Aff & Neg Procurement

Michigan 2008
DoD Starter
DoD Procurement – Starter Packet – Index
***AFFIRMATIVE***
DoD Procurement – Starter Packet – Index..........................................................................................................................1
DoD Procurement – 1AC......................................................................................................................................................2
DoD Procurement – 1AC....................................................................................................................................................10
DoD Procurement – 1AC....................................................................................................................................................11
Topicality – Incentives........................................................................................................................................................12
Inherency - DoD Energy Consumption Increasing.............................................................................................................13
Inherency - Attitudes...........................................................................................................................................................14
Oil Hurts Readiness – Resupply Chains.............................................................................................................................15
Oil Hurts Readiness – Military Budgets.............................................................................................................................16
Oil Hurts Readiness – Supply Disruptions.........................................................................................................................17
Extend – Hegemony Good..................................................................................................................................................18
Alternative Increase Readiness – Resupply........................................................................................................................22
Alternative Increase Readiness – Supply Disruptions.......................................................................................................23
Alternative Increase Readiness – Military Budgets ...........................................................................................................24
Solvency – Spillover...........................................................................................................................................................25
Solvency - Biofuels.............................................................................................................................................................26
Solvency – Bases................................................................................................................................................................27
They Say “Green Procurement now”..................................................................................................................................28
They Say “Military will get Priority in a Crisis”................................................................................................................30
They Say “Small Percentage”.............................................................................................................................................31
They Say “Solvency Long Term”.......................................................................................................................................32
They Say “DoD can’t Change”...........................................................................................................................................33
They Say “Alternate Causalities”.......................................................................................................................................34
****NEGATIVE****.........................................................................................................................................................35
Topicality – 1NC.................................................................................................................................................................36
Inherency – 1NC.................................................................................................................................................................37
Extend – DoD Green Procurement Increasing Now...........................................................................................................38
Hegemony Bad...................................................................................................................................................................39
Hegemony Bad...................................................................................................................................................................40
Hegemony Bad...................................................................................................................................................................41
Solvency – 1NC..................................................................................................................................................................42
Solvency – 1NC..................................................................................................................................................................43
Extend – No Spillover.........................................................................................................................................................44
Extend – Small Percentages................................................................................................................................................45
Extend – Long Time Frame................................................................................................................................................46
Extend – Alternate Causalities............................................................................................................................................47
Extend – Procurement Fails................................................................................................................................................48
Biofuels Solvency Responses.............................................................................................................................................49
Bases Solvency Responses.................................................................................................................................................50
Political Capital Links........................................................................................................................................................51
Obama Good Links.............................................................................................................................................................52
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DoD Procurement – 1AC
Observation One – Inherency
Military energy consumption will increase with expanding the War on Terror
Eileen Westervelt, U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, 2005 [September Energy Trends and
Implications for U.S. Army Installations, http://static.cbslocal.com/station/wcco/news/
specialreports/projectenergy/06_0420_projectenergy_energytrendsreportfromarmycorps.pdf]
Energy Trends Figure 1 and Table 1 show current demand, supply, and proportionate distribution of energy for the
world, nation, and Army. Table 2 lists world reserves. The Army and the nation’s heavy use of oil and natural gas is
not “in synch” with the nation’s or the earth’s supplies. The relative fuel shares of energy use vs. energy reserves
underscores our need to supplement oil and natural gas as our staple fuels. The domestic supply and demand
imbalance would lessen if coal and/or nuclear energy were made more environmentally acceptable or if the
renewable share of our energy portfolio were to increase. Worldwide energy consumption is expected to increase by
2.1 percent/yr and domestic energy consumption by 1.4 percent per year. This will exacerbate global energy
competition for existing supplies. Army energy consumption is dominated by facilities consumption. Facilities
consumption may decrease in both total quantity and in intensity basis—but not without an aggressive energy
program with careful planning, diligent monitoring, and prudent investment. The closure of European installations
and relocation of troops onto domestic installations will make this outcome especially challenging. The energy
consumption associated with Army mobility (tactical and nontactical vehicle consumption) is expected to remain
constant, but may potentially increase depending of future phases of the Global War on Terror and on geopolitical
tensions resulting from the world energy situation.
The Current DoD energy policy fails – it is uncoordinated and does not emphasize alternative
energies
Gregory Lengyel, 21st Century Defense Initiative of the Brookings Institution 2007 [Department of Defense Energy
Strategy Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks August http://www.brookings.edu/~/media /Files/rc/papers/ 2007/08
defense_lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf
Despite these trends there is no existing formal Department of Defense Energy Strategy and no single individual or
organization responsible for energy issues within the Department. The DOD Annual Energy Management Report for
FY 2006 lists the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) as the DOD
Senior Energy Official responsible for meeting the goals of Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) and Executive
Order (EO) 13123, Greening the Government through Efficient Energy Management.22 However, this position has
been vacant for several years and does not satisfy the need for a comprehensive Senior Energy Official for the
Department. This is not to say the DOD is unconcerned with energy issues. The Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) and the Services have recently conducted or sponsored numerous studies focusing on energy, many of which
have been invaluable information sources for this paper: MITRE Corporation JASON Project, Reducing DOD
Fossil Fuel Dependence (2006); Defense Science Board, More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden
(2001), and soon to be released Energy Strategy (2006-2007); OSD Energy Security Integrated Product Team
(2006); Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Technology Options for Improved Air Vehicle Fuel Efficiency (2006);
Navy Research Advisory Council, Study on Future Fuels (2005); Army Corps of Engineers, Energy Trends and
Their Implications for US Army Installations (2005); and Defense Advanced Research Projects, Petroleum-Free
Military Workshop (2005), to name a few. Common recommendations include making fuel efficiency a more
significant factor in determining new mobility platforms (e.g. miles per gallon for ground vehicles, nautical
miles/pound (lb.) fuel/lb. payload for aircraft and ships) and creating incentives for energy efficiency throughout the
DOD. However, none of the studies offered anything other than liquid hydrocarbons as the best fuel for DOD
mobility platforms for at least the next 25 years. Impressive groups of energy experts have produced many of these
studies, but they are all either Service specific or temporary in nature, meaning the group of experts dispersed after
writing the study’s final report. The lack of a full-time energy advocate within the DOD leaves a void in follow-up
actions to study recommendations, or creation of directive guidance on energy issues within the Department.
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Observation Two – Hegemony
DoD dependence on Fossil Fuels is increasing and that kills hegemony – it depends on
unstable areas, makes long term planning difficult and holds our military hostage to
fluctuating oil prices
Thomas Crowley Logistics Management Institute 2007 [april transforming the way dod looks at energy an approach
to establishing an energy strategy http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_ 404_F T602T1
_Transformi ng%20the%20Way%20DoD%20Looks%20at%20Energy _Final%20 Report.pdf.]
Over the past several decades, the United States has become increasingly reliant on imported energy, primarily from
petroleum. The Energy Information Agency (EIA) forecasts that U.S. dependence on petroleum imports will
increase to 68 percent by 2025. DoD, the largest U.S. consumer of energy, also relies on foreign supplies of crude oil
and the finished transportation fuels (such as military jet fuel) that are derived from it. Fuel represents more than
half of the DoD logistics tonnage and more than 70 percent of the tonnage required to put the U.S. Army into
position for battle. The Navy uses millions of gallons of fuel every day to operate around the globe, and the Air
Force—the largest DoD consumer of fuel— uses even more. DoD’s heavy operational dependence on traditional
fuel sources creates a number of decidedly negative effects: DoD shares the nation’s reliance on foreign energy
sources, which effectively forces the country to rely on potential adversaries to maintain its economy and national
security. DoD’s energy dependence exposes the department to price volatility, forc- ing it to consume unplanned
resources that could be used to recapitalize an aging force structure and infrastructure. The availability of traditional
energy supplies beyond 25 years is difficult to project. Because of the 8- to 20-year time frame of future operational
concepts and a similarly long, or longer, capital asset replacement cycle for DoD platforms, DoD must begin now to
address its uncertain energy future. The United States bears many costs associated with the stability of the global oil
market and infrastructure. The cost of securing Persian Gulf sources alone comes to $44.4 billion annually. DoD
receives little support from other consuming nations to perform this mission although they share in the benefits due
to the global nature of the oil market. Through 2004, members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries alone have earned $4 trillion in oil revenue. Some portion of that oil revenue has likely gone toward
efforts inimical to U.S. national security interests.
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Reliance on Fossil fuels tethers our forward deployed forces – it undermines mobility and
flexibility because it relies on the resupply chain
Operational Disconnect The security and military strategies for DoD require an energy-intense posture for
conducting both deterrence and combat operations. The strategies rely on persistent presence globally, mobility to
project power and sustain forces, and dominant maneuver to swiftly defeat adversaries. These current and future
operating concepts tether operational capability to high-technology solutions that require continued growth in
energy sources. Current consumption estimates, although based on incomplete data, validate these increasing fuel
requirements and the implications for future operations. Clearly, the skill of our logistics forces in providing fuel
has grown significantly since World War II. Still, we must be mindful of the operational implications of logistics
requirements. The stalling of General Patton’s Third Army following its campaign across France in August and
September 1944 is a telling example of the fuel “tether.” Despite the heroic efforts of logistics forces, the wear and
tear on supply trucks and the strategic priority for fuel and logistics support in other areas of operations limited
Patton to local operations for nearly 2 months. The Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) estimates that 20,000
soldiers are employed to deliver fuel to operations (and spending $1 million per day to transport petroleum, which
does not include fuel costs for contractor-provided combat support). The delivery of fuel poses such an operational
and tactical risk that in July 2006, Maj. Gen. Richard Zilmer, the highest-ranking Marine Corps officer in Iraq’s
Anbar Province, characterized the development of solar and wind power capabilities as a “joint urgent operational
need.” General Zilmer cited reductions in often dangerous fuel transportation activities as the main motivation for
this request: “By reducing the need for [petroleum-based fuels] at our outlying bases, we can decrease the frequency
of logistics convoys on the road, thereby reducing the danger to our Marines, soldiers, and sailors.” Operational
capability is always the most important aspect of force development. However, it may not be possible to execute
operational concepts and capabilities to achieve our security strategy if the energy implications are not considered.
Cur- rent planning presents a situation in which the aggregate operational capability of the force may be
unsustainable in the long term.
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Oil Dependence kills US hegemony – it undermines coalitions, emboldens enemies, deters free
markets and increases military vulnerability to supply disruptions
The lack of sustained attention to energy issues is undercutting US foreign policy and US national security. Major
energy suppliers – from Russia to Iran to Venezuela – have been increasingly able and willing to use their energy
resources to pursue their strategic and political objectives. Major energy consumers – notably the United States, but
other countries as well – are finding that their growing dependence on imported energy increases their strategic
vulnerability and constrains security objectives.19 Foreign Policy issues are daily concerns for the White House and
the Department of State, but the DOD is typically the department called upon when Foreign Policy goes awry. In his
article, Energy Security: The New Threats in Latin America and Africa, David L. Goldwyn, a senior fellow at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, argues current US energy dependency challenges US power in five
ways. First, many nations dependent on consuming imported oil are reluctant to join coalitions led by the United
States to combat weapons proliferation, terrorism or aggression. Examples are the French, Russian and Chinese
resistance to sanctions on Iran; Chinese resistance to sanctions against Sudan; and US tolerance of Middle East
repression that would otherwise be sanctioned were it to occur in any other non-oil-producing part of the world.20
Secondly, high oil revenues in the hands of oil exporting nations allow governments to act with impunity against
their own people, their neighbors, and the United States. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, Latin America’s
loudest anti-American cheerleader, has used oil revenue to build support for his economic vision by providing
subsidized oil to neighboring countries and gain leverage over them by purchasing bonds to finance their debt.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has renationalized the energy sector, restricted foreign access to Russia’s pipeline
system, and demanded open access to Europe. Iran has reduced its international debt and increased foreign reserves
to prepare of possible sanctions. “Even Saudi Arabia’s economic reform movement, born in the days of $10 oil in
1998, evaporated when oil reached $30 per barrel in 2000. Enrichment of America’s competitors or adversaries
harms US security interests in every part of the globe”.21 The third problem is that the global oil market is far from
being a free market system. Governments which do not allow free market access to develop, exploit and expand
supplies control most of the world’s major oil reserves. Most free market commodities allow the market supply to
expand to meet demand. As oil prices rise, many governments are less receptive to foreign investment, preventing
supply from responding to demand and driving prices even higher. 22 An increased price of imported goods
increases the US trade deficit and exports wealth to foreign lands. In 2005, imported oil accounted for one-third of
the country’s $800 billion trade deficit.23 A fourth problem created by the highly competitive world oil market is the
political gamesmanship that undermines the fluidity and fairness of the market for available supplies. “New
competitors like China and India are trying to negotiate long term contracts (at market prices) to ensure they have
supplies in the event of a crisis or supply disruption…From an economic point of view it may not matter if China
lends Angola $3 billion at low interest to gain part of an exploration project as long as the oil is produced. But China
gains an enormous geopolitical advantage by this act.”24 A fifth problem oil dependency creates for America and
directly impacts the DOD is vulnerability to price volatility that result from supply and demand shocks.25 From the
fall of 2005 until gasoline prices started to decline in fall 2006, the “price of gasoline” had replaced “the weather” as
every American’s favorite subject of conversation with a stranger. The price of standard crude oil on NYMEX was
under $25 per barrel in September 2003, but by August 11, 2005, increased to over $60 per barrel, and topped out at
a record price of $78.40 per barrel on July 13, 2006.26 Experts attributed the spike in prices to a variety of factors,
including war in Iraq, North Korea's missile launches, the crisis between Israel and Lebanon, Iranian nuclear
brinkmanship, and Hurricane Katrina. None of these factors, except for war in Iraq, could be controlled by the US
government. The global energy infrastructure built over the last century is quite fragile and was not designed with
any vision of terrorist attacks or computer hackers. The DOD must accept the fact that vulnerabilities exist and that
bad actors will eventually exploit these vulnerabilities if corrective measures are not taken.
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Military Readiness is key to hegemony
Donnelly, 2003---Resident Scholar at AEI (Thomas, Resident Scholar at AEI, 2/1. ttp://www.aei.org/publications
/pubID.15845/pub_detail.asp)
The preservation of today's Pax Americana rests upon both actual military strength and the perception of
strength. The variety of victories scored by U.S. forces since the end of the cold war is testament to both the futility
of directly challenging the United States and the desire of its enemies to keep poking and prodding to find a
weakness in the American global order. Convincing would-be great powers, rogue states, and terrorists to accept the
liberal democratic order--and the challenge to autocratic forms of rule that come with it--requires not only an
overwhelming response when the peace is broken, but a willingness to step in when the danger is imminent. The
message of the Bush Doctrine--"Don't even think about it!"--rests in part on a logic of preemption that
underlies the logic of primacy.
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US leadership solves every major impact—European, Asian, Middle-eastern wars, economic
collapse, nuclear proliferation and use
Khalilzad 1995 – RAND, Ambassador to Afghanistan (Washington Quarterly, Spring)
Realistically and over the longer term, however, a neo-isolationist approach might well increase the danger of
major conflict, require a greater U.S. defense effort, threaten world peace, and eventually undermine U.S.
prosperity. By withdrawing from Europe and Asia, the United States would deliberately risk weakening the
institutions and solidarity of the world's community of democratic powers and so establishing favorable conditions
for the spread of disorder and a possible return to conditions similar to those of the first half of the twentieth century.
In the 1920s and 1930s, U.S. isolationism had disastrous consequences for world peace. At that time, the United States was but one of several
major powers. Now that the United States is the world's preponderant power, the shock of a U.S. withdrawal could be even greater. What
might happen to the world if the United States turned inward? Without the United States and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), rather than cooperating with each other, the West European nations might compete
with each other for domination of East-Central Europe and the Middle East. In Western and Central Europe, Germany -- especially since
unification -- would be the natural leading power. Either in cooperation or competition with Russia, Germany might seek influence over
the territories located between them. German efforts are likely to be aimed at filling the vacuum, stabilizing the
region, and precluding its domination by rival powers. Britain and France fear such a development. Given the
strength of democracy in Germany and its preoccupation with absorbing the former East Germany, European
concerns about Germany appear exaggerated. But it would be a mistake to assume that U.S. withdrawal could not, in
the long run, result in the renationalization of Germany's security policy. The same is also true of Japan. Given a
U.S. withdrawal from the world, Japan would have to look after its own security and build up its military
capabilities. China, Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia already fear Japanese hegemony. Without U.S.
protection, Japan is likely to increase its military capability dramatically -- to balance the growing Chinese forces
and still-significant Russian forces. This could result in arms races, including the possible acquisition by Japan of nuclear
weapons. Given Japanese technological prowess, to say nothing of the plutonium stockpile Japan has acquired in the development of its nuclear
power industry, it could obviously become a nuclear weapon state relatively quickly, if it should so decide. It could also build long-range missiles
and carrier task forces. With the shifting balance of power among Japan, China, Russia, and potential new regional
powers such as India, Indonesia, and a united Korea could come significant risks of preventive or proeruptive
war. Similarly, European competition for regional dominance could lead to major wars in Europe or East Asia. If the
United States stayed out of such a war -- an unlikely prospect -- Europe or East Asia could become dominated by a
hostile power. Such a development would threaten U.S. interests. A power that achieved such dominance would seek
to exclude the United States from the area and threaten its interests-economic and political -- in the region. Besides,
with the domination of Europe or East Asia, such a power might seek global hegemony and the United States would
face another global Cold War and the risk of a world war even more catastrophic than the last. In the Persian Gulf,
U.S. withdrawal is likely to lead to an intensified struggle for regional domination. Iran and Iraq have, in the
past, both sought regional hegemony. Without U.S. protection, the weak oil-rich states of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) would be unlikely to retain their independence. To preclude this development, the Saudis might seek
to acquire, perhaps by purchase, their own nuclear weapons. If either Iraq or Iran controlled the region that dominates the world
supply of oil, it could gain a significant capability to damage the U.S. and world economies. Any country that gained hegemony would have vast
economic resources at its disposal that could be used to build military capability as well as gain leverage over the United States and other
oilimporting nations. Hegemony over the Persian Gulf by either Iran or Iraq would bring the rest of the Arab Middle
East under its influence and domination because of the shift in the balance of power. Israeli security problems would
multiply and the peace process would be fundamentally undermined, increasing the risk of war between the Arabs
and the Israelis. The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East Asia, Europe, and the Persian
Gulf would harm the economy of the United States even in the unlikely event that it was able to avoid involvement
in major wars and conflicts. Higher oil prices would reduce the U.S. standard of living. Turmoil in Asia and Europe
would force major economic readjustment in the United States, perhaps reducing U.S. exports and imports and
jeopardizing U.S. investments in these regions. Given that total imports and exports are equal to a quarter of U.S.
gross domestic product, the cost of necessary adjustments might be high. The higher level of turmoil in the world
would also increase the likelihood of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means for their
delivery. Already several rogue states such as North Korea and Iran are seeking nuclear weapons and long-range
missiles. That danger would only increase if the United States withdrew from the world. The result would be a much
more dangerous world in which many states possessed WMD capabilities; the likelihood of their actual use would
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increase accordingly. If this happened, the security of every nation in the world, including the United States,
would be harmed.
Therefore we offer the following plan:
The United States Federal Government will increase the procurement of renewable energies
for the military. The Department of Defense will require the use of biofuels for aviation and
renewable sources for military bases in the US.
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Observation Three – Solvency
The Military can lead the US into energy security – their example raises the public’s
awareness, and defense contracts increase partnerships with industry
Scott Buchanan, Department of Defense Office of Force Transformation 2006 [Energy and Force Transformation Joint Force
Quarterly http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i42/17-JFQ42%20Buchanan%20Pg%2051-54.pdf
Enabling the rapid adaptation of new energy technologies to civilian use is required for the Nation’s long-term
physical and economic security. n Energy efficiency will not adversely affect military capability. Stimulate Private
Industry. Beyond making DOD more efficient and capable of executing future operations, adapting new energy
technologies for civilian use may have a larger strategic impact. The Defense Department can lead or stimulate the
culture change—required at all levels of the Nation—to recognize the hidden costs of fuel oil and move strategically
to less foreign energy dependence. Only then can the United States become better positioned economically and more
secure in a future environment with less volatile energy supplies. Partnering with industry will perhaps stimulate the
development of effective energy technologies, develop expertise, and accelerate the acceptance of new technologies
by the military and the public. Elements such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency could begin this
partnering effort by sponsoring a private-sector “prize program” to encourage new ideas and approaches and
demonstrate DOD interest. Partnering would mitigate some industry risk and could potentially: n accelerate
engineering breakthroughs to adapt current technologies to military vehicles and other civilian uses n lead to
developing and proving the advanced manufacturing processes required for new energy technologies n create
procurement strategies that support new industry and manufacturing plants until private demand can sustain them n
stimulate interest and investment in energy efficiency n make U.S. industries more competitive in the future oil-
dependent energy environment.
DoD Procurement of Biofuels will decrease dependence on imported oil and spur investment
in biofuel infrastructure.
Felicia French, Army Environmental Policy Institute 2005 [ April 5, How the Army Can Be An Environmental
Paragon Through Energy, http://www.aepi.army.mil/internet/how-army-can-be-energy-paragon.pdf]
Biofuels convert biomass to liquid fuel for transportation needs and contain oxygen resulting in cleaner combustion
and less toxic emissions than fossil fuels. Although biofuels release the global warming gas carbon dioxide when
combusted; carbon dioxide is also absorbed from plants grown for biofuels. This in essence recycles the carbon
dioxide and ultimately is a neutral carbon net exchange (33: NP). Unlike fossil fuel oil spills or leaks, a biofuel spill
would not be deleterious to the environment and would more easily biodegrade into the soil or water. Biomass
derived ethanol and biodiesel can be mixed with or directly replaced for gasoline and diesel, respectively. At present,
these are the only two alternative liquid fuels available that can be substituted for the two thirds of all petroleum
used in the U.S. for transportation and of which 50 percent is imported. (33: NP). Increasing our production and use
of biofuels will drastically decrease our dependence on imported oil. Thus biomass and biofuel have significant
economic, health, environmental, and security benefits. Ethanol is an alcohol produced from the fermentation of
carbohydrates and predominantly used for a fuel additive (up to 85 percent mixture) to decrease smog emissions
such as carbon monoxide (26: NP). The overall research on whether or not it requires more BTUs to produce ethanol
than what BTUs are actually yielded from ethanol is inconclusive. Biodiesel combines alcohol, and either clean or
recycled vegetable oil, animal fats, or cooking grease. It can also be added to current fuels (about 20 percent) to
decrease smog emissions or alone in diesel engines (26: NP) In relatively minimal time, the Army can start
supplementing our fuel requirements with biofuel in most of if not all of its vehicles. Since a number of our vehicles
currently run on diesel fuel, we can convert them over to biodiesel. It would even be possible to sell or turn in our
mess hall cooking grease to recycle into biodiesel fuel for our own use. Through the Army’s increased purchase of
biofuels, we could begin to influence the increase in production and with it the infrastructure to produce greater
supplies of biofuel. This will leave our country less vulnerable to near term and future oil interruptions. With the
Nation’s aging petroleum oil refineries at or near maximum capacity, building biofuel refineries to replace them
would be the most prudent and economically feasible course of action. However, using biofuel is primarily an
interim action as it has the potential to remove food from the Third World.
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DoD procurement of renewable energy enhances military readiness – it reduces the need for
resupply, improves military health, reduces costs and drives innovation. Current Military
renewable use is not enough – the military should be the model
Felicia French, Army Environmental Policy Institute 2005 [ April 5, How the Army Can Be An Environmental Paragon Through
Energy, http://www.aepi.army.mil/internet/how-army-can-be-energy-paragon.pdf]
Using some, all, or a combination of the renewable energies discussed in this chapter will further facilitate the Army’s meeting
the six goals of The Army Strategy for the Environment. Expressly: Foster a Sustainability Ethic by embracing the fact that
current energy resources are exhaustible and substituting them for renewable resources; Strengthen Army Operations by reducing
unhealthy heat, noise, and waste emissions and decreasing our logistical tail; Meet Test, Training, and Mission Requirements by
sustaining the land, water, and air at our training sites; Minimize Impacts and Total Ownership Costs through the use of on site
domestic renewable energy; Enhance Well-being by sustaining our natural resources and protecting human health through the use
of clean and less raw material intensive renewable energy; Drive Innovation by accelerating the transfer of fossil fuel to
renewable energy technology to meet present and future requirements. Conclusions This paper demonstrates the need for an
Army Energy Strategy that supports the new Army Strategy for the Environment six goals. This analysis indicates that currently
the Army has an energy program that is insular, fragmented and needs an integrated approach. This is not to say that the Army is
not already making an effort toward conserving energy and using renewable energy in a number of sites and areas. However,
because of the Army’s limited resources, it needs to make a concerted effort to focus and prioritize against the Army’s Strategy
for the Environment until it is expanded into our everyday life and on every Army installation and operation. Just as it is not
advisable to put all of ones money into one stock or only into a savings account, it is not advisable to depend on only one source
of energy or conservation of energy alone. Whether one wants to argue the validity or dubiousness of fossil fuel combustion’s
contribution to global warming or climate change, there are a variety of other compelling reasons to reduce and eliminate our
need for fossil fuel. The cost benefits of energy conservation and use of renewable energy are vast and have profound and
numerous positive repercussions to our quality of life. Our national security, health, economy, and environment are all affected by
our use of energy making it imperative that we take every possible action to ameliorate our energy policies and usage. As the
Army is a defender of freedom, it in turn also defends our quality of life. This is why the Army should be at the vanguard of an
energy transition to renewable energy and restorative conservation.
Increasing alternative energy is necessary for future military readiness – it is critical to

