2013 Topic3 Reason&Rationality

EDM 9206
The Foundations of EAP
Reason & Rationality
Distinction between Theoretical &

Practical Reasons
Theoretical reason/pure reason: It refers to
human capacities of obtaining reliable

knowledge/theories of their environment. It
basically belongs to the epistemological domain
of human endeavors.
Practical reason: It refers to human capacities of
constructing with other human fellows intelligible
or even acceptable actions and/or interactions. It
basically belongs to the action (practical) domain
of human endeavors.
Practical Foundation of Educational

Administration and Policy
Both educational administration and policy can
be construed as human actions and efforts

deliberately undertaken by human agents to
intervene particular aspects of the current
educational environment with the intention to
bring about improvement to the status quo or to
bring about desirable and novel situations.
.

Accordingly, educational administration and
policy are human efforts with in-order-to

intents, which point to the future. As a result,
educational leaders who practice educational
administration and policy are obliged to give
reasons to their in-order-to intents, in other
words, to provide reasons to the actions
which they intend and propose to undertake.
Therefore, practical reason is one of the
foundations of study as well practice of
educational administration and policy.

Conceptions of action, project and agency
Action can be discerned as ones intentionality
that has been consolidated into protention and
anticipation, according to which she will make
effort to its fulfillment. It can simply be construed
as a single in-order-to intention.
Project can be understood as a series of actions,
which work in a sequence of in-order-to intents.
If all go well, they will probably lead to the
fulfillment of the anticipated goal.

Agency is the project organized and undertaken by
an agent. The concept puts particular emphasis on
the conception of the agent, who is supposed to
be a knowledgeable, rational and reasonable actor.
Knowledgeability: To be knowledgeable, the agent
is supposed to have sufficient if not full
knowledge of the project to be undertaken as well
the environment (both physical and social) in
which her project is to be unfolded.

Agency
Rationality: To be rational, the agent is supposed to
have identified the objective to be attained, to have
chosen an effective (or even the most efficient)
action plan to be undertaken, and finally to have
concrete idea and/or belief of the chance for
success.
Reasonable: To be reasonable, the agent will not
only have to be rational but must justify her actions
and/or project to be socially acceptable. In other
worlds, she must provide a normative justification
to the public (both partners and audiences) within
the respective institutional context.
Topic 3
Rationality and Reason
(I)
Concepts of Rationality
Weberians Conceptions of Rationality

Webers definition and typology of rationality
and action
Rationality as mental processes that
consciously strive to master reality
However much they may vary in content,
mental processes that consciously strive
to master reality are common to all types
of rationality.
(Karlberg, 1980, p. 1159)
Actor
To act &
to master
Degree of
Consciousness / Reflectiveity &
Knowledgeability
Rationality
The World

Webers Typology of rationality:
Practical/instrumental rationality
Conscious mastery of reality through pragmatic
and egoistic interest
Practical rationality as the way of life which
accepts given realities and calculates the most
expedient means of dealing with difficulties they
present
Substantive rationality
Conscious mastery of reality through ordering
action into pattern/hierarchy in accordance with
past, present, or potential value postulate.

Webers Typology of rationality:
Formal rationality
Conscious mastery of reality through means-end
calculation by reference back to universally
applies rules, laws or regulations.
Theoretical rationality
Conscious mastery of reality through
construction of precise abstract concepts rather
than action
Philosophers, priest and then scientist

Webers typology of action:
Traditional action
Affectual action
Value-rational action
Purposive-rational / Means-end rational action

Webers typology of action:

Webers theory of rationalization of the Occident
Among the classical figures of sociology, Max Weber

is the only one who broke with both the premises of
the philosophy of history and the basic assumptions
of evolutionism and who nonetheless wanted to
conceive of the modernization of old-European
society as the result of a universal-historical process
of rationalization. ...Weber shares this concept (i.e.
rationalization) with Marx, on the one hand, and with
Horkheimer and Adorno, on the other.

According to Marx, the rationalization of society

takes place directly in the development of productive
forces, that is, in the expansion of empirical
knowledge, the improvement of production of
techniques, and the increasingly effective
mobilization, qualification, and organization of
socially useful of labor power. One the other hand,
relations of production, the institutions that express
the distribution of social power and regulate a
differential access to the means of production, are
revolutionized only under the pressure of
rationalization of productive forces.

