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SYED ANUAR FAUAAD B. SYED MUHAMMAD, PhD Dept. of Bioprocess Engineering, Faculty of Chemical Engineering. N01-257 07 55 35484
Notes contributor: Mohd. Fadhil/Tn. Amran

Modern chemical plants use advanced and complex technology. Chemical plants are the safest of all manufacturing facilities. .BUT .

it has the potential for accident of CATASTROPIC proportions.

Jabatan Keselamatan dan Kesihatan Pekerja

Example of Major Disasters

Flixborough, England 1974

Failure of temporary bypass pipe connecting reactor 4 to reactor 6 (this occurred while the reactor 5 was undergoing repair) Resulting in the release of 40 tons of liquid cyclohexane Forming vapor clouds (100- 200 m diameter) that exploded, killing 28 people, injured 36. It was on Saturday, 1st June.

Seveso, Italy 1976

Reactor out of control, produced excessive side product of extremely toxic of dioxin (TCDD or agent orange) (2,3,7,8Tetrachlorodibenzodioxin) - the most toxic man-made chemicals used for manufacture herbicides.

2 kg of vapor TCDD released to atmosphere through relief system and heavy rain washed into soil.

250 people suffered from skin disorder (chloracne).

Bhopal, India 1984

Contaminated methyl isocynate (MIC) escaped when a valve in the plant's underground storage tank broke under pressure.
Vapor released through pressure relief system but the scrubber and flare systems failed to function. 25 tons of MIC vapor released. Toxic cloud spread nearby town with 900,000 population, poisoning/killing 2500 civilian, injured more than 20,000. No plant workers were injured or killed. No plant equipment was damaged. The owner was Union Carbide (American based company).


Flare systems

To Flare

kickback of mud/gas

Gulf of Mexico oil spill, April 20, 2011

Explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig - killed 11 workers and unleashed an unprecedented ecological emergency in the Gulf. More than 155 million gallons of crude seeped out, causing billions of dollars in cleanup costs and economic losses. Poor safety practices, a faulty cement seal and a rush to meet a deadline by BP and its subcontractors (Transocean and Halliburton) were key causes of the explosion and oil spill. Enhance safety and risk management throughout operations of BP. global

Nowadays.. .we have advanced safety technology/tools for the complex chemical processes.. So we need engineers with, Sound technical knowledge (fundamental and application) of process safety as well as experience in order to effectively apply the technology.

Safety used to mean: Strategy of accident prevention through the use of safety helmet, safety shoes and a variety of rules and regulation the emphasis was on workers safety.

Nowadays, safety is used synonymously with loss prevention - The prevention of accidents through the use of appropriate technologies, to identify the hazards of a chemical plant and eliminate them before an accident occurs (i.e. proactive)

Safety is also means freedom from unacceptable risk of harm. [see ISO/IEC Guide : International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)]

Term Accident Incident

Definition Undesired event giving rise to death, ill health, injury, damage or other loss Event that gave rise to an accident or had potential to lead to an accident (not all incidents propagate into accidents); as remainder for others!! (An incident where no ill health, injury, damage, or other loss occurs is referred to as near-miss) Source or situation (chemical or physical) with a potential to cause harm, injury or damage to either human, property or the environment or some combination of these. Mechanical hazards e.g. wet floor could cause tripping,


moving equipment that could cause collision etc.

Chemical hazards e.g. fuel leakage could cause fire, explosion, toxic fumes form hazardous chemical etc. Risk Combination of the likelihood (probability) of a specified hazardous event occurring and its consequences Overall process of estimating the magnitude of risk and deciding whether or not the risk is tolerable

Risk Assessment

To ensure safe design, installation, commission, and operation throughout the life of a plant. Need to identify all potential hazards or incident scenarios and to minimize all risks using loss prevention techniques such as: - inherent safety concept in design - hazard identification methods - technological advances using better design/control - proper maintenance etc.


Any potential hazards need to be identified as early as possible so that action can be taken to correct or ease/mitigate the situation.

Safety Program
A successful safety program needs ingredients such as, 1. System e.g. OSHMS (Occupational Safety & Health Management System), SHC (Safety Hire Scheme), SHO (Safety & Health Officer), Policy, Regulation (Act) etc. Attitude or awareness (example to do some of thankless work) Fundamentals (technical knowledge to design, construct, operate, maintain etc.) Experience (learn from past accident, experience of others and doomed to repeat it) Time: safety takes time (to train, to set up system, to do hazard identification,risk assessment, documentation and review etc.) You.everyone should participate/contribute in all levels, safety is equally important to production.

