STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

LEARNING OUTCOME
1.Understand why judges need to interpret
statutes
2.Understand the constitutional
responsibility of the judiciary in relation to
statutory interpretation
3.The difficulty in determining the legislative
intention of Parliament
4.Discuss the influence of EU membership
upon techniques of statutory interpretation
and the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998

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THE IMPORTANCE OF STATUTORY

INTERPRETATION
Deciphering the intentions of parliament
judicial time spent in the interpretation
of statutes
Doctrine of separation of powers and
Supremacy of Parliament
Position of the Supreme Court (UK) v
Supreme Court (USA)- can the UK Supreme
Court Challenge the will of Parliament?

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THE NEED FOR INTERPRETATION

There are two fundamental issues :
1. Natural limitations of language words have several
meaning , meaning of the words changes over time ,
different judges interpret words differently
2. In giving effect to the intention of Parliament , it is not
always clear precisely what parliament did intended
when they used a particular word/phrase
Interpretation of statutes- why are statutes
ambiguous/uncertain?
FAR Binnion
L Denning
Professor Hart- open texture of the legal language
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LITERAL RULE
WHAT IS THE LITERAL RULE?
WHY THE LITERAL RULE?
Tindall CJ in THE SUSSEX PEERAGE CASE 1844- the only
rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should
be construed according to the intent of Parliament which passed
that Act. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and
unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound
those words in that natural and ordinary sense. The words in
themselves alone do, in such a case best declares the intention of
the lawgiver.

R v The Judge of the City of London Courts[1892] per L

Esher
Consider examples:
Whiteley v Chappell(1868)
Griffith v Sec of State for the Environment(1983)
R v Maginnis(1987)
R V Harris (1836)
Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance (1998)
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THE GOLDEN RULE

Backup rule to the LITERAL RULE : modification of the literal
rule ; judge begins by adopting the literal rule but if it leads to
an absurd result , the judge may modify the words to some
extent .
GREY v PEARSON [1857] PER BARON Parke/Lord
Wensleydale- to be applied where the use of the literal rule
may lead to manifest absurdity, incongruity, repugnance or
inconsistency
use of the literal rule may lead to injustice or manifest
absurdity.. In which case the language maybe varied or
modified so as to avoid such inconvenience but no further.
River Wear Commissioners v Adamson[1854]- L
Blackburn continued to refer to the importance of relying on
the literal rule before moving on to the golden rule.
The rule was designed to act as a safety net to avoid any
absurdity that the literal rule may derive at if used.
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Adler v George (1964) vicinity of a prohibited

ADVANTAGE
Avoids absurdity
The doctrine of SP and SOP is maintained because the
intentions are conveyed
Covers up as a supply omission- circumstances where
Parliament may not have envisaged a situation by the
words of the Act.
DISADVANTAGE
The reluctance of the courts to consider the words of
parliament absurd
Words may have shades of meaning
The uncertainty that it may cause
Threat to the doctrine of SOP
L.Simon in Stock v Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd [1978]
advocated departure from the literal rule only where:
There is a gross and clear anomaly
Where Parliament could not have envisaged that anomaly
The anomaly can be obviated without detriment to the
legislative intent
Language of the statute allows for such modification
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THE MISCHIEF RULE

Oldest approach to statutory interpretation
The rule in HEYDONS CASE [1584]
allows the court to look at the state of the former
law in order to discover the mischief in it which the
statute was designed to remedy
The mischief is usually referred to in the preamble
to the statute 9 Black Clawson International v
Papierwerke (1975)
HEYDON CASE :

What was the common law before the making of the Act
What was the mischief and defect for which the common
law did not provide
What remedy the Parliament have resolved and appointed
to cure the defect
The true reason of the remedy
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SMITH V HUGHES [1960] Parker LCJ

Section 1 of the Streets Offences Act 1959 (it shall
be an offence to)solicit in the street(for the
purpose of prostitution).
The accused was in a house.. tapping on the window..
To attract the attention of passers-by.
ROYAL COLLEGE OF NURSING OF UK V DHSS
(1981)
L Parker LCJapplying the mischief rule.
Law Commission Report 1960- commented on the mischief
rule- a somewhat more satisfactory approach to the
interpretation of statutes but it is somewhat outdated in its
approach, because it assumes that statutes is subsidiary or
supplement to the common law, whereas in modern conditions
many statutes mark a fresh point of departure.
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THE PURPOSIVE APPROACH

L REID in Black Clawsons Case
We often say that we are looking for the intentions of parliament but
that is not quite accurate. We are seeking the meaning of the words
which parliament used. We are not seeking what parliament meant
but the true meaning of what they said.

L GRIFFITH in Pepper v Hart(1993)

the days have long passed when the courts adopt a strict
constructionist view of interpretation which requires them to adopt
the literal meaning of the language. The courts now adopt a
purposive approach which seeks to give effect to the true purpose of
legislation and are prepared to look at much extraneous material that
bears on the background against which the legislation was enacted.
Note : adopting a purposive approach to interpretation are taking a
wider view and essentially trying to decide what Parliament intended
to achieve in passing the Act .
This approach encourages the judge to look for the spirit of the Act and
to read words into or out of the Act when this is necessary.

