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2008 Eaton Corporation. All rights reserved.

Aircraft Hydraulic System Design


Peter A. Stricker, PE
Product Sales Manager
Eaton Aerospace Hydraulic Systems Division
August 20, 2010
2
Purpose
Acquaint participants with hydraulic system
design principles for civil aircraft
Review examples of hydraulic system
architectures on common aircraft
3
Agenda
Introduction
Review of Aircraft Motion Controls
Uses for and sources of hydraulic power
Key hydraulic system design drivers
Safety standards for system design
Hydraulic design philosophies for conventional, more
electric and all electric architectures
Hydraulic System Interfaces
Sample aircraft hydraulic system block diagrams
Conclusions
4
Introduction
As airplanes grow in size, so
do the forces needed to move the
flight controls thus the need to
transmit larger amount of power
Ram Air
Turbine Pump
Hydraulic
Storage/Conditioning
Engine
Pump
Electric
Generator
Electric
Motorpump
Flight Control
Actuators
Air Turbine
Pump
Hydraulic system
transmits and controls
power from engine to
flight control actuators
2
Pilot inputs are
transmitted to remote
actuators and amplified
1
3
Pilot commands move
actuators with little effort
4
Hydraulic power is
generated mechanically,
electrically and
pneumatically
5
Pilot Inputs
5
Introduction
Aircrafts Maximum Take-Off Weight (MTOW) drives
aerodynamic forces that drive control surface size and loading
A380 1.25 million lb MTOW extensive use of hydraulics
Cessna 172 2500 lb MTOW no hydraulics all manual
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Controlling Aircraft Motion
Primary Flight Controls
Definition of Airplane Axes
1 Ailerons control roll
2 Elevators control pitch
3 Rudder controls yaw
1
3 2
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Controlling Aircraft Motion
Secondary Flight Controls
High Lift Devices:
Flaps (Trailing Edge), slats (LE Flaps)
increase area and camber of wing
permit low speed flight
Flight Spoilers / Speed Brakes: permit steeper
descent and augment ailerons at low speed
when deployed on only one wing
Ground Spoilers: Enhance deceleration on
ground (not deployed in flight)
Trim Controls:
Stabilizer (pitch), roll and rudder (yaw) trim to
balance controls for desired flight condition
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Example of Flight Controls (A320)
REF: A320 FLIGHT CREW OPERATING MANUAL
CHAPTER 1.27 - FLIGHT CONTROLS
PRIMARY
SECONDARY
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Why use Hydraulics?
Effective and efficient method of power amplification
Small control effort results in a large power output
Precise control of load rate, position and magnitude
Infinitely variable rotary or linear motion control
Adjustable limits / reversible direction / fast response
Ability to handle multiple loads simultaneously
Independently in parallel or sequenced in series
Smooth, vibration free power output
Little impact from load variation
Hydraulic fluid transmission medium
Removes heat generated by internal losses
Serves as lubricant to increase component life
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HYDR. MOTOR
TORQUE TUBE
GEARBOX
Typical Users of Hydraulic Power
Landing gear
Extension, retraction, locking, steering, braking
Primary flight controls
Rudder, elevator, aileron, active (multi-function)
spoiler
Secondary flight controls
high lift (flap / slat), horizontal stabilizer, spoiler, thrust
reverser
Utility systems
Cargo handling, doors, ramps, emergency electrical
power generation
Flap Drive Spoiler Actuator
Landing Gear
Nosewheel Steering
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Sources of Hydraulic Power
Ram Air Turbine
AC Electric Motorpump
Maintenance-free
Accumulator
Engine Driven Pump
Mechanical
Engine Driven Pump (EDP) - primary hydraulic power source,
mounted directly to engines on special gearbox pads
Power Transfer Unit mechanically transfers hydraulic
power between systems
Electrical
Pump attached to electric motors, either AC or DC
Generally used as backup or as auxiliary power
Electric driven powerpack used for powering actuation zones
Used for ground check-out or actuating doors when
engines are not running
Pneumatic
Bleed Air turbine driven pump used for backup power
Ram Air Turbine driven pump deployed when all engines
are inoperative and uses ram air to drive the pump
Accumulator provides high transient power by releasing
stored energy, also used for emergency and parking brake
Power Transfer Unit
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Key Hydraulic System Design Drivers
High Level certification requirement per aviation
regulations:
Maintain control of the aircraft under all normal and
anticipated failure conditions
Many system architectures* and design approaches
exist to meet this high level requirement aircraft
designer has to certify to airworthiness regulators by
analysis and test that his solution meets requirements

