The Idea of Dhtu-vda in Yogacara and Tathgata-garbha Texts

Y AMABE Nobuyoshi

Matsumoto Shir are convinced that tathgatagarbha theory and the Yogacara school share a common framework that they call dhtu-vda or locus theory. The word dhtu-vda itself is a neologism introduced by Matsumoto1 and adopted by Hakamaya.2 They argue that the dhtu-vda idea stands in direct contradiction to the authentic Buddhist theory of prattyasamutpda or dependent origination, which in turn leads them to consider tathgata-garbha and Yogacara theories to be non-Buddhist. In their opinion, not only these Indian theories but also the whole of original enlightenment thought (hongaku shis) in East Asia fell under the shadow of the dhtu-vda idea,3 with the result that most of its Buddhism is dismissed as not Buddhist at all.4 The idea of dhtu-vda is thus an integral part of the Critical Buddhism critique and as such merits careful examination in any evaluation of the overall standpoint. Since Matsumoto rst found the dhtuvda structure in Indian tathgata-garbha and Yogacara literature, we need to begin with a look at the texts in question. My approach here will be purely philological and will limit itself to the theoretical treatises (sastras).
AKAMAYA NORIAKI AND

BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE DHTU-VDA THEORY

For Hakamaya and Matsumoto, the cardinal tenet of Buddhism is prattyasamutpda, which they understand as consisting of a temporal sequence of causally linked dharmas or phenomena that lack any solid basis in reality. Matsumoto illustrates this by means of the following chart.5
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CHART 1

dharma

dharma

dharma

dhtu

Chart 2, in contrast, illustrates the basic structure of dhtu-vda.6

CHART 2

rvaka-dharma

pratyekabuddha-dharma

tathgata-dharma

= super-locus

dharmadhtu = ekayna

= locus

This second model, in contrast to the prattyasamutpda model, introduces a universal, solid basis under such names as dharmadhtu and buddhadhtu. In Matsumotos terminology, this universal dhtu is a locus that supports phenomenal dharmas as super-loci. He enumerates the characteristic features of this dhtu-vda model as follows:7
1. Locus is the basis for super-loci. 2. Locus gives rise to super-loci. 3. Locus is one, super-loci are many. 4. Locus is real, super-loci are not real. 5. Locus is the essential nature of super-loci. 6. Super-loci are not ultimately real, but have some reality in that they have arisen from the locus and share its nature.8

Thus, the dhtu-vda model is essentially a monism (or, according to Matsumotos own terminology, a generative monism ns).9

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Hakamaya and Matsumoto take this to be an Upaniadic model and thus not authentically Buddhist. Particularly problematic for them is the fact that this dhtu-vda framework is not as egalitarian as it appears. As they see it, one can classify any number of different elementsfrom the three vehicles to social castesas super-loci resting on the universal locus. Since the diversity of the super-loci is an essential element of the dhtuvda structure, the distinction among super-loci remains unaffected. On the other hand, the apparent equality that obtains on the absolute level serves at once to justify, obscure, and conrm the discrimination that appears on the phenomenal level.10 In Matsumotos opinion, this essentially discriminatory nature of the dhtu-vda structure is clearly expressed in verse I.39 of the Abhisamaylakra:11
Because the dharmadhtu has no distinction, any distinction among gotra is unreasonable. Nevertheless, because the dharmas to be posited [on the locus of dharmadhtu] are distinct, a distinction [among gotra] is proclaimed.12

In the same way, the ideas of universal Buddha-nature and icchantika in the Mahayana Mahparinirva Sutra do not contradict each other but combine to form a harmonious whole. The Mahynastrlakra asserts, on the one hand, that all sentient beings have tathgatagarbha (verse IX.37)13 and, on the other hand, admits that some people will never be able to attain nirvana (verse III.11). Hence the dhtu-vda structure also represents a principle supporting the discriminatory gotra theory of the Yogacara school.14

MONISM OR PLURALISM?

