(B) THE CAUSE MUST BE (B) THE CAUSE ARISES AFTER THE
ALREADY EXISTING AT THE TIME MARRIAGE CELEBRATION.
OF THE MARRIAGE.
(C) THERE ARE SEVEN GROUNDS (C) THERE ARE TEN GROUNDS FOR
FOR ANNULMENT. LEGAL SEPARATION.
WHEN TO FILE?
FACTS: ON MARCH 21, 1996, LUCITA ONG FILED A COMPLAINT FOR LEGAL SEPARATION UNDER ARTICLE 55
PAR. (1) OF THE FAMILY CODE BEFORE THE RTC OF DAGUPAN CITY. SHE ALLEGED THE FOLLOWING:
1. THAT AFTER THREE YEARS OF MARRIAGE, SHE AND WILLIAM QUARRELED ALMOST EVERY DAY, WITH
PHYSICAL VIOLENCE BEING INFLICTED UPON HER;
2. THAT WILLIAM WOULD SHOUT INVECTIVES AT HER LIKE PUTANG INA MO, GAGO, TANGA, AND HE WOULD
SLAP HER, KICK HER, PULL HER HAIR, BANG HER HEAD AGAINST CONCRETE WALL AND THROW AT HER
WHATEVER HE COULD REACH WITH HIS HAND;
3. THAT WILLIAM WOULD ALSO SCOLD AND BEAT THE CHILDREN AT DIFFERENT PARTS OF THEIR BODIES USING
THE BUCKLE OF HIS BELT AND THAT WHENEVER SHE TRIED TO STOP WILLIAM FROM HITTING THE CHILDREN, HE
WOULD TURN HIS IRE ON HER AND BOX HER;
4. AND THAT ON DECEMBER 14, 1995, A VIOLENT QUARREL ENSUED AND WILLIAM HIT HER ON HER HEAD,
LEFT CHEEK, EYE, STOMACH, AND ARMS; WHEN WILLIAM HIT HER ON THE STOMACH AND SHE BENT DOWN
BECAUSE OF THE PAIN, HE HIT HER ON THE HEAD THEN POINTED A GUN AT HER AND ASKED HER TO LEAVE THE
HOUSE.
WILLIAM FOR HIS PART DENIED THE CHARGES AND ASSERTED
THAT SINCE LUCITA HAS ABANDONED THE FAMILY, A DECREE OF LEGAL
SEPARATION SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED, FOLLOWING THE FAMILY
CODE WHICH PROVIDES THAT LEGAL SEPARATION SHALL BE DENIED
WHEN BOTH PARTIES HAVE GIVEN GROUND FOR LEGAL SEPARATION.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION SHOULD BE
GRANTED?
HELD:
YES. AS BETWEEN THE DETAILED ACCOUNTS GIVEN FOR LUCITA AND THE GENERAL
DENIAL FOR WILLIAM, THE COURT GIVES MORE WEIGHT TO THOSE OF THE FORMER. THE
COURT ALSO GIVES A GREAT AMOUNT OF CONSIDERATION TO THE ASSESSMENT OF THE
TRIAL COURT REGARDING THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES AS TRIAL COURT JUDGES
ENJOY THE UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY OF OBSERVING THE DEPORTMENT OF WITNESSES ON
THE STAND, A VANTAGE POINT DENIED APPELLATE TRIBUNALS.
ALSO WITHOUT MERIT IS THE ARGUMENT OF WILLIAM THAT SINCE LUCITA HAS
ABANDONED THE FAMILY, A DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED,
FOLLOWING ART. 56, PAR. (4) OF THE FAMILY CODE WHICH PROVIDES THAT LEGAL
SEPARATION SHALL BE DENIED WHEN BOTH PARTIES HAVE GIVEN GROUND FOR LEGAL
SEPARATION. THE ABANDONMENT REFERRED TO BY THE FAMILY CODE IS ABANDONMENT
WITHOUT JUSTIFIABLE CAUSE FOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR.AS IT WAS ESTABLISHED THAT
LUCITA LEFT WILLIAM DUE TO HIS ABUSIVE CONDUCT, SUCH DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
ABANDONMENT CONTEMPLATED BY THE SAID PROVISION.
