The Occurrence of

Mediation
Levent Tansu Turkmenoglu
29.12.2014
IR 503-Theories of IR

Outline
The relevance of international peace mediation
Defining mediation
The debate on the occurrence of mediation:

Why and when would disputants want to engage in a

mediation process?

Calling the stalemate concept into question

Conclusion
References

The Relevance of International Peace Mediation

In 2004, the UN Secretary Generals High-level Panel

on Threats, Challenges and Change recognized the
positive contribution of mediation.1

It takes note that the demand for the good offices of

the UN and mediation has skyrocketed. With a view
to strengthening its mediation capacity, the UN
established the Mediation Support Unit of its
Department of Political Affairs.2

United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.

2 See United Nations Fact Sheet: Strengthening the Department of Political
Affairs Strengthening the UNs capacity to step in- to resolve conflicts earlier
rather than later is among the smartest investments we can make,
Secretary-General Ban Kimoon address to the Fifth Committee on the 20082009 Budget, 25 October 2007, see
<http://http.www.un.org/Depts/dpa/peace.html>.
1

The Relevance of International Peace

Mediation
Four years later, on the 23rd of September 2008,
the Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon requested that
the Security Council and UN member states invest
further in mediation activities applied in different
conflict scenarios and contexts, and insisted on
the need to coordinate and harmonize them. 3

Intervention of Ban Ki-moon, United Nations, Security Council,

5979th meeting,
Tuesday, 23 September 2008, New York.
3

The Relevance of International Peace

Mediation
The 2009 Report of the Secretary General on Enhancing
Mediation and Its Support Activities acknowledges that ...
the practice of mediation has received remarkably little
attention or support. Instead, our efforts have been
concentrated on the more costly tasks of dealing with the
shattered remnants of devastated lives, communities and
institutions of state, while the daunting challenge of
reconstruction has absorbed resources that could have
gone into early conflict resolution.4

Report of the Secretary General on Enhancing Mediation and Its Support

Activities (S/2009/189).
4

The Relevance of International Peace

Mediation
The same report recognizes mediation as a professional tool for
conflict resolution, emphasizes that the practice of mediation
requires specific skill sets and expertise, and signals to the
international community that acquiring and applying these
techniques require substantial efforts, both in financial terms but
also in terms of systematized learning as to its practice.
Initiated by Finland and Turkey, which have created a UN Group
of Friends of Mediation, a UN General Assembly Conclusion in
June 2011 stressed the continued need for resources, capacity
building, and the professional practice of mediation. 5
United Nations: General Assembly 65th session, Strengthening the role of mediation in
the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention and resolution, A/65/L79.
5

Defining Mediation
The Concept of Mediation:
Although mediation can be practiced in many different ways,
the meaning of the term mediation is fairly uncontroversial.
By definition, it is a process of conflict management where
disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help
from, an individual, group, state, or organization to settle their
conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to
physical force or invoking the authority of the law. 6
Bercovitch, Jacob, J. Theodore Anagnoson, and Donnette L. Wille. (1991) Some Conceptual
Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in
International Relations.
Journal of Peace Research 28 (1): 717.
6

Defining Mediation
Dispute Resolution - Spectrum

Litigation

Arbitration

Mediation

Negotiation

Defining Mediation

But when does it take place, and

when does it not?

Defining Mediation
Not only may a deeper understanding of
how disputants get to the table be useful
knowledge for practitioners (Greig and Diehl
2006)7,
but also if we are to correctly estimate the
efficiency of mediation, its usefulness and ability
to save lives and spare suffering, it is essential
that we know which conflicts are mediated and
which are not (Beardsley and Greig 2009)8

Greig, J. Michael , and Paul F. Diehl. (2006) Softening Up: Making

Conflicts More Amenable to Diplomacy. International Interactions 32
(4): 355384.
7

Beardsley ,Kyle C., and J. Michael Greig. (2009) Disaggregating the

Incentives of Conflict Management: An Introduction. International
8

The Debate on the Occurrence of

Mediation
Disputant Incentives & Rational
Choice Theory
(The Occurrence of
Mediation)

The Debate on the Occurrence of

Mediation
What determines whether or not the disputants
will seek assistance from a third party to settle
their differences? Or, for that matter, accept an
offering of mediation in the case where the
intermediary takes the initiative?
And in what situations would a third party offer
their services for conflict management or agree
to help out, should the disputants request its
presence?

The Debate on the Occurrence of

Mediation
Rational Choice Theory in the making of disputant incentives:
Majority of students seems to lean toward interest-based rational choice theory to
explain disputant motives in the occurrence of mediation.
(see Figure 1)
If one believes that interest-based rationalistic calculations always are at the heart of
political interaction, then interestsnot favorable circumstancesshould be the primary
suspects.
While most studies on the peaceful settlement of disputes focus on the substance of the
negotiations, the timing of the negations is also key. Parties resolve their conflict only
when they are ready to do so -- when alternative, usually unilateral, means of achieving a
satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and
costly predicament. At that "ripe" moment, they seek or are amenable to proposals that
offer "a way out. 9
Zartman, I. William (2003). Ripeness.

The Debate on the Occurrence of

Mediation
Rational Choice Theory in the making of
disputant incentives (contd):

The concept of a ripe moment centers on the parties' perception of a

mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) - a situation in which neither side can
win, yet continuing the conflict will be very harmful to each (although not
necessarily in equal degree nor for the same reasons). Also contributing to
"ripeness" is an impending, past, or recently avoided catastrophe.10

So, conflict becomes ripe for resolution when the parties realize that the
status quo - no negotiation- is a lose-losesituation (because they cannot
win), not a zero-sum (win-lose) situation. Thus to avoid the mutual loss,
they must consider negotiation.

