FREE WILL

Freedom of the Will

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Many of us well before we start doing philosophy encounter the free will dilemma when we realize we hold two contradictory beliefs, a belief in science and a belief in the capacity of persons to act freely.

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It has seemed obvious to most people who have not been exposed to philosophy (perhaps subjected would be a better word) that free will and determinism are incompatible. -- Peter van Inwagen

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It is almost impossible to get [those starting out in] philosophy to take seriously the idea that there could be such a thing as free will in a deterministic universe. Indeed, people who have not been exposed to philosophy usually understand the word determinism (if they know the word at all) to stand for the thesis that there is no free will. -- Peter van Inwagen.

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[Indeed] you might think that the incompatibility of free will and determinism deserves to seem obvious --- because it is obvious. - Peter an Inwagen (again)

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If every event has a cause, as science presupposes, how is it possible for a person to engage in free action? Yet how is it possible to praise or blame someone for a good or bad act, if that person has not acted freely? As Inwagen and pre-philosophical reflection suggest, our belief in free will and moral responsibility and our belief in science seem to contradict one another.

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We have an apparent conflict. How might it be resolved? The most straight-forward method will be to reject one of our two beliefs, our belief in free will or our belief in science.

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The rejection of free will in the face of determinism is called hard determinism. Libertarianism takes the opposite point of view, resolving the conflict between free will and our belief in science by rejecting determinism.

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Neither option seems that satisfactory, but maybe we simply have to grit our teeth and reject one of our beliefs that give rise to the conflict, maybe we have to reject our belief in science or reject our capacity to act freely. Some believe, though, there is a third way.

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This third way is called soft-determinism or compatibilism. Soft-determinists or compatibilists believe it is a mistake to think that we have only two options available to us, that we have to reject either free will or science.

Compatibilists believe we can accept both and its a mistake to think theyre in conflict.

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Free will and determinism are compatible. But how can this be? Part of the answer rests (surely) on our understanding or misunderstanding of free will.

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Take the example of a small boy whose mother tells him big boys dont cry. One day he sees his father crying. He remembers what his mother told him. Why is his father crying? This makes no sense to him. His father is a big boy and, well, big boys dont cry. Maybe he misunderstood what his mother was trying to tell him. Big boys sometimes do cry. What he thought was incompatible turns out to be compatible.

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In the above example and the proceeding I am following Ted Sider who now teaches at Cornell. Take the concept of contact. Before high school physics its not unusual for someone to think that for two objects to make contact with one another, it is absolutely necessary that they touch one another, that there be no space between the two objects.

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From high school physics, however, we learn that as two objects approach one another, as the shoe of ones right foot, say, approaches a soccer ball, the electrons of the atoms in ones shoe and the atoms in the ball repel one another with electromagnetic force. The closer ball and shoe get, the greater the forces until the soccer ball comes to a complete stop and flies in the opposite direction.

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The ball and shoe, however, never touch each other in the sense that there is no space inbetween them. On a pre-high school understanding of contact a person could think the ball never (really) comes into contact with ones shoe since there is always some space between them. But we know, no? in the game of soccer players kick a ball around. Players shoes come into contact with soccer balls.

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To think there is no contact between ball and shoe is the result of a conceptual confusion about what it means for two things to make contact. Similarly, compatibilists believe libertarians and determinists are conceptually confused about the meaning of free will.

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Libertarians and determinists believe, compatibilists think, that for there to be a free action, the action has to be uncaused. Like the small boy who believes that no crying is part of the definition of what it means to be a big boy, compatibilists think libertarians and determinists are conceptually confused about free will. They believe uncaused is part of the definition of free will. Compatibilists think this is a mistake.

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As with the small boy and the concept of contact, determinists and libertarians think there is a conflict between determinism and free will because they misunderstand the idea of a free action.

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A free action is not uncaused.

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But if a free action is not uncaused, what is it? What does it mean? A free action is caused, as all actions are, but it is caused in the right sort of way. There are causes and causes.

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Having or not having a cause does not settle the question whether an action is free. What settles it is the kind of cause it has.
Again: if its caused in the right sort of way, then it is free. It is both caused and free. Freedom and determinism do not conflict.

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You are having dinner with friends and you find the person who is sitting next to you is annoying and you take your cup of coffee and pour it slowly onto their lap. Or someone is sitting next to you and the person to the other side of you bumps your arm as you are drinking coffee and the coffee spills onto the lap of the annoying person to your left. The first case was a free action: it was caused in the right sort of way. The second action was not a free action. It was caused in the wrong way.
Both actions, the first and the second were caused. But one was free, the other wasnt.

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Okay, there are causes and there are causes. How does this help? Whats the big idea? What exactly is going on here?

What does the compatibilist mean by caused in the right sort of way?

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How about this for a start?
A free action is an action that is caused by the persons desires and beliefs.

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But hold on; wait a minute. Imagine Being Hypnotized. Under hypnosis a psychotherapist induces you to wake up in the middle of the night and go out to all-night pizzeria for a pizza with all the toppings.

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You wake up that night, think to yourself, hmmm, Id love a pizza with all the toppings. Right about now I cannot think of anything I want more.

You get up, go out, and have a pizza: a pizza with all the toppings.
A free action? According to our first attempt at a definition it would seem so: a free action is one caused by the persons desires and beliefs. But it isnt, is it? It isnt free, no? Under hypnosis a person acquires desires and beliefs against their will, that are not own.

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How about this then? A free action is an action that is caused by the persons desires and beliefs, provided the person has freely chosen those desires and beliefs.

