United Stated District Court District of Connecticut

Anthony McKnight Sr. Plaintiff v. Department of Corrections et al. Defendants

3:10cv1471(MRK) Date: July 3, 2012

Plaintiff Motion In Opposition To Defendants Motion To Dismiss

The plaintiff, Pro Se, files this Motion in Opposition to defendants Motion to Dismiss. 1.) The State of Connecticut is granted through the Tenth Amendment of the united states, the right to implement Connecticut General Statutes 5-142(a), 5-189(i), and any other law it deems necessary in the governance of its citizens. or any injured employee. 2.) The abolishment of slavery was legislated in 1848 and was done so without the interference of the federal government to legislate otherwise. 3.) This tenth amendment was pre requisite to the state joining the union or the United States of America, or UNITED STATES OF AMERICA in 1871. 4.) As provided to the court in the Appendix pages entitled state of Connecticut retirement services division, The defendant public officials has provides services to white injured corrections officers similarly situated as the plaintiff, However, this service or process was denied the plaintiff. Plaintiff being a African descendant injured corrections officer considered a slave by the defendants. 5.) The defendants contrary to the laws of the state and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the constitution of the united states, which was established before 1871 when incorporation powers were granted. 6.) At all times, the plaintiff was considered a resident of the state in which he was born and employed. The plaintiff is homeless by virtue of the defendants violating these

rights established through the State of Connecticut legislature and the laws of the united states. 7.) The biased processing the retirement benefits of injured Caucasian officers similarly situated to African descendant officers similarly situated, also violates the Equal Protection Clauses of both the State of Connecticut and the Constitution of the United States. 8.) It is therefore necessary to deny the defendant any Motion to Dismiss absent the provisions set for in the state laws, and laws governing the united states being satisfied. 9.) These deficiencies by defendant have not been corrected to the satisfaction of the plaintiff. 10.) The plaintiff being the victim and injured party to these negligent acts of the defendant public officials of the State of Connecticut, must be made whole under the laws of the State of Connecticut and the Fourteenth Amendment. 11,) The primary defect in the motion to dismiss by the defendant is the idea that the plaintiff is being considered slave property belonging to the defendant and not as a person with rights pursuant to the laws of the land of Connecticut. 12.) The plaintiff is a person and an opponent to the actions undertaken by the defendants involved in the instant complaint before the court. 13.) Although the legal consequences that defendants may be subjected to as a result of their actions against the plaintiff are convoluted and cross into both local government and private business issues, the plaintiff is not obligated at the present time and through this complaint, to dismiss those legal liabilities the defendants may incur as a matter of federal and state laws. 14.) If it is the objective of the defendants to settle these matters as a whole, it is the responsibility of the defendants to come to agreement with the plaintiff, and subsequently submit a motion to dismiss on those issues relating to matters of defendants concern. At which time, upon the satisfaction to the plaintiff that the issues have been resolved, the plaintiff may enjoin the defendant in its motion to dismiss before this court. 15.) The plaintiff, Anthony McKnight Sr., wishes to be compensated for the damages sustained in his personal station as a result of failures by the defendant public officials to perform their public mandated duties.

