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Counter Terrorism Policy

William Eric Davis. All Rights Reserved.

COUNTER-TERRORISM
Counter-terrorism is the use of personnel and
resources to deter, preempt, disrupt, or
destroy terrorists and their support
networks. It can include diplomacy, law
enforcement, military and other options.
The prefix "counter" in words such as counter-terrorism,
counterintelligence, and counterespionage is intended to
mean that any effort taken will be proactive, aggressive
and offensive, as opposed to any reactive or simply
defensive strategy which might be implied by other terms
such as anti-terrorism or responding to terrorism.

BEING PROACTIVE
There are a variety of policy options in
counter-terrorism, but outside of
prevention (in the form of secondary target
hardening), few experts recommend
conciliation, restraint, isolationism, or
ignoring the problem.

Soft Approaches
Diplomacy
Negotiation
Social Reform
Good Intelligence Analysis

Soft" approaches are complex, complicated, and


require patience, but they have the potential to be
highly effective in the long run, and in the end, that
is perhaps all that matters - what works.

Hard Approaches
Law Enforcement Options
Military Options (including Preemption)
CIA style Black Bag Jobs (Black Ops)

Terrorism & Political Violence


Evaluating Anti-Terror Policies
Diplomacy
Intelligence
Preemption
Deterrence

DIPLOMACY
Diplomacy is defined as the ordered conduct of
relations between one group of human
beings and another group alien to
themselves.
The primary purpose of diplomacy is
communications, and the ultimate goal of
diplomacy is peace.
Diplomacy, as it is practiced today, can be
considered a method of conflict
transformation.

Material Conflicts & Identity Conflicts


There are two kinds of conflicts for which Diplomacy is best
suited:
(1) Material conflicts: which revolve around dividable
assets and can usually be handled by traditional conflict
resolution techniques (including warfare).
(2) Identity conflicts: which involve deep-seeded feelings of
hate, but a sense of legitimate grievance, and are
usually handled by diplomacy techniques that frequently
(but not necessarily) focus on reconciliation and/or
restorative justice.

Diplomacy Experts are Executives, Not


Legislators or Judges
Diplomacy is mostly "executive" in the
sense that a seasoned team of
professionals (called the Foreign
Service or Diplomatic Service) are used
who are dedicated to the practice of
diplomacy and nothing else.
Diplomacy is also NOT about negotiation,
guile, or trickery. In fact, the practice of
diplomacy is often all about fixing the
problems that nations got into because they
were trying to deceive one another.

Diplomacy vs. Negotiation


When diplomats are dispatched to settle a conflict or
controversy, it is not the same as sending
negotiators.
The role of a negotiator is make a bargain or to distract
the enemy while you are doing other things, like
preparing to attack them.
With negotiation, there is usually compromise; someone
wins, someone loses, or at least both parties never get all
they want.

The role of a diplomat, however, is to resolve a situation


(without negotiating) to the ultimate triumph for all;
everyone usually wins (something), and the region is
ideally transformed by peace.

What is a Diplomat?
Diplomats carry letters of credentials and full
powers signed by a President or Secretary of
State to act on behalf of a nation (or group).
However, this does not bind their country until any
agreement has gone through an acceptance
process (like passage in a legislature, signature
by a President, Prime Minister, or dictator.

Uses of Diplomacy
The most common uses of diplomacy in counterterrorism
include:
1. Developing bilateral or multilateral anti-terrorist policies.
2. Arranging for the sharing of intelligence.
3. Arranging permission for law enforcement authorities from
one country to come in and arrest (or interrogate) a
suspected terrorist in another country; or rendition.
4. Establishment of appropriate sanctions on sponsors of
terrorism.

Evaluation of Diplomacy
Diplomacy is the most frequently used
and most successfully used form of
counterterrorism.
It requires the least amount of resources
among all the counterterrorism strategies.

