Well Integrity within Norsk Hydro

INTERNAL
Objective

 Develop a consistent procedure for

management of annular leaks
 Risk based approach
 Routines for early detection and how to
handle the leaks
 Procedure made in collaboration between
NH, Exprosoft and Kåre Kopren(PTG)

 Key items in the procedure:

 Include detection, diagnosis, assessment and responses to well annular leaks
 No increase in installation risk (QRA modelling)
 Specific risk reduction measures
 Variations in risk level (subsea vs. topside, gas vs. oil, etc.)
 Applicable to all well types operated by Norsk Hydro
 In compliance with regulations and standards

INTERNAL • Date: 2005-01-13 • Page: 2

Principles
SIT
SIV

 Overview of well data and AWV XOV

ACV PMV P
SCV

PWV PCV

limitations shall follow the well WOCS

BMV

throughout the lifetime MBSAVV AMV

P
Flow - line connector

Methanol

 All leaks shall trigger an internal Scale Inhibitor

deviation (synergi) – verification in

Production

B&B To The Cutting's Disposal System

 Well data shall be updated when a

leak is detected
DHSV
 Checkout of integrity of next Screen with ECP and
casing Pressure gauge radioactive tracer

 Test program to identify leak Retrievable

production
Clean out valve
above or below BSV, surface packer
pressure after stabilizing of Gas cap gas lift screen and gas lift valve

pressure, leak rate

 Update of well risk level, based on Side mounted guns

Wellmaster database
 Update of operational procedures
Retrievabl
e isolation
packer
Sliding sleeve Flow control valves

INTERNAL • Date: 2005-01-13 • Page: 3

Status procedure for management of well
annular leaks

 Procedure is finished

Remains:
 Implementation

 Training of offshore personnel to detect leakages + diagnostic work

 A pilot course has been held in april.
 Standard course package will be developed based on the experience
from the pilot course
 All personell involved in detection and diagnostic work offshore and
onshore will be invited

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Historical Norsk Hydro downhole annulus well
integrity (WI) issues by field
Figure shows “Cumulative #Annulus WI Issues / Cumulative #Completions” by Year
Field 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
BORG 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
BRAGE 0.0 % 0.0 % 7.4 % 9.7 % 17.6 % 60.4 % 57.9 % 54.7 % 60.0 % 59.1 %
FRAM VEST 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
GRANE 0.0 % 0.0 % 12.5 %
NJORD 0.0 % 0.0 % 16.7 % 12.5 % 35.3 % 44.4 % 47.4 % 47.4 %
OSEBERG B 2.9 % 2.6 % 2.3 % 2.0 % 1.9 % 1.8 % 6.6 % 8.1 % 7.5 % 7.4 %
OSEBERG C 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 3.0 % 6.1 % 6.1 % 5.4 % 5.0 % 5.0 % 5.0 %
OSEBERG SØR 0.0 % 0.0 % 9.1 % 14.3 % 11.1 % 10.5 %
OSEBERG VEST 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
OSEBERG ØST 75.0 % 27.3 % 20.0 % 21.1 % 25.0 % 25.0 %
SNORRE 0.0 % 0.0 % 1.6 % 1.5 % 2.6 % 3.5 % 7.5 % 8.1 % 8.1 % 8.1 %
SNORRE B 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
TOGP 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
TORDIS 0.0 % 14.3 % 14.3 % 12.5 % 11.1 % 11.1 % 10.0 % 10.0 % 10.0 % 10.0 %
TWOP 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 4.2 % 8.0 % 7.7 % 39.3 % 39.3 % 37.9 %
VARG 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
VIGDIS 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
VISUND 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 10.0 % 10.0 % 10.0 %
Total 0.7 % 1.1 % 2.5 % 3.0 % 6.3 % 12.4 % 14.6 % 16.7 % 16.9 % 17.0 %

20.0 %
15.0 %
10.0 %
5.0 %
0.0 %
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

 Note: Based on Norsk Hydro WellMaster phase V data (Snorre and Visund currently
Statoil), last major database update April 2004
INTERNAL • Date: 2005-01-13 • Page: 5
 Task Force : Well leaks - Root Cause Analysis

Inge M. Carlsen
Sintef

J. Abdollahi
Sintef

Tommy Langnes Geir Ove Haugen Hilde B. Haga Tore R Andersen Thorvald Jakbsen
OCTG Drill pipe Completion design Material technology Prod. technology

Best practice Wear testing Diagnosis Wear testing Diagnosis

ISO test Packer design Material selection Course
Wear testing Safety factors Procedures
Dope-free connection Best practice
Course
Database
Barrier test procedure

Reference group : Bjørn Engedal (leader), Nils Romslo, Geir Slora, Eli Tenold, Bjarne Syrstad, Torbjørn Øvrebø, Siamos Anastasios

