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GODFREY

HODGSON
HOLMES
TARCA

CHAPTER 11
POSITIVE THEORY OF ACCOUNTING
POLICY AND DISCLOSURE
Latar Belakang
Penelitian pasar modal (1970an) memberikan
langkah yang besar dalam menjelaskan pengaruh
akuntansi
Penelitian mengandalkan EMH (Efficient Market
Hypothesis)
Menuntun pada pengembangan kebijakan
accounting positive theory

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Early demand for theory
Teori positif memasukkan sejumlah observasi
Banyak perusahaan secara sukarela memberikan
laporan akuntansi
Perusahaan melobi terkait standar akuntansi
Perusahaan membuat pilihan kebijakan yang
konsisten
Perusahaan cenderung ke arah konservatisme

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Contracting theory
Perusahaan dipandang sebagai legal nexus
atas hubungan kontraktual
Perusahaan dipandang sebagai cara yang
efisien dalam mengatur aktivitas ekonomi
untuk mengurangi biaya kontrak

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Contracting theory
Kontrak meliputi :
Kontrak shareholders dengan manajer
Kontrak yang memberikan sumber daya
Kontrak dengan para pekerja
Kontrak dengan pemasok
Kontrak dengan pemberi jasa pengiriman

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Agency theory
Agency theory terdapat hubungan antara satu di
pihak principal dengan agen (agen)
misalnya Dimana ada pemisahan manajemen dan
kepemilikan
Kedua belah pihak adalah maximisers utilitass
Oleh karena itu, agen dapat bertindak dari kepentingan
pribadi (self-interest)
Perbedaan kepentingan adalah masalah agensi
Kontrak yang menggabungkan angka akuntansi dapat
digunakan untuk menyelaraskan kepentingan kedua belah
pihak
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Agency theory
Masalah agensi pada gilirannya menimbulkan
biaya agen yang dikeluarkan untuk
mengatasinya :
monitoring costs
bonding costs
residual loss

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Agency theory
Monitoring Costs biaya pemantauan perilaku
agen; Awalnya ditanggung oleh prinsipal namun
diteruskan ke agen melalui penyesuaian
remunerasi mereka (price protection)
auditing costs, operating rules
Bonding Costs biaya yang ditanggung oleh agen
sebagai hasil dari tindakan untuk menyesuaikan
kepentingan mereka dengan principal
Menyediakan laporan keuangan yang lebih teratur
(biaya kepada manajer dalam hal waktu dan usaha)

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Agency theory
Para agen menanggung bonding cost untuk
mengurangi monitoring cost yang akhirnya
mereka tanggung
Agen menghentikan pengeluaran untuk
bondong cost bila biaya marjinal sama dengan
pengurangan marginal dalam monitoring cost
yang mereka tanggung
$1 = $1

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Agency theory
Residual Loss Kerugian yang terkait dengan tidak
sepenuhnya menyesuaikan kepentingan agen dengan
kepentingan principal
Ex post settling up - (ex post = pada akhir setiap
periode)
remunerasi masa depan agen berdasarkan kinerja agen
yang diamati
remunerasi perubahan principal yang akan dibayarkan
kepada agen untuk menyelaraskan dengan kinerja mereka

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Agency theory
Di dunia nyata, perlindungan harga dan penyelesaian
tidak sempurna atau lengkap
Agen merasa bahwa mereka tidak akan sepenuhnya
dihukum karena perilaku mereka yang berbeda
Mereka memiliki insentif untuk bertindak secara
oportunis
Hal ini meningkatkan kerugian residual
Kerugian ini ditanggung oleh principal dan juga, atau
alih-alih, agen

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Agency theory
Teori agensi mengaitkan peran akuntansi
Akuntansi adalah bagian dari mekanisme
monitoring dan bonding
Nomor akuntansi digunakan dalam kontrak

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Proteksi harga dan masalah keagenan
shareholders/manajer

Pemisahan kepemilikan dan manajemen


mengarah pada perilaku yang berbeda oleh
agen
Divergensi terjadi karena
Masalah risk-aversion
Masalah dividend-retention
the horizon problem

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Price protection and
shareholder/manager agency problems

Risk aversion
Manajer lebih memilih risiko lebih kecil daripada
pemegang saham
Derajat diversifikasi berbeda yang mempengaruhi risiko
Kewajiban terbatas kepada pemegang saham

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Price protection and
shareholder/manager agency problems
Dividend-retention
Manajer lebih memilih untuk membayar lebih
sedikit keuntungan sebagai dividen daripada yang
disukai para pemegang saham
pay their remuneration
empire building

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Price protection and
shareholder/manager agency problems
Horizon
Manajer memiliki horizon waktu yang lebih
singkat sehubungan dengan asosiasi mereka
dengan perusahaan daripada pemegang saham
Pemegang saham tertarik pada arus kas masa depan
manajer memiliki horison waktu hanya selama yang
mereka inginkan untuk tetap dengan perusahaan

