THE MOMBASSA

ATTACKS OF
NOVEMBER 28,
2002
JONATHAN FIGHEL

ANA IBORRA VEGA

NATALIA LPEZ MERINO

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. FACTS
2. ACTORS INVOLVED
3. MOTIVATION
4. STRONG AND WEAK ARGUMENTS

FACTS
November 28, 2002
Two coordinated attacks:
1. Paradise Hotel

explosive vehicle + suicide bomber

15 people were killed

2. Israeli passenger jet

two SA-7 surface-to-air missiles

. Involved al-Qaeda operatives
supported by a local infrastructure

FACTS: THE ATTACK

Land-based
suicide
operation
Innovative:
Aviation attack
Multidimensional synchronized operation (surface
3 types of operational planning
missiles)
Sea-borne dhows
for infiltration and
scape

Two years earlier gathering in Mogadishu by al-Qaeda

attack team to plan the attacks

Decembe
r 2001
Targets
reconnaissanc
e in Kenya

April
2002
Short list

AprilAugust
2002
Meetings in
Mogadishu for
indoctrination
and weapons
training

August
2002
Team
relocated to
Mombassa

FACTS: THE ATTACK

Two independent synchronized attacks
Create mass casualties

Paradise
Hotel

Two
groups

1. One suicide bomber blow

himself up in the entrance
2. The other crashed a
vehicle loaded with
explosives
A rifle and a
pistol in
possession

Aircraft
assault

Fired 2 shoulder-mounted
anti-aircraft missiles from
Mombassa International
Airport runaway

FACTS: THE ATTACK

FAILED,

but
marked a turning
point in future alQaeda operational
threats

MANPADS (Man-portable air-defense system)

Al-Qaeda demonstrated for the first time its operational

strategy and ability to target a civilian plane from the

ground

FACTS: THE ESCAPE

Regrouped in Lamu Island
harbour
Isolated, largely Muslim coastal
region
Easy to escape by boat
towards Persian Gulf or
Somalia November 29

Saleh Ali Nabhan joined al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen. Killed in

September 2009

Issa Oman Issa in contact with al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen

Abdul Malik apprehended February 2007
Fazul Abdullah Mohammad (Abdul Karim) still at large?

ACTORS INVOLVED: THE

NETWORK FAZUL ABDULLAH
Leader and AQs mastermind

PARADISE HOTEL

ISRAELI PLANE

Fumo Muhammad
Fumo

Issa Osman Issa

ATTACKERS

Harun Abdisheikh
Bamusa

Saleh Ali Nabhan

Abdul Malik

8 LOCAL COLLABORATORS

ACTORS INVOLVED: THE

NETWORK

FAZUL
ABDULLAH
Representative of
AQ

Preparation
phase
Before the
attack

Personal
commitment and
bonds: motivational
factors
Surveillance data
and operational
instructions

ACTORS INVOLVED: THE

NETWORK FAZUL ABDULLAH
Leader and AQs mastermind

PARADISE HOTEL

ISRAELI PLANE

Fumo Muhammad
Fumo
Harun Abdisheikh
Bamusa

Issa Osman Issa

ATTACKERS

Saleh Ali
Nabhan
Abdul Malik

8 LOCAL COLLABORATORS
KNOWLEDGE
HUB

AQs accumulated ideological and

operational knowledge

MOTIVATION: AQ
OPERATIONAL
FINGERPRINTS
Strategic decision of AQs
leadership during 2001 and before
9/11

Jewish and
Israeli targets

AQ
le
ad
er
shi
p
Top-AQ
regional
leader (Fazul
Abdullah)

TOP DOWN
al-Qaedaled
operation

AQ senior
operatives

Mombassa attacks
2002

Local collaborators

MOTIVATION: SELECTION OF
TARGETS
Legitimatio
n of the
attack

AQ post9/11
evolving
estrategy

Declaration of War Against the Americans

Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places 1996
World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and
Crusaders 1998