Diplomatic Successes
Some famous cases where diplomacy worked in
the terrorist context include:
Ending the OPEC hostage crisis at Vienna in
1975.
Arranging a prisoner exchange with Lebanese
hijackers in 1985.
Catching Carlos the Jackal in 1994.
Getting the IRA to agree to a laying down of
arms in 1998 (and subsequent breakthroughs).
And numerous cease-fire agreements between
Israelis and Palestinians from 2001-2003
(although they always eventually failed).

Diplomacy can work (w/ rational regimes),


but it can also be a ruse

NEGOTIATION AS COUNTERTERRORISM
Conventional wisdom holds that it is
never wise to negotiate with terrorists
or to concede to their demands, at least
while they are still engaging in
violence.
In fact, the U.S. and many of its allies are
formally committed to a policy of "no
negotiation" with terrorists (although they
have made exceptions, generally to their
regret).

Democracies like to Negotiate


History shows democracies are more willing to
negotiate and compromise with terrorists than not,
and more than alternative forms of government.
Democracy is itself a system of bargaining.
When such efforts go wrong, they only encourage the
terrorists to repeat their acts and become more
violent later on.
They also embarrass a nation and result in lost
credibility for many years.
When such efforts go partially right, and that is all they
can be - partially effective, the best that can happen
is the incident goes away, and there is some closure
(for awhile).

Possible Concessions

Payment of ransom money to terrorists

Payment of bribe or protection money to terrorists

Giving weapons, food, material, technology, or information to terrorists

Release of imprisoned terrorists

Release of imprisoned supporters or sympathizers of terrorism

Release of political prisoners, dissidents, extremists, and spiritual fanatics

Provision of transport to another location intra- or internationally

Provision of political asylum or amnesty within a host country

Safe passage out of own country to a willing host country

Provision of top-notch legal services and a public court forum to air their cause

Provision of access to the news media to broadcast their propaganda

Examples of Negotiation
A countless number of ransom payments have been
made by governments, corporations, and families to
terrorists.
Numerous prisoner exchanges, prisoner releases,
and even mass releases of prisoners have been made
throughout history, and the U.S. has been party to it.
For all its tough talk, Israel has engaged in almost as
many concessions as crackdowns. It has gotten
them little.
It solves a short-term problem (like getting a hostage
released), but it contributes to the long-term problem
of terrorism.

The Iran-Contra Affair


Perhaps the most famous act of concession involving the U.S. was the IranContra scandal. During 1985-1986, high-ranking officials of the U.S.
government sold $30 million worth of guns to Iran in hopes of getting
Iranian help for releasing American hostages held by Shiite terrorists in
Lebanon.

The money from the gun sale was used to support anti-Sandinista forces
in Latin America. Iran, for its part, came through and successfully
pressured the terrorists to release the hostages in Lebanon.

Shortly after, however, more American hostages were seized by the same
terrorist group, among others, and the U.S. suffered a major credibility
problem in Latin America from which it has not since recovered.

Iran-Contra is just one example of things gone horribly wrong, but in all
fairness, it is up to history to decide if short-term expediency options are
worth the long-term costs.

Evaluating Negotiation
The best that can be said about negotiating
with terrorists is that concessions are
only marginally effective (and for the
most part, bad ideas), but they might be
conceivably useful under some very
specific historical circumstances where
they don't reward terrorism or create
credibility problems.

INTELLIGENCE
An Intelligence policy means to
increase intelligence budgets so as to
detect terrorist plots before they are
carried out and to help catch terrorists
should they succeed in an attack.
Human Intelligence
Signals (Electronic) Intelligence
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Intelligence Indicators of Terrorism


Indicators are usually thought of as factors of risk.
Regarding terrorism, the three primary factors of risk are:
(1) Adversary Capability
(2) Adversary Intentions
(3) Target Vulnerability

There is some debate within intelligence circles as to whether the third


one is necessary (does vulnerability encourage violence?).
Some experts talk about "terrorism threat assessment" (as opposed to
terrorism risk assessment) as only involving the first two.

The third is controversial precisely because it sometimes involves


collecting vulnerability information on an ally or friendly force.

