:www.environmentalintegrity.org/pubs/EIP%2
52010%2520worst%2520C02%2520states%2520news%2520release%2520FINAL.pdf+CO2+emi
ssions+largest+%22global+warming&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us&client=firefox-a).

Poor progress report on efforts to rein in greenhouse gases: Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from
U.S. power plants climbed 2.9 percent in 2007, the biggest single- year increase since 1998,
according to new analysis by the nonprofit and nonpartisan Environmental Integrity Project (EIP)
of data from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Now the single largest factor in U.S.
climate change pollution, the electric power industry’s carbon dioxide emissions have risen 5.9
percent since 2002 and 11.7 percent since 1997.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
39/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Climate—uniqueness
Current power plants are using billions of tons of CO2- and that number is only
increasing
EIP (“U.S. Power plan Carbon Dioxide Emissions rose 3 percent in 2007, Biggest one-year jump
in nearly a decade,” 2007,
http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:Uir72jkHYoYJ:www.environmentalintegrity.org/pubs/EIP%2
52010%2520worst%2520C02%2520states%2520news%2520release%2520FINAL.pdf+CO2+emi
ssions+largest+%22global+warming&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us&client=firefox-a).

According to the EIP report, the consumption of electricity accounted for more than 2.3 billion
tons of CO2 in 2006, or more than 39.5 percent of total emissions from manmade sources,
according to the U.S. Department of Energy. Coal-fired power plants alone released more than
1.9 billion tons, or nearly one third of the U.S. total. The Department of Energy projects that
carbon dioxide emissions from power generation will increase 19 percent between 2007 and
2030, due to new or expanded coal plants. An additional 4,115 megawatts of new coal-fired
generating capacity was added between 2000 and 2007, with another up to 15,000 megawatts
expected to come online in the 2008 through 2012 timeframe.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
40/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Climate—links

National RPS would displace coal, gas, and nuclear power


Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

A national RPS would displace coal and natural gas. In a 2002 assessment of a 10% national
RPS, the Department f Energy determined that “the imposition of a national RPS would lead
to lower generation from natural gas and coal facilities.” Analysts have confirmed this
trade-off in RPS states like Michigan, New York, Virginia, and Texas. • Renewable energy
offsets nuclear power. Studies from Michigan, North Carolina, and Oregon found that
renewable generation displaces new nuclear reactors and decreases the mining of uranium.

National RPS would reduce CO2 emissions and ensure clean air
American Wind Energy Association (“Federal RPS Factsheet,” 2007,
http://www.awea.org/legislative/pdf/Federal_RPS_Factsheet.pdf)

Helps Achieve Cleaner Air: Adopting a national RPS of 20 percent by 2020 can help reduce
emissions of harmful air pollutants and of carbon dioxide (a leading greenhouse gas). Wind
power offsets other, more polluting sources of energy. That is important because electricity
generation is the largest industrial source of air pollution in the U.S. When wind power
projects generate electricity, fuel at other power plants is not consumed. A UCS study found
that a 20 percent RPS would reduce carbon dioxide CO2 emissions by 434 million metric
tons per year by 2020 – a reduction of 15% below “business-as-usual levels”, equivalent to
taking nearly 71 million cars off the road.4 A recent New York study found that if wind
energy supplied only 10% (3,300 MW) of the state’s peak electricity demand, 65% of the
energy it displaced would come from natural gas, 15% from coal, 10% from oil, and 10%
from electricity imports.5

National RPS substantially reduces greenhouse gas emissions


Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

A national RPS reduces greenhouse gas emissions. Renewable energies could offset almost
½ ton of carbon dioxide for every MW generated. A 20% by 2020 national RPS could reduce
as much carbon dioxide as taking 71 million cars off the nation’s roads.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
41/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Climate—At: Inevitable
We must act now to prevent the worst impacts of global warming
Seth Borenstein (staff writer for the Associated Press, “Scientists on global warming: Act now,”
6/24/2008, http://www.tucsoncitizen.com/ss/tech/89152.php).

The year of Hansen's original testimony was the world's hottest year on record. Since then,
14 years have been hotter, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. Two decades later, Hansen spent his time on the question of whether it's
too late to do anything about it. His answer: There's still time to stop the worst, but not
much time. "We see a tipping point occurring right before our eyes," Hansen told the AP
before the luncheon. "The Arctic is the first tipping point and it's occurring exactly the way
we said it would." Hansen, echoing work by other scientists, said that in five to 10 years,
the Arctic will be free of sea ice in the summer.

Immediate action is key to stop the worst impacts of global warming


Seth Borenstein (staff writer for the Associated Press, “Global warming too advanced to
reverse?” http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4188/is_20060403/ai_n16203776, 4/3/2006).

"You don't give up," said Schneider, co-director of Stanford's Center for Environmental Science
Policy. "If you have high blood pressure, do you sit there till you die or do you take Lasix (blood
pressure medicine)?" It takes decades to stabilize emissions of greenhouse gases -- which are
spewed by power plants, cars and factories -- and another half-century after that to slow revved-
up ocean warming, so "you're stuck with say 100 years of warming," said Barnett. "I believe we
are past the point of no return," he said. "What does the point of no return mean? To me, it
means we've reached a point where we are seeing the impacts of global warming . . . The
question is: How much worse is it going to get? That is a case in which we can control our destiny
-- if we act now."

Effects of global warming could be seriously reduced by quickly decreasing CO2 levels
David Doniger et al (Antonia Herzog, Daniel Lashof, all are in the Natural Resource Defense
Council in Washington, “An ambitious, centrist approach to global warming legislation,”
12/22/2006, http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/314/5800/764.pdf).

There is growing concern that global warming of more than 2°C from preindustrial levels could
have dangerous climatic consequences (1, 2). It is estimated that, to avoid exceeding this 2°
target, heat-trapping gas and aerosol concentrations need to be stabilized so that their net
radiative effect is less than that of 450 parts per million (ppm) CO2 (3). This could be achieved if
the United States and other industrial nations cut current emissions by 60 to 80% by 2050, and if
developing countries limit emissions growth and impose similar reductions later in the century.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
42/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Climate—Co2 solvency
National RPS significantly reduces greenhouse gas
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

A national RPS reduces greenhouse gas emissions. Renewable energies could offset almost ½
ton of carbon dioxide for every MW generated. A 20% by 2020 national RPS could reduce as
much carbon dioxide as taking 71 million cars off the nation’s roads.

Conventional energy uses up substantially more land than renewables


Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

Renewable energies require less land then conventional power plants. Including the land used for
mining, transportation and generation, conventional coal-fired power plants use as much as 100
square kilometers of land for every GW of electricity generated. Wind farms use up to 75% less
land. Over 95% of the land used for wind farms remains free for other uses like ranching and
farming. Less than 40 square miles could support 38,000 wind turbines producing up to 4% of
the nation’s electricity demand each year. Solar PV uses up to 90% less land. America’s entire
current electricity demand could be generated by installing PV panels on only 7% of the
country’s available roofs, parking lots, and highway retaining walls.

National RPS would reduce greenhouse gas emissions, replace coal and gas, and
would overall help the environment
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

A national RPS would displace coal and natural gas. In a 2002 assessment of a 10% national RPS,
the Department f Energy determined that “the imposition of a national RPS would lead to lower
generation from natural gas and coal facilities.” Analysts have confirmed this trade-off in RPS
states like Michigan, New York, Virginia, and Texas.• Renewable energy offsets nuclear power.
Studies from Michigan, North Carolina, and Oregon found that renewable generation displaces
new nuclear reactors and decreases the mining of uranium. • A national RPS saves billions of
gallons of water. Conventional and nuclear power plants will soon be withdrawing more water for
electricity production than America’s farmers use for all the irrigated agriculture in the entire
nation (over 3.3 billion gallons each day). A nuclear reactor requires 600 times as much water to
generate the same amount of electricity as a wind farm. A coal-fired plant uses 500 times as
much water as a wind farm; A gas-fired plant uses 250 times as much. A single 100-watt solar
panel saves up to 3,000 gallons of water over its lifetime. • A national RPS reduces air pollution.
Air pollution from conventional power plants kills between 50,000 and 70,000 Americans each
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
43/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
year. A single 1 MW wind turbine (operating at only 30% capacity) displaces 96 tons of nitrous
oxides, 69 tons of sulfur dioxide and 1800 pounds of toxic mercury during its 30-year lifespan. •
A national RPS reduces greenhouse gas emissions. Renewable energies could offset almost ½ ton
of carbon dioxide for every MW generated. A 20% by 2020 national RPS could reduce as much
carbon dioxide as taking 71 million cars off the nation’s roads. • Renewable energies require less
land then conventional power plants. Including the land used for mining, transportation and
generation, conventional coal-fired power plants use as much as 100 square kilometers of land
for every GW of electricity generated. Wind farms use up to 75% less land. Over 95% of the land
used for wind farms remains free for other uses like ranching and farming. Less than 40 square
miles could support 38,000 wind turbines producing up to 4% of the nation’s electricity demand
each year. Solar PV uses up to 90% less land. America’s entire current electricity demand could
be generated by installing PV panels on only 7% of the country’s available roofs, parking lots,
and highway retaining walls.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
44/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Climate—Water internal

Federal RPS is key to avoid the oncoming water crisis and save billions of gallons a
day
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

B. Water Conservation If projected electricity demand is met using water-intensive fossil fuel
and nuclear reactors, America will soon be withdrawing more water for electricity production
than for farming. Perhaps the most important—and least discussed—advantage to a federal
RPS is its ability to displace electricity generation that is extremely water-intensive. The
nation’s oil, coal, natural gas, and nuclear facilities consume about 3.3 billion gallons of water
each day.244 In 2006, they accounted for almost 40 percent of all freshwater withdrawals
(water diverted or withdrawn from a surface- or ground-water source), roughly equivalent to
all the water withdrawals for irrigated agriculture in the entire United States.245 A
conventional 500 MW coal plant, for instance, consumes around 7,000 gallons of water per
minute, or the equivalent of 17 Olympic-sized swimming pools every day.246 Older, less
efficient plants can be much worse. In Georgia, the 3,400 MW Sherer coal facility consumes as
much as 9,913 gallons of water for every MWh of electricity it generates. 247 Data from the
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) also confirms that every type of traditional power
plant consumes and withdraws vast amounts of water. Conventional power plants use
thousands of gallons of water for the condensing portion of their thermodynamic cycle. Coal
plants also use water to clean and process fuel, and all traditional plants lose water through
evaporative loss. Newer technologies, while they withdraw less water, actually consume more.
Advanced power plant systems that rely on re-circulating, closed-loop cooling technology
convert more water to steam that is vented to the atmosphere. Closed-loop systems also rely
on greater amounts of water for cleaning and therefore return less water to the original
source. Thus, while modern power plants may reduce water withdrawals by up to 10 percent,
they contribute even more to the nation’s water scarcity.248 Nuclear reactors, in particular,
require massive supplies of water to cool reactor cores and spent nuclear fuel rods. Because
much of the water is turned to steam, substantial amounts are lost to the local water table
entirely. One nuclear plant in Georgia, for example, withdraws an average of 57 million gallons
every day from the Altamaha River, but actually “consumes” (primarily as lost water vapor) 33
million gallons per day from the local supply, enough to service more than 196,000 Georgia
homes,.249 With electricity demand expected to grow by approximately 50 percent in the next
25 years, continuing to rely on fossil fuel-fired and nuclear generators could spark a water
scarcity crisis. In 2006, the Department of Energy warned that consumption of water for
electricity production could more than double by 2030, to 7.3 billion gallons per day, if new
power plants continue to be built with evaporative cooling. This staggering amount is equal to
the entire country’s water consumption in 1995.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
45/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Climate—Water internal
Federal RPS is key to avoid the oncoming water crisis and save billions of gallons a
day
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

The electric utility industry’s vast appetite for water has serious consequences, both for
human consumption and the environment. Assuming the latest Census Bureau projections, the
U.S. population is expected to grow by about 70 million people in the next 25 years.251 Such
population growth is already threatening to overwhelm existing supplies of fresh and potable
water. Few new reservoirs have been built since 1980 and some regions have seen
groundwater levels drop as much as 300 to 900 feet over the past 50 years as aquifers extract
water faster than the natural rate of replenishment.252 Most state water managers expect
either local or regional water shortages within the next 10 years, according to a recent survey,
even under “normal” conditions.253 In fact, 47 states in the country reported drought
conditions during the summer of 2002.254 Water shortages risk becoming more acute in the
coming years as climate change alters precipitation patterns. In the Pacific Northwest, for
example, global warming is expected to induce a dramatic loss of snow-pack as more
precipitation falls as rain. As a result, numerous studies have suggested that the hydrology of
the region will be fundamentally altered with increased flood risks in the spring and reductions
of snow in the winter. 255 Consequently, power retailers in the region have expressed concern
that large hydroelectric and nuclear facilities will have to be shut down due to lack of
adequate water for electricity generation and cooling.256 During the steamy August of 2006,
the record heat sparked unplanned reactor shutdowns in Michigan and Minnesota as nuclear
plant operators scrambled to find enough water to cool radioactive fuel cores.257
Xcel energy had to similarly cancel a $1.2 billion coal facility in Pueblo, Colorado, because of
water concerns.258

Power plant water heating Kills entire ecosystems


Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

The Argonne National Laboratory has documented how power plants have withdrawn
hundreds of millions of gallons of water each day for cooling purposes and then discharged the
heated water back to the same or a nearby water body. This process of “once-through” cooling
presents potential environmental impacts by impinging aquatic organisms in intake screens
and by affecting aquatic ecosystems by discharge effluent that is far hotter than the
surrounding surface waters.259 Drawing water into a plant often kills fish and other aquatic
organisms, and the extensive array of cooling towers, ponds, and underwater vents used by
most plants have been documented to severely damage riparian environments. In some
cases, the thermal pollution from centralized power plants can induce eutrophication—a
process where the warmer temperature alters the chemical composition of the water, resulting
in a rapid increase of nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorous. Rather than improving the
ecosystem, such alterations usually promote excessive plant growth and decay, favoring
certain weedy species over others and severely reducing water quality. In riparian
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
46/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
environments, the enhanced growth of choking vegetation can collapse entire ecosystems.
This form of thermal pollution has been known to decrease the aesthetic and recreational
value of rivers, lakes, and estuaries and complicate drinking water treatment.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
47/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Trade—inherency
Trade war is inevitable absent Us concessions to Europe on climate
Fontaine 4 – co-chairs the Energy, Environmental & Public Utility Practice Group of the Cozen O'Connor law firm, former EPA
lawyer (Peter, Global Warming: The Gathering Storm, http://www.pur.com/pubs/4419.cfm, AG)

There is little question that CO2 reduction measures will increase the cost of energy in the EU,
Japan, and the other industrialized nations that have ratified Kyoto. As a result, Annex I countries that have
not undertaken comparable measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, including the United States, Canada, and Australia, will
A fundamental
enjoy a competitive advantage in the form of lower energy costs and, in turn, lower costs of production.
impact of Kyoto therefore will be a global imbalance in the costs of production among the United States,
Australia, and virtually the rest of the industrialized world. This imbalance will prompt the EU to seriously
examine the option of imposing some form of countervailing duty on U.S. imports to compensate
for the disadvantage and to fund additional CO2 offset projects under the CDM mechanism. The
EU clearly is concerned about the potential for competitive harm associated with the recent
greenhouse gas emissions program, noting that EU emissions allowance trading scheme (ETS) "has the potential to lead
to even further increases in power prices that could cause significant damage to EU competitiveness, especially for energy intensive
industries such as pulp and paper, iron and steel, cement and lime, chemicals and others. ... It is essential that this situation be
monitored and actions taken if these industries become disadvantaged."7 Several non-governmental organizations also have
advocated for trade sanctions against the United States, arguing that: Until the U.S. ratifies and implements the Kyoto Protocol,
there cannot be fair and free trade with the U.S. and the U.S. will be in clear violation of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Nor is there any reason to question that the EU
Countervailing Measures.8 Recent WTO Successes Against the U.S.
will use trade sanctions as a hammer when it finds that the U.S. has garnered an unfair
competitive advantage by subsidizing exports. Two recent examples, the sales
corporation/extraterritorial income (FSC/ETI) and the steel import cases, demonstrate that the EU
will use trade sanctions when necessary to force a change in U.S. behavior. In both cases, the EU
successfully implemented countervailing duties of several billion dollars that were upheld by the WTO Appellate Body. In both cases,
the United States underestimated the EU's resolve to impose trade sanctions, and the sanctions prompted the United States to act
quickly to remove the subsidies.9
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
48/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Trade—20% key

US energy policy is falling far behind Europe’s twenty percent RPS


Sovacool 7 (Benjamin and Jack Barkenbus, Necessary but Insufficient, Environment 49.6, Ebsco, AG)

Blair announced that the United Kingdom would


IN EUROPE this past February, then–British Prime Minister Tony
support a 20 percent mandatory target for renewable power as a share of European generation
capacity.1 His announcement complements the policies of 17 other European Union countries that have also
set some type of national, mandatory target for promoting renewable energy. And in terms of climate
policy in Europe, the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) calls for mandatory reductions
in greenhouse gas emissions and allows countries to trade carbon credits. In the past five years, Brazil,
China, Indonesia, Israel, Nicaragua, Norway, South Korea, Sri Lanka , Switzerland, and Turkey have adopted mandatory renewable
energy or climate change targets.2 These countries have frequently linked action on renewable energy and climate change together
because they realize that the combustion of fossil fuels greatly contributes to climate change, and they do not like fouling their own
the United States, the federal government has set no national target for
nests. Meanwhile, in
renewable energy, established no national cap on greenhouse gas emissions, and refused to
create a nationwide trading system for carbon credits. As a result of the administration’s
unwillingness to take forceful actions commensurate with the nation’s leadership and
responsibilities, the country remains unprepared to face the unprecedented energy and
environmental challenges that loom in the future.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
49/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Natural Gas 2AC

Natural gas reliance for electricity makes economic volatility inevitable


Roberts 4 – award winning energy journalist (Paul, The End of Oil, p 183, AG)

What this means is that today there is no slack in the system, no extra gas to meet any unanticipated
demand and the market knows it. The slightest blip in demand, from a brief cold snap to a heat
wave, or even a spike in oil prices, which encourages big consumers to switch to gas — anything that might conceivably
increase need for natural gas or gas-generated electricity — sends prices skyward. They then plummet just as
quickly. Such volatility is quite attractive to energy speculators who are willing to gamble large sums buying
gas in the hope that prices will continue to rise. (In fact, it is widely speculated that the price hikes in the summer of 2003 stemmed
in part from gas sellers' withholding supply to squeeze" prices up at the margins.) Yet it is also true that such manipulations cannot
In such an
occur in a loose market; they can take place only when supplies are tight, as appears to be the trend.
environment, volatility is inevitable — and devastating, especially in an economy increasingly
powered by gas-fired electricity. As gas prices rise, utilities are raising power rates. Industries like
plastics makers that depend on natural gas for a "feedstock" are shutting down plants and moving overseas,
where gas supplies are closer to hand. When U.S. gas prices spiked to ten dollars per one million Btu's in 2001, entire
U.S. factories were shuttered, and at least two hundred thousand U.S. manufacturing jobs disappeared. This so-called demand
destruction is one reason Greenspan warned in Lune 2003 that a gas shortage could effectively wipe out the struggling economic
recovery. "Energy
is rapidly becoming a major limiting factor on economic growth," Jeffrey Currie,
senior energy economist for Goldman Sachs, told a congressional hearing last year. "If the core
energy infrastructure in the U.S. does not improve, energy crises are likely to become
progressively more frequent, more severe and more disruptive of economic activity."25 Without
substantial new gas production, argues Weissman, "there is no readily apparent means to meet the incremental electricity needs of
the U.S. economy over the next five to seven years raising serious question as to how the growth of the U.S. economy will be
sustained during the remainder of this decade, while new, longer-term sources of natural gas supply are being developed."36

Nuke war
Bearden 2k (T.E former LTC U.S. Army, Director of the Assoc. of Distinguished American Scientists, Fellow Emeritus @ Alpha
Foundation’s Institute for Advanced Study, 6/24, http://www.seaspower.com/EnergyCrisis-Bearden.htm)

History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to economic collapse, the stress on
the final

WMD) now possessed by some 25


nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (

nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea {[7]} launches nuclear weapons

upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China — whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can

reach the United States — attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the
conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and
potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is
almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its
perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent
will destroy civilization as
of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself {[8]}. The resulting great Armageddon
we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
50/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Blackouts 2AC

National RPS prevents grid failures which cause terrorism and economic collapse
Sovacool and Cooper 7 (Benjamin and Christopher, 8 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol'y 5, AG)

federal intervention is needed to improve electricity reliability. Contrary to what some opponents of
First,
Electrical
renewable energy assert, the variability of renewable resources becomes easier to manage the more they are deployed.
and power systems engineers have long held the principle that the larger a system becomes, the
less reserve capacity it needs. Demand variations between individual consumers are mitigated by grid interconnection in
exactly this manner. When a single electricity consumer, for example, starts drawing more electricity than the system allocated for
each consumer, the strain on the system is insignificant because so many consumers are drawing from the grid that it is entirely
likely another consumer will be drawing less to make up the difference. This "averaging" works in a similar fashion on the supply side
of the grid. Individual wind turbines average out each other in electricity supply. 18 So when the wind is not blowing through one wind
Because the technical availability of one wind turbine rivals
farm, it is likely blowing harder through another.
that of a single conventional power plant, wind farms of hundreds or thousands of turbines have
even greater reliability because it is unlikely that all turbines would be down at the same time.
Furthermore, when turbines do malfunction, they take far less time to recover than massive
conventional power plants or nuclear reactors that have literally millions of individual
components, arranged in complex circuits prone to mechanical failure. 19 Analysts already confirmed the
benefit of wind power's greater technical availability in the United States. Indeed, a November 2006 study assessing the widespread
use of wind power in Minnesota [*7] concluded that "wind generation does make a calculable contribution to system reliability" by
decreasing the risk of large, unexpected outages. 20 Improved reliability of supply is important, as blackouts
and brownouts exact a considerable toll on the American economy. The U.S. Department of Energy ("DOE")
estimates that while power interruptions often last only seconds or minutes, they cost consumers an average of $ 150 to 400 billion
every year. 21 The Electric Power Research Institute projects the annual costs of poor power reliability at $ 119 billion, or forty-four
renewable energy technologies must be
percent of all electricity sales in 1995. 22 However, to capture such benefits,
spatially deployed in every state and must have national penetration rates above ten percent.
Penetration rates of renewable energy technologies nationwide are still low--around three percent
of overall installed electricity capacity in 2007. Collective state efforts are expected to increase this amount to only around four
percent by 2015 and five percent by 2030, but the environmental benefits of renewable energy only really start to accrue at
Federal intervention in the form of a nation-wide SBC or RPS aiming for
penetration rates well above this rate.
targets of ten to twenty percent by 2020 would expand the diversity of technologies used to
access renewable resources. IMPROVING ENERGY SECURITY Second, larger penetration rates are needed to
ensure energy security. This is because the geographical dispersion of generators not only
improves their overall reliability; it makes them more secure--and thus resilient to accidental
power outages and failure, or intentional attack and disruption. Notwithstanding intense media focus on the security
dangers from nuclear reactors and natural gas facilities, the nation's power grid represents an equally serious threat to energy
security. The security issues facing the modern electric utility grid are almost as serious as they are invisible. For example, in 1975
the New World Liberation Front bombed assets of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company more than ten times, and members of the Ku
Klux Klan and San Joaquin Militia have been convicted of attempting to attack electricity infrastructure. 23 Internationally, organized
paramilitaries such as the Farabundo-Marti National Liberation Front were able to interrupt more than ninety percent of electric
Some caution that all it would take to
service in El Salvador and even had manuals for attacking power systems. 24
cause a "cascade of power failures across the country," costing billions of dollars in direct and
indirect damage, is a few motivated people with minivans and a couple of mortars and balloons,
which they would use to chaff substations and disrupt transmission lines. 25 A deliberate,
aggressive, well-coordinated assault on the electric power grid could devastate the electricity
sector. Replacement time would be "on the order of Iraq," not "on the order of a lineman putting
things up a pole." 26 Several recent trends in the electric utility industry have increased the vulnerability of its infrastructure.
To improve their operational efficiency, many utilities and system operators have increased their reliance on automation and
computerization. Low margins and various competitive priorities have encouraged industry consolidation, with fewer and bigger
facilities and intensive use of assets in one place. As the National Research Council noted, "control is more centralized, spare parts
Federal promotion of
inventories have been reduced, and subsystems are highly integrated across the entire business." 27
renewable energy on a national scale can improve the security of the grid by decentralizing
electricity generation. Even when renewable resources like wind and solar are concentrated, the
tendency for them to produce power in incremental and modular amounts makes it much more
difficult to disrupt large segments of generation. The International Energy Agency has noted that
centralized energy facilities create significant targets for terrorism because attacking a few
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
51/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
facilities can cause large power outages. 28 In contrast to the security risks of large centralized generators,
modular and distributed energy systems
decentralizing energy facilities and providing power through more
minimizes the risk of accidents and grid failures, and does not require transporting or storing
hazardous or radioactive materials. Analysts have tended to refer to renewable energy systems
(and other forms of distributed generation such as fuel cells and small-scale cogeneration units) as "supple" power technologies
because they are modular suited to dispersed siting. 29 A national RPS or SBC promoting renewables could
greatly contribute to the overall security of the nation's electric infrastructure by forcing more
technologies into the portfolio of all American utilities.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
52/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Blackouts Solvency
RPS solves blackouts by diversifying and expanding energy
Sovacool 8 (Benjamin, A Matter of Stability and Equity, Energy & Environment 19.2, IgentaConnect, AG)