2. 3.




OSHMS (Occupational Safety & Health Management System) provides a framework/support to: (An example of comprehensive system)
Reduce disruption due to accidents, Reduce Workers-Company claims, Assist complying with regulatory/regulations requirements, Demonstrate due diligence/carefulness, shall your company ever need, Contribute to the morale and high level and esteem/respect, Assist promoting and maintaining organisation image, Expedite/speed-up the safe, successful induction/training of personnel, Assist in the induction of new personnel or cross functional training, Add requirements to contractors thus reducing hazardsrisks, Demonstrate conformance (obey the rules) to others such as stakeholders Demonstrate social responsibility.

AIChEs Code of Professional Ethics Fundamental principles Engineers shall uphold and advance the integrity, honor and dignity of engineering profession by : 12using knowledge & skill for enhancement of human welfare. honest and impartial/fair and serving with fidelity/reliability to public, employers, clients. 3striving to increase competence/fitness and prestige of engineering profession.

AIChEs Code of Professional Ethics

Fundamental canons/rules (for engineers)

Shall hold paramount/top safety, health and welfare of public in performance of their professional duties.

Shall perform services only in areas of their competence/fitness.

Shall issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner. Shall act in professional matters for each employer or client as faithful agents or trustees, shall avoid conflicts of interest. Shall build their professional reputations on merits of their services. Shall act in such manner as to uphold/support and enhance the honor, integrity and dignity of engineering profession. Shall continue their professional development throughout their careers and shall provide opportunities for professional development of those engineers under their supervision.

A Concept Question Two dams are identical in size and shape and the water levels at both are the same. One dam holds back a lake containing 2 million m3 of water while the other hold back a 4 million m3 lake. Which statement is correct concerning the average force on the dams?

Give your answer either : The dam with the larger lake has twice the average force on it. The dam with the smaller lake has twice the average force on it. The dam with the larger lake has a slightly larger average force on it or None of the above.

Accident and loss statistics are basis to measure the effectiveness of safety programs. Among statistical methods used to characterize accident and loss performance : 1. OSHA Incidence Rate (OSHA IR) 2. Fatal Accident Rate (FAR) 3. Fatality rate or deaths per person per year These methods report number of accidents and/or fatalities for fixed number of workers during specified period.

Here OSHA refers to, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, USA .i.e. similar to DOSH (Department of Occupational Safety and Health) in Malaysia

Some glossary/dictionary of terms used by OSHA (USA)

Occupational injury- Any injury such as cut, fracture, sprain/twist, amputation/elimination etc. as a result from work accident or from exposure involving single incident in the work environment. Occupational illness- Any abnormal condition, caused by exposure to environment factors associated with employment. It includes acute and chronic illnesses or diseases that may be caused by inhalation, absorption, ingestion, or direct contact. Lost workdays- Days which employee normally work but could not because of occupational injury or illness. This day does not include the day of injury.

Note: Table 1-2 (page 6) is given more definitions

More definitions
Occupational safety the protection of people/workers from physical injury. Occupational health the protection of the bodies and minds of people/workers from illness

1. OSHA Incidence Rate (OSHA IR)

Based on cases per 100 worker in 1 year.
50 work weeks 40 hrs 2000 hrs yr week

1 worker year =

100 worker years = 100x2000 = 200,000 hrs worker exposure to hazard

Two types of calculation OSHA IR(1) : Based on injuries and illness (including fatalities) OSHA IR(2) : Based on lost workdays

OSHA Incidence Rate (OSHA IR)


Number of injuries/illness/fatalities x 200000 OSHA IR(1) = Total hrs work by all employees during period covered Number of lost workdays x 200000 OSHA IR(2) = Total hrs work by all employees during period covered

Examples: 1) A company with 100 workers recorded 10 injuries in one year.

10 x 200000 OSHA IR(1)= 10 100 x 2000

No. of hours of 1 worker work in a year

We could say, OSHA IR as a number of injury (i.e 10) per 200000 working hours or exposed hours

Examples: 2) A company with 50 workers recorded 10 injuries in one year.


10 x 200000 20 50 x 2000

3) A company with 10 workers recorded 10 injuries in one year.