mobility, deterrence and persistence of forward deployed forces
Thomas Crowley Logistics Management Institute 2007 [april transforming the way dod looks at energy an approach to establishing
an energy strategy http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_ 404_F T602T1 _Transformi ng%20the%20Way%20DoD%20Looks
%20at%20Energy _Final%20 Report.pdf.]
Recent experience indicates that the nature of the threat facing the United States is changing. Today, we cannot be
sure in advance of the location of future conflicts, given the threat of dispersed, small-scale attacks inherent in
warfare with rogue nations and insurgent forces. In addition, the U.S. military must be prepared to defend against
single strikes capable of mass casualties. This complex security environment—an environment in which a wide
range of conventional and unconventional attacks can come from unpredictable regions of the world and the risk of
a single attack is high—requires the United States not only to maintain a force that is forward and engaged on a
daily steady-state basis, but also to ensure that it is ready for quick, surge deployments worldwide to counter, and
deter, a broad spectrum of potential threats. Theme 1. Our forces must expand geographically and be more mobile
and expeditionary so that they can be engaged in more theaters and prepared for expedient deployment anywhere in
the world. Theme 2. We must transition from a reactive to a proactive force posture to deter enemy forces from
organizing for and conducting potentially catastrophic attacks. Theme 3. We must be persistent in our presence,
surveillance, assistance, and attack to defeat determined insurgents and halt the organization of new enemy forces.
To carry out these activities, the U.S. military will have to be even more energy intense, locate in more regions of
the world, employ new technologies, and man- age a more complex logistics system. Considering the trend in
operational fuel consumption and future capability needs, this “new” force employment construct will likely demand
more energy/fuel in the deployed setting. Simply put, more miles will be traveled, both by combat units and the
supply units that sustain them, which will result in increased energy consumption. Therefore, DoD must apply new
energy technologies that address alternative supply sources and efficient consumption across all aspects of military
operations.
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Military procurement of alternatives increases military readiness by increasing basing options
– our Army would become a better neighbor
Another way the Army can reduce waste and encourage recycling is through the practices and procedures used in the
procurement of goods. We can stipulate from those we purchase from that they must provide us with “extended
product responsibility” or cradle-to-cradle service (1: 14). This is a way of holding manufactures responsible for the
production process, quality and recycling of their products. By doing so, the Army can reduce our own and
encourage the reduction of waste such as electronic appliances (i.e. computers, monitors, washers, dryers, and
refrigerators) as well as carpets, flooring and roofs. These products end up in garbage dumps leaching toxic
chemicals into the ground. Purchase and installation of all energy efficient rated appliances would save energy and
reduce green house gas emissions. Home appliances account for 30 percent of electrical consumption and 12 percent
of green house gas emissions in the U.S. (40: NP). By reducing our footprint on the community environment, we
make ourselves more attractive and desirable to have as tenants and neighbors than a land developer with possibly
little or no regard and consideration for the environment. The Army will be viewed as providing environmental
stewardship as well providing jobs for the local economy. Conserving and reducing our requirements for energy by
applying the principles mentioned in this chapter will facilitate the Army’s meeting all the goals of The Army
Strategy for the Environment. Construction of Green buildings and using reusable products is completely in line
with fostering a sustainable ethic. Sharing facilities with other AC and RC units strengthens Army operations and
minimizes impacts and total ownership costs. Green installation design enhances the well being of Army families
and our communities. Procurement and use of micropower and distributed energy will facilitate meeting our testing,
training, and mission requirements and will help drive innovation in the private and public sector. Using reusable
products will foster a sustainability ethic, and minimize impacts and total ownership costs.
Prioritizing alternative energy in the DoD is essential to military readiness – minor

investments in development projects can have enormous operational impacts
Scott Buchanan, Department of Defense Office of Force Transformation 2006 [Energy and Force Transformation Joint Force
Quarterly http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i42/17-JFQ42%20Buchanan%20Pg%2051-54.pdf
The actual level of DOD investment may be higher because research within other program elements may include
platformspecific energy concerns. Nevertheless, even if the level is doubled or tripled, it would be a small
investment compared to the investment in other strategic initiatives such as missile defense. More important, an
investment in energy-efficiency R&D and, ultimately, oil independence may have a far greater impact on the
strategic balance. An inherent tension exists within the tiered-system approach that DOD takes to science and
technology (S&T). On one hand, wide-ranging S&T investment provides a mechanism for discovering new
knowledge and developing things that would not otherwise exist. On the other hand, most successfully fielded
military S&T is directed toward operational and programmatic needs. While at least seven different fuel cell efforts
are under way, the low level of investment in energy efficiency R&D may indicate that energy efficiency is not
being pursued with urgency or an overarching strategic view toward transforming the way we plan, operate, and
fight. The following areas may provide a basis for such an overarching DOD energy strategy. Invest Strategically in
Energy Technology. By significantly increasing its R&D investments, DOD can improve the efficiency and
capability of the current force. These investments will require the establishment of a strategic transformational
mandate for significant near-term energy-efficiency improvements (such as retrofit of existing platforms that will be
part of the force for several years), reduced logistics force requirements, and long-term military and national energy
independence from foreign energy sources (including new efficient platforms powered by alternate energy sources).
The technologies considered should be far-reaching, with the specific view of their potential both to provide the
lethal force required in the execution of military operations and to provide that force more effectively and efficiently.
In other words, although recent operations have demonstrated the usefulness of heavy forces, a smaller, more
responsive, and more affordable force might better meet capability demands than a larger, slower force that is more
expensive to operate.
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Topicality – Incentives
[ ] DoD procurement policies are incentives – they encourage the military to buy green
products
Inside Defense 2006 [ September 15, http://www.military.com/features/ 0,15240,1135 99,00.html ,DoD Pushes
Biobased Fuels]
In his January State of the Union address, President Bush said the United States is “addicted to oil,” and called for
“more reliable alternative energy sources.” The event this week follows on the heels of an Aug. 17 memo from
Defense Department acquisition chief Kenneth Krieg that encourages DOD leaders to promote the purchase of
biobased products, as the Pentagon prepares to implement a federal law that is expected to change the way the
armed services buy items ranging from hand sanitizers to fuel additives. Biobased products utilize plant, animal
and marine or forestry materials, according to DOD's Green Procurement Program Strategy, a 2004 document that
describes Pentagon policy on acquiring environmentally friendly products.
[ ] DoD procurement policies are incentives – they encourage the military to buy green
products
Military.com 2006 [DoD Pushes Biobased Fuels September 15, http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,11
3599,00.html
In his January State of the Union address, President Bush said the United States is “addicted to oil,” and called for
“more reliable alternative energy sources.” The event this week follows on the heels of an Aug. 17 memo from
Defense Department acquisition chief Kenneth Krieg that encourages DOD leaders to promote the purchase of
biobased products, as the Pentagon prepares to implement a federal law that is expected to change the way the
armed services buy items ranging from hand sanitizers to fuel additives. Biobased products utilize plant, animal
and marine or forestry materials, according to DOD's Green Procurement Program Strategy, a 2004 document that
describes Pentagon policy on acquiring environmentally friendly products.
[ ] Military procurement of renewable energy is an Incentive for private use of

