Grounds for voluntary inhibition

and disqualification of judges

Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

Arellano University School of Law Arellano
Law Foundation
2015-2016

 Judges family
Includes a judges:
1. spouse,
2. son,
3. daughter,
4. son-in-law,
5. daughter-in-law, and
6. any other relative by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth civil
degree, or
7. person who is a companion or employee of the judge and who
lives in the judges household.

Disqualification of judges under

Rule 137 section 1

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in

any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within
the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in
which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel,
or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or
decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties
in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself

from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned
above.

Cont

Sec. 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. - If

it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above
provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing,
file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and
the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw
therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of
his disqualification. His decision shall be forthwith made in writing
and filed with the other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay
shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his
own competency, until after final judgment in the case.

Rules contemplate
two kinds of inhibition
1. compulsory - it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot
actively and impartially sit in the instances mentioned.
2. voluntary - leaves to the sound discretion of the judges concerned
whether to sit in a case for other just and valid reasons, with only
their conscience as guide.
- Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74
[2010]

Proof that a specific act of bias or

partiality was committed

What can reasonably be gleaned from jurisprudence on this point

of law is the necessity of proving bias and partiality under the
second paragraph of the rule in question. The proof required
needs to point to some act or conduct on the part of the judge
being sought for inhibition. In the instant Motions, there is not
even a single act or conduct attributed to Justice Hernandez
from where a suspicion of bias or partiality can be derived or
appreciated. - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos.
173057-74 [2010]

Evidence required

We find the above explanation well-taken and thus uphold the

assailed Resolution upon the grounds so stated. We have ruled in
Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi , that the
mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground
for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis.
Extrinsic evidence must further be presented to establish bias,
bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable
error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. This
Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly
indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be
branded the stigma of being biased or partial. - Ramiscal, Jr. v.
Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010]

Proof of clear and convincing evidence

The bare allegations of the judges partiality, as in this case, will

not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to
overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble
role of dispensing justice in accordance with law and evidence,
and without fear or favor. - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez
G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010]

"No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in

which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise...."

The relationship mentioned therein becomes relevant only when

such spouse or child of the judge is "pecuniarily interested" as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise. Petitioner, however, miserably
failed to show that Professor Carolina G. Hernandez is
financially or pecuniarily interested in these cases before the
Sandiganbayan. - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos.
173057-74 [2010]

A summary of judicial obligations

3.1 A judges conduct should be above reproach and in the

discharge of his judicial duties he should be conscientious,
studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just,
impartial, fearless of public clamour, and regardless of private
influence should administer justice according to law and should
deal with the patronage of the position as a public trust; and he
should not allow outside matters or his private interests to
interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his
office.- Administrative Order No. 162, of the Department of
Justice, dated August 1, 1946.Sandoval v. Justice Tan, Jr. G.R.
No. 106657 [1996]

10

Meaning of
ruling in a lower court is the subject of review or
in which he has presided in any inferior court when
his ruling or decision is the subject of review.

Granted that Justice Victor presided partly over the case in the
court a quo, his was not the pen that finally rendered the
decision therein. Hence, he cannot be said to have been placed
in a position where he had to review his own decision as
judge in the trial court. Accordingly, he was not legally bound to
inhibit himself from the case. - Sandoval v. Justice Tan, Jr. G.R.
No. 106657 [1996]

11

Cont

Nevertheless, Justice Victor should have been more prudent

and circumspect and declined to take on the case, owing to
his earlier involvement in the case. The Court has held that a
judge should not handle a case in which he might be perceived,
rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality, which
axiom is intended to preserve and promote public confidence in
the integrity and respect for the judiciary. While he is not legally
required to decline from taking part in the case, it is our
considered view that his active participation in the case below
constitutes a just or valid reason, under Section 1 of Rule 137 for
him to voluntarily inhibit himself from the case. - Sandoval v.
Justice Tan, Jr. G.R. No. 106657 [1996]