Max Weber views the institutional framework of the

capitalist economy and the modern state in a
different way not as relations of production that
fetter the potential for rationalization, but as
subsystems of purposive rational action in which
Occidental rationalism develops at a societal level.
Of course, he is afraid that bureaucratization will lead
to a reification of social relationships, which will
stifle motivational incentives to a rational conduct of
life.

Horkheimer and Adorno, and latter Marcuse, interpret

Marx in this Weberian perspective. Under the sign of an
instrumental rationality that has become autonomous,
the rationality of mastering nature merges with the
irrationality of class domination. Fettered forces of
production stabilized alienated relations of production.
The Dialectic of Enlightenment removes the
ambivalence that Weber still entertained in relation to
rationalization process and it abruptly reverses Marxs
positive assessment. Science and technology for
Marx an unambiguously emancipatory potential
themselves become the medium of social repression.
(Habermas, 1984/1981, p. 143-144)

Webers theory of rationalization of the
Occident
Domains of rationalization
Capitalism as worldly asceticism and methodical

enterprise of production
Legal formalism
Bureaucraticism
Ascetical and ethical vocationalism and
professionalism
Webers thesis of the construction of the human

Iron Cage
Ray and Reeds thesis of the Iron Cage of

bureaucratic rationalization
Stephen Kalbergs thesis of the eclipse of substantive
rationality
Horkheimer and Adornos thesis of Dialectic of
Enlightenment

Stephen Kalbergs thesis of the eclipse of substantive
rationality (Kalberg, 1980)

Practical, theoretical, and formal rationalization process strongly
dominate substantive rationalization processes in modern Western
societies. The Judeo-Christian world view, which provided the
point of reference for major groupings of substantive and ethical
rationalities as well as for the theoretical rationalization of their
values, has been largely replaced by the scientific world view.
(V)alues could no longer defined as the legitimate subject matter of
the 20th centurys major theoretical rationalization process. (11734)
The banishment of these values led Weber to ask a specific
question: What type of person will -or could-survive in the modern
cosmos? (p. 1175)

Would this type of person be little more than a pale reflection of the
formal rationality characterizing his merely adaptive action in the
legal, economic, and scientific spheres as well bureaucratic form of
domination, and of the practical rational orientations require to
handle lifes daily task and difficulties? The type of person capable
of systematically rationalizing action from within in relation to a
unified value constellation and thereby lending his or her entire
existence an unambiguous direction and meaning as viewed by
Weber as a historical subject bound to historically and
sociologically unique traditions, cultural values, and socialeconomic structures. Casting his glance down through the ages
from the perspective of the dawning of the 20th century, he saw the
fading away of the distinct configuration of sociological factors that
carried the historical subject which, to him, embodied Western
civilizations highest ideals: the autonomous and free individual
whose actions were given continuity by their reference to ultimate
values. (P. 1175-6)

Thesis of eclipse of substantive rationality in
EAP in HKSAR: The Case of the Quality

School Education discourse in HKSAR
Quality education of instrumental rationality

Quality education of practical rationality
Quality education of formal rationality
Quality education of theoretical rationality
Quality education of substantive rationality
Jurgen Habermas Theory of Rationality

Conceptions of rationality
When we use the expression rational, we suppose that

there is a close relation between rationality and knowledge.
Rationality has less to do with the possession of knowledge
than with how speaking and acting subjects acquire and
use knowledge. In linguistic utterances knowledge is
expressed explicitly; in goal-directed actions an ability, an
implicit knowledge is expressed. The close relation
between knowledge and rationality suggests that the
rationality of an expression depends on the reliability of the
knowledge embodied in it. ( Habermas, 1984, P.8)
Rationality is understood to be a disposition of speaking
and acting subjects that is expressed in modes of behavior
for which there are good reasons or ground. (p.22)

Habermas classification of rationality
Cognitive-instrumental rationality:
A goal-directed action can be rational only if the actors

satisfies the conditions necessary for realizing his intention to
intervene successfully in the world. (Habermas, 1984, p. 11)
Accordingly, there are two conditions for the success of an
teleological (goal-directed) action
Cognitive condition: True propositions of the conditions
necessary for the realization of the intervention.
Instrumental condition: The effectiveness of carrying out the
interventions, i.e. teleological actions.
Definition of cognitive-instrumental rationality: The concept

of cognitive-instrumental rationality carries with it
connotations of successful self-maintenance made possible
by informed disposition over, and intelligent adaptation to,
conditions of a contingent environment. (p.10)