2. HOMOSEXUALITY
MANUEL ALMELOR VS RTC AND LEONIDA ALMELOR
G.R. NO. 179620, AUGUST 26, 2008
FACTS: AFTER 11 YEARS OF MARRIAGE, LEONIDA ALMELOR FILED A PETITION TO ANNUL THEIR MARRIAGE
ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY ALLEGING THAT, MANUEL, HER HUSBAND, CONCEALED TO
HER THAT HE WAS A HOMOSEXUAL.
HER SUSPICIONS WERE FIRST AROUSED WHEN SHE NOTICED MANUEL'S PECULIAR CLOSENESS TO HIS MALE
COMPANIONS. SHE ALSO FOUND SEVERAL PORNOGRAPHIC HOMOSEXUAL MATERIALS IN HIS
POSSESSION.HER WORSE FEARS WERE CONFIRMED WHEN SHE SAW MANUEL KISS ANOTHER MAN ON THE
LIPS. AT THIS POINT, LEONIDA TOOK HER CHILDREN AND LEFT THEIR CONJUGAL ABODE.
MANUEL, FOR HIS PART, DENIED HIS WIFE'S ALLEGATIONS AND ASSERTED THAT HIS WIFE'S ACTION IS BASED
ON AN ONGOING FAMILY RIVALRY AS BETWEEN LEONIDA'S FAMILY-OWNED HOSPITAL AND HIS.
THE TRIAL COURT NULLIFIED THE MARRIAGE, NOT ON THE GROUND OF ARTICLE 36, BUT ARTICLE 45 OF THE
FAMILY CODE.
ISSUE: W/N THE MARRIAGE SHOULD BE ANNULLED BASED ON
PETITIONER’S ALLEGED HOMOSEXUALITY?
HELD:
NO. THE TRIAL COURT DECLARED THAT LEONIDA'S PETITION FOR NULLITY HAD "NO BASIS AT ALL
BECAUSE THE SUPPORTING GROUNDS RELIED UPON CAN NOT LEGALLY MAKE A CASE UNDER
ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE." IF SO, THE LOWER COURT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED
OUTRIGHT THE PETITION FOR NOT MEETING THE GUIDELINES SET IN MOLINA. WHAT LEONIDA
ATTEMPTED TO DEMONSTRATE WERE MANUEL'S HOMOSEXUAL TENDENCIES BY CITING OVERT
ACTS GENERALLY PREDOMINANT AMONG HOMOSEXUAL INDIVIDUALS. SHE WANTED TO
PROVE THAT THE PERCEIVED HOMOSEXUALITY RENDERED MANUEL INCAPABLE OF FULFILLING
THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
BUT INSTEAD OF DISMISSING THE PETITION, THE TRIAL COURT NULLIFIED THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN MANUEL AND LEONIDA ON THE GROUND OF VITIATED CONSENT BY VIRTUE OF
FRAUD.
IN 1955, TENCHAVEZ INITIATED THE PROCEEDINGS AT BAR AND ASKED FOR LEGAL
SEPARATION AND ONE MILLION PESOS IN DAMAGES. VICENTA CLAIMED A VALID
DIVORCE FROM PLAINTIFF AND AN EQUALLY VALID MARRIAGE TO HER PRESENT
HUSBAND, RUSSELL LEO MORAN; WHILE HER PARENTS DENIED THAT THEY HAD IN
ANY WAY INFLUENCED THEIR DAUGHTER'S ACTS, AND COUNTERCLAIMED FOR
ISSUE:
W/N A DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION SHOULD BE GRANTED?