12

Automatic granting of a motion for

voluntary inhibition improper

Indeed, the automatic granting of a motion for voluntary

inhibition would open the floodgates to a form of forum-shopping,
in which litigants would be allowed to shop for a judge more
sympathetic to their cause, and would prove antithetical to the
speedy and fair administration of justice. - Kilosbayan
Foundation v. Judge Janolo, Jr. G.R. No. 180543 [2010]

13

 Utang na loob per se not a ground for

inhibition

Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a friend, classmate,

associate or patron of a presiding judge appears before him as
counsel for one of the parties to a case. "Utang na loob", per se,
should not be a hindrance to the administration of justice .
Nor should recognition of such value in Philippine society prevent
the performance of one's duties as judge. Query of Executive
Judge Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October 26, 1987

14

Intimacy or friendship between a judge and

an attorney of record is no ground for
disqualification

It is clear from a reading of the law that intimacy or friendship

between a judge and an attorney of record of one of the
parties to a suit is no ground for disqualification. xxx We held
that the fact "that one of the counsels in a case was a classmate of
the trial judge is not a legal ground for the disqualification of
said judge. To allow it would unnecessarily burden other trial
judges to whom the case would be transferred.
Ultimately, confusion would result, for under a different rule, a
judge would be barred from sitting in a case whenever one of his
former classmates (and he could have many) appeared." - Query
of Executive Judge Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October
26, 1987

15

Personally approaching the judge to

disqualify himself not contempt

We do not consider it as an act of contempt of court when

petitioner asked his counsel to see respondent Judge in his
chamber and request him to disqualify himself upon a
ground which respondent Judge might consider just or valid.
It is one thing to act not in accordance with the rules, and another
thing to act in a manner which would amount to a disrespect or an
affront to the dignity of the court or judge. - Austria v. Hon. Judge
Masaquel, G.R. No. L-22536 August 31, 1967

16

Former associate in practice of law

We are in accord with the statement of respondent Judge in his

memorandum that the circumstance invoked by petitioner in
asking him to inhibit himself from further trying the case that
Atty. Sicat was his former associate in his practice of law is
not one of the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137 of the new Rules of Court for disqualifying a
judge. While it is true that respondent Judge may not be compelled
to disqualify himself, the fact that Atty. Sicat, admittedly his former
associate, was counsel for a party in the case being tried by him,
may constitute a just or valid reason for him to voluntarily
inhibit himself from hearing the case on a retrial, if he so
decides, pursuant to the provision of the second paragraph of
Section 1 of the said Rule 137. Austria v. Hon. Judge Masaquel,
G.R. No. L-22536 August 31, 1967
17

Judge was the former public prosecutor

who handled the same case

The above-mentioned criminal case was inherited by the

undersigned upon assumption to office as Presiding Judge of this
sala last November 12, 1996. It was only after 4 months herein
undersigned discovered and remembered that he handled the
aforecited criminal case as public prosecutor years back. Hence,
for all intents and purposes, from the time he discovered his
previous participation in the above-cited criminal case, up to the
present, the undersigned never heard nor tried nor conducted
any full-blown trial in the same. Besides the private prosecutor
did not interpose any objection.

WON respondent judge should be administratively sanctioned.

18

Cont

The prohibition is thus not limited to cases in which a judge hears the
evidence of the parties but includes as well cases where he acts by
resolving motions, issuing orders and the like as Judge Rojas has done
in the criminal case. xxx The purpose of the rule is to prevent not only a
conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part
of the judge. A judge should take no part in a proceeding where his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
In violation of these rules, Judge Rojas sat as a judge in Criminal Case No.
09-5668 from November 12, 1996 to April 13, 1998 without securing the
written consent of both the prosecution and the defense and
entering the same upon the record of the case. For almost one and a
half years, he issued various orders resetting the dates of the hearing and
of the reception of additional evidence for the prosecution and for the
defense. Undoubtedly, by these acts, he sat in and acted on the case. In Re: Inhibition of Judge Rojas A.M. No. 98-6-185-RTC [1998]