A national RPS must ensure that the ultimate penetration of renewable energy technologies is
sufficient by setting a target above 20 percent by 2020 and 25 percent by 2025. This is because, contrary to
what some opponents of renewable energy assert, the variability of renewable resources becomes easier to
manage the more they are deployed.
For instance, electrical and power systems engineers have long held the principle that the larger a system becomes,
the less reserve capacity it needs. Demand variations between individual consumers are mitigated by grid
interconnection in exactly this manner. When a single electricity consumer, for example, starts drawing more electricity than the
system has allocated for each consumer, the strain on the system is insignificant because so many consumers are drawing from the
grid that it is entirely likely another consumer will be drawing less to make up the difference. This “averaging” works in a similar
fashion on the supply side of the grid. Individual wind turbines average out each other in electricity supply.
[34] So when the wind is not blowing through one wind farm, it is likely blowing harder through another.
The European Wind Energy Association explains how the smaller unit size and larger
geographical dispersion of wind turbines actually turns the variability of wind power into an
advantage over large, conventional systems:
Variations in wind energy are smoother, because there are hundreds or thousands of units
rather than a few large power stations, making it easier for the system operator to predict
and manage changes in supply as they appear within the overall system. The system will
not notice the shutdown of a 2 MW wind turbine. It will have to respond to the shutdown of a
500 MW coal fired plant or a 1,000 MW nuclear plant instantly. [35]
The catch is that penetration of renewable energy technologies has to be large enough to achieve these benefits of diversification,
Because the technical availability of one wind turbine rivals that of a
generally above 20 percent. [36]
single conventional power plant, wind farms of hundreds or thousands of turbines have even
greater reliability (since it is very unlikely that all turbines would be down at the same time). [37] Analysts have already
confirmed the benefit of wind power’s greater technical availability in the United States. Indeed, a November 2006 study assessing
thewidespread use of wind power in Minnesota concluded that “wind generation does make a
calculable contribution to system reliability” by decreasing the risk of large, unexpected outages,
but only if renewable energy penetration is substantial. [38]
Moreover, increasing the penetration of renewable energy above 20 percent improves the diversification of the electric utility grid
in another dimension. Under a national RPS, intermittent generators are not only likely to be geographically dispersed but also
a national RPS would expand the diversity of technologies used to
technologically dispersed. That is,
access renewable resources. Technological dispersion increases system reliability by decreasing
dependence on any one intermittent source of energy. Utilities can harness wind on windy days,
sun on sunny days, hydropower on rainy days, and so on.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
53/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Solvency—A2 RPS BAD

They can’t win offense—there’s only a risk a national RPS fixes the distortions by
existing state RPS policies
Cooper 8 (Christopher, A National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Politically Correct or Just Plain Correct?, Electricity journal 21.5,
ScienceDirect, AG)

If an RPS were required to be all things to all people, none would ever pass muster. In truth, a
national RPS would be designed primarily to correct market distortions (many of which are created by
imposing a patchwork of inconsistent state RPS policies on an interstate electricity market), to introduce some uniformity and
Like most RPS
predictability into the renewable energy market, and to help diversify the nation's electricity fuel mix.
opponents, Michaels assesses the efficacy of a national RPS as if it exists in a vacuum, ignoring
the inconvenient truth that 25 states and Washington, DC, have adopted binding RPS policies,
none of which is like the other and all of which distort the efficient functioning of an increasingly
interstate electricity market. Indeed, Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and I have argued previously in this Journal that, “the most
compelling argument for federal action is that a national RPS may help correct many of the
market distortions brought about by a patchwork of inconsistent state actions.”3 A national RPS
would diminish conflicts over RPS-eligible fuels, reduce uncertainty over the duration of state RPS
policies,4 and eliminate inequities created by “free rider” states that enjoy artificially low
electricity prices while other states pay to clean up the effects of cheap, dirty fuels.5 Nowhere does
Michaels refute any of these more complex arguments in favor of federal intervention. A national market for renewable
energy requires a more expansive market with uniform trading rules that can only be established
through federal action.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
54/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Solvency—general
National RPS effectively benefits consumers, utilities, and states decreasing costs and
increasing healthy environments
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

Politicians and real estate moguls are fond of referring to things as “win-win” situations. The truth
is most important policy decisions involve winners and losers; benefits that accrue to one group
often come at the expense of another. Every so often, constituencies align like the stars and
policymakers are faced with a true “win-win” situation. A properly designed national RPS is one of
those rare choices. When compared to conflicting state-based RPS policies and their impact on
energy markets and electricity pricing, it is easy to find that a federal mandate could benefit
ratepayers and regulated utilities in several unique ways that most policy advocates have not
even considered. A National RPS Benefits U.S. Consumers A national RPS would decrease
consumer electricity prices by: • Decreasing the cost of fossil fuels used to generate electricity •
Decreasing the cost of natural gas used to heat and power homes • Decreasing the cost of
transmission congestion • Protecting against rate hikes to recover infrastructure investments and
stranded costs • Preventing predatory trade-offs that require some ratepayers to subsidize
others A National RPS Benefits Regulated Utilities A national RPS decreases regulatory
compliance costs by: • Reducing the need for costly litigation to clarify vague and competing
state regulations • Lowering the administrative costs associated with inconsistent state
standards • Making regulations more predictable to ease planning of resource investments •
Creating economies of scale that decrease the cost of renewable energy technologies • Giving
utilities greater flexibility in meeting RPS mandates by expanding the market of eligible
renewable resources. • Decreasing the cost of RECs by creating a uniform national market •
Encouraging the tracking of greenhouse gas emissions reductions before the implementation of a
national carbon cap-and-trade program A national RPS increases utility profits by: • Maximizing
the “hedge” benefits of renewable energy investments • Decreasing construction cost overruns
and encouraging more modular generation • Decreasing transportation costs associated with
fossil fuel supply chains • Overcoming public opposition to new transmission infrastructure •
Speeding cost recovery of transmission investments • Reducing the need for expensive reserve
capacity • Creating a level playing field that rewards strategic investment, rather than location A
national RPS benefits American industry A national RPS would help American companies by: •
Producing thousands of new manufacturing, installation and maintenance companies and
encouraging thousands of existing companies to expand into the burgeoning renewable
technology manufacturing sector. • Creating more new jobs for American workers in the same
states that have lost the most manufacturing jobs • Decreasing the number of sick days workers
take because of illnesses related to power plant air pollution and accidents related to the mining,
transportation and processing of fossil fuels and uranium. • Increasing total consumer income by
up to $8.2 billion by 2020 • Enhancing U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) $10.2 billion by 2020 A
national RPS benefits American taxpayers A national RPS would provide secondary
environmental and social benefits by: • Conserving substantial amounts of water in drought-
prone areas • Decreasing the number of premature deaths and illnesses related to power plant
air pollution and transportation and storage accidents • Offsetting millions of tons of greenhouse
gasses that contribute to global warming • Reducing the amount of America’s wilderness than is
consumed to generate electricity using fossil fuels and nuclear power Given such obvious and
overwhelming advantages, it is hard to believe that many utilities and policymakers diligently
oppose a federal RPS mandate, repeating myths that have long since been debunked. Largely,
the remaining objections to federal intervention constitute a (diminishing) series of canards that
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
55/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
mischaracterize a national RPS policy as an unnecessary federal intervention in a relatively free
market. Forgetting that a majority of states are well on their way to imposing their own clunky,
overlapping, inconsistent, competing and sometimes irrational mess of mandates, opponents of
a national RPS wheel out these war-torn myths every time the issue is considered:
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
56/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Solvency—A2 Inequity
Inequities won’t occur—utilities are consolidated
Cooper 8 (Christopher, A National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Politically Correct or Just Plain Correct?, Electricity journal 21.5,
ScienceDirect, AG)

The consolidation of a national electricity holdings market renders as nonsense the argument
that a national RPS would benefit some states at the cost of others. Since a properly designed
national RPS would require all load-serving entities (including publicly owned utilities, municipal
utilities, and electric cooperatives) – not individual states – to meet RPS mandates, the burdens
and benefits of a national program are likely to reflect the emerging interstate nature of the U.S.
electricity market. Moreover, with increased consolidation of the electricity market, a federal mandate is far less
likely to create inequities than requiring companies to be subject to competing regulations of any
state in which they have holdings. One recent incident illustrates how utilities are becoming caught in the middle of
these emerging state conflicts.

A national RPS benefits all states


Cooper 8 (Christopher, A National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Politically Correct or Just Plain Correct?, Electricity journal 21.5,
ScienceDirect, AG)

Union of Concerned Scientists used the NEMS model and EIA's own projections of
In 2005, the
natural gas prices to assess the economic impact of a 20 percent federal RPS by 2020. UCS
found that consumers in the West South Central region (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas) would save the most ($13.3
billion). Consumers in New England would save the least (a mere $1.4 billion). Even the states of the East South Central region
(Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi) would realize savings of up to $1.6 billion as a result of lower natural gas prices and
improved reliability.55 Indeed, every state would benefit from a national RPS because: • All regions would
see lower fossil fuel prices. Several studies have documented that an increase in renewable energy production would
decrease demand on tight supplies of natural gas and coal.56 Resources for the Future found that a 1 percent reduction in natural gas
demand can reduce its price from up to 2.5 percent in the long term.57 In Pennsylvania, where more than 90 percent of electricity
comes from coal and uranium, a study conducted by Black & Veatch determined that a statewide RPS of 10 percent by 2015 would
lower both the consumption and price of coal. The study noted that even a 1 percent reduction in fossil fuel prices would save the
state $140 million per year by 2015.58 • All regions have renewable resources. Even in the Southeast, where
regulated utilities often claim there is a dearth of available renewable resources, recent research has found commercially significant
wind resources offshore in the Gulf of Mexico and the South Atlantic.59 According to the National Hydro Association, the Southeast
also has the potential to add 2,941 MW of incremental hydropower at existing dams, an amount second only to the Northwest/Rocky
Mountain region.60 A preliminary study undertaken by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) also found approximately 900 MW of
energy available in from wind, biomass, solar, and incremental hydroelectric that could be “cost competitively” developed by in the
Southeast.61 And a study by the University of Tennessee suggests that forest and agricultural by-products alone could generate up to
22.2 billion kWh of electricity in TVA's service area at competitive prices.62 • A national market creates economies of
scale that reduce the cost of renewable technologies. The cost of renewable energy, particularly wind, has
consistently decreased as the technology has been deployed.63 In their analysis of federal renewable energy programs, DOE's Office
of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) projects significant continued improvements in the competitiveness of wind
technology over the next decade. EERE forecasts cost reductions due to discounts for large-volume purchases of materials, parts and
components as well as from the “learning effects” that flow from deploying the technology to meet greater cumulative volume
levels.64 • A national REC trading market means that all regions can buy credits at the same price.
By providing a common definition of eligible resources and establishing uniform trading rules, a national RPS would allow renewable
generators to sell their RECs to retail suppliers anywhere. Regulated utilities have the option of investing in their own renewable
generation or purchasing RECs from suppliers that are able to generate renewable energy for the most competitive cost.65 Such an
expanded market would drive down the costs of RECs since supply would be pegged to demand organically rather than resulting from
conflicting, artificial geographical restrictions. • A national market more accurately values renewable
generation. NRECA has noted that state-RPS mandates are likely to raise electricity rates where renewable energy substitutes
for lower-cost products, as in Washington State, where a new mandate may force some forms of expensive renewable energy to
replace lower-cost hydropower.66 Not only would a national RPS prevent such a tradeoff, it would allow renewable energy to compete
with higher-cost electricity wherever its generation is most expensive. By expanding the market, a national RPS would increase
competition so that the value of wind energy from farms in Texas can be determined by its ability to compete with coal-fired power
plants in Missouri or nuclear reactors in Georgia. Price signals would flow unencumbered by the barricades erected by a state-based
system.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
57/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Solvency—A2 Inequity
Inequity is due to status quo state RPSs
Cooper 8 (Christopher, A National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Politically Correct or Just Plain Correct?, Electricity journal 21.5,
ScienceDirect, AG)

The Bush Administration officially rejects a national RPS on the grounds that it would create
inequities between states. But the irony is that, under the current system of state-based RPS
mandates, some states are paying for the improved environmental and security situation
enjoyed by all. While RPS states pick up the tab for cleaning the air and water and diversifying
the nation's electricity generation, other states enjoy artificially deflated electricity prices as they
tap cheap sources of energy that pollute the environment of their neighbors.

Employing a decentralized, state-by-state approach to address pollution that does not respect
state borders is remarkably challenging because upwind and upstream states do not suffer the
full burdens of their pollution and may have little incentive to act.34 Historically, some states have rejected
environmental protections when they believe that such policies would raise compliance costs and encourage industries to flee to less
stringent states. Meanwhile, cleaner air and more reliable power from renewable resources are enjoyed by all states, even though
long as
their costs are borne by only the few generators who have invested in renewable energy by choice or mandate.35 As
policymakers try to combat national problems using a state-by-state approach, state lawmakers
can use parochial interests to perpetuate the disparity.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
58/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Solvency—A2 Increases Gov’t
Plan minimizes government interventionism
Sovacool 8 (Benjamin, A Matter of Stability and Equity, Energy & Environment 19.2, IgentaConnect, AG)

A federal RPS would maximize administrative efficiency. Since an RPS lets the market decide
where best to deploy renewable energy technologies, it removes the need for market distortions
in the form of subsidies and tax credits. For instance, subsidy levels in California, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Rhode
Island range from 0.59 to 1.95 cents per kWh for wind and hydroelectric projects and 0.11 to 0.57 for landfill gas projects. [27] In
an RPS minimizes government involvement and encourages customers to pay producers
contrast,
directly for RPS benefits. The selection of winning technologies and bids is left to market forces
and competition, rather than government evaluation. [28]
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
59/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Solvency—2 Tiered Rps Advocate

A two-tiered RPS that creates two separate markets for production by utilities and for
consumption by states pulls states in a race to the top and prevents externalization of
pollutants to certain geographic areas
Shoock 7 – JD Fordham Law (Corey, 12 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 1011, AG)

Renewable energy is more than simply a business. For that reason, this Note proposes an end-user-oriented, demand-side Social RPS
to go along with the industry version. Fossil fuels are responsible for millions [*1072] of dollars in health care costs, 503 a host of
environmental and economic catastrophes, 504 and even national security vulnerabilities. 505 The push for a renewable portfolio
standard given this set of concerns necessarily requires a different mode of implementation from the business-centered standard.
The Industry RPS, its tailored execution structure notwithstanding, simply uses energy credits as
a means to act on those who sell power. 506 The Social RPS makes use of renewable energy
credits as well, but the relevant actors here are not utilities or independent power producers, but
American states. Through the commodification of energy credits, even in a scheme that backloads implementation, power
retailers that lack renewable assets will more often than those holding such assets choose to purchase credits on the market. 507 The
risk that the social costs of fossil fuel production will be increasingly concentrated in certain regions is significant. 508 Given that
renewable energy sources have geographic restraints, their production and distribution hubs will initially, in all likelihood, be sited at a
greater distance from end-users than their larger-market-share fossil fuel competitors. 509
[*1073] The Industry RPS only acts on businesses, not individuals and not geographic entities. 510
While the aggregate nation-wide market share of renewables would certainly increase under this
standard, its positive social benefits like lower emissions are not evenly spread out either
geographically or throughout the population. 511 Therefore, the Social RPS will seek to accomplish
the overall reduction of fossil fuel emissions across the board, not for the sake of the renewable
energy industry, but for the sake of health of its people and environment. To do so, it will have to
act on the states by mandating end-use consumption or purchase rates, rather than production
or sales rates. While matters relating to the consumption of energy could constitutionally be
justified as within the realm of the Commerce Clause, 512 this Note finds that the most effective
way to avoid legal challenge 513 and ensure the successful reduction of fossil fuel externalities is
to condition certain federal funding to the states on the timely compliance with the
standard. Just as Congress conditioned a percentage of federal highway aid for each state on the raising of its drinking age to 21
during the 1980s, 514 Congress would declare that it will release funding packages for highway,
education, homeland security, and all other necessary state aid only upon the certification of the
required number of renewable energy credits for that fiscal year.
As with the Industry RPS, the Social version will be implemented using a rate-compounding
formula to ensure that state legislatures have the opportunity to weigh their own options and
adjust over time. [*1074] Certainly, states could seek to carry the brunt of the purchasing and
consumption requirement on themselves through mandating renewable energy use on
government property. 515 A state could choose instead to regulate municipal utilities, 516 enact
their own RPS if they haven't done so already, or draft incentives for renewable energy producers
to move to their state. 517 In light of the disparate nature of states, their relative geographic advantages, and populations,
the Social RPS would necessarily have to be a lower standard, enacted more slowly than its commercially-oriented counterpart.
States which already have their own version of an RPS are not restricted in any way from
enforcing it, as long as the state does not drop below the mandates consumption/ purchase floor
set by the federal Social RPS. 518
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
60/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Solvency—20% Best
Twenty percent RPS is most cost effective—consensus proves
Nogee 7 – Clean Energy Program Director with the Union of Concerned Scientists (Alan et al, The Projected Impacts of a National
Renewable Portfolio Standard, Electricity Journal 20.4, ScienceDirect, AG)

Using UCS assumptions for renewable energy technologies, average consumer natural gas prices
would be lower than business as usual in nearly every year of the forecast under the 20 percent
RPS, with an average annual reduction of 1.5 percent. In addition, average consumer electricity prices would be lower than business
as usual in every year of the forecast, with an average annual reduction of 1.8 percent. As a result, the 20 percent RPS would save
consumers $49.1 billion on their electricity and natural gas bills by 2020 (Figure 1).19 All sectors of the economy would benefit, with
commercial, industrial, and residential customers’ total savings reaching $19.1 billion, $17.4 billion, and $12.6 billion, respectively.
With UCS running NEMS using EIA's assumptions unmodified, the results showed that a 20
percent RPS would still reduce gas and electricity prices. Cumulative savings to electricity customers under a 20
percent RPS totaled $15.4 billion by 2020, with cumulative savings to gas consumers of an additional $11.6 billion, for a total savings
of more than $27 billion. A 10 percent renewable standard would save less money than the 20 percent
scenario. In the UCS scenario, consumers would save almost $28.2 billion on their electricity and natural gas bills by 2020, with
the savings continuing to grow to $37.7 billion by 2025. EIA's own analysis found that the 10 percent RPS would save consumers
energy bills would be
$22.6 billion by 2025.20 National RPS scenarios using either UCS or EIA assumptions also show that
reduced in every region of the country, including the Southeast, where some people have suggested there is limited
low-cost renewable energy potential (Table 1). This is primarily due to the lower natural gas prices for electricity generation and other
direct gas consumers that all regions would see. In addition, all regions do have some renewable energy resources, and would likely
the
see an increase in using local resources for generation that would often displace the need for importing fossil fuel. Furthermore,
national credit trading market created by a national RPS would allow utilities in all regions to
purchase RECs for the same price, providing utilities with negotiating leverage over local
renewable generators. The strong relationship between renewable energy generation, and natural gas demand and prices is
further supported by a 2005 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBL) study, which reviewed 13
analyses using different computer models and assumptions. The analyses all confirmed that renewable energy
(and energy efficiency) could reduce gas demand and put downward pressure on natural gas prices and bills by displacing gas-fired
found that the higher the level of renewable energy penetration, the
electricity generation. The report also
more gas is saved, and the more gas prices are reduced. Furthermore, LBL's study shows how these
results are broadly consistent with economic theory, with results from other energy models, and with limited
empirical evidence.21
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
61/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Solvency—A2 Leakage

The benefits of innovation and modeling outweigh the risk of pollutant leakage to
unregulated areas
Wiener 7 – Professor of Law, Environmental Policy, and Public Policy at Duke (Jonathan, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1961, AG)

