ABILITY TO APPLY TASK

AND WORKLOAD
MANAGEMENT
Planning and coordination

PLANNING
A basic management function involving formulation of
one or more detailed plans to achieve optimum balance
of needs or demands with the available resources.
The planning process
(1)identifies the goals or objectives to be achieved,
(2) formulates strategies to achieve them,

WHY MANAGERS PLAN

Have you ever walked up to a pretty girl, and when you started to talk, nothing came out but silence?
Have you run out of fuel just a few miles from the nearest fuel station?
Have you found yourself freezing cold, wishing you had worn a sweater?
Or maybe you have had to pull an all-nighter to finish a project that you procrastinated on until the last
possible minute?
What all these scenarios have in common is a lack of planning.
Having a plan is a good practice for everyone, especially for managers.

The phrase the human element is one of those

terms that in a way helps to obscure the true
meaning rather than to clarify it.
When we speak of the human element or the
human factor we are in fact talking about people
and I think that we should always remember that
our industry depends upon people, whether they
are in the board room, on shore or on a ship on
the high seas
ONeil, 2000

YOU

ARE THE HUMAN ELEMENT!

HE impacts
System effectiveness in terms of
Safety
Productivity

Well-being of the humans who are part of the

particular
system
The wider society

Contemporary human factors subject

area is multi-disciplinary
Medicine/physiology Anthropometry
Biomechanics
Chronobiology

Psychology
Engineering
Social science
Mathematics
Education and training
Organizational Science
Law
Very practical outcomes necessary

Nature of contemporary highrisk systems

Complex (Definition)
1. Consisting of many different and connected
parts not easily analyzed or understood;
Characterized by complexity - the state or quality
of being intricate or complicated (Oxford
Dictionary)
2. Having many dynamic parts and variables that
are linked in complicated interactions (in time,
scope, functioning, linear, non-linear) and produce
global (macro) results (manifest emergent and
generative phenomena) that are not explained by
the interactions between specific constituent
parts. Interactions (and even variables) may be

Operations under pressure (time, commercial,

goal)
Operations under resource constraints
Slow development (incubation; metastability)
May create "illusion of control
Adverse consequences significant

The need to understand accidents

causation
Safety correlated to knowledge?
Prevention is better than cure
Reality: Perfect prevention not possible
Optimum: Learn from accidents

Accident causation models

Inception - fate based approach
Sequential models
Epidemiological models
Systemic models

Inception - fate based

approach
Titanic- 14th April 1912

Date

1898* (Date of novel)

1912 (Date of tragedy)

Name

The Titan

The Titanic

Disaster

North Atlantic

North Atlantic

Route

NY to Liverpool

Southampton to NY

Voyage

3rd

Maiden

Causes

Iceberg collision
Excessive speed
Too few lifeboats
As few as the law allowed

Iceberg collision
Excessive speed
Too few lifeboats
As few as the BOT regulations
allowed

Occurred

April, at night

14th April at 11:40 pm

Perceptions

Largest ship afloat

Greatest work of man

Largest ship afloat

Wonder of the age
Unsinkable

Sequential models

Heinrich's Domino Accident Sequence

Bird and Loftus' Loss Causation Model

Lead to ...
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA)
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
Cause-Consequence Analysis
Good for failures in simple systems
Limited in application to complex
systems

Epidemiological models
Analogy with spread of disease
Some explicit factors; many latent
factors
co-temporal in space

Therefore
Good for failures in simple systems
Limited in application to complex
systems

Systemic models
Take into account the complex
interaction between humans and
technology
Try to acknowledge the complex social
structures within which this
interaction occurs (PEESTLE)
Seeks to study the interactions and
relationships between socio-technical,
organizational and human aspects of
a system

In the socio-technical
system ...
Humans (at all levels)
Most flexible
Most adaptable
Therefore most "unreliable"?
Most valuable?

The human element: Definitions and human

behaviour models
Necessity for definition in terms of meaning and scope
Colloquial use will relate to everything (all things are
impacted by humans one way or another)
Misnomer?

The human element

The human "contribution" to socio-technical

systems
8 basic points (of the compass) related to
human nature

Humans ...

Make sense of things (sense-making)

Take risks (risk and risk perception)
Make decisions (decision-making)
Make mistakes ("human error")
Get tired and stressed (fatigue and
stress)

Learn, develop and adapt (learning)

Lives and work with others (team
work, culture, gender, family)

Communicate with others

(communication)

1. Make sense of things (sense

making)
The difference between sensing and making
sense of things.
Status quo
Uncertainty
Ambiguity
Complexity
Information richness
Cognition and biases
www

Sense-making
Cognition
Perception
Situation awareness
Unique to each individual
Sharing goals, meaning etc. requires ... Empathy
Communication (medium for sharing and growing empathy)

Influenced by;
Culture
Personality
Personal needs
Self-concept
Past experience
Goals
Current practicalities
From HE Guide - Review

Self concept
WHO AM I? WHERE DO I GET THESE NOTIONS FROM?