10 x 200000 OSHA IR(1)= 100 10 x 2000

4) A company with 50 workers recorded 10 injuries in 6 months .

10 x 200000 OSHA IR(1)= 40 50 x1000

Number of hrs per worker in half-year

2. Fatal Accident Rates (FAR)

FAR is used by British chemical industries. FAR data is widely available in open literature. Based on 1000 employees working for 50 years during their lifetime.
Number of hrs per worker in a year



1000 x 50 x 2000 = 108 working hrs or exposed hrs

Number of fatalities x 108 FAR = Total working hrs by all employees during period covered

We could say FAR as number of deaths per 108 working hrs or exposed hrs.

Example: FAR In Table1-3, FAR for construction industry is 5 for year 1990, This means that if 1000 workers begin employment in the industry, 5 of the workers will die as a result of their employment throughout all of their working lifetimes (i.e. 50 years). Check:

5 x108 5 x108 FAR= 5 8 1000 x 50 x 2000 10

No. of hours of 1 worker work in a year

Number of workers in 50 years or we could say that for every 50000 workers in the construction industry in year 1990, 5 of them died in work related accident.

More rock climbers are killed than traveling by car. Is this statement supported by statistics? From data (Table 1-4), Traveling by car, FAR=57, Rock climbing, FAR = 4000. (Table 1-3) Occupational accident, FAR = 1.2

Answer: Yes or No.?

Statistics say rock climbing produces more fatalities per exposed hrs. We need more data (i.e. exposed hrs) to actually calculate the number of fatalities. or we call as working hrs. of employee

Example: FAR A rock climbing club has 1000 members working in chemical industry, on average each member spend 3 hrs/day driving and 2 hrs/month climbing. In 10 years how many member will die due to rock climbing, road accident and occupational accident ?

Number of fatalities x 10 8 FAR= Total working hrs by all employees during period covered in this case, Number of fatalities x 10 8 FAR= Total exposed hrs by all members during 10 year period

ROCK CLIMBING Number of fatalities = Number of fatalities = FAR x(Total hrs climbing by all member in 10 years) 8 10 4000 x(1000x2x12x10) = 9.6 deaths 8 10

ROAD ACCIDENT Number of fatalities = Number of fatalities = FAR x(Total hrs on the road by all member in 10 years) 8 10 57 x(1000x3x365x10) = 6.2 deaths 8 10

ACCUPATIONAL ACCIDENT OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENT FAR Number of fatalities = x(Total hrs working by all member in 10 years) 8 10 1.2 Number of fatalities = x(1000x2000x10) = 0.24 deaths 8 10

The OSHA Incidence Rate (OSHA IR) and FAR accident statistics, in Table 1-3, showed a decrease for all selected industries for 1990 as compare to 1986.
Discuss why?

Although statistically shows that chemical industry is safe, why there is more concern about chemical plant safety? The concern regarding the industrys potential for many deaths, i.e Bhopal tragedy Actually, accident statistics do not include information on the total number of deaths from a single incident. Thus, the accident statistics can be somewhat misleading in this respect. For example: Chemical Plant A : employs 1 operator, explosion happened only 1 fatality. Chemical Plant B : employs 10 operator, explosion happened 10 fatality. In both cases the OSHA IR and FAR are the same. Chemical Plant B explosion killed more people, but corresponding to large number of exposed hours. For both Chemical Plants, the risk taken by an individual operator is the same.


Number of fatalities per year Fatality Rate = Total number of people in applicable population

Fatality Rate = (Exposed hrs per person per year) x FAR

Unit for Fatality Rate is deaths/person.year Fatality rate can be calculated/used if the number of working hrs or exposed hours is poorly defined/not known.
FAR can be converted to Fatality Rate (or vice versa) if number of exposed hours is known.

Example 1-1

A process has a reported FAR of 2. If an employee works 8 hr shift 300 days per year, compute the deaths per person per year (or Fatality Rate).

Fatality Rate = Exposed hrs/person/year x(FAR) 8 hr 300 day 2 deaths Fatality Rate = 4.8 x10 5 deaths person.year day. person yr 10 8 hr

OSHA incidence rate (OSHA IR) cannot be converted to FAR or Fatality Rate because it contains both injury & fatality information.

A Concept Question
The Wood and Iron have equal volumes. The wood floats while the iron sinks in water. Which has the greater buoyant force on it?

Give your answer, either: The Wood. The Iron or They have equal buoyant forces on them.