19

Justice of CA had acted as counsel for

respondent but no sanction

Considering that Justice Montenegro had so represented the

National Power Corporation in CA G.R. CV No. 34524 in his then
capacity as the Acting Solicitor General, he should have really
begged off from any participation in the decision process by,
indeed from being the ponente for, the appellate court.
In all fairness to Justice Montenegro, however, he explained such
failure to promptly inhibit himself as one of mere
inadvertence and oversight on his part, and when reminded
that he, in fact, had acted as counsel for respondent NPC as
the then Acting Solicitor General, he then forthwith
disengaged himself from further involvement in the disposition
of the case. - Urbanes, R. v. CA, G.R. No. 112884 August 30,
1994

20

Should a judge whose decision was reversed

by the appellate court voluntarily inhibit
herself when the case is remanded to her sala

The fact that Judge Quijano-Padilla ruled adversely against

petitioner in the resolution of the motion to dismiss, which this
Court later reversed in G.R. No. 160753, is not enough reason,
absent any extrinsic evidence of malice or bad faith, to
conclude that the judge was biased and partial against
petitioner. As this Court has emphasized in Webb v. People, the
remedy of erroneous interlocutory rulings in the course of a trial is
not the outright disqualification of a judge, for there is yet to
come a judge with the omniscience to issue rulings that are always
infallible. The courts will close shop if we disqualify judges who
err, for we all err. - Barnes v. reyes, et. al., G.R. No. 179583
[2009]

21

Is a former assistant or associate of the

judge in the practice of law a ground for
automatic disqualification

We are in accord with the statement of respondent Judge in his

memorandum that the circumstance invoked by petitioner in asking him
to inhibit himself from further trying the case that Atty. Sicat was his
former associate in his practice of law is not one of the grounds
enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the new
Rules of Court for disqualifying a judge. While it is true that respondent
Judge may not be compelled to disqualify himself, the fact that Atty.
Sicat, admittedly his former associate, was counsel for a party in the case
being tried by him, may constitute a just or valid reason for him to
voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the case on a retrial, if he so
decides, pursuant to the provision of the second paragraph of Section 1 of
the said Rule 137. Austria v. Hon. Judge Masaquel, G.R. No. L-22536
August 31, 1967

22

Is being a former classmate of the judge

a ground for inhibition or
disqualification?

Appellants stress that the trial court should be held disqualified

because the counsel for plaintiffs-appellees had been a
classmate of the trial judge. Admittedly, this is not a legal
ground for disqualification. To allow it would unnecessarily
burden other trial judges to whom the case would be transferred.
Ultimately, confusion would result, for under the rule advocated, a
judge would be barred from sitting in a case whenever one of his
former classmates (and he could have many) appeared. Vda. De
Bonifacio v. BLTB, et. al., G.R. No. L-26810. August 31, 1970
It is clear from a reading of the law that intimacy or friendship
between a judge and an attorney of record of one of the parties
to a suit is no ground for disqualification. - Query of Executive
Judge Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October 26, 1987
23

Who shall resolve a motion for reconsideration

filed against the decision of a judge, after he had
voluntarily inhibited himself from further sitting
in the case?

The administrative matter before us differs from most petitions

involving a judge's disqualification here, a judge voluntarily
inhibits himself and, instead of a party or both parties filing a
motion on the matter, it is another judge who insists that he
continue with the case.
However, as much as possible, the judge to whom a case is
transferred should not resist too much the order of
recusation unless the motives for inhibition are suspect. - Query
of Executive Judge Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October
26, 1987

24

Judge attempted to make complainant and the

accused settle their dispute amicably considering
that they are brothers and the wife of the accused is
his first cousin

Respondent's efforts, praiseworthy though they may be, cannot justify the
disregard of the law. At the first sign that complainant was not willing to
listen to respondent's counsel, the latter should have recused himself from
the case without further delay. He cannot sacrifice the integrity of the
judicial office on the chance that complainant might relent and agree at
last to settle the matter with his brother. A period of two (2) months is
more than enough for respondent to make use of his good office.
After a reasonable time trying his ability to bring the parties to an amicable
settlement and using his moral influence on them without success, he
should have inhibited himself from the case and continued his
peace efforts in a private capacity.
Judge is reprimanded. Lazo v. Judge Tiong, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173.
December 15, 1998

