Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases

 Continuing Mandamus is a writ issued by a court in

an environmental case directing any agent or
instrumentality of the government or officer thereof
to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final
judgment which shall remain effective until
judgment is fully satisfied (Sec, 4[c, Rule I, Part I
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M
No. 09-6-8 SC).
 When any agency, instrumentality of the government or officer
thereof:
1. Unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins ad a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an
environmental law rule or regulation or a right
2. Unlawfully excludes another from the use of enjoyment of such
right.

 There must be no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the

ordinary course of law.
 Regional Trial Court
 Exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable
neglect or omission occurred.
 Court of Appeals
 Supreme Court

Nota bene: Environmental cases are exempted from payment of docket

fees.
 When the action is filed the court may:

 Issue such orders to expedite the proceedings, and

 Grant a Temporary Environmental Protection Order
 TEPO IS GRANTED WHEN there is an extreme urgency and
the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable
injury
If the petition is sufficient in form and substance the court
shall issue the writ and require the respondent to comment
on the petition within 10 days from receipt of a copy thereof.
 After the comment is filed of the time of filing has expired
the court his option to:

1. Hear the case. If it does so decide to conduct a hearing,

the rules requires that IT BE SUMMARY IN NATURE.
2. The court may, however, opt to merely require the
parties to SUBMIT MEMORANDA.
 If warranted the court shall
1. Grant the privilege of writ of continuing mandamus
2. Grant other reliefs as maybe warranted resulting from
the wrongful or illegal acts of the respondent.
 The court shall also require the respondent to submit
periodic reports detailing the progress and execution of the
judgment, and the court may, by itself or through a
commissioner or the appropriate government agency,
evaluate and monitor compliance.
 Upon full satisfaction of the judgment, the respondent shall
make a final return of the writ to the court which rendered
the judgment by the respondent. If the court finds that the
judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of
judgment shall be entered in the court docket.
 FACTS:

 On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus,
Cavite against several government agencies, among them the
petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the
Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-
99 of the RTC, the complaint alleged that the water quality of the
Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law,
specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine
Environment Code.
 Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main
that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD
1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution
incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart
from raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated
for cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the
cleaning of the Manila Bayis not a ministerial act which can
be compelled by mandamus.
 1. Whether or not Sections 17 and 20 of PD under the
headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up
Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they
limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents.
 2. Can petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up
and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?
 1. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the
government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the
containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific
pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to
act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as
water quality ―has deteriorated to a degree where its state will
adversely affect its best usage. This section, to stress, commands
concerned government agencies, when appropriate, ―to take such
measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality
standards. In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water
is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.
 For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched,
indicates that it is properly applicable to a specific situation in which the
pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left
behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies shall
undertake the cleanup work for the polluters‘ account. Petitioners‘
assertion, that they have to perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay
only when there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do not
undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off
mark. As earlier discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the Environment
Code comes into play and the specific duties of the agencies to clean up
come in even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners,
thus, cannot plausibly invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16
of RA 9275 on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on the
happening of a specific pollution incident. In this regard, what the CA said
with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid
as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: ―PD 1152 aims to introduce a
comprehensive program of environmental protection and management.
This is better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather
than limiting them to specific pollution incidents.
 Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the
execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial duty is one that
―requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
judgment. It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the
discretion of the person executing it. It is a ―simple,
definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved
to exist and imposed by law. Mandamus is available to
compel action, when refused, on matters involving
discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion one way or the other.
 FACTS:

 Claiming that tourist arrivals to Boracay would reach 1 million in

the future, respondent Province of Aklan planned to expand the
port facilities at Barangay Caticlan, Municipality of Malay. Thus, on
May 7, 2009, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Aklan Province
issued a resolution, authorizing Governor Carlito Marquez to file an
application with respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority
(PRA) to reclaim the 2.64 hectares of foreshore area in Caticlan. In
the same year, the Province deliberated on the possible expansion
from its original proposed reclamation area of 2.64 hectares to forty
(40) hectares in order to maximize the utilization of its resources.
 After PRA’s approval, on April 27, 2010, respondent Department of
Environment and Natural Resources-Environmental Management Bureau
Region VI issued to the Province Environmental Compliance Certificate for
Phase 1 of the Reclamation Project to the extent of 2.64 hectares to be done
along the Caticlan side beside the existing jetty port.

 MOA with PRA – “the land use development of the reclamation project shall
be for commercial, recreational and institutional and other applicable uses.”

 Province deemed it necessary to conduct series of public consultation

meetings.

