TORTS AND DAMAGES

Drilon vs CA, 270 SCRA 211

Aberca vs Ver GR 69865, Apr. 15, 1988
NEW CIVIL CODE
Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or
in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other
unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the
person who thereby suffers damage.

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages
for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require
the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be
found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.
 An acquittal on the ground that the guilt of
the defendant “has not satisfactorily established”
is equivalent to one on reasonable doubt, and
does not preclude or prevent a civil suit under
Art. 29 of NCC.
Reason for Art. 29
Criminal Liability is harder to prove than civil
liability because the former demands proof beyond
reasonable doubt; the other, mere preponderance of
evidence. Now then, if the criminal conviction is not
obtained because of reasonable doubt, there is still a
chance that the civil liability can be held to exist
because of preponderance of evidence.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
• It is settled principle that “when the action was filed in good
faith there should be no penalty on the right to litigate
• An action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must prove
the fact of prosecution, that the defendant was himself the
prosecutor or that he instigated its commencement; that it
finally terminated in his acquittal; that in bringing it the
prosecutor acted without probable cause and that he was
actuated with legal malice that is, by improper and sinister
motives.
Drilon vs CA, 270 SCRA 211
FACTS:
In a letter-complaint to Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, General Renato de Villa who was then Chief of Staff
of the AFP, requested DOJ to order the investigation of several individuals named therein, including private
respondent Adaza, for their alleged participation in the failed December 1989 coup d’etat. Assistant State
Prosecutor Trampe, the Team Leader, finding sufficient basis to continue the inquiry, issued a subpoena to the
individuals named in the letter-complaint, Adaza included, and assigned the case for preliminary investigation
to a panel of investigators composed of prosecutors. They held that there is probable cause to hold
respondents for trial for the crime of REBELLION WITH MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER. Their Resolution
became the basis for the filing of information.
Feeling aggrieved by the institution of proceedings against him, Adaza filed a complaint for damages before the
RTC of Quezon City. In his complaint, Adaza charged petitioners with engaging in a deliberate, wilful and
malicious experimentation by filing against him a charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated
murder when petitioners, according to Adaza, were fully aware of the non-existence of such crime in the
statute books. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss but it was denied.
Petitioners filed a petition for Rule 65 before the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent Judge in ruling that sufficient cause of action exists to warrant a full-blown hearing of the case filed
by Adaza. CA dismissed the petition.
Adaza: His claim before the trial court was merely a suit for damages and for violation of RA 3019, and not a
suit for malicious prosecution.
Hence this petition.
Drilon vs CA, 270 SCRA 211

ISSUE:
Whether the suit filed by Adaza was one for malicious prosecution.
Drilon vs CA, 270 SCRA 211
RULLING: YES
In Philippine jurisdiction, it has been defined as:
An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal
proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such
prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. The gist of the action is the putting of
legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury
The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution are found in the provisions of the
New Civil Code on Human Relations and on damages particularly Articles 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217
and 2219 (8). To constitute malicious prosecution, however, there must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the
defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case
to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. Thus, in order for a
malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove three (3) elements: (1) the fact of the
prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the action finally
terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause;
and (3) that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister
motive. All these requisites must concur.
Drilon vs CA, 270 SCRA 211
There is nothing in the records which shows, and the complaint does not
allege, that Criminal Case No. Q-90-11855, filed by the petitioners against
respondent Adaza for Rebellion with Murder and Frustrated Murder, has
been finally terminated and therein accused Adaza acquitted of the charge.
Not even Adaza himself, thru counsel, makes any positive asseveration on
this aspect that would establish his acquittal. Insofar as Criminal Case No. Q-
90-11855 is concerned, what appears clear from the records only is that
respondent has been discharged on a writ of habeas corpus and granted bail.
This is not, however, considered the termination of the action contemplated
under Philippine jurisdiction to warrant the institution of a malicious
prosecution suit against those responsible for the filing of the information
against him.
Drilon vs CA, 270 SCRA 211
Doctrine: Malicious prosecution is an action for damages brought by
one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal
proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause,
after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in
favor of the defendant therein. The gist of the action is the putting of
legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or
injury
NEW CIVIL CODE
Art. 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability
arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of
evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from
the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter.
Meaning of “ Independent Civil Action”
An independent civil action is one that is brought
distinctly and separately from criminal case allowed for
consideration of public policy, because the proof needed for
civil cases is LESS than that required for criminal cases; but
with the injunction in general that success in financially
recovering in one case should prevent the recovery of
damages in other. It should be noted that the bringing of the
independent civil action is permissive, not compulsory.
Scope of Art. 31
Art. 31 contemplates a case where the obligation
does not arise from a crime, but from other act- like a
contract or a legal duty.
Aberca vs Ver, GR 69865, Apr. 15, 1988
FACTS:

