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Oleh

Teddy Anggoro
(Sarjana, Master, Doktor pada Universitas
Indonesia)

1. Hakim Banding Pada Komisi Banding


Merek
2. Pengajar Fakultas Hukum UI
• Sarjana untuk Matakuliah Hukum
Persaingan Usaha, Hukum Kepailitan,
Analisa Ekonomi dari Hukum
• Magister Hukum untuk Matakuliah Hukum
Perusahaan, dan HKI dan Persaingan
Usaha
• Magister Kenotariatan untuk Matakuliah
Hukum Kepailitan dan Hukum Jaminan
Hukum Perusahaan
What is ?

 Company
 Corporation
 Business Organization

LAW
Form of Business
Organization

 Sole Proprietorship

 Corporation

 General Partnership

 Limited Partnership

 Limited Liability Partnership

 Limited Liability Company


JENIS BENTUK USAHA

 Usaha Perseorangan

 Persekutuan
 Firma
 Commanditaire Vennotschaap

 Perseroan Terbatas
Esensi Usaha

 Apa bentuknya?

 Siapa yang bertanggung Jawab?


URGENSI HUKUM
KORPORASI
 Riset Doing Business 2010 “ Reforming Through
Difficul Times”

 Riset World Bank 2000 “Voice of The Poor: Crying


Out for Change”
SEJARAH PERSEROAN
TERBATAS

 Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd., AC 22. (1897).


disebutkan bahwa “ the notion of non-human
juristic entities has a history going back at least to
roman times,” Salomon v. A Salomon & Co. Ltd
Sejarah Perseroan Terbatas

 B.C. Hunt dalam bukunya The Development of the


Business Corporation in England 1800-1867, 1936
menyatakan bahwa, “ the brilliant intellectual
achievement of the roman lawyer, the juritic
person, a subject of right, and liabilities as is a
natural person.”
 Korporasi sebagai subyek hukum, layaknya pribadi
kodrati, tidak lahir secara alamiah layaknya
ciptaan Tuhan lainnya, tetapi dia sebagai
pengemban hak dan kewajiban dihidupkan oleh
manusia dengan otorisasi Negara.
 Wetboek van Koophandel (WvK) 1848

 German Law 1892 “ Gesellschaft mit


beschrnketer Haftung”

 Tradisi Civil Law System


 Susan Pace Hamill, dalam artikelnya The
Story of Limited Liability Company:
Combining the Best Feature of a Flawed
Business Tax Structure, The University of
Alabama School of Law, Foundation Press,
2005, Menyatakan “Amerika Serikat yang
pertama kali mengundangkan Limited
Liability Company (LLC) Statute adalah
Negara bagian Wyoming, yaitu pada
tanggal 4 Maret 1977.”
 William J. Carney dalam artikelnya Limited Liability,
Atlanta: Emory University School of Law
menyatakan: “USA 1874 dengan diterapkannya
Limited Liability Partnership Association oleh
Negara bagian Pennsylvania, adapun di Inggris
penerapan tanggung jawab terbatas dilakukan
pada tahun 1855.”
Prinsip German Law 1892

 Menggunakan kata “ Limited ” dalam


nama korporasi;
 Korporasi sebagai subyek hukum yang
penuh;
 Anggota yang lama dapat menentukan
siapa anggota baru dalam korporasi;
 Kematian anggota tidak dapat
mengakibatkan ditutupnya korporasi, jika
hal tersebut disebutkan tegas dalam
anggaran dasar.
 Prinsip ini menjadi Universal Principle of
Limited Liability Company, termasuk
Wyoming LLC Act 1977
Di Indonesia

 Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Dagang, original dari


Kerajaan Belanda sejak 1848, konsekuensi asas
konkordansi;
 Undang-Undang No. 4 Tahun 1971, tentang
Perubahan KUHD;
 Undang-Undang No. 1 Tahun 1995, 7 Maret 1995

(UNIFIKASI)
 Undang-undang No. 40 Tahun 2007
KONSEPSI PERSEROAN
TERBATAS

 Artificial Person;

 Legal Entity;

 Separate Legal Personality;

 Limited Liability.
Artificial Person

 Lord Shaw of Dunfermline ’ s dalam perkara


Daimler Co. Ltd. V. Continental Tire & Ruber Co.
(G.B.) Ltd [1916] 2 A.C. 307. menyatakan bahwa
badan usaha mandiri dengan tanggung jawab
terbatas sebagai “ It is a creation of law
convenient for the purposes of management,
of holding of property, of the association of
individuals in business transaction …”
Legal Entity

 Yang membedakan antara orang pribadi dan


badan hukum, menurut Buckley L.J. Daimler Co.
Ltd. V. Continental.. adalah " The artificial legal
person called the corporation has no physical
existence. It exists only in contemplation of law.
It has neither body, parts, nor passions. It cannot
wear weapons nor serve in wars. It can be
neither loyal nor disloyal. It can-not compass
treason. It can be neither friend nor enemy.
Apart from its corporators it can have neither
thoughts, wishes, nor intentions, for it has no
mind other than the minds of the corporators. "
Separate Legal Personality

 Ross Grantham, dalam hasil penelitiannya


The Limited Liability of Company Director,
The University of Queensland, TC Beirne
School of Law, Legal Studies Research
Paper Series, Research Paper No. 07-03,
2007, menyatakan “Corporate personality
entails that the company is recognised for
the purposes of the law as a right and duty
bearing entry that is distinct from those
natural persons who benefit from the
company’s business or through whom, …”
Limited Liability