* Hydraulic System Architecture:
Arrangement and interconnection of hydraulic power sources
and consumers in a manner that meets requirements for
controllability of aircraft
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Considerations for Hydraulic System Design
to meet System Safety Requirements
Redundancy in case of failures must be
designed into system
Any and every component will fail during life of
aircraft
Manual control system requires less
redundancy
Fly-by-wire (FBW) requires more redundancy
Level of redundancy necessary evaluated per
methodology described in ARP4761
Safety Assessment Tools
Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis
computes failure rates and failure criticalities of
individual components and systems by
considering all failure modes
Fault Tree Analysis computes failure rates
and probabilities of various combinations of
failure modes
Markov Analysis computes failure rates and
criticality of various chains of events
Common Cause Analysis evaluates failures
that can impact multiple components and
systems
Principal failure modes considered
Single system or component failure
Multiple system or component failures occurring
simultaneously
Dormant failures of components or subsystems
that only operate in emergencies
Common mode failures single failures that
can impact multiple systems
Examples of failure cases to be considered
One engine shuts down during take-off need
to retract landing gear rapidly
Engine rotor bursts damage to and loss of
multiple hydraulic systems
Rejected take-off deploy thrust reversers,
spoilers and brakes rapidly
All engines fail in flight need to land safely
without main hydraulic and electric power
sources

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Civil Aircraft System Safety Standards
(Applies to all aircraft systems)
Failure
Criticality

Failure Characteristics
Probability of
Occurrence
Design
Standard
Minor
Normal, nuisance and/or possibly requiring
emergency procedures
Reasonably
probable
NA
Major
Reduction in safety margin, increased crew
workload, may result in some injuries
Remote
P 10
-5
Hazardous
Extreme reduction in safety margin, extended
crew workload, major damage to aircraft and
possible injury and deaths
Extremely remote
P 10
-7
Catastrophic
Loss of aircraft with multiple deaths Extremely
improbable
P 10
-9
Examples
Minor: Single hydraulic system fails
Major: Two (out of 3) hydraulic systems fail
Hazardous: All hydraulic sources fail, except RAT or APU (US1549 Hudson River A320 2009)
Catastrophic: All hydraulic systems fail (UA232 DC-10 Sioux City 1989)
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System Design Philosophy
Conventional Central System Architecture
Multiple independent centralized power
systems
Each engine drives dedicated pump(s),
augmented by independently powered
pumps electric, pneumatic
No fluid transfer between systems to
maintain integrity
System segregation
Route lines and locate components far
apart to prevent single rotor or tire burst
from impacting multiple systems
Multiple control channels for critical
functions
Each flight control needs multiple
independent actuators or control
surfaces
Fail-safe failure modes e.g., landing
gear can extend by gravity and be locked
down mechanically
LEFT ENG.
SYSTEM 1
SYSTEM 3 RIGHT ENG.
SYSTEM 2
EDP EDP
ROLL 1
PITCH 1
YAW 1
OTHERS
EMP
EMP RAT
PTU
ROLL 2
PITCH 2
YAW 2
OTHERS
EMP
ROLL 3
PITCH 3
YAW 3
LNDG GR
EMRG BRK
NORM BRK
NSWL STRG
ADP
EDP Engine Driven Pump
EMP Electric Motor Pump
ADP Air Driven Pump
PTU Power Transfer Unit
RAT Ram Air Turbine
Engine Bleed Air
OTHERS
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System Design Philosophy
More Electric Architecture
Two independent centralized power
systems + Zonal & Dedicated
Actuators
Each engine drives dedicated pump(s),
augmented by independently powered
pumps electric, pneumatic
No fluid transfer between systems to
maintain integrity
System segregation
Route lines and locate components far
apart to prevent single rotor or tire burst
to impact multiple systems
Third System replaced by one or more
local and dedicated electric systems
Tail zonal system for pitch, yaw
Aileron actuators for roll
Electric driven hydraulic powerpack for
emergency landing gear and brake
Examples: Airbus A380, Boeing 787
LEFT ENG.
SYSTEM 1
RIGHT ENG.
SYSTEM 2
EDP EDP
ROLL 1
PITCH 1
YAW 1
OTHERS
EMP
GEN1 RAT
ROLL 2
PITCH 2
YAW 2
OTHERS
EMP
ROLL 3
ZONAL
PITCH 3 YAW
3
NORM BRK
EMRG BRK LNDG GR
NW STRG
GEN2
EDP Engine Driven Pump
EMP Electric Motor Pump
GEN Electric Generator