Risk Acceptance and ALARP (As low As Reasonably Practicable) Concept

Risk cannot be eliminated entirely. Every chemical process has a certain amount of risk. At some point in the design stage someone needs to decide if the risks are tolerable". One tolerability criteria in the UK is As Low As Reasonably Practicable" (ALARP) concept; formalized in 1974 by United Kingdom Health and Safety at Work Act. Tolerable risk is defined as the risk that has been reduced to a level that can be tolerated/endured/bared by the organization having regards to its legal obligations and its own OHS policy.

The Accident Pyramid

Lost prevention is includes: property damage + production lost.

Property damage is much more common than fatality as shown in Figure of Accident Pyramid (Fig.1-3).
No damage is refers to near misses incident give opportunity for a industry investigate the problem occurs correct before a more serious incident happens Approximate number of accident Fig.1-3 1 Death/Disabling injury


Minor Injury


Property Damage


No Damage (near misses)

Individual risk (IR) is the frequency at which an individual may be expected to sustain/tolerate a given level of harm from specified hazard. It has been suggested that IR ~ 2.2 x 10-5 x FAR. Occupational risk is a risk that may happen at the work place. Usually given in term of FAR. Societal/Shared risk is a frequencies of risk which specified numbers of people in a given population sustain a specified level of harm from specified hazards.

This framework is represented as a three-tier system as shown in figure (next slide) ALARP criteria. It consists of several elements : Intolerable level: Beyond the upper-bound on individual (and possibly, societal risk) risk levels. Tolerable (ALARP) region between (1) and (3), risk is undertaken only if benefit is desired after considering the cost on individual and group/societal risk reductions. Negligible risk (acceptable region): below the lower-bound on individual (and possibly, societal risk) risk levels. This level is not to issues warrant/permit regulatory.

Increasing in individual risks and societal concerns

INTO LERABLE LE VE L (Ri sk cann ot be ju sti fi e d on an y grou n d)

Region 3
TO LE RABLE on l y i f ri sk re du cti on i s i mprati cabl e or i f i ts cost i s grossl y di sproporti on ate to th e i mprove me n t gai ne d

THE ALARP RE GIO N (Ri sk i s un de rtak e n onl y i f be n e fi t i s de si re d)

Region 2

TO LE RABLE i f cost of re du cti on woul d e xce e d th e i mprove me nt gai n e d

BRO ADLY (No ne e d for ACC EPTABLE de tai l e d worki n g RE GIO N to de monstrate ALARP)


Region 1

Increasing in individual risks and societal concerns

Intolerable region: risk cannot be justified on any ground

Tolerable only if further risk reduction is impracticable or if its cost is clearly unequal / disproportionate to the improvement gained

Risk undertaken only if a benefit is desired Tolerable if cost of risk reduction exceed the improvement gained Broadly acceptable region of negligible risk: no need for detailed work to demonstrate ALARP

From one public survey, 28% say chemicals do more good than harm, 29% say more harm than good, 38% say same amount of good and harm. Some naturalists/natural scientists suggest eliminating chemical plant hazards by returning to nature e.g. to eliminate synthetic fibers production and use natural fibers such as cotton.. However, FAR for agriculture is actually higher than chemical industry. See Table 1-3 (page 8)

Accidents have direct, indirect and root causes:

Direct cause attribute to equipment failure or unsafe operating conditions Indirect cause not as readily apparent/obvious and can generally be tied to some human failure Root cause result of poor management safety policies, procedures or decisions Note: This causes do not include natural hazards such as flood and windstorm etc.


Table 1-6 : Three Type of Chemical Plant Accidents Patterns Type of accident Fire Probability of occurrence High Potential for fatalities Low Potential for economic loss Intermediate





Toxic release



Low (equipment) Other such as clean-up, legal etc. can be high


Figure 1-7: Causes of Losses (accidents) associated with 100 of the largest property damage losses in hydrocarbon-chemical industry: A thirty-year review

A c c i d e n t s

40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Mechanical 44 Operator error 22 Unknown 12 Process upsets 11 Natural hazards 5 Design 5 Sabotage & Arson 1

Note: Except for natural hazards, all of these causes can be traced back to human error.