 Pettet, dalam tulisannya dalam Limited Liability,


Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law
7th Ed. Menyatakan, “ meaning of limited
liability in company law is that by virtue of
statute a shareholder is not liable to contribute
to the assets of the company on a winding up
beyond the amount remaining unpaid on his or
her shares.”
 United Kingdom, dalam Section 74 The
Insolvency Act 1986, Limited liability diartikan
sebagai “ Immunity of shareholders for the
company ’ s debt incurred while it is going
concern.”
 Ross Grantham dalam penelitiannya The
Limited Liability of Company Director… bahwa
prinsip limited liability adalah “speaks expressly
to shareholders,” sedangkan prinsip separate
legal personality adalah memberikan secara
tidak langsung perlindungan bagi Direksi dan
juga perlindungan atas investasi dari
pemegang saham dalam bisnis korporasi.
Grantham.
TUJUAN KORPORASI

 Frank R. Lopez dalam artikelnya berjudul


Corporation Social Responsibility In A Global
Economy After September 11: Profit, Freedom and
Human Right, ,, Mercer Law Review, Vol. 55, 2004,
hal. 743 menyatakan : “the first corporation were
created to serve the public. Corporation were
created as an extention of either the church or the
state. ‘ Ecclesiatical ’ corporation, for example,
were created as a device for the church to hold
property. Most early corporation, however, were
created to serve the sovereignity of kings and
queens.”
TUJUAN KORPORASI

 Frank R. Lopez dalam artikelnya berjudul


Corporation Social Responsibility In A Global
Economy After September 11: Profit, Freedom and
Human Right, ,, Mercer Law Review, Vol. 55, 2004,
hal. 743 menyatakan : “the first corporation were
created to serve the public. Corporation were
created as an extention of either the church or the
state. ‘ Ecclesiatical ’ corporation, for example,
were created as a device for the church to hold
property. Most early corporation, however, were
created to serve the sovereignity of kings and
queens.”
TUJUAN KORPORASI
 Indra Surya dalam Disertasinya yang berjudul
Transaksi Benturan Kepentingan di Pasar Modal,
FHUI, menyatakan bahwa International
Corporation pertama di dunia seperti British East
India Company (BEIC), Dutch East Indies Company
(DEIC), Hudson Bay Company (HBC), dan
Veereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie (VOC),
menunjukan bahwa kepentingan korporasi dan
kerajaan tidak terpisah.
TUJUAN KORPORASI
 Pada tahun 1930an, oleh Lee Drutman diceritakan
bahwa, “ A Corporation with thousand of
employees and millions of costumers, a
corporation was receiving public subsidies and
encroaching on communities, a more
extensive reporting system that measured the
impact of the corporation on peoples lives
have made sense. This never developed,
however, and the profit-generating mentality
remained the dominant driving force behind
corporation.”
SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
DOCTRINE

 Adolph A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in


Trust, 44 Harvard Law Review. 1049, 1931,

 Michigan Supreme Court Decision, cases


Dodge v Ford Motor Co. 170 N.W. 668 1919

 Peraih Nobel Milton Friedman , (Social


Responsibilities of Business)
SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
DOCTRINE

 Benedict Sheehy dalam Scrooge-The Reluctant


Shareholder: Theoretical Problems In the
Shareholder-Stakeholder Debate, University of
Miami Law Review, Vol. 14, 2005, menyatakan
ada 4 (empat) alasan, yaitu: (1) hold the
residual claims; (2) have the greatest risk; (3)
have the greatest incentive to maximize firm
value; and (4) have the least protection.
KONTRA

 Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate


Managers Trustees?, Harvard Law Review, Vol.
45, 1932, (Social Services)

 Supreme Court of British Columbia, in cases


Teck Corporation Ltd. V. Millar (1973) 33 DLR
(3d) 288. Justice Berger opinion, (Interest
Employee and Community)
KONTRA

 Director Primacy Doctrine

 Team Production Doctrine

 Margaret M. Blair dan Lynn A. Stout


Pendirian Perseroan Terbatas
Indonesia Amerika
Pendiri, Pemegang Saham, Direksi, Member, Organizer, Shareholder,
Komisaris Director

Akta Pendirian, Anggaran Dasar Certificate of Organization,


Operating Agreement

Menteri Hukum dan HAM Secretary of State


Surat Keputusan Pengesahan Badan Certificate of Existance
Hukum

Tidak diwajibkan Pengumuman Tidak diwajibkan pengumuman


Organ Perseroan

 One Tier Board Model

 Two Tier Board Model

 Modification Board Model


Sejarah

 The Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC)


 Internal Structure can describe today as a one-
tier board model
 The board of seventeen directors, elected by the
76 governors of the six chambers (Amsterdam,
Middelburg, Rotterdam, Delft, Hoorn, and
Enkhuizen)
 in 1623, Introduced what we call a Supervisory
Board
Sejarah
 Enron Cases
 high degree of irresponsible and partly criminal
conduct, particularly by external auditors
 what is stunning is not only the failure of the auditing
control device – which can be classified somewhere
in the middle between inside and outsidecontrol –
but that all control mechanisms failed
 efficient internal control of management and
auditing by the supervisory board or the responsible
board committee is indispensable
Two Tier Board Model
 Management Board (Vorstand)

 Supervisory Board (Aufischtsrat) (control the


management not the corporation)

 German dalam 3 UU Ketenagakerjaan (iron, steel


and coal industries) mensyaratkan komposisi 3:1
bagi wakil tenaga kerja dalam Aufischtsrat jika
mempekerjakan lebih dari 500 pekerja
One Tier Board Model