Capability Indicators
Lethal Agents:
1. Biological
2. Nuclear or radiological
3. Chemical
4. Conventional bombing/explosion
5. Hijacking
6. Hostage taking/kidnapping
7. Assassination
8. Firearms
10. Knives/blades
11. Computers
Delivery Methods:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Ground based
Water vessel/scuba
Aircraft
Missile
Suicide/Human host
Mail/Postal service
Food/Beverage/Water supply
Gaseous

Intention Indicators
1. Weapons or material movement
2. Terrorist travel
3. Terrorist training
4. Significant events and dates
5. Increased Propaganda levels
6. Surveillance of targets
7. Tests of security

Vulnerability Indicators
1. Low current security posture
2. Number of people in a target area
3. Significance of target
4. Specific facility vulnerabilities
5. Inability to deter or disrupt
6. Level of cooperation with U.S.
7. Significant events and dates

Security on Sesame Street

Idealism vs. Realism


Idealism: "The act or practice of envisioning things in an ideal form." As a
foreign policy, it means to gauge the intentions of our enemies as an
indication of threat to US national security. Friendly gestures by our
enemies may lead to US vulnerability. It also includes a focus on
advancing human rights around the world.
Realism: "the inclination towards literal truth and pragmatism" ( As a
foreign policy, means to gauge enemy capabilities and adjust US
policy to deal with an attack, regardless of indications of the intent of
another country or group. Can sometimes be seen as provocative.
More willing than idealists to overlook human rights abuses and to
tolerate dictators (in the interest of security), such as Ferdinand
Marcos in the Philippines and even Saddam Hussein.

Note: Liberals (Democrats) tend to be idealists, while Conservatives


(Republicans) tend to be realists. However, we are only talking about
tendencies. There are always exceptions.

Another Way to Look at It


Idealists measure threat to the US in terms of feelings
(how others feel toward the US). If more people
hate us than before, then the US security level is
lower, according to idealists (regardless of the
enemys capabilities). Idealists tend to be optimistic.
Realists measure threat to the US in terms of the
capabilities of the enemy. Accordingly to realists, if
we have reduced their capability, we have improved
American security (regardless of how people feel
about it or us). Realists tend to be pessimistic.

Strive for Perfection?


Idealists assert we should strive for perfection.
However, idealists often become lost in their dreams,
and forget the real world around them; and as a
result can acquire an out-of-touch aura about them.
Realists on the other hand are more grounded in reality
(hence the name), and as a result are often better
prepared to deal with it. However, as they focus too
much on reality, they often aim lower than can be
reached, only aiming for what can be reached with
assurance, and as a result often miss out on the
(few) times humanity does reach excellence.

Why does a person become a


realist or an idealist?
It has to do with attitudes about risk.
Realists tend to be risk-averse (i.e., they dont
like it).
Idealists tend to be more tolerant of taking
risks.
This raises the question: why does one
become risk-averse (or, alternatively, a risk
seeker)?

Idealism has a Dismal Record of Success

In 1939, the West considered Hitler rational and open to


negotiation. The Munich Agreement resulted from it, but
instead of preserving peaceit allowed Hitler to start a war
with a decided advantage.

In 1979, President Carter thought the Soviets meant the US no


harm and negotiated the START II arms treaty (which was onesided in favor of Soviets). The Soviets invaded Afghanistan
while the treaty was in the US Senate awaiting ratification.

In 1994, the Clinton administration negotiated a deal with North


Korea: they would give up their nuclear weapons program and
would get free fuel and food in exchange. North Korea
immediately (& secretly) started violating the agreement.
Clinton did not include provisions for monitoring compliance
into the agreement.

G. W. Bush is a realist, but


sometimes has idealistic policies
For example, when deciding to go to war in
Iraq, he looked at Iraqs capabilities
(suspecting WMDs); i.e., realism, but Bush
also somewhat concerned himself with
Saddam Husseins intentions.
Once the war was over (and the occupation
began) he began to try and transform Iraq
into a stable democracy believing that it
would lead to peace and stability in the
region (via the Democratic Peace); i.e.,
idealism.

