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 September
2000
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Holyrood Report, Fraser Chapter 8 page 97

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Scottish Parliament Project Organisation Structure
2000

Multi Headed Client, Fraser Report Chapter 12 page

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Other Parliamentary buildings

http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/res
 STANDARD PROJECT MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
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TOOL STANDARD USEAGE USEAGE ON SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT BUILDING

Launch Meeting Understand and agree scope and responsibilities Project Manager was not in position at the first meeting

Action Plan/Work Identify activities, durations, milestones, This was in place, but not updated, hence useless
Breakdown Schedule personnel

Activity Orientated BudgetAllow cost estimates based on historic data Not adopted.
gathered on similar projects.

Risk Management Identify sources of risk, analyse them and agree a Risks were identified and analysed but no action taken.
(budgetary) response

Project Evaluation and Calculate activity slack/float times and rank in This does not appear to have been carried out and certainly
Review Techniques order – pessimistic, most likely, optimistic not adhered to.

Gantt Chart Sequencing of operations Bovis utilised their own methods, which were criticised by
team members as being difficult to understand.

Goldratt’s Critical Chain To focus on common project issues of unrealistic Trade offs should have been made between design – cost or
due dates, too many changes, lack of resources design – time, but this did not occur.
and data, unrealistic budget.

Plan – Monitor – Control Specific measurement of performance cost and These reports were compiled, but the findings “filtered out”
Cycle time to allow these items to be controlled. Data by the civil service to give an unrealistic performance report.
should have been collected and regular reports
instigated.

(adapted from Meredith et al, 2004 and Fraser, 2004)

The Scottish Parliament TOOL STANDARD USEAGE USEAGE ON SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT BUILDING

Earned Value Analysis Measurement of % budget spent against Not adopted in this case
completion – not a good indicator of
completion.

Project Control Should regulate results by altering activities Ineffective as the architect ignored the project manager’s
accordingly by correcting errors, instructions and requests.
considering impact on creativity and
innovation.

Go/No Go System Agreed standard must be met before permission is Not adopted – instead post-control seems to have been in
given to continue with another item of place.
work

Change Control Requested changes should be reviewed, impact on Not followed – architect and client simply agreed changes
other areas evaluated, communicated and without informing project manager or other team
agreed prior to action. members

Project Evaluation Appraise progress vs goals and objectives to Conducted but ignored.
improve performance

Project Termination Decide whether to continue with an under- Considered but never seriously evaluated.
performing project based on “sunk costs”
or to terminate and cut losses.

Final Report Measure project’s performance, admin, Not yet prepared.

organisation structure, project management
techniques.

(adapted from Meredith et al, 2004 and Fraser, 2004)

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This is a good site

http://
www.scottish.parliament.uk/vli
/ holyrood/inquiry/sp205-00.htm

Lists everything
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http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/pdf_res_notes/rn01-64.pdf

Mr Davidson drew a number of conclusions in his report

including the following;

“…it must be noted that in costing terms the Spencely

Report indicated a realistic price range expectation of £195
Million to £230Million. This was at a stage when some of the
design
difficulties were not fully designed through. The conclusion
from this is that the motion put to and passed by the Scottish
Parliament, known as the “Jackson Motion”, which was for a
fixed cash sum at current prices of £195 Million, was
somewhat optimistic and, in light of the complexity of the
tender and control process inherited from the previous
Scottish Office
Administration, naïve for such a complicated and indeed
unique design.”
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http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/committees/historic/audit/reports-00/aur00-06-03.htm

• 28 SEPTEMBER 2000.
• At the Audit Committee meeting on
Tuesday, 26 September, Muir Russell
agreed to provide notes on a number of
issues that were touched on during the
evidence taking session on the Auditor
General for Scotland's Report on the new
Scottish Parliament Building.
• I thought it would be helpful to put in
writing the areas on which the Committee
is expecting to receive clarification. These
are:
• Details of the person specification and
recruitment method adopted for the
replacement project manager
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RESPONSE

