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MARC H 5, 2010 BY SK YE C HRISTENS EN

Weak State Theory & Democracy Assistance

The ruler shouted angrily. why do you go on and on about my enemies and those of my country?Is there a distinction between me and the Country? Excerpt from Wizard of the Crow, Ngugi wa Thiongo
Contemporary Security Studies have much to offer electoral studies and democratization in the area of weak states. Many of the electoral experts of the world are primarily involved in advising and supporting the creation of democratic structures in countries emerging from conflict or barely holding on to a semblance of governance and order. In these contexts, the lessons learned from established political systems have an applicability problem when introduced to third world regimes trying to hold on to power, and

those actors which deaden any expansion of state-led order and social control. In short, this is democracy in an alien environment. A strain of contemporary security studies known as weak state theory covers these dynamics. By looking at the security dynamics from the perspective of the regime, and identifying regime security strategies, we find that these security strategies directly and perversely interact with democratization, assistance and cooperation. UPDATE: For an irreverently graphical look at this topic, please see this subsequent post.

Background on Weak State Theory

There is seemingly endless theoretical literature on the nature of the state; and indeed much on the concept of weak states. Cribbing from LSE professor Barry Buzan, States are a combination of three things: The institutional expression of the state (the bureaucracy), the idea of the state (the nation), and the physical base of the state (territory). Weak states, are those states were the idea and the bureaucracy are lacking, leaving us with an ungoverned space whose territorial integrity is nonetheless enforced by international norms enshrined in the UN Charter (among other places). For an interesting look at the contemporary security perspective on this see the U.S. Army counter-insurgency strategy (COIN). In this context, traditional political science (Realism and Liberalism) tells us little; enter the realm of Weak State Theory, a cluster of

what are known as Regime Survival Strategies housed under the theoretical umbrella of one theory called the Insecurity Dilemma. (Truthfully, much of the compilation of these theories is my own, since it has yet to been cohesively articulated by its original authors.) The theory operates from the perspective of the rulers of the weak states. By analyzing actions in the context of the weak state, we see the context under which decisions are made and provide policy implications that affect the context and mitigate the costs of these contexts. In weaker states, the nature of government and its relationship to other actors, means that the survival of the regime becomes practically indistinguishable from the survival of the state. Ngugi wa Thiongos Wizard of the Crow is quoted above; the weak state leader tolerates no conceptual distinction between regime and state.

The Insecurity Dilemma

The Scyllas and Charibdiss have swallowed up many Mortals. Joseph Kelsey 1703
The weakness of the state, creates an environment where centers of power outside the regime pose a threat to authority of the state. These groups may include religious groups, local self-defense, militias, tribal systems, drug lords, smugglers, parastatals, and businesses (and theres often a lot of overlap there). Many of these groups enjoy power, wealth, and identification that compete with the

state itself. As such, the state is only one actor in a mlange of groups and power structures residing within the territory. What differentiates the state from these other actors is the international recognition it receives. This creates a state-society standoff; the more the regime tries to establish state control of the country/economy/society, the more resistance they face from powerful actors/groups in society. If one thinks of Liberia during the war these dynamics are clearly illustrated. Mining, rubber, and forestry industries were held and operated by rebel groups, these groups actively resisted any expansion of the Monrovia-based state to protect their businesses. The same goes for the drug lords in Mexico; Hezbola in Lebanon; Tribal justice in Burundi, or innumerable other examples; any expansion of state control seems to come at their expense. The more elites try to establish effective state rule, the more they provoke challenges to their authority from powerful groups in society.(Collins 2007) Like all good dilemmas, that of insecurity is a chicken and egg conundrum. The inability of the state to provide security causes groups to provide their own which in turn compromises the ability of the state. The dynamic holds irrespectively of the leadership in the capital; the nature of the society conditions the response of the leadership rather than the other way around.