Matsumotos arguments are well prepared, and the coexistence of a universal Buddha-nature15 and unequal attainments is indeed problematic. Still, it may well be possible to explain this coexistence in somewhat different terms. A good place to begin is the famous denition of gotra in the Bodhisattvabhmi section of the Yogcrabhmi :
What is gotra? In brief, gotra is twofold: the one existing by nature (praktistha) and the attained one (samudnta). The gotra existing by nature is the distinct state of the six-sense-basis (a^yatana-viea ) of bodhisattvas. That [distinct state] was naturally 195

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acquired in the beginningless past and has been transmitted as such [to the present]. The attained gotra is what is acquired through the practice of merits in the past [lives]. In this case, both meanings are intended. Further, this gotra is also called seed (bja), dhtu, and origin (prakti ).16

Since Hakamaya himself quotes this last sentence as an example of the monistic dhtu model,17 it is clear that he considers the gotra theory of the Bodhisattvabhmi to be a form of monism. His argument is based on the fact that all the terms given (gotra, bja, dhtu, prakti) appear in singular forms.18 But the argument is not without its weaknesses. First, the paired terms praktistha-gotra and samudnta-gotra have a close analogue in the Vastusagraha section of the Yogcrabhmi:
In sum, dhtus are twofold: the ones existing by nature (rang-bzhin gyis gnas pa, W, *praktistha19) and the ones enhanced through habitual practice (goms-pas yongs-su-brtas-pa, H, *abhysa-paripua). The ones existing by nature are, for example, the eighteen dhtus (khams), which are seeds (sa-bon, *bja) staying in their own respective continuities. The dhtus enhanced through habitual practice are enhanced seeds resting in the body (rten, *raya) so that the good or bad dharmas habitually practiced in other, former lives might arise [easily].20

In these two passages, it is clear that the praktistha-gotra of the Bodhisattvabhmi corresponds to the *praktistha-dhtu of the Vastusagraha. The correspondence between the samudnta-gotra, attained gotra, of the Bodhisattvabhmi and the *abhysa-paripua-dhtu, the dhtu enhanced through habitual practice, of the Vastusagraha may not be immediately evident, but is conrmed by the Mahynastrlakra-bhya, which equates samudntam [gotram], attained gotra, and paripua [gotra], enhanced gotra.21 Consequently, a correspondence between this portion of the Vastusagraha and the aforementioned portion of the Bodhisattvabhmi seems beyond dispute. The basic message of the passage of the Vastusagraha is that there are innumerable good and bad elements (dhtu) in sentient beings that correspond to good and bad mental functions, and that one must accordingly cultivate the good elements in order to realize good mental states.22 In other words, here the dhtu theory is clearly of a pluralistic sort. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the pluralistic structure of this
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passage was recognized by Hakamaya himself in an earlier essay.23 At the same time, we have established that the gotra theory of the Bodhisattvabhmi was closely related to the dhtu theory of the Vastusagraha. This being the case, it is likely that the gotra theory of the Bodhisattvabhmi itself was pluralistic in structure.24 The pluralistic dhtu model and the gotra theory are intrinsically related to one another. In the same way that the dhtu of desire is incapable of generating hatred, the gotra of sravakas is unable to generate the supreme wisdom of the Buddha. Without such distinct gotras, therefore, it would not be possible to establish a distinction among the three vehicles.25 Accordingly, at least as far as these passages are concerned, the only chart we are able to draw is the one below (Chart 3). Obviously the pluralism it presents is not the same as the generative monism that Matsumoto offers.
CHART 3

sravaka

pratyekabuddha

bodhisattva

rvaka-dhtu (gotra)

pratyekabuddha-dhtu (gotra)

bodhisattva-dhtu (gotra)

SASKRTA OR ASASKRTA? . .