Conceptions of rationality
Communicative rationality:
An assertion can be called rational if the speakers satisfies

the conditions necessary to achieve the illocutionary goal
of reaching an understanding about something in the world
with at least one other participant in communication.
(Habermas, 1984, p. 11)
Definition of communicative rationality: Concept of
communicative rationality carries with it connotation based
ultimately on the central experience of the unconstrained,
unifying, consensus-bringing force of argumentative
speech, in which different participants overcome their
merely subjective view and, owing to the mutuality of
rationally motivated conviction, assure themselves of both
the unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of
their lifeworld. (p. 10)
Habermas Conceptions of Communicative Rationality
Actor
Mutual understanding
and consensus
Reasonable, well-grounded, &

unconstrained argumentations
Communicative
Rationality
Another Actor

Rationality and the world
Realist's objective world: The realist worldview
starts from the ontological presupposition of the
world as the sum total of what is the case and
clarifies the conditions of the rational behavior on
this basis. ...On this model rational actions
basically have the character of goal-directed,
feedback-controlled interventions in world of
existing states of affairs. (1984, p. 11-12)

Rationality and the world
Phenomenologist's lifeworld: The phenomenologist

does not ...simply begin with the ontological
presupposition of an objective world; he makes this a
problem by inquiring into the conditions under which
the unity of an objective world is constituted for the
members of a community. The world gains objectivity
only through counting as one and the same world for a
community of speaking and acting subjects. ...Through
communicative practice they assure themselves at the
same time of their common life-relations, of an
subjectively shared lifeworld. This lifeworld is bounded
by the totality of interpretations presupposed by the
members as knowledge. (Habermas, 1984, p. 12-13)

Habermas theory of argumentation: Validity-claims
of communicative rationality:
I believe that the concept of communicative

rationality ...can be adequately explicated only in
terms of a theory of argumentation. (1984, p. 18)
We use the term argumentation for that type of
speech in which participants thematize contested
validity claims and attempt to vindicate or criticize
them through arguments. An argument contains
reasons or grounds that are connected in a systematic
way with the validity claim of a problematic
expression. (1984, p. 18)

Habermas theory of argumentation: Validity-claims
of communicative rationality:
Types of argumentation: Habermas has differentiated

argumentation into the following types
Theoretical discourse: It refers to the form of

argumentations in which controversies over validity
claims of truth of propositions and/or efficacy of
teleological actions are thematized and if positive
settled.

Habermas theory of argumentation:
Types of argumentation:
Practical discourse: It refers to form of argumentations

undertaken in existing normative contexts or moralpractical spheres. Accordingly, controversies over
validity claims are appealed to the rightness of
expressions within particular normative contexts and
moral-practical rules.

Evaluative criticism: There are situations in which the

validity of an expressions is neither appealed to the truth
or efficacy in objective world nor to the rightness in
normative contexts but to specific set of value standards
shared among members of particular culture and
language communities. Habermas has specified
aesthetic criticism as the prototypical case of this form
of argumentation. In this form of argumentation the
adequacy of the set standard of values to be used will be
asserted, criticized, debated and if possible accepted.

Therapeutic critique: In the case of private and/or selfpresenting expressions, their validity claims will be
based on the truthfulness and sincerity of the speakers.
The prototypical case of therapeutic critique, which
Habermas specifies, is critique employed by
psychotherapists to distinguish their clients selfdeceptive and/or illusive utterances from truthful and/or
sincere expressions.
Explicative discourse: It refers to a form of
argumentation in which the comprehensibility, wellformedness or rule-correctness of symbolic expressions
is no longer naively supposed or contested but is
thematized as a controversial claim. (1984, p.22)
Topic 3
(I)
Concepts of Reason
John Rawls distinction between

rational and reasonable
Persons are reasonable in one basic aspect
when, among equals say, they are ready to

propose principles and standards as fair terms of
cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given
the assurance that others will likewise do so.
.The reasonable is an element of the idea of
society as a system of fair cooperation and that
its fair terms be reasonable for all to accept is
part of its idea of reciprocity. (1993, 49-50)
Rawls Theory of Justice
40