HELD:
YES. IN THE PHILIPPINE JURISDICTION, VICENTA ESCAÑO'S DIVORCE AND
SECOND MARRIAGE ARE NOT ENTITLED TO RECOGNITION AS VALID FOR HER
PREVIOUS UNION TO TENCHAVEZ MUST BE DECLARED TO BE EXISTENT AND
UNDISSOLVED. IT FOLLOWS, LIKEWISE, THAT HER REFUSAL TO PERFORM HER
WIFELY DUTIES, AND HER DENIAL OF CONSORTIUM AND HER DESERTION OF HER
HUSBAND CONSTITUTE IN LAW A WRONG CAUSED THROUGH HER FAULT, FOR
WHICH THE HUSBAND IS ENTITLED TO THE CORRESPONDING INDEMNITY (CIVIL
CODE, ART. 2176). NEITHER AN UNSUBSTANTIATED CHARGE OF DECEIT NOR AN
ANONYMOUS LETTER CHARGING IMMORALITY AGAINST THE HUSBAND
CONSTITUTE, CONTRARY TO HER CLAIM, ADEQUATE EXCUSE. WHEREFORE, HER
MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION WITH RUSSELL LEO MORAN IS TECHNICALLY
"INTERCOURSE WITH A PERSON NOT HER HUSBAND" FROM THE STANDPOINT
OF PHILIPPINE LAW, AND ENTITLES PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT TENCHAVEZ TO A
DECREE OF "LEGAL SEPARATION UNDER OUR LAW, ON THE BASIS OF ADULTERY."
4. SEXUAL INFIDELITY
FACTS: PRIVATE RESPONDENT, TERESITA, THE LEGAL WIFE OF THE PETITIONER, FILED A COMPLAINT
AGAINST PETITIONER FOR LEGAL SEPARATION ON THE GROUND OF CONCUBINAGE, WITH A PETITION
FOR SUPPORT AND PAYMENT FOR DAMAGES. SHE ALSO FILED A CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST PETITIONER
FOR CONCUBINAGE. SUBSEQUENTLY, AN APPLICATION FOR THE PROVISIONAL REMEDY OF SUPPORT
PENDENTE LITE WAS FILED BY TERESITA AND WHICH WAS GRANTED BY THE LOWER COURT.
PETITIONER CONTENDS THAT THE CIVIL ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION AND THE INCIDENTS
CONSEQUENT THERETO, SUCH AS, APPLICATION FOR SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE, SHOULD BE SUSPENDED
IN VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR CONCUBINAGE FILED AGAINST HIM THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
IT IS PETITIONER'S POSITION THAT SUCH CIVIL ACTION ARISES FROM,
OR IS INEXTRICABLY TIED TO THE CRIMINAL ACTION FOR
CONCUBINAGE, SO THAT ALL PROCEEDINGS RELATED TO LEGAL
SEPARATION WILL HAVE TO BE SUSPENDED TO AWAIT CONVICTION OR
ACQUITTAL FOR CONCUBINAGE IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
ISSUE:
W/N CONVICTION FOR CONCUBINAGE WILL HAVE TO BE FIRST
SECURED BEFORE THE ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION CAN PROSPER?
HELD:
NO. A CIVIL ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION, BASED ON CONCUBINAGE, MAY
PROCEED AHEAD OF, OR SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH, A CRIMINAL ACTION FOR
CONCUBINAGE, BECAUSE SAID CIVIL ACTION IS NOT ONE "TO ENFORCE THE
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM THE OFFENSE" EVEN IF BOTH THE CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL ACTIONS ARISE FROM OR ARE RELATED TO THE SAME OFFENSE. SUCH
CIVIL ACTION IS ONE INTENDED TO OBTAIN THE RIGHT TO LIVE SEPARATELY,
WITH THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES THEREOF, SUCH AS, THE DISSOLUTION OF THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, CUSTODY OF OFFSPRINGS, SUPPORT, AND
DISQUALIFICATION FROM INHERITING FROM THE INNOCENT SPOUSE, AMONG
OTHERS.
FACTS: JOSE AND SERAFINA WERE MARRIED IN 1938. IN 1951, JOSE DISCOVERED THAT SERAFINA MAINTAINED ILLICIT RELATIONS
WITH A CERTAIN ARCALAS. IN 1955, PLAINTIFF AGAIN SURPRISED HIS WIFE IN THE ACT OF HAVING ILLICIT RELATIONS WITH
ANOTHER MAN.
