David R. Valente
A crisis considered by many as the worst since the Great Depression, and the first at the scale of a globalized world, reached
in 2008 the world financial systems and the global economy. Two key consequences are likely to come out of this crisis: (1)
new regulatory systems; and (2) new stakeholder perceptions on managerial practice. We evaluate in this study the impact
that a business environmental change is likely to have in corporate growth strategies. We find that the debt cost, the firm
stock valuation, the investor ownership structure, the executive remuneration incentives and the shareholder risk aversion
are all factors that significantly impact the preference of firms to choose acquisitive growth. We find also through a survey
of 107 global top executives that the debt cost, the long term executive remuneration schemes and the shareholder risk
aversion are likely to increase in the “new normal” business environment. As a conclusion, we find that the movements in
these three indicators are significant to explain an expected long term increase in the preference for firms to choose high
organic growth strategies in detriment of acquisitions. The conclusions are likely to originate new benchmarks for financial
investors, so that the evaluation on public firms´s performance may be adjusted to a new set of indicators. Finding the
correct firm positioning in the start of a new business environment is key. We hope to provide in this study a fundamental
basis to support new benchmarks and managerial sight over the long term firm competitiveness and performance.
1. We are convinced that the recent wave of acquisitions in the last decade (e.g. mega-deals) is highly
influenced by the systems thinking behaviour that managers tend to adopt when working within the capital
market dynamics. We believe there are non-strategic factors with a strong impact on the willingness for
firms to acquire
2. Vast research finds that in average acquisitions deliver value only in 30 to 50% of the deals (see
Sudarsanam, 2003, ch. 4)
3. We are convinced that the global crisis may bring some structural changes in regulations, stock market
perceptions and others likely to reduce the incentives for managers to focus on quick short term growth
4. Based on the research assumptions, we believe the world post crisis environment will have less incentives
for extreme short term focus and that less but more value creating acquisitions may take place
“Companies that do not deliver in new forms of investments start slowly erasing its value… the value that a company
can create is intrinsically related to its capacity to tackle new projects in order to maintain or increase its revenues
sources, as well as to operate more efficiently (Canals, 2001) Companies that do not deliver in new forms of
investments start slowly erasing its value. Therefore, the value that a company can create is intrinsically related to its
capacity to tackle new projects in order to maintain or increase its revenues sources, as well as to operate more
efficiently (Canals, 2001)”
“Corporate growth is agreed to be the single most important driver of the stock price (Deans & Denneen, 2005; Meer,
2005)”
“Counting from as far as sixty six to seventy five percent of a company’s value (The Boston Consulting Group
research)”
If one wants to study the impact of the Financial Crisis in Corporate Strategic thinking, the
expected influence of it on the preferred firm growth models can be a very relevant proxy!
“Firms have been continuously focusing on short-term metrics, not taking a deeper approach to value creation. That is in fact
the strongest reason that led to the total collapse of the financial systems in the 2008 global financial crisis. But why do firms
keep forgetting about long-term value creation? We argue that the theory of resource dependence can have a strong explanatory
effect in clarifying how corporate value creation is targeted. Public firms act in different sets of systems, one of which is the
capital market system, making firms to be dependent on the dynamics of the market system for financial resources.”
“As Michael Porter (1992) stresses, the system includes shareholders, lenders, investment managers, corporate directors,
managers, and employees. He adds that all of them make choices in contexts determined by government regulation and
accepted management practices.”
“Public firms, by being dependent on “the system”, are faced with the duty of performing accordingly to their demands.
Different ownership structures, different preferred financing mechanisms, different target growth requests, and many others
can impact the way firms develop their corporate strategies.“
Firms are dependent on business environments for resources and particularly public firms are
dependent on the demands of the capital markets´ system in order to choose their strategies.
“Vast research finds that in average acquisitions deliver value only in 30 to 50% of the deals (see Sudarsanam, 2003, ch. 4).
At the same time, firms used in the last 10-15 years acquisitions as never before, many times with all but no clear
synergistic thinking.”
“Deans & Denneen (2005) argue that from a sample of value growers, 87% of their growth comes from internal activities.”
“The recent environmental storm [financial crisis] has proven the un-sustainability of the “system”, as well as of the players
that followed its incentives. Most of the survivors took a different path; they recognized the need to manage risk
management and to manage for the long term”
We believe the described variables can (in)directly affect preference for different growth strategies
Independent Resource
Dependent variable
variable Dependence
Cost of Debt
Cost of
Financial Crisis
capital Acquisitive
growth
Stock market valuation
Investor
Organic
risk awareness
Growth
As public firms are dependent on investors´resources, they have to adjust their strategies to
the adjusted set of factors that follows the 2008-09 financial crisis
INTERNAL AND
RI
LC
EXTERNAL
CIA
MARKET PRESSURES
AN
likely to increase
SHAREHOLDER
RISK Shareholder risk aversion likely to
PREFERENCES increase
1986 7,7 16,78 0,82 from EUROSTAT, IMF, OECD official sources.
1987 8,4 15,41 0,81
1988 8,9 12,20 0,81 The PER is the indicator of overvaluation of the S&P 500 index
1989 8,5 14,71 0,80 64,00
(Source: Bloomberg data services, 1980-2000).