Based on

Personality
Social context
CULTURE
Past experience
Experience Expertise

2. Take risks (risk and risk

perception)
Sense-making linked to risk perceptions
What is risk?
Objectivity versus subjectivity of risk
Risk perception

Based on perceived control, value and familiarity

Risk homeostasis Behavioural compensation for increased safety under

specific circumstances

"Amplenuation" of risk Risk may be perceived to be higher or lower

based on social amplification or attenuation of risk

Risk perception - COLREGS

Rule 14:
(a) When two power-driven vessels
are meeting on reciprocal or nearly
reciprocal courses so as to involve risk
of collision each shall alter her course
to starboard so that each shall pass
on the port side of the other.

Risk perception - COLREGS

Rule 15: When two
power-driven vessels are
crossing so as to involve
risk of collision, the vessel
which has the other on
her own starboard side
shall keep out of the way
and shall, if the
circumstances of the case
admit, avoid crossing
ahead of the other vessel.

Risk perception - COLREGS

Research to determine decision criteria for action
Type of other ship (dangerous goods or not ?)
Size and manoeuvrability of other ship
Speed of other ship compared to own ship
Angle between the two courses
CPA (acceptable CPA? Note perception issue here too)
Crossing ahead or astern of own ship
Other ships around that may impair the manoeuver?
Other dangers around?

Ref Clostermann

Risk perception - COLREGS

3. Make decisions (decisionmaking)

Rational decision making

Reality

Optimum
Have complete information about all
alternatives
Ability to distinguish between all
components of alternatives

Decision criteria stable over lifetime of

decision and associated consequences

Unlimited time available

Utopian impossible

Time limited
Not all information available

Uncertainty, ambiguity almost guaranteed

Decision criteria may be highly unstable a

consequences dynamic

Decision-making
Situation awareness "... the perception of elements in the environment within
a volume of space and time, the comprehension of their
meaning, and the projection of their status in the near
future" ... "dynamic understanding of what is going on"
(Endsley, 1988; 1995)

The ability of an individual to possess a mental model of

what is going on that is compatible with reality and which
provides a basis for the determination of how this reality
will progress/develop
Individual SA vs Shared SA / Common Operating Picture
(COP)

Decision-making - Situation
awareness
Levels/Constituent parts
1. A correct perception of the elements
that make up the current situation, to
give an accurate a picture as possible
2. The comprehension (combination,
interpretation, storage and recall of
information) related to the elements that
relate to significance of elements
3. The combination of 1 and 2 that leads
to a correct projection of the developing
situation
4. Optimally, an appreciation of the
tools/processes/mechanism for
maintaining control in the developing

4. Make mistakes ("human error")

"To err is human (Cicero)?

Error will be taken as a
generic term to encompass
all those occasions in which
a planned sequence of mental
or physical activities fails to
achieve
its intended outcome, and when
these failures cannot be
attributed to the intervention of
some change agency (Reason,
1990)

Level Fou

Level Three

Level One

Influences on error making

Individual

Organizational

Inadequate rest
Increased stress
Less than optimum training
Limited experience
Lack of or wrong communication

Limited time
Flawed design
Limited resources (HR, finance,
tools etc.)
Poor safety culture

Problems with the term "human error

The term is of limited help in accident prevention
Points to "where" fault is and not why
Based on "hindsight a human bias that is really the illusion that
the world is completely predictable, facilitates the concealment of
underlying factors
A fundamental human strength depends directly on the ability to
make, and then recover from, mistakes. Without error there can
be no learning or development View from HE Guide

5. Get tired and stressed (fatigue and

stress)
A reduction in physical and/or mental
capability as the result of physical,
mental or emotional exertion which
may impair nearly all physical abilities
including: strength; speed; reaction
time; coordination; decision making;
or balance.
(IMO)

Exxon Valdez - 1989

Exxon Valdez - 1989 Case Study

On a cold midnight in March, the single hulled Exxon Valdez struck
Bligh Reef off Alaska.
The tanker spilt 11 million US gallons of crude oil into the sea. The
slick eventually covered 11 million square miles of ocean (a gallon of
crude goes a long way), creating the most devastating man-made
environmental sea disaster in history. Hundreds of thousands of sea
creatures died. Within two years, the local marine population and
fishing industry had all but collapsed.

Several residents, including a former mayor, committed suicide

and the Alaska Native Corporation went bankrupt. Billions of dollars
were paid in damages and fines. The shoreline will not recover until
2020
The human element A guide to human behaviour in the shipping industry.

The EXXON VALDEZ was operated with a reduced crew complement.