According to Touval and Zartman (1985), when disputants are in a period

of intense conflict, they are particularly hostile and less willing to direct
talks between one another. Mediation is thus favored over bilateral
negotiations, perhaps because concessions may be politically particularly
sensitive at such a time, and politicians who would like to see a peaceful
settlement may feel the need of a face saver between them and their
domestic populations. 11

Touval,Saadia,and I. William Zartman. (1985) Introduction: Mediation in Theory.

In International
Mediation in Theory and Practice, edited by Saadia Touval and I.
10 11

The Debate on the Occurrence of

Mediation

The Debate on the Occurrence of

Mediation
Rational Choice Theory in the making of
disputant incentives (contd):

Greig (2005) argues that [b]y studying all enduring rivalries

from 1946 to 1992 over time, he finds that a conflict is five and
a half times as likely to experience mediation in a month
during which a militarized dispute is ongoing, as compared to a
month in which there is no such dispute.12

Greig and Diehl (2006),likewise, find that an ongoing

militarized dispute makes disputants two and a half times more
likely to participate in mediation. A full-scale war has an even
stronger effect, making mediation seven times as likely.13

Greig, J. Michael. (2005) Stepping into the Fray: When Do Mediators

Mediate? American
Journal of Political Science 49 (2): 249266.
12

13Greig, J. Michael , and Paul F. Diehl. (2006) Softening Up: Making

Conflicts More
Amenable to Diplomacy. International Interactions 32 (4):

Calling the Stalemate Concept into

Question
Critique of Rational Choice Theory in the making of
disputant incentives:
Although mediation is more likely in periods of high conflict costs, it
is rarely initiated by the disputants (just as rising costs do not have
a significant effect on the occurrence of bilateral negotiations).
Instead, by digging deeper, Greig and Diehl (2006) find that what
makes mediation incidence more probable in such periods is
initiatives by third parties.
This, then, seems to suggest that costs, as experienced by the
rivaling parties, do not produce mediation.14
14

Hellman, Johan. (2012) International Studies Review, Vo. 14, pp. 591603

Calling the Stalemate Concept into

Question
Critique of Rational Choice Theory in the making of disputant
incentives (contd):
For instance, Touval (2003) takes note of this when he discusses the European
intervention in the war in Bosnia (in the 1990s): The timing of the European
mediators intervention was determined not by their estimation of the
ripeness of the conflict, but by the mediators own domestic and foreign
policy concerns.
Similarly, he also claims that US mediation between Egypt and Israel had the
primary objective of diminishing Soviet presence and influence in the region
and was thus not initiated because of favorable conditions. (Touval, 2003)

Calling the Stalemate Concept into

Question
Critique of Rational Choice Theory in the making
of disputant incentives (contd):
Greig and Diehl (2006) make another interesting discovery,
which they label the promise of diplomacy. Disputes that
earlier have experienced negotiation or mediation, either
successful or unsuccessful, are more likely to be mediated
again.
Moreover, Beardsley claims mediation is also more probable
in disputes where the argument concerns more than one
issue, which should positively influence the potential for
concessions through the possibility of trade-offs (2010).

Conclusion
Keeping these in mind;
In general, studies in the international mediation research
rely heavily on rational choice theory, and thus, the
teachings of realism (or are at the very least clearly
influenced by its emphasis on Realpolitik)
In a way, it may be viewed as natural that a research
program that specializes in conflict should be heavily
influenced by realism.
Conflict, and the constant presence of the threat of it, is,
after all, realisms domain par excellence.

Conclusion
However;
A widening of the horizons and experimenting with
different theoretical foundations may benefit the
mediation research program and promote a deeper
understanding of how and when mediation occurs.
Both liberalism, which is already present(rarely), and
constructivism may very well be able to provide new
insights.
It is, for instance, widely acknowledged that third parties
may alter the costs of conflict and benefits of settlement.
(Touval and Zartman 1985)

Conclusion
Therefore;

Admittedly, sometimes they probably do so in ways that can

rightfully be incorporated into models based on realist theory. (for
instance, by threats of military retributions and sanctions)

But, sometimes, external factors such as expectations (by other

states) and conventional norms( e.g. culture) may just as well be
the motivation behind a particular choice of action, factors that
belong in a constructivist approach. (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998;
March and Olsen 1998)

Widespread norms are a part of the globalized world we live in

today, and there is ample evidence that they do in fact affect the
way in which states interact (Mitchell 2002).

It seems plausible that solving differences in a non-violent

manner is such a norm, and it seems likely that it is such a strong
one that it could influence the decision making of disputants in a
conflict, considering the recent incline in mediation efforts by
International Organizations and NGOs.

References
Beardsley ,Kyle C., and J. Michael Greg. (2009) Disaggregating the
Incentives of Conflict Management: An Introduction. International
Interactions35 (3): 243248.
Bercovitch, Jacob, J. Theodore Anagnoson, and Donnette L. Wille.
(1991) Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of
Successful Mediation in International Relations. Journal of Peace
Research 28 (1): 717.
Greig, J. Michael. (2005) Stepping into the Fray: When Do Mediators
Mediate? American Journal of Political Science 49 (2): 249266.
Greig, J. Michael , and Paul F. Diehl. (2006) Softening Up: Making
Conflicts More Amenable to Diplomacy. International Interactions 32
(4): 355384.
Hellman, Johan. (2012) International Studies Review, Vo. 14, pp. 591
603.
Touval,Saadia,and I. William Zartman. (1985) Introduction: Mediation
in Theory. In International Mediation in Theory and Practice, edited
by Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman. London: Westview Press.
Zartman, I. William (2003). Ripeness.