 Entrusts both management and control to the


hands of the board of directors

 Board of Directors, distinct into:


 executive directors (led by CEO) who are
employed as managers parallel to their
directorate
 non-executive directors (led by board
chairman) who are not involved in the running of
the day-to-day business of the company
One Tier Board Model
 All directors have the same powers, non-executive
directors can also take the initiative in
management decisions, and they are not
restricted to post-decision approval like the
German supervisory board

 Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421. disebutkan all


directors – regardless of whether they are
executives or non-executives – owe the same
duties to the company
Perancis
 One-tier model with the conseil d’administration
 Two-tier model with the conseil d’administration
dan conseil de surveillance
 The Loi Nouvelle Régulations Economique
(NRE)109, adopted in 2001, Introduced Third
Model, There is position Président Directeur
Générale (PDG), who took both the position of
chairman of the board and of the chief
executive officer
 Labour participation is secured in that two
members of the workers’ council
Italia

 From January 2004, based on Vietti-Reform ties by


Mirone Committe, companies will have the choice
between three different board models:
 two-tier board structure following the German model with
a management board (consiglio di gestione) and a
supervisory board (consiglio de sorveglianza)
 One-tier structure that ties in with the Anglo-Saxon model
 Collegio Sindacale and Consiglio di Amministrazione (that
composed at least of one third of independent directors
and for a control committee (comitato per il controllo
sulla gestione) exclusively composed of independent
directors)
 There is no role of Employee Representation
Indonesia

 Two Tier Board Model, Management Function


by Direksi dan Control Function by Dewan
Komisaris

 Three Tier Board Model (Syar’i Business) Direksi,


Dewan Komisaris dan Dewan Pengawas Syariah
(Pasal 109)
Direksi & Perseroan Terbatas

 Direksi Organ Tubuh; GENERAL Meeting


sebagai Otak, oleh karena itu seolah-olah
Direksi adalah Personifikasi PT.
 2 (dua) Konsep Direksi:
 Trustee Doctrine
 Agency Doctrine
 Agency Doctrine, sejalan dengan Financial
Theory.
 John R. Boatright mengatakan, “ The most
important right of shareholder are elect the
board of director”
Tanggung Jawab Direksi
 Berdasarkan Waktu
 Sebelum (PT Evergreen Printing Glass vs. Willem Sihartoe
Hoetahoeroek)
 Setelah (PT Asuransi Kerugian Jasa Raharja vs.
Setiarko ” Graha Gapura ” dan KRT Rubianto
Argonandi“PT Rencong Aceh Semen”

 Berdasarkan Fiduciary Duty( Delaware Supreme Court Decision)


 Duty of Loyalty, Re Emerging Comunication Inc. Shareholder
Litigation. 3 dari 7 dihukum. Inside Director: Prosser, Inside
Director and Company Counsel: John Raynor dan Outside
Director Salvatore Mouio.
 Duty of Care, Smith vs Van Gorkom (Trade Union
Corporation Case, Marmon Group) Kesepuluh Direktur
dihukum mengganti kerugian US $ 23.5 Million
Fiduciary Duty

 Steven C. Peck, dalam artikrlnya berjudul The


Confidence and Trust That Encompasses the Fiduciary
Relationship, California Business Lawyer, 28 Desember
2009, menyatakan “A fiduciary is someone who has
undertaken to act for and on behalf of another in a
particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a
relationship of trust and confidence … A
fiduciary is expected to be extremely loyal to the
person to whom he owes the duty (the "principal"): he
must not put his personal interests before the duty, and
must not profit from his position as a fiduciary, unless
the principal consents."
Fiduciary Duty

 Robert Brown Jr. Dalam artikel Disloyalty Without


Limit: Independent Directors and the
Elemination of the Duty of Loyalty, Kentucky
Law Journal, Vo. 95, 2006, mengatakan
“absolute require of existing
fiduciary relation and
fiduciary duty is a fairness.”
Fiduciary Duty

 Fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith


 Duty of loyalty, “ the decision makers within the
company should act in the interest of the company,
and not in their own interest” (Bernard S. Black)
 Duty of Good Faith, “… that directors must act in
good faith in what they believe to be the best
interest of the company” (Paul L. Davies)

 Fiduciary duties of Skill and Care


 Diligently (Rajin)
Standart of
 Carefully (Hati-hati) Conduct
 Skillfully (Terampil)
Fiduciary duties of loyalty
and good faith
1. Directors must act bona fide, in what they
believe to be in the best interest of the
company, (Lord Greene dalamSmith v.
Fawcett Ltd [1942] 1 A11 ER. 542, Lipton,
“They (board of directors) must exercise their
discretion bonafide in what they consider to
be in the interest of the company, and not for
any collateral purposes.”
Fiduciary duties of loyalty
and good faith
2. Directors must exercise their powers for the purpose
for which they were conferred and not for an
extraneous purpose (Direksi diharapkan dapat
bertindak adil dalam memberikan manfaat
yang optimum bagi korporasi dengan
menjalankan tujuan dari korporasi. Direksi
tidak dapat melakukan tindakan di luar dari
tujuan korporasi, walaupun menurut
pertimbangannya tindakan tersebut baik
bagi korporasi.)
Fiduciary duties of loyalty
and good faith
3. Directors must not fetter their discretion to exercise
their powers (Direksi tidak boleh melakukan
pembatasan dini untuk bertindak yang
sesuai dengan tujuan dan kepentingan
korporasi. Direksi dalam menjalankan
tugasnya harus tetap bebas dalam
mengambil keputusan atau membuat
kebijaksanaan sesuai pertimbangan bisnis
dengan sense of business yang dimilikinya.)
Fiduciary duties of loyalty
and good faith
 Directors must not place themselves in position of
conflict of interest without the consent of the
company, Lord Herschell’s dalam kasus Bray
v. Ford[1896] A.C. 44, 50; “it is an inflexible
rule of a court of equity that a person in a
fiduciary position ... is not, unless otherwise
expressly provided, entitled to make a profit;
he is not allowed to put himself in a position where
.”
his interest and duty conflict
Fiduciary duties of skill and
care
 Duty of Skill (Direksi tidak diharapkan tingkat
keahlian kecuali hanya setingkat yang dapat
diharapkan secara wajar dari orang yang sama
pengetahuan dan sama pengalaman
dengannya)