16.) Attachment H of defendants 2011 SEBAC Agreement states in pertinent part: artificial reductions or frauds were committed by the defendants, which defrauded African descendants such as the plaintiff, an injured employee of workers compensation benefits through the defendant Workers Compensation Commission, which is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the laws of the State of Connecticut.. 17.) The rulings by Workers Compensation Commissioners Miles and Delaney proof of this fraud. and proof that, as the plaintiff was minimized to the status of inventory in contrast to that of similarly situated Caucasian injured employees as in the case of Michael Cozzolino. This is referenced as fraud in the subsections of Connecticut General Statute 31-290, as it directly violates the mandated provisions within C.G.S., 5-142(a0, 5-169(i), and other state mandated provisions. 18.) The evidence presented as it related to the negligent act of these defendant public officials is a matter of the record, as more evidence of these bias and discriminatory acts established through the SEBAC contracts signed into law since 1995 by the defendant public officials, will be introduced at trial if necessary. The plaintiff contends he should prevail as the evidence is presented. 19.) Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857){also See Plessey v. Ferguson} also known as the Dred Scott Decision, was a ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court that people of African descent brought into the United States and held as slaves (or their descendants, whether or not they were slaves) or chattels, were not protected by the Constitution and were not U.S. citizens. 20.) Since passage of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the decision has not been a precedent case, but retains historical significance as perhaps the worst decision ever made by the Supreme Court. As in the decisions of both Commissioners Miles and Delaney of the Workers Compensation Commission, the plaintiff in this instant complaint was likewise reduced to the status of a slave, property and inventory by the state through the wanton and willful negligence of the defendant public officials. 21.) The Opinion of the Court, written by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, stirred debate. The decision was 72, and every Justice besides Taney wrote a separate concurrence or dissent. For the first time since Marbury v. Madison, the Court held an Act of Congress to be unconstitutional. The decision began by first concluding that the Court lacked

jurisdiction in the matter because Dred Scott had no standing to sue in Court, as Scott, and all people of African descent for that matter, were found not to be citizens of the United States. This decision was contrary to the practice of numerous states at the time, Connecticut being one of those states, particularly Free states, where freed slaves did in fact enjoy the rights of citizens, such as the right to vote and hold public office. 22.) Connecticut is one of the Free states as established through its abolishment of slavery in 1848. Furthermore, the Court ruled that slaves, as chattels or private property, could not be taken away from their owners without due process. The plaintiff never knowingly committed to being a slave of the public official defendants. 23.) Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly overruled the Dred Scott case, the Court stated in the Slaughter-House Cases that at least one part of it had already been overruled by the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, which begins by stating, "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." To which the Court noted: The first observation we have to make on this clause is, that it puts at rest both the questions which we stated to have been the subject of differences of opinion. It declares that persons may be citizens of the United States without regard to their citizenship of a particular State, and it overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States. 24.) The intellectual properties of the plaintiff should remain the property of the plaintiff and not the property belonging to the defendants, merely as a matter or issuance of that property right through the dismissal of the complaint. 25.) The defendant asserts and concedes through their various motions and applications to the court and their various rulings by the Workers Compensation Commission that the plaintiff is the property of the state contrary to the opinion of the United States Supreme Court.

26.) The plaintiff contends that at all times, the materials submitted and created as a result of plaintiffs research, belongs solely the intellectual property of the plaintiff as a free man. This, to disposed of or present in the manner the plaintiff sees fit, and does not belong to the defendants, which categories the plaintiff as inventory to be disposed of at the will of the defendants. This in categorization as a slave belonging to the defendants therefore considers the property of the plaintiff as belonging to the defendant. Meaning, as being ruled a slave, the plaintiff has no property rights, and is therefore discriminated against, as Michael Cozzolino has property. 27.) Any dismissal of the complaint or amendment to the complaint at chief, will prejudice the position of the plaintiff in matters concerning the issues brought forth. As it is the right of the plaintiff, as a citizen of the state to attempt to obtain further monetary relief from damages that may not be addressed by this court. Therefore, the plaintiff requests that if this court sides with the defendant, the court does so without prejudice towards the plaintiff. 28.) Without the conferences that would in fact settle the issues protecting the intellectual property rights of the plaintiff, as plaintiff contends to be a citizen and not a slave or property of the defendants. The plaintiff respectfully requests that any motion by the defendant to dismiss the complaint be denied. 29.) It is therefore necessary to conclude the issues of damages before the court. This, before any granting of dismissal by the court At which time, the plaintiff upon satisfactory resolution, may in fact agree to, or submit on his own behalf a motion to dismiss. To do otherwise would only serve to extend in disadvantaging the plaintiff in his properties, and quest for the proper remedies sought. 30.) The plaintiff objects to any granting of dismissal without settlement conference which will allow the plaintiff and defendants the opportunity to specifically secure his intellectual property rights going forth. 31.) Being the aggrieved party, as stated in the complaint and its amendments, it is the prerogative of the plaintiff to join in on, or submit to the court a motion for the consideration of the court to dismiss the filed complaint. 32.) The essence of the complaint, and later amendments to that, is to in fact attempt to

