Accident: a specific unplanned event or sequence of events that has a specific undesirable consequence consequence. Consequences: the results of an accident event sequence. It is originally considered to be the fire, explosion, and release of toxic material that results from the accident, but not the health effects, economic loss, etc., which is the ultimate result.
Battelle, Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, AIChE, New York (1985).
EXAMPLES
Feyzin, France, 1966 Fixborough, England, 1974 Bhopal, India, 1984
Significant Inventories of a) Flammable Materials b) Combustible Materials c) Unstable Materials d) Toxic Materials e) Extremely Hot or Cold Materials f) Inerting Gases (Methane, Carbon Monoxide) Highly Reactive a) Reagents b) Products c) Intermediate Products d) By-products
Containment Failures a) Pipes b) Vessels c) Storage Tanks d) Gaskets, Bellows, etc. e) Input/output or venting
Hazards
Initiating Event/Upsets
Intermediate Events (System or Operator Responses to Upsets) Propagating Ameliorative Material Releases a) Combustibles b) Explosive Materials c) Toxic Materials d) Reactive Materials Ignition/Explosion Operator Errors Control Responses Operator Responses a) Planned b) Ad Hoc
Accident Consequences
Contingency Operations
a) Alarms b) Emergency Procedures a) Omission c) Personnel Safety b) Commission d) Evacuations c) Diagnosis/Decision-Making e) Security External Events a) Delayed Warning b) Unwarned External Events a) Early Detection b) Early Warning
External Events a) Floods b) Earthquakes c) Electrical Storms d) High Winds e) High Velocity Impacts f) Vandalism Method/Information Errors a) As Designed b) As Communicated
DEFINITIONS
Incident
The loss of containment of material or energy (e. g., a leak of 10 1b/sec of ammonia from a connecting pipeline to the ammonia tank, producing a toxic vapor cloud).
Incident Outcome
The physical manifestation of the incident; for toxic materials, the incident outcome is a toxic release, while for flammable materials, the incident outcome could be a BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion), flash fire, unconfined vapor could explosion, etc. (e. g., for a 10 1b/sec leak of ammonia, the incident outcome is a toxic release).
Consequence
A measure of the expected effects of an incident outcome case (e. g., an ammonia cloud from a 10 1b/sec leak under Stability Class D weather condition, and 1.4 mph wind traveling in a northerly direction will injure 50 people).
*CCPS, Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis, AIChE, New York (1989)
INCIDENTS
INCIDENT OUTCOMES
Toxic Vapor Atmospheric Dispersion
Jet Fire
Tank Full Tank 50% Full o o o etc. After 15 min. Release After 30 min. Release After 60 min. Release o o o etc.
The relationship between incidents, incident outcomes, and incident outcome cases for a hydrogen cyanide (HCN) release.
Definitions
Hazard
a physical situation with a potential for human injury, damage to property, damage to environment or some combination of these. (IChem E) a characteristic of the system/plant/process that represents a potential for an accident. (AIChE)
Risk
the likelihood of a specified undesirable event occurring within a specified period or in specified circumstances. (IChem E) a measure of potential economic loss or human injury in terms of the probability of the loss or injury occurring and the magnitude of the loss or injury if it occurs. (AIChE)
TYPICAL HAZARDS
Significant inventories of: Extreme physical conditions Flammable materials Combustible materials Unstable materials Corrosive materials Asphyxiants Shock sensitive materials Highly reactive materials Toxic materials Inerting gases Combustible dusts Pyrophoric materials High temperatures Cryogenic temperatures High pressures Vacuum Pressure cycling Temperature cycling Vibration/liquid hammering
5. 6.
Hazard Identification
No
Modify System
Yes
Operate System
(Hazard Assessment) or (Hazard Evaluation) = (1) + (2) + (3) + (4) + (5) + (6)
qualitative
Hazard Assessment
the techniques for deciding how far we ought to go in removing the hazards or protecting people from them.
Solution
Eliminating the possibility of gas evolution by changing the raw material responsible for the problem.