 Duty of Care (Direksi harus memiliki


pemahaman yang sama mengenai
bagaimana koeporasi harus dijalankan,
sekalipun dalam keadaan sulit)
Business Judgement Rule

 Roger LeRoy dan Gaylod A. Jentz dalam,


Business Law Today: The Essentials, Cengage
Learning, 2007, mengatakan bahwa “ A rule
that immunizes corporate management from
liability for action that result in corporate losses
or damages if the action are undertaken in
good faith and are within both the power of the
corporation and the authority of management
to make.”
Business Judgement Rule

 Douglas M. Branson, dalam artikelnya The Rule That Isn’t


a Rule- The Business Rule, Valparaiso University Law
Review, Vol. 36, 2002 mengatakan American Legal
Institute, membuat parameter perlindungan bagi direksi
dan keputusannya dari Legal Attack, yaitu:
 first, she and her colleagues made a judgement or decision;
 second, the decision makers were free from disabling
conflict of interest;
 third, they exercised some (not necessarily reasonable) care
in informing themselves about the matter decided; and
 fourth, they had rational (not necessarily reasonable) basis
for the decision they made.”
Business Judgement Rule

 Business Judgement Rule as standart of liability

 Business Judgement Rule as abstention doctrine


Business Judgement Rule as
standart of liability,
 Delaware Supreme Court, Graham v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co. 188 A2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963)

 Dasar Pemikiran “What a directors to act with


the same amount of care which ordinarily
careful and prudent men would use in similar
circumstance.”
Business Judgement Rule as
abstention doctrine
 Shlensky v. Wrigley, 273 N.E.2d 776 (III. App. 1968) dengan
argument sebagai berikut: “that the court will not step in
and interfere with honest business judgement of the
directors unless there is a showing of fraud, illegality or
conflict of interest”.
 Harlowe ’ s Nominees Pty Ltd v. Woodside (Lakes
Entrance) Oil Co. Oil Co. N.L.121 C.L.R. 483 dengan
argumen sebagai berikut:“directors in whom are vested
the right and duty of deciding where the company’s
interest lie and how they are to be served may be
concerned with a wide range of practical considerations
and their Judgement if exercised in good faith and not
for irrelevant purposes is not open to review by the
court”
Philosophy of Bussines
Judgement Rule
 Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel,
dalam bukunya The Economics Structure of
Corporate Law, (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1991) menyatakan “ behind
business judgement rule lies recognition that investors wealth
would be lower if managers decision were routinely subjected
to strict judicial review… precisely why investors wealth not be
maximized by closed judicial scrutiny is less clear. The standard
justifications are that judges lack competence in making
business decisions and that the fear of personal liability will
cause corporate managers to be more cautious and also result
in fewer talented people being willing to serve as
director”
Piercing The Corporate
Veil
 Susan V. Kelley, Personal Liability for Corporate
Debt, Wisconsin Lawyer, Vol. 67. No. 12 October
1994. “ Tanggung jawab pribadi Direksi atas
perbuatan hukum korporasi dimungkinkan jika
undang-undang menentukan lain atau karena
adanya contractual obligation”
Piercing The Corporate
Veil
 Metaforis Limited Liability

 Tidak absolut melindungi pemegang saham dan direksi dari


pertanggungjawaban pribadi.
 Kondisi tertentu pengadilan dapat mengangkat tabir
tersebut untuk menjatuhkan hukuman pertanggungjawaban
pemegang saham maupun direksi secara pribadi.
 Korporasi menjadi alter ego pemegang saham atau direksi,
dan dijadikan topeng atau alat oleh mereka untuk
menghindar dari kreditor atau melakukan kecurangan.
Piercing The Corporate Veil
& Alter Ego

 Keduanya digunakan untuk menarik


pertanggungjawaban pribadi dan menembus
tanggung jawab terbatas yang menjadi
karakteristik korporasi. (Piercing the Corporate
Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine under Federal
Common Law, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 95, no.
4, 1982. Hal. 853.)
Alter Ego Doctrine

 Untuk pertama kalinya doktrin alter ego


diterapkan pada tahun 1931 oleh Wisconsin
Supreme Court dalam Milwaukee Toy Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n of Wis., 203 Wis. 493, 495, 234
N.W. 748 (1931).
Wisconsin Supreme Court

 “ limited liability will be disregarded and the


corporate veil will be pierced when the
corporation has no separate existence and a
person deals with his or her own property
through a corporation just as if he or she were
dealing with it individually”
Alter Ego is?

