Introduction
Business
of
intermediation
banking
is
business
of
As
banking
sophisticate
became
diverse,
complex,
Objectives
Examine how Indian banks have dealt with credit
risk over the last two decades
Evolution of regulatory framework
Analyse trends in asset quality of Indian banks
Evolution of NPA
regulation in India
1992
Prudential
norms
on
income
recognition,
asset
classification and provisioning introduced
Restructuring guidelines introduced
Assets, where the terms of the loan agreement
regarding interest and principal is renegotiated or
rescheduled after commencement of production to be
classified as sub-standard
2001
90 day norm for NPAs introduced (effective from March
31, 2004)
specified asset classification treatment of restructured
Regulatory norms were not further tightened during the good precrisis years
Average NPA
in %
GNPA
NNPAs
1997-2001
12.8
8.4
2001-2005
8.5
4.2
2005-2009
3.1
1.2
2009-2013
2.6
1.2
Mar 2013
3.4
1.7
Sep 2013
4.2
2.2
2001-2013
20012007
2007-2013
60,434
60,434
50,647
652,987
160,102
492,885
520,221
169,889
350,332
114,890
24,003
90,887
216,133
189,198
74,838
71,049
141,295
118,149
193,200
50,647
193,200
Slippages Trends
Slippages better metric to assess credit
management
Slippages & net slippages
Showed a declining trend in the early 2000s;
started rising since 2006-07
191.3
279.0
190.5
167.1
129.5
125.4
173.2
205.2
221.0
264.1
217.0
255.9
257.0
Average Slippage to
(Recovery + Upgradation) Ratio
PSB
OPB NPB
FB
Recovery as
% of
reduction in
NPAs
12.6
39.3
48.1
12.0
49.4
38.7
16.0
50.7
33.4
12.3
48.3
39.4
15.2
39.0
45.8
15.2
40.2
44.6
14.5
42.5
42.9
Upgradation as a
% of slippages
2001-13
17.6
2001-07
14.9
2007-13
18.4
Reduction as a %
of slippages
2001-13
2001-07
78.4
105.
3
2007-13
70.8
Write-Off and recovery from WriteoffsRecovery from written off Accounts during the FY ended
(Rs. crore)
Mar-01
Mar-02
Mar-03
Mar-04
Mar-05
Mar-06
Mar-07
Mar-08
Mar-09
Mar-10
Mar-11
Mar-12
Mar-13
All
Banks
424
501
479
1,065
1,768
2,902
2,480
3,101
3,686
4,362
5,036
5,191
6,960
PSBs
418
494
463
1,008
1,612
2,699
2,220
2,824
3,372
3,819
4,412
4,656
5,953
OPBs
26
45
84
132
173
217
207
231
201
200
NPBs
30
111
109
120
87
92
197
327
294
779
FBs
10
16
139
66
40
29
Mar-01
Mar-02
Mar-03
Mar-04
Mar-05
Mar-06
Mar-07
Mar-08
Mar-09
Mar-10
Mar-11
Mar-12
Mar-13
All
Banks
6,446
8,711
12,02
1
10,82
3
11,65
7
11,62
1
11,65
3
15,99
6
PSBs
5,555
6,428
9,448
13,55
9
11,30
8
8,048
8,799
9,189
8,019
6,966
25,01
9
11,18
5
23,89
6
17,79
4
20,89
2
15,55
1
32,21
8
27,01
3
OPBs
331
588
653
525
464
544
610
724
616
884
682
671
863
NPBs
580
896
1,564
1,286
1,682
1,409
1,232
1,577
5,063
6,712
2,336
3,024
3,487
20
798
356
440
628
905
590
1,334
3,350
6,238
3,083
1,646
855
FBs
Slippag All
e Ratio Banks PSB OPB NPB
1.8
Mar-07
1.8 1.8 2.0
1.7
Mar-08
1.7 1.4 2.1
2.2
Mar-09
1.8 1.9 3.0
FB
1.5
2.1
5.5
Mar-10
2.1
2.0
2.2
2.0
5.5
Mar-11
2.0
2.2
1.7
1.3
2.2
Mar-12
2.5
2.8
1.5
1.1
2.3
Mar-13
2.6
3.1
1.8
1.2
1.8
Average
slippage
ratio
PSB OPB NPB FB
2001-13
2.7 2.6
3.9 2.8
2001-07
3.2 3.3
5.7 2.4
2007-13
2.2 1.8
1.8 3.0
Slippage ratio = fresh accretion to
NPAs during the year to standard
Net
All
Slippag Banks
e Ratio
0.8
Mar-07
0.9
Mar-08
1.2
Mar-09
1.3
Mar-10
1.1
Mar-11
1.5
Mar-12
1.6
Mar-13
0.6
0.7
0.7
1.2
1.2
1.8
1.9
0.5