Yet Weak Regimes are Tenacious

Despite this seemingly unsolvable dilemma, weak state regimes are remarkably tenacious. While the insecurity dilemma may prevent them from becoming states with broad institutional capacity, many weak state regimes exist uninterrupted for decades. The Saleh regime of Yemen has been in power since unification 1990; many of its counterparts in weak states in Africa have clung to power for much longer. This is a puzzler facing weak state theorists; how is this possible? The answer is regime security strategies. Weak state regimes are both innovative and consistent in their response to the insecurity dilemma. Strategies Include:

Elite Accommodation; Ethnic Manipulation; Potemkin Democratisation; Private Military Contractors / Other Outside Actors; Super Power Alignment; and Regional Defense Agreements.

Elite Accommodation
Elite Accommodation is the art of making arrangements with key elite throughout society to ensure regime security and a semblance of sovereignty. Where non-regime elite exercise control which would otherwise compromise sovereignty (of the state), the regime may make informal deals with elites allowing them to continue to exercise control without compromising the survival of the regime. (Reno 1999) Warlords or political leaders with private armies may be permitted control over a particular area, have state resources diverted their way or be given exclusive control over a particular

commercial activity for example, in exchange for an agreement not to try and overthrow the regime or encroach on its other activities.(Collins 2007) These concessions may be more legal appointment to minister of mines for example or more illegal informal agreements to overlook smuggling, drug trade, etc. In doing so the regime subsumes and co-opts potential adversaries or democratic opposition.(Reno 1999) In many weak states, patronage is simply a matter of business from the top levels of society to the bottom. Corruption at the top feeds patronage networks further down, and these in turn feed more networks further down an informal social security. Elite accommodation is far from a win-win for the state; in accommodating elites, the regime cedes control and or resources from what theoretically should be under public control or even prohibited. As such it also requires that the regime possess resources or have valuable concessions at its disposal.

Leaders may tolerate cosmetic reform measures but will never sanction reforms that would dismantle elite patronage networks.
The implications for international and democracy assistance is that the Rule of Law and any semblance of meritocracy is fundamentally compromised. Anti-corruption reforms, while critical to international standing, are thus in conflict with the regime security strategies. State and organizational goals and objectives are fundamentally different than western equivalents. Leaders may tolerate cosmetic

reform measures but will never sanction reforms that would dismantle elite patronage networks.

Ethnic Manipulation
Closely linked, yet separate to accommodation strategies, are a cluster of other and potentially more dangerous regime security strategies. Elites will favor certain groups in the allocation of state resources, oppress minorities viewed as hostile, create minority scapegoat groups during times of unrest, and appoint members of the elites own ethnic group to positions of power. (Collins 2007) At the extreme end where regimes lack the capacity or resources to accommodate opposition challenges or to counter their claims with reforms (see the administrative complex) then regimes resort to political violence. Excess repression is perpetuated not because it has a high probability of success, but because the weakness of the state precludes its resort to less violent alternatives.(Mason & Krane, 1989, p. 177 via Job) For assistance providers this means that politics/ethnicity are inseparable. The game of politics is not a game at all for the contestants, rather it must be viewed as a contest where the consequences may be existential for the contestants. Codes of conduct can only be considered window-dressing in an environment with a tradition of foul play.

The Administrative Complex: Control, Undermine, or Balance.

As the expansion of state control invokes security issues, so does the very administration of the state itself. In weak state administrations, state entities themselves (especially where rents can be exploited or coercive power accumulated) can emerge as potential rivals to the regime. Despite the threats they pose to regimes, administration of some sort is required for the survival of the regime especially in resource extraction and military administrations. In response to this dilemma, Weak State rulers employ strategies of draconian control of state organizations to compromise the efficiency of their operations, or tried balancing powerful institutions against each other. In other words, components of the regime begin to compete within the state, playing off one agency against the other to avoid being deposed from within. We can see this balance of power approach where a proliferation of police and military institutions compete with each other. While this seems an effective regime security strategy, the resulting impact upon the citizenry, can be disastrous.(Job 1992)

The proliferation of counterbalancing and inefficient structures; intentionally-inefficient institutional design.