 “there is such a unity of interest and ownership


that the individuality, or separateness, of said
person and corporation has ceased ” , The
California Supreme Court dalam Minton v.
Cavane, 56 Cal. 2d 597, 364 P.2d 473 (196I).
Two Primary Factors of
Personal Liability
 New Jersey Court dalam perkara Walensky v.
Jonathan Royce International, Inc., 264 N.J.
Super. 276 (App. Div. 1993)berpendapat “(1)
uses the corporation (or his LLC) as his “alter
ego” and (2) thus abuses the corporate form in
order to advance his own personal interests.
Pemicu Piercing The Corporate
Veil dan Alter Ego

 Kerugian Pihak Ketiga

 Kerugian Perusahaan Sendiri


Advantage Leasing Corp. v. Novatech
Solution, No. 03-216 (Wis. Ct. App.
March 24, 2005)

 District Court Wisconsin memutuskan bahwa


corporate veil piercing harus diterapkan untuk
menjatuhkan pertanggungjawaban pribadi direksi
dan pemegang saham,
 Appeal Court Wisconsin berpendapat, Direksi
memang sudah seharusnya bertanggung jawab
secara pribadi atas perbuatan melawan hukum
yang dia lakukan, terlepas dari statusnya sebagai
direksi atau pemegang saham, sekalipun yang ia
lakukan merupakan bagian dari lingkup
pekerjaannya.
Kapan veil piercing tersebut dapat
dilakukan?
 “The Prima Facie Element of Veil Piercing”, Consumer's Co-
op of Walworth County v. Olsen, 142 Wis. 2d 465, 419 N.W.2d
211 (1988).
 tergugat telah mendominasi dengan sempurna dalam
praktek bisnis korporasi sehingga antara tergugat
dengan korporasi “ has no separate mind, will or
existence of its own”
Pasal 97 ayat (2) dan (3) Undang-
Undang Perseroan Terbatas

 Setiap anggota direksi untuk melaksanakan pengurusan


Perseroan dengan itikad baik dan penuh tanggung
jawab, atas kesalahan dan kelalaian karena tidak
melaksanakan pengurusan dengan itikad baik dan
penuh tanggung jawab mengakibatkan setiap anggota
direksi bertanggung jawab secara pribadi
 tergugat menggunakan kontrol yang dia miliki untuk
melakukan kecurangan atau kesalahan yang melanggar
ketentuan hukum atau kewajiban hukum, atau bertindak
secara tidak jujur dan tidak adil
 terdapat causal connection antara elemen pertama-kedua
dan menimbulkan kerugian bagi penggugat
 kerugian tersebut harus sudah timbul dan dapat dihitung ketika
penggugat melakukan gugatan
PT. Bank Perkembangan Asia V. PT. Djaja
Tunggal cs., No. 1916 K/Pdt/1991 (1996)

 Putusan Pengadilan Negeri dan Pengadilan Tinggi Bandung.


 Tergugat I harus membayar hutang dan kerugian sebesar Rp.
5.502.293.038,83-
 Tergugat II-III-IV-V-VI-VII membayar ganti rugi secara tanggung
renteng sebesar Rp. 100.000.000,-,
 Menyatakan bahwa Tergugat II-III-IV-V turut bertanggung
jawab secara pribadi atas hutang tersebut, karena merupakan
anggota manajemen Penggugat dan Tergugat I,
 Secara bersamaan dan telah bertindak tidak beritikad baik
dengan memberikan pinjaman kepada Tergugat I tanpa
melakukan analisis kredit dan mengetahui bahwa jaminan Hak
Guna Usaha No. 39 dan 40 yang diberikan Tergugat I adalah
telah daluarsa sejak 24 September 1980.

 Mahkamah Agung membatalkan


Derivative Action

 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp,


menyatakan bahwa, The shareholder derivative
action is the chief regulator of corporate
governance. Cohen v Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corp 337 US 541, 548 (1949)
 Kata derivative dalam konteks ini ditujukan
untuk memperlihatkan bahwa hak untuk
menggugat tidak dimiliki sebagai pihak dalam
perkara (personal yang dirugikan), tetapi
sebagai turunan dari korporasi.
Pendapat Ahli
 John C. Coffe dan Donald E. Schwarts, derivative action memainkan peranan penting dalam
mencegah Direksi dari pelanggaran kewajiban dan hukuman atas pelanggaran tersebut. (The
Survival of Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, Columbia Law
Review 81, 1981, hal. 261)

 Oliver C. Schreiner, yang dicegah dari derivative action adalah manajemen yang tidak jujur
dari Direksi, , (The Shareholders Derivative Action – A Comparative Study of Procedures, South
African Law Journal 96, 1979, hal. 203.)

 Thomas P. Kinney berpendapat bahwa yang dicegah adalah prilaku yang salah (wrongful
behavior) dari Direksi. (, Stockholders Derivative Suits: Demand and Futility Where the Board
Fails to Stop Wrongdoers, Marquette Law Review 78, 1994, hal. 172.)

 George T. Washington berpendapat bahwa peranan derivative action adalah untuk


memberikan perlindungan yang seimbang bagi minority shareholders. (, Stockholders
Derivative Suits: The Companys Role and a Suggestion, Cornell Law Quarterly 25, 1940, hal.
361.)

 The 1993 Companies and Securities Advisory Committee Report on a Statutory Derivative
Action adalah pendapat yang berhasil menyatukan berbagai macam perbedaan pendapat
tersebut, yaitu dengan menggunakan istilah “ achieving managerial accountability ”
sebagai kegunaan dari adanya shareholder derivative action, (Companies and Securities
Advisory Committee Report on a Statutory Derivative Action, July 1993, hal. 4.