Evidence indicated that Watchkeeping safeguards on the EXXON
VALDEZ had been compromised because of the manning level.
The number of unlicensed crewmembers in the deck department was
not sufficient to provide uninterrupted lookout capability when other
routine deck-department duties arose.
When one AB was required to serve as helmsman, the remaining ABs
on duty had to cover all work and lookout responsibilities unless an AB
from another watch was "turned to" on overtime. Moreover, when a
lookout was required for long transits through congested waterways,
no other qualified persons on duty were available to relieve that
crewmember for breaks. As a result, on the EXXON VALDEZ, the
lookout position routinely went unattended when the AB was called for
other tasks or took a break.
NTSB Report

The third mate testified that two officers normally served on the navigation watch
of Exxon vessels when maneuvering in confined or congested waters. One officer
usually conned the vessel, and the other conducted the navigation. Without the
assistance of a fellow deck officer on the night of the grounding, the third mate's
workload included both tasks. This workload might have been manageable for an
alert, experienced officer even though it became progressively intensive as the
EXXON VALDEZ approached the location for the turn back to the traffic lanes.
NTSB Report

Notwithstanding the intensity of the workload, the third mate's failure

to plot positions of the EXXON VALDEZ on the navigation chart was a
crucial compromise between the requirements of conning and
navigating the vessel. He reduced his work by relying extensively on
radar so that he could monitor the waterway and navigate at the
same time. However, the perimeters of the submerged reef were not
displayed by radar. If he had practiced conventional navigation
techniques of plotting frequent fixes on the chart, he could have
methodically incorporated the perimeters and location of the reef into
his judgment for a track line around the ice.
NTSB report

The third mate had probably had very little sleep the
night before the grounding and had worked a stressful,
physically demanding day. Since deballasting and cargo
handling activities were ongoing while the EXXON
VALDEZ was at the Alyeska terminal, the third mate was
unlikely to have obtained a full off-watch .period of rest
when he went to bed at some time after 0100 on March
23. Also, he may have been called as early as 0520 to
relieve the second mate. According to the second mate,
he and the third mate were covering the chief mate's
watch essentially on a 6-hours-on and 6-hours-off basis
NTSB Report

An unlicensed crewmember recalled seeing the third mate on

deck during the first half of the afternoon 1200-to-I600 watch,
and the third mate stated that he did work in the afternoon
conducting a salinity test and that later he relieved the chief
mate during supper. The third mate testified that he had had a
nap in the afternoon, but the time that he would have been
resting would have been between being on deck during the
1200-to-I600 watch and relieving the chief mate for supper.
The Safety Board concludes that the third mate could have had
as little as 4 hours sleep before beginning the workday on
March 23 and only a 1- to 2-hour nap in the afternoon. Thus, at
the time of the grounding, he could have had as 1itt1e as 5 or
6 hours of sleep in the previous 24 hours. Regardless, he had
had a physically demanding and stressful day, and he was
working beyond his normal watch period
NTSB Report

Fatigue - Causes

Workload
Hard to define
Hard to measure
More or less?
Job + individual characteristics

Perceived risk or interest

Diet
Fitness and movement
Time of day
Environment
Sleep debt

Fatigue Causes
Sleep debt Absence of enough sleep
Need for sleep Quality/kind Stage 1:
Dropping off
Stage 2: Light sleep
Stage 3 and 4: Deep sleep (mental and
physical recuperation stage)
Stage 5:REM sleep (dream stage, critical for
mental stability, memory and learning)
Duration (7-8 hours in 24 hour period)
Continuity (uninterrupted)
Sleep - a homeostatic phenomenon
Maritime accidents with sleep as a factor Work
patterns at sea (watches, timings etc)
Motion, lights and noise as sleep-inducing
factors

Stress
An adaptive response, mediated by
individual characteristics and/or
psychological processes, that is a
consequence of an external action,
situation or event that places special
physical or psychological demands
upon a person (Ivancevich & Matteson,
1980)
Behavioural, psychological and/or
physiological response to "stressors"
(external environmental factors that
challenge personal notions of control -

Potential sources of stress

External environment
Organisation structure and
culture
Job characteristics
Personal factors
Work relationships
Physiological and
psychological symptoms and
behavioural changes - an
outcome and also a

Symptoms of stress

Physiological
Short term
Adrenalin secretion
Cold sweat

Long-term

Coronary heart disease

High blood pressure
Gastric ulcers
Back pain
etc.

Symptoms of stress
Behavioural
Loss (change) of appetite
Increased smoking or drinking
Insomnia or sleeping too much
Increased absenteeism (flight)
Increased aggression (fight)
Increased error-making and time
spent on jobs
Lower productivity and missed
targets
Increased conflict
etc.