PLAINTIFF, THEREAFTER, SIGNIFIED HIS INTENTION OF FILING A PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION, TO WHICH DEFENDANT
MANIFESTED HER CONFORMITY PROVIDED SHE IS NOT CHARGED WITH ADULTERY IN A CRIMINAL ACTION. ACCORDINGLY,
PLAINTIFF FILED ON JULY 5, 1955, A PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION.
WHEN SERAFINA WAS QUESTIONED BY THE FISCAL UPON ORDERS OF THE COURT, SHE REITERATED HER CONFORMITY TO THE
LEGAL SEPARATION. INTERPRETING THESE FACTS VIRTUALLY TO MEAN A CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT THE APPELLATE COURT
DECLARED THAT UNDER ART. 101, LEGAL SEPARATION COULD NOT BE DECREED.
ISSUE:
W/N THE LOWER COURT'S RULING TO DENY THE PETITION FOR BEING
BASED ON A CONFESSION OF JUDGEMENT IS PROPER?
HELD:
NO. ARTICLE 100 OF THE CIVIL CODE DOES NOT EXCLUDE, AS EVIDENCE, ANY
ADMISSION OR CONFESSION MADE BY THE DEFENDANT OUTSIDE OF THE
COURT. IT MERELY PROHIBITS A DECREE OF SEPARATION UPON A CONFESSION
OF JUDGMENT. CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT USUALLY HAPPENS WHEN THE
DEFENDANT APPEARS IN COURT AND CONFESSES THE RIGHT OF PLAINTIFF TO
JUDGMENT OR FILES A PLEADING EXPRESSLY AGREEING TO THE PLAINTIFF'S
DEMAND.
YET, EVEN SUPPOSING THAT THE STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT BEFORE THE FISCAL
THAT SHE "LIKE ALSO" TO BE LEGALLY SEPARATED FROM HER HUSBAND
CONSTITUTED PRACTICALLY A CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT, INASMUCH AS
THERE IS EVIDENCE OF THE ADULTERY INDEPENDENTLY OF SUCH STATEMENT, THE
DECREE MAY AND SHOULD BE GRANTED, SINCE IT WOULD NOT BE BASED ON
HER CONFESSION, BUT UPON EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PLAINTIFF. WHAT
THE LAW PROHIBITS IS A JUDGMENT BASED EXCLUSIVELY OR MAINLY ON
DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION.
ISSUE:
W/N THERE IS COLLUSION IN THE PRESENT CASE?
HELD:
NO. IN THIS CASE, THERE WOULD BE COLLUSION IF THE PARTIES HAD
ARRANGED TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT A MATRIMONIAL OFFENSE HAD BEEN
COMMITTED ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT, OR IF THE PARTIES HAD CONNIVED TO
BRING ABOUT A LEGAL SEPARATION EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF GROUNDS
THEREFOR.
WHEN SERAFINA WAS QUESTIONED BY THE FISCAL UPON ORDERS OF THE COURT, SHE
REITERATED HER CONFORMITY TO THE LEGAL SEPARATION. INTERPRETING THESE FACTS
VIRTUALLY TO MEAN A CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT THE APPELLATE COURT DECLARED
THAT UNDER ART. 101, LEGAL SEPARATION COULD NOT BE DECREED.
ISSUES:
1. W/N THE LOWER COURT'S RULING TO DENY THE PETITION FOR
BEING BASED ON A CONFESSION OF JUDGEMENT IS PROPER?
2. W/N THERE IS COLLUSION IN THE PRESENT CASE?
1. NO. ARTICLE 100 OF THE CIVIL CODE DOES NOT EXCLUDE, AS EVIDENCE, ANY
ADMISSION OR CONFESSION MADE BY THE DEFENDANT OUTSIDE OF THE
COURT. IT MERELY PROHIBITS A DECREE OF SEPARATION UPON A CONFESSION
OF JUDGMENT. CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT USUALLY HAPPENS WHEN THE
DEFENDANT APPEARS IN COURT AND CONFESSES THE RIGHT OF PLAINTIFF TO
JUDGMENT OR FILES A PLEADING EXPRESSLY AGREEING TO THE PLAINTIFF'S
DEMAND.