0.5
1.0
1.1
0.7
0.6
0.8
1.5
1.8
2.4
1.5
0.6
0.5
0.6
1.0
1.6
4.7
3.9
0.6
1.5
1.1
All
banks
5.1
5.4
2.9
5.4
5.9
PSB
5.2
5.6
3.2
6.5
7.1
OPB
5.2
4.0
2.7
2.8
3.4
NPB
3.9
4.0
1.5
1.9
1.8
FB
6.8
6.8
2.3
2.3
1.8
Summing up
Standards of credit and recovery administration is
inefficient and poor as is reflected from the fact that
upgradation as a % of slippage is very low only less
than 20 % of accounts have been upgraded
Recoveries are very less- A major part of reduction is
through write-off
Even during 2001-07, recoveries and upgradation
were not as good-things have considerably
deteriorated thereafter
Gross NPA in itself not a problem but in
conjunction with restructured advances they
have emerged as a major issue
Restructured Accounts
Growth in restructured accounts
Trends
mixed trend in early 2000s
Ma
Ma
Mar- r- Mar Mar r09
10 -11 -12 13
2.4
5.1
2.5
6.7
2.3
5.8
2.9
7.6
3.4
9.2
Rest.
Std. Adv) MarMar-10 Mar-11 Mar-12 Mar-13
09
to Total
Adv.
PSBs
5.1
7.3
6.6
8.9
11.1
OPBs
5.7
5.9
4.9
5.3
5.9
NPBs
5.5
4.8
3.2
3.2
3.1
FBs
5.0
4.7
2.7
2.8
3.1
PSB
6.8
8.8
8.1
10.0
12.1
OPB
6.8
7.3
6.1
6.3
6.8
NPB
6.6
7.3
5.5
5.4
5.3
FB
6.5
9.5
7.2
6.6
6.4
Summing up..
Only less then 10% of the total amount written off (including the
Technical Write-off ) is recovered
Technical write off creates moral hazard and creates a dent in overall
recovery efforts
Banks should be given the freedom to decide whether the cases involve
restructuring
- where only the technical covenants of the loan or the date of
commencement of commercial production might have changed and the
banks are convinced that the pay-offs from asset created will be
sufficient to repay the loan
- Cases where the reduction does not bring down the lending rate below
base rate should not be considered as concession
I
24
Mar-09
Mar10
Mar-11
Mar-12
Mar-13
Micro+Small
10.7
10.6
9.4
9.7
10.6
Medium+La
rge
7.8
9.4
8.0
11.2
14.8
Infrastructure
projects
strain on banks
regulatory, administrative
and legal constraints
Banks took inadequate
cognizance of the need for
contingency planning for
large projects in their
appraisal
absence or insufficiency of
user charges
In %
Mining
Iron and
Steel
Textiles
Infrastructur
e
Real Estate
Mar-09 Mar-13
4.0
8.2
9.3
16.9
16.7
21.3
5.0
18.0
2.5
2.0
Micro+Small
*
Medium+La
rge
Micro+Small
Medium+La
rge
Mar-09
Mar10
Mar11
Mar12
Mar13
10.1
11.4
12.0
10.8
10.7
39.9
42.9
45.0
46.8
48.4
16.1
20.4
21.1
17.5
17.2
23.8
28.7
27.5
37.7
48.8
4.3
3.4
Micro+Small
12.2
7.7
7.7
Share
* The datain
for Medium & Large and Micro & Small pertains to Industries and services sectors.
total bank
Priority
sector
Non Priority
sector
Credit
monitoring
neglected
was
Legal
infrastructure
recovery
remained
supportive
for
non-
PSB
OPB
NPB
FB
Increasing
incidence
of
frauds,
especially
large
value frauds in recent years
Over 64 % of fraud cases
are advances related over
70% in case of large value
frauds (over Rs. 50 crore)
Poor appraisal and absence
of equity has led to larger
no. of advance related
frauds especially through
diversion
Moral hazard associated
with identifying business
failures as frauds
Lacunae in credit
appraisal not identified
Fixation of Staff
accountability a casualty
2010-11
2011-12
Bank
Amt
Grou No.
No.
(in cr.)
p
PSBs 201 1820
2012-13
Amt
(in
cr.)