Leakage may be less severe


[*1971] One effect of local emissions limitations, however, works in the opposite direction.
(and prior studies may overstate its magnitude) if enough new technology is generated in the
regulating country (or state) and if this technology diffuses to sources in the unregulated
countries (or states). 27 One study of endogenous technological change estimated that, with very high price elasticities, the
technological innovation and diffusion effect can even outweigh the price-driven leakage effect
so that net leakage from subglobal GHG regulation becomes negative - that is, regulation to
reduce emissions in one country can induce net abatement and emissions reduction in
unregulated countries. 28 Thus, the degree of net leakage is an empirical question and depends
importantly on the type of technologies developed and diffused in response to emissions limitations.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
62/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Solvency—RPS solves foreign fuels imports
Federal RPS allows interstate commerce which solves dependence on foreign fossil
fuels
Sovacool 8 (Benjamin, A Matter of Stability and Equity, Energy & Environment 19.2, IgentaConnect, AG)

all states currently import some of their fossil fuels. Surprisingly, Georgia imports coal
Additionally,
from Kentucky, Virginia, and Venezuela; Florida from Columbia and South Africa; Virginia from
Kentucky and Canada. The promotion of a federal RPS would help replace such imports with a
domestic supply of non-interruptible fuel. It would also be more equitable and democratic as it
would minimize the release of toxic pollutants into these areas. The southeast states lead the country in terms
of electricity consumption per capita, as well as carbon dioxide emissions and air pollution. The benefits of less global warming and
cleaner air are not state problems, and it is a mistake to approach them through a state-based RPS market.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
63/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Solvency—A2 Wind cancels out other tech
Wind would not dominate the RECs—all technologies would be promoted
Sovacool 8 (Benjamin, A Matter of Stability and Equity, Energy & Environment 19.2, IgentaConnect, AG)

opponents of a national RPS often argue that since a federal RPS would induce least cost
Finally,
compliance, most utilities would only select the least cost renewable energy technology. Since the
renewable energy technology with the lowest levelized cost tends to be wind, this had led some to conclude that a federal RPS would
While this argument makes sense,
create less diversification because it would only advance large-scale wind projects.
the historical record seems to disprove it. State RPS programs have already promoted significant
diversification of electrical generators. Power retailers have installed 555 MW of wind, landfill
gas, hydroelectric, geothermal, biomass, and photovoltaic systems to meet RPS requirements in
California, but rely on around 30 MW of wind in New York, 3 MW of landfill gas in Illinois, and 1 MW of photovoltaics in Montana.
[63] In Pennsylvania, it is estimated that by 2015 their RPS will be met by a diverse least-cost portfolio comprised of wind, biomass,
the Tellus Institute
hydroelectric, digester gas, and landfill gas projects. [64] And in their projections of a national RPS,
argued that wind would fulfill only around half the national requirement, with the remaining
majority coming from geothermal, biomass and solar resources. [65] Even the EIA projected in
2006 that a 20 percent clean energy standard by 2020 would likely be met by a diverse set of
resources. While the study included advanced nuclear and clean coal resources, it estimated that the standard would promote
118 billion kWh of biomass, 90 billion kWh of wind, 42 billion kWh of geothermal, 33 billion kWh of landfill gas, and 6 billion kWh of
solar photovo
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
64/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Solvency—Wind
RPS encourages wind use and saves money
Shoock 7 – JD Fordham Law (Corey, 12 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 1011, AG)

a wind energy production


Notwithstanding the fact that in certain regions wind is in fact the low-cost option, 397
presence within the purview of a utility grid manager can be a boon. 398 For instance, wind power, like all
renewables, can help offset the risks of supply shortages in fossil fuels. 399 Additionally, since wind
power can be added incrementally, excess capacity costs are limited. 400 The inherent [*1058]
disadvantage of the remoteness of wind facilities can actually be turned into an infrastructural
benefit as electricity generation outposts situated throughout the grid can reduce the risks of
voltage concentration and overload in the production areas, thereby reducing maintenance costs.
401 Furthermore, any government action on either the state or federal level to penalize distributors for creating pollution would make
if the utility was faced with meeting a
a renewable energy production facility a cost-saving asset. 402 The same is true
renewable portfolio standard that mandated it sell a certain quantity of electricity derived from
non-polluting sources. 403
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
65/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Solvency—A2 market solves wind
The market can’t solve without RPS
American Wind Energy Association October 1997
(http://www.awea.org/policy/rpsbrief.html) [S. Page]
Even "perfectly competitive" markets have inherent imperfections that are well-established in
economic theory. The combination of the following market barriers will serve as powerful
hindrances to renewables: Externalities: Fossil fuel generators pollute the air but do not have
to pay for the local, regional, and global damage caused by their emissions. Renewable energy
does not pollute but, in unregulated markets, will receive no credit for the damages they
prevent. Public Goods: The price stability, environmental, and economic benefits of renewable
energy resources are ones that accrue to the public at large, not directly to the purchasing
consumer. This "free rider" phenomenon can be expected to deter consumers from
volunteering to pay a little more for renewables since their purchase will benefit other, non-
contributing consumers as much as it will them. Thus, while a "green market" of some size
may develop, it is likely to be far smaller than what is required to significantly diversify the
nation's electricity supply and than what might be expected given the strong public support
that renewables enjoy. Transactions Costs: Under retail competition, there will be high
transactions costs associated with reaching consumers who are willing to pay for the public
benefits of renewables. In addition, the market reality will be that -- absent the long-term
contracts that have supported virtually all existing renewable energy projects, but which will
be very rare in competitive markets -- investors will have very short investment horizons. In
markets that will be characterized by short-term energy sales and price volatility, investors will
prefer low-capital-cost technologies with short payback times. Financing for capital-intensive
renewable energy projects will be expensive and difficult to obtain, even if they produce more
cost-effective power over their lifetimes. Without a strong, long-term renewable energy policy,
it is quite possible that the amount of renewable energy serving the U.S. could decline from
current levels, rather than increase as it should. The risk of such a possibility is too great to
take, given the importance of achieving a more diverse, economically and environmentally
sound electricity supply.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
66/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Solvency—A2 Winning & Losing Regions
All regions benefit from RPS
Sovacool 8 (Benjamin, A Matter of Stability and Equity, Energy & Environment 19.2, IgentaConnect, AG)

Opponents often make the argument that a federal RPS would hurt utilities that continue to rely
predominately on coal, natural gas, or uranium to generate electricity. For instance, if the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA), a large, southeastern utility that uses mostly coal and nuclear power-were to meet a 10 percent RPS by 2020, it
would need to produce 19.7 billion kWh from renewable resources. To meet this obligation, TVA would have to expand their Green
Power Switch program fully 250 times its current size by 2020. [58] This has provoked TVA, along with many other utilities, to argue
that a federal RPS would force them to raise costs and rates, and would put them at a competitive disadvantage to other power
providers.
However, a preliminary study undertaken by TVA found approximately 900 MW equivalent energy
from wind, biomass, solar, and incremental hydroelectric facilities that could be “cost
competitively” developed. [59] Furthermore, a study undertaken by the University of Tennessee found that the TVA
region featured extensive incremental hydroelectric, biomass, and waste gas potential. The study
suggested, for instance, that forest residues, agricultural residues, and energy crops alone could provide 22.2 billion kWh of
electricity. It also concluded that TVA possessed a significant number of landfills and wastewater treatment plants where methane
could be easily captured to produce electricity. [60]
In Pennsylvania, where more than 90 percent of electricity comes from coal and nuclear resources, a study conducted by Black &
The
Veatch concluded that a 10 percent state-wide RPS by 2015 would have virtually no negative consequences for consumers.
study found that such an RPS would result in $10.1 billion more output, including $2.8 billion in
earnings and 85,000 more jobs, as well as serving to depress fossil fuel prices and consumption, further lowering prices.
The study noted that even just a 1 percent reduction in fossil fuel prices would lead to a $140 million reduction in fossil fuel
expenditures for the state, or roughly half of the estimated RPS cost premium in 2015. [61]
a 2005 UCS study concluded that all regions would benefit from a national RPS. The
Similarly,
study differed from earlier assessments in two ways: it compared the least cost of electricity to
the retail price of electricity, and looked not at technical potential but effective load carrying
capability, which reflects the match between output and peak electricity demand. Assessing a 20
by 20 federal RPS using these concepts and dividing the country into ten regions, the study found that consumers
would save the most ($13.3 billion) in the West South Central (including states such as Texas and Arkansas) but would still save $1.6
billion in the South Central (including states such as Tennessee and Alabama).
The study also noted that all regions
would see lower natural gas prices for electricity and direct gas consumers, and that, unlike fossil
fuels, all regions have extensive renewable resources. Furthermore, the study suggested that a national credit
trading market means that all regions can buy RECs for the same price, giving larger utilities negotiating
power over local generators, and achieving economies of scale that would reduce the cost of RECs nationwide. [62]
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
67/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Solvency—At: RPS causes winners/losers
RPS prevents “winners and losers” by evening out the playing field with RECs
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

Myth #1: A national RPS would create “winners and losers” Truth: All states have renewable
resources they can affordably develop. However, under the current system of state mandates,
some RPS states are “losers” by subsidizing the cheap, polluting electricity in non-RPS states.
Other RPS states are victims to inconsistencies between state mandates that produce perverse
predatory trade-offs and require them to export their cheap in-state renewable electricity to
other states in exchange for more expensive electricity or renewable energy credits. A national
mandate would level the playing field by creating consistent, uniform rules and by allowing
utilities to purchase RECs or develop renewable resources anywhere they are cost competitive.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
68/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Solvency—solves gas/oil need
National RPS would displace coal, gas, and nuclear power
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

A national RPS would displace coal and natural gas. In a 2002 assessment of a 10% national
RPS, the Department f Energy determined that “the imposition of a national RPS would lead to
lower generation from natural gas and coal facilities.” Analysts have confirmed this trade-off in
RPS states like Michigan, New York, Virginia, and Texas. • Renewable energy offsets nuclear
power. Studies from Michigan, North Carolina, and Oregon found that renewable generation
displaces new nuclear reactors and decreases the mining of uranium.

National RPS would reduce CO2 emissions and ensure clean air
American Wind Energy Association (“Federal RPS Factsheet,” 2007,
http://www.awea.org/legislative/pdf/Federal_RPS_Factsheet.pdf)

Helps Achieve Cleaner Air: Adopting a national RPS of 20 percent by 2020 can help reduce
emissions of harmful air pollutants and of carbon dioxide (a leading greenhouse gas). Wind
power offsets other, more polluting sources of energy. That is important because electricity
generation is the largest industrial source of air pollution in the U.S. When wind power projects
generate electricity, fuel at other power plants is not consumed. A UCS study found that a 20
percent RPS would reduce carbon dioxide CO2 emissions by 434 million metric tons per year
by 2020 – a reduction of 15% below “business-as-usual levels”, equivalent to taking nearly 71
million cars off the road.4 A recent New York study found that if wind energy supplied only
10% (3,300 MW) of the state’s peak electricity demand, 65% of the energy it displaced would
come from natural gas, 15% from coal, 10% from oil, and 10% from electricity imports.5
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
69/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
States—A2 States solve now
Doubt statistics that underpin their state RPS solvency—they confuse correlation with
causation
Wiser 7 (Ryan et al, April, The Experience with Renewable Portfolio Standards in the United States, The Electricity Journal 20.4,
Elsevier, AG)

These estimates should be viewed with some caution. They track bulk non-hydro renewable
energy capacity installations, without confirmation that any given facility was constructed
because of a state RPS or was, in fact, even eligible for a given state's RPS. Further complicating
the estimation is that some states allow out-of-state generation to count toward their RPS
requirements, so renewable capacity built in a non-RPS state may be used to meet another
state's mandate. In fact, significant renewable installations have occurred in states without RPS
programs.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
70/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
States—Race to Bottom
Devolved action causes a race to the bottom due to externalities and the global
nature of pollutants—leakage to unregulated areas makes pollution worse
Wiener 7 – Professor of Law, Environmental Policy, and Public Policy at Duke (Jonathan, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1961, AG)

Even if these legal hurdles can be surmounted, there remains a high political hurdle for state-
level actions: because ghgs mix globally and have global impacts, local abatement actions pose
local costs, yet deliver essentially no local climate benefits. This in turn suggests that local
actions will often be difficult to enact. Each state (or country) has an incentive to free ride on other
states' (or countries') actions, enjoying the global benefits without bearing the local costs. The result
is underinvestment in abatement, unless cooperation can be organized. 17 Indeed, a "race to the bottom" is even
more likely in the case of a globally mixing pollutant with no local impacts, because local
decisions to relax regulations would reduce costs without incurring the local pollution harms
associated with conventional pollutants. Yet in fact we do see state-level actions being undertaken in the Northeast
and in California, as well as action by the European Union despite U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. Such action may look
worthwhile to those who think the costs are low, or favor emissions [*1966] reductions regardless of the costs, or favor a state
patchwork to motivate industry support for a federal (or global) regime, or perceive real costs but favor moving first in order to learn
by doing, or perceive real costs but favor action that would impose higher costs on other states or industries (raising rivals' costs), or
are governors or other high officials with broader political ambitions. The political coalitions in each state that help secure the
enactment of GHG limitations may reflect the combination of ambitious leaders with so-called "Baptists and bootleggers" 18
coalitions - environmentalists seeking to protect the climate, and industry segments (such as alternative energy sources) seeking to
raise their rivals' costs. 19 II. Normative Disadvantages of State-Level Actions But even if these legal and political obstacles can be
overcome (and it seems that they are being overcome to some degree, though challenges still await in California and in RGGI), there
No matter where they are emitted,
remains the normative question - whether these state-level actions are desirable.
ghgs mix globally in the atmosphere and have global impacts. The benefits of emissions
abatement are therefore shared globally. Climate protection is a global public good, and the challenge is to produce
this global public good via the consent of heterogeneous national actors. Subnational state-level actions will have a
small impact on the global picture, and could even be perverse. Each state of the United States -
even California - contributes a small share of global GHG emissions. Certainly, no state could
effectively control its own ambient level of carbon dioxide or other ghgs, because that ambient
level is determined by the worldwide concentration of ghgs in the atmosphere. This shows, incidentally,
why regulation of carbon dioxide under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and State Implementation Plans (sips) of
Clean Air Act sections 109 and 110 would likely fail if carbon dioxide were listed as a "pollutant" by the EPA under section 108 of the
Clean Air Act. No SIP could, on its own, attain a serious NAAQS for ghgs without international cooperation. The problem is not whether
carbon dioxide [*1967] qualifies as a pollutant, but that state-based ambient standards are a mismatch with a globally mixing GHG.
20 Only international cooperation on emissions limitations can effectively reduce ambient concentrations. Even the Kyoto Protocol is
not sufficiently global, because it omits emissions limits on the world's largest sources - the United States and China, as well as
Australia, India, Brazil, and others. When the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in 1997, developing countries were forecast to surpass
industrialized countries in carbon dioxide emissions by about 2030. 21 Subsequent studies have moved that date ever closer - so
much so that China is now forecast to surpass the United States in carbon dioxide emissions by 2009. 22 The net effect of the Kyoto
Protocol on global emissions and concentrations may thus be quite modest. Subglobal action (and, a fortiori, subnational
action) to reduce ghgs has several disadvantages. First, because the sources of ghgs are globally widespread,
even ubiquitous, in every country and every sector of the economy, subglobal regulatory coverage fails to control
important sources of pollutants. Second, it forfeits the greater cost savings obtainable in a larger
allowance trading market encompassing more countries. Third, it raises the likelihood of market
power being exercised by large players in the smaller allowance trading market. And, fourth,
perhaps most important, it suffers from cross-border "leakage" of emissions: subglobal regulatory
coverage encourages source activities to shift or "leak" to unregulated areas over time. Leakage
results from the movement of three levers: a price effect, a "slack off" effect, and a capital relocation effect. The price effect [*1968]
operates in the short term, without any relocation of industry. Consider action by only one country to limit GHG emissions, by conserving energy or protecting
forests. Emissions abatement in Country A would reduce the demand for fossil fuels in Country A, lowering the world market price for such fuels and thereby increasing the
quantity demanded in Country B (a country not regulating its emissions). Similarly, restricting forest clearing in Country A would restrict timber supply and raise the world market
price for timber, inducing an increase in the quantity of timber harvested in Country B. Prices also affect trade in emissions-intensive products: as Country A restricts its
emissions, the price of emissions-intensive goods produced within Country A will rise and the quantity will decrease. Unregulated producers in Country B will respond by
increasing their production of these emissions-intensive goods, both for domestic consumption and for export to Country A. The magnitude of these effects depends on the price
elasticities of the emissions-intensive activities (i.e., how much the activity levels change in response to price changes) and on the degree of
integration of world markets for the relevant goods and services. The "slack off" effect is a response to changing national net
benefits. In the absence of a treaty, Country A might undertake some abatement, just to the point where its (small) domestic share of
if Country A
the global marginal benefits equals its domestic marginal costs of abatement. Country B would do likewise. But
begins to abate its own emissions more aggressively, some additional global protection would be
obtained, and the marginal benefit to Country B of its own abatement efforts would be
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
71/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
diminished slightly (on the standard assumption of diminishing marginal benefits of protection),
so that the domestically rational degree of abatement in Country B would fall. Hence, as some
states emit less, other states rationally emit more. Finally, in the longer term, restrictions on
emissions in Country A could induce emissions-intensive industries to uproot and relocate
facilities to unregulated Country B in order to produce their products at lower cost and export
their products to world markets (including back to the regulated country). The extent of this relocation
effect depends on the openness to trade and investment flows of the world economy, and on the marginal cost of the emissions
constraint relative to the marginal cost of relocating. I have illustrated these examples using hypothetical Countries A and B. The
same analysis applies a fortiori to action by a single state of the United States. Indeed, states of the United States are
likely to [*1969] be even more vulnerable to leakage than are many countries in the
international arena. First, individual states are more fully integrated into the open trade of the
national American market (as well as international markets) than are some countries. For example, for U.S. states, a major
concern is that electricity supply would shift immediately and seamlessly from regulated in-state
sources to unregulated out-of-state sources connected to the same shared electrical transmission
grid. This type of leakage may not be as serious a concern for countries with their own delimited national electricity systems.
Second, the Dormant Commerce Clause may place more stringent restrictions on U.S. states'
efforts to restrict or tax emissions-intensive imports from other states than those imposed by
GATT/WTO trade disciplines on countries' efforts to do the same internationally.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
72/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
States—A2 State Model
States aren’t modeled
Wiener 7 – Professor of Law, Environmental Policy, and Public Policy at Duke (Jonathan, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1961, AG)

proliferation of different GHG policies and allowance markets


Second, the flip side of experimentation is that a
in different states - and across countries - may generate conflicting approaches and vested interests
that are difficult to reconcile and mesh in a larger national or international regime. Differences
across state policies may impede collaborative linking among states (such as RGGI or a group of western
states), which the states would like to arrange in order to reduce leakage and expand their trading
market. So whatever states do, there must be the latitude for a federal law, an interstate compact, or a treaty to revamp the
system, and the expectation among parties that this may well occur. Ultimately, of course, we may learn from the states' experiments
that it is better not to adopt some policies.

Fed won’t model states


Sovacool 7 (Benjamin and Jack Barkenbus, Necessary but Insufficient, Environment 49.6, Ebsco, AG)

In the last 10 years—from 1997 to 2006—federal bills promoting RPS were introduced in
Congress 17 times.12 In addition, 102 legislative proposals dealing with climate change have
been introduced from 1997 to 2004.13 All have been beaten back by Republican-dominated
Congresses. It is safe to say, therefore, that considerable state action in both cases has arisen
not because of some judgment that statebased action is optimal or preferable but rather
because of the perceived policy vacuum at the federal level.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
73/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
States—uniformity

Unifomity among states is impossible due to varying interpretations—this makes


interstate cooperation impossible and turns away investors
Sovacool 8 (Benjamin, A Matter of Stability and Equity, Energy & Environment 19.2, IgentaConnect, AG)

Perhaps most important, the country needs federal action to harmonize inconsistent state
definitions concerning eligible resources, purchase requirements, and obligations. Each state
defines “renewable” resources differently, creating confusion among investors and utilities that
must operate in multiple states at once. For instance, Maine’s standard includes fuel cells and high efficiency
cogeneration, Pennsylvania’s coal gasification and distributed generation, and Hawaii’s energy efficiency practices. Photovoltaic
(solar) panels do not count in Minnesota; solar thermal does not count in Iowa; methane does not count in Maine; small hydroelectric
does not count in New Jersey, and nothing except solar thermal and photovoltaics count in Arizona. In Massachusetts, only new
systems in operation after 1997 meet the standard, in Texas it is 1999, and in Iowa, it does not matter. Maine sets an upper limit of
100 megawatts (MW) while other states limit eligible resources to between 5 and 20 MW. Wisconsin set a 2.2 percent standard by
2011; New York 25 percent by 2013, Delaware 10 percent by 2019; Rhode Island 16 percent by 2020; and Washington, DC 11 percent
by 2022. [6] Pennsylvania and Connecticut exempt some suppliers—such as publicly owned utilities or large utilities that offer default
service—from their RPS requirements, and the duration of the standards in Arizona and Maine are unclear and may expire.
Furthermore, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Maryland divide eligible resources into separate tiers and offer credit multipliers for
different technologies. New Jersey’s standard features a carve-out that mandates at least 90 MW and 1,500 MW must come from
solar by 2008 and 2020, respectively. [7] Iowa, Minnesota, and Texas base their purchase requirements on installed capacity, whereas
other states base theirs on electricity sales. Colorado sets a cost cap that electricity costs cannot increase more than 50 cents per
month in a customer’s bill, yet New Mexico and Nevada have no “safety valve.” Arizona and Hawaii offer no REC trading systems,
California and Colorado have a REC system under development, Maine and Rhode Island trade credits under the New England Power
Pool, and Montana and New York offer REC trading only as long as electricity is delivered directly to the state. [8] As if this was not
enough complexity, RPS compliance in California and New Mexico is at the discretion of the public utility commission, whereas Hawaii,
Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, and New Mexico have RPS where compliance is voluntary, vague, or unspecified. [9] Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania levy compliance fees on power marketers and utilities not meeting state RPS
requirements by charging them $45-55/MWh; Connecticut 5.5 cents per kilowatt hour (kWh) for every month a provider fails to
comply; Delaware 2.5 cents per kWh; and Texas has a non-compliance penalty equal to $50 per megawatt hour (MWh) (with annual
adjustment for inflation) or 200 percent the average market value of credits for the compliance period. [10] Inconsistencies over what
counts as renewable energy, when it has to come online, how large it has to be, where electricity must be delivered, and whether cost
caps, trading, and noncompliance penalties exist create additional transaction costs that must be borne by investors and utilities.
The state-by-state approach to RPS artificially inflates the cost of renewable energy by forcing
some utilities to rely on sub-optimal in-state resources and induce development of renewable
energy generators where they may not be most cost effective. Consider the situation in Washington and
Arizona. Because Washington’s RPS statute excludes hydropower as a “renewable energy” but
other state RPS mandates include it, Washington’s low-cost hydropower is sold to ratepayers in
neighboring states, while Washington consumers are forced to buy higher-cost renewable energy
from generators outside the state. [11] Arizona’s RPS mandate excludes geothermal power while Nevada and New
Mexico include it. This inconsistency gives rise to a scenario in which Arizona’s geothermal generation is exported to neighboring
states, while Arizona’s regulated utilities must either purchase more expensive solar, wind and biomass to meet the state’s mandate
or accept non-attainment of the RPS goal. [12] The differing state RPS targets and expiration dates of state policies can confuse
investors, who are then not able to obtain long term sales contracts, further hampering efforts to deploy renewable energy
technologies. As Ole Langniss and Ryan Wiser put it, “experience in several U.S. states ... shows that inadequate purchase
obligations, overly broad renewable energy eligibility guidelines, unclear regulatory rules, insufficient enforcement, and wavering
The confusion caused by differing state RPS
political support can all doom an RPS to certain failure.”[13]
requirements suggests that policymakers did not explicitly deliberate or agree upon their
goals. State inconsistency has engendered a situation where different interpretations
create very different outcomes, ultimately increasing costs for implementing agencies and
stakeholders. Why does such disparity exist? In most states, RPS reflect more a political compromise needed to get them passed
instead of an optimal policy mechanism to promote renewable energy. Some state standards were hastily drafted provisions that
formed part of political battles over electric utility industry restructuring. Others were tossed to politically weak environmental and
renewables lobbies to dress up larger financial benefits bestowed on utilities. In other cases, RPS were watered down by opposing
current renewable energy policymakers are forced to expend resources
political interests. [14] Regardless,
grappling with inconsistent or vague terminology, and the cumulative result is a situation liable
to court challenge and litigation. [15] Abrupt changes in renewable energy policy has deterred
investors, led companies into bankruptcy, complicated compliance measures, and made
interstate cooperation virtually impossible. [16] Federal harmonization is needed to
standardize varying state definitions of renewable energy, a prerequisite for any national
renewable energy trading market, and to send a clear signal to investors that they can invest in
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
74/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
those technologies meeting the definition.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
75/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
States—uniformity
Unifornity established under a federal RPS encourages investment
Cooper 8 (Christopher, A National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Politically Correct or Just Plain Correct?, Electricity journal 21.5,
ScienceDirect, AG)