Task Force Makabansa (TFM) was ordered by General Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes
against Communist- Terrorist underground houses. TFM raided several houses, employing in most
cases defectively judicial search warrants, arrested people without warrant of arrest, denied
visitation rights, and interrogated them with the use of threats and tortures. A motion
to dismiss was filed by defendants, stating that 1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry about
their detention because the writ of habeas corpus was suspended; 2) defendants are immune from
liability for acts done in their official duties; 3) there was no cause of action. On Nov 8, 1983,
Judge Fortun granted the motion to dismiss, which prompted plaintiffs to file a MR on Nov 18, 1983.
He later inhibited himself and was replaced Judge Lising, who denied the MR for being filed out of
time. Another MR was filed, and was only modified to include Maj. Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba for
officers accountable in the said complaint.
Aberca vs Ver, GR 69865, Apr. 15, 1988
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not immunity from suit may be invoked?
2. Whether petitioners have the right to question the alleged violation
of their rights in the constitution?
3. Whether the superior officers who gave the orders are liable?
Aberca vs Ver, GR 69865, Apr. 15, 1988
RULING:
1. NO, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides a sanction to rights and freedom enshrined in the constitution.
These rights cannot be violated just because of an order given by a superior. The rule of law must prevail, or
else liberty will perish. Even though they just followed the orders of their superior, these do not authorize them
to disregard the rights of the petitioners, and therefore cannot be considered “acts done in their official
duties”. Article 32 speaks of any public officer or private individual, and violation of these constitutional rights
does not exempt them from responsibility.

2. YES, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not prevent petitioners from claiming damages for
the illegal arrest and detention in violation of their constitutional rights by seeking judicial authority. What the
writ suspends is merely the right of an individual to seek release from detention as a speedy means of
obtaining liberty. It cannot suspend their rights and cause of action for injuries suffered due to violation of their
rights.

3. YES, Article 32 speaks of the liabilities of people who are in direct violation of the rights stated, as well as
people who are indirectly responsible for such acts. In the case at hand, the superior officers are the ones who
gave the order, and can be considered indirectly responsible. It was also stated in the complaint who were the
ones who directly and indirectly participated in those acts. By filing a motion to dismiss, they admitted all the
facts stated in the complaint.
THANK YOU
TORTS & DAMAGES

