The Nuclear Terrorist Threat to Russia

and the World -- What is to be Done?

Matthew Bunn, Harvard University

2nd Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference
September 19-20, 2003

http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/bcsia/atom
Terrorists and nuclear explosives
With HEU, gun-type
bomb -- as obliterated
Hiroshima -- very
plausibly within
capabilities of
sophisticated terrorist
group
Implosion bomb
(required for Pu) more
difficult, still
conceivable (especially if
they got help)
Hiroshima -- result of a gun-type bomb
Securing nuclear stockpiles --
a global problem
Thousands of tons of weapons-usable nuclear material exist
in hundreds of buildings in more than 40 countries
worldwide
Security ranges from excellent to appalling -- no binding
global standards in place
>130 operational research reactors fueled with HEU in ~ 40
countries -- most with modest security
Russia has worlds largest stocks, still in transition from
Soviet security system not designed for open society with
open borders -- rest of FSU has little experience, few
resources, for guarding nuclear materials
Issues around the world: e.g., Pakistan (high security but
very high threat -- outsider and insider)
Outsider threats
Large overt attack
e.g., Moscow theater, October 2002: ~ 40 heavily armed, well-
trained, suicidal terrorists, striking without warning
Multiple coordinated teams
e.g., 9/11/01 -- 4 teams, 4-5 participants each, well-trained, suicidal,
from group with access to heavy weapons and explosives, >1 year
intelligence collection and planning, striking without warning
Significant covert attack
e.g., Indian incident with thieves drilling through wall for sources
Use of unusual vehicles
e.g., helicopters used in many recent jail escapes
e.g., speedboat planned for use in $200M Millenium Dome theft
Insider threats
The desperate insider
Danger in Russia reduced with Russian economic stabilization (but
still frequent incidents of minor theft by soldiers and sailors)
The greedy/corrupt insider
e.g., recent arrest of Atomflot deputy director Tyulyakov
(corruption? radioactive theft?) -- countless other cases worldwide
The ideologically sympathetic insider
e.g., case of Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood in Pakistan
The blackmailed insider
Chechens, others have used tactic of kidnapping a child of an
official -- many other possibilities
Outsiders and insiders may work together
Summary: the nuclear terrorist threat

Do terrorists want nuclear weapons?
Clear Bin Laden statements, some Chechen interest
Is it conceivable terrorists could make a crude
bomb if they got the material?
Is there material that might be vulnerable to
theft and transfer to terrorists?
Is it likely that terrorists, if they had a crude
device, could smuggle it to Moscow,
Washington, or New York?
Yes No









Much has been accomplished
to reduce this threat
Russian unilateral steps to tighten security for nuclear
facilities -- especially since Chechen terrorist attacks, 9/11
U.S.-Russian cooperation has improved security for
hundreds of tons of potential bomb material, thousands of
nuclear warheads, at dozens of sites
Enough bomb material for thousands of nuclear weapons
has been permanently destroyed
Project Vinca (removal of HEU from Yugoslavia) showed
potential for U.S.-Russian cooperation to address insecure
stockpiles around the world
Hundreds of dedicated Russian and U.S. experts have made
major contribution to world security
But much remains to be done
138 MT
108 MT
354 MT
Comprehensive Upgrades
Rapid Upgrades
Cooperative Upgrades Not
Completed
MT=Metric Tons
Weapons-Usable Material MPC&A Upgrades
in Russia Expected by Oct. 1, 2003
Strong Presidential statements highlight
the danger of terrorists with WMD
Bush:
The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism
and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are
seeking weapons of mass destruction.History will judge harshly those
who saw this coming danger but failed to act.
-- National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 9/02
Putin:
We do not think that the major threats nowadays are presented by
ICBMsWe all know exactly how New York and Washington were
hitWas it ICBMs? What threat are we talking about? We are talking
about the use of mass destruction weapons terrorists may obtain
chemical weapons, biological weapons, and so on. Russia is convinced
that this is what should be given the most serious thought to.
-- Press conference, 1/01
Matching statements to actions
If they really see nuclear terrorism as a high-priority threat:
Why have disputes over access to sensitive sites, liability and tax
issues, slow contracting procedures, visa problems, and other
impediments been allowed to slow progress in securing nuclear
weapons and materials for years?
Why were security and accounting for nuclear stockpiles around the
world not identified as a priority of the Global Partnership?
Why has the Russian government consistently underfunded its own
nuclear security upgrade programs (e.g., $200M cost to meet
Russian physical protection regulations -- GAN 2002 report)?
Why has the Russian government only given the 12th GUMO the
resources to install a handful of the already-purchased site security
upgrade kits each year, leaving equipment in warehouses for years?
Why has the U.S. government decided not to help upgrade security
for Russian operational tactical warhead sites?
Key priorities if the Presidents agreed on
a high-priority cooperative program
Global cleanout -- fast-paced effort to remove nuclear
material from most vulnerable sites around the world
Accelerated, strengthened MPC&A cooperation
Fast-paced agreed deadline -- e.g., FSU upgrades done in 4 years
Focus also on sustainability -- security that will last, including after
international assistance ends
Security strong enough to meet post-9/11 threats
Requires Presidential decision to finally resolve access issue, sweep
aside other impediments to acceleration
Joint U.S.-Russian efforts to cooperate with other countries
-- e.g., Pakistan, India, China -- to improve nuclear security
Accelerated blend-down of HEU; securing and monitoring
most dangerous warheads; strengthened global standards;
expanded support for the IAEA
The challenge
If Presidents Bush and Putin really believed that nuclear
terrorism was an urgent threat, and that actions they could
take could substantially reduce it, many problems would be
solved -- how do we convince them?
If the two Presidents announced that they had agreed to
reduce this threat as much as possible as quickly as
possible, what specific actions would we recommend?

On the day after a nuclear terrorist attack, what would we
wish we had done to prevent it?
Why arent we doing it now?
2010: the vision
No nuclear terrorism has occurred, no nuclear weapons or
materials have fallen into the hands of terrorists or hostile
states
All nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material
worldwide are secure and accounted for, to stringent
international standards
All high-consequence nuclear facilities are secure from both
outsider and insider sabotage and attack
All large radiological sources are under effective control
Effective measures are in place to interdict nuclear
smuggling
There is sufficient transparency to give the international
community confidence these steps have been taken

2010: the danger
Multiple unrecovered thefts of weapons-usable nuclear
material have occurred
Weapons-usable nuclear materials in some countries around
the world remain dangerously insecure -- as do nuclear
power plants and spent fuel facilities in some countries
Substantial numbers of large radioactive sources remain
unaccounted for
Intelligence indicates that a thriving black market in nuclear
material exists, and that several terrorist groups, as well as
states such as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, have gained
access to enough weapons-usable material for a bomb
Nuclear terrorist attacks may have already occurred -- or
could occur at any time
For further reading


Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials
http://www.nti.org/cnwm

Letter Report from the Co-Chairs of the Joint Committee on
U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Non-Proliferation,
John P. Holdren and Nikolai P. Laverov
http://www4.nationalacademies.org/news.nsf/isbn/s02052003?Open
Document