Only tangentially does Michaels address the significant benefits that would result from creating uniform rules for trading renewable
energy credits (RECs) in a national market. While acknowledging that the price volatility of RECs under existing state programs makes
them useless for collateralizing debt, Michaels asserts simply that “there is no clear reason why a federal program would be
the volatile prices of state-based RECs results
different.” This statement appears counterintuitive on its face, since
almost entirely from the different compliance levels and enforcement regimes adopted by the 25
states with binding RPS policies. Multiple studies published in this very Journal explain how the
fluctuating prices of state RECs send unclear price signals to renewable energy investors about
the attractiveness of development activity.6 The lack of a real national market for RECs creates
an absence of liquidity and limits renewable energy investment capital.7 An efficient market for
renewable energy (and RECs) requires a more expansive market with some uniform trading rules
that can only be established through federal action. C. Third sin: Hampering interstate trade Contradictory
and imprecise definitions of “renewable energy” in state RPS mandates make deciding what
qualifies as a “renewable energy credit” exceedingly difficult. State-by-state differences and
restrictions have splintered the national renewable energy market into regional and state
markets with conflicting rules on the treatment and value of RECs. The state-by-state approach
to RPS is also creating unanticipated difficulties to the expansion of distributed generation
technologies. In just the Northeast, for example, the electricity wholesale market is controlled by three independent system
operators – ISO-NE (New England), NYISO (New York), and PJM (13 mid-Atlantic states). In August 2005, PJM launched its Generation
Attribute Tracking System (GATS) to monitor RECs between PJM member-states. While GATS will help facilitate a robust REC trading
market between PJM members, its convoluted rules hamper REC trading outside of its geographically defined service area.
Generators external to PJM, for instance, are allowed to trade RECs in the GATS market, but must qualify for one of the RPS policies of
a PJM member state and must be physically located adjacent to PJM geographical boundaries. However, some PJM member states
(Delaware, Maryland, and DC) impose an additional requirement that the electricity from renewable generators outside of PJM be
imported into the territory in order for external generators to freely trade RECs within their states.20 PJM member states also differ
conspicuously in their treatment of RECs from generators within the service area. In Maryland and Pennsylvania, generators are
allowed to bank their RECs for up to two years after the year of generation. But in Rhode Island, generators may only bank up to 30
percent of their compliance total (and then only if the banked RECs are in excess of the compliance total in the year of generation).
Contributing to the complexity, ISO-NE has its own REC trading market supported by the Generation Information System (GIS). GIS
sets stringent limits on who can trade within the ISO-NE region, regardless of the individual state RPS policies. GIS also requires that
generators operate in control areas that are directly adjacent to ISO-NE, further distorting the REC trading market. Generators in
NYISO, for example, can trade RECs in Massachusetts, but generators in PJM cannot. Connecticut further restricts REC trading to
generators actually within ISO-NE, but, to complicate matters even more, that restriction may expire in 2010. D. Fourth sin:
ambiguities within the statutes and unclear expiration targets have
Instigating litigation In many states,
created confusion among regulated utilities, resulting in protracted and expensive lawsuits. In
Massachusetts, a vague definition of “renewable resources” precipitated legal battles over whether hydroelectric facilities were
included in the standard or not.21 In New Mexico, ambiguity over whether the state's RPS applied to existing or new renewable
energy technologies prompted a lawsuit from El Paso Electric that went all the way to the New Mexico Supreme Court.22 A
particularly ugly legal battle arose from one utility's claim that Iowa's RPS mandate was inconsistent with existing federal statute. In
1984, MidAmerican Energy Company, the largest investor-owned utility in the state, challenged the legality of Iowa's RPS mandate on
the grounds that it obligated the utility to purchase power from renewable energy facilities at rates in excess of the avoided cost set
by the federal Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA).23 MidAmerican and the state of Iowa spent 15 years and countless
dollars locked in a heated legal battle before the issue was settled in 1999 (in favor of the utility).24 In many states, ambiguities
The legal morass
within the statutes and unclear expiration targets have created confusion among regulated utilities.
generated by state-based RPS strategies also can discourage renewable energy investments by
creating risky and unpredictable markets. While MidAmerican was busy fighting Iowa's RPS
statute in court, it was not installing new renewable capacity. Upon settlement of the dispute, however, the
company invested roughly 10 percent of its entire portfolio in 568 MW of new wind energy. Similarly, PacifiCorp held back on
Similar
investments in nearly 1,400 MW of renewable capacity throughout the nation until the situation in Iowa was resolved.25
delays in renewable energy investments will occur with the continued emphasis on a state-by-
state approach to RPS. Indeed, MidAmerican has signaled that it is prepared to litigate against
new RPS statutes in Oregon and Washington, risking uncertainties in renewable energy
investments in the Pacific Northwest for years, possibly decades.26 E. Fifth sin: Creating uncertainty The
complexity of state-based RPS statutes is compounded by uncertainty over the duration of many state RPS programs.
Stakeholders trying to plan investments in state renewable energy markets are tormented with
unknowns.27 New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island, for example, will review and potentially modify their RPS schemes in 2008,
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
76/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
2009, and 2010, respectively. Hawaii's standard expressly allows for its requirements to be waived if they prove to be “too costly” for
retail electric providers and consumers.28 Arizona, New Mexico, and Maine may terminate their RPS programs entirely.29 When
policy stability is assured, long-term project financing follows. But potential investors are less likely to assume risks
where legislative or regulatory commitments are weak or constantly changing. Ten years ago,
researchers at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory estimated that these uncertainties may increase the costs of renewable energy
projects up to 50 percent compared with the probable costs under stable regulatory environments.30 It is not hyperbole to suggest,
therefore, that the instability inherent in a state-based approach to RPS is dramatically distorting
private investments in renewable energy generation nationally.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
77/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
States—Free Riding

Federal actions solves free-riding by some states


Sovacool 8 (Benjamin, A Matter of Stability and Equity, Energy & Environment 19.2, IgentaConnect, AG)

the current system of state RPS is riddled with leakages. A solitary state’s effort to
Analogously,
deploy more renewable energy technologies and improve the environment through the market
may result in benefits to other states that have not paid for them. As long as adjacent or regional
states support renewable power, residents nearby receive the benefit at no cost. Economically
rational state politicians therefore prefer to “free-ride” and instead spend money on measures
guaranteed to bring benefits to constituents.[18] The current patchwork of state based RPS thus
provides an incentive for the numbers of states that have not passed RPS to free ride on those
that have. Only a national RPS evens the playing field and brings the benefits of renewable
energy to all states.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
78/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
States—Legal

Legal uncertainty surrounding interstate trade kills investment, even if they win its
legal
Cooper 8 (Christopher, A National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Politically Correct or Just Plain Correct?, Electricity Journal 21.5,
ScienceDirect, AG)

retail electricity market represents the essence of


Joel B. Eisen doesn’t mince words in declaring his belief that the
interstate commerce: Electricity involves a national marketplace that reaches every American
and cannot be carved into neatly defined or clearly distinct markets and regulatory jurisdictions.
It is perhaps the clearest case of unfettered Commerce Clause jurisdiction extant today.36 Yet,
state RPS mandates remain at perpetual risk from constitutional legal challenges. In many ways, the
tension of state RPS policies regulating an interstate electricity market is founded on a legal
house of cards that could collapse at any time. Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power “to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with Indian tribes.” In the many years since ratification of
the U.S. Supreme Court and other lower courts have consistently repealed state
the Constitution,
legislation that may hinder or prohibit interstate trade.37 States are permitted to promote in-
state business, but they are not permitted to protect those businesses from out-of-state
competition. The courts have ruled that this “dormant Commerce Clause” means that a state cannot “needlessly obstruct
interstate trade or attempt to place itself in a position of economic isolation.”38 The smooth functioning of the national market
requires the federal government to prevent states from adopting protectionist or autarkic policies that would attribute a product's
market share to its geographic origins rather to market mechanisms. State RPS statutes that set geographic restrictions on renewable
generation or otherwise limit the interstate trade of RECs may be accused of violating this central tenet of the U.S. Constitution. Not
utilities have demonstrated a natural proclivity for successfully challenging
surprisingly,
state regulations on Commerce Clause grounds.39 In 1982, New England Power Company successfully
invalidated a New Hampshire statute prohibiting a hydroelectric company from exporting electricity out of the state without the
utility's approval. In 1992, utilities in Wyoming convinced the Supreme Court to overturn an Oklahoma statute requiring the state's
regulated utilities to consume a certain percentage of Oklahoma-mined coal.40 But the Supreme Court's 2002
decision upholding the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's jurisdiction over the
transmission component of retail sales may be the starkest signal yet that regulated utilities can
call upon the federal government to intervene when they feel unfairly compromised by state
regulations.41 Indeed, Eisen argues that the practical implication of the Court's decision in New York v. FERC is that, “the federal
government could assert jurisdiction all the way to the consumer's toaster if it so chose.” Thus, it is only a matter of time
before utilities and lawmakers challenge the constitutionality of certain state RPS mandates.42
Nevada, New Jersey, and Texas have all adopted restrictions that only count in-state renewable
resources toward their respective RPS mandates. Similarly, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and the District of Columbia
stipulate that RPS-eligible renewable resources must come from within PJM's territory.43 Some states have gone so far as
to devalue RECs from other states. California's RPS, for example, requires RECs to be bundled
with the electricity generated from renewable resources (which has the practical effect of
restricting unbundled RECs from other states).44 Even the California Public Utilities Commission has warned state
policymakers that their position on out-of-state RECs may be constitutionally questionable.45 While the legality of these restrictions
state and federal regulators are starting to
has yet to be challenged on Commerce Clause grounds, Eisen warns that
engage in a kind of “Commerce Clause brinksmanship.”46 As recently as 2006, Constellation Energy threatened
to sue Maryland's Public Utility Commission on Commerce Clause grounds for rejecting its merger with Baltimore Gas and Electric.47
If a state RPS were found to violate the Commerce Clause, the practical effect would be its immediate repeal. While state legislatures
one successful challenge
could try to craft an RPS that would pass Constitutional muster or appeal to a higher court,
would be enough to risk a cascade of copy-cat litigation as regulated entities piggyback
on judicial precedent. In any event, the result is a risky and unpredictable regulatory
environment threatening the longevity of state-based RPS mandates and the long-
term stability of the nation's renewable energy market.

Counterplan’s legally unfeasible


Wiener 7 – Professor of Law, Environmental Policy, and Public Policy at Duke (Jonathan, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1961, AG)
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
79/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Meanwhile, state regulation of GHG emissions may face a variety of legal obstacles, including
challenges (i) under the Dormant Commerce Clause, especially if states attempt to regulate or
tax emissions embedded in products (such as goods, services, and electricity) imported into the state from other states;
(ii) under the Dormant Treaty Clause or more generally for interference with the foreign affairs
power of the federal government, especially where U.S. states purport to enter into agreements
with foreign countries such as Great Britain or the European Union; 15 (iii) under theories of
preemption by federal statutes such as the Clean Air Act; and (iv) under the Interstate Compacts
Clause, in the cases of RGGI, western states, or other cooperative multistate programs. 16
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
80/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
States—Legal

State RPS would be struck down under the Commerce Clause because they can’t
regulate interstate trade or electricity trasmision
Sovacool 8 – Research Fellow in the Energy Governance Program at National University of Singapore; Government and
International Affairs Professor at Virginia Polytechnic Institute; DoE consultant on the Climate Change Technology Program (Benjamin,
A Matter of Stability and Equity, Energy & Environment 19.2, IgentaConnect, AG)

Only federal action would avoid constitutional challenges relating to the dormant commerce
clause. The U.S. Supreme Court consistently strikes down state legislation that attempts to tax or
prohibit interstate trade. The Commerce Clause in the U.S. constitution grants affirmative powers
to Congress to regulate a variety of areas. The “Dormant Commerce Clause” limits state powers
that impede interstate trade. States are permitted to promote in state business, but they are not
permitted to protect those businesses from out of state competition . The Dormant Commerce Clause means
that a state cannot “needlessly obstruct interstate trade or attempt to place itself in a position of economic isolation.” [20] The rule is
believed to be necessary for the smooth functioning of the national market, and is intended to ensure that a product’s market share is
Two potential areas of conflict
attributable solely to the workings of that market and not the product’s geographic origins.
between state-based RPS and the Dormant Commerce Clause concern geographic restrictions on
eligible renewable resources and how states assign value to RECs. For example, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey,
and Texas set in-state restrictions for those renewable resources counting toward their RPS. Yet in New Energy Co. of Indiana v.
Limbach the Supreme Court ruled that an income tax credit limited to in state ethanol producers was unconstitutional; Wyoming v.
Oklahoma that requiring use of indigenous fuel resources for in-state electricity production violated the Dormant Commerce Clause;
and in Alliance for Clean Coal vs. Miller a federal court ruled that an Illinois preference for the use of Illinois coal to satisfy Clean Air
the court established that the balance between a
Act amendments was illegal. [21] In each of these instances,
state’s taxing power and the Commerce Clause should be resolved in favor of unrestricted state-
to-state trade. This suggests that, while no state RPS has yet been challenged in court, the door
certainly remains open.

States can’t do RECs intrastate


Sovacool 7 (Benjamin and Jack Barkenbus, Necessary but Insufficient, Environment 49.6, Ebsco, AG)

Finally, state-based renewable portfolio standards risk challenges on legal grounds. Article 1, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants
Congress the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with Indian tribes.”23 In the
many years since ratification of the Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently used the converse of this part of the
commerce clause (hence its description as the “dormant commerce clause”) to strike down state legislation that it has determined
might hinder or prohibit interstate trade. In 1986, the Court defined this to mean that a state cannot “needlessly obstruct interstate
The smooth functioning of the national
trade or attempt to ‘place itself in a position of economic isolation.’”24
market requires the federal government to prevent states from adopting protectionist or autarkic
policies that would attribute a product’s market share to its geographic origins rather than to
market mechanisms. Two potential conflicts exist between state RPS policies and the dormant
commerce clause: geographic restrictions on eligible renewable resources and the different ways
states assign value to RECs. Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, and Texas have all adopted restrictions that only count in-state
renewable resources toward their respective RPS mandates. Some states that have implemented their own RPS
mandates have adopted policies that devalue RECs from other states. California’s RPS, for example,
requires RECs to be bundled (thus disallowing unbundled RECs from other states). While no one has yet challenged the legality of
these restrictions, several legal precedents suggest that a legal case against these restrictions could
prevail.25

States fail at regulating intrastate pollution


Sovacool 8 – Research Fellow in the Energy Governance Program at National University of Singapore; Government and
International Affairs Professor at Virginia Polytechnic Institute; DoE consultant on the Climate Change Technology Program (Benjamin,
June, The Best of Both Worlds, 27 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 397, AG)
Along these lines, Thomas W. Merrill notes that state environmental policymakers have been
reluctant to pursue meaningful regulation of transboundary or interstate pollution. 97 Merrill has
identified six factors complicating state efforts to address such "spillover" pollution. First, states
often disagree on questions of attribution and whether a source state is legally [*420]
responsible for pollution emanating from its facilities. Second, states disagree on questions of
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
81/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
causation, or on what standards of proof are appropriate to establish that their pollution injured
another state. Third, they differ on questions of standard care and liability, or on whether or not
the source state causing injury has acted unreasonably or negligently. Fourth, even when these
first three factors are agreed upon, most states will disagree over an appropriate remedy or
course of action. Fifth, most states have a litigate-or-settle mentality, and are therefore reluctant
to engage in lawsuits given uncertain outcomes and expenses, especially losses in the form of
attorney fees and costs. And sixth, few cases of pure or unidirectional transboundary pollution
exist. Instead, all states involved in negotiations are usually responsible for pollution going
somewhere; that is, pollution is reciprocal. Most states will therefore ignore such problems
completely rather than risk admitting liability once discussions about interstate pollution
commence.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
82/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
States—Legal

State RPS might be destroyed because of court battles


Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

A National RPS Avoids Costly Court Battles • Ambiguous state mandates invite law suits.
Utilities have gone to court over vague state RPS laws in Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts
and New Mexico. New legal battles could be waged in Oregon and Washington. • State RPS
laws are vulnerable to Constitutional challenge. California, Washington, DC, Maryland, Nevada,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Texas have all adopted restrictions on out-of-state renewable
energy that many scholars agree violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. • A
Constitutional challenge is inevitable. Growing tension between state and federal utility
regulators has engendered a kind of “Commerce Clause brinksmanship,” that invites interstate
utilities to challenge the constitutionality of state RPS mandates. • The Supreme Court has
already given FERC the authority to intervene. The practical affect of the Supreme Court’s
2002 decision in New York v. FERC is that “the federal government could assert jurisdiction all
the way to the consumer’s toaster if it so chose.” • A successful federal lawsuit could destroy
state RPS programs. One successful Commerce Clause challenge risks a cascade of copy-cat
litigation, collapsing the entire state-based RPS structure and destroying the emerging
interstate renewable energy market.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
83/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
States—Industry <3

Industry is begging for a federal policy—too many lawsuits with the states
Buzbee 7 – law prof, Emory (William, 82 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1547, AG)

proposed legislation to regulate greenhouse gases


Of perhaps the greatest national and international importance,
that contribute to global climate change received a boost when several industry leaders
indicated they might welcome such a federal law. Until now, federal law has provided only limited regulation of
greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide, and agencies have been reluctant to use existing statutory powers to promulgate regulatory
71 An array of states and cities have started to regulate greenhouse gases, and
constraints.
common law [*1570] suits have been filed as well. 72 The apparent industry change of heart
reflects a desire to "avert the multiplicity of regulations being drafted by various state
governments." 73 According to the President of Shell Oil, "We cannot deal with 50 different
policies ... . We need a national approach to greenhouse gases." 74 Relatedly, recent legislative debates have
explored whether regulation of motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions should fall under the states' authority or exclusively within
the federal domain. 75
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
84/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
States—ferc key

FERC is key—state-level action encourages states to turn towards protectionism—


regulation under the FERC allows smooth interstate commerce
Sovacool 8 – Research Fellow in the Energy Governance Program at National University of Singapore; Government and
International Affairs Professor at Virginia Polytechnic Institute; DoE consultant on the Climate Change Technology Program (Benjamin,
A Matter of Stability and Equity, Energy & Environment 19.2, IgentaConnect, AG)

The prospect of states and localities implementing their own independent REC trading programs
also raises the question of whether and how states can maintain regulatory control over
environmental quality when it is embodies that authority in an object of commerce. States that
lose control over quality of their credits may erect barriers and devalue credits from other states.
California’s RPS, for example, requires RECS to be bundled (thus disallowing unbundled RECS
from other states). [22] It remains to be seen whether such a standard would stand up to scrutiny under the Dormant Commerce
only the federal government has
Clause. [23] While the states have a significant history and authority as regulators of electric utilities,
the constitutional authority to regulate wholesale electric power and interstate commerce (in the form of
RECs). While the states have historically set prices for retail electricity sales, approved the permitting of electric generators, regulated the
environmental effects of electricity sales, and developed integrated resource plans for utilities, only the federal government has the
power to regulate the national wholesale power market under the Federal Power Act of 1935. This Act gives
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) exclusive authority over the sale of electric power at wholesale
rates and the transmission of electric power on a national scale. Thus, only the federal government has the power to
regulate commerce between the states. As stated, once Congress exercises its right to regulate an aspect of interstate
commerce, that aspect of interstate trade ceases to be dormant. Federal action here can be especially important given
that more aggressive state mandates for renewable energy have already been challenged in court for violating PURPA,
which requires that utilities only have to purchase power from qualifying facilities at “avoided costs.” In California, FERC determined that state
efforts to force utilities to deploy more renewable energy projects violated federal law. [24]
Ferc must be certified for REC administration
Shoock 7 – JD Fordham Law (Corey, 12 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 1011, AG)

Congress, after setting a production standard, would have to pass an


The Industry RPS must be managed as a federal regulatory scheme. 471
enabling statute that allows an agency (likely the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) to certify and administer
"renewable energy credits." 472 These credits represent one kilowatt hour of electricity each, and for each power generator and
distributor, the RPS determines how many credits they must hold at the end of each fiscal year. 473 If the RPS for a
given year is 10%, each power retailer must have renewable source energy account for 10% of their total
kilowatt hour sales for the year. 474 The credits are proof of these sales. 475 The credits would be tradable between
industry actors as a parallel "commodity" to the electricity itself. 476 The credits, while not per se indicative of sales, instead
signify that renewable energy has been supported in the amount of one kilowatt hour per credit. 477 Thus, a non-utility-owned wind farm (a power
generator as opposed to a power retailer) 478 in North Dakota that produces and sells only renewable energy would have 90% of that year's credits to
sell on the open market to power producers and distributors in any other part of the country that do not sell enough on their own. 479 Credits would not
be allowed to be carried over from year to year, and the market price would depend on how ambitious the annual increase in the RPS would be. 480 In
this way, every power retailer (like a utility) would have to determine whether it would be more expensive [*1068] to produce their own renewable
energy or directly subsidize the production of it elsewhere. 481 Industry actors that fail to meet the standard would be subjected to steep fines that
substantially outpace the fair market value of the energy credit, making the RPS effectively self-enforcing. 482 Another advantage is that unlike
direct government subsidies, no public funding is necessary. 483 Furthermore, it is effective in both regulated and competitive
The overseeing agency would merely be required to certify the annual
wholesale energy markets. 484
ownership of the credits themselves, administer penalties for non-compliance, and adjudicate
disputes over credit transactions. 485 The formula for setting fine rates would be set statutorily along with the RPS to
avoid costly and time-consuming bureaucratic rule-making procedures. The AWEA also notes that in an energy credit-based RPS
scheme, the market value of credits will ultimately determine when the standard "self-sunsets." 486 Once a credit becomes
worthless, the RPS will have accomplished its goal for at least the year. 487 To ensure long-term growth of the renewable energy
industry, the RPS will have to start high enough, accelerate fast enough, over a long enough period of time to set off the diminishing
rate of return for the credits. 488

FERC is key to enforce interstate tradability


Eisenstat 7 – head of the energy practice with Dickstein Shapiro LLP (Larry and Michael J. Rustum, A Federal Mandate Requires
Federal Action, Electric Light & Power, http://uaelp.pennnet.com/display_article/302308/34/ARTCL/none/none/1/A-Federal-Mandate-
Requires-Federal-Action/, AG)