 Ian M. Ramsay and Benjamin B. Saunders menyatakan bahwa peranan derivative action
adalah menjamin corporate governance yang efektif yang di dalamnya terdapat aspek
akuntabilitas. (Litigation by Shareholders and Directors: An Empirical Study of the Statutory
Derivative Action, Legal Studies Research Paper, Melbourne Law School. Hal. 2.)
Sejarah Derivative Action

 Robinson v. Smith pada tahun 1832, dalam perkara ini Chancellor Reuben H.
Walworth mengatakan bahwa beneficiary dapat membawa gugatan atas nama
(on behalf) trust terhadap faithless trustee yang menolak bertindak untuk
kepentingan trust dan melakukan kecurangan (fraudulent breach of trust).

 Foss v. Harbottle Principles. Dalam Perkara Foss v. Harbottle, Richard Foss dan
Edward Starkie Turton sebagai minority shareholders dari Victoria Park Company
menggugat 5 (lima) orang Direksi korporasi yang terdiri dari Thomas Harbottle,
Joseph Adshead, Henry Byrom, John Westhead dan Richard Bealey karena telah
menjual 180 acres tanah yang sebelumnya dibeli pada bulan September 1835 di
atas harga pasar dan telah mengagunkan properti korporasi dengan harga yang
tidak layak (improper price). Dalam perkara ini, Vice Chancellor Sir James Wigram
menyatakan bahwa “ the corporation should sue in its own name and in its
corporate character, or in the name of someone whom the law has appointed to
be its representative.” Dengan kata lain bahwa yang berhak untuk menggugat
korporasi adalah korporasi itu sendiri sebagai subyek hukum atau individu yang
oleh hukum ditunjuk sebagai representasi korporasi. Oleh karena itu, gugatan
penggugat ditolak oleh pengadilan Inggris.
Reaksi dari Foss v. Harbottle
Principles.

 Justice Jenkins L. dalam perkara Edward v. Halliwell,


 proper plaintiff rule Proper plaintiff rule diartikan sebagai
perbuatan salah terhadap korporasi bukan merupakan perbuatan
yang salah bagi pemegang saham, atas kesalahan tersebut yang
berhak menggugat adalah korporasi itu sendiri. Hal ini sejalan
dengan separate legal entity doctine yang pertama kali
diperkenalkan dalam perkara Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co.
 Internal management-simple majority rule.,pengadilan tidak akan
mencampuri internal management dari suatu korporasi sepanjang
tindakan manajemen didasarkan pada kewenangan yang
dimilikinya, sekalipun terjadi kesalahan, jika mayoritas pemegang
saham menerima kesalahan tersebut menjadi tanggung jawab
korporasi maka pengadilan tetap tidak dapat mencampuri urusan
tersebut. Hal ini sejalan dengan internal affairs doctrine yang
pertama kali diperkenalkan dalam perkara Burland v. Earle.
Pengecualian dari Foss v.
Harbottle Principles.

 The illegal or ultra vires exception

 The special majority exception

 The personal right exception

 The fraud on the minority exception

 The interest of justice exception


The illegal or ultra vires
exception
 Dimana tindakan Direksi adalah ilegal atau ultra
vires terhadap korporasi, dalam keadaan ini
pemegang saham dapat menggugat atas
nama sendiri untuk membatasi atau
menghentikan tindakan Direksi tersebut, karena
tindakan ilegal dan ultra vires tidak akan
disahkan (ratify) oleh mayoritas pemegang
saham.
The special majority exception

 Dimana tindakan korporasi (corporate action) disetujui


dengan cara yang biasa yaitu persetujuan mayoritas
pemegang saham sedangkan anggaran dasar (statute or
the company constitution) mensyaratkan berbeda, yaitu
harus dengan persetujuan pemegang saham minoritas di
dalamnya (special majority). Dalam keadaan ini pemegang
saham dapat menggugat atas nama pribadi atas
pelanggaran anggaran dasar tersebut. Penerapan
exception ini terdapat dalam perkara Baillie v. Oriental
Telephone Co. Ltd., dan Cotter v. National Union of Seamen,
pengadilan mengijinkan pemberlakukan aturan ini karena
telah karena telah terjadi pelanggaran anggaran dasar
oleh korporasi tanpa adanya kesempatan untuk
mengembalikan kerugian pemegang saham minoritas
The personal right exception