 On the other hand, the Sangguniang Baranggay of Caticlan, the Sangguniang

Bayan of the Municipality of Malay and petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc.
(BFI), an organization composed of some 160 businessmen and residents in
Boracay, expressed their strong opposition to the reclamation project on
environmental, socio-economic and legal grounds.
 Despite the opposition, the Province merely noted
their objections and issued a notice to the
contractor on December 1, 2010 to commence with
the construction of the project. Thus, on June 1, 2011,
BFI filed with the Supreme Court the instant petition
for Environmental Protection Order/Issuance of the
Writ of Continuing Mandamus. Thereafter, the court
issued a Temporary Environmental Protection
Order (TEPO) and ordered the respondents to file
their respective comments to the petition.
 The petition was premised on the following grounds, among others:

 A) The Province failed to obtain the favorable endorsement of the LGU

concerned;
 B) The Province failed to conduct the required consultation procedures
as required by the Local Government Code.

 The Province responded by claiming that its compliance with the

requirements of the DENR-EMB RVI and PRA that led to the approval of
the reclamation project by the said government agencies, as well as
the recent enactments of the Barangay Council of Caticlan and the
Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay favorably endorsing
the said project, had “categorically addressed all the issues” raised by
the BFI in its petition. It also considered the petition to be premature
for lack of cause of action due to the failure of the BFI to fully exhaust
the available administrative remedies even before seeking judicial
relief.
 Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and
academic

 Whether or not the petition is premature because petitioner failed to exhaust

administrative remedies before filing this case

 Whether or not respondent Province failed to perform a full EIA as required by laws
and regulations based on the scope and classification of the project

 Whether or not respondent Province complied with all the requirements under the
pertinent laws and regulations

 Whether or not there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the
project
 NO. In Pagara v. Court of Appeals which summarized our earlier decisions
on the procedural requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
to wit:

The rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a

hard and fast rule. It is not applicable (1) where the question in
dispute is purely a legal one, or (2) where the controverted act is patently
illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction;
or (3) where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an
alter ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the
latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or (4) where there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, -
Gonzales vs. Hechanova, L-21897, October 22, 1963, 9 SCRA 230; Abaya
vs. Villegas, L-25641, December 17, 1966, 18 SCRA; Mitra vs. Subido, L-
21691, September 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 127.
 As petitioner correctly pointed out, the appeal provided for
under Section 6 of DENR DAO 2003-30 is only applicable, based
on the first sentence thereof, if the person or entity charged
with the duty to exhaust the administrative remedy of appeal to
the appropriate government agency has been a party or has
been made a party in the proceedings wherein the decision to
be appealed was rendered. It has been established by the
facts that petitioner was never made a party to the
proceedings before respondent DENR-EMB RVI. Petitioner
was only informed that the project had already been approved
after the ECC was already granted. Not being a party to the said
proceedings, it does not appear that petitioner was officially
furnished a copy of the decision, from which the 15-day period
to appeal should be reckoned, and which would warrant the
application of Section 6, Article II of DENR DAO 2003-30.
 The new Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, provides
a relief for petitioner under the writ of continuing mandamus, which is a special
civil action that may be availed of “to compel the performance of an act specifically
enjoined by law” and which provides for the issuance of a TEPO “as an auxiliary
remedy prior to the issuance of the writ itself.” The Rationale of the said Rules
explains the writ in this wise:

Environmental law highlights the shift in the focal-point from the initiation of
regulation by Congress to the implementation of regulatory programs by the
appropriate government agencies.

Thus, a government agency’s inaction, if any, has serious implications on the

future of environmental law enforcement. Private individuals, to the extent
that they seek to change the scope of the regulatory process, will have to rely
on such agencies to take the initial incentives, which may require a judicial
component. Accordingly, questions regarding the propriety of an agency’s
action or inaction will need to be analyzed.

This point is emphasized in the availability of the remedy of the writ

of mandamus, which allows for the enforcement of the conduct of the tasks to which
the writ pertains: the performance of a legal duty.
 The writ of continuing mandamus “permits the court to retain
jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful
implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s decision”
and, in order to do this, “the court may compel the submission of
compliance reports from the respondent government agencies as
well as avail of other means to monitor compliance with its decision.”

According to petitioner, respondent Province acted pursuant to a

MOA with respondent PRA that was conditioned upon, among others,
a properly-secured ECC from respondent DENR-EMB RVI. For this
reason, petitioner seeks to compel respondent Province to comply
with certain environmental laws, rules, and procedures that it claims
were either circumvented or ignored. Hence, we find that the petition
was appropriately filed with this Court under Rule 8, Section 1, A.M.
No. 09-6-8-SC.
 Petitioner had three options where to file this case under
the rule: the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction
over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission
occurred, the Court of Appeals, or this Court.

Petitioner had no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy

in the ordinary course of law to determine the questions of
unique national and local importance raised here that
pertain to laws and rules for environmental protection, thus
it was justified in coming to this Court.