If past is prologue, most regional expansion proposals likely will be threatened by parochial
interests and complicated funding arrangements. Indeed, absent Congress passing the equivalent of the
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
85/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
National Interstate and Defense Highways Act of 1956, this time to further the expansion of the transmission grid, it will be left
to FERC and the states to promote such infrastructure projects as are necessary for utilities to meet a federal RPS. Yet,
neither has the authority nor the resources to mandate a nationwide coordinated approach to
processing new siting applications or requests for interconnection and transmission at the state
and federal levels. Put simply, maximum renewable penetration will very likely require not only
federal transmission siting authority but authorizing the FERC to consolidate control areas in
order to take full advantage of the geographic diversity of renewable energy resources. Business as
usual clearly won’t cut it. There must be a federal mandate to the effect that federal and state
government set and enforce national goals. Otherwise, there is little, if any, chance of meeting the existing state RPS
objectives, let alone new federal targets. The consequences could be very severe given that even the most aggressive RPS proposed
appears to fall well short of what ultimately will be required to meet greenhouse gas emission reduction targets.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
86/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
States—PTC Link

Plan replaces PTC, whereas state programs do not


Wiser 7 (Ryan et al, April, The Experience with Renewable Portfolio Standards in the United States, The Electricity Journal 20.4,
Elsevier, AG)

Significantly, the federal programs would all allow tradability of recs within the entire U.S., whereas most state policies contain
The federal proposals have also tended to assume a
significant state-wide or regional limitations on REC sources.
replacement of the federal Production Tax Credit (PTC) with a national RPS, whereas state
programs will operate with or without the federal PTC.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
87/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
States—Inefficient **

Action by fifty states creates huge inefficiencies --- multijurisdictional overlap


Sovacool 8 (Benjamin, A Matter of Stability and Equity, Energy & Environment 19.2, IgentaConnect, AG)

A national RPS consequently avoids direct funding by multiple state agencies that can become
administratively burdensome, time consuming, and inefficient. Under a federal RPS, renewable
energy projects must continually compete to ensure an adequate volume of power and credits,
creating a continuous incentive for utilities to seek cost reductions in the price of their renewable
systems. Such competition is lacking with current state mandates that dispense one time
monetary awards to individual renewable generators. [29] Moreover, it is much more effective
and efficient to have one centralized RPS program instead of dozens of separate, inconsistent
state programs. [30]
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
88/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
States—Not Enough
States even if they meet target won’t generate enough renewables
Wiser 8 – Electricity Markets and Policy Group at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, a well-known expert on RPS who
regularly advises and consults with state and federal agencies in the design and evaluation of renewable energy policies, an advisor
to the Energy Foundation's China Sustainable Energy Program and the Corporate Advisory Board of Mineral Acquisition Partners, has
published over two hundred journal articles and research reports (Ryan and Galen Barbose, April, Renewables Portfolio Standards in
the United States, http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/lbnl-154e.pdf , AG)

Though the eventual market impacts of existing state RPS policies are uncertain, and will depend
critically on design and implementation details, there is little doubt that the aggregate amount of new renewable
energy generation required under these policies is significant. The estimated 60 GW of new renewables capacity equates to an
additional 4.7% of total projected nationwide electricity generation in 2025, compared to a non-hydro share of 2.1% in 1999 and 2.4%
Roughly 15% of the projected growth in retail electricity sales from 2000 though 2025
in 2006.
would come from new renewable generation required under existing state RPS policies. Even
with this growth, however, non-hydro renewables would continue to provide a relatively modest
contribution to U.S. electricity supply: adding the estimate of new renewable generation required
by existing state RPS programs from 2000 to 2025 to the 1999 base amount of non-hydro
renewables sums to just 6% of total projected electricity generation in the U.S. by 2025.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
89/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
States—POUs

States exemptions of municipalities weakens uniformity


Wiser 8 – Electricity Markets and Policy Group at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, a well-known expert on RPS who
regularly advises and consults with state and federal agencies in the design and evaluation of renewable energy policies, an advisor
to the Energy Foundation's China Sustainable Energy Program and the Corporate Advisory Board of Mineral Acquisition Partners, has
published over two hundred journal articles and research reports (Ryan and Galen Barbose, April, Renewables Portfolio Standards in
the United States, http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/lbnl-154e.pdf , AG)

As alluded to earlier, state RPS policies also differ in terms of which entities are obligated under
the program. Many states have exempted certain LSEs or end-use customers from meeting RPS
reqiurements (see Table 2). In particular, states often exempt some or all POUs from formal RPS
obligations, or instead allow POUs to develop their own renewable energy standards. Various other
types of permanent or temporary exemptions have also been adopted, for example, exemptions for small
utilities, large customers, or customers in utility service territories with a rate freeze. Force
majeure clauses and cost caps, which are common, can also effectively function as exemptions
by reducing the amount of load subject to RPS obligations.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
90/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
States—Uniformity key
Industry’s desire to expand regionally is hampered by a lack of uniform standards
Sovacool 7 (Benjamin and Jack Barkenbus, Necessary but Insufficient, Environment 49.6, Ebsco, AG)

Important issues such as geographic scope, eligible technologies or industries, inclusion of


existing versus new technologies, and the specifics of credit trading have been decided
differently in every state. Consequently, the resulting state-based market may create confusion,
complexity, and inconsistency for policymakers, investors, and businesses. Contrary to enabling
a well-lubricated national renewable energy market, inconsistencies between states—over what
counts as renewable energy, when it has to come online, how large it has to be, where it must be delivered, and how it may be traded
—clog the renewable energy market like coffee grounds in a drain. Implementing agencies and
stakeholders must grapple with inconsistent state RPS goals, and investors must interpret
competing and often arbitrary statutes.19 To pick just a few prominent examples, Massachusetts set its target at 4
percent by 2011, while Rhode Island chose 15 percent by 2020. In Maine, fuel cells and high efficiency cogeneration units count as
“renewables,” while the standard in Pennsylvania includes coal gasification and small-scale fossil fuel power plants. Iowa, Minnesota,
and Texas set their purchase requirements based on installed capacity, whereas other states set them relative to electricity sales.
Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, and Rhode Island trade renewable energy credits (RECs) under the New England Power
Pool, whereas Texas has its own REC trading system. Minnesota and Iowa have voluntary standards with no penalties, whereas
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania all levy different noncompliance fees.20 The result is a
renewable energy market that deters investment, complicates compliance, discourages
interstate cooperation, and encourages tedious and expensive litigation.21 The electricity
utility industry is also transitioning away from a state-by-state energy market,
making a state-by-state RPS approach anachronistic. The Energy Policy Act of 2005
removed the geographic restrictions that limited public utility holding companies to
single, integrated systems.22 More utilities operate across state lines, and many have begun
to merge and consolidate to maximize profits and deal with the perceived challenges of
restructuring. Using individual states as a crucible for innovations in electricity generation and marketing may have made sense
when limits were placed on the size and geographic scope of utility holding companies, but it makes little sense now.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
91/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
States—Free Riders
State action encourages free riders that exploit the least regulated states—even the
best case scenario can’t meet necessary targets
Sovacool 7 (Benjamin and Jack Barkenbus, Necessary but Insufficient, Environment 49.6, Ebsco, AG)

In addition, as mentioned above, stateby- state action on climate change is prone to what is known as the “free rider” phenomenon.
utilities operating in a region that includes those states with mandatory emissions
For example,
regulations and those without has an extra incentive to build new power plants only in those
without. PacifiCorp, a utility serving customers in the Pacific Northwest, has repeatedly attempted to build coal-fired power plants
in Wyoming and Utah—states without mandatory greenhouse gas reduction targets— but not in Oregon (which has mandated a
The state-by-
stabilization of greenhouse gas emissions by 2010) or Washington (which has mandated 1990 levels by 2020).32
state patchwork of climate change policies, in other words, allows stakeholders to manipulate the
existing market to their advantage. Localized climate action also sends distorted price signals. By
lowering demand for carbon-intense products, state standards reduce the regional (and even global)
price for carbon-intense fuels. But in doing so, they provide further incentives for nearby states without
climate regulation to do nothing because of lowered prices.33 Put another way, states acting on climate change
depress the cost of fossil fuels and other carbon-intense commodities by lowering demand for them and thus their price. Yet
reduced prices encourage overconsumption in areas without carbon caps, decrease the incentive
to enact energy efficiency and conservation measures, and discourage the adoption of
alternative fuels for vehicles and renewable energy technologies. Finally, even the most aggressive climate
statutes (aimed at cutting emissions by 2010) will make only a negligible contribution to offsetting greenhouse gas emissions. With
the exception of New York and New Jersey (which rank ninth and seventeenth among states in greenhouse gas emissions), the rest of
all of the states with mandatory 2010 greenhouse gas reduction targets all rank relatively low in terms of their emissions. According
to EIA, by 2030, total energyrelated carbon dioxide emissions will equal approximately 8.1 billion metric tons (equating to a 62
percent increase from 1990 levels with an average increase of 1.2 percent per year). Yet those states that have committed to
achieving timebounded, quantitative reduction targets for greenhouse gas emissions accounted for only around 20 percent of
nationwide emissions in 2001.34 Even if all states with mandatory 2010 climate plans attained their targets, their policies would
result in a reduction of approximately just 460 million metric tons of carbon dioxide by 2020—a 6.38 percent reduction compared to
The other 36 states do not just offset these gains; the overall growth rate still
EIA’s reference case.
increases at 1.06 percent every year. As a result, according to EIA, stateby- state reductions “are
nowhere near the magnitude of reductions needed to bring the U.S. into compliance
with the Kyoto Protocol’s call for reductions of 5 percent below 1990 levels from 2008 to
2012—much less the reductions needed to avert dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system.”35
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
92/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
States—Inefficient
State control kills coordination
Ryan Wiser (scientist in the Electricity Markets and Policy Group at Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory, PhD in energy and resources, “Renewable Portfolio Standards: A Factual Introduction
to Experience from the United States,” April 2007, http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/emp/reports/62569.pdf
[Ishita])

Though the concept appears simple and direct in theory, in practice, RPS designs vary
substantially from one another; so much so, that there is some debate over what exactly
constitutes an RPS, and whether certain states qualify as having an RPS. Illinois, for example,
has established voluntary renewable energy targets; New York has established a policy that it
calls an RPS, but that involves ratepayer collection of funds and incentive payments from a
state energy authority. Above we have identified New York as a state with an RPS, and Illinois
as one without such a policy: we readily acknowledge that such classifications are subject to
debate.

National RPS avoids inconsistencies and inefficiencies related with State RPS’s
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

While most state efforts have been laudable, state RPS statutes have created a patchwork of
inconsistent, often conflicting mandates that distort the market for renewable energy
technologies and unintentionally inflate electricity prices. By subjecting an increasingly
interstate electric utility market to confusing and sometimes contradictory state regulations,
this tangle of state-based RPS programs discourages long-term investments and, in some
cases, encourages utilities to exploit the inconsistencies.

National RPS avoids inconsistencies and inefficiencies related with State RPS’s
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

A National RPS Creates a Level Playing Field for States • Uniform rules avoid “free riders” Some
states enjoy artificially deflated electricity prices from cheap, dirty sources of energy, while
ratepayers in RPS states pick up the tab for cleaning the air and water and diversifying the
nation’s electricity generation. • A national RPS prevents utilities from profiting off of
inconsistencies Because Washington’s RPS excludes hydropower, for example, Washington’s low-
cost renewable energy is sold to consumers in neighboring states, while Washington ratepayers
are forced to buy higher-cost renewable energy credits from generators outside the state. In
effect, Washington consumers are subsidizing cheaper renewable energy for surrounding states.
A national RPS prevents these kinds of predatory trade-offs by creating a uniform definition of
eligible renewable fuels. • All states have renewable resources The Southeast has the potential
to add 2,941 MW of electricity from additions to existing hydroelectric facilities. The Tennessee
Valley Authority has documented nearly 900 MW of “cost competitive” renewable energy from
wind, biomass, solar and incremental hydropower just in TVA’s service territory. And researchers
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
93/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
at the University of Georgia have found commercially significant wind resources off the coast of
Georgia and South Carolina. • A national RPS allows utilities to develop resources anywhere A
national renewable energy market allows regulated utilities to invest in renewable resources
wherever their development is most cost competitive. • Federal REC trading rules create a
uniform price for renewable energy credits (RECs) A national REC trading market would allow
generators to sell their RECs at a uniform price to retail suppliers anywhere in the nation. An
expanded REC market generates more investment capital for renewable technologies by
guaranteeing a more stable and predictable rate of return.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
94/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
States—Inefficient
Ambiguous State RPS prevents new investments and noncompliance
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

Amid this complex morass of regulations, stakeholders and investors must not only grapple with
inconsistencies, they are forced to decipher vague and often contradictory state statutes.26 In
Connecticut, for example, the state’s Department of Public Utility Control originally exempted
two of the state’s largest utilities from RPS obligations because the description of “electric
suppliers” in the statute was unclear. These exemptions created uncertainty over whether the
statute would be enforced against any utilities at all.27 Hawaii’s standard contained so much
“wiggle room” that it was unclear even to its own advocates whether it applied to most of the
state’s utilities.28 Such ambiguity has lead to “wide disagreements among parties in regulatory
proceedings” about how to enforce some state RPS mandates. 29 In testimony before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Don Furman, a senior VP at PacifiCorp,
lamented how “for multi-state utilities, a series of inconsistent requirements and regulatory
frameworks will make planning, building and acquiring generating capacity on a multi-state basis
confusing and contradictory.”
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
95/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 REC PIC

REC is key—everything fails without it


Sovacool 8 (Benjamin, A Matter of Stability and Equity, Energy & Environment 19.2, IgentaConnect, AG)

A federal RPS must also establish a national REC trading scheme that does not set geographic restrictions or
limitations on renewable generators, avoiding artificial winners and losers. Tradable credits are needed to function as
a simple accounting system to prevent cheating and ensure compliance. They also provide
considerable flexibility to utilities, retailers, and generators. Utilities can rely on credits to reduce
risks, since credits can be purchased to make up any shortfall or take care of any excess. Utilities
located in areas with poor renewable resources are not “punished” because they have the ability
to invest in energy generation in resource-rich areas. Another advantage of particular importance to intermittent
technologies such as wind and solar is that credits can be sold at any time, regardless of when power was generated. [31] Similar
credit trading schemes are becoming more popular and palatable among businesses. Four-fifths
of utility executives polled in 2007 expected mandatory emissions caps within a decade, and ten
companies, including Alcoa, Caterpillar, and DuPont, recently called on Congress to set up a cap and trade system for greenhouse
gases. [32]
Absent RECs, verifying compliance would be next to impossible, and would require
tracking all renewable energy transactions within an entire trading region, an enormously
complicated task. The efficacy of geographic restrictions is uncertain because key facets of RPS
policy, such as electricity flow, pollution reduction, economic development, and technological
development, have externalities that do not honor political boundaries. [33] Moreover, such
limitations do not match the delivery of power, since most states share electricity infrastructure,
and cannot ensure that all of the renewable electricity they use will be generated indigenously.
RECs would also ensure that a federal RPS would not need any formal expiration, as a “self-
sunset” would take place once the market value of renewable energy credits has stabilized at or
near zero, signifying that renewables have successfully entered the market.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
96/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Cap and Trade

RPS is better than cap and trade due to existing state RPS interaction capability
Cabral 7 – lawyer specializing in climate change (Neal, 8 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol'y 13, AG)

Three primary bases for tension exist between an RPS and a cap-and-trade program. First,
renewables, as imposed through an RPS, are typically not the least-cost compliant solution to
carbon reductions, particularly in the earlier stages of any carbon cap-and-trade program where
the required reductions are expected to be relatively modest. Second, once a carbon cap-and-
trade program is enacted, the purpose of an RPS program becomes more uncertain because
renewable power purchased pursuant to an RPS program will no longer provide any additional
carbon reductions beyond those required by the cap. Third, it is difficult to integrate RPS
requirements into a carbon cap-and-trade program in a way that produces relatively fair results
with respect to the entities that purchase the renewables and, therefore, bear their costs. Taken
together, these three tensions between an RPS program and a least-cost carbon cap-and-trade
policy tend to weaken the current standard rationales for enacting RPS programs. In order to
properly sort out these issues and develop a coordinated and sound national carbon policy that
includes a renewables component, legislators must evaluate and agree on the specific purposes
for enacting an RPS program in the context of an expected carbon cap-and-trade program. They
must also structure both programs to meet the defined objectives of the RPS.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
97/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Gradual PIC
Gradual key to reduce volatility
Sovacool 8 (Benjamin, A Matter of Stability and Equity, Energy & Environment 19.2, IgentaConnect, AG)

A national RPS system must be gradual and set specific benchmarks such as 6 percent by 2009; 9 percent by 2012; 14
percent by 2015; 17 percent by 2018; 20 percent by 2020; 23 percent by 2023; and 25 percent by 2025. By increasing the amount of
renewable energy slowly over time, the standard ensures that the renewable energy market will result in competition, efficiency and
A gradual phase-in provides time to set up
innovation that will deliver renewable energy at the lowest possible cost.
standards for credit certification, monitoring, and compliance. It creates relative certainty and
stability in the renewables market by enabling long term contracts and financing for the
renewable power industry, in turn lowering costs. A gradual standard would also reduce credit
prices and credit volatility, since developers would realize they could recover their investments
over a reasonable period of time. And it gives utilities and generation companies an incentive to
improve their competitive position in the market, so that they have an interest in driving down the cost of
renewables to reduce their RPS compliance costs. [39]

Gradual RPS key to market compliance


Shoock 7 – JD Fordham Law (Corey, 12 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 1011, AG)

TheAccelerated Growth Rate ("A.G.R.") formula begins with the projected market share for
renewables on a stipulated date, identifies an easy-to-meet initial target, and compounds that
growth rate until the desired market share is reached. The simplest derivation is a constant A.G.R., wherein the
factor by which the annual growth rate is multiplied stays the same throughout the life of the RPS. For illustration's sake, a 50%
constant A.G.R. RPS could begin January 1, 2010 with a base-line [*1070] renewable market share of 3.95% in utility consumption.
497 The alterable variable the annual growth rate - will begin at 0.01%, meaning that by December 31, 2010, all electricity retailers
must have enough renewable energy credits to satisfy 3.96% RPS. The following year the 0.01% growth rate will increase by a factor
of 50% to 0.015%, so that by December 31, 2011 the RPS would sit at 3.98% (rounding to the nearest hundredth). In 2012, the
growth rate accelerates 50% to 0.023%, making the RPS 4.02%. By 2015 the RPS is 4.15%, still only a 4.5% increase over the EIA's
projections. 498 By starting small and compounding the RPS's annual rate of increase, the A.G.R. formula backloads the standard and
assures the market that a sufficient quantity of renewable energy credits will be available in the beginning to achieve total industry
compliance. By 2020, the growth rate would be 0.93%, leading to a seemingly modest 6.68% RPS, a mandate, but one that surpasses
the expected 2020 market share by more than 69%. At this point, the acceleration begins to show results, registering RPSs of 8.08%
in 2021, 10.18% in 2022, 13.33% in 2023, 18.06% in 2024, and 25.16% by December 31, 2025 - a nearly 520% higher market share
Setting a constant A.G.R. like 50% is the simplest method of implementing the
than projected.
standard with an eye for incremental progress while providing industry participants the chance to
adapt over time to the new market. A more complex accelerated growth rate formula can be used to speed up or slow
down the desired achievement of RPS milestones. For instance, if in using the same 3.95%-0.01% base in 2010, the initial rate
increase is 100% for the first two years with lowering rate increases by a factor of 10% every two years (2013 and 2014 at 90%
growth increase, 2015 and 2016 at 80%, etc.), the 2015 RPS would be 4.49%, increasing to 25.08% at 2022, roughly the same
standard the 50% scheme reached, only three years earlier. The sun-setting of the RPS, designed to be a
function of the market, 499 kicks in at whatever percentage the statute sets as its ultimate goal
for renewable market infiltration. 500 If, for example, 25% were the figure Congress had chosen, in
the 50% constant A.G.R. formula [*1071] scenario, the acceleration would cease after 2025. In the staggered
acceleration growth rate formula, 2022 would be the end date. At that point Congress could either elect to
maintain that 25% as its final RPS, enact a more limited growth formula, or arbitrarily set a final
standard number. Once the acceleration ends and Congress finalizes the standard, the end game of the Industry RPS begins.
The other RPS structure that avoids the abrupt increases of the 2003 congressional proposal is one that mirrors any
interest rate compounded annually. 501 Using the initial market share as the principle (present value), long-term RPS
goal as the future value, the period over which the compounding runs, and the rate of the annual increase, the market share
compounded interest approach provides a considerably faster start than the A.G.R. formulae mentioned above, including a 7.28% RPS
The drawback to this
in 2015 - between 60% and 70% higher than either of the two demonstrated A.G.R. scenarios.
approach is that it does not provide the same slow start as the A.G.R. permutations, potentially
exposing under-prepared retailers to heavy non-compliance penalties. By 2025, what began as a fast start
for the interest compounding formula comes in at nearly 25% three years after the staggered A.G.R. approach and one year before
The difference between the implementation schemes is one of strategy and
the 50% constant A.G.R.
simplicity. The compounding interest formula is more parsimonious, but the A.G.R formulae allow
for a broad-based and conservative phase-in over at least the first seven years of the RPS with
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
98/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
an option to ramp up the acceleration once the "getting-to-know-you" period is over. Either structural
method, however, represents an improvement over the arbitrarily-rounded legislative targets of the 2003 proposal. 502
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
99/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Demand PIC
RPS should be based on demand not capacity
Sovacool 8 (Benjamin, A Matter of Stability and Equity, Energy & Environment 19.2, IgentaConnect, AG)

a national RPS should require utilities to meet a


Rather than mandate a fixed amount of renewable capacity,
percentage of electricity sales through renewable resources. A mandate based on sales rather
than installed capacity ensures that suppliers are concerned more with the actual delivery of
electricity than the construction of renewable energy systems that may never produce a watt of
energy actually sent to consumers.
Setting the RPS as a function of electricity demand also provides utilities with an incentive to
pursue cost effective demand-side management and energy efficiency strategies as a way of
reducing electricity demand and, therefore, the total compliance level of the RPS. For instance, if a
utility had to meet 20 percent of its electricity sales with eligible renewable resources and worried that it could not affordably
generate enough renewable electricity or purchase enough credits, it could first pursue aggressive energy efficiency and demand-
side management strategies to lower sales and reduce the total amount of renewable generation needed to comply with the
A demand-based RPS is an elegant way of including energy conservation in the mandate
standard.
while adding a level of flexibility in meeting RPS targets.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
100/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Don’t Spec Sources CP

Specifying qualifying sources is vital to solvency


Cory 7 (Karlynn and Blair Swezey, Renewable Portfolio Standards in the States: Balancing Goals and Rules, Electricity journal 20.4,
ScienceDirect, AG)