For assistance providers, it is critical to understand that State administrations serve different and accommodative role protecting the regime as much as delivering services. Their capacity implies the development of power centers outside the regime, which may be seen as threatening to the regime. Capacity Building/development as such is not benign, rather it may threaten regime security and involve political risk. Lastly, the proliferation of counterbalancing and inefficient structures may be more than ineptitude and accommodation, it may be part of the careful balancing and limiting of power through intentionally-inefficient institutional design.

Potemkin Democracies
Elections and international electoral assistance are part-and-parcel of regime security. Many regimes in the post-cold-war period have become involved in constructing the outward appearance of democracy. (Collins 2007) Like the hollow facades purportedly constructed by General Potyomkin to fool a visiting empress, weak state rulers rarely offer any substantial concession to democratization. Seen through the lens of regime security, democratization without any substantial concession to democracy can actually function to bolster regime security by giving it a degree of legitimacy. (Collins 2007) Assistance providers must be aware of this function. Decisions on what type of assistance impact the legitimacy of the regime.

Like the hollow facades purportedly constructed by General Potyomkin to fool a visiting empress, weak state rulers rarely offer any substantial concession to democratization.

Bring In the Mercenaries!

Where the development of administration and military forces may create centers of power outside the regime, rulers often turn to outside support for services such as security, administration, public relations, and resource extraction. Perceived to create less vulnerability, in some instances external contractors have become political actors in their own right. Host regimes may prefer to contract out other state functions to external enterprises to avoid creating centers of power outside the regime. For the Angola Parliamentary elections in 2008, the logistical operations were contracted out to a spanish firms. Contracting out large portions of the process may be a way to compromise the power an EMB might otherwise have. Contractors may be western political consultancies, election logistics, construction, IT, security and media strategists. Assistance providers should be aware that international firms assisting the process may be answering to the regime.

Assistance providers should be aware that international firms assisting the process may be answering to the regime.

Superpower alignment and Regional Defense Compacts

Cold-war era states once attempted to secure their regimes through superpower alignment. The more recent War on Terror provided new opportunities for superpower protection as a regime security strategy. In the Obama era, the rebranded Overseas Contingency Operation has provided continued cover for some states who found that anti-terror cooperation is a small price to pay for superpower protection from threats, both international and domestic. Likewise, regional defense compacts may provide perhaps less robust regime security without the costs of superpower alignment. (Collins 2007) While WST sees foreign defense arrangements as potentially beneficial for regime security, analysts counter that it comes at the expense of domestic legitimacy. Foreign backing only makes the government appear more incapable of effectively ruling the country and may come at the expense of domestic legitimacy. Assistance providers should understand that outsiders can either improve regime security through the perception of friends in Washington/Brussels/Paris/London or compromise domestic legitimacy through perceptions of inadequacy.

Conclusion
Generally speaking the regime security strategies have a broad explanatory power in weak states. The next step will be for the paradigm to help us predict the decision process by which regimes decide one particular mix of strategies over another. It is interesting to note that though many of the regime security strategies were originally theorized in an African context they seem to apply on the Arabian Peninsula and across central Asia despite cultural and what are generally considered civilizational differences. Despotism it seems, is cross-cultural.

Despotism it seems, is cross-cultural.

The application of regime security strategies have many implications for external assistance. The Insecurity Dilemma means that military solutions and institutional building strategies in weak states may only provoke violent opposition Elite accommodation systems that hinder development also hamper development assistance (by funneling it off to projects in the French Riviera.) In when combined with an administrative complex regime security interests clash with institution building, anti-corruption, and rule of law promotion. Assistance providers should be aware that where Ethnic manipulation strategies are in use, politics is a realm of existential security threats for the actors involved. Potempkin Democratization strategies underline the importance of careful assessment whenever assistance is provided.