YET, EVEN SUPPOSING THAT THE STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT BEFORE THE FISCAL
THAT SHE "LIKE ALSO" TO BE LEGALLY SEPARATED FROM HER HUSBAND
CONSTITUTED PRACTICALLY A CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT, INASMUCH AS
THERE IS EVIDENCE OF THE ADULTERY INDEPENDENTLY OF SUCH STATEMENT, THE
DECREE MAY AND SHOULD BE GRANTED, SINCE IT WOULD NOT BE BASED ON
HER CONFESSION, BUT UPON EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PLAINTIFF. WHAT
THE LAW PROHIBITS IS A JUDGMENT BASED EXCLUSIVELY OR MAINLY ON
DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION.
2. NO. IN THIS CASE, THERE WOULD BE COLLUSION IF THE PARTIES HAD
ARRANGED TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT A MATRIMONIAL OFFENSE HAD BEEN
COMMITTED ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT, OR IF THE PARTIES HAD CONNIVED TO
BRING ABOUT A LEGAL SEPARATION EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF GROUNDS
THEREFOR.
MANDATORY.
NOTE!
NOTICE OF PRE-TRIAL SHALL BE SENT TO THE RESPONDENT
EVEN IF HE FAILS TO FILE AN ANSWER. IN CASE OF
SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION AND THE RESPONDENT
FAILED TO FILE HIS ANSWER, NOTICE OF PRE-TRIAL SHALL
BE SENT TO RESPONDENT AT HIS LAST KNOWN ADDRESS.
PRE-TRIAL
WHAT ARE THE CONTENTS OF PRE-TRIAL
BRIEF?
THE PRE-TRIAL BRIEF SHALL CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING:
(1) A STATEMENT OF THE WILLINGNESS OF THE PARTIES TO
ENTER INTO AGREEMENTS AS MAY BE ALLOWED BY LAW,
INDICATING THE DESIRED TERMS THEREOF;
(2) THEIR RESPECTIVE CLAIMS TOGETHER WITH THE
APPLICABLE LAWS AND AUTHORITIES;
(3) ADMITTED FACTS AND PROPOSED STIPULATIONS OF
FACTS, AS WELL AS THE DISPUTED FACTUAL AND LEGAL
ISSUES;
(4) ALL THE EVIDENCE TO BE PRESENTED, INCLUDING
EXPERT OPINION, IF ANY, BRIEFLY STATING OR
DESCRIBING THE NATURE AND PURPOSE THEREOF;
PRE-TRIAL
WHAT ARE THE CONTENTS OF PRE-TRIAL
BRIEF?
NOTE!
FAILURE TO FILE THE PRE-TRIAL BRIEF OR TO COMPLY WITH ITS
REQUIRED CONTENTS SHALL HAVE THE SAME EFFECT AS
FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRE-TRIAL UNDER THE
SUCCEEDING SECTION.
PRE-TRIAL
WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF FAILURE TO APPEAR AT
THE PRE-TRIAL?
IF THE PETITIONER FAILS TO APPEAR PERSONALLY:
DISMISSED, UNLESS HIS COUNSEL OR A DULY
AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE APPEARS IN COURT AND
PROVES A VALID EXCUSE FOR THE NON-APPEARANCE
OF THE PETITIONER.
WHEN IS IT MADE?
UPON TERMINATION OF THE PRE-TRIAL, THE COURT
SHALL ISSUE A PRE-TRIAL ORDER WHICH SHALL RECITE
IN DETAIL THE MATTERS TAKEN UP IN THE CONFERENCE,
THE ACTION TAKEN THEREON, THE AMENDMENTS
ALLOWED ON THE PLEADINGS, AND, EXCEPT AS TO THE
GROUND OF LEGAL SEPARATION, THE AGREEMENTS OR
ADMISSIONS MADE BY THE PARTIES ON ANY OF THE
MATTERS CONSIDERED, INCLUDING ANY PROVISIONAL
ORDER THAT MAY BE NECESSARY OR AGREED UPON BY
THE PARTIES.
PRE-TRIAL ORDER
IF THE ACTION PROCEED TO TRIAL, THE
ORDER SHALL CONTAIN A RECITAL OF THE
FOLLOWING:
BUGAYONG VS GINEZ
FACTS:
BENJAMIN BUGAYONG, A SERVICEMAN IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY, WAS MARRIED TO LEONILA GINEZ IN 1949 AT ASINGAN, PANGASINAN.