Additional Profiling Indicators


[Factors that identify potential terrorism]
1. Group Information
2. Financial Information
3. Personnel Data
4. Location Data

The Group Information Indicator


Group Information -- Name(s), ideology
(political or social philosophy), history of the
group, dates significant to the group, and
dates on which former leaders have been
killed or imprisoned.
Terrorist groups often strike on important
anniversary dates. Some groups also have a
manifesto, which is important to obtain or
confirm (such as doomsday dates).

The Financial Information Indicator


Financial Information -- Source of funds, proceeds
from criminal activities, bank account information.
Sudden influxes of funding or bank withdrawals indicate
preparation for activity. It's also important to identify the
group's legal and financial supporters.
Technically, anyone who would write an official letter of
protest or gather names on a petition for a terrorist is a
legal or financial supporter. Sometimes, an analysis of
support will reveal linkages and/or mergers with other
terrorist groups.

The Locational Data Indicator


Locational Data -- Location of group's headquarters,
location of group's "safe" houses (where they hide
from authorities), and location of group's "stash"
houses (where hide weapons and supplies).
Regular attacks on "stash" houses is the most frequently
used counter-terrorism technique.
It's important to specify the underground that exists -where terrorists can flee. This is harder than identifying
safe havens. Terrorists like to live in communal homes
instead of living alone.
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The Personal Data Indicator


Personnel Data -- List of leaders (and changes in leadership), list
of members (and former members), any personnel connections
between its members and other groups of similar ideology, and
the skills of all group members (weapons expertise, electronics
expertise, etc.)
Knowing the skills of the group is an important part of threat
assessment.
If the philosophy revolves around one leader, it's important to know
what will occur if something happens to that leader.
Often, the analysis of family background is useful to determine how
radically a leader or member was raised. Group structure,
particularly if the organization pattern is cellular, determines who
knows whom.

Evaluation of Intelligence
Traditional law enforcement methods are not all that
effective when it comes to the investigation or
intelligence of terrorism.
"We should not be constrained by Boy Scout ethics in an
immoral world."
-Kenneth AdelmanWe must keep some muscle in the back alley, willing to do
some ugly business, if we are going to detect and
prevent terrorism.

DETERRENCE
Deterrence is about how to get an opponent to NOT do
something due to some threatened consequence for
doing it or minimizing chances of a successful
attack by the terrorists.

Building up fortifications
Improving security
Threatening retaliation (or carrying it out)

Very much within Rational Choice Approach.

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How to do Deterrence
Creation of technology based barriers
Stricter Laws and Penalties
Hardening potential targets
Building up Military Defenses
All intended to reduce probability of a successful
terror attack.
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Evaluation of Deterrence
While ordinary street crime is often deterred by crackdowns,
target hardening, denying opportunity, and aggressive security
(with known displacement patterns), terrorism frequently
defies deterrence because they don't seek targets of
opportunity, but symbolic targets.
As a group, terrorists are very team-oriented, and often prepared for
suicide missions.
On the other hand, ordinary criminals are undisciplined, untrained, and
oriented toward escape. Terrorists are just the opposite. They have
prepared for their mission, are willing to take risks, and are attackoriented. If captured, they will usually not confess or snitch on
others as ordinary criminals do.
Traditional law enforcement methods are not all that effective when it
comes to the investigation or intelligence of terrorism.

PREEMPTION
Attacking the enemy before they strike us.
It need not mean that the enemys attack is
imminent.
Bush Preemption Doctrine (Eligibility):
Non-Democracy
Have or seeking WMDs
Ties to Terrorism
[Eligible nations in 2001: Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, North
Korea, Syria]

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Paul Wolfowitz
[Architect of the Bush Preemption Doctrine]

Moral Superiority as Counterterrorism


Some would say that moral superiority is how to win the war on
terrorism.
Most terrorist movements and groups do come to an end, and
even a doctrine can be defeated. Winning a war on terrorism
requires that there be a moral conviction in the justice of the
fight.
A terror war must give expression to the morality involved, and
fight as if it were a war of ideas.
Terrorism, in may ways, is an attack on national will. Terrorists
often count on the fact that their targets are "soft and weak"
and will not be able to sustain a coordinated grand strategy.
Terrorists know that their targets will critique themselves, and
debate among themselves. They know their targets will argue
among themselves about the morality of counterterrorism, and
in fact, they are often counting on this kind of moral skepticism
to develop before they attack again.