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Price protection and
shareholder/manager agency problems
Permasalahan kontrak
1. Menyediakan rencana bonus (untuk mengurangi masalah
dividen-retensi)
2. Membayar manajer lebih berdasarkan pergerakan harga
saham sebagai pendekatan pensiun manajer (untuk
mengurangi masalah horizon)
3. Membayar bonus pada tingkat progresif sebagai peningkatan
keuntungan yang dilaporkan (untuk meminimalkan masalah
risiko keagenan)
4. Kurangnya remunerasi dengan kompensasi berbasis saham
sebagai kepemilikan manajer dalam peningkatan perusahaan
(untuk mengurangi masalah risiko keagenan)
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Shareholder-debtholder agency
problems
In this context, the manager is assumed to be
either the sole owner of the firm, or has
interests that are totally aligned with the
interests of the shareholders
the principal is the debtholder
the agent is the manager acting on behalf of
shareholders

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Shareholder-debtholder agency
problems
Firm value is the value of debt plus the value
of equity
The value of equity can be increased by
either increasing the value of the firm (efficient
contracting); or
transferring wealth away from debtholders
(opportunistic behaviour)

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Shareholder-debtholder agency
problems
Varieties of opportunistic behaviour
excessive dividend payments
asset substitution
underinvestment
claim dilution

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Shareholder-debtholder agency
problems
Excessive dividend payments
reduces the asset base securing the debt
shareholders have received cash but limited liability
protects them from being personally liable for the debts of
the firm in the event of bankruptcy
the debt becomes mispriced
reduces the value of the debt

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Shareholder-debtholder agency
problems
Asset substitution
firm invests in higher risk projects to benefit
shareholders
no benefit to debtholders
but do share in possible losses
shareholders are able to diversify and have limited
liability
debt becomes mispriced

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Shareholder-debtholder agency
problems
Underinvestment
in some circumstances, shareholders have
incentives not to undertake positive NPV projects
because to do so would increase the funds
available to the debtholders but not to the
shareholders

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Shareholder-debtholder agency
problems
Claim dilution
occurs when the firm issues debt of a higher
priority than the debt already on issue
decreases the relative security and value of the
existing debt

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Shareholder-debtholder agency
problems
Lenders will price protect
through interest rates, the withholding of funds
and the length of the loan
The interests of shareholders can be bonded
to those of debtholders via restrictions in
lending agreements
loan covenants

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Ex post opportunism versus ex
ante efficient contracting
Ex post opportunism
occurs when, once a contact is in place, agents
take actions that transfer wealth from principals
to themselves

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Ex post opportunism versus ex
ante efficient contracting
Ex ante efficient contracting
occurs when agents take actions that maximise
the amount of wealth available to distribute
between principals and agents
ex ante before contracts are finalised

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Signalling theory
Managers voluntarily provide information to
investors - signals - to assist in their decision
making
Similar to efficient contracting
Aligned with the information hypothesis
Managers signal expectations and intentions
regarding the future
Incentives to signal good, neutral and bad
news
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Political processes

Often firms try to avoid public attention that is


costly to them
financially
in terms of public perception and reputation
They reduce their reported profit or its
volatility
e.g. banking sector in Australia

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Conservatism, accounting
standards and agency costs
Conservatism shows a bias by accountants
accelerating recognition of expenses and
decelerating recognition of revenue
IASB argues this does not reveal the real
financial picture and reduces information
available to users

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Additional empirical tests of the
theory
Testing the opportunistic and political cost
hypothesis
Tests using contract details
Refining the specification of political costs
Testing the efficient contracting hypothesis

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Additional empirical tests of the
theory
Evidence that managers use accounting
numbers to
counter political pressure
gain political advantages
set management targets related to remuneration
minimise breaching debt covenants
provide dividend constraints
constrain management manipulation

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Evaluating the theory
Mixed support for positive accounting theory
Two categories of major criticism
methodological and statistical criticism
empirical evidence is weak and inconclusive
philosophical criticism
contrary to its claims, it is laden with value judgments
focuses on human behaviour and not the behaviour
and measurement of accounting entities
positivism is no longer taken seriously

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Issues for auditors
The demand for auditing can be explained by
agency theory as part of the monitoring and
bonding activity and costs
higher quality auditors
industry specialist auditors

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Summary
Positive accounting theory has been a major force in
academic accounting research
Incorporates a theoretical model of contractual
exchange between persons who use accounting
numbers to effect their payoffs
Provides an explanation as to why accountants
account as they do
minimises the cost of agency relationships
yet opportunistic behaviour by agents is the norm
but some efficient ex ante behaviour by agents
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Key terms and concepts
Positive theory
Contracting theory
Agency theory
Agents
Principals
Monitoring costs
Bonding costs
Residual loss
Ex post settling up
Risk aversion problem
Dividend retention problem
Horizon problem

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Key terms and concepts
Shareholder/manager agency problem
Shareholder/debtholder agency problem
Excessive dividend payment problem
Asset substitution problem
Underinvestment problem
Claim dilution problem
Ex post opportunism
Ex ante efficient contracting
Signalling theory
Political processes
Conservatism

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