MORAL DAMAGES : DEFAMATION

BRILLANTE vs COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R.118757 & 121571, Oct. 19, 2004
DEL MUNDO vs COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.104576, Jan. 20, 1995
BRILLANTE vs COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
G.R.118757 & 121571, Oct. 19, 2004
FACTS:
• On January 7, 1988, Brillante, then a candidate for the position of Councilor in Makati, held a press conference at the
Makati Sports Club which was attended by some 50 journalists. In the course of the press conference, Brillante accused
Binay of plotting the assassination of Syjuco. He further accused Binay of terrorism, intimidation and harassment of the
Makati electorate. Brillante also circulated among the journalists copies of an open letter to President Aquino which
discussed in detail his charges against Binay.
• Several journalists who attended the press conference wrote news articles about the same.
• As a result of the publication of the open letter, Binay filed with the Makati fiscal’s office four complaints for libel against
Brillante, as the author of the letter; Gonong, Buan and Camino for writing and publishing the news article on Brillante’s
accusations against him in the People’s Journal; Hernandez, Villanueva and Manuel for writing and publishing a similar
news article in the News Today; and for publishing the open letter, Buan and Camino of the People’s Journal;9 and Arcadio
A. Sison (Sison) as President of A. Sison and Associates, an advertising agency.10
• Francisco Baloloy (Baloloy), who was identified in the open letter as among the persons who attended the meeting
organized by Binay and Prudente to plan the assassination of Syjuco, likewise filed a criminal complaint for libel against
Brillante, Domingo Quimlat (Quimlat), Publisher and Editor-in-Chief of Balita, and Sison as President of A. Sison and
Associates.11
• Subsequently, five Informations for libel against Brillante were filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.
• The trial court found Brillante guilty of four counts of libel, which decision the CA affirmed.
BRILLANTE vs COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
G.R.118757 & 121571, Oct. 19, 2004
ISSUE: WON Brillante is guilty of the crime of Libel.
RULING: YES
Libel is defined under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime,
or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one
who is dead."
To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or
condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d)
existence of malice.
There could be no dispute as to the existence of the first three elements of libel in the cases at bar.
An allegation made by a person against another is considered defamatory if it ascribes to the latter the
commission of a crime; the possession of a vice or defect, whether real or imaginary; or any act, omission,
condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends
to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Brillante’s statements during the January 7, 1988 press conference
and in the open letter explicitly referred to reprehensible acts allegedly committed by Binay, Prudente and
their associates, such as the use of goons to threaten Binay’s opponents in the election and the plotting of
Syjuco’s assassination.
BRILLANTE vs COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
G.R.118757 & 121571, Oct. 19, 2004
The element of publication was likewise established. There is publication if the defamatory material is
communicated to a third person, i.e., a person other than the person to whom the defamatory statement
refers. In the cases at bar, it was proven that Brillante uttered defamatory statements during the press
conference attended by some fifty journalists and caused the open letter to be published in several
newspapers, namely, News Today, People’s Journal, Balita, Malaya and Philippine Daily Inquirer.
Further, Brillante himself admitted that he named Binay, Prudente and their associates as the persons who
participated in the planning of the election-related terrorism and the assassination of Syjuco not only in his
open letter but also during the press conference.
Thus, the determination of Brillante’s culpability for libel hinges on the question of whether his statements
were made with malice.
Malice is a term used to indicate the fact that the offender is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks
not in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed; it implies an intention to
do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous remarks made
such remarks with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code states, as a general rule, that every defamatory imputation is presumed
to be malicious, even if true, if no good intention and justifiable motive is shown.
As an exception to the rule, the presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation
qualifies as privileged communication.
BRILLANTE vs COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
G.R.118757 & 121571, Oct. 19, 2004
Doctrine of the Case

“Every man has a right to build, keep and be favored with a

good name. This right is protected by law with the recognition
of slander and libel as actionable wrongs, whether as criminal
offenses or tortious conduct.”
DEL MUNDO vs COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R.104576, Jan. 20, 1995
DEL MUNDO vs COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R.104576, Jan. 20, 1995
DEL MUNDO vs COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R.104576, Jan. 20, 1995
ISSUE: WON Del Mundo is entitled for payment of Moral damages

RULING: NO
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such as
physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in
nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no
proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity
being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered
by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219 and
Article 2220 of the civil Code. A causal relation, in fine, must exist between the act or omission referred to in
the Code which underlies, or gives rise to, the case or proceeding, on the one hand, and the resulting injury, on
the other hand; i.e., the first must be the proximate cause and the latter the direct consequence thereof.
A judicious review of the records in the case at bench, indeed, fails to show that substantial legal basis was
shown to support the herein questioned collective award for the questioned damages. We are, therefore,
constrained to disregard them.
As regards the other issues raised by petitioner, the findings of the appellate court, involving such as they do
mainly factual matters that are not entirely bereft of substantial basis, must be respected and held binding on
this Court.
DEL MUNDO vs COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R.104576, Jan. 20, 1995

Doctrine of the Case

“A party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary

loss actually suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such damages, to
be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually
be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. We have emphasized t
hat these damages cannot be presumed, and courts, in making an awar
d must point out specific facts which could afford a basis for measuring
whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.”
General Rule: Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown.

Exceptions: Malice is not presumed and must therefore, be proved, under

the following exceptions under Art. 354:
“1. A private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or social duty:
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments
or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are
not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in
said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officer in the
exercise of their function.” The privileged character of these communications
is not absolute, but merely qualified since they could still be shown to be
malicious by proof of actual malice or malice in fact. The burden of proof in
this regard is on the plaintiff or the prosecution. (Del mundo vs CA)
Thank you