Moral Counterterrorism Policy


The moral arguments against terrorism (that it is
unjustifiable) should be forcefully restated time and time
again, and by as many voices as possible, globally.
The language of morality can be powerful. Not only does it
appeal to foreign audiences, but it can also help with
domestic morale.
Democratic-minded and moderate leaders of
organizations in the host nations for terrorists
should be assisted in having their "voices" amplified
by the democratic nations.

American Foreign Policies


Monroe Doctrine
Truman Doctrine (Containment of Communism)
Reagan Doctrine (Roll Back Communism)
Bushs Preemption (No waiting for terror attacks).

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There are Differences of Opinion on How to


Best Deal with Terrorism, and often they
are Partisan Differences

EFFECTIVENESS of POLICIES
In Descending order of Effectiveness (According to
some studies):
1.

Diplomacy

2.

Intelligence

3.

Preemption

4.

Deterrence (Least Effective)

This does not mean we should pick one to the


exclusion of all others.
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SUBSTITUTION EFFECT
As one counter-terrorism policy (strategy or tactic)
becomes successful, the enemy will switch strategies
and tactics.
We call this a substitution effect. That is, the enemy will
substitute a different tactic once current one is no longer
effective for them. They may also change the structure
of their organization.
The US must be on guard and watch for this. We need to
stay one step ahead of the enemy.
We should not get complacent once it appears we are
winning.
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Terrorist Innovation

New Modes of Attack


New Techniques and Tactics
New Targets
New Methods of Recruitment
New Types of Organization
Etc.

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Terrorism will Continue to Evolve


If governments want to curb terrorism they must
NOT focus on just one type of event, because
terrorist tactics will change and evolve to adapt
to our counterterrorism strategy.
Instead, we MUST target simultaneously a wide
range of various terrorist attack modes.
This includes financing as well as strategy and
tactics. We should go after everything.
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Allocating Resources Efficiently


Comparing the effectiveness of anti-terrorist
policies is crucial in order to allocate
government resources in the most
efficient way in the fight against terrorism.
But, it should be dynamic (changing) rather
than static (unchanging) because
terrorists evolve.
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INTERACTION EFFECT
The effect of X on Y will depend on the value of Z.
This means it is possible for a policy to become the victim
of its own success.
That is, the effect of preemption, and deterrence, will depend on
the effect of intelligence policy (which changes).
Intelligence effectiveness will decline eventually because
terrorists evolve, and as a result preemption and deterrence
will increase in effectiveness if we turn to it once intelligence
declines in effectiveness.
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Predicting Growth of Terror Attacks


The rate of growth of terrorist attacks increases with
terrorist innovations.
The US government employs deterrence and preemption to
reduce the growth rate of terrorist attacks.
However, deterrence triggers the development of terrorist
innovations, which increases the number of terror attacks
(and using the new innovations).
The government uses intelligence to anticipate terrorist
innovations aiming at decreasing its growth rate.
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TERRORISM STRATEGIES ARE CYCLICAL


Overall, an important regularity arises from the
substitution effect:
As terrorists substitute between attack modes, or
substitute timing, the time series of all terror
incidents are characterized by CYCLES.
If skyjackings become difficult, they switch to port
attacks, etc., until skyjackings become feasible
again.
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Allocating Resources
As anti-terrorist resources become scarce, our
government should allocate more to intelligence
than to preemption, and more to preemption than
to deterrence.
But, we should be ready to quickly reallocate
resources as intelligence achieves success (we
should probably already be shifting resources to
some degree to stay one step ahead of the
enemy).
There is, however, a cost for preemption (EU,
China and Russia do not like it).
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