alternatives
This paper will examine the use and conservation of energy for both army mobility and facility operations. The
military has been on the forefront of many social, medical and technological changes; therefore we can use our
credibility and resources to be the vanguard of change to renewable energy into mainstream society. As a voracious
consumer of energy, it will be financially and politically feasible for the army to decrease dependence on fossil fuel.
To do so would facilitate use of alternative energy by the public and private sector. Additionally, it is more
conducive to a positive public image of being environmentally and fiscally responsible consequentially allowing
greater access to local training sites-further decreasing our requirement for mobility fuel. The presentation offers
recommendations for alternative and renewable energy to be used by the army and the numerous positive
consequences of this transformation to include: diminishing US dependence on Middle Eastern oil, decreased
dependence on one source of energy, halt the catastrophic effects of global warming, and ameliorate the deleterious
health effects of fossil fuel combustion.
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Inherency - DoD Energy Consumption Increasing
[ ] DoD dependence on oil is increasing primarily due to aviation fuel
Mobility Energy Use Mobility energy is the fuel used to power DoD weapons platforms, tactical equipment, and all
other types of vehicles. In contrast with facility energy, mobility energy consists almost entirely of petroleum-
based products and accounts for 94 percent of DoD’s petroleum consumption. The categories of fuel used for mo-
bility are jet fuel, gasoline, distillates and diesel, ship’s bunkers, and residuals. As illustrated in Figure 2-2, about 75
percent of the mobility fuel used by DoD is jet fuel. Distillates and diesel follow with 17 percent. Many DoD
platforms are multifuel capable, so it is not appropriate to consider these percentages as directly attributable to air,
land, and sea platforms. JP-8, used primarily for air operations, makes up about 56 percent of the total petroleum
purchased by DoD. The continued use of JP-8 as the fuel of choice for operations is testament to the U.S. military
doctrine that relies heavily on air power as an integral part of the joint force across the whole spectrum of opera-
tions. The agility, mobility, and speed that this doctrine provides have been effective, but it comes at a high cost
and further reliance on liquid petroleum. A recent Los Angeles Times article noted that the U.S. military is
consuming about 2.4 million gallons of fuel every day in Iraq and Afghanistan. The data, provided by the U.S.
Central Command, show that DoD is using approximately 57,000 barrels a day, at a cost of about $3 million per day.
This equates to about 16 gallons per soldier per day. This is significantly more than the 2005 consumption rate of 9
gallons per soldier. These numbers make it clear that energy consumption for military operations has increased
dramatically in the last 15 years. In Desert Storm, consumption was 4 gallons per soldier per soldier, and in World
War II, consumption was only 1 gallon per day per soldier. Appendix A contains additional detail about DoD’s
mobility fuel use.
[ ] The Army is too dependent on fossil fuels because consumption is high

The Army does not have the luxury of ignoring its dependence on fossil fuel. Along with the rest of the Nation, it is
almost completely dependent on fossil fuel to accomplish its mission. The Department of Defense (DoD) bill for
mobility and installation energy was over $8.2 billion in fiscal year 2004 (27: NP). DoD is the largest single
consumer of the total U.S. energy consumed. The Army uses about 6 percent of DoD mobility fuels (gas, diesel and
jet fuel) to power tactical and utility vehicles, and weapons platforms to include M1 Abrams tanks and all
helicopters (9: 4). However, this does not account for the fuel used by Air Force planes and Navy ships in
transporting Army personnel and equipment in peacetime and especially in wartime. Fuel logistics for the Army
accounts for 70 percent of all tonnage hauled when the Army mobilizes. The transportation of that same fuel from
base to projection platform comprises 8 percent of the cost (21: 85). The Army also pays $3.2 billion annually to
20,000 active duty and 40,000 reserve component personnel to transport this fuel (21: 88). The Army could have
more “teeth” and less “tail” if we weren’t so dependent upon this fuel. This logistical behemoth impedes
deployment, maneuverability, and increases our personnel and equipment requirements and diverts troops from
combat arms. Additionally, in 2003 it costs $769 million in energy bills for the Army to maintain over 4,100
installations and sites (about two-thirds of all DoD installations) including Army National Guard, Army Reserve,
and overseas facilities. This totaled 896 million square feet in 158,690 buildings (10: 1).
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Inherency - Attitudes
[ ] The Military doesn’t focus on alternative energies because it doesn’t see the
connection between efficiency and performance
Kristine Blackwell Lt Colonel USAF 2007 [June 15 The Department of Defense: Reducing Its Reliance on Fossil-
Based Aviation Fuel – Issues for Congress http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34062.pdf.]
In 2000, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) directed the Defense Science
Board (DSB) to form a task force to examine how DOD could improve the fuel efficiency of their weapons systems.
The task force would also identify institutional barriers that impeded the department’s understanding of and ability
to capture the full advantages of more fuel efficient systems. The task force was not asked to look at possible
sources of alternative fuel and they did not address that topic in their report. They reported five significant findings.
Finding #1: Although significant warfighting, logistics and cost benefits occur when weapons systems are more fuel-
efficient, these benefits are not valued or emphasized in the DOD requirements and acquisition processes. When
buying new weapons, DOD placed performance as its highest priority and seemed to overlook how fuel efficiency
could result in improved performance. Furthermore, when developing new systems the department did not seem to
take into account how the fuel use of a particular system could have far-reaching effects on the total force (e.g., a
system’s logistical requirements may create a vulnerable delivery chain). Finding #2:The DOD currently prices fuel
based on the wholesale refinery price and does not include the cost of delivery to its customers. This prevents a
comprehensive view of fuel utilization in DOD’s decision-making, does not reflect the DOD’s true fuel costs, masks
energy efficiency benefits, and distorts platform design choices. The DSB pointed out that overlooking the true cost
of fuel also masks the real benefits of fuel efficiency. As a consequence, fuel efficiency is not regarded as a relevant
factor in the acquisition of weapon systems or in other logistics related decisions. For example, in 1997, using an
average fuel price of 97 cents, the Air Force estimated that re-engining the B-52H would generate a savings of just
under $400 million over 40 years. Based on that calculation, the service concluded that retrofitting was not cost-
effective. The DSB reworked the equation using an average fuel cost of $1.50 per gallon (the board estimated that
10% of the fuel would be delivered via aerial refueling at a cost of $17.50 per gallon) and calculated a savings of
$1.7 billion. Finding #3: DOD resource allocation and accounting processes (the Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System(PPBS), DOD Comptroller) do not reward fuel efficiency or penalize inefficiency. The task force
found that DOD interest in fuel efficiency had been mainly limited to meeting goals established by legislation or
executive order. Since those goals mainly applied to installations, including their non-warfighting vehicles, there
was little incentive to improve the fuel efficiency of weapon systems. Additionally, the department had no way to
quantify–and therefore value–the benefits of conserving fuel.
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Oil Hurts Readiness – Resupply Chains
[ ] Limited fuel resources reduce readiness of the military
Scott Buchanan, Department of Defense Office of Force Transformation 2006 [Energy and Force Transformation
Joint Force Quarterly http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i42/17-JFQ42%20Buchanan%20Pg%2051-
54.pdf
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) can learn from the Royal Navy’s pre–World War I energy transformation.
Like the Royal Navy a century ago, DOD is faced with the problem of limited resources due in large part to our
energy infrastructure. Fuel represents more than half of the DOD logistics tonnage and over 70 percent of the
tonnage required to put the U.S. Army into position for battle.3 The Navy uses millions of gallons of fuel every day
to operate newest platforms demand. Because of our tremendous logistics capability, the Armed Forces can be
successfully deployed and employed anywhere in the world for both deterrence and combat operations. However,
that capability comes at a high price: a tremendous energy demand. The energy consumption rates of our forces in
Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, is four times what it was in World War II and twice that of Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm.8 The logistics tail now consists largely of the fuel required to execute and sustain
operations.
[ ] Dependence and resupply undermine military readiness

Energy Bulletin. 2007[May 21 US military energy consumption- facts and figures http://www.energy
bulletin.net/29925.html
FACT 14: Delivering fuel to consumers is not limited to logistics pains. Over 70 percent of the tonnage required to
position today's U.S. Army into battle is fuel. The Air Force spends approximately 85 percent of its fuel budget to
deliver, by airborne tankers, just 6 percent of its annual jet fuel usage." [18] Of the top 10 battlefield guzzlers in the
U.S. Army, only 2 are combat vehicles (the Abrams tank and the Apache helicopter). The other eight carry fuel and
supplies. Over half of the fuel transported to the battlefield is consumed by support vehicles, not vehicles engaged in
frontline combat. The logistics costs to deliver fuel include people, training, platforms (for example, oilers, trucks,
and tanker aircraft), and other hardware and infrastructure. Those costs can be tens and sometimes hundreds of times
the cost of the fuel itself, depending on how it is delivered.[19] The Army has 40,000 troops involved in either the
distribution or movement of energy.[20]
[ ] Delivery of fuel increases costs and limits readiness of armed forces

Scott Buchanan, Department of Defense Office of Force Transformation 2006 [Energy and Force Transformation
Joint Force Quarterly http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i42/17-JFQ42%20Buchanan%20Pg%2051-
54.pdf
Delivering fuel where and when it is needed is a significant and increasing burden on the Services. The logistics
costs to deliver fuel include people, training, platforms (for example, oilers, trucks, and tanker aircraft), and other
hardware and infrastructure. Those costs can be tens and sometimes hundreds of times the cost of the fuel itself,
depending on how it is delivered. However, the exact costs are unknown because acquisition and operational
decision processes neither fully quantify those costs nor consider alternatives to the “logistics systems” that platform
acquisition and perhaps operational decisions will dictate.12 It is likely that actual costs of delivering fuel for
operations are dramatically higher than decisionmakers realize. Until now, the methods for acquiring military
platforms, both combat and support, and accounting for the costs of fuel to operate and sustain them have been
sufficient.
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Oil Hurts Readiness – Military Budgets
[ ] Fossil fuel dependence constrains our military – it makes transportation and
electricity grids vulnerable and diverts money from readiness into rising fuel costs
The Department of Defense is the single largest consumer of energy in the United States3. The United States has
built the mightiest military in world history, but has done so with little regard to the huge burden that comes with an
insatiable appetite for energy. DOD energy issues cannot be viewed in isolation. They are a subset of the larger
national problem. Reducing dependence on imported energy is a critical national issue that must be addressed
without delay. First, the DOD needs to recognize the problem from a military perspective: energy is the key enabler
of US military combat power. With that comes huge consumption of mostly imported petroleum based fuels, a
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) structure
dependent on the civilian electrical grid, and rising costs to support the military’s energy needs. Despite those key
elements, DOD has no comprehensive strategy for energy or organizational structure to implement an energy
strategy. Second, the DOD must recognize that energy security makes the military vulnerable in several ways. DOD
operations require assured access to large amounts of fuel for combat platforms and electricity for DOD installations
from a vulnerable electrical grid. Recent cost increases and higher projected costs for energy take defense dollars
away from other key budget areas. Energy requirements are directly related to combat effectiveness, and the
infrastructure required to transport and distribute energy to the battlefield is extremely expensive and diverts
resources away from combat. Combat forces are limited by a “tether of fuel” that needs to be lengthened. Third,
energy must be managed like other combat enablers, such as intelligence, acquisition, and logistics. Present DOD
fuel costs represent only a 2.5 – 3% fraction of the national defense budget. That may seem small, but in a fiscally
constrained wartime environment where DOD and Service budgets have been cut again and again – every dollar is
already committed. The forecast is for more of the same. An already huge national debt, federal budget deficits, a
looming fiscal storm of rising national health care costs and a potential Social Security crisis make fiscally
constrained times appear permanent for the US Government. Fourth, the DOD must have a long-term Energy
Strategy and “energy chain of command”, based on a comprehensive National Energy Strategy and a long-term
vision of energy security 50 years from now and beyond. Ideally, America will reach a clean, carbon-neutral,
domestically controlled, abundant, and affordable energy solution. No one really knows which technology or energy
source will provide the fork in the road away from a largely petroleum dependent economy and military. The DOD’s
Energy Strategy must also look at what can be done today and for the next 20- years to use energy more efficiently
and more environmentally friendly. The strategy must diversify energy sources, increase physical security, and
ensure access. This near-term strategy will buy time for research and technology to help America reach a long-term
vision. This paper will focus on the more near-term, or the next 20-years.
[ ] Energy Price increases consume an enormous portion of the DoD budget.

Energy not come cheap. The DOD spent approximately $13.55 billion on energy as a commodity in FY 2006. Of
that, DOD spent roughly $10 billion on mobility fuels and $3.5 billion on facilities and infrastructure. A $10 per
barrel increase in the cost of fuel increases DOD operating costs by roughly $1.3 billion per year, which roughly
equates to the entire 2007 procurement budget for the United States Marine Corps.10 Those numbers alone are
staggering, and as illustrated in Figure 3, are clearly trending upward. The DOD bill for jet fuel in FY 2006 was $7.9
billion. This represents a 73% increase from the FY 2000 cost of $2.2 billion, even though consumption only rose
12%, largely attributable to the Global War on Terror. However, fuel costs for budgeting and resource planning have
traditionally been based on the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) standard price, which does not reflect the
cost of the fuel logistics system required to deliver fuel to the war fighter. The standard price of fuel represents only
a fraction of the true cost.
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Oil Hurts Readiness – Supply Disruptions
[ ] Energy Dependence crushes the military because it makes them vulnerable to supply
disruptions – the Military must lead on diversifying energy sources
The United States has a National Security problem, energy security, in which the Department of Defense has a
unique interest. The United States imports 26% of its total energy supply and 56% of the oil it consumes. The DOD
is the largest single consumer of energy in the United States and energy is the key enabler of US military combat
power. Huge energy consumption, increased competition for limited energy supplies, ever increasing energy costs,
and no comprehensive Energy Strategy or oversight of energy issues in the DOD have created vulnerabilities. These
include potential fuel and electricity supply disruptions as well as foreign policy and economic vulnerability. The
DOD needs a comprehensive Energy Strategy and organizational structure to implement a strategy to improve
National Security by decreasing US dependence on foreign oil, ensure access to critical energy requirements,
maintain or improve combat capability, promote research for future energy security, be fiscally responsible to the
American tax payer, and protect the environment. This strategy can be implemented through leadership and culture
change, innovation and process efficiencies, reduced demand, and increased/diversified energy sources.
[ ] Vulnerability to supply disruptions undermines US military readiness