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The evolving judicial attitude towards interpretation

Professor Willis in Statutory Interpretation in a Nutshelljudges must use the rule of interpretation that makes
the best sense of justice.
Denning LJ in Magor & St Melons RDC v Newport
Corporation (1950)
we sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and of
ministers and carry it out, and we do this better by filling
in the gaps and making sense of the enactment than by
opening it up to destructive analysis
Lord Denning approach was critised :
- Had gone beyond the proper role of the judge
- Engaging in a legislative or quasi legislative
function
- Lord Simmonds stated a naked usurpation of
legislative function
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In recent years : judge are more comfortable using te

purposive approach to interpretation
-in dealing with European legislation
-Pepper v Hart , stated that court are more ready to adopt
a approach that seeks to give effect to the true purpose
of legislation
-R ( on the application of Quintavalle) v Secretary of
State for Health (2003)
Note : Some may think that the best way to give effect to
Parliaments intention is to stay very close to the words that
Parliament actually used via literal approach to interpretation
. Other judges might feel that they are better able to give
effect to Parliaments intention by seeking to understand the
purpose of the legislation and then reading words in or out in
order to achieve that aim
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PEPPER V HART (1993)

-where the courts recognized reliance on Hansard as an extrinsic source to
assist the courts in its endeavor towards discovering the true intentions of
parliament
A landmark decision of the House of Lords in the use of legislative history in
interpreting statutes when the primary legislation is ambiguous
Before this , such a ruling would have been in breach of parliamentary privilege.

Decision of Pepper v Hart received with mixed reception and although the
courts accepted it with caution yet academic argued against it use .

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Lord Browne Wilkinson supported the use of Hansard it can only be

used if it is constitutional and practical serving the interest of justice .
He argued the traditional approach must be strongly adhered to by the
judiciary because :
1.It maintains constitutional properties of the legal system
2.The difficulty and expense in researching extrinsic materials
3.The citizens right to have access to known and accessible
documents
4.The improbability of finding helpful information from Hansard
5.Hansard cannot be relied on in criminal cases or be used to overrule
precedent prior to P v H except in exceptional circumstances
6.It can only be used to determine the mischief in the legislation
7.Parliamentary privilege will not be affected we will not be criticizing
what is said in parliament but rather to determine what ministers are
saying and to give effect to their work
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THE PROBLEMS FACED IN RELIANCE ON HANSARD

1.Difficulty in accessing materials
2.The cost and delays in obtaining the materials
3.The difficulty that may be involved in interpreting Hansard
4.The delays that might increase court time
5.Judges are not trained to interpret Hansards
6.The need to determine with some level of accuracy what MP were
trying to say or intended to say during the course of parliamentary
debates
7. Academics suggest that this is against the rules of evidence, violates
the doctrine of SOP and it may prove to be costly

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RELIANCE OF HANSARDS IN UK LIMITED

HANSARD CAN ONLY BE RELIED ON WHEN :
Where the statute itself must be obscure, ambiguous or leads to an absurdity
The material relied upon must consist of one or more statements of ministers
or other promoters of the bill together if necessary to understand such
statements and their effects
Statements relied upon are clear and the solution provided is easily
accessible
WARWICHSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL J JOHNSON
DONCASTER BOROUGH COUNCIL V SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
ENVIRONMENT
THREE RIVERS DC V BANK OF ENGLAND

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Lord Reid in Maunsell v Olins [1975]

The rule of Statutory Interpretation are not our
rules in the ordinary sense of having some
binding force. They are our servants not our
masters. They are aids to construction,
presumptions and pointers. Not infrequently one
rule points in one direction, another in a
different direction. In each case we must look at
all relevant circumstance and decide as a matter
of judgment what weight to attach to any
particular rule.
.

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HAS MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMON MARKET INFLUENCED

THE CHANGES TOWARDS STATUTORY INTERPRETATION?
L Denning in Bulmer v Bollinger (1974) had suggested that we must
now consider a more liberal method of interpretation to allow us to
make sense of EC legislation.
He referred to the Treaty as unlike any other enactment to which
English judges have become a custom too. The draftsman of our
statutes have striven to express themselves in the utmost
exactness. They have tried to foresee all possible circumstances and
have sacrificed style and simplicity and foregone brevity. They have
become long and involved.
Therefore judges too have interpreted statutes as applying to the
circumstances covered by the very words. They give them the literal
interpretation. And if the words do not cover the new situation the
gaps will be left open till parliament finds time to fill it.
The treaty however differs. It expresses its aims and purposes. All in
sentences of moderate length and commendable style but they lack
precision. Therefore it is important for UK judges to deduce from the
words and the spirit of the Treaty the meaning of Community rules.
In 1977,in Buchanon v Babco L Denning encouraged his fellow
brethren just as in Rome you should do as the Romans doso in
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the European Community you should do as they do