Overview and preview of capital structure effects Business versus financial risk The impact of debt on returns Capital structure theory Example: Choosing the optimal structure Setting the capital structure in practice
Basic Definitions
V = value of firm FCF = free cash flow WACC = weighted average cost of capital rs and rd are costs of stock and debt we and wd are percentages of the firm that are financed with stock and debt.
V =
t=1
FCFt
(1 + WACC)t
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Adding debt increase percent of firm financed with low-cost debt (wd) and decreases percent financed with high-cost equity (we) Net effect on WACC = uncertain.
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Probability
0 E(EBIT)
EBIT
Note that business risk focuses on operating income, so it ignores financing effects. Cal State East Bay
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What is operating leverage, and how does it affect a firms business risk?
Operating leverage is the change in EBIT caused by a change in quantity sold. The higher the proportion of fixed costs within a firms overall cost structure, the greater the operating leverage.
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Higher operating leverage leads to more business risk: small sales decline causes a larger EBIT decline.
Rev. $ TC
Rev.
EBIT } TC
F QBE
F
QBE Sales
Sales
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Higher operating leverage leads to higher expected EBIT and higher risk.
Probability
EBITL
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EBITH
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Financial risk:
Additional business risk concentrated on common stockholders when financial leverage is used. Depends on the amount of debt and preferred stock financing.
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Both firms have same operating leverage, business risk, and EBIT of $3,000. They differ only with respect to use of debt.
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Taxes paid:
U: $1,200; L: $720.
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Uncertainty
Now consider the fact that EBIT is not known with certainty. What is the impact of uncertainty on stockholder profitability and risk for Firm U and Firm L?
Continue d
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Firm U: Unleveraged
Bad 0.25 $2,000 0 $2,000 800 $1,200 Economy Avg. 0.50 $3,000 0 $3,000 1,200 $1,800 Good 0.25 $4,000 0 $4,000 1,600 $2,400
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Firm L: Leveraged
Bad 0.25 $2,000 1,200 $ 800 320 $ 480 Economy Avg. 0.50 $3,000 1,200 $1,800 720 $1,080 Good 0.25 $4,000 1,200 $2,800 1,120 $1,680
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Bad
10.0% 6.0% 6.0%
Avg.
15.0% 9.0% 9.0%
Good
20.0% 12.0% 12.0%
Firm L
BEP ROIC ROE
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10.0% 6.0% 4.8%
Avg.
15.0% 9.0% 10.8%
Good
20.0% 12.0% 16.8%
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Profitabilty Ratios
BEP (Basic earning power)=EBIT / Total assets ROIC (Return on invested capital) = NOPAT / Total Assets = EBIT (1-T) / Total assets ROE (Return on equity) = Net income / Equity
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Conclusions
Basic profitability ratios, earning power and ROIC are unaffected by financial leverage. L has much wider ROE swings because of fixed interest charges. Higher expected return is accompanied by higher risk.
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2.12% 2.12%
2.12% 4.24%
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In a stand-alone risk sense, Firm Ls stockholders see much more risk than Firm Us.
U and L: ROIC = 2.12%. U: ROE = 2.12%. L: ROE = 4.24%.
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With corporate taxes, the benefits of financial leverage exceed the risks: More EBIT goes to investors and less to taxes when leverage is used. MM show that: VL = VU + TD. If T=40%, then every dollar of debt adds 40 cents of extra value to firm.
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MM relationship between value and debt when corporate taxes are considered.
Value of Firm, V V L TD V U Debt
Under MM with corporate taxes, the firms value increases continuously as more and more debt is used.
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MM relationship between capital costs and leverage when corporate taxes are considered.
rs
0
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40
60
80
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]D.
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Tc = corporate tax rate. Td = personal tax rate on debt income. T = personal tax rate on stock income. s Cal State East Bay
]D
= VU + (1 - 0.75)D
= VU + 0.25D
Value rises with debt; each $1 increase in debt raises Ls value by $0.25.
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Trade-off Theory
MM theory ignores bankruptcy (financial distress) costs, which increase as more leverage is used. At low leverage levels, tax benefits outweigh bankruptcy costs. At high levels, bankruptcy costs outweigh tax benefits. An optimal capital structure exists that balances these costs and benefits.
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Signaling Theory
MM assumed that investors and managers have the same information. But, managers often have better information. Thus, they would:
Sell stock if stock is overvalued. Sell bonds if stock is undervalued.
Investors understand this, so view new stock sales as a negative signal. Implications for managers?
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Agency costs
A second agency problem is the potential for underinvestment.
Debt increases risk of financial distress. Therefore, managers may avoid risky projects even if they have positive NPVs.
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0%
20%
8.0%
30%
40%
8.5%
10.0%
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40% 50%
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0.67 1.00
1.400 1.600
14.40% 15.60%
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50
50%
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11.40%
$2,631,579
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0%
20% 30% 40% 50%
$0
$531,915 $817,439 $1,086,957 $1,315,789
$2,500,000
$2,127,660 $1,907,357 $1,630,435 $1,315,789
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Wealth of Shareholders
Value of the equity declines as more debt is issued, because debt is used to repurchase stock. But total wealth of shareholders is value of stock after the recap plus the cash received in repurchase, and this total goes up (It is equal to Corporate Value on earlier slide).
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0%
20%
$25.00
$26.60
0
20,000
100,000
80,000
30%
40% 50%
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$27.25
$27.17 $26.32
30,000
40,000 50,000
70,000
60,000 50,000
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Empirical Evidence
Tax benefits are important $1 debt adds about $0.10 to value.
Supports Miller model with personal taxes.
Bankruptcies are costly costs can be up to 10% to 20% of firm value. Firms dont make quick corrections when stock price changes cause their debt ratios to change doesnt support trade-off model.
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Empirical Evidence
(Continued)
After big stock price run ups, debt ratio falls, but firms tend to issue equity instead of debt.
Inconsistent with trade-off model. Inconsistent with pecking order. Consistent with windows of opportunity.
Many firms, especially those with growth options and asymmetric information problems, tend to maintain excess borrowing capacity.
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