Implications of the Problem- Vulnerability Vulnerability: The susceptibility of a nation or military force to any
action by any means through which its war potential or combat effectiveness may be reduced or its will to fight
diminished. Strategic vulnerability: The susceptibility of vital instruments of national power to being seriously
decreased or adversely changed by the application of actions within the capability of another nation [or non-state
actor] to impose. Strategic vulnerability may pertain to political, geographic, economic, informational, scientific,
sociological, or military factors. Joint Publication 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms US
dependence on huge amounts of oil and electricity to power our economy and our military creates much
vulnerability. It would not be wise to publish a detailed list of vulnerabilities of US and global energy critical
infrastructure and key resources; however, it is no big secret that vulnerabilities exist. Terrorists or common vandals
in either the United States or around the globe have already attempted all of the open source referenced scenarios
described in this chapter. Potential Oil Supply Disruptions “Our nation’s dependence on imported oil leaves it
dangerously vulnerable to attack. A single well-designed attack on the petroleum infrastructure in the Middle East
could send oil to well over $100 per barrel and devastate the world’s economy.”1
[ ] Dependence kills readiness - Supply disruptions will cripple forward deployed forces.
Deployed operational forces are particularly vulnerable to supply disruptions. Fuel is delivered by convoy to Iraq
from Jordan, Kuwait, and Turkey. In FY 2006, over 156 million gallons of fuel were delivered to US/coalition forces
in western Iraq. In the north, over 103 million gallons of fuel were delivered through Turkey.5 In July 2006, USMC
Major General Richard Zilmer, commander of the multi-national force in western Iraq, submitted a priority request
for a self-sustainable energy solution to reduce the number of fuel logistics convoys in Iraq that are increasingly
vulnerable to attack.6
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Extend – Hegemony Good
[ ] Decline in U.S. primacy creates a global power vacuum—this collapses every
institution of global stability and causes spreading nuclear wars
Ferguson, 2004 – Professor of History at New York University's Stern School of Business and Senior fellow at the
Hoover Institution (Niall, “A world without power,” Foreign Policy 143, p. 32-39, July-August)
Critics of US. global dominance should pause and consider the alternative. If the
United States retreats from its hegemonic role, who would supplant it? Not Europe, not
China, not the Muslim world- and certainly not the United Nations. Unfortunately, the
alternative to a single superpower is not a multilateral utopia but the anarchic nightmare of a new
Dark Age. We tend to assume that power, like nature, abhors a vacuum. In the history of world politics, it
seems, someone is always the hegemon or bidding to become it. Today, it is the United States; a century ago, it was the United Kingdom. Before
that, it was France, Spain, and so on. The famed nineteenth-century Gennan historian Leopold
von Ranke, doyen of the study of
statecraft, portrayed modem European history as an incessant struggle for mastery,
in which a balance of power was possible only through recurrent conflict. The influence of economics on the study of diplomacy only seems to
confirm the notion that history is a competition between rival powers. In his best-selling 1987 work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers:
Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Yale University historian Paul Kennedy concluded that, like all past empires, the
U.S. and Russian superpowers would inevitably succumb to overstretch. But their place would soon be usurped, Kennedy argued, by the rising
powers of China and Japan, both still unencumbered by the deadweight of imperial military commitments. In his 2001 book, The Tragedy of
Great Power Politics, University of Chicago political scientist John J. Mearsheimer updates Kennedy's account. Having failed to succumb to
overstretch, and having survived the German and Japanese challenges, he argues, the United States must now brace itself for the ascent of new
rivals. "A rising China is the most dangerous potential threat to the United States in the early twenry-first century," contends Mearsheirner. "The
United States has a profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead." China is not the only threat
Mearsheimer foresees. The European Union (E.u.) too has the potential to become "a formidable rival." Power, in other words,
is not a natural monopoly: the struggle for mastery is both perennial and
universal. The "unipolarity" identified by some commentators following the Soviet collapse cannot last much longer, for the simple
reason that history hates a hyperpower. Sooner or later, challengers will emerge, and back we must go to a multipolar, multipower world. But
what if these esteemed theorists are all wrong? What if the world is actually heading
for a period when there is no hegemon? What if, instead of a balance of power, there is an absence of power?
Such a situation is not unknown in history. Although the chroniclers of the past have long been preoccupied with
the achievements of great powers- whether civilizations, empires, or nation-states- they have not wholly overlooked eras when power receded.
Unfortunately, the world's experience with power vacuums (eras of "apolarity," if you
will) is hardly encouraging. Anyone who dislikes U.S. hegemony should bear in mind
that. Rather than a multipolar world of competing great powers, a world with no
hegemon at all may be the real alternative to US. primacy. Apolarity could turn
out to mean an anarchic new Dark Age- an era of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic
plunder and pillage in the world's forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilization's retreat into a
few fortified enclaves.
Continues…
The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports
of the global economy--from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai--would become the targets of plunderers and
pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise
liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear
wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending
catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical
Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue
their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these
continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the
prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If
the United States retreats from global hegemony--its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial
frontier--its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony,
or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to
unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity--a global vacuum of power. And far more
dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder
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19
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DoD Starter
[ ] Asian, European and Middle Eastern stability all depend on US leadership
Schmitt, 2006– Resident scholar and director of the Program on Advanced Strategic Studies at the American
Enterprise Institute (Gary, “Is there any alternative to U.S. primacy?” The Weekly Standard, Books & Arts, Vol. 11
No. 22, February, Lexis)
In the case of Europe, after examining both the sources of tension and cooperation in current transatlantic relations,
Lieber argues that Europe has no choice but to depend on American leadership and power. Europe's lack of
unanimity over foreign policies, and its own lack of hard power, leave it with little choice but to rely on the United
States when it comes to maintaining the world's security blanket. As for the Middle East, after making the case for
going to war with Saddam's Iraq--a case that ultimately hinges on the risks of not acting--Lieber notes that it still
remains the case that "only the U.S." can deter regional thugs, contain weapons proliferation to any degree, keep the
Arab-Israeli peace process afloat, and keep the oil supplies flowing to us and our allies. And in Asia, it is the United
States that "plays a unique stabilizing role . . . that no other country or organization can play." Absent America's
presence, the region's key actors would face a dramatically different set of security concerns, in which more overt,
"great power" competition would likely become the norm.
[ ] Even if hegemony might be tangentially harmful to some, a world of U.S. hegemony

still has significantly less violence than one without
Kagan, 98 – Alexander Hamilton Fellow at American University (Robert, “The benevolent empire,” Foreign Policy,
Iss. 111, pg. 24-35, Summer, Proquest)
And neither of them, one suspects, is very seriously intended. For the truth about America's dominant role in the
world is known to most clear-eyed international observers. And the truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised
by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world's population. It is certainly a better international
arrangement than all realistic alternatives. To undermine it would cost many others around the world far more than
it would cost Americans-and far sooner. As Samuel Huntington wrote five years ago, before he joined the plethora
of scholars disturbed by the "arrogance" of American hegemony: "A world without U.S. primacy will be a world
with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States
continues to have more influence than any other country shaping global affairs."
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[ ] U.S. leadership deters conflict and solves all their impacts—collapse results in
cascading great power wars
Thayer 2006 [Bradley A., Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, Duluth, The National Interest,
November -December, “In Defense of Primacy”, lexis]
countries want to align themselves with the
A remarkable fact about international politics today--in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that
United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes--their own protection, or to gain greater
influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio
of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had
U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing
so many allies.
one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of

the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms,
like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the
UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its
You
charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation.
can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like
India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions
Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains

of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even
from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting
communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable
future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates.
The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change
of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States
Everything we think of when we consider the current

today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics.
international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing
democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind
it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The
Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the
liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose
it)."
Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington
U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical
and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War,
antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--
between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests
a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power
are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but
wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology
of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align
with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the
likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more
open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States.
Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good
enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted.
Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but
nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban
forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin
America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the
With
Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy.
its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce,
respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order
is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created
this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because
the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess.
Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of
post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and
globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it
the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare
provides. Fourth and finally,
of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--
and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the
planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous
earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S.
military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and
prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical
American generosity has done more to help the

reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces.
United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the
United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous
earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as
possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first
time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money
was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly
positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg. THERE IS no other
state, group of states or international organization that can provide these global benefits. None even comes close. The United Nations cannot because it is riven with conflicts and major cleavages that divide the international body time
and again on matters great and trivial. Thus it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on salient issues and to act as a unified force once a decision is reached. The EU has similar problems. Does anyone expect Russia or China to take
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Let's face it: for the time being, American primacy remains
up these responsibilities? They may have the desire, but they do not have the capabilities.
humanity's only practical hope of solving the world's ills.

Alternative Increase Readiness – Resupply
[ ] Alternative energy is critical for forward deployed forces – it reduces vulnerability of
fuel resupply
Boston Globe , 2006 [ October 2, Military wants a more fuel-efficient Humvee Pentagon makes an energy push;
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2006/10/02/military_wants_a_ more_fuel
_efficient_humvee/]
The pressure for renewable energy sources is driven from the front lines. On July 25 , Major General Richard Zilmer
of the Marine Corps, who is in charge of the force in Anbar, Iraq, wrote a priority request, saying that his supply
convoys on Iraq's roads were increasingly at risk. As much as 70 percent of the convoys are carrying fuel, according
to studies. Zilmer wanted alternative-energy sources brought to his base, such as solar and renewable battery
systems, as substitutes for fuel used to power generators. The Pentagon also is taking note of the cost of delivering
the fuel to far-flung areas of Iraq. James Woolsey, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency and currently
an energy adviser to the Defense Department, has estimated that getting gas to a tank in Iraq could cost as much as
$100 a gallon, considering the cost of supply lines, tanker vehicles, and protection of the tankers.
[ ] DoD alternative energies are necessary to sustain forward deployment

Eileen Westervelt, U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, 2005 [September Energy Trends and
Implications for U.S. Army Installations, http://static.cbslocal.com/station/wcco/news/
specialreports/projectenergy/06_0420_projectenergy_energytrendsreportfromarmycorps.pdf]
The energy situation is highly uncertain–for the Army, the Nation, and the world. Now is the time to consider both
short and long-term issues to develop enduring energy policies and solutions for our military installations to discern
an effective and viable path for the Army’s energy future. To sustain its mission and ensure the capability to project
and support the forces, the Army must insulate itself from the economic and logistical energy-related problems
coming in the near- to mid-future. This requires a transition to modern, secure, and efficient energy systems and to
building safe, environmentally friendly technologies. This is both a supplyside and demand-side challenge requiring
integrated solutions and thoughtful planning and execution. Primary issues affecting energy options are: availability,
affordability, sustainability, and security. Any review of these issues must take a global perspective since resources
are unevenly distributed around the world. Further, the impacts of energy consumption have global reach from both
an environmental and political perspective.
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Alternative Increase Readiness – Supply Disruptions
[ ] Studies prove that increasing alternative energy use can reduce DoD vulnerability to
fossil fuel disruptions
The Pentagon’s Office of Force Transformation and Resources contracted LMI to develop an approach for the
creation of a new DOD energy strategy. LMI identified three areas where DOD’s current practices were not aligned
with its stated energy goals, recommended three main actions that DOD needed to take in order to address the
misalignments, and provided other energy related options that could enable DOD to improve their corporate energy
related processes. The three areas of strategic, operational, and fiscal considerations LMI identified where DOD’s
practices and stated energy goals produced some friction and limitations were as follow.
1. Strategic: DOD’s dependence on foreign supplies of fuel limits its flexibility in dealing with certain producer
nations;
2. Operational: DOD seeks greater mobility, persistence, and agility for its forces but the energy requirements of its
forces limits the department’s ability to attain those things; and
3. Fiscal: DOD seeks to reduce the operating costs of its forces and of future procurements but increased energy
consumption and increased prices are causing energy associated operating costs to grow. The three actions LMI
recommended DOD take to address the areas noted above were as follow.
1. Incorporate energy considerations (energy use and energy logistics support requirements ) in the department’s key
corporate decision making: strategic planning, analytic agenda, joint concept and joint capability development,
acquisition, and planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE);
2. Establish a corporate governance structure with policyand resource oversight to focus the department’s energy
efforts; and
3. Apply a new framework to promote energy efficiency, including alternate energy sources, to those areas
consuming the most fuel (aviation forces), requiring the most logistics support (forward land forces and mobile
electric power), or having the most negative effect on the warfighter (individual warfighter burden).
[ ] DoD procurement of renewables is essential for future readiness because it decreases

dependence
In an environment of uncertainty about the price and availability of traditional energy sources, DoD is facing
increasing energy demand and support requirements that it must meet if it is to achieve its broader strategic goals—
notably, establishment of a more mobile and agile force. However, recent technological advances in energy
efficiency and alternative energy technologies offer a unique opportunity for DoD to make progress toward
reconciling its strategic goals with its energy requirements through reduced consumption of fuel—especially foreign
fuel. To capitalize on this opportunity, DoD needs to implement an energy strategy that encompasses the
development of innovative new concepts and capabilities to reduce energy dependence while maintaining or
increasing overall warfighting effectiveness. Recognizing that DoD must change how it views, values, and uses
energy—a transformation that will challenge some of the department’s most deeply held assumptions, interests, and
processes—the Office of Force Transfor- mation and Resources, within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy, asked LMI to develop an approach to establishing a DoD energy strategy. LMI identified three areas of
disconnect between DoD’s current energy consumption practices and the capability requirements of its strategic
goals: Strategic. DoD seeks to shape the future security environment in favor of the United States. But, our
dependence on foreign supplies of fuel limits our flexibility in dealing with producer nations who oppose or hinder
our goals for greater prosperity and liberty. Operational. DoD’s operational concepts seek greater mobility, persis-
tence, and agility for our forces. But, the energy logistics requirements of these forces limit our ability to realize
these concepts. Fiscal. DoD seeks to reduce operating costs of the current force to procure new capabilities for the
future. But, with increased energy consumption and increased price pressure due to growing global demand for
energy, energy-associated operating costs are growing.
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Alternative Increase Readiness – Military Budgets
[ ] Savings from reduced fossil fuel consumption will be spent on improving readiness
U.S. Government Agency News, 2001 [May 3, Defense Unveils Plan to Reduce Electricity Demand in California,
http://usgovinfo.about.com/blagencyrelease03.htm]
This initiative augments ongoing energy conservation efforts within the Department that have resulted in a 23
percent decrease in energy consumed per square foot in DoD buildings nationwide since 1985. "The Services have
been resolute in reducing their energy consumption over the years. These savings have been spent on readiness and
quality of life, and improving the environment," said Rumsfeld. "This success story, however, makes the new power
reduction initiative all the more difficult, since the less difficult solutions have been implemented already. The
Services will need to be innovative, aggressive and tenacious to meet our goals for California." To achieve these
goals, the Department will redirect $32 million in fiscal 2001 to implement the Services' demand reduction and
power generation plans, and for investments such as lighting upgrades, updated controls, improvements to heating,
ventilation and air conditioning systems, and installation of demand meters, to meet later goals. An additional $19
million will be added to the fiscal 2002 budget to achieve fully the initiative's long-term goals. "The Services have
pulled out all stops in developing innovative strategies to meet these goals," said Ray DuBois, deputy under
secretary of Defense for installations and environment. "Some measures include hiring specialists to develop
regional peak load reduction strategies, such as integrated schedules for high power-consuming equipment, and
installing thermal energy storage units to shift the cooling load to off-peak times." Non-fossil fuel generation plays
an important role in the Services' plans including wind power, fuel cells and photovoltaic arrays. "One of the more
innovative concepts involves buying power from the owner of an existing wind generation plant located adjacent to
a military base who has been unable to sell power to the commercial grid economically because of high transmission
and distribution charges," said DuBois. While implementing this initiative will cost DoD additional money up front,
these investments in energy efficiency and demand reduction are sound business decisions. The more than $50
million DoD investment will leverage almost $290 million in private sector investment for infrastructure
improvements and generation capability, and will ultimately yield annual energy cost savings in excess of $25
million. Future savings will pay back initial investments, be used for additional energy savings measures and
housing and quality of life upgrades.
[ ] Reducing fossil fuel use is key to the DoD because high costs distort budgets and
undermine resupply
Paul Dimotakis, The MITRE Corporation, 2006 [December 09, 2006, Reducing DoD Fossil-Fuel Dependence,
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/fossil.pdf]
JASON finds compelling reasons for the DoD to minimize fuel use, both overall and in individual vehicles and
carriers. Fuel, even if it is currently a relatively small portion of the overall budget is accompanied by large
multipliers – it takes fuel to deliver fuel – and is accompanied by high costs in both infrastructure (O&M) and, in the
battlefield, in lives. Price uncertainties compound budget planning, and fuel costs may rise to represent a more-
significant factor for the DoD in the future, even though current projections may indicate otherwise. More
importantly, the impacts of delivering fuel are evident in dictating tactics, operations costs, maintenance costs, and
military capabilities.
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Solvency – Spillover
[ ] DoD procurement will set an example for all energy consumers
Waste News June 11, 2007 [DOD links environment, energy, mission Lexis]
Executive Order 13423, signed by President Bush and published in the Federal Register in January, will help the
Defense Department incorporate sustainability into its operations, Beehler said. The executive order incorporates
goals for all federal agencies in the areas of energy efficiency, renewable energy, water conservation, green
purchasing, pollution prevention, green building, fleet purchases and electronic stewardship. Ed Pinero, the federal
environmental executive, told conference attendees that the executive order took goals outlined in five previous
executive orders and two memoranda of understanding and consolidated them into one executive order. In addition,
Executive Order 13423 updates outdated goals contained in some of the previous executive orders. Combining
energy and environmental goals into one order should make it easier for federal employees to view them as part of
an overall sustainability effort, Pinero said. ``I'm very sensitive to our environmental footprint and the economic
footprint we have as the government,'' Pinero said. ``We're the single biggest purchaser of pretty much anything
there is out there.'' And that gives the federal government the ability to influence availability and public awareness
of green products, he said. ``The taxpayers want to see the government lead by example,'' Pinero said.
[ ] Military procurement boosts renewable companies, making them profitable