INTERNAL • Date: 2005-01-13 • Page: 6

Ongoing work: Well Integrity Management
System (WIMS)

 New database to be developed until 2007

 JIP managed by Exprosoft with Hydro, Statoil and Total as
participants.
 A development based on the procedure for management of well
annular leaks

 Purpose:
 A uniform and structured approach for handling of well integrity during
the lifetime of a well.
 All information available through one system
 A clear indication of the well barrier status at all times

INTERNAL • Date: 2005-01-13 • Page: 7

Well Integrity Management System (WIMS)

 WellMaster software used as a basis – additional applications to be

developed
 Important functionalities:
 Visualising the well barriers and well barrier elements (WBE) through
use of barrier diagrams and barrier sketches
 Identify the functions and and requirements that the well and each
WBE should fulfil
 Present the status/condition of each WBE (leak, erosion, etc.)
 Keep record of performed tests and results of tests
 Keep record of diagnosis results when deviations are identified
 Keep record of changes in well integrity and resulting corrective actions
 Overview of well risk status
 Structured / uniform approach to analyze and evaluate risk

INTERNAL • Date: 2005-01-13 • Page: 8

Risk based procedure for management of well
annular leaks

INTERNAL
Rationale for risk based approach

 Reflect variations in actual well risk level

 Subsea, topside
 Gas, oil, water
 Etc.

 In principle no tubing and casing leaks accepted by the PSA

 ”to be on the safe side” – leak(s) will affect the operational risk in
a negative way
However;
 Regulations and NORSOK D-010 open for risk assessment
 Departure normally granted by submission of supporting risk
analysis results
 Must incorporate principle of ”risk reduction” – risk should not be
significantly higher as a result of the deviation

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Procedure outline Well normal
operation

 Procedure split in three main tasks Annulus

(guidelines): pressure Compare
limits
1. Detection and diagnosis
2. Evaluation
3. Implementation and follow-up
Diagnosis

 Main results
 Extensive diagnosis part Acceptance Risk and response
criteria evaluation
 Risk assessment method
– Specific risk acceptance criteria
– Extensive use of quantitative risk Implementation and
analysis (fault tree analysis with follow-up
WellMaster data as input)
– Specific risk reduction measures
 Documentation of process

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Task 1; Detection and diagnosis
 Collection of basic well data (preparatory)
 Well schematic, P- tests/FIT/LOT, annulus
capabilities (as well barrier), annular volumes,
fluid densities, etc. Well normal
 When is it needed to assess if there is a leak? Well design operation
Monitoring
 Establish Max operational A-annulus pressure
(MOASP) = default bleed off alarm limit
 Establish pressure domain for initiation of Annulus
diagnosis activities pressure Compare
limits
 “External factors” diagnosis
 Abnormal pressure readings may not be
attributed to downhole failure/degradation Diagnosis
 “Internal factors” diagnosis”
 The potential leak rate to the wellhead
surroundings (if blowout through leak path)
 Amount of hydrocarbon influx to the annulus Leak location
 Leak location (depth and relative to well barriers) (P vs. TVD)
and leak rate
 Leak failure cause (deterioration/escalation
potential) estimation tools
provided
 Leak directions

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Task 2; Risk assessment and response
evaluation

 Risk assessment stepwise covers several risk factors

 A risk status code (RSC) is assigned to the well in Acceptance Risk and response
each step criteria evaluation
 Most severe RSC determines the RSC for the well
 The well RSC determines a set of actions/risk reducing Implementation and
measures to be implemented - Each risk factor have specific
risk factor acceptance criteria follow-up

 Risk factor acceptance criteria basis:

 No risk increase on installation level (as modelled in QRA)
 Quantitative analysis performed for a representative ”library” of well types in
order to measure relative increase in leakage risk and effect of risk reducing
measures
 Rule based/deterministic acceptance criteria (based on industry practice)
– Minimum two well barriers
– No leak to surroundings
– Allowable hydrocarbon (HC) storage in annuli
– Risk of escalation/further detoriation
– Change in well kill opportunity

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Task 2; Well risk status code overview

RSC Well RSC description Well risk acceptance

A No downhole leak Acceptable

B Degraded well. Acceptable.