Economic
instability
soft targets with
high potential for
economic
disruption

Suicide attacks

Mass casualties
Direct
confrontation with
Israel

MOTIVATION: AL-QAEDA
CLAIMS RESPONSIBILITY
False statement by Army of Palestine
December 2, 2002 AQ claims responsibility

Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad

More attacks
Holy places occupation
Jewish-Crusader
Alliance
Muslim interests, Palestinian
cause

Operatives as agents of
the Muslim umma
against the Jews and
Crusaders

STRONG ARGUMENT #1
Before the Mombassa attack, Israel and the international
iltelligence community were unaware of al-Qaedas
strategic decision to attack Israeli/Jewish targes,
which was made in early 2001 and before the 9/11
attacks.
p. 416 The Israeli Reaction

STRONG ARGUMENT #1
Confession by KSM
18. I was responsible for surveying and financing for the destruction of
the Israeli embassy in India, Azerbaijan, the Philippines, and Australia.
19. I was responsible for surveying and financing for the destruction of an
Israeli El-Al Airlines flight on Thailand soil departing from Bangkok
Airport.
20. I was responsible for sending several Mujahedeen into Israel to conduct
surveillance to hit several strategic targets deep in Israel.
21. I was responsible for the bombing of the hotel in Mombasa that is
frequented by Jewish travelers via El-Al airlines.
22. I was responsible for launching a Russian-made SA-7 surface-to-air
missile on El-Al or other Jewish airliner departing from Mombasa.

STRONG ARGUMENT #2
AQs return to Kenya, where the organization had already
carried out a terrorist attack, stemmed from its assessment of
the weakness of the local security forces[] Kenya, given its lax
security, was also convenient as a staging point for the operation
because of the presence of a local, supportive, radical Islamic
infrastructure.

SOMALIA: Failed state.

p. 429 Strategic Insights and Implications: Mainly for training, money and
Terrorists Save Havens
material.
Non-permissive environment
KENYA: Weak state.

States poor governance

+
Relative stability and basic
infrastructure
POTENTIAL BASE AREA

STRONG ARGUMENT #2
KENIAN PARADOX
Kenya is the most stable, most effective, and most
democratic government in the Horn of Africa, BUT, has
also experienced the most terrorist attacks against
Western targets and has been the most useful
operational base for al-Qaeda

Target-rich environment:
Functioning sovereign government
Weak governance in critical areas
Disaffected minority Muslim
population

WEAK ARGUMENT #1
Fazul Abdullah al-Qaedas mastermind- is still at
large.
p. 423, The escape

11 June
2011

Somali officials confirmed

today that Fazul Abdullah
Mohammed, AQs leader in
East Africa, was killed at a
Somali military checkpoint
in Mogadishu.
Al-Shababs capabilities Post-Westgate, Ken
Menkhaus

AQs East Africa chief Fazul

Mohammed killed in Somalia, Bill
Roggio

WAS FAZUL ABDULLAHS DEATH

AN ACCIDENT?

WEAK ARGUMENT #2
Of course the attack [launch of missiles against the
Arkia plane] could also have failed because of operator
ineptitude or inexperience.
p. 424, The attack

The Mombasa attack was planned and executed as a topdown AQ-led operation developed by a core of senior
professionals and experienced operatives who had been
involved in past terror attacks. (p. 426, AQ operational fingerprints)
The attackers, mostly local Kenyan collaborators, were
already involved in the 1998 US embassy bombing in Nairobi,
motivated by AQ ideology, and had professional terrorist
operational experience.
(p. 426, AQ operational fingerprints)

WEAK ARGUMENT #2
ISSA OSMAN ISSA

Al Qaeda leaders play significant role in Shabaab, Bil Roggio. 1 August 2010

SALEH ALI NABHAN

Highlights in terrorist activity february 13, 2008 to march 14,