Figure 1-8 Hardware associated with 100 of the largest property damage losses in hydrocarbon-chemical industry: A thirty-year review

30 25
of Accidents
Piping system 30 Unknown 23 Storage tank 19 Reactor piping 11 Process holding tank 6 HEXs 4 Valves 4 Process Towers 3 Compressors 2 pumps 2 Gauges 2

20 15 10 5 0

Figure 1-9 Loss distribution for onshore accidents for 5-year intervals over 30-year period
3 2.5 2
Total Loss 1.5 (billion US$)

1967-71(5 losses) 1972-76 (9 losses) 1977-81 (17 losses) 1982-86 (16 losses) 1987-91 (27 losses) 1992-96 (18 losses)

0.5 0
Note: OSHA legislation on Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals was introduced (in USA) in the year 1992

Current issues in the Chemical Process Industry (CPI)

In recent years, significant safety achievement have been made in the chemical process industry (CPI). However, accident is still keep on happening worldwide. One of the latest major accidents occurs at the jetty of Petronas Chemicals Methanol Sdn Bhd on July 26, 2012 involving an oil tanker which caught fire and exploded.

The accident rate in the CPI - USA

Note: CBS (Chemical Safety Board, USA)

The accident rate in the CPI - EU

The accident rate in the CPI Japan

The accident rate in the CPI - China

Problem Statement
The number of accidents in the CPI has not decreasing. The aim of this session is to answer why accidents are still happening in the CPI although many safety scholars mentioned that significant safety achievements have been made in recent years. The safety problems i.e. high accident rate, are related to the changes made in todays chemical plant operation.

The level of risk has increased

Produce new chemicals, operate at full plant capacity and build more and bigger chemical plants. Several new chemicals and its derivatives are introduced that bring special hazards. Severe/dangerous processing conditions are employed The complexity of the modern chemical plants has increased because of heat and material integration Complicated control systems These increase the likelihood of accidents - more risky operation .

Economic downturn and tight competition

In todays unstable world economy and tight competition, various actions are taken to remain competitive including major restructuring and cost cutting programs. These actions have negative impact on process safety due to limited resources, increased work load and less time to promote safe operation. Major restructuring may affect the safety knowledge within organizations due to workforce transfer and retrenchment/cutcost. The safety of the plant operation was seriously compromised.

Safety knowledge within organization

The organizations are losing their safety knowledge and experience due to cost-cutting activity. This issue has been linked to brain-drain and resilience/flexibility in safety issues . Resilience is the capability of process to maintain functioning in a safe state after a disturbance.

Resilience engineering involves the methods to keep up the resilience.

This is needed since the gradual changes in plant, organization and operating principles have tendency of slowly eroding/wear down the capability of resilience. As a result the probability of accidents is gradually increasing when the process is operated closer to safety limits.

Lack of learning from accidents

Poor learning from accidents. Lessons learned from earlier accidents were not fully utilized by the practitioners to prevent accidents. Most of the accidents are very similar to accidents that had happened before and could be avoided by using the knowledge currently available. Accidents with similar causes are recurring/returning within a fiveyear interval. 95% of accident causes are known, foreseeable/predictable and could be prevented by the existing technology.

Accident analysis and level of learning

The application/utilization of the lessons learned to prevent accidents is slow. This may be due to poor accident investigation, analysis and reporting. Only one third (1/3) of the accident cases studied are considered to provide lessons learned on a broader/bigger basis. Majority of accident analyses provide only very case specific information that difficult to apply in general. Accident analyses that provide new knowledge and understanding in accident prevention are still much lacking.

Level of learning from past accident

Implement and using accident prevention measures effectively



Analysis of accident cases to create general understanding


Accident reports with analyses

Accident description



Raw accident data

Poor dissemination/distribution of accident information

Poor implementation of experience feedback system. Current implementation of process learning cycle is not sufficient due to poor input quality, lack of analysis, poor dissemination and insufficient use of information.

The weakest link is related to dissemination of accident information. To disseminate accident information: physical means such as accident reports publicized in journals and books. electronic means such as online open source accident reports and databases. accident databases with good data retrieving/recovering system are preferred.

Chemical Plant Accident Cases

Plant Design/ Modification

Design/ Safety Tools

Learning from accidents based experience feedback cycle

Accident Databases

Data Mining Dissemination Knowledge & Learning Generation

Risk management approach

Another fundamental safety issue is about unbalanced safety management approach used for loss prevention (i.e severity does not match with dangerous process). Lately, much emphasis has been given to the outer layers of protection, especially the procedural and organizational means and occupational health & safety.