The rational is, however, a distinct idea from the
reasonable and applied to a single, unified agent

(either an individual or corporate person) with the
powers of judgment and deliberation in seeking
ends and interests peculiarly its own. The ration
applies to how these ends and interests are adopted
and affirmed, as well as to how they are given
priority. It also applies to the choice of means, in
which case it is guided by such familiar principles
as: to adopt the most effective means to ends, or to
select the most probable alternative, other things
equal. (1993, p. 50)

More specifically, what rational agents lack is the
particular form of moral sensibility that underlies

the desire to engage in fair cooperation. Rational
agents approach being psychopathic when their
interests are solely in benefits to themselves.
(1993, p. 51) As in everyday speech, we may
characterize rational agents that their proposal was
perfectly rational given their strong bargaining
position, but it was nevertheless highly
unreasonable. (1993, 48)

In light of Rawls distinction, practical reason can
then be construed as reasons that reasoning

agents attributed to their actions. It goes beyond
the principle of rationality and means-end
calculation. It conforms to the principle of
reciprocity and fairness, which members of a
given community mutually accepted.

Accordingly, practical reason can be defined as
human capacity to attribute their actions to
The principle of rationality,

The principle of reciprocity, and/or even
The principle of fairness
John Rawls Conception of Justice as

Fairness
Distinction between theoretical (pure) and
practical reasons:
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as
truth is of system of thought. A theory however
elegant and economical must be rejected or
revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and
institutions no matter how efficient and wellarranged must be reformed or abolished if they
are unjust. Being first virtue of human actives,
truth and justice are uncompromising. (Rawls,
1971, Pp. 3-4)

Fairness
Justice as fairness: One of the fundamental
justifications of Rawls theory of justice is to base

his concept of justice on the idea of fairness.
It might seem at the first sight that the concepts of

justice and fairness are the same, and that there is no
reason to distinguish them, or to say that one is
fundamental than the other. I think that this
impression is mistaken. In this paper I wish to show
that fundamental idea in the concept of justice is
fairness; and I wish to offer an analysis of the
concept of justice from this point of view. (Rawls,
1999[1958], p. 42)

Fairness
Justice as fairness: .
The meaning of fairness: Fundamental to justice is

the concept of fairness which relates to right
dealing between persons who are cooperating with
or competing against one another, as when one
speak of fair games, fair competition, and fair
bargains. The question of fairness arises when free
persons, who have no authority over one another,
are engaging in a joint activity and among
themselves settling or acknowledging the rules
which define it and which determine the respective
shares in its benefits and burdens. .

Fairness
Justice as fairness: .
The meaning of fairness:

.. A practice will strike the parties as fair if none feels
that, by participating in it, they or any of the others
are taken advantage of, or forced to give in to claims
which they do not regard as legitimate. This implies
that each has a conception of legitimate claims which
he thinks it reasonable for others as well as himself to
acknowledge. A practice is just or fair, then, when it
satisfies the principles which those who participate in
it could propose to one another for mutual
acceptance under aforementioned circumstances.
(Rawls, 1999[1958], p. 59)

Fairness
The idea of original position
In reality, most of the situations in which humans
enter into cooperation or competition are not in fair
terms. That is they are not in equal footings when
engage in a bargain and one of the parties may has
an upper hand over their partners. The worst
scenario the parties found themselves in a situation
where they have to strike a balance not in the most
favorable terms of both parties. In other words, the
best that each can do for himself may be a
condition of lesser justice rather than of greater
good. It is at this point that the conception of the
original position embodies features peculiar to
moral theory. (Rawls, 1971, p. 120)

Fairness
The conception of the veil of ignorance
The idea of the original position is to set up a fair
procedure so that any principles agreed to will be
just. The aim is to use the notion of pure procedural
justice as a basis of theory. Somehow we must nullify
the effects of specific contingencies which put men at
odd and tempt them to exploit social and natural
circumstances to their own advantage. Now in order
to do this I assume that the parties are situated
behind a veil of ignorance. (Rawls, 1971, p. 136)

Fairness
It is assumed, then, that the parties do not know
certain kinds of particular facts.
First of all, no one knows his place in society, his class

position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in
the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his
intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does
anyone know his conception of the good, the particulars of
his rational plan of life, or even the special features of his
psychology such as aversion to risk or liability to optimism
or pessimism.