There is more involved in what has been discussed above than merely whether dhtu is singular or plural. It has to do with the foundation for supramundane attainment. If there is any possibility at all for us to acquire supramundane wisdom, on what does such a possibility rest? The Bodhisattvabhmi responds by referring to inherent gotra and denes the foundation as a^yatana-viea, or the distinct state of the six-sensebasis. But just what does this a^yatana-viea mean? We get a clue, I believe, from the following passage of the Abhidharmakoa-bhya:
The [distinction between noble ones and ordinary ones] is made in terms of the distinct states of bodies (raya-viea). [This distinction is possi197

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ble] because the body (raya) of noble ones is transformed (parvtta) by the power of the paths of seeing and practice (darana-bhvanmrga), so that [the body] is no more capable of generating the delements to be abandoned by the [paths of seeing and practice]. Therefore, when ones body has ceased to be the seed of delements (abj-bhte raye klen), like a grain of rice consumed by the re, one is called [a noble person] who has abandoned delements.26

In the body of literature to which this text belongs, raya usually means, in the absence of further contextual specication, body, or perhaps more precisely, our personal existence centered on the body. This makes it virtually synonymous with a^yatana, which makes a^yatana-viea and raya-viea equivalent.27 In the passage cited, the body of a noble person is distinguished from the body of an unenlightened person in that the former no longer produces delements. In other words, the bodies of the unenlightened remain in a state that produces delements and such bodies are conceived of as the bja of delements.28 In the passage from the Bodhisattvabhmi, the six-sense-basis (a^yatana) of a bodhisattva is distinguished from that of a sravaka and a pratyekabuddha in that the a^yatana of a bodhisattva is capable, eventually, of generating the supreme wisdom of the Buddha. The six-sensebasis of a bodhisattva who has the potentiality to give rise to the highest wisdom of the Buddha is considered to be the bodhisattva-gotra. The important point here is that the gotra is taken to represent a particular state of concrete physical-mental existence. In other words, the basis for deliverance is posited on the phenomenal levelnamely, sasktaand not on the absolute level of asaskta.29 We are reminded here of an important theoretical requirement of abhidharma Buddhism, namely that an asaskta or unconditioned dharma cannot be a generative cause of anything30 and therefore cannot directly generate supramundane wisdom.31 This same pattern is followed by the Yogcrabhmi.32 Tathat is synonymous with dharmadhtu, which, according to Hakamaya and Matsumoto, gives rise to all the mundane and supramundane elements. It should be noted, however, that the role of tathat in soteriological contexts of the Yogacara system (especially in the Yogcrabhmi ) is rather limited. If it is sometimes called the cause of holy dharmas (namely supramundane wisdom), it is because tathat assists the arising of
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supramundane wisdom by becoming its cognitive object or lambanapratyaya. In other words, meditation on tathat in the preliminary stages eventually induces supramundane wisdom.33 But tathat, in principle, does not become a generative cause,34 which means that once again the suitability of the dhtu-vda model as generative monism to the Yogacara literature is suspect.35 Classical Yogacara theory regarding gotra maintains that the divergent attainments of the three vehicles are each based on their own dhtu or gotra. Needless to say, this is a highly problematic position, and one needs to consider carefully why they were driven to take it. Merely in terms of the formal logic involved, however, the argument is rather straightforward: divergent effects must have divergent causes. This is much easier to understand than the idea of divergent effects based on a single cause, as the dhtu-vda model suggests.36 I do not believe that the universal dharmadhtu was the leading principle that supported the gotra theory of the Yogacara school.37

GOTRA AND DHARMADHTU

The theory does not, however, hold universally. If we consider a typical tathgata-garbha text, the Ratnagotravibhga, we nd that such a clear distinction between saskta and asaskta is not strictly observed.38 The text does not hesitate to assert that the actions of the Buddha arise from asaskta.39 Even the praktistha-gotra of the Bodhisattvabhmi is linked to the tathgata-garbha, which is equivalent to tathat.40 But if praktistha-gotra is equated with the omnipresent tathat, no theoretical basis remains to support the absolute distinction among the three vehicles. Thus, the Ratnagotravibhga states:
Eventually the rays from the sun-disk of the Tathgata fall even on the bodies of sentient beings xed in state of evil (mithytva-niyatasatna). The statement that an icchantika never attains nirvana was made to remove the hatred against the teachings of Mahayana, because the hatred against the teachings of Mahayana is the cause of ones being icchantika. [In other words, this statement has] a hidden intention [that even icchantikas will attain nirvana] at another, [later] time [if they abandon their hatred of Mahayana]. Indeed, because the originally pure gotra exists (prakti-viuddha-gotra-sabhavd), no one can be ultimately impure by nature.41 199

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The dhtu-vda model of ultimate discrimination based on universal buddhadhtu does not seem to work very well on this end either. Logic requires that divergent phenomena must have divergent bases. If the basis is universal, there is no logical reason to maintain an ultimate discrimination among the super-loci. This structure is presented graphically in Chart 4. Note that the super-loci here are no longer discriminatory:
CHART 4

attainment of nirvana

attainment of nirvana

attainment of nirvana

praktistha-gotra = dharmadhtu

DHTU-VDA

On the basis of the above arguments, I am persuaded that the classical gotra theory of the Yogacara school was based on pluralistic dhtus or gotras. Once the gotra is reinterpreted as universal dharmadhtu or tathat, it loses the theoretical basis that supports the absolute distinction among the three vehicles.42 There is yet another factor to be taken into account. India is a country in which tradition holds great authority. Old theories are not directly discarded when new ones come along, but are often retained and attempts are made to reconcile the old with the new. Something like this seems to have happened in the case of the gotra theory of the Yogacara school. Actually, even within the Yogcrabhmi the idea of tathat was coming to play an ever greater role in the soteriological context. For example, a portion of the Vinicayasagraha section of the Yogcrabhmi says that the cause of supramundane dharmas does not lie in ordinary seeds but in tathat as a cognitive object.43 The theoretical limitation of tathat to the realm of a cognitive object, and hence its exclusion from the realm of generative causes, seems still to be in force. And yet at the same time one senses a dissatisfaction with the gotra theory of the Bodhisattvabhmi, which grounds supramundane attainment on the phe-

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nomenal a^yatana-viea. This appears to indicate an expansion of the role of tathat into the realm of the soteriological. Now if the source of supramundane attainment is not individual seeds but universal tathat, there seems no reason to sustain the idea of individuals being predestined to a particular level of attainment.44 Nevertheless, the idea of distinct gotras is not abandoned, and the attempt is made to defend distinct, predestined goals by claiming that some people are faced with an ultimate obstacle that blocks the way into tathat, while others are not. At this point the argument, it seems to me, has ceased to be rational and is simply concerned with preserving tradition. The Yogcrabhmi is not a coherent text but a composite of heterogeneous elements, some more traditional, others more progressive. In general the material in the Vinicayasagraha is more developed than what we nd in the basic seventeen sections of the Yogcrabhmi. Still, the Vinicayasagraha is part of the Yogcrabhmi and presupposes what is contained in its basic sections. And since the basic sections clearly present the traditional gotra theory, the authors of the Vinicayasagraha were not at liberty directly to contradict or ignore that theory. This would appear to be the historical dynamic at work behind the inconsistency between the monistic tathat and the pluralistic three vehicles. True, certain passages do suggest a dhtu-vda-type structure. A good example is the verse of the Abhisamaylakra that we referred to at the outset:
Because the dharmadhtu has no distinction, any distinction among gotras is unreasonable. Nevertheless, because the dharmas to be posited [on the locus of dharmadhtu] are distinct, a distinction [among gotras] is proclaimed.