However,RECs’ eligibility criteria are not uniform across all states, which has implications for many
facets of RPS implementation. Most state RPS laws and regulations agree on the inclusion of wind
and solar energy resources as well as methane sources derived from landfill gas and anaerobic
digestion of some biomaterials. Eligibility is less uniform for hydropower, geothermal, municipal
solid waste, and fuel cells. States also have adopted different rules around the eligible life of a REC and REC banking.
Ultimately, different state REC definitions will need to be harmonized to allow for broader trade
between states and REC tracking systems. Pressure remains for states to realize the economic development benefits
of their RPS policies. Rather than unduly restricting access to potentially less costly out-of-state resources, which in some cases may
run afoul of federal interstate commerce laws, states can provide incentives to encourage in-state generation projects and renewable
energy industries. Solar technologies have been the primary beneficiaries of resource set-asides in RPS policies. However, states face
some unique challenges with system output verification because of the potentially large number of small systems and because most
systems are located “behind the meter” at customers’ sites. It is still too early to judge the effectiveness of solar set-asides, as these
provisions are just starting to operate; therefore, little actual experience has been documented. However, solar set-asides are likely to
be most successful where they are combined with significant incentives and strong enforcement mechanisms, including
Ultimately, to be successful, RPS policies must have consistent and
noncompliance penalties.
enforceable rules. Factors that increase market uncertainty include compliance waivers, low
cost thresholds, vague resource and technology eligibility definitions, and weak (or no)
enforcement penalties. All of these factors can make the RPS policy less predictable and compromise success.
Encouraging market certainty and ensuring clarity in RPS regulations are critical to
policy success. While mid-course policy corrections may be warranted, any changes should take full account of the potential
impacts on market prices and investor confidence.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
101/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Resource PICS—Fuel Based Definition Best
A fuel based definition of eligibility is best
Sovacool 8 (Benjamin, A Matter of Stability and Equity, Energy & Environment 19.2, IgentaConnect, AG)

A national RPS should include all renewable resources and discriminate against none. The definition of eligible renewable
resources could be based on the renewable aspects of the fuels used rather than any particular
technologies deployed. For instance, eligible resources could be defined as: Any electrical generator that creates electricity
from sunlight, wind, falling water, renewable plant or animal material, and/or natural geothermal sources. A fuel-based
definition does not rely on policymakers to determine the forms of technology that should
receive market preference and does not require policymakers to continuously revise the mandate
to include new technology that may be developed. By including both new and existing
generators as eligible resources, a national RPS would avoid bitter debates concerning whether
certain “upgrades” to existing systems make them “new,” as with the feud over New Source
Review under the Clean Air Act. Gradual benchmarks ensure that new renewable generation is
developed without having to distinguish between “existing” and “new” renewable energy
systems. Avoiding this debate reduces administrative complexity and frees generators from continuously monitoring regulatory
rulings to determine whether a particular expenditure will be considered maintenance and refurbishment of an existing facility or a
new investment that qualifies toward the RPS mandate. A fuel-based definition of eligible resources would include large hydroelectric
facilities. The construction of new hydroelectric facilities and incremental improvements to existing ones could help utilities to use
renewable resources to provide base-load power. Including incremental hydropower also allows areas like the Southeast and the
Finally, a fuel-based definition
Pacific Northwest to benefit from their regions’ substantial sources of existing clean energy.
of eligible resources would ensure that truly renewable resources attain a greater proportion of
the nation’s electricity fuel portfolio. While alternative technologies such as non-renewable
distributed generation, clean coal with carbon capture and storage, and energy efficiency could
be encouraged, there are strong market-based reasons that they should not be directly included in an RPS. Such sources
would neither diversify energy resources nor achieve the economic benefits of a vibrant
renewable energy sector. Renewables should compete with other renewables, just as clean coal
should compete with dirty coal and light water reactors with advanced nuclear generators.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
102/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Resource PICS—Diverse portfolio
Renewable energy is key to the world economy – maintaining a diverse portfolio is key
to over all success of renewable development
Lane 08 (Terry, US House of Rep Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global
Warming, News Advisory, Press Room,
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/gw31_republican/pr_03_06_2008.html)

U.S. Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner, R-Wis., ranking Republican on the House Select Committee on
Energy Independence and Global Warming, made the following statement during today’s hearing
titled, “Blowing in the Wind: Renewable Energy as the Answer to an Economy Adrift:”“As I’ve said
many times, promoting and advancing technology must be a key part of any global warming or
energy security policy. And I am pleased that the chairman has scheduled this hearing today on
renewable energy technology. “This week, people came to Washington from all over the world to
talk about renewable energy. President Bush addressed the Washington International Renewable
Energy Conference yesterday, not to mention the scores of other government and business
leaders who are here to examine the future of worldwide renewable energy production. “The
reason everyone is talking about renewable energy production is because of its future role as a
vital part of the world’s economy. Traditional fossil fuels are, and will remain, a key source of
worldwide energy production. But just like a strong investment portfolio includes a diverse group
of stocks and bonds, future energy portfolios should include a diverse array of energy
technologies, including fossil fuels, renewable energy and nuclear power. “On that point, I’m
happy that the chairman has also scheduled a hearing for next week on nuclear energy
technology. Nuclear power is clean, safe and produces no greenhouse gases. It too must be part
of a diverse energy portfolio. “But diversity is the key. When it comes to energy security or
environmental protection, different energy technologies work better in different places. Each has
benefits and drawbacks. “For example, wind energy is a promising source of clean, renewable
power. But the wind doesn’t blow consistently, and some areas are better for wind power than
others. As Interior Secretary Dirk Kempthorne noted at the conference yesterday, wind farms can
harm bird populations, some of which are already under stress. The Audubon Society has noted
that the average population of common birds has declined 70 percent since 1967. “So placing
wind farms in places that will harm bird populations does not advance the cause of renewable
energy, Secretary Kempthorne said, and I agree. “In the right places, wind farms will be a great
source of renewable energy. But this shoe doesn’t fit every footprint. “Likewise, solar power is a
great resource, but mostly in areas where large tracks of land are available for use and the sun
shines consistently. These should be just two options in a diverse energy portfolio. “The Energy
Information Administration recently reported to the Senate its projections for future energy
production, and use of renewables in the U.S. will nearly double by 2030. But even then,
renewable energy won’t produce as much electricity as nuclear power currently does. And
nuclear power only accounts for about 20 percent of the nation’s electricity production. That is
why maintaining diverse energy resources is a top priority.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
103/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Resource PICS—Solar Energy (1/2)
No link – their evidence doesn’t assume our specific solar power SES Solar Two that’s
key to diversity, reducing greenhouse emissions, and helping the economy
Osborn 08 (Bruce, Capitol Strategies Group, “Application Filed for the world’s largest solar
energy generating plant,” http://209.85.215.104/search?q=cache:C-
ZwGa2Jft8J:www.stirlingenergy.com/downloads/30-June-2008-Application-Filed-for-Worlds-Largest-
Solar-Energy-Generating
Plant.pdf+having+a+diverse+energy+portfolio+solar+power&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=18&gl=us)

“SES Solar Two is a vital part of our renewable energy portfolio,” said Mike Niggli, chief operating
officer for SDG&E. “As we strive for a balanced and diverse energy mix, the Stirling Energy
will be a significant contributor to helping SDG&E meet its green energy goals.” The project will
be constructed in two primary phases. The first will include 12,000 SunCatcher dishes generating
300 megawatts. The second phase will generate 450 megawatts using 18,000 solar dishes. Each
SunCatcher dish is 38 feet tall, 40 feet wide and generates 25,000 watts. “The full build out of
SES Solar Two will require completion of the Sunrise Powerlink, a 150-miletransmission line
proposed by SDG&E from the Imperial Valley to San Diego,” Osborn said. “We can deliver the
first phase to San Diego on existing power lines, but new transmission infrastructure is critical to
achieving full realization of the Solar Two facility.” The benefits to the Southern California region
will be significant and far-reaching. The SES SolarTwo generating facility will help California meet
its renewable energy requirements while achieving the mandates to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. The SunCatcher technology consumes no water for cooling and uses very little water
to keep the mirrors clean. The project will also spark an industry that will provide exceptional
economic benefits. The SES
Solar Two project is expected to generate 700 construction jobs, 160 permanent jobs, and
millions
of dollars in wages and taxes.

Solar power is key to get our energy independence and diverse portfolio that’s key to
avoid price fluctuations and volatility
SES 06 (Solar Energy Systems Limited, specialist in Solar Energy Generation technology,
subsidiary of Greenworld Solutions Ltd., “Why Solar?” http://solensys.net/b/docs/why_solar.html)
Investing in solar power increases our world's energy independence and energy security. The
current world's energy crisis was just the latest in a long cycle of price fluctuations. The energy
market will always be volatile, particularly since the fossil fuels that power it will eventually dry
up completely. Ultimately, the best way for cities to reduce their vulnerability to unstable energy
markets is to produce more of their own electricity sustainably with substantial investments in
solar and other renewable sources. Moreover, renewables offer a smart way to create a diverse
energy portfolio. Limited sources of energy make consumers more vulnerable to unpredictable
price fluctuations. Just as a smart investor invests in a diverse range of stocks, it is prudent for
individuals to have an energy portfolio that includes a range of generation technologies.

Solar energy reduces greenhouse gases and increases efficiency


ScienceDaily 07 (“Solar Energy Conversion offers a solution to global warming,”
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/03/070307075611.htm)
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
104/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Solar energy has the power to reduce greenhouse gases and provide increased energy efficiency,
says a scientist at the U.S. Department of Energy's Argonne National Laboratory, in a report
(view it online) published in the March issue of Physics Today. Last month, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) of the United Nations released a report confirming global
warming is upon us and attributing the growing threat to the man-made burning of fossil fuels.
Opportunities to increase solar energy conversion as an alternative to fossil fuels are addressed
in the Physics Today article, co-authored by George Crabtree, senior scientist and director of
Argonne's Materials Science Division, and Nathan Lewis, professor of Chemistry at Caltech and
director of its Molecular Materials Research Center.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
105/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Resource PICS—Solar Energy (2/2)
Solar power ensures energy independence and security – its key to create a diverse
energy portfolio that key to success
VoteSolar no date (“Why Solar,” http://www.votesolar.org/whysolar.html)

Investing in solar power increases our nation's energy independence and energy security.
California's energy crisis was just the latest in a long cycle of price fluctuations. The energy
market will always be volatile, particularly since the fossil fuels that power it come from abroad
and will eventually dry up completely. Ultimately, the best way for cities to reduce their
vulnerability to unstable energy markets is to produce more of their own electricity sustainably
with substantial investments in solar and other renewable sources.
Moreover, renewables offer a smart way to create a diverse energy portfolio. Limited sources
of energy make consumers more vulnerable to unpredictable price fluctuations. Just as a smart
investor invests in a diverse range of stocks, it is prudent for cities to have an energy portfolio
that includes a range of generation technologies.

Solar power is inevitable – now is a key time


Wenzel 08 (Elsa, “Barriers to solar energy’s blockbuster promise,”
http://news.cnet.com/8301-11128_3-9939715-54.html)

Solar power hasn't swept the nation but it must and will, said members of utilities, clean-tech
start-ups, venture capital firms, and academia at the Big Solar conference here
Wednesday.California will literally live up to its "Golden State" nickname and shine as a model for
the rest of the country thanks to progressive lawmakers, Silicon Valley dealmakers, and
innovators at state and university labs, according to the event's many optimists."The time has
come in the United States for large-scale solar," said Ed Smeloff, senior manager of utility project
sales at SunPower, a maker of solar systems including those at the nation's largest plant at Nellis
Air Force Base in Nevada. "The wind is to our backs on this."Among the bright points noted by
Smeloff and others, each presidential candidate supports clean energy, of which solar is the best
understood.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
106/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Resource PICS—Wind Energy
Wind energy is the bedrock for other renewable energy developments and a secure,
diverse energy portfolio
Arvizu 05 (Dr. Dan, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, “Windpower 2005 – Banquet
Keynote Speech, http://www.nrel.gov/director/awea_051705.html)

The only practical answer lies in a diverse energy portfolio and to accelerate the development
and use of new energy technologies. As Carl Weinberg has put it, what we really need is "silver
buckshot."
First in this portfolio, I believe, must be energy efficiency — there's so much we can do by simply
using energy more intelligently. We need to be able to capture a large fraction of that almost 1/3
of our energy economy that is not put to useful work. But we also need to bring on new supplies
from renewable energy, non-polluting transportation fuels, decarbonized fossil technologies that
capture and sequester CO2, advanced nuclear fission and fusion technologies, as well as
development of clean energy carriers like electricity and hydrogen.
All of which brings me to the AWEA conference this week. The wind community is to be
applauded. Wind energy is one of the great energy success stories over the past 30 years. I can
recall my first exposure to wind turbine demos at Sandia in the late 70s, early 80s when the rotor
diameter of prototype turbines was 1.5 meters! Today, wind is poised to play a pivotal role in the
world's energy future. We all know that wind power is one of the fastest growing energy sources
in the world. But to claim a chapter in tomorrow's history books, the greater renewable energy
community must step up to the challenge of satisfying a major portion of that future 20 terawatt
clean energy shortfall that is expected by 2050. The trail is being blazed by wind today but must
soon be followed by other renewable technologies, like PV, solar, biomass, and geothermal
energy. If wind falters, the path for less mature renewable technologies will be more difficult and
we run the risk that the vision of a diverse and secure national energy portfolio will remain just
that — a vision.

Wind power is critical to maintain a diverse portfolio


PrNewswire 08 (“PG&E Increases Renewable Portfolio With Horizon Wind Energy,”
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m4PRN/is_2008_July_1/ai_n27877980)

Pacific Gas and Electric Company has increased its portfolio of renewables with the signing of a
long-term agreement to purchase wind energy from the Arlington Wind Power Project, LLC, a
subsidiary of Horizon Wind Energy, LLC. Horizon will deliver 240 gigawatt hours of renewable
wind energy annually to PG&E's customers throughout northern and central California."Clean
wind power is an integral part of our diverse renewable energy portfolio, which includes
hydroelectric, geothermal, solar, wave and biomass resources," said Fong Wan, vice president of
Energy Procurement for PG&E. "Renewable resources continue to play a critical role in our
commitment to provide our customers with reliable, clean, environmentally preferred energy."

Wind energy is essential to the portfolio and provides a hedge against price
fluctuations
Anthony 08 (Jeff, Manager of Utility Programs and Policy, AWEA, “Clearing the Air: Wind Power
and Reliability,” http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/story?id=51767)
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
107/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
"Wind energy is an integral piece of our power supply portfolio. It provides a hedge against fuel
price volatility associated with other forms of electric generation. "Can We Rely on Wind Power?
Yes. Wind power is currently supplying 48 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) of electricity annually in
the U.S., powering the equivalent of over 4.5 million homes. Wind power is an important part of
electric utility generation portfolios. Yet some question whether wind power, being a variable
resource (meaning it generates electricity when the wind is blowing, not on demand) can be
relied upon as part of a system that provides reliable electricity to consumers without
interruption. Based on a growing body of analytical and operational experience, the answer is a
resounding "yes." According to many utilities and reliability authorities, wind power can readily
be accommodated into electric system operations reliably and economically.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
108/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Resource PICS—Geothermal/Biomass
Geothermal energy can offset global warming and avoid impact of overusing fossil
fuels
WordPress 08 (“Can Geothermal Energy Offset Global Warming,”
http://renewenergy.wordpress.com/2008/01/22/can-geothermal-energy-offset-global-warming/)
If we extract enough heat from the earth using geothermal energy, could we offset global
warming? Answer: To oversimplify, geothermal electricity consists of: Locating a suitable
geothermal reservoir (underground collection of hot water or steam). Drilling a well to penetrate
the hot underground water or vapor (geothermal fluid). Extracting the hot fluid. Using a power
plant and related infrastructure to produce electricity, cool the geothermal fluid, and inject some
of it back into the system for reuse. Since we are using the heat of the earth to run the power
plant, some of this energy is transformed into electricity. This means there will be a net heat loss
from the reservoir, and the earth temperature must decrease (blame the laws of
thermodynamics). Your question is, could we do enough of this to actually measurably cool the
earth. The simple answer is no-geothermal does result in cooling, but the impact is insignificant.
Some 42 million megawatts of energy reach the surface continually and are radiated into space as the
earth cools from its initial molten state more than 4 billion years ago. No feasible amount of geothermal
development could make even a small dent in this process. Furthermore, the earth’s heat budget is
continually replenished by the radioactive decay of naturally occurring elements, and almost all of the
energy associated with each decay event is converted to heat. Plus, the heat content of the geothermal
reservoir rocks is continually replenished by conduction of heat from the earth’s deeper interior. But, if
you’re thinking about global warming, using all of that heat to provide clean energy is obviously a way to
go. Like the sunlight hitting the earth every day, the energy available from the heat of the earth is
enormous and largely unused as a source of energy. If we could tap just a fraction of the heat reaching the
surface of the earth every year, we could provide all of the heat and power needed to run our society, and
avoid the potentially tragic consequences of overusing fossil fuels.

Geothermal solves warming


GEA no date (Geothermal Energy Association, ade association composed of U.S. companies who support
the expanded use of geothermal energy and are developing geothermal Resources worldwide for electrical
power generation and direct-heat uses, http://www.geo-energy.org/gea/gea.asp)

Geothermal power plants emit very low levels of one of the most significant gases known to induce global
warming: carbon dioxide. According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), carbon dioxide
accounts for 83 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. (1) Experts generally agree that global
warming poses significant environmental and health impacts, including flood risks, glacial
melting problems, forest fires, increases in sea level, and loss of biodiversity.(2) Geothermal
power plants emit only a small fraction of the carbon dioxide emitted by traditional power plants
on a per-megawatt hour basis, and can help reduce the overall release of carbon dioxide into the
atmosphere

Biomass in RPS specifically is key for electricity generation


EIA no date Energy Information Administration, Official Energy Statistics from the US
Government, “Biomass for Electricity Generation,”
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/biomass/

The U.S. economy uses biomass-based materials as a source of energy in many ways. Wood and
agricultural residues are burned as a fuel for cogeneration of steam and electricity in the
industrial sector. Biomass is used for power generation in the electricity sector and for space
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
109/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
heating in residential and commercial buildings. Biomass can be converted to a liquid form for
use as a transportation fuel, and research is being conducted on the production of fuels and
chemicals from biomass. Biomass materials can also be used directly in the manufacture of a
variety of products. In the electricity sector, biomass is used for power generation. The Energy
Information Administration (EIA), in its Annual Energy Outlook 2002 (AEO2002) reference case,1
projects that biomass will generate 15.3 billion kilowatthours of electricity, or 0.3 percent of the
projected 5,476 billion kilowatthours of total generation, in 2020. In scenarios that reflect the
impact of a 20-percent renewable portfolio standard (RPS)2 and in scenarios that assume carbon
dioxide emission reduction requirements based on the Kyoto Protocol,3 electricity generation
from biomass is projected to increase substantially.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
110/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Resource PICS—RPS= only and all renewables
RPS should include all renewables and exclude none
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

A national RPS should include all renewable resources and discriminate against none. The
definition of eligible renewable resources could be based on the renewable aspects of the fuels
used rather than any particular technologies deployed. For instance, eligible resources could be
defined as: Any electrical generator that creates electricity from sunlight, wind, falling water,
renewable plant or animal material, and/or natural geothermal sources. A fuel-based definition
does not rely on policymakers to determine the forms of technology that should receive market
preference and does not require policymakers to continuously revise the mandate to include new
technology that may be developed. By including both new and existing generators as eligible
resources, a national RPS would avoid bitter debates concerning whether certain “upgrades” to
existing systems make them “new,” as with the feud over New Source Review under the Clean
Air Act. Gradual benchmarks ensure that new renewable generation is developed without having
to distinguish between “existing” and “new” renewable energy systems. Avoiding this debate
reduces administrative complexity and frees generators from continuously monitoring regulatory
rulings to determine whether a particular expenditure will be considered maintenance and
refurbishment of an existing facility or a new investment that qualifies toward the RPS mandate.
A fuel-based definition of eligible resources would include large hydroelectric facilities. The
construction of new hydroelectric facilities and incremental improvements to existing ones could
help utilities to use renewable resources to provide base-load power. Including incremental
hydropower also allows areas like the Southeast and the Pacific Northwest to benefit from their
regions’ substantial sources of existing clean energy. And, finally, a fuel-based definition of
eligible resources would ensure that truly renewable resources attain a greater proportion of the
nation’s electricity fuel portfolio. While alternative technologies such as non-renewable
distributed generation, clean coal with carbon capture and storage, and energy efficiency should
be encouraged, there are strong market-based reasons that they should not be directly included
in an RPS. Such sources would neither diversify energy resources nor achieve the economic
benefits of a vibrant renewable energy sector. Renewables should compete with other
renewables, just as clean coal should compete with dirty coal and light water reactors with
advanced nuclear generators. Healthy market-based competition ensures that the best
mechanisms for utilizing each fuel source are supported.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
111/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Resource PICS—Wind power key
Wind power is the most used renewable- used 93% of the time
William Yeatman and Myron Ebell (Yeatman is an Energy Policy Analyst at the Competitive
Enterprise Institute (CEI). Myron Ebell is the Director of Energy and Global Warming Policy at CEI,
June 12, 2007, “Gone with the wind,” http://cei.org/pdf/5982.pdf).

Renewable Energy is Wind Energy. The notion that an RPS will include a “portfolio” of
renewable energy sources is misleading—wind energy is the only economically viable
renewable energy source given current technologies. Although other renewable sources,
such as biomass and solar, have long-term potential, they are currently no more than niche
technologies. Even assuming that these technologies improve significantly in the next
decade or two, a major logistical obstacle will remain. The technology to convert biomass
into electricity remains prohibitively expensive and uncertain. Huge investments will be
needed to build infrastructure to gather and transport large quantities of biomass to
generating plants. With solar energy, the near-term potential is almost certainly at the
consumer level rather than large-scale generation, again because of cost and reliability
issues. In other words, the potential for photovoltaic panels is greater on rooftops than
across deserts. Wind power, on the other hand, is an established technology. In an analysis
of the impact of a 10-percent nationwide RPS on the energy industry, the federal Energy
Information Administration (EIA) found that “non-hydro electric technologies such as
geothermal, solar thermal, solar photovoltaic, and ocean technologies are not projected to
have net capacity additions.”2 As of 2004, of the estimated 2,335 megawatts of renewable
energy use attributable to state renewable standards, 2,183 megawatts (93 percent) were
generated by wind.3 Thus, a renewable portfolio standard is, in reality, a mandate for wind
power.