Financial Times December 18, 2007 [US Navy funding bolsters Ocean Power Lexis]
Further funding from the US Navy helped Ocean Power Technologies lift first-half revenues from Dollars 861,000
to Dollars 2.2m (Pounds 1.1m). The Aim-listed renewable energy company, which took a secondary listing on
Nasdaq in May, reported operating losses up from Dollars 5.3m to Dollars 7.1m for the six months to October 31.
The increase in the pre-tax loss to Dollars 4.3m (Dollars 4m) was held back by a jump in interest received from
Dollars 723,000 to Dollars 2.8m following the raising of Dollars 90m at Dollars 20 a share on Nasdaq. The
company has a long-standing deal with the US Navy for installing its buoys - which are designed to harness wave
motion in order to generate electricity - off the naval base in Hawaii. In October it was awarded another Dollars
1.9m of naval funding. In addition, it received Dollars 500,000 from PNCG Power, the Oregon utility, for the
installation of a 150kW buoy, which will be used to demonstrate the potential of the Pacific as an energy resource.
The secondary fundraising was carried out partly to fund development of the more powerful buoys. During the half
development spending rose Dollars 1m to Dollars 3.8m. Losses per share fell from 77 to 42 cents, reflecting the
increased share capital.
[ ] Military funding of alternative energy can set a model for all of society – the internet
and aviation empirically prove
The Washington Post, 2002 [May 2, 2002 Thursday, Biotech Companies See a Big New Customer at the Pentagon]
The U.S. military became a high-tech fighting force over the years by integrating advances in science and math to
track enemies, communicate in remote areas and build more powerful weapons. Now, it wants to tap biotechnology
to make stronger materials, enhance soldiers' performance and develop alternative energy sources. More than 350
biotech entrepreneurs, government contractors and military officials met at a conference this week sponsored by the
Washington-based Biotechnology Industry Organization and the Defense Department. Thirty-six biotech companies
pitched potential products with such varied applications as wound healing, memory enhancement and environmental
decontamination. The Defense Department has a record of developing leading-edge technologies that eventually
reach consumers. Much of modern aviation and telecommunications systems can be traced to technology developed
for military purposes. Perhaps the most successful example of this transfer is the Internet, which was developed as
an internal communications network by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in the 1960s. "By solving
unique military problems, it advanced the state of the science to new thresholds and spun off all sorts of commercial
products and services that ultimately benefited the average American citizen and our economy," said Col. Jerry
Warner, who heads the Defense Department's Office of Net Assessment.
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Solvency - Biofuels
[ ] Biofuels are a viable option to reduce the DOD’s dependence on fossil fuels
For comparison, the production of liquid fuels from non-fossil energy sources will now be discussed. Biomass is the
most oftcited route for such purposes because, in principle, biomassderived fuels could be widely available.
Additionally, biofuels could be, at least to some extent, sustainable and renewable. Of concern, therefore, is not only
the relative cost of the biofuel with respect to the cost of crude-oil-based fuels, or FT-derived fuels, but the
suitability of bio-derived fuels for the DoD mission and whether the production of such fuels stems from a
renewable process, e.g., the fraction of sunlight energy stored in the final fuel product, as well as the result of a full
account of all other energy and other inputs required to produce the biofuel.
[ ] DoD use of biofuels would increase military security by decreasing dependency

Inside Defense 2006 [ September 15, http://www.military.com/features/ 0,15240,1135 99,00.html ,DoD Pushes
Biobased Fuels]
Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England is calling for increased use of biobased products by the Defense
Department to help wean the U.S. military off its dependence on fossil fuels that come from unstable areas of the
globe. “Many of these [biobased materials] are substitutes for products based on nonrenewable natural resources
like oil and natural gas, so when we have substitutes, it supports the president's initiatives and . . . national interests
to reduce our dependence on foreign sources of energy [and make] our nation more secure,” he said Sept. 12 at the
Pentagon, during an event to bring manufacturers of biobased products and defense officials together. “Biobased
products are . . . an essential part of our strategic approach to national security,” he added.
[ ] Biofuels are cleaner because they are carbon neutral

Biodiesel is a synthetic fuel made from vegetable oils or animal fats. B20, the commonly used mix of 20% biodiesel
and 80% petroleum-based diesel fuel–works in any diesel engine with few or no modifications. DOD began using
biodiesel in 2000 and is now the nation's top purchaser of B20, buying over 15 million gallons annually. All military
departments use B20 in a variety of non-tactical vehicles. Biofuel. Biofuels are a number of synthetic fuel products
that use biological matter as a feedstock: ethanol, produced mainly from corn; cellulosic biofuel, ethanol made from
cellulosic plants such as fast-growing trees, prairie grass, and agricultural waste; and biodiesel. Pros. Many cite as
one of the advantages of biofuel that the feedstocks are renewable. Also, unlike synthetic fuel from coal and natural
gas, biofuel can theoretically be “carbon neutral.” That is the carbon dioxide emitted during the burning of biofuel is
offset by the carbon dioxide consumed during the feedstocks’ growth. However, current production methods involve
the use of some carbon emitting sources, which detracts from the claim of carbon neutrality.
[ ] DoD use of biofuels would increase military security

Military.com 2006 [DoD Pushes Biobased Fuels September 15,
http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,113599,00.html
globe. “Many of these [biobased materials] are substitutes for products based on nonrenewable natural resources
like oil and natural gas, so when we have substitutes, it supports the president's initiatives and . . . national interests
to reduce our dependence on foreign sources of energy [and make] our nation more secure,” he said Sept. 12 at the
products are . . . an essential part of our strategic approach to national security,” he added.
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Solvency – Bases
[ ] Using renewables for military bases would decrease energy costs and replace fossil
fuels
The DoD Instruction for Installation Energy Management Number 4170.11 dated October 13, 2004 directs the:
Development of programs that shall result in facilities that are designed, operated, and maintained to achieve
optimum performance and maximize energy efficiency in accordance with sustainable design principles. Since about
33 percent of energy used today is used to maintain the climate and lighting in buildings, constructing energy
efficient (green or sustainable) buildings, would impact energy and cost (4: 27). Green or sustainable buildings use
material, energy, water and land more efficiently and on average use 30 percent less energy than conventionally
constructed buildings (18: 19). Many Army facilities, specifically housing areas and barracks, are aging and either in
the process of being (or slated to be) renovated. This is an opportune time for the Army to simultaneously improve
the quality of life for soldiers and their families and also incorporate its sustainability strategy by making these new
facilities energy efficient and self-sustaining. Considering that operating cost over the lifetime of most buildings is
significantly greater than the initial construction cost, the Army can save money over the long term by putting up
front money into constructing the most energy self sustaining buildings in the first place. Another way to conserve
energy is by reducing the size of buildings as the more spacious a building the more energy is required to light, heat,
and cool it. Over the decades, the average American home has increased in size to double the average homes in
Japan or Europe and over 25 times the size of the average African home (40: NP). Preexisting buildings can be
retrofitted with energy efficient applications. Such as installing thermal paned windows with coatings to keep heat
from escaping but allow light to enter and thereby drastically reduce the energy demand to heat and cool a building.
Other efforts would be to replace incandescent lighting with more energy efficient compact fluorescent lighting, add
reflective backings in the light housing to increase illumines of the bulbs, and add solar tubes or sky lights to lighten
rooms naturally during daylight hours. Natural lighting and cleaner air contributes to a healthier working, living and
learning environment (18: 19). Construct buildings for maximum use of passive and active solar energy by properly
orienting them to the sun and insulating with recycled energy efficient material. Installing solar heating and solar
energy devices on all new buildings will allow water to be heated directly by the sun and electricity provided
through photovoltaic panels. Constructing energy self-sustaining facilities with a clean renewable energy
micropower plant would eliminate the need for the installation to be connected to the local power grid. This will also
decrease the energy bill and the threat of a blackout-whether the cause is due to nature or man. While we are in
transition to distributed energy, we can send any excess energy to installation buildings that are not yet modified
with micropower or send the excess energy to the community electric grid and receive credit on the electric bill.
[ ] The military can utilize geothermal energy on its domestic bases

Geothermal Heat Pumps Geothermal heat pump systems are made of a ground heat exchanger, heat pump, and
ductwork to deliver the air. The heat exchanger consists of pipes (a loop) buried under the ground close to a
building. Water or water plus antifreeze flows through the heat exchanger pipes absorbing heat (in the winter) and
giving up heat (in the summer) through the ground. This heated air (relative to the outside ambient air) from the heat
exchanger is pumped into the indoor ductwork to heat buildings in the winter. In the summer the heat pump extracts
the heated indoor air into the heat exchanger in the ground. This heated air can also serve to heat water at no extra
cost. This process saves energy, money and does not create any air pollutants (26: NP). Geothermal heat pumps have
great potential application for the Army. They can be used in regions where solar systems are not advantageous as in
the Northwestern and Northeastern United States and they can also be used to supplement and backup solar or other
energy systems. They can also be used under street and sidewalk surfaces to melt snow.
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They Say “Green Procurement now”
[ ] The DoD has a green procurement policy – it needs education and monitoring to
implement it
Inside The Pentagon, 2006 [September 14, 2006, Pentagon Pushing 'Buy Biobased' Message To
Reduce Dependency On Oil ebsco]
DOD officials have submitted comments on implementation to the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council, which is
crafting a rule on the matter, the source said. Once the implementation guidelines are announced, DOD and other
agencies will have to establish biobased procurement preference programs, craft an agency-wide “promotion”
campaign and submit an annual review to Congress on the effort’s progress, according to the law. Creating effective
methods of monitoring purchases of biobased products for reporting purposes is an issue the Agriculture Department
is tackling, Marvin Duncan, a senior agriculture economist with the department, told ITP last week. The Pentagon is
interested in moving forward with increasing procurement of biobased products by educating officials on options in
the market before the law is implemented, the defense source said. “Pending the finalization of [Agriculture
Department] implementing guidance, DOD activities are encouraged to purchase and use biobased alternative
products and to initiate projects [that] further demonstrate the value and utility of these materials in DOD
applications,” Krieg wrote in the Aug. 17 memo.
[ ] Current energy policies won’t provide the security needed for changing military
needs
The demands placed on the armed forces have changed significantly since their current capabilities were designed
and fielded and the plans and concepts for their employment were developed. The security challenges of the 21st
century require a force structure that is more expeditionary, agile, and responsive. Such a force structure will
consume increasing amounts of energy if current trends continue. Building this future force structure requires the
application of resources, yet budgets will be increasingly constrained by operational energy demands. We call the
misalignments between energy policies and strategic objectives “disconnects,” and they exist along three lines:
strategic, operational, and fiscal. In recognition of the political factors associated with increasing energy
consumption and some alternative energy solutions, we also identified a fourth disconnect—environmental. Table
2-1 defines the disconnects, and the following subsections discuss them in more detail. Strategic Ability to shape
the future security environment favorably to support our national interests, principles, freedoms, and way of life.
Requires reduced reliance on foreign energy resources. Operational Ability to counter projected threats, which
entails increased operational mobility, persistence, and agility. Requires developing efficient technologies that can
support the asymmetric combat capability needed for future operations without increased fuel consumption or
logistics and support limitations. Fiscal Ability to procure new capabilities, which requires efficient energy
consumption. Inability to control increased energy costs from fuel and supporting infrastructure diverts resources
that would otherwise be available to procure new capabilities. Environmental Ability to conduct DoD operations and
activities in a manner that protects the environment while supporting national security objectives and maintaining
operational readiness.
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They Say “Military will get Priority in a Crisis”
[ ] Even If the military won’t have their oil cut off, renewables are an important solution
to fluctuating oil prices
In light of an increasing U.S. dependence on foreign oil, as well as rising fuel costs for the U.S. and the DoD, and
implications with regard to national security and national defense, JASON was charged in 2006 by the DDR&E to
assessing pathways to reduce DoD’s dependence on fossil fuels. The key conclusions of the study are that, barring
unforeseen circumstances, availability concerns are not a decision driver in the reduction of DoD fossil-fuel use at
present. However, the need to improve logistics requirements and military capabilities, and, secondarily, the need to
reduce fuel costs, as well as providing a prudent hedge against a foggy future, especially in the Middle East and
South America, argue for a reduction in fuel use, in general.
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They Say “Small Percentage”
[ ] Even if the DoD uses a small percentage of oil, reducing its use is still important to
reduce military fuel costs and energy vulnerabilities
6. Even though fuel is only a relatively small fraction of the total DoD budget, there are several compelling reasons
to minimize DoD fuel use:
a. Fuel costs represent a large fraction of the 40-50 year life-cycle costs of mobility aircraft and non-nuclear ships.
Note that this is consistent with the life-cycle costs of commercial airliners.
b. Fuel use is characterized by large multipliers and co-factors: at the simplest level, it takes fuel to deliver fuel.
c. Fuel use imposes large logistical burdens, operational constraints and liabilities, and vulnerabilities: otherwise
capable offensive forces can be countered by attacking more-vulnerable logistical-supply chains. Part of this is
because of changes in military doctrine. In the past, we used to talk of the “front line”, because we used to talk of the
line that was sweeping ahead, leaving relatively safe terrain behind. This is no longer true. The rear is now
vulnerable, especially the fuel supply line.
d. There are anticipated, and some already imposed, environmental regulations and constraints. Not least, because of
the long life of many DoD systems,
e. uncertainties about an unpredictable future make it advisable to decrease DoD fuel use to minimize exposure and
vulnerability to potential unforeseen disruptions in world and domestic supply.
[ ] Oil price instability hurts the DoD despite small percentages of consumption
Instability in the price of oil provides an important budgetary impact of fossil-fuel use on DoD. While present fuel
costs represent a small part of the overall DoD budget, at current consumption rates, for every $10/bbl rise in price,
DoD requires an additional $1.5B in its annual budget. There are, in general, two ways to deal with this issue. One is
to reduce DoD demand, which is discussed below. The second is to attempt to beat the commercial market price at
any one time incurring some market risk by entering into long-term contracts, or hedging against future prices of
crude oil on the world market.
[ ] The DoD’s 1% of US consumption is an Enormous amount of energy relative to other

Countries
FACT 1: The DoD's total primary energy consumption in Fiscal Year 2006 was 1100 trillion Btu. It corresponds to
only 1% of total energy consumption in USA. For those of you who think that this is not much then read the next
sentence. Nigeria, with a population of more than 140 million, consumes as much energy as the U.S. military. The
DoD per capita[2] energy consumption (524 trillion Btu) is 10 times more than per capita energy consumption in
China, or 30 times more than that of Africa. Total final energy consumption (called site delivered energy by DoD)
of the DoD was 844 trillion Btu in FY2006.
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They Say “Solvency Long Term”
[ ] The DoD should begin now, even if solvency is long term – it must act to set an
example and to move toward a new energy Vision for the military
DoD energy transformation must begin in the near term, addressing current practices and legacy forces, while
investing for long-term changes that may radically alter future consumption patterns. We recommend a time-phased
approach to reduce our reliance on fossil and carbon-based fuels. This approach includes the following:
Organizational and process changes that can be implemented immediately Engineered solutions, to improve the
efficiency of current forces and those nearing acquisition Invention of new capabilities, employed in new
operational concepts, for those forces yet to be developed. Applying this approach to the three focus areas will give
DoD an opportunity to develop portfolios of solutions that can reduce energy use and dependence. The coordinating
body can evaluate these portfolios to against the energy disconnects to identify optimal solutions across the services,
broader department objectives, and U.S. government strategic objectives and energy efforts. The coordinating body
can then focus technology development as required to achieve the desired solutions. For the energy transformation
to be successful, DoD’s senior leaders must articu- late a clear vision for the change and must ensure—through their
sustained commitment and active participation—that it becomes engrained in the organization’s ethos. We propose
the following vision: DoD will be the nation’s leader in the effective use of energy, significantly reducing DoD’s
dependence on traditional fuels and enhancing operational primacy through reduced logistics support requirements.
Establishing a goal for mobility energy efficiency will provide near-term objectives in support of the vision,
enhance operational effectiveness by reducing logistics support requirements, and free resources for
recapitalization of the force. Our estimates show that implementing a 3 percent reduction per year until 2015 could
result in savings of $43 billion by 2030 based on Energy Information Agency reference case price projections,
without including any multiplier effects. In view of the long period required to develop and populate the force with
new concepts and capabilities, DoD should begin now to shape the force for an uncertain energy future.
[ ] Incremental solutions to DoD energy security are Necessary for hegemony