Fairness
It is assumed, then, that the parties do not know
certain kinds of particular facts.
More than this, I assume that the parties do not know the
particular circumstances of their own society. That is, they
do not know its economic or political situation, or the level
of civilization and culture it has been able to achieve. The
persons in the original position have no information as to
which generation they belong. (Rawls 1971, p. 137; the
Roman numberings are mine)
John Rawls Theory of Justice

Two Principles of Justice
First Principle: Each person is to have an equal right
to the most extensive total system of equal basic
liberties compatible with similar system of liberty for
all.
Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities
are to be arranged so that they are both
to the greatest benefits of the least advantaged, and

attached to offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunities. (Rawls,
1971, p. 302)

Applications of the principles: These principles
primarily apply to the basic structure of society.

They are to govern the assignment of rights and
duties and to regulate the distribution of social and
economic advantages.These principles
presuppose that the social structure can be divided
into two more or less distinct parts. (Rawls, 1871,
p. 61),

Applications of the principles: .
The First Principle applies to those distinct aspects

of the social system that define and secure the equal
liberties of citizenship. The basic liberties of citizens
are, roughly speaking, political liberty (right to vote
and to be eligible for public office) together with
freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of
conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of
person along with right to hold (personal) property;
freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined
by the concept of the rule of law. These liberties are all
required to be equal, since citizens of just society
are to have the same basic rights. (p.61)

Applications of the principles: .
The Second Principle applies to those aspects of
social system that specify and establish social and
economic inequalities. More specifically, it
appliesto the distribution of income and wealth
and to the design of organizations that make use of
differences in authority and responsibility, or chains
of command. (p. 61)

Interpretation of the second principle
Rawls qualifies that the two constituent phrases in
the Second Principle, namely to everyones
advantage and equally open to all need further
interpretation.
Rawls interprets the two phrases as follows (Rawls,
1971, p. 65)
59

Priority and lexical orders between principles of
justice
The priority of liberty: The First Principle, namely the

principle of liberty) has lexical priority over the Second
Principle: This ordering means that a departure from the
institutions of equal liberty require by the first principle
cannot be justified by, or compensated for, by greater
social and economic advantages. (p. 61)
The priority of democratic equality over the other three
systems, in other words, the priority of difference
principle and equality as equality of fair opportunity
over principle of efficiency and equality as careers open
to talent.
Debate on the Foundations of Practical

Reason: Liberalism vs. Communitarianism
Critiques on the liberal assumptions of Rawls theory
of justice
The misconception of the conception of person qua

person: In Rawls original position a person is but a
chooser of no conception of ends and good of life; of
no identity, lived experiences and lifeworld; and of no
origins, history and tradition.
Misconception of asocial individualism: In Rawls
original position, person but a chooser located in a
game situation, in which she is totally independent of
any social affiliations, social roles, social
responsibilities, social identity, and conceptions of
common goods.

Critiques on the liberal assumptions of Rawls theory
of justice
Misconception of ahistorical universalism: The decision

emerged from the original position, i.e. principles of
justice, is assumed to be universally applicable across
human cultures and social institutions.
Misconception of aempirical subjectivism: The decision
arrived at by rational choosers in original position is
assumed be based purely on their subjective
preferences, totally in disregard of the empirical
grounds, in which this decisions are supposed to
unfold and to be implemented.

Alastair MacIntyres conception of communal virtue
MacIntyre in his book After Virtue (2007) outlines a
trajectory through which human virtue such as the
concept of justice can be constituted in human
communities.