(substitution)
Lowering the possibility of gas evolution by altering one of the process condition. (attenuation) Fitting an appropriate pressure relief valve and vent system to protect the plant. (second chance)
Hazard Evaluation procedures Steps in Hazard Evaluation Process Process/ System Checklists Safety Review Relative Ranking Dow & Mond Preliminary Hazard Analysis What If Method
Identify Deviations From Good Practice Identify Hazards Estimate Worst Case Consequences Identify Opportunities to Reduce Consequences Identify Accident Initiating Events Estimate Probabilities of Initiating Events
Primary Purpose Primary Purpose* Primary Purpose Primary Purpose Secondary Purpose Primary Purpose Primary Purpose Primary Purpose
Primary Purpose
MATRIX RELATING HAZARD EVALUATION PROCEDURES TO HAZARD EVALUATION PROCESS STEPS (upper left)
Hazard Evaluation procedures Steps in Hazard Evaluation Process Identify Opportunities to Reduce Probabilities of Initiating Events Identify Accident Event Sequences and Consequences Estimate Probabilities of Event Sequences Estimate Magnitude of Consequences of Event Sequences Identify Opportunities to Redure Probabilities and/or Consequences of Event Sequences Quantitative Hazard Evaluation Primary Purpose Process/ System Checklists Safety Review Relative Ranking Dow & Mond Preliminary Hazard Analysis What If Method
MATRIX RELATING HAZARD EVALUATION PROCEDURES TO HAZARD EVALUATION PROCESS STEPS (lower left)
Hazard Evaluation procedures Failure Modes Hazard and Effects and Fault Event Cause Human Operability Criticality Tree Tree Consequence Error Study Analysis Analysis Analysis Analysis Analysis
Identify Deviations From Good Practice Identify Hazards Estimate Worst Case Consequences Identify Opportunities to Reduce Consequences Identify Accident Initiating Events Estimate Probabilities of Initiating Events Primary Purpose Provides Context Only Provides Context Only Primary Purpose Provides Context Only Primary Purpose Primary Purpose Provides Context Only Primary Purpose Provides Context Only Primary Purpose Primary Purpose Provides Context Only
Primary Purpose
Primary Purpose
Primary Purpose
MATRIX RELATING HAZARD EVALUATION PROCEDURES TO HAZARD EVALUATION PROCESS STEPS (upper right)
Steps in Hazard Evaluation Process Identify Opportunities to Reduce Probabilities of Initiating Events Identify Accident Event Sequences and Consequences Estimate Probabilities of Event Sequences Estimate Magnitude of Consequences of Event Sequences Identify Opportunities to Reduce Probabilities and/or Consequences of Event Sequences Quantitative Hazard Evaluation
Hazard Evaluaton procedures Failure Modes Hazard and Effects and Fault Event Cause Human Operability Criticality Tree Tree Consequence Error Study Analysis Analysis Analysis Analysis Analysis Primary Purpose Primary Purpose Primary Purpose
Primary Purpose
Primary Purpose
Primary Purpose
Primary Purpose
Primary Purpose
Primary Purpose
Primary Purpose
Primary Purpose
Primary Purpose
Primary Purpose
Primary Purpose
MATRIX RELATING HAZARD EVALUATION PROCEDURES TO HAZARD EVALUATION PROCESS STEPS (lower right)
Acceptable Risk
Most treatment of acceptable risk deal primarily with the risk of death. This may appear somewhat arbitrary. But there is justification for this approach:
Data on fatalities are most possibly recorded and are relatively straightforward. (number of fatalities) (number of other injuries) measures which reduce death from a particular hazard tend to reduce injuries as well.
Computation of Risk
1 r N 1 N
x f
i 1 i n i i
N P f
i 1
where, fi = the rate at which the event occurs (event/year) xi = number of fatalities per event i (death/event) Ni = number of peoples exposed to event i (number of exposed peoples/event) Pi = the probability of fatalities among the exposed people (death/exposed people) N = total number of peoples at risk
Table 9.2 Fatal Accident Rates in different industries and jobs in the U.K.
Fatal Accident Rate (FAR) (deaths/108 exposed hours) Clothing and footwear industry Vehicle industry Chemical industry British industry Steel industry Agricultural work Fishing Coal mining Railway shunting Construction work Air crew Professional boxers Jockeys (flat racing) 0.15 1.3 3.5(a) 4 8 10 35 40(b) 45 67 250 7000 50000
(a). This value of the FAR for the chemical industry predates Flixborough. If the Flixborough fatalities are averaged over 10 years the value becomes 5. (b). This value is now appreciably less. Sources: Sowby (1964), Pochin (1975), Kletz (1971,1976d)
Table 9.3 Fatal Accident Rates for the chemical industry in different contries Fatal Accident Rate (FAR) (deaths/108 exposed hours) France West Germany United Kingdom (before Flixborough) 8.5 5 4
(including Flixborough)
United States
Sources: Sowby (1964), Pochin (1975), Kletz (1971,1976d)
5
5
(Kletz, 1986)
FAFRmax 5.0
(U.S.)
Table 9.5 Death rates for some voluntary and involuntary risks (after Kletz, 1976d)
Fatality rate (deaths per person per year) Voluntary risk Taking contraceptive pill Playing football Rock climbing Car driving Smoking (20 cigarettes/day) 2 10-5 4 10-5 4 10-5 17 10-5 500 10-5 6 10-11 0.2 10-7 0.2 10-7 0.5 10-7 1 10-7 1 10-7 Reference
Gibson (1976c) Pochin (1975) Pochin (1975) Roach (1970) Pochin (1975) Wall (1976) Gibson (1976c) Wall (1976) Bulloch (1974) Turkenburg (1974)
Involuntary risk Meteorite Transport of petrol and chemicals (U.K.) Aircraft crash (U.K.) Explosion of pressure vessel (U.S.A.) Lightning (U.K.) Flooding of dikes (Netherlands) Release from nuclear power station (at 1 km) (U.K.) Fire (U.K.) Run over by road vehicle Leukemia
Involuntarily:
Natural Disaster
10-5/person/year Man-made 10-7/person/year
Based on the total working hours of 100 employees in 1 year (2000 hr/year).