IN JULY 1951, BENJAMIN BEGAN RECEIVING LETTERS INFORMING HIM OF ALLEGED ACTS OF INFIDELITY OF HIS WIFE. IN AUGUST 1952,
BENJAMIN WENT TO PANGASINAN AND LOOKED FOR HIS WIFE WHOM HE MET IN THE HOUSE OF ONE MRS. MALALANG, LEONILA'S
GODMOTHER. SHE CAME ALONG WITH HIM AND BOTH PROCEEDED TO THE HOUSE OF PEDRO, BENJAMIN'S COUSIN, WHERE THEY STAYED AND
LIVED FOR 1 NIGHT AND 1 DAY AS HUSBAND AND WIFE. THE NEXT DAY THEY PASSED THE NIGHT IN THEIR HOUSE AS HUSBAND AND WIFE. ON
THE SECOND DAY, BENJAMIN TRIED TO VERIFY FROM HIS WIFE THE TRUTH OF THE INFORMATION HE RECEIVED THAT SHE HAD COMMITTED
ADULTERY BUT LEONILA, INSTEAD OF ANSWERING HIS QUERY, MERELY PACKED UP AND LEFT, WHICH HE TOOK AS A CONFIRMATION OF THE
ACTS OF INFIDELITY IMPUTED ON HER.
BENJAMIN THEN FILED A CASE FOR LEGAL SEPARATION. LEONILA FILED AN ANSWER VEHEMENTLY DENYING THE AVERMENTS OF THE COMPLAINT
AND SETTING UP AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES. AFTER BENJAMIN TESTIFIED, LEONILA'S COUNSEL MOVED FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT ON
THE GROUND OF CONDONATION.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THERE WAS CONDONATION BETWEEN BUGAYONG AND
GINEZ THAT MAY SERVE AS A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION.
HELD:
YES.
GRANTING THAT INFIDELITIES AMOUNTING TO ADULTERY WERE COMMITED
BY THE WIFE, THE ACT OF THE HUSBAND IN PERSUADING HER TO COME
ALONG WITH HIM AND THE FACT THAT SHE WENT WITH HIM AND
TOGETHER THEY SLEPT AS HUSBAND AND WIFE DEPRIVES HIM AS THE
ALLEGED OFFENDED SPOUSE OF ANY ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION
AGAINST THE OFFENDING WIFE BECAUSE HIS SAID CONDUCT COMES
WITHIN THE RESTRICTION OF ARTICLE 100 OF CIVIL CODE.
B. CONSENT
PEOPLE VS SENSANO AND RAMOS
58 PHIL 73
FACTS:
URSULA SENSANO AND MARIANO VENTURA WERE MARRIED AND HAD A CHILD WHOM THE LATTER ALLEGEDLY
ABANDONED WHEN HE WENT AND STAYED IN CAGAYAN FOR THREE YEARS WITHOUT LETTERS OR FINANCIAL
SUPPORT TO THE FORMER WHO WORKED HARD FOR HERSELF AND HER SON UNTIL SHE MET THE ACCUSED MARCELO
RAMOS WHO LATER TOOK CARE OF THEM.VENTURA CHARGED SENSANO AND RAMOS FOR ADULTERY, FOUND BY
THE COURT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED AND SERVED THEIR SENTENCE.
SENSANO AFTER SERVING HER SENTENCED AND LEAVING HER PARAMOUR MADE STEPS TO RECONCILE WITH AND
GO BACK TO HER HUSBAND BUT TO NO AVAIL - SHE AND HER CHILD WERE ABANDONED FOR THE SECOND TIME.
THUS, THEY WENT BACK TO HER CO-ACCUSED RAMOS. DESPITE THE KNOWLEDGE THAT SHE RESUMED LIVING WITH
HER CODEFENDANT, HER HUSBAND DID NOTHING TO ASSERT HIS RIGHT AS HER SPOUSE. INSTEAD, HE WENT ABROAD
FOR SEVEN YEARS AND PRESUMABLY HAD COMPLETELY ABANDONED THEM..