Small increase in risk (none or only related Risk can be controlled
to HC in annuli)

C Degraded well. Acceptable only if risk factors can

High risk increase (e.g. PA above MOASP be controlled (e.g, reduce PA to
during normal operation) below MOASP during normal
operation)

D Dual barrier philosophy not fulfilled / well Not acceptable

barriers severely degraded / leak to
surroundings

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RA step 1; Risk factor = Look at well barrier
leak rate consequences

Criteria RSC
Well barrier leak rate lower than acceptance criterion (not B
considered a failed barrier)

Leak (any size) to a volume not enveloped by qualified well D

barriers

 Leak rate acceptance criteria based on leak sizes reflected in

 QRA’s on installation level
 API 14B leak rate criteria (SCSSV)
 Norsk Hydro risk matrix
 Different leak rate acceptance criteria for
 Non-natural flowing or Non-hydrocarbon flowing wells vs.
Hydrocarbon flowing wells

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RA step 2; Risk factor = Relative change in
blowout probability – example

Well barrier leak rates greater than acceptance

criterion (RAC Item no. 5)
Interm. T/A leak T/A leak T/A leak above
Csg. below above A/B leak SCSSV AND
Barrier SCSSV SCSSV A/B leak
Conventional No D C D D
platform well
Yes D C C C

 Risk status codes based on calculated blowout probability and risk

reduction potential assigned to
 Surface and subsea wells
 Conventional wells (applies to production and injection wells) and gas lift
wells
 Informative calculations performed for multipurpose well, and gas lift well
alternatives with combinations of deep set SCSSV, no SCASSV, annulus tail
pipe SCSSV.

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RA step 3; Risk factor = Look at well release
risk (HC storage - single failure scenario)

Criteria RSC
The hydrocarbon storage mass in the well annuli is, or may C
become, greater than the acceptance criterion
OR
Well annuli fluids are highly toxic (platform well)
Otherwise B

 Hydrocarbon storage criteria relates to:

 For surface wells the quantity of hydrocarbons stored in the well
annuli should not be greater than the typical mass of lift gas in the A-
annulus above the SCASSV in a gas lift well OR alternatively the
max recommended volume stored in other vessels on surface
 For subsea wells the release quantity criterion is based on distance
to permanent surface installations (rising gas plume) and
environmental acceptance criteria

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RA step 4; Risk factor = Look at leakage cause
(well functionality- degradation)

Criteria RSC
Material corrosion or erosion is the (most likely) leak cause. D
There is, or is a potential for, exposure of equipment to C
H2S/CO2 levels that are outside design/NACE specifications.
OR
There is crossflow (unintended flow) in the well
Otherwise B

 Further escalation that cannot be controlled should not be

accepted
 If further escalation/degradation of the well can be controlled by
given risk reducing measures this can be accepted

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RA step 5; Risk factor = Look at mechanical/
pressure loads (well functionality – loads/single
failure scenario)

Criteria RSC
The maximum potential A-annulus pressure - PA (MTP / A- C
annulus injection pressure) is greater than MOASP
OR
Mechanical / Pressure loads causing burst/fracture/collapse is
the (likely) leak cause
Otherwise B

 Maximum Operational A-annulus Surface Pressure (MOASP) is the

limiting wellhead pressure that the A-annulus is deemed safe to be
operated under for an extended period of time (years), e.g., for well
production.
– MOASP = Max known P-integrity of next outer functional annulus (from P-
tests, LOT, FIT, recognised field formation fracture gradient data)
 Checklist for MTP vs. MOASP provided
 If A-annulus pressure can be controlled <= MOASP this can be accepted

INTERNAL • Date: 2005-01-13 • Page: 19

RA step 6; Risk factor = Look at well
kill/recoverability (well functionality – well kill
/single failure scenario)

Criteria RSC
An additional single well barrier leak situation may affect the C
ability to efficiently kill the well with mud.
Otherwise B

 If well kill procedures/preparations can be revised and be equally

effective as the base case (well with no failure) this can be
accepted

INTERNAL • Date: 2005-01-13 • Page: 20

Response actions

 The resulting Well RSC determines a set of mandatory (M) and alternative
(S) remedial actions/risk reducing measures to be implemented
 Remedial actions for each RSC based on
 Norsk Hydro and industry best practice
 The risk assessment (step 1 through 6)

Response (illustrative example only) A B C D

RSC Revise alarm settings M M M M
A
Increased monitoring M M
B
Increased well barrier testing M S
C
D Make plans for well kill M M
Immediate intervention to restore two
M
well barrier envelopes

INTERNAL • Date: 2005-01-13 • Page: 21

Summary

 Applicable to the well types Norsk Hydro operates

 In compliance with regulations and standards for the upstream
sector of the oil industry
 Guidelines and worksheets included for detection, diagnosis, and
risk assessment and response to well barrier leaks
 Support tools and formulas for diagnosis included
 Modular system. Easy to update risk factor acceptance criteria,
include additional risk factors, revise risk reduction measures, etc.
 Documentation of well “history”
 ”Library” of relative well leak probabilities - The well leak probability
for a wide variety of well types and leak locations are modelled for
future reference

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 Questions?

INTERNAL • Date: 2005-01-13 • Page: 23