Coping with stress

Personal strategies
Relaxation techniques
Faith
Exercise
Vacation
Talking to empathetic other
Humour
Appropriate assertiveness
Appropriate delegation
Ability to say no
Right prioritization
Completing tasks as per priority
Avoiding procrastination

Coping with stress

Organizational
strategies

Job design
Work relations
Organization structure
Organization culture (learning, listening,
open, reporting, empathetic)
Provide counselling
Appropriate training (e.g. assertiveness
training) and HR development
Minimize bureaucracy
Provide adequate communication
mechanisms

Ensure adequate rest and vacation built

into work contracts
Design work around people in keeping wi
practicality
Ensure adequate resources for work
Give appropriate authority in keeping wit
job responsibility
Allow for discretion and delegation

6. Learn, develop and adapt

(Learning)
Cujusvis hominis est errare,
nullius nisi insipientis in
errore perseverare
First Philippic, 44 B.C

To err is human; to persevere in error

is only the act of a fool.
-

Cicero
We only stop persevering in error
when we learn:
Cognitive
Psychomotor
Affective

Types of learning
Experiential learning
Vicarious learning
Contextual learning
Inferential/inductive learning
Not mutually exclusive, but
exhibit significant overlaps.

7. Lives and work with others (team work, socio-cultural

functioning)
Group formation
Forming
Storming
Norming
Performing

Transforming
Adjourning

uckman, 1965; Tuckman and Jensen, 1977 etc.

Team dynamics
Team psychological safety vs groupthink The shared
belief held by members of a team that the team is
safe for interpersonal risk-taking (Edmondson, 1999,
p. 350) and where these members feel able to show
and employ [themselves] without fear of negative
consequences to self-image, status, or career (Kahn,
1990, p. 708).
Blame/accountability
Diversity an asset?
Different kinds of teams

Simple Checklist for Successful Performance

Right people are in the right place at the right time

They know what is happening
They know what to do and when to do it and how
They are capable of doing what is required
They have the right tools
They have the lead time required
They did what was required when it was required
Successful and safe performance

Culture
A dynamic intangible and composite system of
interacting values, basic assumptions and norms which
manifests in and influences individual attitudes, beliefs,
behavioural patterns and non-behavioural items and
which informs the meaning individual and groups
attribute to such manifestations in themselves and in
others
Manuel, 2011

Organizational culture has an influence on the overall

safety, reliability and effectiveness of the operations in an
organization. Safety is part of the organizational culture,
and it is the leaders of an organization who determine
how it functions, and it is their decision making which
determines in particular, whether an organization exhibits
the practices and attitudes which make up a culture of
safety
(Hopkins, 2005; Qureshi, 2007)

8a. Communicate with others

A tragic accident resulted from what appears to have been confusion
between the homonyms, "two" and "to." A Flying Tigers 747 cargo
flight was preparing for landing in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 1989.
The following clearances and acknowledgments were recorded:
ATC: "...Descend to two seven zero zero (2,700). "
Pilot: "... Roger -- Cleared to twenty seven hundred.
ATC: "... Descend two (to?)four zero zero -- cleared for NDB
approach 33.
Pilot: "...OK -- four zero zero.
The intended clearance was 2,400 ft., but what the pilots read back
was 400 ft. The controller did not catch the read back error, perhaps
because he was not a native English speaker, and the aircraft
crashed into a mountain peak at 481 feet (NTSB, 1989)

Common challenges
Noise
Personal differences
Nationalities / Culture
Language / Diction
Equipment malfunction and
limitations

8b. Communicate with

machines
The plane that would not
talk

Ergonomics/human factors
HMI; Controls; Displays
Automation Related to reduction in manning
May create/evidence new areas of human weakness
May amplify existing human weakness

Work environment Noise

Motion and Vibration
Lighting
Temperature
Humidity

Bringing it all together

SHEL, SHELL, SCHELL SHELT Model; Really all

SHEL (Hawkins)
Not just the blocks; Interfaces critical

Limitations
Static and related to a
decomposition and
reductionist approach
Not evidencing the interaction
of complex factors inherent in
HR scenarios
Overlaps/dynamics between
H, E and S and effect on L not
articulated

Maritime Human Element Issues

Individual factors
Contemporary risk notions and risk perception
Automation
External environmental conditions
Ergonomics (and design issues)
Culture
Communication
Situation awareness
Crew health condition(ing)
Crew welfare
Team management
Commercial pressure The ETTO principle Efficiency/productivity or greed?
Manning models and levels
Information/administrative overload
Social contact
Etc.

Contending with human factors in the maritime

industry

The role of organizational self-regulation

Education, training and evaluation for human factors (check
STCW role) Appreciation of accident causation modeling

Communication
Leadership and team work
Cross-cultural interaction
Competence (KSA and Values)
Role of simulation? Levels of fidelity?

Thank You