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Whats wrong with this? This works, no? Well, it may work, but it builds into the definition what our definition is supposed to define and that wont do. Its circular. Circular definitions are unacceptable. If they were aceptable, we could simply define free action as action that is free.

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How about this? A free action is an action that is caused by the persons desires and beliefs, provided that the person was not compelled by another person to have those desires and beliefs.

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But is an act that is compelled an act that is simply caused or is it usually also defined in terms of an act that is unfree When we say someone was compelled to do x, dont we also mean they were not free to do x?
The definition may still be circular. It may be less obviously circular, but it may be circular still.

So, too, not all compulsion is external. There is also inner compulsion. What are we to make of it? To make of that? Take kleptomania, for instance.

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A kleptomaniac cannot help herself. She has an inner compulsion to steal and yet guess what? she acts from her own desires and beliefs, so she, too, the kleptomaniac, acts freely under our current definition of free will. But she does not act under her own will, no? Her action is not a free action?

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What if we take out by another person? Will that help? A free action is an action that is caused by the persons desires and beliefs, provided that the person was not compelled to have those desires and beliefs.

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But now we are back to the problem, mentioned earlier, that by including compelled in our definition of free will, weve surreptitiously slipped in under the cover of our definition, the thing to be defined.

Our definition is circular even if in a more roundabout way.

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How about this?
A free action is an action that is caused by the persons desires and beliefs, provided that those desires and beliefs flow from who the person is.

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What does this mean? It seems to resolve both the hypnosis and the kleptomania cases. Your going out for pizza in the middle of the night did not flow from the person you are. Your going for pizza round midnight was not you because someone else planted, through hypnosis, the desire in your head. Your middle-ofthe-night craving for pizza did not flow from the person you are, but from the mind of the hypnotist who planted the desire in your head.

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The expression the person who you are can be further understood by making the distinction between first and second order desires. You can have a first order desire for a glass of wine before dinner, but at the same time have a second order desire to be the sort of person who wishes to cut back on drinking. By acting on your second order desire not to drink so much rather than your first order desire for a drink before dinner, you bring your action more into line with the person you conceive yourself as wishing to be.

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The kleptomaniac may have a second order desire to steal less and yet find herself in a Five and Dime store stuffing small packs of gum into her pockets. Her action does not flow from the person she conceives of herself as being, but from her immediate, first-order desire to grab some gum. Her second-order desire fails to get into the act. Her desire to be a person who doesnt steal has no effect on her first order desire to steal and so does not flow from the person she conceives of herself as being.

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So, our new definition seems to take care of the hypnosis and kleptomania cases, but its also true we often can and do act in ways that are atypical or uncharacteristic. We may suddenly raise our voice, say, even though we are known to be imperturbable and eventempered in stressful situations.

Friends may say: shes usually so composed. That wasnt like her, you know.
Was she (then) not responsible for her sudden outburst because it did not flow from who she is? Was her sudden outburst not a free action because it did not flow from the person she is usually seen to be and she generally conceives of herself as being?

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In answering the question in the PAPER TOPIC: "What would you and the world have to be like for it to be true that you could have had yoghurt instead of pizza?

. . . which of the following three positions is closest to your own?

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ONE We Do NOT Have Free Will. Determinism is True.

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TWO We Have Free Will. Determinism is Not True.

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THREE We Have Free Will and Determinism is True.
(Our Acts Are Determined But Are Often Free Despite This)

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Are you a hard determinist?
Do you believe persons have no free will?

Or a libertarian?
Do you believe persons have free will?

Or a compatibilist?
Do you believe there is no conflict between free will and determinism?

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It was suggested on the last page of the PAPER TOPIC, that you identify at least one of the readings that to your mind stood in strong opposition to your thesis or created the greatest difficulties for your point of view. So, too, it was suggested that you say a few words about how you thought the author would critique one or more of your claims and offer your best response. To help in this here (quickly) once again is the list of authors and titles with a short precis of the positions of each.

Roderick Chisholm
Human Freedom and the Self

We Have Free Will.

Peter van Inwagen

The Powers of Rational Beings

Free Will and Determinism

Are Incompatible

David Hume
Of Liberty and Necessity

Free Will and Determinism

Are Compatible

Richard Taylor
Freedom and Determinism

There is No Free Will.

Harry Frankfurt (1)

Alternate Possibilities & Moral Responsibility

If we use freedom in the fullblooded sense to include moral responsibility than freedom does NOT require the ability to do otherwise.

Harry Frankfurt (2)

Free Will and the Concept of the Person A Persons Action is Free If It is Caused by the Ones Desires and Beliefs, provided those Desires and Beliefs Flow from the Person, on Reflection and over Time, One Conceives Oneself To Be.

Thomas Nagel
Moral Luck

Cases of Moral Luck Suggest that Moral Responsibility May Not Be a Pre-Condition for Praise and Blame.

P. F. Strawson
Freedom and Resentment Our Reactive Attitudes such as regret and gratitude are deeply ingrained in us, in our institutions and practices, deeply natural and unshakable, impossible to dislodge by general metaphysical requirements and conditions.

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And finally, once again, to paraphrase what one, very good contemporary philosopher, J. R. Lucas, has said: "Philosophy has to be self-thought, if it is to be thought at all. It is an activity rather than a set of positions. You need to think out the problems and solutions for yourself, and although another person's philosophizing may help you in your own, you cannot accept their conclusions, or even understand their arguments, until you have already argued a lot with yourself.