 Personal right exception ini memang merupakan


pengecualian dari Foss v. Harbottle Principles, tetapi
tidak dapat diterapkan dengan derivative action
sama seperti 2 (dua) pengecualian sebelumnya.
Karena jika terjadi pelanggaran terhadap hak-hak
personal pemegang saham maka pemegang
saham itu sendirilah yang berhak menggugat
korporasi yang merugikannya, oleh Justice Jenkins L.
dalam Edward v. Halliwell, dikatakan sebagai “not
in the right of the company but in their own right, to
protect from invasion their individual rights as
member.”
The fraud on the minority
exception
 Dimana terjadi tindakan yang dihitung sebagai kecurangan
terhadap pemegang saham minoritas dan pelaku
kesalahan/kecurangan (wrongdoers) adalah pemegang kontrol
dari korporasi. Dalam keadaan ini pemegang saham minoritas
diijinkan untuk melakukan gugatan terhadap pelaku
kesalahaan/kecurangan tersebut atas nama korporasi.
Pengecualian ini mensyaratkan 2 (dua) komponen, yaitu; (1)
pelanggaran dilakukan oleh pihak yang memegang kontrol
korporasi, oleh karena itu gugatan harus dilakukan atas nama
korporasi, dan (2) tindakan yang dipermasalahkan, dalam
pandangan pengadilan, harus dinyatakan sebagai kecurangan
(fraud) terhadap pemegang saham minoritas. Jika hak menggugat
berdasarkan pengecualian satu sampai tiga adalah hak
menggugat personal, maka gugatan berdasarkan pengecualian
ini adalah gugatan derivatif. Oleh karena itu, pengecualian ini
dikatakan sebagai ”the only true exception to the rule in Foss v
Harbottle.”
Contoh Perkara
 Pavlides v. Jensen, dimana Direksi menyetujui menjual barang milik korporasi
sebesar £182,000 padahal barang tersebut dapat laku dengan harga £1000,000.
Pemegang saham minoritas mengadukan dugaan kecurangan dan kesalahan
manajemen yang kotor. Atas tuntutan ini pengadilan berpegang bahwa
pemegang saham minoritas tidak dapat mengugat atas nama korporasi karena
keadaan ini hanya merupakan kelalaian (negligence) dan tidak terdapat
kecurangan nyata (actual fraud) yang dapat dibuktikan.

 Daniels v. Daniels, dalam perkara ini Bapak dan Ibu Daniels adalah Direksi dari
korporasi Daniels yang juga memegang mayoritas saham korporasi. Kemudian
korporasi menjual sepotong tanah kepada Ibu Daniels sebesar £4,250,-, harga ini
merupakan harga di bawah nilai kotor, hal ini ditunjukan dengan 4 (empat) tahun
kemudian tanah tersebut dijual kembali oleh Ibu Daniels dengan harga £120,000.
Atas keadaan ini pemegang saham yang lain mencoba menggugat Direksi atas
nama korporasi Daniels. Meskipun tanpa adanya dugaan kecurangan nyata
(actual fraud). Dalam gugatan ini Justice Tampleman berpegang bahwa
kelalaian atau pelanggaran kewajiban fidusia tidak hanya ditunjukan dengan
kerugian korporasi tetapi juga dihasilkannya keuntungan Direksi dari perbuatan
yang dapat dihitung sebagai kecurangan terhadap pemegang saham. Oleh
karena itu, gugatan pemegang saham minoritas atas nama korporasi Daniels
diterima.
The interest of justice exception

 Sir James Wigram dalam perkara Foss v. Harbottle sendiri:

“If a case should arise of injury to a corporation by some part of its members, for which
no adequate remedy remains, except that of a suit by individual corporators ...,
the claims of justice would be found superior to any difficulties arising out of
technical rules respecting the mode in which corporations are required to sue.”

 Menurut Sir James Wigram, tuntutan keadilan akan memecahkan permasalahan


yang timbul dari aturan teknis yang mensyaratkan agar suatu korporasi dapat
digugat. Dengan kata lain, pengadilan akan mengijinkan pemegang saham
melakukan gugatan yang mengecualikan aturan dalam Foss v. Harbottle ketika
interest of justice mensyaratkan hal itu.

 Menurut L.S. Sealy, interest of justice bukan sama sekali pengecualian tetapi hal
yang sangat mendasar dari niatan pengadilan untuk memberikan bantuan
kepada pemegang saham minoritas yang menuntut perbaikan dari kesalahan
korporasi. Lebih ekstrim lagi, mengenai hal ini, O.A. Osunbor berpendapat bahwa
interest of justice bukanlah pengecualian dari Foss v Harbottle Principles karena
pengecualian tersebut terlalu tidak jelas, samar dan sangat elastis.
Di Indonesia
 Pasal 97 ayat (6)

“Pemegang saham yang mewakili paling sedikit 1/10


(satu persepuluh) bagian dari jumlah seluruh
saham dengan hak suara dapat mengajukan
gugatan atas nama Perseroan melalui pengadilan
negeri terhadap anggota Direksi yang karena
kesalahan atau kelalaiannya menimbulkan
kerugian pada Perseroan.”
Contoh Perkara di
Indonesia
 PT. Dwi Satrya Utama v. Raymond Richard Spark dan Indradi Kosim, dalam perkara ini Pengadilan Negeri Jakarta Pusat
memeriksa gugatan derivatif dari PT. Dwi Satrya Utama sebagai pemegang 45% saham PT. ICI Paints Indonesia terhadap
Raymond Richard Spark dan Indradi Kosim sebagai anggota Direksi dari PT. ICI Paints Indonesia. PT. Dwi Satrya Utama menilai
bahwa Tergugat I dan Tergugat II telah menunjuk Konsultan Hukum Freshfields dan Makarim & Taira untuk kepentingan PPG
Industry yang berniat membeli Pabrik di Cimanggis tanpa persetujuan 2 (dua) Direksi yang merupakan perwakilan PT. Dwi Satrya
Utama. Atas penunjukan Konsultas Hukum itu Penggugat mendalilkan bahwa Tergugat I dan Tergugat II telah menyetujui
pembayaran sebesar S$16,970.13 bagi Freshfields dan US$106,850.12 bagi Makarim & Taira padahal jasa konsultas hukum
tersebut adalah lebih pada kepentingan pihak PPG ketimbang kepentingan PT. ICI Paints Indonesia.