25

Would mandamus lie to compel respondent

Judge to proceed with hearing the case

On July 26, 1995, respondent Judge de la Cruz, Jr. issued an order

denying the motion for inhibition but voluntarily inhibited
himself and subsequently denied the motion for
reconsideration of the order of inhibition.
As such, mandamus would not lie to compel respondent Judge
Marino M. dela Cruz, Jr. to proceed with hearing the case since the
grant or denial of the motion to inhibit involves the exercise of
discretion. The right or duty to exercise this discretion has been
imposed on him by the Rules of Court with regard to any matter
brought before him. Furthermore, petitioners have no vested right
to the issuance of the motion to inhibit given its discretionary
nature. Gutang, et. al. v. CA, G.R. No. 124760 July 8, 1998

26

Verbal motion for voluntary inhibition

is not proper

Acting thereupon, respondent judge ordered the lawyer to file the

corresponding motion within five (5) days from receipt of the
Order; and in the meantime, he suspended the arraignment of the
accused. However, the private prosecutor did not file the
required motion for inhibition, an omission which was
interpreted as abandonment of the stance of the complainant
to inhibit the respondent Judge from hearing subject cases .
Villanueva v. Judge Almazan, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1221. March
16, 2000

27

DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS

Rule 137

Sec. 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. - If

it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above
provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing,
file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and
the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw
therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of
his disqualification. His decision shall be forthwith made in writing
and filed with the other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay
shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his
own competency, until after final judgment in the case.

28

No appeal or stay shall be allowed until

after final judgment in the case is not an
absolute rule

Second, while the restriction in the Rule against appeal or stay of

the proceedings where the trial judge rules in favor of her
competency to sit in a case is not an absolute rule in civil cases,
and has not precluded a resort in appropriate cases to the
special civil action of certiorari before the higher courts for
determination.
This will apply only in cases where the denial of the motion for
inhibition or disqualification was made ahead of the trial
courts judgment on the merits and there is a clear showing
that the case is an exceptional one. This is not true in the case
of the present petitioner. Ong v. Basco, G.R. No. 167899 August
6, 2008

29

Interpretation of Section 2 of Rule 137 of the

Rules of Court against appeal or stay of the
proceedings when the trial judge denies a
motion to disqualify himself and rules in
favor of his own competency

Rule 137 in criminal cases might give a contrary impression, that

such restriction against appeal or stay of the proceedings
when the trial judge denies a motion to disqualify himself and
rules in favor of his own competency does not apply in criminal
cases where such disqualification is sought by the prosecution
or offended party. - Paredes v. Judge Gopengco, G.R. No. L23710 September 30, 1969

30

When the accused seeks inhibition or

disqualification

Where, however, it is the accused in a criminal case who seeks

the disqualification of the trial judge, the general restriction
provided in the rule against appeal or stay of the proceedings
when the judge denies the motion and rules in favor of his own
competency would apply, as it does in civil cases.
In such case, the accused, in the event of his conviction, could
raise the correctness of the judge's ruling on his nondisqualification with his appeal from the decision on the merits;
and were he to be acquitted, he would have no cause for complaint
against the judge's acquittal verdict and ruling of nondisqualification of himself from trying the case and rendering such
verdict. - Paredes v. Judge Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710
September 30, 1969

31

Rule on restriction against appeal or stay of the

proceedings when the trial judge denies a motion
to disqualify himself and rules in favor of his own
competency

When it is the accused in a criminal case who seeks the

disqualification of the trial judge, the general restriction would apply
meaning no appeal until final judgment.

When it is the prosecution or offended party in a criminal case

who seeks the disqualification of the trial judge such restriction
against appeal or stay of the proceedings does not apply. otherwise
the rule on double jeopardy will apply against the prosecution or
offended party.