RAT Ram Air Turbine Generator
Electric Channel
OTHERS
ELECTRICAL
ACTUATORS
LG / BRK
EMERG
POWER
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System Design Philosophy
All Electric Architecture
Holy Grail of aircraft power distribution .
Relies on future engine-core mounted electric generators
capable of high power / high power density generation,
running at engine speed typically 40,000 rpm
Electric power will replace all hydraulic and pneumatic power
for all flight controls, environmental controls, de-icing, etc.
Flight control actuators will like remain hydraulic, using
Electro-Hydrostatic Actuators (EHA) or local hydraulic
systems, consisting of
Miniature, electrically driven, integrated hydraulic power
generation system
Hydraulic actuator controlled by electrical input
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Fly-by-Wire (FBW) Systems
Fly-by-Wire
Pilot input read by computers
Computer provides input to electrohydraulic flight
control actuator
Control laws include
Enhanced logic to automate many functions
Artificial damping and stability
Flight Envelope Protection to prevent airframe from
exceeding structural limits
Multiple computers and actuators provide sufficient
redundancy no manual reversion
Conventional Mechanical
Pilot input mechanically connected to flight control
hydraulic servo-actuator by cables, linkages,
bellcranks, etc.
Servo-actuator follows pilot command with high
force output
Autopilot input mechanically summed
Manual reversion in case of loss of hydraulics or
autopilot malfunction


BOEING 757 AILERON SYSTEM
PILOT INPUTS
AUTOPILOT INPUTS
LEFT WING
RIGHT WING
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Principal System Interfaces
Design Considerations

