Game Theory in

Cognitive Radio
Networks
Efficient mac in cognitive radio networks : a game
theoretic approach , IEEE transaction wireless
communication.

Introduction
Cognitive Radio(CR) aims at enhancing the utilization of
radio spectrum.
Motivation CR is scarcity of spectrum due to increase in
demand from mobile users.
Federal Communication Commission (FCC) study shows
that most of the frequency bands are partially occupied
or unoccupied.
Major factor that leads to inefficient utilization is
Spectrum licensing scheme itself which is static and
inflexible allocation.
Static spectrum allocation leads to spectrum holes

Intro..
In new spectrum licensing models key idea is to make spectrum
access more flexible.
Three major spectrum licensing models : common use ,
exclusive use and shared use models.
In the Common-use model spectrum is open to all users. In
ISM band this model is already in use through IEEE 802.11
standard.
In the Exclusive-use model primary user grants access to
secondary user for certain frequency band at particular time.
In Shared-use model primary users are allocated frequency
bands with are opportunistically used by secondary users.

Intro..
Two approaches to use spectrum in shared-use model:
spectrum underlay, spectrum overlay.
Spectrum underlay constraints the transmission power
of SUs so that they operate below interference limit of
PU.
Spectrum overlay allow s SUs to identify and exploit
spectrum holes in space, time and frequency.
Legacy wireless system were designed to operate on
dedicated band cannot utilize improved flexibility in
shared-use model.
Hence CR.. Implemented using software defined radio.

Cognitive Radio (CR)

Major functionalities of CR include Spectrum
Sensing(SS) , Spectrum Management (SM), Spectrum
Mobility (SMo).
SS obtains information of target frequency.
SM identifies spectrum holes.
SMo monitors changes status changes in target
frequency and adjusts operational parameters.
In CR PU and SU are more adaptive , interaction among
users become more important for

Game Models
Medium Access Control. For Spectrum Overlay
approach based on shared-use model, to identify and
access spectrum holes.
Channel selection/allocation to avoid congestion among
SUs can be formulated as non-cooperative game.
If users are cooperative, channel selection can be
formulated as bargaining game to achieve efficient and
fair Nash bargaining solutions.

Medium Access Control

For overlay spectrum access model
In common-use spectrum licensing model.
Joint channel allocation and access based on game
theory [1].
Channel allocation refers to selection of channel for
transmission by SU.
Channel access refers to obtaining transmission
parameters.
Given SU are non cooperative two game models are
developed to obtain equilibrium strategy for SUs.

 Multiple channels denoted by C.

Secondary users by N.
Each SU has x radio interfaces which can access max
of x channels.
Each interface uses CSMA/CA protocol.
Assumptions x<=C and SUs can observe transmission
by all other users.
Strategies of secondary user are to access set of
channels and size of contention window in CSMA/CA
protocol.

 Payoff is the throughput denoted by

r c,i is the throughput of user i on channel c.
Throughput on channel c is decreasing function of no.
users accessing the channel.
Two strategies so two models for channel selection and
channel access.
Channel allocation game is solved then channel access.

Channel Allocation
SU choose no of radios X c,i to allocate to channel c.
Strategy of user i
C is total number of channels.
Assumption total throughput of the channel is fairly
shared.
Achievable throughput is denoted by
where
Payoff is defined as
Its is observed there are multiple nash equilibria.

Nash Equilibria must have..

Secondary users allocate all radios to all available
channels. To maximize throughput.
The maximum difference between no. of radios
allocated to any channel is 1.
- Difference between the number of radios allocated to c
and c

 Necessary and sufficient condition for nash equilibria

based on load balancing concept are

latter condition ensures that a secondary user does not

allocate many radios to the same channel.

 There is another set of Nash equilibria in which some secondary

users allocate multiple radios to the same channel. Conditions
are ..

Note : there could be other sets of nash equilibria subject to

specific conditions on throughput function

Channel Access
In channel Access with CSMA/CA , DCF is assumed.
Objective maximize bandwidth utilization and to influence users to paly
channel allocation game optimally.
In this game SUs
can cheat by making contention window smaller
than standard.

is the set of cheaters.

Nc is the set of secondary users accessing channel c.
In general, cheaters will decrease the size of their contention window to
achieve a higher channel-access probability, and thus a higher throughput.

 In this channel access game strategy of SU is set of

contention windows of size
Where
is the size of contention window of radio l
of user i.
Channel access probability is
The average throughput of the cheater is
where r c,i,l is the average throughput achieved from the
lth radio of secondary user i.

Two nash equilibria for channel

access game
In the first only single player adopts
while
other adopt
for
The NE achieves highest throughout for player i since
this user has always has chance to transmit. Other
receive zero throughput.
Hence NE is efficient but totally unfair.
In the second , more than one player adopts
so
all users have zero throughput , these NE is called
tragedy of commons.
Because of undesirable solution Nash bargaining is
introduced

Nash bargaining solution

This solution is parito-optimal and fair. In this size of

contention window is assumed to be continuous.
To force all player to adopt Nash bargaining solution
penalizing mechanism is introduced.
Other players punish deviating player by jamming
transmission

Distributed algorithms for Channel

allocation

Distributed algorithm for channel

access

References