In civil and [administrative] cases, no appeal or stay shall be

allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his own
competency, until after final judgment in the case.
32

Disqualification of a judge is not a matter

that affects his jurisdiction

This Court's jurisprudence, likewise contrary to petitioners'

contention, holds that the disqualification of a judge is not a
matter that affects his jurisdiction and power to act such as to
render his decision null and void, so much so that failure on the
part of a party, to timely interpose such an objection of
disqualification prior to the decision has been held to be a fatal
obstacle to raising such objection on appeal. - Paredes v. Judge
Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710 September 30, 1969

33

When to file a motion for

disqualification?

The question of a judge's disqualification, therefore, is one that should

be timely raised in the first instance, so that it may properly be raised
and considered on appeal.
At the same time, as we pointed out in the Abella case, supra, if this Court
were of the opinion upon a review of the case that the litigant had not
had a fair trial, it would grant a new trial, although the judge may not
have been disqualified under Rule 137, not on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction but in the best interests of justice.
This we did in Dais vs. Torres, where we ruled that: "Although a judge may
not have been disqualified under said section, nevertheless if it appears to
this court that the appellant was not given a fair and impartial trial
because of the trial judge's bias or prejudice, this court will order a new
trial, if it deems it necessary, in the interest of justice." Paredes v.
Judge Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710 September 30, 1969

34

Remittal of Disqualification

SEC. 6. A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of

withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the records the basis
of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and
lawyers independently of the judges participation, all agree in
writing that the reason for the inhibition is immaterial or
unsubstantial, the judge may then participate in the proceeding.
The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be
incorporated in the record of the proceedings. - CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY New Code of Judicial Conduct

35

Written consent of all the parties is

required in Remittal of
Disqualification

From the foregoing provision of the rules, a judge cannot sit in any
case in which he was a counsel without the written consent of all
the parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record. The respondent alleged that since there was no objection
from any of the parties, he proceeded to preside over the case
and to decide it. This is a clear violation of the law. The rule is
explicit that he must secure the written consent of all the parties,
not a mere verbal consent much less a tacit acquiescence .
More than this, said written consent must be signed by them and
entered upon the record. - Lorenzo v. Judge Marquez, A.M. No.
MTJ-87-123 June 27, 1988

36

 Common law relationship not a

relationship by affinity

The law cannot be stretched to include persons attached by common-law

relations. Here, there is no blood relationship or legal bond that links the
appellant to his victim. Thus, the modifying circumstance of relationship
cannot be considered against him. PP v. Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05
February 10, 1998

37

Presumption of regularity

Mere allegations, conjectures, suppositions, speculations or

hearsay cannot overcome the presumption that the respondent
[judge] has regularly performed his or her duties. - Bautista v. Ass.
Justice Abdulwahid, A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J, May 2, 2006

"Bare allegations of partiality x x x [is not sufficient] in the absence

of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the
presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to
dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or
favor." - Crisostomo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 171526,
September 1, 2010

38

Duty not to recuse

Judges should not recuse themselves merely because an

unfounded claim of bias or prejudice has been lodged against
them. xxx . [A] judge has an equally strong duty not to recuse
when the circumstances do not require recusal. - Annotated Model
Code of Judicial Conduct, American Bar Association, page 187,
2004

39

Improper purpose for filing motion to

inhibit/disqualify

The rule [on inhibition or disqualification] should not be used

cavalierly to suit a litigants personal designs or to defeat the
ends of justice.
It deemed as intolerable acts of litigants who, for any conceivable
reason, would seek to disqualify a judge for their own purposes
under a plea of bias, hostility, or prejudgment.
It further held that it did not approve of some litigants tactic of
filing baseless motions for disqualification as a means of delaying
the case or of forum-shopping for a more friendly judge. People v. Serrano, 203 SCRA 171, 186-87, October 28, 1991, cited by
Justice Panganiban in his Extended Explanation for Inhibition in
the case of Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2,
2001

40

Thank you for your attention!!

41