Hydraulic System

Hydraulic power from EDP
Nacelle / Engine
Pad speed as a function of
flight regime idle to take-off
Landing Gear
Power on Demand
Flow under normal and all
emergency conditions
retract / extend / steer
Electric motors, Solenoids
Electrical System
Electrical power variations
under normal and all
emergency conditions
(MIL-STD-704)
Flight Controls
Power on Demand
Flow under normal and
all emergency conditions
priority flow when LG,
flaps are also
demanding flow
Avionics
Signals from pressure,
temperature, fluid quantity sensors
Signal to solenoids, electric motors
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1,000
10,000
100,000
1,000,000
10,000,000
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LARGE BIZ / REGIONAL JETS
SINGLE-AISLE
WIDEBODY
MID / SUPER MID-SIZE BIZ JETS /
COMMUTER TURBO-PROPS
VERY LIGHT / LIGHT JETS / TURBO-PROPS
GENERAL AVIATION
Aircraft Hydraulic Architectures
Comparative Aircraft Weights
Increasing Hydraulic System Complexity
21
Aircraft Hydraulic Architectures
Example Block Diagrams Learjet 40/45
MAIN SYSTEM EMERGENCY SYSTEM
MTOW: 21,750 lb
Flight Controls: Manual
Key Features
One main system fed by 2 EDPs
Emergency system fed by DC electric pump
Common partitioned reservoir (air/oil)
Selector valve allows flaps, landing gear, nosewheel
steering to operate from main or emergency system
All primary flight controls are manual
Safety / Redundancy
Engine-out take-off: One EDP has sufficient power
to retract gear
All Power-out: Manual flight controls; LG extends by
gravity with electric pump assist; emergency flap
extends by electric pump; Emergency brake energy
stored in accumulator for safe stopping
REF.: AIR5005A (SAE)
Mid-Size Jet
22
Aircraft Hydraulic Architectures
Example Block Diagrams Hawker 4000
MTOW: 39,500 lb
Flight Controls: Hydraulic with manual reversion
exc. Rudder, which is Fly-by-Wire (FBW)
Key Features
Two independent systems
Bi-directional PTU to transfer power between
systems without transferring fluid
Electrically powered hydraulic power-pack for
Emergency Rudder System (ERS)
Safety / Redundancy
All primary flight controls 2-channel; rudder has
additional backup powerpack; others manual
reversion
Engine-out take-off: PTU transfers power from
system #1 to #2 to retract LG
Rotorburst: Emergency Rudder System is located
outside burst area
All Power-out: ERS runs off battery; others manual;
LG extends by gravity
Super Mid Size
REF.: EATON C5-38A 04/2003
23
Aircraft Hydraulic Architectures
Example Block Diagrams Airbus A320/321
MTOW (A321): 206,000 lb
Flight Controls: Hydraulic FBW
Key Features
3 independent systems
2 main systems with EDP
1 main system also includes backup EMP &
hand pump for cargo door
3
rd
system has EMP and RAT pump
Bi-directional PTU to transfer power between
primary systems without transferring fluid
Safety / Redundancy
All primary flight controls have 3 independent
channels
Engine-out take-off: PTU transfers power from
Y to G system to retract LG
Rotorburst: Three systems sufficiently
segregated
All Power-out: RAT pump powers Blue; LG
extends by gravity
Single-Aisle
REF.: AIR5005 (SAE)
24
Aircraft Hydraulic Architectures
Example Block Diagrams Boeing 777
LEFT SYSTEM
Wide Body
RIGHT SYSTEM CENTER SYSTEM
MTOW (B777-300ER): 660,000 lb
Flight Controls: Hydraulic FBW
Key Features
3 independent systems
2 main systems with EDP + EMP each
3
rd
system with 2 EMPs, 2 engine bleed air-
driven (engine bleed air) pumps, + RAT pump
Safety / Redundancy
All primary flight controls have 3 independent
channels
Engine-out take-off: One air driven pump and
EMP available in system 3 to retract LG
Rotorburst: Three systems sufficiently
segregated
All Power-out: RAT pump powers center
system; LG extends by gravity
REF.: AIR5005 (SAE)
25
Aircraft Hydraulic Architectures
Example Block Diagrams Airbus A380
Wide Body
MTOW: 1,250,000 lb
Flight Controls: FBW (2H + 1E channel)
Key Features / Redundancies
Two independent hydraulic systems
+ one electric system (backup)
Primary hydraulic power supplied by 4
EDPs per system
All primary flight controls have 3 channels
2 hydraulic + 1 electric
4 engines provide sufficient redundancy
for engine-out cases
REF.: EATON C5-37A 06/2006
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Conclusions
Aircraft hydraulic systems are designed for
high levels of safety using multiple levels of
redundancy
Fly-by-wire systems require higher levels of
redundancy than manual systems to maintain
same levels of safety
System complexity increases with aircraft
weight
27
Suggested References
Federal Aviation Regulations
FAR Part 25: Airworthiness Standards for
Transport Category Airplanes
FAR Part 23: Airworthiness Standards for
Normal, Utility, Acrobatic, and Commuter
Category Airplanes
FAR Part 21: Certification Procedures For
Products And Parts
AC 25.1309-1A System Design and
Analysis Advisory Circular, 1998
Aerospace Recommended Practices (SAE)
ARP4761: Guidelines and Methods for
Conducting the Safety Assessment
Process on Civil Airborne Systems and
Equipment
ARP 4754: Certification Considerations for
Highly-Integrated or Complex Aircraft
Systems

Aerospace Information Reports (SAE)
AIR5005: Aerospace - Commercial Aircraft
Hydraulic Systems

Radio Technical Committee Association
(RTCA)
DO-178: Software Considerations in
Airborne Systems and Equipment
Certification (incl. Errata Issued 3-26-99)
DO-254: Design Assurance Guidance For
Airborne Electronic Hardware
Text
Moir & Seabridge: Aircraft Systems
Mechanical, Electrical and Avionics
Subsystems Integration 3
rd
Edition, Wiley
2008