Cumulative
(end Mar13)
Amt
No.
(in
cr.)
No.
Amt
(in cr.)
OPB
20
289
14
63
12
49
149
767
NPB
18
234
12
75
24
67
363
1068
33
19
83
16
456
277
FB
Gran
d
242 2376
Total
Sample of 10 large corporate groups - credit more than doubled between 2007 and
2013 even while overall debt rose 6 times
Sectors
Iron and
Steel
Infrastructur
e
Power
Telecom
Aggregate
CAGR
of
credit
20092012
Impaired
Assets
ratio
(March
2013)
25
17
33
41
28
18
18
16
Summing up..
High credit growth in select sectors has led to decline
in credit quality in subsequent periods
High incidence of advance related frauds are an
outcome of deficient credit appraisal standards
Level of Leverage of corporate borrowers, credit
growth, diversion of funds, sub standard assets and
fraud cases are highly correlated. They are first order
derivative of improper credit and recovery
management
PSBs
Foreign
Banks
NNP
NNP
NNP
NNP
NNP
GNPA
GNPA
GNPA
GNPA
A
A
A
A
A
Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
Mar 94
1.46 -0.65
Mar-95
15.31 10.46 17.12 11.98 7.35 4.12 2.21 0.93 1.62 -0.91
Mar-97
14.33 9.50 16.44 11.15 8.29 4.66 2.92 2.51 3.57 1.02
Mar-99
13.34 8.99 14.63 10.17 13.02 7.82 4.55 3.52 5.00 0.86
Mar-01
11.14 6.28 11.99 6.97 11.86 6.71 5.40 3.21 6.69 1.72
Mar-03
8.81 4.42 9.36 4.54 8.86 5.41 7.50 4.67 5.34 1.76
Mar-05
4.94 1.96 5.38 2.07 5.97 2.72 2.93 1.53 3.01 0.87
Core
CRAR
GNPA
Ratio
Losses as
% of
Capital
Baseline
13.4
9.7
4.0
11.5
8.0
5.9
15.4
10.6
7.0
7.9
23.2
9.6
6.0
9.9
31.0
30% of restructured
advances turn into NPAs
(Sub-Standard)
12.1
8.6
5.7
10.4
30% of restructured
advances written off (Loss)
11.2
7.6
5.7
18.2
June 2013
Mar 2009
Mar 2010
Mar 2011
Mar 2012
Mar 2013
38.47
29.61
34.29
30.00
27.71
OPBs
33.16
35.40
41.58
33.31
31.11
NPBs
38.91
42.64
63.25
55.52
53.73
FBs
51.58
57.73
81.75
83.44
74.04
All Banks
34.80
30.78
36.25
33.00
30.25
PSBs
Stressed Assets Provision Coverage Ratio defined as {(Total Provisions (excl. Provision for std adv) + Tech
W/Os) to (GNPAs + Rest Std Adv + Tech W/Os)}
Recommendations and
Way ahead
Long run
Robust risk management
Improved information system
Facilitating granular analysis of trends in asset quality
Comprehensive MIS
viability assessment
Enforce accountability
Regulatory framework
Need to review the existing regulatory arrangements for
asset classification and provisioning
Facilitative and practical regulation
Restructured accounts to be classified as NPA aligning
domestic norms with global best practices
The practice of technical write offs of NPAs to be
dispensed with
Increased provisioning requirements in line with
international norms and to ensure resilience of the
banking system
Uniform approach to regulation either principle or rule based
For stability in credit risk management practices
To eliminate ad-hoc implementation processes
Debt Recovery
provisions
Tribunals
(DRTs)
&
other
legal
Concluding
Thoughts
Measures .(1)
Credit Appraisal needs to be strengthened with focus on:
Quantum of equity brought in by the promoters
Sources of Equity
Contingency Planning in respect of infrastructure
projects
Improve appraisal and approval process for
restructuring proposals
Benefits of restructuring to be also extended to
smaller borrowers
CDR Mechanism grossly misutilised and needs a
thorough overhaul
Need for an oversight structure for dealing with
restructuring of large ticket advances
Independent body to oversee CDR mechanism
Measures ..(2)
Restructuring and Technical Write-off as a prudential
measure should be eased out by the regulator
Existing NPAs need careful examination for determining
rehabilitation or recovery
Conduct viability study
Quick rehabilitation with support from both the bank
and the borrower
Those who put spoke needs to be sufficiently disincentivized
Bring new promoter if the existing promoter unable to
bring new equity
Restructuring decision should be left to the bank
Thank you