In 1950s and 1960s, the origin of loss prevention was based on technical and design aspects where several technical & design based safety methods were introduced in 1970's such as Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) and Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). However, in late 1970s and onwards, the approach for loss prevention shifted from technical aspects to a human & management oriented ones (Knegtering and Pasman, 2009). In this approach the safety performance is improved through a safety management system (SMS), which resembles/look-likes business management systems.

However, a human centered safety management system is difficult to

maintain. The management is often not aware of production related aspects because of their typical non-engineering background. They seem to lose or even lack focus on process safety and concentrate on daily business and organizational problems. They rely/depend on the site personnel to implement and monitor the SMS. SMS puts too little focus on technical process safety in operations e.g. in hazard detection and elimination. Currently, the trend is to emphasize/highlight safety culture. This shift on human & organizational direction in loss prevention reflects the thinking that the CPI assumes the plant is well designed, accepts the existing process hazards and asks humans to be more careful at the workplace. This cannot guarantee that the process hazards are under control.

Research in technical safety

More focus is given to manage process hazards by using the outer layers of protection. This shift in risk management approaches causes less research to be pursued/put in safety engineering. A limited number of new or extended versions of existing design/technical oriented safety methods have been published. Limit the continuous improvement of loss prevention from design & technical perspective.

Slow implementation of inherently safer plan

Inherent safety has been initiated about 35 years ago.
Clear potential and benefits to the process plant. However, little application in the chemical plant design and operation. Inherently safer strategy is often ignored by the process developers and designers due to its conceptual/intangible (i.e no clear picture on inherent safety design) It is believed that the process hazards are unavoidable and can be controlled effectively through existing add-on safety protection systems

Discussion and Recommendation

In the loss prevention approach accident prevention through inner layers of protection should be encouraged. Higher hierarchy of control such as inherently safer and passive engineered strategies should be considered first; followed by active engineered and procedural strategies. This should also apply to every new plant design project in the CPI.

Prevention through design (PtD)

Accident prevention through design (PtD) should be improved, since the contribution of design errors to accidents is significant. Serious safety consideration throughout process design lifecycle must be emphasized. This promotes early process changes that bring large cost, but for safety benefits.

Introduction to Chemical Plant Design Life Cycle

Process Safety Consideration

Chemical Plant Design

A project/task to determine the structure of a process to produce a product in the way that is economical, safe, and environmentally friendly.

A design project


Raw materials?
Process Structure

Desired Products

Survey/feasibility studies Project structure/planning (milestone) Design Safety, Health & Environment

Middle Distillates

Methanol Methane Ammonia Urea Formadehyde Ammonia Urea Ammonium Nitrate Ammonium Phosphate Polyvinyl Chloride

End Uses of Fractionated Raw Natural Gas

Chloralkali Plant Ethane Ethylene Oxide

Titanium Dioxide Silicones Polyethylene LDPE Glycol Surfactant Polypropylene




Acrylonitrile Caprolactam Terephthalic Acid Polystyrene

Benzene Butane

Unsaturated Esters ABS, SAN MTBE

Naphtha Utilisation For Petrochemicals (1/2)

EDC/VCM Polyvinyl Chloride


Acetic Acid Vinyl Acetate Polyvinyl Acetate

LLDPE/HDPE Ethylene O2 Ethylene Oxide Benzene Ethylbenzene Naphtha Cracker H2O Ethyl Alcohol Ethyl Aldehyde Styrene

H2 O

PTA Ethylene Glycol


Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET)


Acetic Acid

Polypropylene H2O Propylene Isopropanol O2 Acetone HCN Methyl Methacrylate


Benzene Isopropylbenz (Cumene)



Hydroperoxide (CHP)

Cleavage Phenol /


Naphtha Utilisation For Petrochemicals (2/2)


(By Products)
Mixed C4

n - Butane
Butene - 1 Butadiene H2

Acetic Acid

Polybutadiene (Synthetic Butadiene Rubber)


Nylon 6,6 Nylon 6 Polybutene MTBE (ABS) Nylon-6 Styrene Cyclohexanone EG Polyester Fiber Pure Terephthalic Acid (PTA)


Butene - 2


Naphtha Cracker Toluene C2 Benzene Pyrolysis Gasoline Mix-xylene Para - xylene Fuel Oil C3 Phenol Acetic Acid Ethylbenzene O2 Caprolactam Toluene Diisocyanate (TDI)

Fuel Gas

Plant Design Phases

1. Research 2. Process Development 3. Preliminary Engineering 4. Basic Engineering 5. Detailed Engineering 6. Fabrication, Construction & Installation 7. Start-up 8. Operation

Process Development
Target Development of process concept and scale-up to industrial scale. Main tasks and decisions - Idea generation and process creation/innovation. - Laboratory and simulation studies on reaction mechanism and kinetics. - Examination of raw materials (pure and industrial grade). - Laboratory & reaction calorimeter tests. - Process alternatives generation - Bench and pilot scale tests. - Market survey. - Legal and patent check. Main safety issues - Use of hazardous material as feedstock. - Fail to choose the safer state of feedstock. - Incorrect data on the reaction kinetic and reaction behavior. - Incorrect data on runaway reaction potential. - Overlook the chemical reactivity and incompatibility. - Underestimate the effect of impurity, by-product and contaminants. - Unclear mechanism to control the unwanted/runaway reaction. - Inaccurate scale-up.

Preliminary Engineering
Target Preliminary process design for the feasibility study. Main tasks and decisions - Process concept selection and flow sheet development. - Selection of unit operations. - Preliminary sizing of equipment. Main safety issues - Complicated and extreme routes selection (high temperature and pressure). - Unsuitable types of unit operations.

- Preliminary selection of construction material.

- Site selection.

- Unsafe operating conditions.

- Overlook the chemical reactivity and incompatibility at process - Final feed/product specifications. equipment level.

- Feasibility study.

- Lack of safety analysis on the chemical contaminations.

Basic Engineering
Target Creation of the process data for detailed engineering. Main tasks and decisions - Detailed process design and optimization. Main safety issues - Inappropriate layout, positioning and physical arrangement.

- Process design of equipment and - Incompatible heat transfer medium. piping system. - Incorrect heating/cooling sizing. - Basic automation and - Inadequate safety and process protection. instrumentation engineering. - Wrong or inaccurate process data for equipment - Preliminary layout design. - Unsuitable material of construction. - Utilities design. - Failing to consider corrosive environment. - Waste minimization. - Inappropriate mechanical/ physical and - Hazard and operability study. chemical resistance specification. - Incorrect material flow set-up. - Lack of safety analysis.

Detailed Engineering
Target Design of the physical process (equipment, piping etc.) for acquisitions and construction. Main tasks and decisions - Detailed piping design. - Detailed layout design. Main safety issues - Inappropriate piping layout and protection. - Inappropriate internal shape of equipment/component.

- Instrumentation and automation - Incorrect location and positioning of support/ design. attachment/ venting of process equipment. - Mechanical design of the equipment. - Inadequate electrical, mechanical and structural/ foundation specification.

- Structural and civil engineering. - Inadequate static, lightning and ignition sources control. - Electrical design. - Inadequate detection, automation and - Design of utilities/services. instrumentation. - Inadequate operating, start-up, shutdown and emergency manuals. - Wrong specification of buy item. - No back up for utilities failure.

Fabrication, Construction & Installation

Target Acquisitions, construction and installation of the process. Starting up the process and make it to meet the specification. Main tasks and decisions - Contracting and bidding. - Contractor selection. - Procurement. - Installation. - Inspection. - Testing. Main safety issues - Part or components miss-match. - Wrong installation or poor work quality.

- Incorrect positioning of sensor/ instruments.

- Accessibility. - Lack of monitoring and supervision of contractor. - Miscommunication between designer, contractors and plant owner.

- Field changes.

Target Safe operations within design specifications and capacity. Improvement of the process. Main tasks and decisions - Selection of safe operation and maintenance principles. - Gathering experience. Main safety issues - Poor planning. - Lack of safety analysis. - Lack of technical and reaction knowledge. - Poor safety culture. - Poor inspection and maintenance. - Poor management of change.

- Process optimization.
- Process improvement - Record keeping on plant histories and technological update.

The Good and The Bad in Plant Design Phase

Good project & good implementation


Good project & poor implementation Poor project & good implementation

Poor project & poor implementation




Basic design

Detailed design



Safety comes first !!! Two Important Elements
Human Factor We Need Good Safety Management Practice Safe Design Need to Incorporate Inherently Safe Design

This class will look at both issues.

A Concept Question
The Aluminum and the Lead have equal masses. Which has the greater buoyant force on it?

Give your answer, either: The Aluminum, The Lead, They both have the same buoyant force or Cant tell without knowing their volumes.