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Basic Causes the issue is more on management of resources. Officer watches should have been "doubled" for sections if not all of Baltic Sea transit. Navigating officer must go over each track again and check depths, dangers, wheel over positions, parallel index info, etc.
Basic Causes the issue is more on management of resources. Officer watches should have been "doubled" for sections if not all of Baltic Sea transit. Navigating officer must go over each track again and check depths, dangers, wheel over positions, parallel index info, etc.
Basic Causes the issue is more on management of resources. Officer watches should have been "doubled" for sections if not all of Baltic Sea transit. Navigating officer must go over each track again and check depths, dangers, wheel over positions, parallel index info, etc.
off Route T in Kattegat 15 Nov. 2002, 2020 hrs smt Vessel laden with 50,194 mt fuel oil OBO P Immediate Causes ➛ Course drawn over 10.8 mtr depth when vessel drawing 12.5 mtr. ➛ A line and arrow drawn to indicate 1 hour notice which obscured the 10.8 mtr depth. ➛ Passage Plan, not amended for bunkering RV alteration and course. ➛ C/O altered to new course and should have been rec- checked the new course on chart, before altering. He did not !! ➛ Failure of Bridge Team in that neither of the dk offcrs noticed the depths on and near the new course 299o. Immediate Causes
➛ 3/O unable to cope with position fixing and collision
avoidance functions after taking over watch at 2000 hrs. He had no time to check positions plotted as crossing vessel on starboard bow was causing concern. ➛ Master or C/O should have remained on the bridge considering above. Basic Causes ➛ It is not uncommon for a Master to do just what Capt. “G” did - draw the new course himself. The recommended practice is to have the 2/O lay down courses which the Master then checks. If the Master does this job himself it is much more likely that any error he makes will go undetected. Basic Causes ➛The issue is more on management of resources. Officer watches should have been “doubled” for sections if not all of Baltic Sea transit. This would have enhanced navigational safety, plus given Master rest. Watch Level Matrix
➛ All ships informed of the grounding and it’s cause, ie.
failure of passage plan and basics of navigation chart work - that after courses are drawn, the navigating officer must go over each track again and check depths, dangers, wheel over positions, parallel index info, etc. When vessel is navigating in narrows, dangerous or heavy traffic areas, the navigating officer must come on the bridge 10 minutes earlier to relieve the OOW, in order to check carefully all above before taking over the watch. Corrective Action ➛ The Passage Plan had sufficient information in it. However, the fact whether the OOW had time to refer to it, in this specific case with vessel in congested and shallow waters is questioned.
More information on dangers, tides, parallel indexing,
communication, traffic density, position fixing frequency, etc. is being encouraged to be written in clear sections of charts for immediate reference of the OOW.
All importantly, shallows on either side of courses to be
clearly marked off as “no-go areas” with 2B pencil. As guideline, shallows within half hour steaming either side of course line. Corrective Action Masters shud not hesitate to contact the company , should there be concern regarding navigational safety, be it fatigue of bridge team, “commercial” pressure , lack of experience of trading area, and so on.
In this serious accident 200 mt. of bottom steel
was renewed. Time lost was 39 days for repairs and a further 8 days until she regained deviation point. Cost of repairs USD 1 million !!!!