make the plaintiff whole from the damages caused by the negligence of the defendants. This is in a result of the defendants not performing their mandated duties they as public officials were entrusted to uphold. {Please see Plaintiffs Motion for Injunctive Relief, and Writ of Mandamus}. 33.) Although, it is the duty of the court to verify that the making whole occurred thereby dismissing the complaint etc., It should be upon the affirmation of the plaintiff that this equality or making whole has occurred as it is the plaintiff whom suffered, and therefore it should be the plaintiff that acknowledges or affirms that these damages caused by the negligence have been overcome. At time of this submission, the plaintiff has not been made whole. Therefore, plaintiff requests that the motion to dismiss be denied at this time. 34.) As the damages were inflicted upon the plaintiff by the defendants and not the court, thus far. (See the plaintiffs1995 Complaint and this courts Memorandum of Decision). Therefore the plaintiff should be allowed the opportunity to consent to the matter having been resolved. As not to resolve the matter will bring forth more damages. 35.) Upon the submission by defendants to dismiss, they are engaged in more sinister acts against the plaintiff. Therefore, this issue before the court, the matter has not been resolved. This lack of resolve is creating the lack of wholeness and diminishes the plaintiffs station in life, which is caused by the actions and inactions of the defendants. 36.) Within the defendants motion to dismiss, there exists nothing of benefit to the plaintiff, or which satisfies the plaintiffs complaint. As the motion which relies primarily on the Courts Memorandum of Decision, which both diminishes the plaintiff to a sub person level, beneath that of the equality sought as in the case of Michael Cozzolino. This person benefited from the process required by the laws to be performed by the defendants. The defendants violated these laws as it relates to the benefits earned by plaintiff, an African descendant similarly injured corrections officer. 37.) Through the passing and signing into the law SEBAC 2011 Agreement, Attachment H of that law, the defendants admit through the Workers Compensation Commission and Its decisions rendered by both commissioners Miles and Delaney as being fraudulent and reducing the plaintiffs rights to that not equal to the similarly situated injured Caucasian corrections officer Michael Cozzolino. The adjustment referenced in the

agreement have not been satisfied. We see the evidence of this in the plaintiffs submitted memorandums and within the language of the documents issued by the courts on the state and federal levels. 38.) The plaintiff does not waive any personal rights implied by the defendants motion to dismiss, nor does the plaintiff waive any personal rights that may have been implied by the courts Memorandum of Decision. The plaintiff retains all personal rights which include property rights granted by the state and the laws of the united states, and the protections thereof. 39.) The artificial reductions in both the defendants Workers Compensation Commission hearings not only artificially reduces the benefits of the plaintiffs, it also fictitiously reduces the constitutional rights of the plaintiff. 40.) This, in contrast to the rights accorded similarly situated injured Caucasian employees through and by the same defendant Workers Compensation Commission. Michael Cozzolino was/ is processed by defendants a pension of more than $3,800.00/per month. 41.) The plaintiff requested retirement filed in August of 2009, has yet to be processed as the laws provide similarly situated injured employees (See Michael Cozzolino Attachment). 42.) Although it references artificial reductions, and fictitiousness, the violations of both state constitutional and federal constitutional rights of plaintiff creates hardships against plaintiff and creates real life depravations in the rights of the plaintiff, reflected in his present station in life. These hardships are spared Caucasians similarly situated. 43.) Equality at the law is a right under law and not a privilege to be granted and denied at the whim of individual public officials. As these decisions by the defendant public officials realistically discriminates and causes violations of the rights of individual African descendant citizens, this is contrary to the mandate established by state law, and in turn the laws of the united states. 44.) We see the duplicity and sinister nature of the defendants by way of the issuing of U.S. Mail referenced to the plaintiff on the US Mail postage envelope issued by defense council. The name referenced by defense council is in fact the name referenced at birth, as provided. This is different from to the references made by the state in the correspondence

