G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992 PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC vs.

Torres Facts: On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong". The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, dated July 10, 1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers. Issue: Whether or not the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with. Dec. No. The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government. Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.) Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation. (Emphasis supplied, Labor Code, as amended.) Once, more we advert to our ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 that: . . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (p. 447.) Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. (p. 448.) We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws. (p. 448.) For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and implemented. WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is GRANTED. The implementation of DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, by the public respondents is hereby SUSPENDED pending compliance with the statutory requirements of publication and filing under the aforementioned laws of the land. G.R. No. 149417 June 4, 2004

GLORIA SANTOS DUEAS vs. Santos Facts: Petitioner Gloria Santos Dueas is the daughter of the late Cecilio J. Santos who owned a parcel of land with a total area of 2.2 hectares located at Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. In 1966, Cecilio had the realty subdivided into smaller lots, the whole forming the Cecilio J. Santos Subdivision (for brevity, Santos Subdivision). The then Land Registration Commission (LRC) approved the project and the National Housing Authority (NHA) issued the required Certificate of Registration and License to Sell. At the time of Cecilios death in 1988, there were already several residents and homeowners in Santos Subdivision. Sometime in 1997, the members of the SSHA submitted to the petitioner a resolution asking her to provide within the subdivision an open space for recreational and other community activities, in accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1216. Petitioner, however, rejected the request, thus, prompting the members of SSHA to seek redress from the NHA. Petitioner ascribes error to the appellate court for holding that P.D. No. 957 has retroactive application. She points out that there is no retroactivity provision in the said decree. Hence, it cannot be applied retroactively pursuant to Article

4 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The same holds true for P.D. No. 1216, which amended Section 31 of P.D. No. 957 and imposed the open space requirement in subdivisions. Petitioner stresses that P.D. No. 1216 only took effect on October 14, 1977 or more than ten (10) years after the approval of the subdivision plans of Cecilio Santos. Issue: Whether or P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1216 has retroactive effect. Dec.: No. P.D. No. 957, as amended, cannot be applied retroactively in view of the absence of any express provision on its retroactive application. Thus:Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. Thus, it is necessary that an express provision for its retroactive application must be made in the law. There being no such provision in both P.D. Nos. 957 and 1344, these decrees cannot be applied to a situation that occurred years before their promulgation. We have examined the text of P.D. No. 1216 and nowhere do we find any clause or provision expressly providing for its retroactive application. Basic is the rule that no statute, decree, ordinance, rule or regulation shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly stated. Hence, there is no legal basis to hold that P.D. No. 1216 should apply retroactively.

[G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002] ERNESTINA BERNABE vs. CAROLINA ALEJO Facts: The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of (23) years, Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he be given his share in Fiscal Bernabes estate, which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the provisions of the Family Code as well as the case of Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, the complaint is now barred. Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action for recognition, because Article 285 of the Civil Code has been supplanted by the provisions of the Family Code. She argues that the latter Code should be given retroactive effect, since no vested right would be impaired. Issue: Whether or not that respondents had four years from the attainment of minority to file an action for recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the Civil Code, in complete disregard of its repeal by the [express] provisions of the Family Code(Arts.172, 173 and 175) and the applicable jurisprudence. Dec. Yes. The Family Code provides that rights that have already vested prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows: ART. 285. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrians right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment. Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could not have filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. As respondent aptly points out in his Memorandum the State as parens patriae should protect a minors right. Born in 1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the Family Code took effect and only twelve when his alleged father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in court.

G.R. No. 125932 April 21, 1999 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MILLER Facts: On July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller, filed with the RTC of Angeles City, a verified petition to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag which was granted. Issue: Whether the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child despite the prohibition under the Family Code, effective on August 3, 1988 when the petition for adoption was filed on July 29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allowed aliens to adopt.

Dec. Yes. This Court has ruled that an alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him. "A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. The term expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny." Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effective of the Family Code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter, as well as childless couples or persons to experience the joy of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parent instincts.

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995 LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA vs. Brillantes Facts: This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the MTC Manila. Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro and that the judge was already married to Ongkiko before he married Yolanda. Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.

Issue: Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to respondent considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code. Dec. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]). Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children. G.R. No. 166562 Ting vs. Velez-Ting Facts: After being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage

based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter. The CA faulted the trial courts finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oates conclusion was based only on theories and not on established fact contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. CA and in Rep. of the Phils. v. CA and Molina. On review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Issue: Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases. Dec: No. To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed

in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca, and again in Antonio v. Reyes. In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit. The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm. The doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come again in litigation. As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were plainly unreasonable; (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision.