***CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY*** Lord Stewart Wood of Anfield Speech in Lords debate on recent developments in the Middle East,

13 th July My Lords, I want to take a step back from the details of specific countries and ask how the extraordinary events of the past two years in the Middle East should force us to reassess what kind of foreign policy is appropriate for a region experiencing such profound change. I want to argue that the suddenness, irreversibility and variety of transition processes we are seeing from Libya and Tunisia in the West to Iran and Iraq in the east should force us all, on all sides of the House, to think again about the kinds of challenge faced across the region; and it should make us reconsider the instruments of foreign policy that are most suited to supporting the regions move towards greater stability, greater prosperity, greater democracy and the protection of the rights of all citizens. My Lords, the security situation of the Middle East has always been of greater concern to the international community than that of any other part of the world. Crises in the region can trigger global recessions, divide the international community, as well as bring sustained misery to those living in the areas affected. Perhaps because of the regions unparalleled sensitivity, the approach of the West to the region has (with some notable exceptions such as over Palestine and Iran) been characterised by a strong preference for stability over change. Broadly speaking, our approach to the Middle East has been governed by a set of orthodoxies: an orthodoxy that the governance of Arab nations of the Middle East were broadly stable, at least at the level of the regimes themselves; an orthodoxy that the interests of the international community lay in support (tacit or explicit) for these regimes, because the maintenance of order (and the suppression of sectarianism) required us to support authoritarian rule an orthodoxy (especially after the Iranian Revolution in 1979) that we should be reticent to wish for democracy in countries where the ballot box might deliver governments that were radical, populist and Islamist in character among some, an orthodoxy that there was no great yearning for democracy among the populations of many Middle Eastern countries and an orthodoxy that the dominant conflict in the Middle East, the key to understanding the region and to achieving long-lasting security, was the conflict between Israel and Palestine.

My Lords, the developments of the past 18 months have exposed the limits of these orthodoxies. Some of the most remarkable moments of our era Mohamed Bouazizis selfimmolation in Tunisia, the demonstrations in Tahrir Square, the overthrow of Colonel
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Gaddafi, the Yemeni President agreeing to hand over power after a third of a century in power, and the announcement of Mohammed Mursis victory in Egypt just two weeks ago when many thought democracy would be strangled at birth have forced us to think again about the categories we use to understand the Middle East, and the way we respond. The responses to popular pressure have been diverse and surprising. The Egyptian regime of President Mubarak collapsed quickly, while in Syria the continuing brutal response of the Baath government to opposition demonstrations has led to what most people would call civil war. In general, the regimes of Arab monarchies have proven more resilient than Arab non-monarchies. In Iraq, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, we are watching the first fragile steps of nations towards some kind of democracy, however imperfect. These are developments still in train. The political situations are fraught and fluid. But although we have not arrived at stable settlements in any of the countries of the Middle East, we do know that a foreign policy for the region based on past orthodoxies is no longer up to the job. I want to suggest that a revised approach to foreign policy for the Middle East needs to be divided into three categories of action: first, policies to help end conflict, contain violence and protect civilians second, policies to help support peaceful transitions and new constitutional orders and third, more longer term, policies to build up the democratic capacity of postauthoritarian nations.

Before turning to these three categories, there is one precondition for the effectiveness of any aspect of our foreign policy towards the Middle East and that is the need for international coordination of policy. We will rarely if ever have a positive effect on the lives of the people of the Middle East by going solo. When the international community is coordinated in taking disciplined and decisive action, it has a chance of success. In Libya, concerted action by the United Nations followed by military support to Gaddafis opponents averted the threat of a protracted Civil War; while the coordinated imposition of EU and US sanctions two weeks ago has on Irans oil exports has already had a significant effect on immobilising Irans oil tanker fleet. But where the international community has been divided as it has in different ways over the Iraq conflict, Israel-Palestine, and most recently over Syria our ability to support peaceful change is diminished. Coordination requires close partnership with our allies in the EU, as well as the US, and I hope that despite this governments seemingly accelerating Euroscepticism, it can in this area of foreign policy at least commit to working in constructive partnership with our European allies. My Lords, let me turn to the three categories of foreign policy I outlined earlier, beginning with the first category: the immediate task of action to help end conflict and protect civilians. Violence is still a daily occurrence in too many of the countries of the Middle East. Bahrain has witnessed violence perpetrated by govermment security forces against prodemocracy protesters. In Libya and Iraq, security forces, armed gangs and militias continue
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to disrupt government, economic life and threaten innocent civilians. And in Syria, now in a state of civil war, yesterday saw the highest number of deaths in one day since March 2011. The total death toll now approaches 17,000. And disturbingly, Syrias internal conflict now threatens to spread to Turkey, Lebanon and perhaps even Israel. Foremost among our challenges is for the international community to prioritise efforts to force the cessation of violence in these varied situations without which the other aspects of transition simply cannot take place. In this context, and in light of todays report by the Joint Committees on Arms Export controls recommending a change in our policy towards sales of weapons and military equipment to authoritarian regimes, Id be interested in the ministers view of what action the government is proposing to take to look again at the rules for exports to countries such as Syria and Bahrain, where the world has witnessed such brutal oppression over the past year. Alongside efforts to contain and defuse violence sits the priority of responding to dire humanitarian situations across the region. In Yemen, estimates suggest nearly half the population (about 10m Yemenis) are either hungry or on the edge of hunger. In Aleppo in Syria, residents are now forced to scavenge for food and fuel, yet international humanitarian access is virtually non-existent. We must be swift and relentless in insisting on full access for humanitarian relief where it is needed. Finally, a less widely noted but severe challenge to many countries is the deterioration of their economy. Transitions even relatively successful ones bring uncertainty and thus undermine the confidence of investors. For example, Egypt has seen foreign investment collapse to a quarter of the levels seen under Mubarak. Global economic fragility continues to undermine opportunities for young people in the Middle East. Across the Arab world, over half the total population is now under 25, yet youth unemployment (itself a major cause of the Arab Spring protests) remains at frighteningly high levels averaging well over 25% across the region. Support from the IMF, World Bank and bilateral aid from the EU and US is crucial not just to alleviate insecurity and poverty, but to enable transitions to gain legitimacy. These immediate concerns tend to dominate discussion of our foreign policy in the Middle East. But, however remote the prospect of more stable times might appear at the moment, I think it is crucial that or foreign policy begins to look to the longer term needs of countries undergoing transition. These needs may be less immediate, but responding to them may be the most effective way of playing a part in securing a more peaceful and democratic region. So let me turn to the second category of actions: policies to help support stable transitions and the emergence of new constitutional orders. We know that the toppling of long-standing undemocratic regimes is more often the prelude to disorder, chaos, the surfacing of age-old sectarian enmities and sometimes protracted violence, than it is the first step towards liberal democracy. The first challenge is to support efforts to establish political processes that can help countries navigate the multiple small steps from overthrow of the regime to officials whose election enjoys broad
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legitimacy. In their different ways, Libya, Egypt and (most successfully) Tunisia are all embarking on this delicate but transformative process. My Lords we may feel like bystanders as we watch, for example, the tussle between the newly elected President and the military elite in Egypt. And to a large extent we must let these transitions chart their own course. But the onus is on us all to find ways of supporting the process of transition such as UN efforts to press for a national unity government in Syria, or building on the success of the limited transition deal brokered in Yemen by the Gulf Cooperation Council. But now is the time for us also to think about ways in which we can support the establishment of new constitutional arrangements that suit the particularities of each country, but which embed authority in elected institutions and protect the rights of citizens of whatever religious or ethnic background. In the long-term, the stability of countries undergoing transitions will depend on the legitimacy of the institutions of political power. My Lords, this might seem a long way off, but I think we can play an important role in stimulating what you might call some constitutional imagination about which institutional arrangements suit the emerging democracies of the Middle East. For example, in countries marked by bitter sectarian conflict, such as Lebanon, Bosnia or Northern Ireland, institutional arrangements that embed power-sharing in legislative, executive and administrative life have been central to ensuring stability and legitimacy (sometimes called consociational democracies); in other countries, varieties of federalism are used to meet the demands of different communities for greater relative autonomy. My Lords, it may seem odd or perhaps utopian to argue that this kind of applied political science should be an integral part of our foreign policy thinking. But experience from across history suggests that a constitution that responds to historical grievances, and commands respect among populations for its fairness as well as its efficiency, is a huge prize in the search for true stability. This brings me to my third and final category of policy interventions I believe we need to cultivate ways to make democracy work effectively, and to reinforce the habits of democracy. We know from the experience of democratic transitions in Africa, South America and elsewhere that real stability and a functioning democracy do not develop spontaneously when elections arrive and new constitutions are drawn up. Over time and yes this may be over decades embedding the habits of democracy, and ensuring that obstacles to the effective functioning of democratic institutions are overcome, are indispensible. The path from nominal democracy to genuine democracy is often a long and tortuous one, but it is one that can be shored up with support and encouragement from countries such as ours. Let me take two examples of the barriers to effective democracy. Firstly, when authoritarian regimes collapse, the collapse often reveals a nexus of power structures underneath that prove much more resilient to change, and persist into the period of democratic transition. A good case is that of the military in Egypt. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces in Egypt continues to act with parallel political authority to that exercised by parliament and the newly elected President acting in the name of some purported
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higher national interest, while in fact preserving the militarys own influence and status. The historical experience of countries such as Pakistan and Turkey show that the relationship between the military and formal democratic institutions can remain problematic for a long time. In other countries, it is the relationship between religious and secular authority that can limit the extent to which democracy can truly take root. There are no easy answers to these cases where countervailing forces limit the effectiveness of democracy, but we need to take them seriously, and use experiences from other countries to inform our approach to addressing them. A second example is the need to build up civic capacity in countries that have had precious little organised civic life outside of organised religion and the state. We know from previous waves of democratic transition that the development of what the American political scientists Almond and Verba called a civic culture the acceptance of the authority of the state, and widespread participation in civic life is an important part of what makes democracies work well. This is an area in which we need a much broader conception of foreign policy one that embraces the role of political parties in the UK in working with new political parties in the region, to help build organisations and membership; one that seeks partnership with NGOs to build capacity with nascent Middle Eastern NGOs; and one that looks to support the work of organisations such as the BBC, the British Council and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, who do so much to promote debate, culture and transparency in parts of the world where democracy is fragile or non-existent. My Lords, our foreign policy towards much of the Middle East was historically based on the premise of stability but we now find ourselves in an era of dramatic change. It was based on a view that stability and democracy were not easy bedfellows but we now find the thirst for democracy spreading across the region. It is a time of great excitement and great uncertainty. Our foreign policy towards this part of the world, and that of our allies in the US and the EU, needs to adjust to this new world, and learn from the positive and less successful experiences of democracy building in places Iraq and Afghanistan. The three areas of priority for our foreign policy towards the Middle East focusing on conflict prevention and civilian protection; supporting transitions and new constitutional orders; and building up the democratic capacity of civil societies are areas that should enjoy cross-party support. In my view, they are approaches that enable us to welcome transitions from authoritarian rule towards some kind of democratic future in Middle Eastern countries, rather than (as is too often the case) being scared of the instability it brings from a distance. Turbulent times are dangerous times, but they need not be cause for pessimism if we work in partnership with other nations to build a foreign policy based on a commitment to support and reinforce democratic values. The courage that the people of Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Bahrain, Syria and elsewhere have shown deserves nothing less. ***ENDS***