• Appointment of Project Manager

• As Dr Gibbons and I told the Committee, we were able to
minimise the gap following the resignation of the former
project manager because the project team was clear
about the type of person and experience needed for
project manager in the circumstances of this project and
a suitably experienced person was available to transfer
to this role. He was at that time project manager on the
interim Parliament project (the Mound), performing
successfully in that role, so he was a known quantity.
• His appointment to that post followed a decision to
establish separate project management for the interim
Parliament project, to ensure its successful delivery and
to enable the Holyrood project team to concentrate on
the main project itself. He was appointed after
discussion with a number of project management
companies on how best to secure the capability to move
the interim Parliament project forward quickly, and was
seconded from Project Management International Plc, of
which he was and remains an employee, with
reimbursement made to the company
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http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/notes/snpc-03357.pdf

• Lord Fraser highlighted in the Holyrood Inquiry

that:
• …the £40 million figure could never have been
a realistic estimate for anything other than
most basic of new Parliament buildings.
However, what can be stated clearly is that at
the time £40 million was included in the White
Paper, there was no clear understanding
whether that was a total cost including
professional fees or only a construction cost. It
was certainly not explained to the Scottish
public what the figure
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• The Auditor General Report of 2004 made the following conclusions:
• Spillage
• The main cause of the 20 months delay to the project since
September 2000 was the
• production of detailed design variations and the late supply of
information during the
• construction process.
• Cost Increases
• The main reasons for construction cost increases after 2000 were
design development
• and delay in the construction process. The design development was
entirely related to
• realising the detail of the building and aspects such as the quality of
finish and the
• palette of materials that were used, in accordance with the client’s
requirements.
• Project management and control
• Although it is likely that a high quality building is being delivered,
the time and cost
• objectives have not been met. The same quality could have been
achieved for less if
• the whole design and construction process had been better
executed.
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Summary of the Holyrood Inquiry’s
Conclusions and
Recommendations
• The Holyrood Inquiry was published in September
2004 by Lord Fraser.
• One of the principal conclusions found in the
Holyrood Inquiry was that “whenever there was a
conflict between quality and cost, quality was
preferred”.
• Lord Fraser further concluded that since Donald
Dewar was determined in building a new
parliament for Scotland as soon as possible, the
timetable dictated the high risk and “fast track”
procurement route.
• In regards to the procurement method adopted,
there was an inadequate level of evaluation or
understanding of the construction management
route; subsequently ministers were not informed of
all the risks involved.
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The Origins of the £40 million Figure

The evidence before the Inquiry is reasonably clear that

this figure originally came from Mr Wyllie. On 10 June 1997 he
minuted Mrs Doig with his costing of the option of onstructing
a new building on a greenfield site. Assuming a building with
an area of 15,000m² gross (11,250m² net – a net to gross ratio
25%) including 1,000m² for the Chamber, 3,000m² for
Committees and Ministers and 11,000m² for the remainder, he
put forward figures “in the order of £35-40 million”.His
minute made it clear that the figures included professional
fees, fit out, furniture and VAT although the position in this
respect contrasts with his written recognition in which he said
that his figures had “excluded site works, fit out, professional
fees and VAT”. In a further minute of the same date to Dr
Gibbons he elaborated on that range of figures as
follows:

Holyrood Report, Fraser, Chapter 3 Page 23

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http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/vli/holyrood/inquiry/sp205-11.htm#1

Was a ‘Pause’ Recommended?