*This might be a dangerous card, just look over it. Also the pdf has a lot of RPS neg stuff
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
112/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Resource PICS—Solar power viable/competitive
Solar power industry is growing and becoming increasingly competitive
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

Most companies now have extensive stockpiles of silicon needed to guarantee PV


production, and many have signed fixed-price contracts guaranteeing a supply of
silicon.345 The CFO of one large international PV manufacturer recently boasted that, “at
this time we have 100 percent of our silicon wafer supply contractually secured.”346 The
sale of Shell Solar’s crystalline solar business to SolarWorld in 2006 is expected to secure
even more access to silicon and promote more efficient production processes with higher
yields.347 Since the high demand for PV modules has enabled manufactures to pre-pay for
supply, many silicon companies have massively expanded their production processes:
Tokuyama is building a 200-ton half commercial vapor to liquid distillation pilot plant in
Japan. Wacker already has a 100-ton fluidized bed reactor pilot plant in Germany. The
company REC is looking to build a 200-ton pilot plant in Moses Lake, WA. These expansions
ensure that an additional silicon production capacity of 5,900 tons per year dedicated
exclusively for PV arrays will come online in 2008.348 Annual revenues for the solar
industry are expected to increase more than fourfold from $20 billion 2006 to $90 billion in
2010. At the same time, production costs are projected to fall dramatically.349 In April,
2007, the managing director of Australia’s largest PV manufacturer, noted that the industry
was seeing “incremental changes in innovation which are pushing down costs and helping
the sector's expansion.” He concluded that falling costs will make the solar power industry
increasingly competitive.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
113/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2: exclude some power provider PIC
Exceptions create confusion, decrease competition, and lead to failure
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

Some state-based RPS statutes initially excluded some power providers in an attempt to
protect certain types of utilities. In practice, the attempt to carve out exemptions through
imprecise statutory language created confusion and uncertainty for regulated entities. In
Connecticut, for example, the state’s RPS exempted default service providers, creating
speculation among all of the state’s regulated utilities that the law would not be enforced at
all.362 And in Washington, utilities with no load growth are exempted from the state’s RPS
mandate, if parts of the state experience decreased population growth or diminished
electricity demand, load serving entities would be absolved from their regulatory burden
entirely.363 Applying the standard to all retail power providers—including investor owned
utilities, publicly owned utilities, municipalities, and rural electric cooperatives—creates an
equal playing field and avoids creating inconsistencies in regulation. Requiring all retail
providers to meet the mandate reduces opportunities for “free riders” within the electricity
sector. Regulated utilities, which pay to clean the air and conserve the water, would not be
required to subsidize the generation of dirty, low-cost non-renewable electricity from
exempt generators. A standard applying to all providers also creates better economies of
scale and ultimately helps drive down the cost of renewable generation for all suppliers. By
applying the mandate uniformly and without exemption, a national RPS avoids the kind of
regulatory unpredictability that initially plagued Connecticut’s program.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
114/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2: not 20% CP
RPS of 20% by 2020 economically works the best
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

Lesson 1: The RPS target must be large enough to create economies of scale, but phased in
gradually to protect utilities. To bring the benefits of renewable energy to most consumers,
a national RPS must set a target large enough to achieve economies of scale in
manufacturing. Economic models have found significant benefits from a 20 percent by 2020
mandate, for example. If the target is not set large enough, it may fail to promote
renewable energy technologies at all. The clearest example of a state RPS that has failed to
produce new renewable energy is Maine. The Maine legislature passed an RPS that took
effect in March, 2000, setting an immediate and seemingly large target of 30 (and including
large hydroelectric facilities as an eligible resource). However, existing hydroelectric,
biomass, and landfill gas generators in the state were already exceeding the standard.356
NREL analysts concluded that Maine’s RPS, “has failed to lead to any new renewable
resources, and has failed to generate significant revenues above commodity electricity
market prices.”357 Even the Maine Public Utilities Commission admitted that “the
experience to date, however, reveals that the current portfolio requirement is not satisfying
the Restructuring Act’s stated policy of encouraging the promotion of new renewable
energy resources.”358
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
115/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 ptc cp

PTC causes cost overruns a that RPS avoids


Birgisson 6 – renewable energy lawyer (Gunnar and Erik Petersen, Renewable Energy Development Incentives, Electricity
journal 19.3, ScienceDirect, AG)

The interplay between the PTC and RPSs also warrants consideration. While the PTC at present is a key
factor in developing renewable energy, its future raises many questions. One concern is whether the continued
growth of wind energy might in fact threaten the PTC and turn it into a victim of its own success.
The PTC gives tax credits for the entire output of a qualifying generator for 10 years and there is
no yearly cap on each plant or all plants. As more wind and other renewable energy projects
come on-line and earn the 10-year PTC, the impact on the federal budget grows. This acceleration will
be magnified as RPSs ramp up, greater amounts of renewable energy are generated, and PTC allocations rise. As RPS requirements
It is an open question whether or not
increase, there will be increasingly large tax credits to entities that hold PTCs.
this is sustainable. It would also appear that well-developed mandatory wholesale procurement
standards render subsidies such as the PTC redundant. Mandatory wholesale procurement
requires retail providers to procure renewable energy. The costs of the renewable energy and the
conventional energy that the retail provider procures are included in the retail rates paid by
customers. Providing subsidies outside this structure would be redundant if all utilities were
subject to mandatory wholesale procurement.

Ptc isn’t comprehensive


Shoock 7 – JD Fordham Law (Corey, 12 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 1011, AG)

Beyond the start-again-stop-again nature of the PTC, a cycle which [*1046] EPAct 2005 continued, 290 the problem with the
legislation as far as both the renewable energy industry and its non-commercially motivated proponents were concerned was that it,
included heavy appropriations to fossil fuel-based initiatives.
like electricity production policies before it, also
291 The Act provided a 300 million barrel expansion to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (from 700 million
barrels to 1 billion), provided "accelerated review and approval processes for new refinery facilities,"
and appropriated $ 1.8 billion worth of funding to subsidize costly "clean coal" facilities. 292 The
funding of both renewable energy and fossil fuels by the federal government show that Congress is most concerned with keeping
prices down for electricity rather than promoting a particular industry over another. Given the stark differences between the two
candidates for legislative support, Congress seems to have disregarded fossil fuel externalities. When taking into account the capital-
intensive nature of "clean coal," in which one of the most promising procedures involves burning gasified coal and pumping a mixture
of the fumes under ground risking leaks and water contamination, 293 the federal government appears to be, as the adage goes,
"robbing Peter to pay Paul." Critics cite that the only parties who benefit from a boondoggle like this are fossil-fuel burning utilities,
mining companies, and energy lobbyists. 294
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
116/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 tax solves CP
Tax incentives fail without RPS
Union of Concerned Scientists 8/27/07
(http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/clean_energy_policies/the-renewable-electricity-
standard.html#5) [S. Page]
Setting minimum standards has been an effective and essential policy for achieving many
critical societal goals, such as increasing vehicle and appliance efficiency, company
environmental performance, and building and product safety. Renewable energy production
tax credits are vital for leveling the tax playing field with fuel-intensive technologies that pay
lower property taxes and can deduct fuel expenses, but do not necessarily overcome other
critical market barriers. In order to ensure the tax credits are effective, there needs to be a
policy that creates a market for the technologies. For example, the production tax credit for
wind has produced most new wind capacity in states that also have a state RES. The RES
creates a market for renewable technologies that are commercially viable or close to viable
and helps reduce their costs (see below). Complementary policies, including net metering and
other financial incentives, are also needed to encourage the development of higher cost
renewable emerging technologies with significant long term potential such as customer-sited
solar photovoltaics. The combination of setting minimum standards, while providing incentives
for exceeding standards has proven to be a cost-effective approach to improving performance.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
117/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Politics—Controversy

RPS stalls the agenda—makes compromises impossible


Drabick 3 – Environmental and Energy Study Institute (J.R., State Policies Set Mandates for Renewable Energy, BioCycle 44.10, p
40, ebsco, AG)

Before the bill becomes law, however, it must first be reconciled with the House of Representatives energy bill passed in April that
does not include an RPS standard. The Congress failed to pass an energy bill last year because the House
and Senate could not craft a compromise. The Senate's energy bill this year is an exact duplicate of the bill it passed
last year, which contained an RPS. The RPS and the electricity title overall were major areas of disagreement in last
year's conference. Republican leadership, however, has expressed confidence that a compromise energy bill will be enacted
this fall.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
118/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Politics—GOP hates
GOP hates
Sovacool 7 (Benjamin and Jack Barkenbus, Necessary but Insufficient, Environment 49.6, Ebsco, AG)

In the last 10 years—from 1997 to 2006—federal bills promoting RPS were introduced in
Congress 17 times.12 In addition, 102 legislative proposals dealing with climate change have
been introduced from 1997 to 2004.13 All have been beaten back by Republican-dominated
Congresses. It is safe to say, therefore, that considerable state action in both cases has arisen
not because of some judgment that statebased action is optimal or preferable but rather
because of the perceived policy vacuum at the federal level.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
119/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Politics—Plan pop with public
Although generally unpopular, RPS stimulates infrastructure development gaining
public popularity
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

Transmission – A National RPS Speeds Investment in Critical Infrastructure • Utilities benefit


from congestion pricing. When transmission is saturated, prices increase because there is
not enough electricity to meet demand. Market forces create perverse incentives for some
utilities to profit from congestion prices, delaying new transmission until the system is at
risk of catastrophic failure. • A national RPS forces critical transmission system upgrades
Maintaining adequate transmission will require the construction of 26,600 miles of new
transmission in the next decade, quadrupling planned expenditures to $56 billion by 2011. •
Renewable energy overcomes public objection to new transmission lines Case studies show
that public opposition to transmission lines turns into widespread support when utilities
justify the infrastructure with the need to interconnect new renewable generation. • A
national RPS speeds recovery of transmission investments Because of their quicker lead-
times, renewable energy systems can start providing revenue to help pay down debt on
transmission investments while conventional plants are waiting to come online. Expedited
debt repayment decreases capital costs and lowers electricity rates.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
120/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
Politics—Plan unpop

National RPS is so unpopular that it has already been rejected 17 times in Congress
Solve Climate (“Renewable Portfolio Standards: America’s clean energy standard,” 4/24/2008,
http://solveclimate.com/blog/20080424/renewable-portfolio-standards-america-s-clean-energy-
savior).

Seems obvious, especially when you throw this into the mix: The Network for New Energy
Choices found in its 2007 report that a national RPS would create 80% more jobs than
comparable investment in fossil fuels and would save electricity consumers in every region
money -- $49.1 billion nationwide, in fact. The problem? A national RPS requires coordinated
and coherent federal leadership on climate change and energy. Over the past ten years, a
federal RPS has been considered by Congress -- and rejected -- 17 times. The US Senate has
passed some form of it three times since 2002. The House passed one in 2007. Congress has
never managed to agree on a common RPS. And, to drive the point home, the one other
proven policy that has spurred clean energy development in America -- the federal tax credit for
renewables -- is on the verge of expiring and could be on the chopping block in Washington, too.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
121/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Price DA—Electricity/Gas
RPS saves consumers money by driving down gas prices and electricity rates
Sovacool 8 (Benjamin, A Matter of Stability and Equity, Energy & Environment 19.2, IgentaConnect, AG)

UCS determined that a 20 percent by 2020 federal RPS would decrease consumer energy bills by an average of 1.5 percent per
year and save consumers a total of $49.1 A Matter of Stability and Equity: The Case for Federal Action on 253 Renewable Portfolio
According to UCS, a 20
Standards in the U.S. billion (in 2002 dollars) on their electricity and natural gas bills by 2020. [45]
percent RPS by 2020 would lead to substantial cost-savings for four reasons: A national RPS
would reduce competition for fossil fuels and lower future prices of coal and natural gas. Many
renewable energy technologies are now less expensive than new fossil fuel plants that generate
the same amount of energy. A national RPS would reduce the cost of renewable energy by
creating economies of scale in manufacturing, installation, operations and maintenance.
Increased reliance on renewable energy would offset expensive natural gas-fired generation, and
“hedge” against volatile natural gas prices. The economics for renewable energy have become
so favorable in recent years because operation and maintenance expenses for utilities utilizing
fossil fuels rose by nearly $26 billion from 2002 to 2006. Ninety-six percent of this increase was driven by rising
fossil fuel prices, not because parts or labor had gotten more expensive. [46] Aggregate fossil fuel costs nearly doubled in the four
years between 2000 and 2004, from $0.023 per kWh, to $0.0437 per kWh. The overbuilding of gas-fired peaking plants in the 1990s
resulted in skyrocketing demand for natural gas, which, in turn, caused prices to surge. Between 1995 and 2005, natural gas prices
rose by an average of 15 percent per year. As a result, many electricity generators switched back to coal-fired peaking units. But the
switch only increased demand for coal, driving the price up. In 2003, for example, the cost of coal in Central Appalachia was $35 per
A
ton. The price increased nearly 7 percent each year until, by 2006, a ton of coal in the same region cost close to $60 a ton. [47]
national RPS can save consumers money especially by reducing demand for natural gas . Several
studies have documented that an increase in renewable energy production would decrease costs for electricity generation by
Because some renewable resources generate the most
offsetting the combustion of natural gas. [48]
electricity during periods of peak demand, they can help offset electricity otherwise derived from
natural gas-fired “peaking” or reserve generation units. Photovoltaics, for example, have great value as a reliable
source of power during extreme peak loads. Substantial evidence from many peer-reviewed studies
demonstrates an excellent correlation between available solar resources and periods of peak
demand. In California, for example, an installed PV array with a capacity of 5,000 MW reduces the peak load for that day by about
3,000 MW, cutting in half the number of natural- gas “peakers” needed to ensure reserve capacity. [49] The value of
renewable energy to offset natural gas combustion varies with the projected supply (and thus the
price) of natural gas. When demand for natural gas increases (or supply decreases), its price increases
and so does the value of the renewable resources used to displace it. Researchers at Resources
for the Future calculated that, given the historic volatility of the natural gas market, a 1 percent
reduction in natural gas demand can reduce the price of natural gas by up to 2.5 percent in the
long term. [50] This inverse relationship between renewable generation and natural gas prices was confirmed by researchers at
the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) who reviewed the projected effect of 20 different RPS
scenarios on future natural gas prices: Each 1 percent reduction in natural gas demand could
lead to long-term average wellhead price reductions of 0.8 percent to 2 percent, with some of
the models predicting more aggressive reductions. Reductions in the wellhead price will not only
have the effect of reducing wholesale and retail electricity rates but will also reduce residential,
commercial, and industrial gas bills. [51] LBNL researchers reviewed 13 studies and 20 specific analyses all confirming
that the higher the level of renewable energy penetration, the more gas is saved and the more gas prices are reduced. Nine of fifteen
studies specifically evaluating national RPS proposals of 10 to 20 percent found that consumers would save anywhere
from $10 to $40 billion from decreased natural gas prices. [52] By developing indigenous renewable
resources, all regions also can enjoy substantial cost savings from decreased fossil fuel transportation costs. The University of
Wyoming estimates that up to 80 percent of the cost of coal for ratepayers in Illinois is to cover railway costs. Coal at the mouth of a
mine in Wyoming, for example, costs about $5 per ton. By the time it reaches a power plant outside of Chicago, that same coal costs
about $30. The cumulative costs to transport natural gas may be even higher. Natural gas transportation and distribution already
account for 41 percent of the residential price of natural gas. Since the construction of natural gas pipelines can cost as much as
$420,000 per mile [53], fully constructing the natural gas infrastructure recommended by the Administration’s National Energy Plan
(which calls for over 301,000 miles of new natural gas transmission and distribution pipelines) could cost ratepayers as much as
Why do some utilities claim that a national RPS would substantially increase
$126.4 billion. [54]
electricity prices, given the overwhelming consensus that investment in renewable energy could
offset rising natural gas prices? Increasingly, investors are exploring how renewable resources can serve as a hedge
against electricity sector risks [55], especially the financial risks associated with natural gas price volatility and the risk of future
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
122/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
environmental regulations. [56] Utilities trying to hedge against the volatility of natural gas prices forecast future costs. Historically,
utility analyses have tended to rely on uncertain longterm forecasts of spot natural gas prices
rather than on prices that can be locked-in through futures, or fixed-priced supply contracts (called “forward”
prices). On first glance, it would appear that comparing fixed-priced renewable resources to volatile natural gas prices would favor
renewable technologies. However, LBNL researchers compared forward gas prices from 2000 to 2003 to
utility forecasts of natural gas prices (based on the EIA reference case over this same period) and found that the
methodology used by most utilities to compare the projected cost of renewable energy to the
projected cost of natural gas created a bias in favor of the gas. The authors noted that: Utilities and
others who have conducted resource acquisition, planning and modeling studies based on EIA reference case (as well as other) gas
price forecasts...have arguably produced “biased” results that favor variable-price gas-fired over fixed-price renewable generation,
potentially to the tune of ~0.4–0.6 cents/kWh levelized. This is because if consumers are rational and value price stability, then the
cost of fixed-price renewable generation should be compared to the hedged or guaranteed cost of natural gas-fired generation, rather
than to projected costs based on uncertain gas price forecasts. [57] According to LBNL’s findings, there is a
premium associated with purchasing large volumes of natural gas at a guaranteed price that
most utilities do not account for when comparing the cost of natural gas-fired generation to the
cost of renewable generation. If utilities accounted for this “hedging” cost, renewable energy
would be substantially cheaper in many cases. Since the supply of renewable resources is, by definition,
inexhaustible, the cost of fueling a renewable energy system is “fixed”. By underestimating the hedging costs associated with fossil
fuels and overlooking the cost-savings of fixed-price renewable fuels, most utility estimates are skewed against renewable
generation.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
123/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Price DA—Must Read
Electricity prices won’t skyrocket—their statistics rely on false assumptions and ours
are more qualified
Cooper 8 (Christopher, A National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Politically Correct or Just Plain Correct?, Electricity journal 21.5,
ScienceDirect, AG)

One of the more curious criticisms Michaels launches against a national RPS policy is his claim
that fixed-price renewable fuels that displace variably-priced fossil fuels merely transfer risk from
utilities to customers. Citing a study he wrote himself more than 12 years ago, Michaels
asserts that “the fixed-price wind contract, however, gives the utility a predictable stream of expenses that regulators will almost
surely approve. The contract shifts risks to captives and conceals the magnitude of those risks.” Presumably, the magnitude of the
risk that is shifted from utilities to customers depends on the volatility of the natural gas market. So Michaels concludes that “the
utility gets a bargain when gas is expensive and overpays when it is low.” But Michaels’ dismissal of the benefits of
fixed-price renewables relies on a simplistic explanation of utility resource planning and natural
gas markets. Utilities that try to use renewables to hedge against the volatility of natural gas
prices generally attempt to estimate future costs using uncertain long-term forecasts of spot
natural gas prices rather than prices that can be locked in through futures or fixed-price
contracts (called “forward” prices). This calculation ignores the significant risk inherent in this transaction. As Michaels
admits, if uncertain forecasts underestimate the cost of natural gas when it is actually
purchased, the utility that bet on gas instead of renewables will have overpaid tremendously in
opportunity costs. Researchers at the Berkeley Lab compared forward gas prices from 2000 to
2003 with utility forecasts of natural gas prices over the same period and found that the utility
forecasts produced a bias in favor of natural gas generation that amounted to anywhere from 0.4
to 0.6 cents per kWh levelized. In other words, the Berkeley Lab found that the additional risk associated
with betting on variably-priced natural gas over fixed-price renewable generation cost utilities a
premium even before the price differential of the fuel is considered. This is because, “if consumers are
rational and value price stability, then the cost of fixed-price renewable generation should be compared to
the hedged or guaranteed cost of natural gas-fired generation, rather than to projected costs
based on uncertain gas price forecasts.”12 Michaels’ claim that fixed-price renewables contracts
merely shift risk to consumers appears to ignore this “risk premium” altogether. By decreasing
the total amount of assumed risk, relying on renewables to displace variably-priced natural gas
generation saves consumers money even if it shifts more of the risk to them. The risk (and hence the
cost) diminishes independent of the price a utility ultimately pays (or would have paid) for the natural gas. But even a simplistic
overwhelming amount of evidence buttresses former
model of assumed risk favors fixed-price renewables. An
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan's prediction in 2003 that “today's tight natural gas
markets have been a long time in coming, and future prices suggest that we are not apt to return
to earlier periods of relative abundance anytime soon .”13 Shrinking reserve margins, delay in the
construction of new gas pipelines, more stringent emissions regulations, and the likelihood of
future carbon controls will all contribute to an increased demand for natural gas by the electricity
sector and virtually guarantee that the price of natural gas will continue to increase.14
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
124/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Price DA—Ext
RPS decreases natural gas prices and electricity price rises would be small—prefer
official sources
Drabick 3 – Environmental and Energy Study Institute (J.R., State Policies Set Mandates for Renewable Energy, BioCycle 44.10, p
39, ebsco, AG)

According to EIA, a 20
Most importantly, however, an RPS can help achieve these benefits at little extra cost to consumers.
percent by 2020 national RPS would lead to a four percent increase in electricity prices in 2020,
and would actually decrease natural gas wellhead prices by 17 percent in 2020, as compared to
their reference case. With such little cost implications, the reliability, economic security, and environmental and public health
benefits of an RPS become even more attractive.

[EIA provides official energy statistics from the Department of Energy]

The true social cost of status quo energy reliance is long term—this outweighs
immeditate link
Sovacool 8 (Benjamin, Renewable Energy: Economically Sound, Politically Difficult, Electricity journal 21.5, AG)

Researchers from the Alliance to Save Energy found that if damages in the form of noxious
emissions and impacts on human health resulting from combustion of coal, oil, and natural gas
were included in electricity prices, coal would cost 261.8 percent more than it does; oil 13.4 percent;
natural gas 0.5 percent. If priced to include the risks from greenhouse gas emissions and climate change, the costs of coal would rise
35 to 70 percent more; oil 9 to 18 percent more; natural gas 6 to 12 percent more. The researchers also found that if electricity was
priced this way, fossil fuel use would decrease 37.7 percent compared to projections; CO2 emissions would decrease 44.1 percent,
and GDP would improve 7.7 percent and household wealth jump 5.5 percent (primarily as the result of improved health).34 Daniel
Kammen and Sergio Pacca found that if they internalized the cost of mortality and asthma – just two items – into electricity rates, and
assumed the value of a life was $5 million (cheap in my opinion), then the annual cost of operation for conventional coal power plants
in Illinois, Massachusetts, and Washington was 50 ¢/kWh, almost eight times higher than the average 6.5 ¢/kWh paid by
consumers.35 How does such an unfair and polluting system continue, astute readers may ask? Greenpeace estimated that
American oil, natural gas, and coal companies spend approximately $31 million every year on lobbying and campaign
contributions.36 During important elections, the numbers jump significantly: oil and gas companies contributed about $255 million to
political campaigns and electric utilities an additional $20 million for the presidential election in 2004. From 2003 to 2006, fossil fuel
lobbyists contributed about $58 million to state-level campaigns alone. Over the same period, renewable energy lobbyists spent just
The
$500,000.37 VII. Conclusion No, the sheer difficulty with promoting renewables is not economic but social and political.
challenge is to convince politicians to put the needs of the public above those of the industry,
and to get the electricity marketplace to function as it should in theory—to accurately price the
$422 billion in external costs that the industry surreptitiously shifts to society. Blaming the unfavorable
“economics” behind renewables when the existing electricity market is so distorted is almost as bad as believing that purple cows
make the milk in Europe.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
125/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Price DA—A2 Michaels
Michaels warrants go aff
Cooper 8 (Christopher, A National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Politically Correct or Just Plain Correct?, Electricity journal 21.5,
ScienceDirect, AG)

Internal contradictions are a tale-tell sign that an opponent's ideology has muddled his logic.
Michaels’ case against a national RPS is replete with them. For example, in a nod to economic determinism,
Michaels surmises, “if renewables were efficient compliance investments, utilities would already have chosen them.” The fact that
utilities have shown a “lack of interest,” he concludes, proves that RPS-induced investment in renewable fuels would represent a
misallocation of resources. Setting aside for the moment his claim that utilities have shown little interest in renewables, Michaels’
In trying to prove that a national RPS
own analysis undermines his claim that renewables are a poor use of utility funds.
is unnecessary to capture economies of scale in the manufacture of renewable technologies,
Michaels’ asserts that “the existing renewables industry has also had few problems accessing the
capital markets. New technologies are attracting venture capital and firms as large as General Electric are using their own cash,
all without a national RPS.” The contradiction is clear: if capital markets are flooding the renewables
industry with cash, why would utility investments in renewables represent a poor use of
resources? Or, to turn Michaels’ determinism against itself, if renewables really were a poor investment of
resources, venture capitalists would not be betting their own cash on the success of these
technologies. Another contradiction is even more obvious. In building his case against a national
RPS as an efficient emissions control policy, Michaels claims that “a national RPS will not affect
the total emissions of criteria pollutants.” According to Michaels, this is because utilities that are required to invest in
renewable generation in a world with a national RPS will sell their pollution allowances to utilities that “chose not pollute” because
allowances were too expensive. The availability of cheap pollution allowances, Michaels asserts, would lead to increased conventional
fuel combustion so that the result is no net decrease in emissions.8 But in another section of his analysis,Michaels asserts
that decreased demand for natural gas under a national RPS will not affect the long-term price of
natural gas because, “if the market is near equilibrium, the fall in demand will bring losses to
some producers, who will abandon the industry when divestment becomes feasible.” Production will
shrink, according to Michaels, until the price of natural gas increases and the marginal producer can break even. Michaels
advances this theory in order to prove that every dollar saved by users of natural gas represents
a dollar lost by natural gas producers so that “the net benefit to producers and consumers of gas
as a group is zero.” Michaels’ own analysis undermines his claim that renewables are a poor use
of utility funds. Unfortunately, the logic of his argument requires that Michaels admit that
renewable generation displaces natural gas combustion to such an extent that marginal
producers of natural gas would abandon the industry entirely. In other words, by Michaels’ own
assertion, natural gas producers would not benefit from all the new conventional generation that
he claims would result from the availability of cheap pollution allowances. Rather than spurring new
natural gas combustion from utilities that otherwise could not afford the pollution allowances, here Michaels admits that a
national RPS really would displace natural gas combustion (and to such an extent that the natural gas industry
shrinks in direct proportion to the growth in renewables). As non-polluting renewables displace polluting natural gas facilities under a
national RPS policy, total emissions of criteria pollutants decrease dramatically.