1990 8,6 15,20 0,81 51,71
1991 7,9 21,83 0,81 78,44 The Investor Structure is calculated as the ratio of the
1992 7,0 24,04 0,78 63,7 72,65
private pension funds, the government pension funds and the
1993 5,9 23,53 0,74 108,5 57,30
1994 7,1 16,98 0,71 96,7 66,11 insurance firms to the total value of mutual funds´ holdings in
1995 6,6 17,42 0,69 94,1 70,10 the US equity market (Source: The Flow of Funds Accounts of
1996 6,4 20,70 0,64 145,2 67,58
the United States, 1980-2008)
1997 6,4 24,51 0,61 143,2 67,25
1998 5,3 32,15 0,60 26,0 69,82
The Executive Compensation Structure is the ratio of the
1999 5,6 32,57 0,56 38,7 59,54
2000 6,0 25,38 0,56 85,0 65,45
restricted stock options and long term incentives to the value of
2001 5,0 25,97 0,58 30,8 78,24 stock options, salary and bonus in the US (Source: Compustat
2002 4,6 19,12 0,61 28,2 81,53
database of the Wharton Research Data Services, 1992-2008)
2003 4,0 20,53 0,59 32,6 87,79
2004 4,3 17,92 0,57 23,9 78,43 The Investor Confidence (as to “risk aversion”) is studied
2005 4,3 18,28 0,56 19,8 77,52
2006 4,8 16,18 0,55 30,5 82,56
using the investor confidence index published (Source: State
2007 4,6 17,79 0,54 24,5 77,73 Street Investor confidence index, 1992-2008)
2008 3,7 13,81 0,54 10,1 80,60
* This is a study at a macro economic level. The lack of micro level data did not allow a firm level study
14-01-10 David R. Valente 10
In fact, we confirmed that all variables were significantly related to the acquisitive
activity, even when controlled by the S&P 500 growth and GDP growth variables
TARGETED SAMPLE
The pressures that firms face from external environments (e.g. capital markets) can be
confirmed as highly important in the definition of corporate growth strategies
The expected long term impact of the Crisis on the following variables:
There seems to be little doubt that the executive long term incentives, the shareholders
risk aversion and the cost of debt financing are likely to increase in the future
The expected long term impact of the crisis in the following variables:
Not clear whether the periods of stock overvaluation and the short term minded investor
structure are likely to decrease. Against what was expected, executives believe capital
market market short term pressures may increase in the future.
The impact of the crisis in the preference toward M&A growth (per factor):
The cost of debt, the shareholder´s risk aversion and the executive long term incentives illustrate
the lower expected preference of executives toward M&A growth in a long term post crisis period
The impact of the crisis in the preference toward M&A growth, per factor:
Confirmation that the cost of debt and the executive long term incentives seem to be responsible
to impact the decrease in preference towards acquisitive corporate growth strategies**
•Indexed to 50% (the level of acquisitive growth before the financial crisis)
14-01-10 ** The conclusions are proved in the writen document David R. Valente 18
In overall terms, executives expect an increase of 10% in the number of firms
highly focusing in organic growth strategies…
The long term impact of the crisis in the preference toward growth strategies:
We can see already an increase in the number of firms that are likely to increase their focus in
organic growth strategies.
“Before, large corporations tend to demonstrate growth through acquisitions, often to 'avoid' the need to re-think organic
growth challenges (sales approach, cost structures...). In the future, if executive incentives become more moderate, the
pressure for dramatic growth may be off, and there should be a renewed focus on the internal challenges and organic
growth (for the better of the corporate mission, I would say). That is also because M&A has too often been focused on
inflating growth - without tackling internal challenges first. I believe that this is due to the fact many top executives are
not "in there" for the long run, and have incentives to show short-medium term results. With more moderate incentives,
there should be more focus on long-term health, as corporate executives may stay on longer.” (Senior Executive, France,
IT)
“Higher financing costs will reduce the incentive to invest in acquisitive growth simply for the sake of achieving higher
top-line numbers. The impact of the economic crises will also increase the incentive to leverage organic growth via
strategic acquisitions.” (US, Head of M&A, Industrial Manufacturing)
“The FGC had made us look at our growth targets with more strategic intent. We have made considerable
changes to our business and revenue model, and we put a greater importance on executive time and the
types of relationships and partnerships they should form. Interesting for our industry (accounting) we are
exploring a new acquisition model to pay a premium over a three year period, by financing the acquisition
through an outsourcing fixed gross margin and debtors collection” (Senior Executive, US, FMCG)
•Preference for acquisitions in the long term, period of sustainable growth after the economy passes the crisis environment
14-01-10
and company valuations return to normal levels David R. Valente 21
In order to take advantage of such expectations, we developed 4 micro level
recommendations to help strategic change to become a reality
Although not new recommendations, we believe they make particular sense in the moment of change we are living in…
Ben
chm Acquisitive
Cost of debt ar king
indi growth
cato
rs
System
Compensation pressures on Accepted managerial practice Corporate
structure Growth Strategies
executive
decision-making
tors
dica
Investor risk tio n in
a
aversion m valu Organic
Fi r Growth
Firms who understand markets changing dynamics can be expected to move earlier out of the old highly
acquisitive and short term world and get into a new paradigm of managing for the long run…
•Controlled hazard takes into consideration that no strategic change can completely disrupt the capital markets thinking
14-01-10
due to the theory of financial resource dependence we exposed before for public firms. David R. Valente 23
Thank you for your interest in this study!
If you are interested in reading the full text version or in any other
information on the project, please contact me at the following address:
davidrvalente@gmail.com