The Department of Defense can lead the way in transforming the way in which the United States consumes and
produces energy. In the 1985 movie, Back to the Future, scientist Dr. Emmett Brown returns from the year 2015
with a 1980’s vintage vehicle modified with a “Mr. Fusion” device creating huge amounts of energy from organic
material found in common household garbage. The year 2015 is only 8 years away and there is no evidence Mr.
Fusion, or any other major scientific breakthrough making oil obsolete, is going to happen inside the next 30 years.
Mr. Fusion represents the unlikely event of a game winning home run with bases loaded and a full count. In reality
there are few home runs to reduce the United States’ addiction to foreign oil. Improving energy security must be
done using a steady, incremental approach not tied to individual personalities, specific military leaders or partisan
political administrations. Securing the energy future of the Department of Defense is a prerequisite to ensuring the
United States remains the world’s preeminent global power.
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They Say “DoD can’t Change”
[ ] The DoD can change its culture – it already recognizes the need for change –
alternatives can lead that change
In this environment of uncertainty about the availability of traditional fuel sources at a reasonable cost, DoD is
facing increasing energy demand and support requirements that it must meet if it is to achieve its broader strategic
goals— notably, establishment of a more mobile and agile force. However, recent technological advances in energy
efficiency and alternative energy technologies offer a unique opportunity for DoD to make progress toward
reconciling its strategic goals with its energy requirements through reduced consumption of fuel— especially
foreign fuel. To capitalize on this opportunity, DoD needs to implement an energy strategy that encompasses the
development of innovative new concepts and capabilities to reduce energy dependence while maintaining or in-
creasing overall warfighting effectiveness. Recognizing that DoD must change how it views, values, and uses
energy—a transformation that will challenge some of the department’s most deeply held assumptions, interests,
and processes—the Office of Force Transformation and Re- sources, within the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (USD) for Policy, asked LMI to develop an approach to establishing a DoD energy strategy. Spe- cifically,
it asked LMI to develop a process for identifying, evaluating, and implementing new energy-saving and
-replacement technologies and techniques and to identify possible energy governance structures that would enable
DoD to gain a system view of energy consumption, support requirements, efficiency, and costs.
[ ] Leadership is necessary to change the energy culture of the DoD

Leadership and Culture Change “Leadership is about vision, inspiration, values, and culture. Management is about
systems, processes, resources, and policies. Organizational structure can, by itself, preclude success, it cannot, by
itself, ensure success.”2 True culture change of any large organization must start at the top. Edgar H. Schein is Sloan
Fellows Professor of Management Emeritus and a senior lecturer at the Sloan School of Management at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In his book, Organizational Culture and Leadership, he tackles the complex
question of how an existing culture can be changed – one of the toughest challenges of leadership. According to
Schein, as an organization matures, it develops a positive ideology and a set of myths about how it operates. The
organization continues to operate by the shared tacit assumptions that have worked in practice, “and it is not unlikely
that the espoused theories, the announced values of the organization come to be, to varying degrees, out of line with
the actual assumptions that govern daily practice.”3 In the case of DOD energy use, this assumption would be the
assumption that energy is cheap, plentiful, and for someone else to worry about. Where these differences exist,
scandal and myth explosion become relevant as mechanisms of culture change. Left to themselves, change will not
occur “until the consequences of the actual operating assumptions create a public and visible scandal that cannot be
hidden, avoided, or denied.”4 Recent examples include changes in NASA’s safety culture following the Challenger
and Columbia disasters or the Army’s recent health care shakeup following the exposure of substandard
administrative handling of wounded soldiers and conditions at certain Walter Reed Army Medical Center facilities.
The DOD cannot afford to wait for an energy related scandal before initiating change. Schein proposes that leaders
can systematically set out to change how a large, mature organization operates recognizing such change may involve
varying degrees of culture change. In short, it involves unlearning old behaviors and relearning new behaviors, and
cannot be done unless some sense of threat, crisis, or dissatisfaction is present to create the motivation to start the
process of unlearning and relearning.5 “The change goal must be defined concretely in terms of the specific problem
you are trying to fix, not as a ‘culture change’…Culture change is always transformative change that requires a
period of unlearning that is psychologically painful.”6
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They Say “Alternate Causalities”
[ ] DoD incentives for Alternative energies are necessary to solve our military’s
vulnerability to energy shocks – alternate causalities are not a reason to reject the plan
because incremental solutions are critical
In the Foreword of Amory Lovins’ book, Winning the Oil Endgame, former Secretary of State George P. Shultz uses
a baseball analogy to describe how the US needs to rely on a steady, incremental approach to move forward on
reducing the United States’ addiction to foreign oil and securing the energy future. The solution for the Department
of Defense is no different. Energy Strategy Although there are many intelligent energy experts residing within the
Department of Defense and many outstanding efforts underway contributing to improve energy security, the DOD
does not currently have a permanent organizational focal point or advocate for energy issues or a written long-term
Energy Strategy. The DOD needs both - an organizational structure to serve as the focal point for energy issues and
an Energy Strategy that:
• Improves National Security by decreasing US dependence on foreign oil
• Ensures access to critical energy requirements
• Maintains or improves combat capability
• Promotes Research for future energy security
• Is fiscally responsible to the American tax payer
• Protects the environment
Decreasing US dependence on foreign oil in a meaningful way can only be done by looking at the wide array of
ways the DOD can consume less petroleum based fuel through efficiencies, smarter processes, and diversification of
fuel sources to include alternatives other than petroleum. Domestically controlled production of alternative fuels will
also help assure access to critical energy requirements. Additionally, the DOD must ensure resiliency of installation
electricity supply through increased on-site renewable energy production, reduced dependence on the commercial
electric grid, and the capability to operate at 100% capacity in the event of a commercial grid blackout. Efficiency
effects will improve combat capability and lengthen the “tether of fuel.” Reduced energy costs for logistics
requirements will allow assets and funds to be available for combat needs. Lastly, reduced consumption and
increased alternative and renewable energy production will help preserve the environment through reduced carbon
emissions and more efficient use of natural resources.
[ ] Incremental solutions to DoD energy security are Necessary for hegemony

The Department of Defense can lead the way in transforming the way in which the United States consumes and
produces energy. In the 1985 movie, Back to the Future, scientist Dr. Emmett Brown returns from the year 2015
with a 1980’s vintage vehicle modified with a “Mr. Fusion” device creating huge amounts of energy from organic
material found in common household garbage. The year 2015 is only 8 years away and there is no evidence Mr.
Fusion, or any other major scientific breakthrough making oil obsolete, is going to happen inside the next 30 years.
Mr. Fusion represents the unlikely event of a game winning home run with bases loaded and a full count. In reality
there are few home runs to reduce the United States’ addiction to foreign oil. Improving energy security must be
done using a steady, incremental approach not tied to individual personalities, specific military leaders or partisan
political administrations. Securing the energy future of the Department of Defense is a prerequisite to ensuring the
United States remains the world’s preeminent global power.
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****NEGATIVE****
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Topicality – 1NC
A. Definition – Incentives must be voluntary, not mandatory.
Kernerman English Multilingual Dictionary 2006 [http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/incentive
incentive [inˈsentiv] noun

something that encourages etc
B. Violation – the Plan Fiats that the Military buys renewables – it doesn’t give them a
voluntary incentive to. There is a contextual difference between mandatory regulations and
voluntary incentives
Sam Schoofs, Calvin College, 2004,[ 6 August 2004 A federal Renewable Portfolio Standard: Policy Analysis and
Proposal, http://www.wise-intern.org/ journal/2004/WISE2004-SamSchoofsFinalPaper.pdf.]
D. Renewable Energy Policy Overview

There are two main categories of renewable energy policies. The first category gives some financial incentives to
encourage renewable energy that includes tax incentives, grants, loans, rebates, and production incentives [13]. Tax
incentives cover personal, sales, property, and corporate taxes and they help to reduce the investment costs and to
reward investors for their support of renewable energy sources [12], [13]. As an example, 24 states currently have
some form of grant program in place that ranges from as small as $500 up to $1,000,000 [13]. The second category
of renewable energy policies is called rules and regulations, which mandate a certain action from an obligated entity.
Included within this category are renewable portfolio standards, equipment certification, solar/wind access laws, and
green power purchasing/aggregation polices [13]. As an example, equipment certification allows the states to
regulate the performance criteria that equipment is required to meet in order to be eligible for financial incentives
[12]. Seven states currently have equipment certification programs in place
C. Superior Interpretation –
1. Precision – our evidence draws a clear distinction between regulations and incentives.
Precision is critical to all other standards because without precision, you would never know
where to draw the limits
2. Ground – The affirmative captures core negative ground – the mandatory counterplan,
and artificially improves plan solvency
D. Topicality is a jurisdictional voting issue to preserve clash and education
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Inherency – 1NC
1. No inherency – the military and the Executive are already emphasizing green procurement
by the DoD
globe. “Many of these [biobased materials] are substitutes for products based on nonrenewable natural resources like
oil and natural gas, so when we have substitutes, it supports the president’s initiatives and . . . national interests to
reduce our dependence on foreign sources of energy [and make] our nation more secure,” he said Sept. 12 at the
products are . . . an essential part of our strategic approach to national security,” he added. In his January State of the
Union address, President Bush said the United States is “addicted to oil,” and called for “more reliable alternative
energy sources.” The event this week follows on the heels of an Aug. 17 memo from Defense Department
acquisition chief Kenneth Krieg that encourages DOD leaders to promote the purchase of biobased products, as the
Pentagon prepares to implement a federal law that is expected to change the way the armed services buy items
ranging from hand sanitizers to fuel additives. Biobased products utilize plant, animal and marine or forestry
materials, according to DOD’s Green Procurement Program Strategy, a 2004 document that describes Pentagon
policy on acquiring environmentally friendly products. Sens. Richard Lugar (R-IN) and Tom Harkin (D-IA), along
with Rep. Marcy Kaptur (D-OH) and Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns, also spoke at the Pentagon event, dubbed
“Biobased: Enhancing DOD’s Mission, Protecting the Environment.”
2. High energy prices have driven U.S. military to use less fossil fuels
Wall Street Abstracts January 9, 2007 [MILITARY SEEKS OIL SAVINGS Lexis]
Surging energy prices and volatility in oil-producing regions drive US military's efforts to curb its use of oil and
other fuels through conservation, increased fuel efficiency and greater use of alternative energy; Pentagon plans to
spend more than $2 billion over next five years on energy initiatives; military is estimated to have spent $13 billion
on fuel for year ending Sept 30; graphs (M)
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Extend – DoD Green Procurement Increasing Now
[ ] No inherency – Federal regulations already require green purchasing
The Defense Logistics Agency 2007 [ July, http://www.p2sustainabilitylibrary .mil/issues/ emerge
jul2007/index.html, Green Purchasing]
"Green Purchasing" or "Green Procurement" is now a major buzzword in the Federal Government. However, Green
Purchasing is not a new concept. Requirements for Green Purchasing have been integrated into Federal regulations
and Executive Orders since 1976 with the goal of integrating environmental considerations into all stages of the
Federal purchasing process. Environmental requirements in these statutes impact much more than just
"Environmental Operations," many of them direct Federal agencies to incorporate environmental considerations into
decisions of personnel who define requirements, place orders, make purchases, or contract for products and services
in their daily operations. The August 2004 Memorandum for the Establishment of the Department of Defense
(DoD) Green Procurement Program (GPP) stipulates that the DoD goal is to achieve 100 percent compliance with
mandatory Federal Green Purchasing Programs (GPP) in all acquisition transactions, from major systems programs
to individual unit supply and service requisitions. The Memorandum states that the responsibility for implementing
DoD's GPP is not the responsibility of any single organization or operation, but it is the responsibility of every
person involved in the procurement process to ensure DoD complies fully with all Federal procurement preference
requirements. To improve the implementation of green purchasing and other "Greening the Government"
initiatives, Executive Order (EO) 13423: Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation
Management, was issued in January 2007. Green purchasing is a major aspect of this EO and it mandates specific
green purchasing requirements as part of the important sustainable environmental practices that are, and will be,
required for all Federal Agencies.
[ ] Current DoD policy has reduced consumption and set up the infrastructure for
increases in alternative energy
The good news that is most of the energy expertise already exists in various functional areas of OSD and the
Services, and parts of a comprehensive Energy Strategy are already in place. The Air Force recently published an
Energy Strategy, focused on optimizing energy use, reducing demand, and expanding supply options. These issues
will be targeted primarily through initiatives in aviation, and infrastructure and vehicles.23 The DOD already has an
outstanding installations and facility energy management program led by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Installations and Environment that in many ways is a model for the federal government. Facility Energy
Management Policy Statement: The Department of Defense (DOD) occupies over 620,000 buildings and structures
worth $600 billion comprising more than 400 installations on 25 million acres in the United States and spent over
$3.5 billion on facility energy consumption in Fiscal Year (FY) 2006. DOD is the largest single energy consumer in
the Nation representing approximately 78% of the federal sector, and a significant (and sometimes the largest)
energy user in many local metropolitan areas. Conserving energy and investing in energy reduction measures makes
good business sense and allows limited resources to be applied to readiness and modernization. The Department has
already reduced its facility energy consumption significantly; by FY 2005 the Department had already achieved a
reduction in energy consumption by 28.3 percent as compared to a FY 1985 baseline. Due to the Energy Policy Act
of 2005 in FY 2006 the baseline was reset to FY 2003. DOD achieved a 5.5% reduction in goal facilities for FY
2006. Despite this success, the Department must make greater strides in energy efficiency and consumption
reduction in order to meet the Departmental vision of providing reliable and cost effective utility services to the
Warfighter. Dramatic fluctuations in the cost of energy significantly impact already constrained operating budgets,
providing even greater incentives to conserve and seek ways to lower energy consumption. These include
investments in cost-effective renewable energy sources, energy efficient construction designs, and aggregating
bargaining power among regions and Services to get better energy deals.24
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Hegemony Bad
[ ] US hegemony is ill defined – it will continue to expand dangerously and entangle the
US in foreign conflicts
Conry, 97 (Barbara, Foreign Policy Analyst at Cato Institute. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-267es.html)
"Global leadership" has gained increasing prominence as a guiding principle for American foreign policy. Yet the
concept itself remains largely unexamined. Although "leadership" sounds benign, today's proponents of global
leadership envision a role for the United States that resembles that of a global hegemon--with the risks and costs
hegemony entails. Global political and military leadership is inadequate, even dangerous, as a basis for policy.
The vagueness of "leadership" allows policymakers to rationalize dramatically different initiatives and makes
defining policy difficult. Taken to an extreme, global leadership implies U.S. interest in and responsibility for
virtually anything, anywhere. Global leadership also entails immense costs and risks. Much of the $265 billion
defense budget is spent to support U.S. aspirations to lead the world, not to defend the United States. There are also
human costs. Moreover, it is an extremely risky policy that forces U.S. involvement in numerous situations
unrelated to American national security.
[ ] These entanglement wars risk nuclear conflict

Layne, 97 (Christopher, Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, “From Preponderance to
Offshore Balancing” International Security, Summer)
The insurance argument advanced by the strategy of preponderance’s advocates is also problematic. Great power
war is rare because it is always an uncertain undertaking: war is to some extent its own deterrent. It is, however, an
imperfect deterrent: great power wars do happen, and they will happen in the future. In a world where nuclear
weapons exist the consequences of U.S. involvement could be enormous. The strategy of preponderance purports
to insure the United States against the risk of war. If extended deterrence fails, however, the strategy actually ensures
that America will be involved in war at its onset. As Californians know, there are some risks (earthquakes, for
example) for which insurance is either prohibitively expensive or not available at any price because, although the
probability of the event may be small, if it occurred the cost to the insurer would be catastrophic. Offshore balancing
has the considerable advantage of giving the United States a high degree of strategic choice and, unlike the strategy
of preponderance, a substantial measure of control over its fate.
[ ] Interventions on behalf of the liberal order perpetuate endless war