issued by the State Department of Social Services and the Workers Compensation Commission, which are in capital letters corresponding to the Memorandum of Decision issued by the court, which is in contrast to citizens rights as a person, or minimizes the legal standing of plaintiff, as it refers to the taking away of plaintiffs rights.(Please See Memorandum in Support). 45.) The plaintiff first suffered physical injuries, which should be considered personal injuries, as a result of being employed by the state. The financial injuries that resulted, are in fact due to the failure or negligence of the defendants to perform their duties in continuing both the salary of the plaintiff and to provide medical care to the plaintiff. This in turn created the loss of family, home and other properties, as well as life, and his station in life. This property right is granted by the laws of the state through various Connecticut state statutes such as 5-142(a), 5-169(i) and others. 46.) The plaintiffs rights should not be diminished as property or inventory of the state by the defendant nor any court due to the protections provided in the law. In this diminished capacity inserted by the defendants, the plaintiff is reduced to the station of a piece of furniture, car, cattle, horse, chattel which are considered inanimate objects under the law. 47.) By virtue of the statutes granting plaintiff certain rights as enacted in 1993 by the Connecticut Legislature, the law refers to the injured employee as He, He shalll continue to receive, He shall be credited with service. It doesnt say the property of the state or defendants. If the state defendant wished it to be such, they had the capacity to make the statute list injured state workers as such. In not doing so, and allowing Caucasian officers similarly situated as African descendants the entitled benefits, and not the plaintiff, they in fact discriminate. 48.) The birth certificate of the person employed clearly establishes Anthony McKnight as a person described as any by statute, not by roman catholic laws or Caucasian affiliations. 49.) Those injuries which qualify the plaintiff for benefits are manifested in a physical nature, which is real and not fictions. The pains and sufferings endured by the plaintiff are not fictions. When the plaintiff vomits, and have other symptoms and pains caused by the injuries suffered on April 26, 1993, these discomforts are not at all fictions, as they are

internal to the plaintiffs person. 50.) The artificial reductions, refers to the actions of the defendants, and not to the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. The mishandling of the claim for benefits by the defendants are set forth in the policy and laws established by the defendants through the SEBAC agreements of which the plaintiff in no wise voted for. 51.) The plaintiff was not in any manner in favor of any SEBAC Agreements, nor did the plaintiff authorize by any vote given to the representatives or senators, governor, comptroller, treasurer or any defendant public officials that signed and agreed with these agreements. 52.) The unfunded liabilities established by SEBAC V where discriminatory, and although repealed, it did not affect the entitlements of Michael Cozzolino during this time, as reductions and unfunded primarily was discrimination tactics employed to punish individuals such as the plaintiff. African Americans similarly situated received reduced benefits, or no benefits at all through the artificial reductions established in Attachment H of SEBAC Agreement. Wherefore, for all the reasons listed in the aforementioned paragraphs by the plaintiff in opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss, along with the materials and motions filed by the plaintiff along with attachments/appendixes, in this motion and previous motions, the plaintiff respectfully requests that the court denies Defendants Motion to Dismiss.

Respectfully submitted this ______day of July, 2012.

By: _______________________ Anthony McKnight Sr.

CERTIFICATION This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed via U.S. Mail to the Defendant, State of Connecticut, Office of the Attorney General, 55 Elm Street, Hartford, Connecticut 06460. This ____ Day of July, 2012.