WHEN VENTURA RETURNED HOME, HE CHARGED SENSANO OF ADULTERY FOR THE SECOND TIME IN ORDER TO
OBTAIN DIVORCE UNDER ACT NO. 2710.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT RAMOS CAN FILE ADULTERY AGAINST HIS SPOUSE
FOR THE SECOND TIME BEING THE OFFENDED PARTY.
HELD:
NO. THE COURT CONCLUDED THAT THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE AS WELL AS
THE CONDUCT OF RAMOS SHOWED THAT HE CONSENTED TO THE
ADULTEROUS RELATIONS EXISTING BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND FORMER
CO-DEFENDANT. HE IS THEREFORE UNDER THE LAW NOT AUTHORIZED TO
INSTITUTE THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING.
WHEN THE HUSBAND KNEW THAT HIS WIFE RESUMED LIVING WITH HER
PARAMOUR AND DID NOTHING TO INTERFERE WITH THEIR RELATIONS OR TO
ASSERT HIS RIGHTS AS HUSBAND, THEN THIS CONDUCT WARRANT THE
INFERENCE THAT HE CONSENTED TO THE ADULTEROUS RELATIONS EXISTING
BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND THEREFORE HE IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY LAW
TO INSTITUTE A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING FOR ADULTERY.
C. COLLUSION
BROWN VS. YAMBAO,
102 PHIL 168, OCTOBER 18, 1957
FACTS:
WILLIAM H. BROWN FILED A PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION FROM HIS WIFE, JUANITA YAMBAO, BEFORE
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA ON THE GROUND OF ADULTERY.
ACCORDING TO BROWN, WHILE HE WAS INTERNED BY THE JAPANESE INVADERS FROM 1942 TO 1945 AT
THE UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS INTERNMENT CAMP, HIS WIFE ENGAGED IN ADULTEROUS RELATIONS
WITH A CERTAIN CARLOS FIELD OF WHOM SHE BEGOT A BABY GIRL. BROWN SAID THAT HE LEARNED OF HIS
WIFE’S MISCONDUCT ONLY IN 1945 UPON HIS RELEASE FROM INTERNMENT AND THAT THEY HAVE LIVED
SEPARATELY THEREAFTER.
BROWN IS NOW PRAYING FOR THE CONFIRMATION OF THEIR LIQUIDATION AGREEMENT; FOR CUSTODY OF
THE CHILDREN ISSUED OF THE MARRIAGE; AND THAT THE DEFENDANT BE DECLARED DISQUALIFIED TO
SUCCEED THE PLAINTIFF AND FOR OTHER REMEDY AS MIGHT BE JUST AND EQUITABLE.
NOW, BECAUSE JUANITA YAMBAO FAILED TO FILE HER ANSWER TO THE PETITION IN DUE
TIME, THE TRIAL COURT DECLARED HER IN DEFAULT AND ORDERED THE CITY FISCAL TO
REPRESENT THE STATE AND INVESTIGATE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 101 OF THE
NEW CIVIL CODE, IF COLLUSION EXISTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
BROWN IS NOW APPEALING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION SHOULD BE
GRANTED?
HELD:
IN THE CASE AT BAR, THE SC SAID THAT THE PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION
SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED IT BEING EVIDENT THAT BROWN IS ALSO GUILTY OF
CO-HABITING WITH A WOMAN OTHER THAN HIS WIFE.
ARTICLE 100 OF THE CIVIL CODE PROVIDES THAT:“THE LEGAL SEPARATION MAY
BE CLAIMED ONLY BY THE INNOCENT SPOUSE, PROVIDED THERE HAS BEEN NO
CONDONATION OF OR CONSENT TO THE ADULTERY OR CONCUBINAGE.
WHERE BOTH SPOUSES ARE OFFENDERS, A LEGAL SEPARATION CANNOT BE
CLAIMED BY EITHER OF THEM. COLLUSION BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO OBTAIN
LEGAL SEPARATION SHALL CAUSE THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION.”