Layne, 98 (Christopher, Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, World Policy Journal,
“Rethinking American grand strategy: Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century?” Volume 15, Issue
2, Summer, Proquest)
Indochina and Bosnia demonstrate how the strategy of preponderance expands America's
frontiers of insecurity. The posited connection between security and economic
interdependence requires the United States to impose order on, and control over, the
international system. To do so, it must continually enlarge the geographic scope of its
strategic responsibilities to maintain the security of its already established interests. As the
political scientist Robert H. Johnson observes, this process becomes self-sustaining because
each time the United States pushes its security interests outward, threats to the new
security frontier will be apprehended: "Uncertainty leads to self-extension, which leads in turn to new
uncertainty and further self-extension." 16 Core and periphery are interdependent strategically; however, while the core remains
constant, the turbulent frontier in the periphery is constantly expanding. One does not overstate in arguing that this expansion is potentially
limitless. Former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski recently has suggested, for example, that NATO expansion is just the first step
toward creating an American-dominated "Trans Eurasian Security System" [TESS], that ultimately will embrace Russia, China, Japan, India, and
other countries--a security structure "that would span the entire [Eurasian] continent." 17 There is a suggestive parallel between late
Victorian Britain and the United States today. The late-nineteenth-cenury British statesman Lord Rosebery, clearly
recognized that economic interdependence could lead to strategic overextension: Our
commerce is so universal and so penetrating that scarcely any question can arise in any part
of the world without involving British interests. This consideration, instead of widening,
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rather circumscribes the field of our actions. For did we not strictly limit the principle of
intervention we should always be simultaneously engaged in some forty wars. 18
Hegemony Bad
[ ] U.S. Unilateral preemption Threatens Global Security and Increases Global
Terrorism
Pape, 2005 (Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, Summer, International Security Lexis-
Nexis)
The Bush administration's rhetoric is not limited to Iraq, but seeks to legitimate preventive war as a
"normal" tool of U.S. statecraft. Now that the United States has actually acted on the Bush preventive
war strategy, other countries will have to include in their calculations the possibility that
it may do so again. For other major powers, the main threat to their security stems not from the risk that the
United States will eventually pose a direct threat to attack their homelands, but that the U.S. policy of preventive
war is likely to unleash violence that the United States cannot fully control and that poses an indirect threat to their
security. As a result, even though the United States means them no harm, other major
states must still contend with the spillover effects of U.S. unilateral uses of force.
These indirect effects are especially pronounced for U.S. military adventures in the
Middle East, which could stimulate a general rise in the level of global
terrorism targeted at European and other major states. As the French foreign policy adviser
Bruno Tertrais explains: "The implementation of the U.S. strategy [of preventive war] tends
to favor, rather than reduce, the development of the principal threats to which it is
addressed: terrorism and proliferation . . . . The Al Qaeda organization . . . has now reached the
shores of Europe, as shown by the [terrorist attacks] in Turkey (December 2003) and Spain (March 2004). The
campaign conducted by the United States has strengthened the Islamists' sense of
being totally at war against the rest of the world."n44
[ ] Extinction
Alexander, 2003---professor and director of the Inter-University for Terrorism Studies (Yonah , Washington Times,
8/28)
Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the
international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist
threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to
regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national
security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the
unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial
and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and
numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by
each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now
revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries
affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many
reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as
lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak
punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare.
Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of
conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future
terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear
and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.
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Hegemony Bad
[ ] Even if their Hegemony Good args could be true, they assume pre-9/11 hegemony –
currently, racist nationalism is corrupting US leadership and causing Imperialism
Lieven, 6 (Anatol, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment in the Global Policy Program, Demon in the Cellar,
Carnegie, Prospect Magazine, March http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications /index.cfm?fa=vi ew&id=14
Because of a deep-rooted (and partly justified) belief in American exceptionalism, and the
decline of the study of history, Americans are not used to studying their nationalism in a
western historical context. It is important that they begin to do so. Nobody looking
at the history of nationalist Europe in the century or so before 1945 would suggest that the US
should follow such a path. In particular, American nationalism is beginning to
conflict with any enlightened or even rational version of American imperialism: that
is to say, with the interests of the US as world hegemon. A relatively benign version of
indirect American imperial dominance is by no means unacceptable to many people
round the world - both because they often have neighbours whom they fear more than America, and because
their leaders are increasingly integrated into a global capitalist elite whose values are largely defined by those of
America. But American imperial power in the service of narrow American and Israeli
nationalism is a very different matter, and an unstable base for hegemony. It
involves power over the world without any responsibility for global problems and without any responsiveness to
others' concerns. This is not a matter of sentimental or naive liberal humanism. The US, as unquestioned king of the
international order, has a truly vital national and imperial interest in preserving and strengthening it with new rules
and conventions. The us is in part simply an old European state which avoided the catastrophes that nationalism
brought upon Europe in the 20th century. Its nationalism thus retains an intensity which Europeans have had kicked
out of them by history. 72 per cent of Americans say they are "very proud" of their nationality, compared to 49 per
cent of Britons, 39 per cent of Italians and just 20 per cent of the Dutch. But the dangers of unreflective
nationalist sentiments remain all too obvious. Nationalism thrives on irrational
hatreds, and the portrayal of other nations or ethno-religious groups as
irredeemably wicked and hostile. Yesterday this was true of the attitudes of many American
nationalists to the Soviet Union. Today it risks becoming the case with regard to the Arab and Muslim worlds, or to
any country which defies American wishes. The run-up to the war in Iraq saw an astonishing explosion of
chauvinism directed against France and Germany.
[ ] This means they don’t get the turns, but it feeds our impacts
Francis Fukuyama, School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, 2006 (February 19,
“After Neoconservatism,” The New York Times, online)
More than any other group, it was the neoconservatives both inside and outside the Bush administration
who pushed for democratizing Iraq and the broader Middle East. They are widely credited
(or blamed) for being the decisive voices promoting regime change in Iraq, and yet it is their
idealistic agenda that in the coming months and years will be the most directly threatened. Were the United
States to retreat from the world stage, following a drawdown in Iraq, it would in my
view be a huge tragedy, because American power and influence have been critical
to the maintenance of an open and increasingly democratic order around the world.
The problem with neoconservatism's agenda lies not in its ends, which are
as American as apple pie, but rather in the overmilitarized means by which it
has sought to accomplish them. What American foreign policy needs is not a
return to a narrow and cynical realism, but rather the formulation of a "realistic
Wilsonianism" that better matches means to ends.
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Solvency – 1NC
1. No Spill Over - The DoD is not a key model for alternative energy – it is too small of a
market and has different energy needs than the civilian sector
2. The 2006 DoD fossil-fuel budget is, approximately, 2.5-3% of the national-defense budget, the range dependent
on what is chosen as the total national-defense budget. Larger (percentage) fuel costs are borne by families and
many businesses, for example, and fuel costs have only relatively recently become noticeable to the DoD.
3. At present, there is a large spread between oil-production cost and crude-oil prices. Many projections, however,
including that of the U.S. Energy Information Agency, indicate that crude oil prices may well decrease to $40-
$50/barrel within the next few years, as production and refining capacity increases to match demand.
4. DoD is not a sufficiently large customer to drive the domestic market for demand and consumption of fossil fuel
alternatives, or to drive fuel and transportation technology developments, in general. Barring externalities, e.g.,
subsidies, governmental and departmental directives, etc., non-fossil-derived fuels are not likely to play a significant
role in the next 25 years.
5. DoD fuel consumption constraints and patterns of use do not align well with those of the commercial sector. Most
commercial-sector fuel use, for example, is in ground transportation, with only 4% of domestic petroleum
consumption used for aviation. In contrast, almost 60% of DoD fuel use is by the Air Force, with additional fuel
used in DoD aviation if Naval aviation consumption is included. Options for refueling ships at sea are more limited
(or nonexistent) compared to those for commercial vehicles in urban areas. Options for DoD use of electrical energy
on ground vehicles are limited, since one can not expect to plug into the grid in hostile territory, for example, to
refuel/recharge an electric vehicle. Furthermore, drive cycles for DoD ground vehicles differ significantly from EPA
drive cycles that, as a consequence, provide poor standards for fuel consumption.
2. Small Percentages - Oil costs won’t substantially affect the military – they are too small of a
percentage of overall DoD spending, and aviation fuel costs will decline
B. DoD fuel costs DoD fuel costs have become visible only relatively recently. Even at present, they represent only 2.5-3% of the
nationaldefense budget, the spread depending on what is chosen as the denominator for total national-defense costs. While
uncertainties and the recent large increase in fuel costs present DoD budget planners with formidable challenges, representing a
(much-larger) fraction of non-fixed (“discretionary”) spending, JASON must conclude that fuel costs, per se, while not
negligible, cannot be regarded as a primary decision driver, at present. The largest fraction (~ 62%) of DoD fuel use is expended
in CONUS. Continuous progress has been made by DoD in recent years to decrease energy and fuel use. However, because
weapons systems have very long life-cycles, fuel represents a significant fraction of life-cycle costs for U.S. Air Force mobility
carriers (~ 40%) and conventionally fueled Navy ships (~ 30%). JASON also notes that expected reductions in the U.S. Air
Force tactical inventory (number and type of aircraft on active duty), as discussed on pages 76 and 77, will, perforce, decrease
future consumption of aviation fuel, which represents the largest single DoD fuel-use component.
3. Long Time Frame - The military doesn’t face an oil crisis any time soon – there is time for
renewables to evolve naturally
Sohbet Karbuz, Assoc of Mediterranean Energy Companies 2006 [July 13, Energy Bulletin, Pentagon and Peak Oil:
A Military Literature Review, http://www.energybulletin.net/newswire.php?id=13199]
Another Air Force Colonel, Richard Fullerton[9], concentrating on Peak Oil, argues that energy’s future in the Air
Force will look much like its recent past: “For the foreseeable future, oil will continue to be a primary energy
source.” He argues that Peak Oil doomers are wrong because according to the best estimates [referring to the EIA]
we will reach peak by 2037. The world has still a lot of oil” His conclusion is: “Energy independence is a myth as
long as we consume oil, and our fuel prices will remain inextricably tied to the global oil market….the transition to
new energy sources will take a evolutionary (become economical) rather than a revolutionary path.”
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DoD Starter
Solvency – 1NC
4. Alternate Causalities - Many things are necessary for DoD energy security – Alternatives
are only one small part of it
From our research, we concluded that DoD has the opportunity to address the four disconnects by fundamentally
changing how it views, values, and uses energy. Many actions are required to implement this transformation, but the
highest-level requirements are straightforward: Incorporate energy considerations (energy use and energy logistics
support requirements) in the department’s key corporate processes: strategic planning, analytic agenda, joint
concept and joint capability development, acquisition, and planning, programming, budgeting, and execution
(PPBE) Establish a corporate governance structure with policy and resource oversight to focus the department’s
energy efforts Apply a structured framework to address energy efficiency, including alternate energy sources, to the
department’s greatest energy challenges— those areas consuming the most fuel, requiring the most logistics support,
or having the most negative impact on the warrior. The following are some options for energy actions related to
DoD’s corporate processes: Apply the energy-efficiency requirements of Executive Order 13423 (3 percent
reduction per year, or 30 percent reduction by 2015 from 2003 baseline) to mobility forces Analyze current and
projected energy and energy logistics required to support operational plans and capability-based planning and
incorporate findings in other corporate processes Assess the role of information in reducing energy requirements
through improved operational and logistics effectiveness and reduced in-theater personnel requirements Incorporate
energy considerations (energy use and energy logistics support requirements) in all future concept development,
capability development, and acquisition actions Make energy a top research and development priority Improve the
incentives for investment in energy efficiency
5. Procurement Fails - No solvency DOD constantly violates procurement policies

Army Times, 2007 [January 18, DoD procurement laws routinely broken, IG says,
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2007/01/dfnProcurement070118/]
The U.S. military spends so much money hiring contractors that it must pay other agencies to help move the cash
out the door, the acting Pentagon inspector general told senators Jan. 17. In the process, procurement laws are
routinely violated, “price reasonableness,” competitive awards and contractor oversight are abandoned, and millions
of dollars are wasted, IG Thomas Gimble told the Senate Armed Services subcommittee on readiness. The Pentagon
spent $141 billion in 2005 to hire private companies to perform services for the U.S. military — everything from
renting office space for counterintelligence personnel to buying armor for military vehicles. The number of contracts
involved is so enormous the Pentagon pays to more than a half dozen other agencies to help spend its money. Four
agencies alone — the General Services Administration, Interior Department, Treasury and NASA — awarded
54,022 Defense Department contracts in 2005 worth $5.4 billion. Audits of 352 of those contracts found them
replete with violations, Gimble said. “Of 131 GSA purchases and 49 Department of Interior purchases reviewed, we
found only one instance where a Defense Department organization documented that using a non-DoD agency to
award the contract was in the best interest of the government,” he said.
6. Even if there is a supply cutoff, the military will have priority for fuel
Additionally, in the event of a catastrophic shut down of world oil flow, our government will ensure that the DOD
has priority access to domestic oil production and the 700-1000 million barrels of oil in the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve. However, scenarios of supply disruptions to DOD installations via the US oil and gas transmission pipeline
system or to deployed operational forces via fuel logistics distribution networks are not completely far fetched.
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Extend – No Spillover
[ ] Military consumption is not enough to make alternatives viable economically
Aerospace Daily & Defense Report 2006 [Oct 5,Pentagon Striving To Find Fuel Alternatives, Conserve Energy
ebsco
Sega also pointed out that a recent test-flight of a B-52 Stratofortress, in which two of the bomber's eight engines
used a fuel that was almost 50 percent synthetic, was a first for the Air Force. Young said one of the keys to
developing a viable synthetic fuel program would be for that industry to build a commercial market. The Pentagon
only accounts for 1 percent of U.S. energy consumption, he said. It's commercial consumption that will make
synthetic fuel a truly viable option.
[ ] DoD procurement of renewables will hurt commercialization throughout society – the

alternative technologies will be too specific to military needs which will divert attention from
commercial demands
Virinder Singh, Renewable Energy Policy Project, 1998 [ Government Procurement To Expand PV Markets,
http://www.repp.org/repp_pubs/pdf/pv4.pdf]
C. Consider the Needs of the Private Market A good government procurement program for renewables should take
into account the needs of the private market. The creation of a government market for renewables that bears no
relationship to the private market eliminates the indirect, but potentially enormous economic development and
environmental benefits of commercializing renewables in the private market. Too often policy efforts to create a
government market have resulted in submarkets reflective of governments’ unique needs and procedures. For many
PV firms, devoting substantial staff time to government contracts may detract significantly from efforts oriented to
the larger private market.14 Emerging industries like PV cannot afford to maintain separate sales and maintenance
staffs. Orienting these staffs to an insulated government purchasing program will hinder important marketing efforts
in the private market. Making product developers choose to operate in either the public or the private market also
defers the benefits which are known to accompany higher production levels.
[ ] Although a large consumer, the DoD cannot drive the market

Although DoD is highly dependent on petroleum and is the largest single petroleum user, it cannot by itself, drive
the market. However, because DoD’s operations (the capabilities, costs, and the strategy that define them) rely so
heavily on the petroleum market, they are vulnerable to the price and supply fluctuations affecting the petroleum
market. Examining the impact of the future energy environment on DoD, and the options available to react to this
environment, requires an understanding of the DoD energy consumption profile (how and where is energy being
consumed).
[ ] The DOD is not a large enough consumer to drive the market

Finding #3: The Department of Defense uses less than 2% of the oil consumed in the United States and is therefore
not a large enough consumer to drive the market for conventional or alternative fuels. JASON and others have
suggested that finding substitutes for fossil fuels must be a national endeavor. According to DOD it uses roughly
340,000 barrels of oil a day whereas the daily consumption rate for the United States is approximately 21 million
barrels. DOD agrees that it plays a significant role in testing, certification, and demonstrating the use of synthetic jet
fuel but is not a large enough consumer to drive the market.
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Michigan 2008
DoD Starter
Extend – Small Percentages
[ ] DoD oil consumption is too small to be vulnerable to supply disruptions – we could
make it up with domestic sources
C. DoD fossil energy perspective

1. U.S. production and DoD consumption The figures on pages 10 and 14 indicate that the U.S. Government
consumes 1.9% of the oil consumed by the rest of the country. Furthermore, the DoD accounts for 93% of the U.S.
Government consumption. For reference, DoD consumed 0.36 Mbbl/day in FY05, or 133 Mbbl that year. DoD fuel
use both in the continental U.S. (CONUS) and abroad (out of CONUS, or, OCONUS), as reported by the Defense
Energy Support Center (DESC), is a relatively small fraction of the total domestic current crude-oil production rate
(cf. figure on p. 12). The annual DoD crude oil consumption can be covered by the total annual production of two
Gulf of Mexico oil platforms (Thunderhorse and Atlantis), or by a small fraction of California and Alaska
production, at present. Thunderhorse is a platform that cost ~$3B, sized for a 0.25 Mbbl/day production, and which
is presently producing, approximately, 90 Mbbl/year. If there were real supply issues for the DoD, the department
could, in principle, purchase a Gulf oil platform for an assured supply for many years, at an amortized production
cost of under $30/bbl, as is done by the large commercial oil production firms at present, even though that is hardly
advisable. In this context, the total deep water Gulf of Mexico production is 1.5 Mbbl/day. Production from the
North Slope of Alaska is, approximately, 1 Mbbl/day. Hence, total DoD needs could be provided from a portion of
the production of just one of these regions of the U.S. Thus, even though 63% of US oil consumption is derived
from imports, it does not follow that a domestic-supply supply shortage for DoD is inevitable. In fact, present-day
DoD requirements are relatively modest when compared not only to the present national-consumption rate but also
when compared with the present domestic-production rate.
[ ] The DoD consumes a tiny fraction of total US energy consumption.