Michaels method is flawed and just proves why states bad


Cooper 8 (Christopher, A National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Politically Correct or Just Plain Correct?, Electricity journal 21.5,
ScienceDirect, AG)

Michaels’ analysis is based either on flawed or outdated data about renewable


Nevertheless,
generation induced by existing state RPS policies. For example, in determining renewable
generation developed as a result of state RPS policies, Michaels counts only generation
developed within the state. But there is ample evidence that developers are pursuing a
significant amount of new renewable generation within non-RPS states for the purpose of selling
the resulting electricity and/or RECs to states with RPS policies where they will command a better
price.9 In April 2008, the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory released its status report on
renewable portfolios standards in the United States with data through 2007. It is hard to miss the
report's determination that “regardless of the details, it is nevertheless evident that existing
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
126/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
state RPS policies have already had a sizeable impact on new renewable resource development.”
For example, Berkeley Lab estimates that from 2001 through 2007, roughly 65 percent of the total wind additions in the U.S. were
motivated, at least in part, by state RPS policies.10 If true, the criticism appears more an indictment of state RPS
compliance mechanisms than a justification for rejecting a national policy.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
127/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Price DA—A2 Transmission Costs
Transmission lines costs are low and non-unique
Cooper 8 (Christopher, A National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Politically Correct or Just Plain Correct?, Electricity journal 21.5,
ScienceDirect, AG)

A standard objection to RPS mandates that Michaels repeats in his analysis is that a national RPS
will cost billions of dollars in new transmission lines. According to Michaels, transmission lines required to access
new renewable generation would cost more per kWh than transmission required for new conventional generation because “a new line
in an interconnected grid normally increases reliability by providing an alternative path when another is out of service. Losing a radial
line to an isolated wind source, however, means that its power has no other path to loads and necessitates more costly reliability
Michaels’ analysis overlooks that much of this new transmission is or will be
arrangements.” Again,
required by existing state RPS policies. This oversight is especially alarming given that Michaels acknowledges, for
example, that, “integrating 10,000 MW of renewables (nearly all wind) to comply with Texas’ 2025 RPS will require between $1.7 and
$3.0 billion in new transmission.” Michaels’ may be arguing for rescinding the 25-plus state RPS policies. But, in the absence of such a
much of the transmission costs that Michaels attributes to a national RPS are
politically unlikely scenario,
really transmission costs that utilities will have to absorb as a result of state RPS policies. As
such, his objections cannot be considered a rational justification for rejecting a national RPS,
given the current political reality that state RPS policies not only exist, but are likely to expand to
more states in the near future.

Turn—national RPS decreases transmission costs


Cooper 8 (Christopher, A National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Politically Correct or Just Plain Correct?, Electricity journal 21.5,
ScienceDirect, AG)

Even so, there are good reasons why a national RPS will decrease the inevitable transmission costs
associated with state RPS policies and help speed the recovery of utility costs for new
transmission infrastructure. First, it is a fallacy that transmission required to access renewable
resources is any more restricted than transmission required to access conventional resources.
Whether because of environmental concerns or to cost-effectively access cheap sources of coal or natural gas, conventional
generation facilities are often located as far from load centers as some renewable generation
facilities. And any additional transmission required to access renewable resources can, if planned
correctly, add additional transmission capacity that increases reliability by providing an
alternative route for power when some lines are unavailable. Second, history proves false
Michaels’ claim that expanded connection of wind facilities prevents system operators from
economizing on reserves because “if units at one location are producing little, those at nearby locations are also likely to be
doing so.” In an analysis of actual output records from wind farms in New York State over a five-year period, researchers for
General Electric found that no sudden change in wind output was sufficiently rapid to qualify as a
loss-of-generation contingency that would affect grid stability. On the contrary, GE researchers found that,
while the wind can vary rapidly at a given location, when turbines are spread out in a project and projects are spread throughout the
state, an abrupt drop in total output becomes so unlikely that there was no need for backup baseload generation to ensure system
this research (as well as several other studies) indicates
reliability.15 In fact, counter to Michaels’ assertion,
that the greater geographical dispersion of renewable generation facilities that would be required
under a national RPS would increase grid reliability compared to a patchwork of state-based RPS
programs.16 Third, under new Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rules designed to create
incentives for investment in much-needed transmission infrastructure, utilities may begin to
recover the costs of transmission projects before the projects are completed and before new
capacity is available to use the infrastructure. In theory, this policy change decreases the cost of transmission to
ratepayers by allowing utilities to pay down the financing on a transmission project sooner rather than later. However, such an
arrangement raises the obvious question: how do utilities know what a transmission project will cost prior to the project's completion?
The answer is that FERC allows utilities to calculate a rate of return based on a “hypothetical capital
structure” that may end up being different from the actual capitalization of the transmission
project. This hypothetical case is used to estimate how much debt a project will incur relative to its equity. In theory, this
calculation would require utilities to assess future revenues derived from the transmission costs
of electricity that runs through the new infrastructure. But FERC's new rules also create an opportunity for
mischief. Under this new arrangement, unscrupulous utilities have an incentive to craft a hypothetical capital
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
128/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
structure with the goal of achieving excessive rates of return on transmission investments. Indeed,
during deliberations over the new rules, the American Public Power Association warned that hypothetical capital structures “can result
in an investor windfall that could substantially increase the actual levels to far in excess of the Commission's allowed return on
equity.”17
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
129/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Price DA—A2 Transmission Costs

RPS solves abuse by capital structures and recovers transmission costs, thus lowering
electricity prices
Cooper 8 (Christopher, A National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Politically Correct or Just Plain Correct?, Electricity journal 21.5,
ScienceDirect, AG)

There are at least three reasons why a national RPS provides FERC a check against the abuse of
hypothetical capital structures and helps speed the recovery of costs on transmission
infrastructure. First, because renewable energy projects have construction lead-times that are
years (or even decades) faster than conventional or nuclear facilities, they can start generating
electricity to be sold over new transmission lines much faster. Florida Power and Light (FPL), for instance,
boasted that it could take a wind farm from groundbreaking to commercial operation in as little as three to six months.18 In 2005,
Puget Sound Energy (PSE) proved FPL's boast was achievable in practice when it brought 83 1.8 MW wind turbines at its Hopkins
Ridge Wind Project from foundation pour to commercial operation in exactly six months and nine days.19 Second, renewable
generation may help overcome objections to transmission infrastructure. Ron Poff of American Electric
Power (AEP) has commented that “transmission is the most difficult project to site and more so than generation.”20 Poff should know.
In 1990, AEP sought permission to build an 89-mile transmission line through parts of West Virginia and Virginia. After major
concessions to objectors (including rerouting the line to avoid the area's rivers and wildlife), the project finally began transmitting
In most
power some 16 years later! Delays in transmission siting and development add substantially to the cost of infrastructure.
cases these costs are capitalized as the project moves forward, creating investor uncertainty and
adding to the costs eventually passed on to ratepayers. But some recent experiences suggest that utilities can
overcome opposition to transmission projects by justifying them as necessary to interconnect new renewable resources. In 2003, for
example, Xcel Energy received approval from the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission to site 178 miles of new transmission lines
and four new substations to facilitate a tripling in size of its Buffalo Ridge wind farm. Early in the public participation process, Xcel
justified the new transmission as critical to expanding wind power generation at Buffalo Ridge, whose transmission lines were already
fully subscribed. In a remarkable reversal of norms, local stakeholders accused the company of not proposing an adequate amount of
new transmission and not working to build it fast enough! Local landowners and advocates perceived the environmental and
economic benefits from renewable energy and that perception translated into overwhelming support for Xcel's transmission
upgrades.21 While not all utilities will achieve Xcel's level of success,the Buffalo Ridge experience provides a case
study for how utilities can win public support for network upgrades that would otherwise face
substantial opposition and delay. By justifying transmission expansions through RPS-induced
renewable generation, utilities can overcome opposition that would delay or stop transmission
upgrades under normal circumstances. The cost savings associated with quicker project
approvals result in lower rates for consumers who would otherwise pay for the delays in
higher capitalization costs. Third, because most modern transmission systems are required to
respect FERC's Open Access requirements, line owners are not allowed to discriminate on the
basis of generation source in the distribution of transmission resources. Therefore, transmission built
initially to access renewable resources actually benefits the entire portfolio of generation sources. Transmission upgrades
needed to facilitate substantial new RPS-induced renewable generation can therefore provide
avenues for conventional generation and buy time for zero-emissions coal and carbon
sequestrations technologies to become commercially viable.22 So new renewable generation
induced by a national RPS would decrease the capitalization costs of new transmission, speed
cost recovery on transmission infrastructure, and provide new avenues for conventional
generation, buying time for carbon sequestration technologies to become commercially viable. All
three of these strategies affect FERC's case-by-case review of rate structures based on a hypothetical capital structure for financing
new transmission projects.
By overcoming opposition to transmission expansions and getting new
generation up and running through transmission lines faster than conventional generation, a
national RPS provides revenue to help pay down debt on transmission investments. If this expedited
debt repayment is calculated in hypothetical capital structures, it should depress the projected capital costs of transmission
expansions and provide FERC with a natural check against excessive rate increases.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
130/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Price DA—At: spending
National RPS saves money and strengthens the economy
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

Is a national RPS better or worse than a patchwork of state-based standards? Cost - A


National RPS Lowers Energy Costs • Consumers in every region save billions, a total of
$49.1 billion nationwide. A 20 percent by 2020 federal RPS would decrease consumer
energy bills by an average of 1.5 percent per year, and save consumers in ever region
billions of dollars: - West South Central: $13.3 billion - East North Central: $8.4 billion -
California: $6.0 billion - Mid-Atlantic: $5.7 billion - Mountain: $5.0 billion - South Atlantic:
$2.9 billion - Northwest: $2.6 billion - West North Central: $2.2 billion - East South Central:
$1.6 billion - New England: $1.4 billion • Larger economies of scale decrease costs 20% to
60%. A national RPS by 2020 could lower construction costs for wind turbines by more than
20 percent and decrease the cost of biomass generators by nearly 60 percent. • Lower
natural gas prices save consumers $10 to $40 billion. Renewable generation offsets natural
gas combustion. A 1 percent decrease in natural gas demand can reduce the price of
natural gas by up to 2.5 percent. Nine of fifteen studies found that a national RPS would
save consumers $10 to $40 billion in natural gas expenditures. • Higher RPS targets save
utilities 0.4 to 0.6 cents per kWh. Renewable resources can serve as a “hedge” against the
financial risks associated with volatility in the natural gas market. The value of this “hedge
benefit” increases as the percent of the RPS mandate increases. • Uniform rules for trading
renewable energy credits (RECs) save utilities $14 billion. By eliminating geographical
barriers, a national REC trading system would increase market volume and provide a
predictable rate of return for investors. A federal RPS with a nationwide REC trading system
saves utilities $14 billion compared to an RPS without national REC trading. • Renewables
generate 80% more jobs than equal investment in fossil fuels. A 20% RPS by 2020 would
create as many as 240,000 new jobs – in manufacturing, construction, operations,
maintenance, shipping, sales and finance – versus 75,000 jobs if the energy were provided
by fossil fuels. • A national RPS creates new jobs in states with the greatest manufacturing
losses. The 20 states that would gain the most manufacturing jobs from a national
investment in wind energy, for example, represent more than 2/3 of the manufacturing jobs
lost in the U.S. between 2001 and 2004. • Quicker lead times minimize expensive
construction cost overruns. Renewable technologies have quicker lead times (2 to 5 years)
than conventional or nuclear plants (10 to 15 years), decreasing the financial risk
associated with borrowing millions of dollars to finance generators that take10 to 15 years
before they start producing a single kilowatt of electricity.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
131/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Price DA—At: Spending
Fossil fuels are so expensive any alternative would save billions
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

Fossil Fuel Prices Have Doubled From 2002 to 2005, for example, operation and maintenance
expenses for utilities rose by nearly $26 billion ($2002). Ninety-six percent of this increase was
driven by rising fossil fuel prices, not because parts or labor had gotten more expensive.57
Aggregate fossil fuel costs nearly doubled in the four years between 2000 and 2004, from $0.023
per kWh, to $0.0437 per kWh. The overbuilding of gas-fired peaking plants in the 1990’s resulted
in skyrocketing demand for natural gas, which, in turn caused prices to surge. Between 1995 and
2005, natural gas prices rose by an average of 15 percent per year. As a result, many electricity
generators switched back to coal-fired peaking units. But the switch only increased demand for
coal, driving the price up. In 2003, for example, the cost of coal in Central Appalachia was $35
per ton. The price increased nearly 7 percent each year until, by 2006, a ton of coal in the same
region cost close to $60 a ton.58 In some regions of the U.S., coal prices actually doubled
between 2002 and 2004. Many of the electricity generating units used for intermediate and
“peaking” purposes (for example, to meet increased demand for air conditioning on hot, summer
days) use natural gas for fuel. This is because natural gas generating units usually require a
lower capital investment than nuclear or coal-fired plants, have shorter construction and lead-
times, and tend to produce lower emissions than coal plants. Natural gas-fired units also can be
turned on or off quickly, giving them operational flexibility to meet short-term peak electricity
demands. The electricity sector’s demand for natural gas has increased from 24 percent of total
natural gas consumption in 2000 to 29 percent in 2005.59 And consumption of natural gas is
likely to increase even further for two reasons: Lower Reserve Margins First, increased electricity
demand in many areas has shrunk reserve margins to historically low levels. By 2005, reserve
margins across the contiguous United States had dropped to 15 percent and, in some large
states (like Texas and Florida), as low as 9 percent. Shrinking reserve margins coupled with
increased electricity demands have forced many utilities to restart “mothballed” natural gas-fired
generating units. And plans for new peaking units in large consumer states like Texas and Florida
rely overwhelmingly on natural gas.60 Prospects for New Sources Second, because U.S. utilities
have over-invested in gas-fired generating units, they hunger for new supplies of natural gas.
Congress responded recently by authorizing greater drilling rights in the Gulf of Mexico and has
hinted at granting greater access to federal lands where natural gas drilling is currently off-
limits.61 Whether new drilling rights are granted or not, the tantalizing prospect of vast new
sources of natural gas may lead utilities to believe that gas-fired units are safer investments than
they really are.
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
132/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Price DA—electricity rates

RPS costs would offset the high price of natural energy and decrease electricity rates
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

Myth #2: A national RPS would increase electricity rates Truth: In most states, RPS mandates
have not significantly increased rates and a consensus of economic models predict that a
national policy would generate substantial consumer savings over even the existing patchwork of
state programs. By expanding the amount of energy that would offset gas-fired generation, a
national RPS would reduce demand on a strained and volatile natural gas market. Renewable
energy units with markedly faster lead-times than conventional and nuclear reactors speeds the
cost recovery of critical transmission investments and reduces the rate increases needed to pay
for new transmission.

Plan saves the electricity sector money by increasing flexibility and rewarding
strategy
Dr. Benjamin Sovacool and Christopher Cooper (Senior Research Fellow for the Virginia Center
for Coal and Energy Research and professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia
Tech AND founded the Network for New Energy Choices (NNEC), a national non- profit
organization committed to reforming U.S. energy policy (Benjamin and Chris, Renewing America:
The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), June, 2007,
http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/Renewing%20America_NNEC_Final.pdf)

Myth #3: A national RPS would cost the electricity sector Truth: When utilities say a national
RPS “costs” the sector, they are usually assuming future profits they will not be able to
recover from consumers through higher electricity rates. For policymakers, balancing utility
profits with electricity prices is one of the hard decisions we elect them to make. However,
elected officials should consider that utility claims of lost profit are short-sited (and
strategically unsound). In reality, a more predictable RPS regulatory environment decreases
utility litigation and compliance costs relative to a growing web of vague and unstable state
mandates. Expanding the universe of eligible renewable resource and establishing clear,
uniform trading rules creates far more flexibility for regulated utilities and rewards utility
investments on the basis of smart market strategy and not geography. By promoting a
robust domestic manufacturing sector, a national RPS reduces the costs utilities pay in
unfavorable exchange rates and foreign parts and labor (and redirects those investments to
the U.S. labor market).
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
133/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 Fism DA

Floor preemption alt causes


Sovacool 7 (Benjamin and Jack Barkenbus, Necessary but Insufficient, Environment 49.6, Ebsco, AG)

In areas outside of environmental regulation, the federal government has a long history of
promoting minimum national standards that the states can exceed. The Fair Labor Standards Act,
for instance, establishes a national minimum wage of $5.15 per hour and preempts Kansas’s
miserly rate of $2.65 but is surpassed by 38 other states that have set their own laws higher
than the federal statute—with Connecticut offering $7.65 and Oregon $7.80.40 Other federal
“floors,” “savings clauses,” and “safety valves” have been established in the areas of health care
insurance, civil rights, drug safety, and the sentencing of hate crimes.41 Federal environmental
law generally allows states to enact standards stricter than federal laws as reflected in the Clean
Water Act, and more recently in the Toxic Substances Control Act, Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, and in the area of brownfields
regulation.42

Environmental centralization strong now


Sovacool 8 – Research Fellow in the Energy Governance Program at National University of Singapore; Government and
International Affairs Professor at Virginia Polytechnic Institute; DoE consultant on the Climate Change Technology Program (Benjamin,
June, The Best of Both Worlds, 27 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 397, AG)

While these three attempts failed, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 radically transformed the siting process
for liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals. 83 Previously, the siting and permitting of large and potentially dangerous industrial
facilities had always been handled by state and local governments. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 turned this process "upside down"
and reduced state and local siting authority to a commenting role with complete [*416] power handed to
the Federal Regulatory Energy Commission. 84 Federal lawmakers designed the change to make it easier to overcome local public
opposition to the siting of such facilities, referencing national security concerns and the public good provided by LNG facilities to the
entire country over state and local interests. In 2005, the Bureau of Land Management opened up all but 124,000 acres of the Otero
Mesa in the Chihuahuan Desert to oil and gas development, including 36,000 acres of fragile grassland in addition to four Wilderness
Study Areas and six Areas of Critical Environmental Concern, despite explicit protests from New Mexico that federal action conflicted
2006, several federal agencies issued
with state law and resource management plans. 85 And just one year later, in
regulations (concerning issues such as prescription drug, automobile, and consumer product
safety) with preambles published in the Federal Register that purported to preclude additional
state action. 86 Likewise, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) proposed new regulations asserting
broad preemptive federal standards for chemical plant safety, 87 once a state and local concern. 88 Such
regulations evidence a clear trend towards the creation of federal ceilings that prevent state and
local policymakers from holding the reins of environmental policymaking.

Federalism won’t spillover—single policies on the environment are compartmentalized


Sovacool 8 – Research Fellow in the Energy Governance Program at National University of Singapore; Government and
International Affairs Professor at Virginia Polytechnic Institute; DoE consultant on the Climate Change Technology Program (Benjamin,
June, The Best of Both Worlds, 27 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 397, AG)

for much of the country's history, the balance between federal and local efforts has
Thus,
continually shifted. In some ways, this is a sign of strength, implying that environmental
federalism changes with the times to address pressing concerns. As Woodrow Wilson famously wrote, The
question of the relation of the States to the federal [*417] government is the cardinal question of our constitutional system. At every
turn of our national development, we have been brought face to face with it, and no definition either of statesmen or of judges has
and
ever quieted or decided it. It cannot, indeed, be settled by the opinion of any one generation, because it is a question of growth,
every successive stage of our political and economic development gives it a new aspect, makes
it a new question. 89
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
134/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
135/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 T Incentive

RPS is both requirement and encouragement


Wiser 7 (Ryan et al, April, The Experience with Renewable Portfolio Standards in the United States, The Electricity Journal 20.4,
Elsevier, AG)

we define an RPS as a requirement that retail electricity suppliers procure


For the purpose of this article,
a certain minimum quantity of eligible renewable energy or capacity, measured in either absolute units
(kwh or kw) or as a percentage share of retail sales. RPS policies are generally designed to maintain and/or increase the contribution
The RPS establishes numeric targets for renewable energy supply,
of renewable energy to the electricity supply mix.
and seeks to encourage competition among renewable
applies those targets to retail electricity suppliers,
developers to meet the targets in a least-cost fashion. RPS purchase obligations generally increase over time, and
retail suppliers typically must demonstrate compliance on an annual basis. These requirements are often backed with some form of
penalty if compliance is not achieved.

RECs incentivize
Fershee 8 – law prof, North Dakota (Joshua, 29 Energy L. J. 49, AG)

The mere existence of a national RPS would provide some incentive for all utilities to invest in
renewable generation because that investment would have two markets - the market for its
electricity and the market for its RECs - instead of just the market for its electricity for a
traditional generation facility. n
RPS AFF 1.0 DDI 2008
136/136 Strange & Serrano Lab
A2 T In

Plan increases tradable credit incentives within the entire US


Wiser 7 (Ryan et al, April, The Experience with Renewable Portfolio Standards in the United States, The Electricity Journal 20.4,
Elsevier, AG)

the federal programs would all allow tradability of recs within the entire U.S., whereas
Significantly,
most state policies contain significant state-wide or regional limitations on REC sources. The federal
proposals have also tended to assume a replacement of the federal Production Tax Credit (PTC) with a national RPS, whereas state
programs will operate with or without the federal PTC.

Anda mungkin juga menyukai