• Within the Spencely Report there is no specific
recommendation for a two month pause in the Project to
enable a costed design to be achieved. However, in
evidence Mr Spencely explained that the eight week
pause was implicit within paragraph 5.4 of his Report:
• ‘It is clearly imperative that the Brief is frozen now and
that the Design Team proceeds immediately to produce
a Scheme Design including a cost plan to a Brief and a
budget approved by the client, so that approval may be
given to proceed with the Project by 8 June 2000.’
• There has been some uncertainty amongst witnesses as
to whether SPCB members were aware that Mr Spencely
was recommending a pause. During a discussion of the
Report’s findings at the SPCB meeting on 28 March, Dr
Gibbons advised that: "Detailed design and construction
would continue to run in parallel and there was no
reason for a pause until 8 June." There is also reference
to Mr Spencely recommending one option as: "the
cessation of all project activity for a period of three
months" in the SPCB’s report to Parliament,
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• In relation to the functions of his suggested
"Progressing Group" Mr Spencely’s
evidence was as follows:
• "I expected the Progressing Group to
operate as the Client — receiving reports
and recommendations "upwards" from the
Project Sponsor and acting on the latter —
to accept, modify or reject; and receiving
and sifting requests for variations to the
Brief "downwards" from MSPs and
Parliamentary staff; all in the light of the
Budget and the Programme; and to control
Budget expenditure and Programme by
making the appropriate management
decisions".
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http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/vli/holyrood/inquiry/sp205-10.htm#3

• In his oral evidence Dr Gibbons, when asked about

viability at handover, said:
• "From what we know now, it clearly was not."
• I am bound to conclude that:
• 1. The Brief was not up to date, and did not reflect the
changes made since November 1998.
• 2. The Brief did not anticipate the requirements of the
Parliament with the inevitable result that adherence to it
would have produced an unsuitable building.
• 3. The budgeted construction cost of £62 million was
flawed in that:
• a. there was inadequate accounting for risk, and the
stated budget bore no relationship to a cost plan;
b. there had been a failure to fully appreciate the
complexity of the design; and
c. account had not been taken of considerations of blast
and security.
• In short, the Project was not in a viable and healthy
condition when it was handed over to the SPCB on 1
June 1999.
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http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/vli/holyrood/inquiry/sp205-14.htm#12

Impact on Overall Cost and Programme

• 13.77 There is no doubt that by having to
focus on specific recurring themes in relation
to Queensberry House, the HPG and the
Project Team found it difficult to make
progress and that these issues were
discussed at the highest level by the First
Minister and Presiding Officer to try and find
a resolution. Crucially, however, it is to be
noted this did not cause any delay to the
overall programme, as Queensberry House
was never on the critical path. At the same
time the costs of Queensberry House have
been significantly greater than anticipated at
the outset.
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• http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/committees/audit/reports-04/grice-auditrep.htm

Adequacy of Cost Plan

• AGS’s comments in paragraphs 4.3 – 4.7 of the
report reflect a misunderstanding of the purpose
of the Cost Plan at Stage D. Such a plan is needed
to translate the Stage D design into individual
works packages and to estimate the value of the
works under each package. This provides a basis
for project management and the consultants to
compare the values of tenders based on the Stage
D design. The adequacy of the Cost Plan for this
purpose is reflected in the fact that, on average
and after allowing for inflation, tenders on which
contracts were based were within 5% of the Cost
Plan Estimate. In view of the uncertainties
identified in Exhibit 9, this could be regarded as a
reasonably satisfactory result.
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• Alasdair Morgan: I find it difficult to understand why the target date has
not only slipped three to four months since last you gave evidence on 8
October, but has become less certain rather than more certain.
• Sarah Davidson: The current target date of best completion at the end of
August, which means that everything will have happened to the best
possible outcome, has the same status as the previous date of the end of
April.
• Alasdair Morgan: Do you have a worst possible outcome date?
• Sarah Davidson: No.
• Alasdair Morgan: What kind of Gantt chart is used? Some kind of worst-
case scenario must have been considered.
• Robert Brown: The object of the exercise is to finish the thing as quickly
as possible—that is clearly what we are after and the progress group is
keeping on top of the contractors to try to ensure that that happens.
However, as we have already explained, the business of the glazing and
blast proofing could have had a dramatic effect on the progress of the
contract. Had last Friday's blast test failed, we would be coming to the
committee today to report a serious situation; there are no two ways
about that. Happily, the blast test was passed. Although we have to take
account of the fact that the test had to happen in the first place, that is
part of the risk review that is taking place at the moment. The major
concerns that we would have had if the blast test had failed have not
materialised. We are therefore able to come to the committee with good
news on that particular point because passing the test removes what was
probably the single biggest risk that remained on the contract.