Our Energy Problems Demand It is difficult to appreciate the scale in which energy is consumed on planet Earth.
Current world consumption of oil averages 82.5 million barrels per day, which would fill 5,347 Olympic sized
swimming pools.1 The United States consumes roughly 25% of that, or 20.7 million barrels per day,2 with the
government consuming roughly 1.9%, and the DOD accounting for 93% of government use.3
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DoD Starter
Extend – Long Time Frame
[ ] Fuel shortages will not affect the DOD in a negative way for decades
Some key findings and recommendations are summarized below. 1. Based on proven reserves, estimated resources,
and the rate of discovery of new resources, no extended world-wide shortage of fossil-fuel production is reasonably
expected over, approximately, the next 25 years. While the possibility of shortterm shortages of refined gasoline or
diesel product exists, depending on domestic refining capacity relative to domestic petroleum demand, there is not a
strong basis to anticipate sustained global shortages of crude oil in the next 25 year (or more) time frame. In
addition, there is no basis to anticipate shortages in petroleum available to the DoD, especially considering that
present DoD fuel consumption is less than 2% of the total U.S. domestic fuel consumption – a demand that can be
met by only a few domestic supply sources, at present – even though likely decreases in domestic-oil production
will make the future domestic-coverage margin smaller. This finding is premised on the assumption of no major
upheavals in the world, in general, and in the major oil-producing nations and regions, and oil-transportation
corridors, in particular, over the next 25-year period.
[ ] Transitioning the military to alternative fuels will take decades

Pentagon's this new environmentalism, however, is not shortsighted and does not much the realities. For instance, all
Air Force's future aircrafts under procurement (F-22 Raptor, F-35 as well as new aerial refueling tanker KC-X etc)
run on oil. They will remain in service at least until 2030. There can never be a petroleum free military until 2030.
This may sound an exaggeration but just think of current fleet (of Navy, Air Force and Army), replacing it with
petroleum-free one, all problems in logistics chain, and money required. The bad news is in 2030 we will be already
in Post-Peak Oil era.
[ ] There are at least 40 more years worth of oil reserves

The present situation is assessed with respect to known, socalled “proven”, reserves and resources of fossil energy,
globally. As indicated in the left figure on page 4, the world has approximately 41 years of proven reserves at this
time, if the 2005 consumption rate is maintained. Less, of course, is assured if consumption increases. The inference,
however, should not be drawn that the world will run out of oil in 40 years, or so. The world increased its oil
reserves from somewhat beyond 30 years to over 40 years (reserves-toproduction ratio), following the events in the
early 1980s in the Middle East, in spite of substantial increases in total consumption.1 Oil producers will not invest
to secure reserves on a time scale longer than ~40 years. The net present value of such an investment would be small
compared to the (cost of) capital required to explore and prove such additional reserves. On the other hand, the data
also indicate that present U.S. oil reserves, extracted at present production rates, will be depleted in the next 12
years. Whether this will be altered by new domestic discoveries during this period depends not only on whether they
exist within the U.S., but also on whether the production cost differential between foreign oil sources and potential
future U.S. resources warrants economic domestic production.
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Michigan 2008
DoD Starter
Extend – Alternate Causalities
[ ] Changing military technology isn’t enough – the DoD needs to completely overhaul
how it plans for energy security
Chapter 3 Assessing Energy Options The strategic, operational, fiscal, and environmental disconnects described in
the preceding chapter illustrate the drawbacks of DoD’s current energy profile, but the disconnects alone do not
point toward a solution. Our survey of the energy technology environment identified many technologies that could
affect DoD’s energy dependence, but technology alone provides little investment insight. To focus a change in how
DoD views, values, and uses energy, DoD must address the use of energy in specific applications as well as larger
corporate issues. Arriv- ing at a solution requires identifying energy challenges; selecting viable technological,
organizational, and process options; and developing potential solution sets—the combinations of technologies and
resources that best address the disconnects, that will most benefit DoD, and that DoD can effectively implement.
[ ] Procuring more alternative energy alone won’t solve – the Military does adequately
monitor its energy use
Waste News June 11, 2007 [DOD links environment, energy, mission Lexis]
Alex Beehler, assistant deputy undersecretary of defense for the environment, echoed his boss' comments about
integrating energy and environmental concerns into all facets of Defense Department operations. ``Basically, what
I've observed is islands of excellence and innovation and really stepping forward,'' Beehler said. ``That is good. But,
of course, what really needs to happen is the islands need to be brought together and form continents.'' In an effort
to help measure energy use and conservation, the Defense Department has undertaken a project to install energy
meters on individual structures at military installations - a feature that until recently was missing. ``If you don't
know how much you are using of something, you certainly have very little appreciation of the value connected with
it,'' Beehler said.
[ ] The plan is insufficient – lack of technology isn’t the problem – the military needs to
change its values and data collection to implement alternatives
Finding #4: Operational and logistics wargaming involving fuel requirements are not cross-linked to the Service
requirements development or acquisition program processes. The task force found that in DOD combat simulation
exercises, each military service emphasized mission execution while adequate fuel supplies were considered a
constant. DSB asserted that doing so left DOD unaware of the potential effects of fuel efficiency on combat
operations and of the vulnerability of the fuel supply chain. Furthermore, with no model of efficient or inefficient
fuel use, DOD could not analyze fuel related logistical requirements as part of the acquisition process. Finding #5:
High payoff, fuel-efficient technologies are available now to improve warfighting effectiveness in current weapon
systems through retrofit and in new systems acquisition. The task force found that there were existing technologies
that could increase weapon systems’ fuel efficiency. However, without the tools to analyze the collective benefits of
fuel efficiency to warfighting capability, the value of improvements could be misjudged and not fully appreciated.
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Michigan 2008
DoD Starter
Extend – Procurement Fails
[ ] DOD contracts often violate Federal Acquisition Regulations
Army Times, 2007 [January 18, DoD procurement laws routinely broken, IG says,
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2007/01/dfnProcurement070118/]
For example, the Pentagon used the Interior Department to buy $592 million in goods and services and paid Interior
more than $23 million in surcharges. But the purchases “could have been routinely handled by junior DoD
contracting personnel” at no extra cost to the Pentagon, Gimble said. And “DoD often paid surcharges for GSA and
the Interior Department to purchase low-cost military equipment or commercial items that could have been obtained
from existing DoD contracts,” he said. Gimble said his office examined GSA purchases made without competitive
bidding and found that nearly half of the time, those purchases violated Federal Acquisition Regulations. “GSA did
not justify sole-source contracts,” he said. The problem was even more prevalent among sole-source Interior
Department contracts, he said. And when the agencies took a stab at meeting the requirement for competition, “it
was generally satisfied by obtaining a minimum of three bids by posting the solicitation on e-Buy,” Gimble said. E-
Buy is a GSA web site for soliciting price quotes. The list of other violations is long. Among them:
• The Pentagon uses other federal agencies to “bank” or “park” money that it has not spent during a given fiscal
year. The money should be returned to the Treasury because authority to spend it has expired, but receiving
agencies, including GSA and Interior, spend it anyway, Gimble said. The Pentagon parked $1 billion to $2 billion at
GSA and $400 million at Interior at the end of 2005, Gimble said.
• The Army used the GSA to spend $44 million worth of operations and maintenance money — money intended to
pay for the Iraq war, among other things — to build two two-story office buildings at Fort Belvoir, Va. When
questioned, the Army argued that “construction did not occur,” even though “no building existed at the site prior to
the contract,” Gimble said.
[ ] No solvency – military procurement rarely achieves its goals due to inefficiency and
contractor failures
CongressDaily, 2006 [9/7/2006, Subcommittee Questions DOD Procurement Practices, MasterFILE Premier, Ebsco]
Facing a steady escalation of costs for weapons and services, the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee
today laced into an array of Pentagon officials with a familiar list of complaints about the "volatility" and apparent
lack of control over the Defense Department's acquisition practices. With help from GAO Comptroller General
David Walker, the panel lurched through a litany of examples of how the cost of fighting wars and developing new
weapons has spiraled upward, while asking why there could be shortages of such items as armored vests when
actual combat gets under way. Walker, who has been tilting with the Pentagon for years over its contracting policies,
noted anew that "acquisition and contracting in the Department of Defense faces a number of systemic and long-
standing challenges that have yet to be effectively addressed." At the same time, with a gentle knock at Congress,
Walker acknowledged that it is not all the DOD's fault. Congress, the defense contracting industry, and the military
services all contribute to the problem, he said. He recalled many instances of "the tendency [of contractors] to over-
promise, then down the road, to fail to deliver [on the promises]," as well as low-balling on initial bids in order to
get the job.
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee ranking member John Murtha, D-Pa., expressed his "great concern over the
problem of incremental funding. We [in Congress] put in money for a ship, for example, in the short-term, then in
the long term we don't have enough money to pay for it." Walker sighed and said, "There have been frequent
mismatches between wants, needs, affordability and sustainability" of weapons, along with "unrealistic and
continually changing requirements" that add to the length and cost of development and testing programs. Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman C.W. (Bill) Young, R-Fla., admonished defense officials for lapses in their
acquisition systems and said, "We want to save taxpayers as much as we can, while getting the needed resources to
our war-fighters, with assets that are better than anybody else's."
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Michigan 2008
DoD Starter
Biofuels Solvency Responses
[ ] Bio aviation fuels are not developed to operate correctly with the DOD’s needs
Cons. In its present state of technological development, the energy density of biofuel is too low to make it a suitable
substitute for jet fuel. Ethanol’s energy density is approximately 25% lower than that of conventional aviation fuel
and is therefore not suitable for jets’ turbine engines. Furthermore, ethanol cannot operate at the extreme
temperatures–both high and low–at which military aviation fuel is needed to perform. However, in 2006, the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) awarded a contract for the development of a synthetic fuel
from “oil-rich crops produced by either agriculture or aquaculture (including but not limited to plants, algae, fungi,
and bacteria) and which ultimately can be an affordable alternative to petroleum-derived JP-8”
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Michigan 2008
DoD Starter
Bases Solvency Responses
[ ] Military bases are already increasing renewable energy use
FACT 15: The Pentagon maybe does not care about the environment, but it's quietly leading the quest for renewable
energy under the banner of finding alternatives to oil. The Navy is studying alternate propulsion systems as well as
proposals for an all-nuclear Navy.[21] Nellis Air Force Bace (NV) awarded a contract on July 31, 2006 to build the
world's largest photovoltaic array in the world. The array will be a minimum of 15 MW and provide approximately
one third of the base's power needs. U.S. Nany is operating the largest wind/diesel hybrid plant in the world (guess
where? Navy Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba) the two largest Federal photovoltaic systems in the United States.
Today, almost 9% of the electricity used by military facilities comes from renewable energy sources, and the
Pentagon plans to raise that to 25% by 2025.
50
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DoD Starter
Political Capital Links
[ ] Plan will require political capital to overcome barriers to renewables
Virinder Singh, Renewable Energy Policy Project, 1998 [ Government Procurement To Expand PV Markets,
http://www.repp.org/repp_pubs/pdf/pv4.pdf]
E. Establish Solid Political Leadership The primacy of “least-cost” in the procurement culture is detrimental to PV
and other renewable energy alternatives. Overcoming this barrier will require concerted leadership that clearly
communicates to government purchasing agents that political leaders are willing to accept the higher price of
renewable energy purchases. Overall, effective political leadership requires an explicit commitment to purchase
renewable energy, as well as a comprehensive revision of the existing government procurement system to remove
imbedded barriers (e.g., payback periods shorter than effective system life). Past experience with federal executive
orders suggests that procedural barriers can prevail over the “bully pulpit” due to their longevity and routinization
within the procurement system.16
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DoD Starter
Obama Good Links
[ ] Plan is a win for Bush – he supports expanding Green Procurement
globe. “Many of these [biobased materials] are substitutes for products based on nonrenewable natural resources like
oil and natural gas, so when we have substitutes, it supports the president’s initiatives and . . . national interests to
reduce our dependence on foreign sources of energy [and make] our nation more secure,” he said Sept. 12 at the
products are . . . an essential part of our strategic approach to national security,” he added. In his January State of the
Union address, President Bush said the United States is “addicted to oil,” and called for “more reliable alternative
energy sources.” The event this week follows on the heels of an Aug. 17 memo from Defense Department
acquisition chief Kenneth Krieg that encourages DOD leaders to promote the purchase of biobased products, as the
Pentagon prepares to implement a federal law that is expected to change the way the armed services buy items
ranging from hand sanitizers to fuel additives. Biobased products utilize plant, animal and marine or forestry
materials, according to DOD’s Green Procurement Program Strategy, a 2004 document that describes Pentagon
policy on acquiring environmentally friendly products. Sens. Richard Lugar (R-IN) and Tom Harkin (D-IA), along
with Rep. Marcy Kaptur (D-OH) and Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns, also spoke at the Pentagon event, dubbed
“Biobased: Enhancing DOD’s Mission, Protecting the Environment.”
[ ] Bush is pushing for compliance to and use of renewable energy mandates

DOD, like other federal agencies, has had to comply with a series of mandates to decrease energy use through
efficiencies in facilities and increase the use of renewable forms of energy. President Bush signed the EnergyPolicy
Act in August 2005, and issued Executive Order 13423 in January 2007 both of which update and generally make
more stringent existing energy conservation measures for installations and non-tactical vehicles such as passenger
sedans. For more information see CRS Report RL33302 Energy Policy Act of 2005: Summary and Analysis of
Enacted Provisions, by Mark Holt et al. Prior to August 2005, there had been some sporadic attention given the topic
of reducing fuel use in operational systems, but relatively little action was taken in the area. See U.S. Department of
Defense, More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden: The Defense Science Board Task Force on
Improving Fuel Efficiency of Weapons and Platforms. Washington, 2001. (January 2001, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense For Acqusition, Technology, and Logistics).
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Michigan 2008

Increasing alternative energy is necessary for future military readiness – it is critical to

Prioritizing alternative energy in the DoD is essential to military readiness – minor

[ ] Military procurement of renewable energy is an Incentive for private use of

[ ] The Army is too dependent on fossil fuels because consumption is high

[ ] Dependence and resupply undermine military readiness

[ ] Delivery of fuel increases costs and limits readiness of armed forces

[ ] Energy Price increases consume an enormous portion of the DoD budget.

[ ] Vulnerability to supply disruptions undermines US military readiness

[ ] Even if hegemony might be tangentially harmful to some, a world of U.S. hegemony

one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of

Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains

Everything we think of when we consider the current

American generosity has done more to help the

humanity's only practical hope of solving the world's ills.

[ ] DoD alternative energies are necessary to sustain forward deployment

[ ] DoD procurement of renewables is essential for future readiness because it decreases

[ ] Military procurement boosts renewable companies, making them profitable

[ ] DoD use of biofuels would increase military security by decreasing dependency

[ ] Biofuels are cleaner because they are carbon neutral

[ ] DoD use of biofuels would increase military security

[ ] The military can utilize geothermal energy on its domestic bases

[ ] The DoD’s 1% of US consumption is an Enormous amount of energy relative to other

[ ] Incremental solutions to DoD energy security are Necessary for hegemony

[ ] Leadership is necessary to change the energy culture of the DoD

[ ] Incremental solutions to DoD energy security are Necessary for hegemony

incentive [inˈsentiv] noun

D. Renewable Energy Policy Overview

D. Topicality is a jurisdictional voting issue to preserve clash and education

[ ] These entanglement wars risk nuclear conflict

[ ] Interventions on behalf of the liberal order perpetuate endless war

5. Procurement Fails - No solvency DOD constantly violates procurement policies

[ ] DoD procurement of renewables will hurt commercialization throughout society – the

[ ] Although a large consumer, the DoD cannot drive the market

[ ] The DOD is not a large enough consumer to drive the market

C. DoD fossil energy perspective

[ ] The DoD consumes a tiny fraction of total US energy consumption.

[ ] Transitioning the military to alternative fuels will take decades

[ ] There are at least 40 more years worth of oil reserves

[ ] Bush is pushing for compliance to and use of renewable energy mandates

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Aff & Neg Procurement

Aff & Neg Procurement