 Selain permasalahan diatas, Penggugat juga mendalilkan bahwa Tergugat I dan Tergugat II telah gagal melakukan tindakan
manajemen korporasi dengan membiarkan General Manager mentransfer uang sebesar US$4,500,000.- dari salah satu rekening
PT. ICI Paints Indonesia di bank nasional ke Deutstche Bank Singapore, padahal saat itu Indonesia sedang menghadapi krisis
ekonomi dan terdapat himbauan Pemerintah agar seluruh warga negara dan badan usaha tidak melakukan transfer uang ke
negara lain.

 Berdasarkan dalil-dalil Penggugat, Pengadilan Negeri Jakarta Selatan dalam putusannya menyatakan bahwa tidak terbukti
penunjukan konsultan hukum Freshfield dan Makarim & Taira oleh Tergugat I dan Tergugat II adalah tidak sah menimbulkan
kerugian bagi PT. ICI Paints Indonesia dan atas tuduhan membiarkan transfer uang sebesar US$4,500,000.- ke Duetstche Bank
Singapore yang menimbulkan kerugian bagi PT. ICI Paints Indonesia juga tidak terbukti di pengadilan.

 Atas pertimbangan tersebut, Pengadilan Negeri Jakarta Selatan menolak gugatan Penggugat dan menghukum Penggugat
mengajukan permintaan maaf kepada Tergugat I dan Tergugat II di harian Kompas dan The Jakarta Post selama 3 (tiga) hari
berturut-turut. PT. Dwi Satrya Utama v Raymond Richard Spark dan Indradi Kosim, No. 59/Pdt.G/2002/PN. Jak-Sel (2002)
Corporate Opportunity

 Keech v Sandford [1726] EWHC Ch J76


 A child had inherited the lease on Romford Market near
London. Mr Sandford was entrusted to look after this
property until the child matured. But before then, the lease
expired. The landlord had told Mr Sandford that he did not
want the child to have the renewed lease. There was clear
evidence of the refusal to renew for the benefit of the
infant.[1] Yet the landlord was happy (apparently) to give Mr
Sandford the opportunity of the lease instead. Mr Sandford
took it. When the child (now Mr Keech) grew up, he sued Mr
Sandford for the profit that he had been making by getting
the market's lease.
Corporate Opportunity

 The Lord King LC. ordered Mr Sandford should


disgorge his profits. He wrote, “I must consider this as a
trust for the infant, for I very well see, if a trustee, on the
refusal to renew, might have a lease to himself, few trust-
estates would be renewed to the cestui que use; though I do
not say there is a fraud in this case, yet [the trustee] should
rather have let it run out, than to have had the lease to
himself. This may seem hard, that the trustee is the only
person of all mankind who might not have the lease: but it is
very proper that rule should be strictly pursued, and not in
the least relaxed; for it is very obvious what would be the
consequence of letting trustees have the lease, on refusal to
renew to cestui que use.”
Corporate Opportunity

 Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A. 2d 503 (Del. Ch. 1939)


 Mr. Guth was the President of Loft Inc, which made a cola
drink. Loft's soda fountains purchased cola syrup from Coca
Cola Ltd, but then Mr. Guth decided it would be cheaper to
buy from Pepsi after Coke declined to give him a larger
jobber discount. Pepsi went bankrupt before Mr. Guth could
inquire about obtaining syrup from Pepsi. Mr. Guth bought
the company and its syrup recipe, (which he then had Loft
chemists reformulate) and then purported to sell the syrup
on to Loft Inc. He was alleged to have breached his
fiduciary duty of loyalty to the company by failing to offer
that opportunity to Loft Inc, and instead appropriating it for
himself.
Corporate Opportunity

 Daniel J. Layton, the concurrent chief justice, gave the lead judgment for the
Delaware Supreme Court. He started off by paying service to the general
principle against conflicts of interest.

"Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust
and confidence to further their private interests. While technically not
trustees, they stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its
stockholders. A public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a
profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has established
a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and
inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty, not only affirmatively
to protect the interest of the corporation committed to his charge, but also
to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to
deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability might properly
bring to it, or to enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its
powers."
Corporate Opportunity

 But then he stated the main principle as this,

"On the other hand, it is equally true that, if there is presented


to a corporate officer or director a business opportunity
which the corporation if financially able to undertake,
which is, from its nature, in the line of the corporation’s
business and is of practical advantage to it, is one in
which the corporation has an interest or a reasonable
expectancy, and, by embracing the opportunity, the self-
interest of the officer or director will be brought into
conflict with that of his corporation, the law will not permit
him to seize the opportunity for himself."
Broz v. Cellular Information
Systems
 "a corporate officer or director may not
take a business opportunity for his own if: (1)
the corporation is financially able to exploit
the opportunity; (2) the opportunity is within
the corporation's line of business; (3) the
corporation has an interest or expectancy in
the opportunity; and (4) by taking the
opportunity for his own the corporate
fiduciary will thereby be placed in a position
inimicable to his duties to the corporation."
Broz v. Cellular Information
Systems
 By contrast, "a director or officer may take
the corporate opportunity if: (1) the
opportunity is presented to the director or
officer in his individual capacity and not in
his corporate capacity; (2) the opportunity is
not essential to the corporation; (3) the
corporation holds no interest or expectancy
in the opportunity; and (4) the director or
officer has not wrongfully employed the
resources of the corporation in pursuing or
exploiting the opportunity."
 Daniel J. Layton felt that there was no real standard for
loyalty and it depends on the facts of the case. The
court may enquire and will decide upon the fairness of
any transaction.
 Delaware General Corporation Law Section144.
"The occasions for the determination of honesty, good
faith and loyal conduct are many and varied, and no
hard and fast rule can be formulated. The standard of
loyalty is measured by no fixed scale."