Alastair MacIntyres conception of communal virtue
In brief, MacIntyre suggests that the complex, historical,

multi-layered character of the core concept of virtue can be
logically developed in three stages. The first stage requires a
background account of what I shall call a practice, the second
an account of what I have characterized as the narrative
order of a single human life and the third an account of what
constitutes a moral tradition. Each latter stage presupposes
the earlier, but not vice versa. Each earlier stage is both
modified by and reinterpreted in the light of, but also provides
an essential constituent of each later stage. The progress in
the development of the concept is closely related, although it
does not recapitulate in any straightforward way, the history of
the tradition of which it forms the core. (Pp. 186-87)

John Rawls responses to his critics: In his book
Political Liberalism published twenty-one years after

A Theory of Justice, he has made numbers of
important concessions to his original formulation.
The revision of the political conception of justice:

Rawls retreats from his original stance that his theory
of justice is the comprehensive doctrine applying to
all spheres and domains in human society; instead his
suggests that the theory apply only to public sphere in
modern polity. Furthermore, he underlines that the
theory is implicit to be at work in the public political
culture of democratic society. (Rawls 1993, P. 15)

John Rawls responses to his critics:
The conception of political constructivism: Rawls has

basically abandoned his conception of original
position in replacement he put forth the conception of
political constructivism. Rawls suggests that Justice
as fairness is best presented in two stages. In the first
stage it is worked out as a freestanding political (but of
course moral) conception for the basic structure of
society. Only with this done and its content its
principles of justice and ideals provisionally on
hand do we take up, in the second stage, the problem
whether justice as fairness is sufficiently stable.
(Pp.140-41)

Has Rawls become a communitarian liberal?
In view of these concessions a Rawls has made in Political

Liberalism, one may conclude that he has relocated his
theory of justice from the foundation of liberalism to the
institutional foundation of democratic community within
which
the institutional practices of public reasonability of a

constitutional-liberal democracy have been firmly in place;
the narrative of citizenship of civil-constitutional democracy
has been commonly shared by its citizens
the culture of democratic reasonability from which
overlapping consensuses have been reached from
generation to generation and has been a tradition.
In Search of the InstitutionalCommunitarian Foundation of Practical

Reason
Topic 3
END

2013 Topic3 Reason&amp;Rationality

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EDM 9206

The Foundations of EAP

Reason & Rationality

Distinction between Theoretical &

human capacities of obtaining reliable

Practical Foundation of Educational

be construed as human actions and efforts

Practical Foundation of Educational

policy are human efforts with in-order-to

Practical Foundation of Educational

Practical Foundation of Educational

Practical Foundation of Educational

Weberians Conceptions of Rationality

Weberians Conceptions of Rationality

Weberians Conceptions of Rationality

Weberians Conceptions of Rationality

Weberians Conceptions of Rationality

Weberians Conceptions of Rationality

Weberians Conceptions of Rationality

Among the classical figures of sociology, Max Weber

Weberians Conceptions of Rationality

According to Marx, the rationalization of society

Weberians Conceptions of Rationality

Max Weber views the institutional framework of the

Weberians Conceptions of Rationality

Horkheimer and Adorno, and latter Marcuse, interpret

Weberians Conceptions of Rationality

Capitalism as worldly asceticism and methodical

Weberians Conceptions of Rationality

Webers thesis of the construction of the human

Ray and Reeds thesis of the Iron Cage of

Weberians Conceptions of Rationality

rationality (Kalberg, 1980)

Weberians Conceptions of Rationality

Weberians Conceptions of Rationality

EAP in HKSAR: The Case of the Quality

Quality education of instrumental rationality

Jurgen Habermas Theory of Rationality

When we use the expression rational, we suppose that

Jurgen Habermas Theory of Rationality

A goal-directed action can be rational only if the actors

Definition of cognitive-instrumental rationality: The concept

Jurgen Habermas Theory of Rationality

An assertion can be called rational if the speakers satisfies

Habermas Conceptions of Communicative Rationality

Reasonable, well-grounded, &

Jurgen Habermas Theory of Rationality

Jurgen Habermas Theory of Rationality

Phenomenologist's lifeworld: The phenomenologist

Jurgen Habermas Theory of Rationality

I believe that the concept of communicative

Jurgen Habermas Theory of Rationality

Types of argumentation: Habermas has differentiated

Theoretical discourse: It refers to the form of

Jurgen Habermas Theory of Rationality

Practical discourse: It refers to form of argumentations

Jurgen Habermas Theory of Rationality

Evaluative criticism: There are situations in which the

Jurgen Habermas Theory of Rationality

John Rawls distinction between

when, among equals say, they are ready to

Rawls Theory of Justice

John Rawls distinction between

reasonable and applied to a single, unified agent

2013 Topic3 Reason&Rationality

2013 Topic3 Reason&Rationality