The earliest extant commentary on the work, the Abhisamaylakravtti of rya-Vimuktisena, explains the meaning of the latter half of the verse as follows:
[Gotras are differentiated, just as the vessels] made from the same clay and baked in the same re [are differentiated] by the distinct names honey pot, candy pot, and so forth [according to what is put in them].45

In Matsumotos phraseology, the Vtti would clearly hold that the manifold super-loci are posited on a single locus, and that this
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homogeneous locus is differentiated only in the sense that the heterogeneous super-loci are differentiated one from another. It is precisely this that he has chosen to name dhtu-vda. But if the distinction among gotra amounts to no more than the supercial temporary distinction between a honey pot and a candy pot, it has ceased to characterize anything essential. This is clearly different from the stringent gotra theory of the Yogacara school.46 The great possibility for the conversion of rvaka allowed for in the Vtti seems to justify my suspicions.47 It seems certain that the distinction among the three vehicles in the Vtti is not the absolute predestination of the Yogacara school.48 In addition, we might mention the following arguments:
Therefore, [the krik I.5cd of the Abhisamaylakra]49 teaches that the dharmadhtu itself, [namely] the gotra existing by nature (praktistha gotra), is the basis for practice, because [the dharmadhtu is] the cause of the holy dharmas. Others hold that gotra is the distinct state of the six-sense-basis (a^yatana-viea), which is twofold: one attained by conditions (pratyaya-samudnta) and one existing by nature (prakty-avasthita). [This opinion is rejected.]50 [Objection:] If dharmadhtu is gotra, does it not follow that all [the sentient beings] are [equally] established in the gotra (gotra-stha),51 since the [dharmadhtu] is omnipresent? [Answer: The dharmadhtu] is called gotra [only] to the extent that it is recognized (lambyamna) and becomes the cause of holy dharmas.52

The context here is very similar to that of the Vinicayasagraha on a number of points. First, the entire argument is necessitated by the rejection of the classical Yogacara theory of gotra and the adoption of tathat or dharmadhtu as the basis for supramundane attainment. Second, tathat or dharmadhtu thus adopted aids the arising of supramundane wisdom by serving as its cognitive object. Third, in spite of the adoption of such a universal basis, the author does not discard the traditional distinction among the three vehicles outright, but strives somehow to retain it. Most likely the crucial factor once again was the authority of the preceding tradition. The Abhisamaylakra had close ties with certain Yogacara texts,53 which makes it easy to understand how the Abhisamaylakra and its Vtti could not completely neglect the traditional gotra
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distinction of the Yogacara school. At the same time, the Yogacara tradition seems not to have been so closely binding on the Vtti as the Vinicayasagraha. The logic of the Vtti that supports the differentiation of gotras is very weak. Hence, as we saw earlier, the distinction among gotras in this text cannot be considered nal.

CONCLUSION

In the compass of this essay I have only been able to cover a small portion of the large number of texts analyzed by Hakamaya and Matsumoto, and have had to exclude mention of any of the sutras. Obviously so limited an examination cannot claim to have taken into account all the aspects of tathgata-garbha thought. However, we can say that at least as far as the sastra texts we have discussed are concerned, the applicability of the dhtu-vda model of discrimination based on monism is questionable at best. The Yogacara theory of gotra is indeed discriminatory, but it is not based on monism. Tathgata-garbha thought is clearly monistic, but the gotra distinction does not seem to signify anything essential. Some texts, such as the Abhisamaylakra-vtti, show an apparent dhtu-vda structure, but that structure would appear to be an inconsistency brought about by a reinterpretation of the gotra theory. That is, replacing the pluralistic gotras with monistic dharmadhtu did not entirely do away with the traditional distinction among the three vehicles. I have tried to illustrate this in Chart 5, which presents my understanding of the dhtu-vda structure. While it may look very similar to Matsumotos scheme, it is really a clumsy patchwork of the super-structure of Chart 3 with the infra-structure of Chart 4, aimed at showing how the infrastructure and superstructure of Chart 5 contradict one another. I
CHART 5

sravaka

pratyekabuddha

bodhisattva

superstructure of
Yogacara inconsistent with

dharmadhtu = praktistha-gotra

infrastructure of tathgatagarbha

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remain rather skeptical of the position that the dhtu-vda had anything like the solid structure that Hakamaya and Matsumoto seem to accord it. I wish respectfully to acknowledge their contribution to Buddhist studies in pointing out the problematics of the tathgata-garbha thought so far overlooked. At the same time, I have tried to indicate the possibility of alternative interpretations based on the philological arguments presented in the foregoing.

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