CONCEPCION ALANIS FILED FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN HER ERSTWHILE
HUSBAND ENRICO L. PACETE AND ONE CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION, AS WELL AS FOR LEGAL SEPARATION
AND ACCOUNTING AND SEPARATION OF PROPERTY. SHE AVERRED THAT SHE WAS MARRIED TO PACETE ON
30 APRIL 1938 AND THEY HAD A CHILD NAMED CONSUELO. SHE LEARNED THAT PACETE SUBSEQUENTLY
CONTRACTED A SECOND MARRIAGE WITH CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION. SHE AND PACETE ACQUIRED VAST
PROPERTY THAT HE FRAUDULENTLY PLACED THE SEVERAL PIECES OF PROPERTY EITHER IN HIS NAME AND
CLARITA OR IN THE NAMES OF HIS CHILDREN WITH CLARITA AND OTHER “DUMMIES;”
AFTER HAVING BEEN SUMMONED, THE DEFENDANTS REPEATEDLY ASKED THE COURT FOR EXTENSION OF
FILING FOR AN ANSWER WHICH EVENTUALLY RESULTED TO BEING DECLARED IN DEFAULT. FIVE MONTHS
AFTER THE PETITION WAS FILED THE COURT GRANTED THE ISSUANCE OF A DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION
AND DECLARED THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AS CONJUGAL PROPERTIES OF ALANIS AND PACETE WHICH
WERE ORDERED FORFEITED IN FAVOR OF ALANIS. THE COURT ALSO NULLIFIED HIS MARRIAGE TO CLARITA.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DECIDING THE CASE
HELD:
RULE 18 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHICH PROVIDES THAT NO DEFAULTS IN ACTIONS FOR
ANNULMENTS OF MARRIAGE OR FOR LEGAL SEPARATION. IF THE DEFENDANT IN AN
ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE OR FOR LEGAL SEPARATION FAILS TO ANSWER,
THE COURT SHALL ORDER THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY TO INVESTIGATE WHETHER OR
NOT COLLUSION BETWEEN THE PARTIES EXISTS, AND IF THERE IS NO COLLUSION, TO
INTERVENE FOR THE STATE IN ORDER TO SEE TO IT THAT THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IS NOT
FABRICATED.
ARTICLE 103 OF THE CIVIL CODE, NOW ARTICLE 58 OF THE FAMILY CODE, FURTHER
MANDATES THAT AN ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION MUST “IN NO CASE BE TRIED
BEFORE SIX MONTHS SHALL HAVE ELAPSED SINCE THE FILING OF THE PETITION,”
OBVIOUSLY IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE PARTIES A “COOLING-OFF” PERIOD. IN THIS
INTERIM, THE COURT SHOULD TAKE STEPS TOWARD GETTING THE PARTIES TO RECONCILE.
DECISION
NOTE!
THE PREVAILING PARTY SHALL REPORT TO THE COURT
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS REQUIREMENT WITHIN
THIRTY DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THE COPY OF THE
DECREE.
NOTE!
THE FAMILY COURT MAY DIRECT THE DEDUCTION OF
THE PROVISIONAL SUPPORT FROM THE SALARY OF
THE PARENT.
CHILD CUSTODY
IN DETERMINING THE RIGHT PARTY OR PERSON TO
WHOM THE CUSTODY OF THE CHILD OF THE PARTIES
MAY BE AWARDED PENDING THE PETITION, THE COURT
SHALL CONSIDER THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
AND SHALL GIVE PARAMOUNT CONSIDERATION TO THE
MATERIAL AND MORAL WELFARE OF THE CHILD.
CHILD CUSTODY
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED:
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED:
ORDER OF PREFERENCE:
ORDER OF PREFERENCE:
FACTS:
MA. CARMINIA CALDERON FILED A COMPLAINT FOR THE
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF HER MARRIAGE TO JOSE
ANTONIO ROXAS ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY. IN THE COURSE OF THE TRIAL, THE COURT
ISSUED AN ORDER GRANTING CARMINIA’S APPLICATION
FOR SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE.
HER HUSBAND FILED A MOTION TO REDUCE SUPPORT
CITING, AMONG OTHER GROUNDS, THAT THE MONTHLY
ISSUE:
FACTS: